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Factors in the Evolution of Canada's Foreign Policy on the Colonial Issue in the
United Nations: An Interdisciplinary Analysis

Tara Maharaj

A Thesis
in
The Humanities
Doctoral Program

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For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
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Abstract

**Factors in the Evolution of Canada's Foreign Policy in the United Nations on the
Colonial Issue: An Interdisciplinary Analysis**

Tara Maharaj, Ph.D.

Concordia University, 1998

This study seeks to explain which factors played a functional role in the formulation and evolution of Canada's foreign policy in the United Nations (UN) on the colonial issue from the mid-1940s to the early 1960s. The decolonisation of colonial empires was an intrinsic part of this major and contentious issue in the United Nations. Newly released classified documents of the Department of External Affairs and official manuscripts from the National Archives of Canada reveal to what extent Canada's decision makers seemed to be constrained by the international operational context and the policies of its allies – the USA, France and the United Kingdom. It is argued that Canada's 'colonial' position in the attempt by UN Members to set a new "standard of permissible action" in the colonial world and that Canada's preferences as to how the decolonisation of empires ought to proceed were in keeping with a Canadian mind set.

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Tara Maharaj
Concordia University
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Introduction

We intend to explain and portray Canada's foreign policy in the United Nations (UN) on the colonial issue. Consequently, our aim in this study is to work towards an understanding of the matrix of the colonial issue in the UN as Canada perceived the situation and defined it over time. An intrinsic part of this issue is the decolonisation of empires. This was a complex and revolutionary political event which was characterised by conflict. The United Nations is a world organisation which has made and continues to make its impact upon world affairs. Its General Assembly is a forum in which members display loyalties and antagonisms when crucial issues in world politics are addressed. We seek to establish, from primary sources, the "political realities" as officials saw them at the time. By establishing a framework of perceived interests and loyalties in which Canada's choices were circumscribed we are able to explain the reasons and ultimate aim of policy.

Officials in Ottawa perceived colonialism to be 'certainly' one of the major issues in the UN and they acknowledged that the achievement of self-determination and self-government by dependent territories to be "one of the chief purposes" of the UN.¹ The fundamental elements which made colonialism a major issue in the UN were the social, economic and political conditions which were collectively seen as the legacy of colonial rule by white over non-white peoples. Non-white ex-colonies argued that the legacy of colonial rule exemplified the denial of the principle of equality of persons and political freedom,

and the rejection by Colonial Powers of the premise that if white peoples have inherent and self-evident rights, then non-white peoples ought also to have these same rights. The international structure of dominance had reserved for Western states the authority to dispense rights and freedoms to non-white peoples. Was this arrangement inspired by racial considerations?

The demands by dependent peoples for social, economic and political equality and the refusal by Colonial Powers to recognise that these were 'fair' and 'just' claims, were factors which made colonialism not only a major issue in the UN but also a complex and contentious one. The core of this issue was the significance given to the idea of self-determination in the perception of the disputants. A racial matrix underlies the enduring theme of the struggle between the two contending forces, that is, the capability of subject peoples to rule themselves. This theme graduates over time to a debate over the actual goal of self-determination, whether it should be one of self-government or one of independence. There are significant differences between these two concepts: one was seen as a guise for the continuation of colonial rule while the other sought a termination of that rule.

It is necessary to establish what officials perceived to be the role, the limits, and the possibilities of Canada's action in the UN effort to achieve an operational consensus on the principle of self-determination, as it had previously been applied in the Western world, as it was described in the UN Charter and as it was further developed in the International Covenant of Human Rights. This

process set "the standard of permissible action" in the colonial world. This standard was based on an implicit recognition of the equality of peoples.

What was the motivation of the non-white ex-colonies to pursue such an enterprise and why the perceived need to establish an international standard of acceptable behaviour for nations? The answer lies in the ideology of race which was intrinsically important in the development of international institutions and relationships during this period. Race and culture were among the factors which had a functional role in establishing Canada's place among the disputants. In addition to this alignment function, 'race' was useful in signalling intentional behaviour. We are, therefore, concerned with the characteristics of racism rather than with problems of racial conflict. We want to know how Canadian officials felt, privately, about phenotypic distinctions and whether these distinctions had any importance for human relationships in the colonial context and in the formulation of policy.

One standard of measurement of the operational role of race in policy formulation is the concept of "differential relationships" which serve to maintain a hierarchical system in the organisation and allocation of social goods in any society. The existence of a hierarchical system is indicative of a special set of value judgements regarding racial types. How do we explain Canada's rather uncooperative behaviour in the UN attempt to universalise equal rights in the International Covenants of Human Rights? The significance attributed to phenotypic distinctions is categorically different from the value placed on cultural distinctions. A recognition of these categorical differences is crucial for

understanding the role of race consciousness as a functional variable in Canada's policy on the colonial issue.

The distinctly cultural clashes between the British and French settlers in early Canada were defined in racial terminology at the time. However, this white-white colonial experience had no relevance for the formulation of Canada's policy on colonial matters, although Canada's colonial relationship with Great Britain was purposely expounded in the UN as an ideal for the evolution of existing colonial arrangements in revolutionary times. The similarity of the 'colonial' situation of Canada's native peoples had important significance and functional relevance for Canada's position in the formative phase of UN involvement in colonial matters. Therefore, we have to address the mental and racial separation between the 'we' of white Canada and Canada's native peoples, in order to identify what the prevailing ideas and ideals of human equality and social justice were, in official policy and practice. This process is helpful in our attempt to explain human conduct because ideals are guidelines for discovering what private rules were being followed in the formulation of policy.

The selection of possibilities and the preoccupation with implementation of a decision are normal prerequisites of any action. Our concern with the formulation and conduct of Canadian policy is whether officials were predisposed to selectively interpret the Charter stipulations in regard to colonial peoples in a pro-colonial way. 'Interpretation' reveals the premise of action and sets the constraints which limit options in a range of alternatives. It is obvious that 'interpretation' alerts us to the degree of intensity and the probable methods of

implementation. In any decision making process, the conviction of ideals does have a functional role and this has to be seen in the context of the issue. The relevant relationships and the structural conditions - time and place - generate the dynamics of action. The cardinal question is, what goals did Canadian foreign policy seek to pursue in colonial matters in the UN?

The decision making elite is visualised as a reflection of a nation's historical and social development. These individuals are conceptualised as social phenomena rather than as personifications of the state. Such a conception has important ramifications for a perceptual analysis. The assumption here is that an anti-colonial or pro-colonial predisposition stems from a basic national historical tradition which endures over successive governments. Canada, even though a former colony, generally serves as a representative sample of Western European states. These states are defined by certain collective norms and are structured within a common political culture. They obviously displayed a pro-colonial predisposition. They shared a mutual obsession with security concerns in a Cold War international context; this necessarily requires an understanding of how fundamental strategic and alliance priorities affected Canada's foreign policy on the colonial issue.

A substantive Cold War rhetoric permeated the arguments and counter-arguments over the right of peoples to self-determination everywhere, not just those of the Western colonial empires but also those in the Communist sphere. Canada appeared not to distinguish between the Western type and the Communist type of domination. In principle, colonial empires were colonial

empires pure and simple. On the other hand, non-white ex-colonies made a critical distinction between the two types of dominations, one based on the superiority of white colonial rulers and the other being simply a great power domination over weak states. Non-white ex-colonies collectively displayed a predisposition, which verged on the extreme, to distrust the intentions of Colonial Powers. These colonies shared region-specific core concerns and vestiges of foreign political and economic domination. They were predominantly anti-colonialists. The two diametrically opposed patterns of behaviour of the Western members and the non-white ex-colonies emerged at the outset of the UN involvement in colonial matters. A national political ideological orientation is at the root of their behaviour.

We make the assumption that the genesis of a nation's political ideology, encompassing questions of sovereignty and racial equality, directly correlates to the types of perceptions and attitudes which become operative under certain conditions relevant to those questions. While political leaders may agree in principle to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principle of self-determination for all peoples, their pronouncements, voting behaviour and alignments on the colonial issue indicate that there was a substantial gulf between their speeches and their actual commitment to these principles.

The same principles were espoused in defence of colonial rule and in the denunciation of that same rule; this illustrates the paradox underlying the decolonisation process in the UN. By discovering how officials felt about colonial rule and the decolonisation of Western empires, and their involvement in the

resolution of this issue - the means and principles rendered and the ultimate goals pursued - we may be able to arrive at some indication of which factors played what role in the design of Canadian foreign policy.

It would be hazardous to assign causal roles to specific independent variables on any foreign policy in the UN. The complexity of the interactions of individual units that comprise the foreign policy motif of states, at any point in time, defies any exact replication of what actually happened. The most any study of foreign policy can aim for is some estimation of the probable influences of independent variables on the perception of the relevant decision makers on any specific issue. The presence of intervening variables complicates the task, even more, and any estimation of the relative potencies of either set of variables can at best be based on the assumption of the researcher rather than attributed to the indisputable presence of facts or evidence.

Since decision makers do not always document every single aspect of how policy was formulated, the most we can go on is what they point out to be the important facets of any problem, what they deem to be the operational limits of the solutions of that specific problem, and what the national goals were in terms of that specific issue. We assume that the public explanations of policy in the UN may not necessarily be the actual reasons for decisions. One also has to look at the operational context in search of the predominant variables on an issue over time. Therefore, adequate attention has to be given to the positions and interests of the key players who affected the international context of this issue.

Correspondences between Ottawa and the UN Delegation, the Canadian Ambassadors in the major capitals of the world and the relevant Governments were utilised in our attempt to redesign what officials perceived to be the "political realities" of the colonial issue and the decolonisation of empires. This is a desirable and defensive enterprise because our pioneering and historical journey in search of this evidence has not been undertaken before.² The initiative for this project was the Ph.D. in Humanities Program which could accommodate the interdisciplinary needs of such an enterprise: the clear and definable historical process in the UN which first authorised an unusual case of rule by one people over another and then dismantled the colonial arrangements which it had previously approved; the moral and ethical questions involved in the premise of colonial rule and, finally, Canadian foreign policy and international politics on this issue, in the UN context. Because the colonial issue was one of the most enduring major issues of the UN, no member could avoid taking a stand in this monumental process of change in the world.

Canada's foreign policy and role in this process has been relegated to one of the neglected areas of scholarly literature. Our attempt to study and document Canada's involvement, from the early and formative phase (1946) to the climax of this process (early 1960s), has been a long and difficult one. Since there had never been a request at the Archives in Ottawa to examine the Record Group of documents on colonial issues in the UN, these documents were never 'accessed'.³ Therefore, every single file on my request sheets had to be reviewed under the Access to Information Act. Each file contained hundreds of documents.

This meant that several thousands of documents had to be processed for my requests. My persistent search for despatches and letters under reference, which in my opinion seemed crucial to understanding process and which were eventually not traceable, were a troublesome burden on the already over-loaded officers at the Archives.

This study on Canada's diplomatic history and foreign policy on a political and morally contentious issue in the UN, is based only on documents which carried the following classifications: Top Secret, Secret, Restricted and Confidential. To the extent which the Access to Information Act permits, these documents reveal the secret aims and goals of British, French and American policy on all matters – political, economic and strategic – which were intrinsic to the colonial issue. The documents also show that British, French and American preferences and goals were constraints on Canada's options. Therefore, a significant part of this study deals with the policies of these three key players because they were perceived by Canada's decision makers to be an instrumental part of the context of colonial matters.

The anti-colonial position in the UN was also an obvious component of context. This antagonistic position has necessarily been accommodated in our analysis through the Canadian Delegation's definition of the situation and Ottawa's enquiries of the limits and possibilities of action in the UN during this, or that, period. The documents indicate the complexity of the subject matter and portray the concatenation of circumstances which arose as the demand for political freedom by subject peoples increased. It was the signal for an end to the

epoch of a unique kind of rule by one people over another. This comprehensive study, on this process, has enabled us to assess the influence of ideas and to identify the ideals in Canada's foreign policy in one significant area of human interaction.

¹ RG 25, Acc. No: 86-87/160 Vol: 79 file: 5475-GH-40 pt.1. M. Cadieux, UN Division. Draft Memorandum. To Department of External Affairs, December 11, 1956. Confidential in preparation for the visit by India's Prime Minister Nehru to Ottawa in December.

² Appendix VII, Research: Methodology and Problems.

³ Exception: Some files on the work of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

Chapter I: An Overview of the Thesis and Methodology

We make the assumption that the colonial issue was a fundamentally unique one; that it was a totally dissimilar one, say, from that of the disarmament issue in the UN. Therefore, the substantial concerns, the basic interests and the coalitions among members would be of an essentially different nature and composition. And, on this basis, we propose that the international operational environment was an influential variable. This is the concern of chapter III. According to Joseph Frankel,

The interplay among the units and the international order as a whole, is affected by the nature of each historical system...Hence an analysis of the nature of the system operating at a given time and place is essential for the understanding of international relations taking place within it.¹

The international system is influential on policy taken in the sense that it tends to provide certain constraints and limits choices of decision makers. According to Gordon Schloming, "each state's unique geographical and historical position creates another set of national interests that help to define its foreign policy agenda as do its resource base and power capabilities."² Certain variables are obviously not operational under all circumstances. For example, Canada's pervasive Cold War perceptions will play an important role in its support of allied security needs to ensure its own security. In this case, other variables may be less ascendant, as influences of behaviour, in this period.

Since the colonial issue was only one part of the total foreign policy concerns of any state, we will attempt to discover the "degree and nature of

involvement"³ of the relevant states in this issue. This depends, obviously, on how the substantive concerns of the decolonisation of empires did affect any state's objective national interests. Paul-Henri Spaak, commenting on Outlines for Belgium's foreign policy wrote that:

There must be a hierarchy in international obligations. The nations of a continent cannot reasonably be asked to consider with the same realism and sincerity of judgement affairs which directly concern them and events which are taking place thousands of kilometers away in regions where they have neither interests nor influence.⁴

We again make the assumption that not only do the principal actors but also middle powers or secondary units, like Canada, had perceived interests in decolonisation. Therefore, on this basis, each will "consider with the same realism," how best this issue should or better still, ought to be resolved, in light of its objective national interests. We have assigned an influential role to the national interest variable, in Canada's policy, over time. This factor variable combines with the environmental variable – geography, in our explanation of the objective national economic and security interests of Canada. They were the underlying dynamics of a direct Canadian stake in the international stability that had been mostly guaranteed through colonial rule over vast areas of the world.

In chapter IV we see how Canada's pro-colonial predisposition functioned in Canada's interpretation of the Charter stipulations in regard to Colonial Territories. It is evident that Canada's preference, on how the process to terminate alien rule over subject peoples ought to proceed, would manifest itself in a position which was diametrically opposed to that of the anti-colonials. Therefore, in chapter IV, we concentrate on Canada's decision making and policy

on how Chapters XI and XII of the UN Charter should function in guiding the process of decolonisation in terms of pace and goal.

What is it that made the decolonisation issue a predominantly unique one among the other issues at the UN? Paragraph 3 of the "Declaration to the Colonial Peoples" which was adopted at the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester, in 1945, shed some light on why this was actually so. It declared that:

The object of imperialist powers is to exploit. By granting the right to colonial peoples to govern themselves that object is defeated. Therefore, the struggle for political power by colonial and subject peoples is the first step towards, and the necessary prerequisite to, complete social, economic and political emancipation.⁵

We address this radical contention in chapter V. We submit that this was an obvious sequitur to the historical impertinence of the Colonial Powers. Michael Crowder has identified a colonial attitude which was based on "a feeling of moral and racial superiority." He acknowledged that: "the European Colonial Powers found nothing wrong in occupying and ruling lands belonging to African peoples at the same time as they were elevating almost into a natural law the right of national self-determination for the populations of Europe."⁶

In chapter V, we discuss the controversy over the meaning and the application of self-determination in the colonial context. The problem arose because of the insistence of certain members that the principle of self-determination should have a very different connotation, when it became operational, in a non-White context. Generally speaking, the concept of self-determination was applied in a European context after the First World War. It was

understood that certain groups had the right to establish themselves within a sovereign border, under democratic circumstances. The clamour of colonial peoples for that same privilege increased after the Second World War. However, they discovered that self-determination was not a self-evident right. Colonial Powers argued that the Charter gave them the authority to dispense that right as circumstances in colonial areas permitted. Our concern with self-determination is limited to the colonial context and, therefore, automatically excludes considerations of secession and other demands, by specific groups within sovereign borders, for the right to determine themselves.

The dynamics of the controversy in chapter V is instructive, for our study, in that we are able to identify what kinds of attitude and behaviour fall under the category of the word 'colonial.' Our working premise on self-determination is the apt description by Michla Pomerance: "When a claim to self-determination is put forward, present rule is presumably perceived by the claimant as 'colonial' or 'alien'."⁷ A further component of our premise is that colonial rule is incompatible with self-determination. Consequently, the right of self-determination necessarily played an instrumental role in the process to terminate colonial rule. Because of this, an emotionally charged atmosphere accompanied the process in chapter V. The anti-colonials did not see a need to elucidate on the meaning of self-determination which had already been applied in the White European context. The colonials argued, on the other hand, that this was a necessary first step.

It is obvious that those members who argued against the universal application of the right of self-determination, in the colonial context, were pre-disposed to a 'colonial' solution. We discuss the starting positions of the disputants and we demonstrate to what extent the anti-colonial faction was prepared to go in rejecting the colonial pretensions of the "white man's burden." In the anti-colonial perception, the process of decolonisation promised a comprehensive program of upheaval of all the established structural supports of a system of white dominance, at the international level. In our opinion, the process we analyse in chapter V was a catalyst in the UN activity that brought an end to colonial empires. Self-determination was categorised as a fundamental human right in international legal instruments and it became, for all intents and purposes, an inherent right.

A Mind Set: specific to Canada

A mind set is a construct which helps us to identify Canada's orientation towards the specific concerns that come under the topic of decolonisation. It is representative of what we believe to be Canada's philosophy about the way the world ought to be organised. It shows us what the world is, at home, and it is a useful tool in helping us to understand why Canada felt that the colonial world, which was designed in keeping with a vision of racially exclusive groupings, should be kept intact. In other words, this mind set is a reflection of Canada's view of the way things ought to be in the colonial world. We have

attempted to establish some linkage between Canada's internal situation of its native peoples and the colonial issue. This was seen to be plausible, only because of the initial and direct UN concern with dependent peoples inside sovereign borders and because of the obvious qualitative similarity of the situation of Canada's native peoples and colonial peoples.

Did officials perceive causal relationships between UN developments and Canada's internal colonial situation? Because of the specific operational and functional roles of race and culture, in the nature of the issue itself, we must attempt to identify whether a racial or colour consciousness exists in Canada's mental and ideological world. Since Canada's historical experience under British colonial rule lacked the racial context of a programmed separation, that was the basis of colonial rule in Asia and Africa, we had to look for another Canadian national context in which the factors of race and culture might have been operative. Under these circumstances, then, the racial and cultural factor variables are not subsumed under the "historical experience" factor variable, but are separate from it, in the Canadian context; this will be dealt with in chapter II. We are operating on the assumption that,

...inferences about political culture drawn from history leave unanswered the question of how much of a country's historical experience lives on in the memories, feelings and expectations of its population, in what form it can said to live on, which elements of the population are the bearers of which historical memories, and with what intensity.⁸

There is ample indication that the British-French contacts in Canada's colonial history were circumscribed by the kinds of interactions that we define in this study as culturally based. The qualitatively different interaction of a racial

kind was that between the white settlers – French and British – and the native peoples. Since we have assigned functional roles to race and culture, in the policy position of Canada on this issue, we had to establish the relevance of these factor variables in white-non-white relationships in the Canadian mind set. This we were able to do in an examination of Canada's early national life in two separate streams: its policy of separation of its native peoples and a selective immigration policy. Race and culture were not only primary but also influential factors in the way early Canadian statesmen chose to 'develop' Canada in their own racial and cultural image.⁹ We found that, in addition, this rough outline of policy was mainly sustained to the end of our study.

Robert Wendzel wrote that, "although most observers fail to give sufficient weight to the influence of the past, it is possible to give too much; the point also can be overstressed."¹⁰ We assign a partial, but causal role to "historical connection" in both the policy positions of white and non-white ex-colonies on the decolonisation issue. In Canada's case (or Australia or South Africa) the historical connection has a positive connotation. The common racial and cultural heritage which these white ex-colonies share with Britain also has a solidarity function role in their involvement with this issue. It is most probably secondary to the list of objective national interests that each government must pursue.

We will attempt to show, in chapter II, how the factors of race and culture are operational in Canada's national character and mind. Since Canadian officials do not make reference to racial distinctions in their speeches, in a direct

way, we can resort to our own interpretations; but these might not be reliable. Therefore, we had to find a way to discover whether certain qualitative distinctions, based on race and culture, find a fit in Canada's conception of its national role in this issue. The basic assumption in this chapter, about "which things" are fundamental to the construction of a mind set, was that Canada could adequately be placed in the Anglo-American tradition conceptualised here as a Western system of white dominance, in which "the lines of power have been coterminous with the lines of color."¹¹ We suggest that a pro-colonial predisposition which endured over successive changes of government in Canada stemmed from a basic national historical tradition.

The focus is, therefore, a systemic one. We assume that, in light of the nature of the issue under consideration, factors such as race and how it functions in an ideological framework of inferiority and exploitation; culture, in terms of ethnic distinctions (dress, food, language, religion); national historic development and objective national interests are relevant strands that "really matter" in understanding Canada's national role conception on this one issue. According to George Shepherd Jr.:

The advantage of the systems approach to the study of race is that its role in the social system and in cross-national political systems is readily verifiable. Because of its sociological antecedents, systems theory is interested in identifying the function and role of pattern variables....Therefore, if...the view of race as primarily a cleavage pattern is employed, race is seen as a variable interacting with other variables within the political system.¹²

In chapter II, race will be operationalised as "primarily a cleavage pattern." Our subject matter is the human factor, essentially man himself and the environment

that he has sought to create. This environment is taken as the qualitative human condition that has come to be accepted as the 'norm' in Canadian society. Our attempt, here, is to try to identify those characteristics specific to the Canadian environment - the norm. We will undertake an assessment of how this standard might have had relevant bearing on Canada's attitude towards the human condition that compromises the substantive concern in the decolonisation of empires at the UN.

It must be stated, at the outset, that we will make no attempt to weigh the relative strengths or influence of any specific variable with power equations, or to come up with power equations that explain the relative valence of any variable in our national character and mind construct. But we make the assumption that a combination of factor variables will serve to actually distinguish certain specific 'types' of behaviour of a state or a group of states, as actors, in the international politics of decolonisation. According to Shepherd, "in a white dominance system race is a major determinant but not an exclusive one."¹³ What follows, in chapter II, is an attempt to discover how the factor variables, race and culture, interact in certain processes that coalesce to produce a certain mind set. The task is to analyse, that is, "to unravel, to separate the strands, or to take to pieces,"¹⁴ official policy which were designed to create a Canada that was in keeping with a certain racial image. A profusion of secondary sources show that race played a primary role in consciousness and actual policy.

In fact, we know that a racial and cultural mental map was to guide the directions that Canada's national development should take. Two different

categories of actual policy will be the subject of consideration. Immigration policy indicate that a fundamental racial distinction was made in policy choices and cultural preferences. The other category is Canada's policy regarding native peoples. This policy was the basis of a racial stratification and a racial cleavage social system that was independent of any external impetus. In other words, it was a policy of choice. In this analysis, the emphasis is not on the individuals that made policy, but rather on the declared intention of avowed policies. Studies have pointed out the consistency with which they were pursued, over time, regardless of who was in power. Our concern, in chapter II, is how these "processes that maintain domination," that is control of whites over non-whites, were "built into the major social institutions,"¹⁵ during Canada's national development.

We maintain that despite the professed appeal of egalitarian principles, in the Western way of life, this system of white dominance is sustained by institutional racism. Alan Anderson and James Frideres define institutional racism "as those established laws and relationships which systematically reflect and produce differential treatment of various segments in society."¹⁶ We will utilise the concepts of race and culture in helping to identify the "various segments" of early Canadian society. Race, in terms of colour identification, serves to isolate the white European settlers (French and English) from the non-white native peoples. Exploitation, which is seen as the denial of equal access and equal standards of achievement, is an attribute of the relationship between

the two separate groups. According to Van de Berghe, "racism is ultimately reducible to a set of attitudes which are, of course, socially derived."¹⁷

An underlying characteristic of this white-non-white interaction is a negative attitude of whites toward non-whites. Culture is operative in the sense that it is believed that the native peoples cannot 'contribute' to the development of a Canadian norm. This segment is based on a racial identification and separation and is also characterised in terms of cultural capability. The word 'contribution' has a positive connotation that was reserved solely for the white segment of Canadian society. On the basis of treaties and the Indian Act of 1876, which are characterised for our purposes as "established laws," the white part of this white-non-white interaction had systematically set up an institutionalised racial cleavage within early Canadian society. And Shepherd tells us how comprehensive this can be:

Racial cleavage is a part of the total system. Studies of racism have revealed how frequently those who maintain they have no prejudice nevertheless participate in the decisions of institutions that discriminate....This was the important breakthrough of the Kerner Commission Report on Civil Disorder in America. It documented racial cleavage and white racism not as deviant but as an integral part of the political system.¹⁸

Race was operative in the internal interaction of the colonial period of the United States and Canadian Territories. However, it was between the white British or French settlers and the non-white native people. In other words, this racial cleavage and white racism were coterminous with the national colonial relationship of these two sets of white settlers with Great Britain, but was not an intrinsic part of what this study refers to as the British colonial relationship. Race

was thus operative primarily as a cleavage pattern in this internal construct of the Anglo-American system of white dominance over non-white peoples, and later, over those of African ancestry. In this context, the racial factor or phenotypic distinctions were operative and predominant in the Canadian and American historical national development.

On the other hand, British colonial administration had to take the French fact, in the Canadian colony, into consideration; but this interaction was of a cultural nature rather than a racial one. The British colonial policy of accommodation of the French language, customs and religion – all cultural aspects of friction – was of a totally different nature from that of the colonial policy of separation in Asia and Africa. The British-French interaction finds a fit in a cultural variable paradigm where the ethnic factor is predominant. That is, considerations of language, customs, and religion circumscribe this interaction between one racial type but different cultural or social types. In these two separate streams, then, the elements of race and culture are seen as intervening variables in the mosaic of Canada's national character and mind.

Evidence and Foreign Policy

As a middle power and ex-colony of Great Britain, Canada had an acute awareness of the international power relationships. Its foreign policy viewed the world as ideologically bipolar; this was manifested as a fundamentally antagonistic competition between the democratic and communist parts of the

world. This ideological interpretation emphasised a specific set of expectations in terms of prevailing international power distributions; in such a world of conflict and tension, Canadian security concerns were paramount. The object of our study is not foreign policy per se, but rather only one aspect of the foreign policy of Canada in the UN; that is, the position that was actually taken, on this one issue, in an international parliamentary atmosphere of conflicting interests and demands. Therefore, "if one asks how the international system makes decisions, he is asking more than national foreign policy making."¹⁹ In the following detailed characterisation by Sidney Bailey, we can get some idea what this "something more" actually entails; and most importantly, what our analysis of Canada's policy, on this issue, in this context, must recognise. According to Bailey,

Foreign policy partakes of the imperfections of all politics. Though a government may willingly affirm its support for certain general principles of international conduct, its foreign policy consists in large measure of improvised responses to external events which in some degree are thought to affect the national interest. These responses may be based in part on consistent standards, but perhaps the outstanding fact about them is that they are always compromises; compromises between conflicting principles, compromises between different political and social pressures within a country...compromises between the need to avoid injuring too severely the interests of hostile or potentially hostile States on the one hand and the need to placate friendly or potentially friendly States on the other. In this sense, foreign policies tend to be impure, questions are rarely decided on their intrinsic merits, and few public statements of foreign policy can be taken entirely at face value.²⁰

If we accept this interpretation then we ought not to attempt any analysis of state behaviour on any specific issue from the basis of the intrinsic merits of the issue itself. One of the principal designers of Canadian policy in the UN wanted the analyst of international behaviour to remember that states "must

react to circumstances and policies of countries over which it has little or no control." Moreover, he suggested that the analyst has to keep in mind that, "certain guiding principles, a way of looking at issues and a sense, based on experience, of what is likely to work, are required."²¹ And how did he "look at" the issue of decolonisation? These are his words:

The United Nations was increasingly preoccupied in the fifties with issues arising from the break-up of empires...Canada was faced thereby with a requirement to take positions on issues in which sorting out of principles, interests, loyalties and tactics was forbidding.... The targets of these were often Canada's allies and associates in NATO and the Commonwealth, among whom there was the common expectation of forbearance, at least in public statements.²²

The aim of chapter III is to establish the framework of perceived interests and loyalties in which Canada's choices were circumscribed.²³ In chapter IV, we intend to establish, from official perspectives, what the guiding principles were in the making of Canada's policy on this one issue. And, in chapters V to VIII, we explain the official views, arguments and tactics which were to be employed in the resolution of this issue. We present the voting results as indication of policy. Because we did not want to run the risk of either misinterpreting the facts or giving a retrospective view of the situation, we have quoted extensively from newly released official documents in which the matter was discussed and planned. This is not to say that the confidential documents of this Department tell the whole story. John Garnett explained the situation best, in these words:

A major problem faced by scholars investigating questions of fact is caused by the absence of reliable source material. Government business is frequently shrouded in mystery. Statesmen and civil servants are inhibited from divulging what they know by the Official

Secrets Act, and even when they are not so constrained their memories may have been written with half an eye on later publication. Even the public records themselves may be unsatisfactory. Apart from the fact that official documents are usually classified until they are no longer controversial, they sometimes disappear without trace, and, when published, may distort the truth or, by their selectivity, fail to reveal all of it. What is more, in the age of the telephone some important material never gets written down at all.²⁴

For example, in anticipation of the independence of the Gold Coast in early 1957, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden wrote to Canadian Prime Minister St. Laurent, "we shall all need to define our attitude toward her expected application for full Commonwealth membership. This is not a matter which we can handle by correspondence: it will require a meeting...."²⁵ We concur with Garnet on the point that, "the fragmentary nature of the evidence available to serious students of international politics sometimes makes it extremely difficult to answer questions of fact."²⁶ Furthermore, our working premise is that speeches or published material from official sources ought not to be "taken entirely at face value." Since they are seen as having little informative utility as to the motive or goal of official policy, there is an obvious paucity and intentional omission of such material in this study.²⁷

An additional factor in this problem of assessing policy is the unavailability of material on the improvised interaction among members in the corridors of the UN and elsewhere.²⁸ Nevertheless, we make the assumption that the bottom line of compromise, in such situations, still imply a certain degree of rational choice in decision-making. If we were to concentrate on one issue, decolonisation, from the formative stages to the climax of process at which basic goals were achieved, how wide can the variance in policy be? And would we not

be able to, at least, identify some of the characteristics which would be indicative of either a positive or negative orientation to the resolution of this issue? In the final analysis, what kind of assumptions can we actually make about the foreign policies of states, in general terms? Bailey has suggested that the basis of policy is the state's national interest. What was Canada's perceived interest in this issue?²⁹ How and to what degree was this operative to produce an erratic, uniform or consistent policy over time, on this one issue?

Bipolarity in the UN

Bruce Russett has concluded that, on the major issues in the UN, the cold war, colonial self-determination and supra-nationalism, "the importance of idiosyncratic and role variables is slight – changes in the person or even party of the major decision makers made little difference in the nations' alignment."³⁰ The most we can do, therefore, is to examine the subjective explanations of what the objective requirements of a state's national interests were in the decolonisation issue, in light of the specifically contrived operational context of the UN, in this or that period. We suggest that, insofar as the mind set factor can have an operational role, it would function in the interpretation of what Canada's perceived national role ought to be in the decolonisation of empires. And, this act of interpretation can only take place in an atmosphere of interacting units where the choices and limits of state action are defined. Doreen and Robert Jackson also believed that "foreign policy decisions must be set within the context of the

opportunities and constraints of the international system."³¹ In our opinion, the UN did play a crucial role in this process. This is the subject matter of chapter III.

The pace and degree of the decolonisation of empires are generally attributed to the successful functioning of the international organisation. David Goldsworthy suggested that, "it is appropriate to consider the UN before we consider individual powers because its institutions and indeed its existence structured so much of the debate [on colonialism]."³² However as Kenneth Waltz has put it, "international organisations...reveal their inability to act in important ways except with the support or at least the acquiescence, of the principal states concerned with the matters at hand."³³ And, in the opinion of Christopher Phillips of the USA State Department, colonialism was "the principle battleground between the East and West."³⁴ We will try to show how, in Canada's perception, the two principal actors of the bipolar international system alternatively saw the decolonisation issue as being resolutely tied up with their perceived national interests.

In describing the decolonising period, T. Millar claimed that, "never before so long, a single set of great power relationships, a single confrontation, fluctuating in its temperature but never ceasing to be a confrontation has dominated international society."³⁵ This environment is comprised of what Waltz had identified as 'forces,' from which "we can infer some things about the expected behaviour and fate of the units; namely, how they will have to compete with and adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish."³⁶ The official correspondence from the embassies in the major capitals, the Canadian

Delegation reports of the talks in the corridors of the UN and the meetings of the Delegations of other friendly members in N.Y., were helpful in informing and influencing official policy. Throughout the study we will show how Ottawa actively sought information, on the potential or intended policy of the Old Commonwealth and the USA on colonial matters,³⁷ in recognition of the need to keep a united front on this controversial issue.

The systems theory of Waltz focused "on the States that make the most difference" in shaping the system.³⁸ In this conception of 'system', the principal actors contrive in their interaction to create operational limits to the pursuit of foreign policy of lesser units in the international system. According to this theory, it is only from this starting point can we hope to discover "the forces" to which "the lesser units are subject."³⁹ We suggest that the traditional definition of "principal actors" were not necessarily applicable to the actors in the decolonisation issues especially in the late 1950s. Writing of this period, John Holmes claimed that, from the Canadian viewpoint, "the policies of the United States were of course of primary importance to all members of the United Nations, including the Soviet Union, because their posture was always a principle element in either the creation of or the solution to the issue."⁴⁰ This may have been so in the general scheme of things. However, we suspect that, specific to the colonial issue, the United States might have been compelled to alter its strategy in face of the consolidated power of the anti-colonial force on specific questions. Why else would a colonial power like the United States behave like an anti-colonial?

We know that the USA had to design its policy to counter the starting position of the anti-colonials in the process we discuss in chapter V. In this sense, both the USA and the Soviet Union can be conceived as having the status of 'lesser' units only for a limited period of time and on specific aspects of the colonial issue. This is clearly brought out in chapters VI and VII. In 1960, the Canadian Secretary of State wrote: "It has become customary to assess the international climate in any given period in terms of the relative degree of harmony existing between the Communist and non-Communist worlds."⁴¹ In our opinion, it is precisely because there was no harmony between these two worlds during this period of time, that the colonial issue was able to become so ascendant in UN business. In chapter III, we will outline the operational context of the international system as it was shaped by the principal actors, variously defined, on this one issue.

Decision Making

In this contrived international environment, we find that "international policy-making" itself "is based on decentralised interaction among a number of relatively independent hierarchies of leaders. Leaders control leaders in what has been labelled a bargaining situation."⁴² This is brought out very clearly in chapters IV to VII. We have laid great emphasis on outlining the details of the behind the scene process. We have found that this was imperative to understanding the dynamics of the situation and how it affected Canada's limits

and choices. Moreover, this method enabled us to isolate to what extent Canada was forced to adopt policies that were not in keeping with its expectations. If we are going to utilise a systems conception in our attempt to analyse and understand policy, then "it is useful," according to James Robinson and Richard Snyder, "to think of international systems not merely as an international system." A more profitable exercise is to look at the units or "the actors...interacting with each in ways that affect or have some influence on each other."⁴³ In this analytic enterprise, we are not only looking at the international order as a whole but also at Canada's perception, of the interplay or interaction, of the units. These two aspects co-jointly, "tell us what international conditions national policies have to cope with."⁴⁴ In other words, together they define the operational limits within which national objectives can be realised.

What we have, in effect, is a conception of a predetermined number of choices available to units in a "decentralised interaction" of objective national interests. And systems theory proposes to "explain why different units behave similarly and despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall within expected ranges."⁴⁵ The explanation begins with an assumption of systemic constraints. One can logically suggest that "propositions at the unit level do not account for the phenomena observed at the systems level."⁴⁶ One guiding and consistent basis of evidence, for this position, is that "since the variety of actors and the variations in their actions are not matched by the variety of outcomes, we know that systemic causes are in play."⁴⁷ It is on this assumption that we attempt, in chapter III, to put together a Canadian conception of its national role in the

decolonisation issue at the UN. In the process, we hope to discover to what extent officials felt constrained to reshape the subjective national interests in light of the systemic operational limits on this one issue. Essentially, what a systems theory must do is to show "how much of states' actions and interactions, and how much of the outcomes their actions and interactions produce can be explained by forces that operate at the level of the system, rather than at the level of the units."⁴⁸

It has been established that fundamental foreign policy has been stable and consistent over time, for most states. We can, therefore, make assumptions on the basis of their bargaining and interaction and whether they are prepared to compromise on similar issues over time. However, the decolonisation issue is different from the other issues and, in this respect, we cannot make inferences from state behaviour on other issues. We assume that the behaviour of the secondary units is not only determined by systemic forces. Kenneth Thompson and Roy Macridis point out that "objective requirements of national interest place innumerable limits on any statesman seeking to formulate foreign policy."⁴⁹ This is probably one explanation for the basic continuity and stability we find in the Canadian foreign policy. And Thompson and Macridis further stress that "regardless of the intentions, social philosophy, or religious outlook of individuals, there are broad strategic interests intimately bound up with a nation's geographic position and international role that must be safeguarded if its independence is to be preserved."⁵⁰

In an assessment of Canadian foreign policy to 1979, Paul Fox concluded "that in most instances the policies that developed were not very different from those...of the past...the process and the policies themselves often turned out to bear a remarkable resemblance to those which had gone before."⁵¹ However, the Canadian example is not the only one which displayed a continuity over time, despite a change in government. Howard Bliss and Glen Johnson also point out that:

From Alexis de Toqueville in the 1830s through Civil War, Recession, Depression, two World Wars, and even Prohibition, observers discern the same basic characteristics in the American policy. Therefore predictions of change in the fundamental values and predispositions of Americans should be carefully examined.⁵²

And Bruce Russett went to the very extreme of generalisations regarding the continuity in foreign policy when he wrote that

In the foreign affairs of the 1950s and the early 1960s nations did not readily change their basic strategies, and their elites, whether from preference or because of internal and external systemic pressures, did not quickly alter their international alignments. Given the continuity we found despite changes of regime, one is strongly inclined to discount the role of most internal (sub-system) pressures – they account for little of the variance.⁵³

What is crucial for our analysis is the fact that not only the basic policy but also the alignments did not fundamentally alter during this time period.

Thompson and Macridis traced continuity in foreign policy of states to something they identified as "the 'national mind,' which interprets the national interest." It is, therefore, something that is derived out of the historical experience and national development of a state rather than emanating out of individual or idiosyncratic sources. They claimed that, even though this "national mind" is an

'intangible' aspect, it "is in itself a factor in the permanence of foreign policy."⁵⁴ This is more or less the same thing that John Burton seemed be saying when he wrote that "the origin of nonalignment was in the nationalist movement of independence of colonial territories."⁵⁵ What did he mean by 'in' the movement? That is also intangible.

However, according to William Zartman, "the concept of national interest...has never been susceptible of a definition as precise that it tells the state exactly where its security lies, how its component elements should be defined or determined, or what particular policies to adopt."⁵⁶ What we have, in effect, is a rather nebulous conception of a tool for analysing state action or the policy positions that a state would take on any one issue. Zartman further adds that:

the concept does not provide a complete description of the process of policy-making and execution; it cannot therefore, tell anything about the success of a policy, and conversely, the outcome of policy does not determine the reasons for its choice. the concept can only provide a general criterion for action.⁵⁷

Yet, we find that this concept is the central focus of most paradigms of political analysts. What, in practical terms, is the general criterion of action? Zartman has suggested that "national-interest policy is geared to the perceived good of the state."⁵⁸ In our interpretation of the 'good' of Canada, we intend to utilise Zartman's "allegiance and justification"⁵⁹ of policy. We suspect that action must rest on the priority of national survival. Along the way, we will seek to outline how officials perceived that the 'good' of Canada might be secured in the way the decolonisation of empires should proceed or be resolved. Bruce Russett

has pointed out that, specific to this context of collective as opposed to national foreign policy-making, national interest may be:

Neither objectively defined nor immutable, but short of utter domestic upheaval the men who most powerfully control national foreign policies have held rather constant preferences and/or perceptions of alternatives. Governments rose and fell without great change in states' positions on the central super-issues of world politics.⁶⁰

We will show that, for the most part, Canada's position on the super-issue of colonialism was a consistent one. In addition, we will argue that Canada's policy was, in part, the result of operative systemic determinants.

The UN: Systemic Determinants

We assign an operative primary and influencing role to the UN organisation as a systemic determinant. This assignment is based on the assumption that the UN itself had strongly influenced the decolonisation process. We, therefore, consider it both as a cause and effect in the following ways. First, in structural terms, it was perceived by the Soviet Union as a potential avenue to destabilise the Western colonial empires. The UN provided the most direct means whereby the Soviet Union could, as an anti-colonial, pursue its self-interest. This will be discussed in chapter III. Secondly, in terms of action, the UN performed a "political function" that was directly instrumental in the decolonisation process itself. This is explained best by Innis Claude. He wrote that:

Statesmen...have persistently, and increasingly, regarded the United Nations as an agency capable of bestowing politically weighty

approval and disapproval upon their projects and policies. The General Assembly and, to a lesser degree, the Security Council have been used for this purpose.⁶¹

Chapter VIII deals with just this activity, specific to the decolonisation issue, over the 20-year period of our study. However, in terms of explaining the substantive part of this "political function," Claude went on to say that: "The debates within, and negotiations around, these political organs have largely concerned the adoption or rejection of resolutions designed to proclaim the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of positions or actions taken by states."⁶²

We will show, in great detail, how the debates had a functional role in motivating Canada to take an active role behind the scenes in order to accomplish two things. First, officials in Ottawa considered ways in which they could influence Colonial Office thinking to meet the 'reasonable' anti-colonial criticism, in the hope of toning down the level and intensity of overall criticism. Secondly, they explored the possibility of trying to bridge the gap between the Colonial Powers and 'moderate' anti-colonials. These activities varied with Canada's desire not to appear to be, too much, in the 'colonial' camp and their efforts were made difficult by the fact that the UK resented UN interference in colonial matters.⁶³ Chapters IV through to VIII, show members taking sides in the decolonisation struggles in their support for, or open rejection of the resolutions that were 'designed' to bring to an end all colonial rule over non-white peoples.

When we look at the resolutions, we see how they gradually change in style and tone. This qualitative process of change is an indication of the "collective delegitimisation" of colonialism. Claude has concluded that this "major

political function of the United Nations...has been to serve as an agency for the collective legitimisation of the status, policies, and demands of states."⁶⁴ Therefore, our assignment of an operative and primary role of the UN will be mostly in "this matter of conferring or revoking legitimacy."⁶⁵ Members have utilised previous resolutions as one would refer to established laws; this was a sort of resort to precedence and the method of cumulation served that purpose. But it is important to point out that an essential element in the whole process of decolonisation was the obstructionist tactics of pro-colonial states. They attempted to prevent, by all means, the adoption of resolutions which could be later utilised as accepted standards, from which to assess the behaviour of Colonial Powers in the fulfilment of their obligations under the Charter. Utilising a universal sample of all General Assembly resolutions on colonialism that were brought to a roll-call, chapters IV to VIII will demonstrate how Canada's behaviour was consistent over time. Canada's voting position is indicative of a functional role of Canada's pro-colonial pre-disposition. Canada's voting was mostly consonant with that of the Colonial Powers.

According to H.G. Nicholas, as an organisation or in structural terms, the UN itself "has no will of its own."⁶⁶ It is rather the underlying dynamics of any issue that will determine "how much on any given occasion the UN will itself undertake"; this, in turn, "depends entirely how much resolve and strength its members put into it."⁶⁷ We will see that a clear rejection by some members of the Charter conception of 'trust' was intrinsic to the decolonisation process. Therefore, the UN political activity of "revoking legitimacy" in the colonial context,

meant, in effect, a rejection of the arguments which were put forward by Colonial Powers to hold on to their empires. These arguments were based essentially on colonial responsibility in the "progressive development" and 'advancement' of their subject peoples. Without any doubt, we can clearly identify those members who supported this aspect of UN political activity and those who chose not to do so. And, in this sense, we want to show, specific to the decolonisation issue at the UN, that "to the extent that dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behaviour becomes predictable."⁶⁸

We are able to identify one group of members who consistently worked to produce, in the General Assembly, "resolutions, speeches, and proclamations galore, affirming the right of national self-determination, denouncing the fundamental iniquity of the colonial system, and proclaiming the duty of colonialists to lay down the white man's burden."⁶⁹ Richard Jackson has pointed out the connection between the activity of these members outside the UN context and the dynamics of the issue of decolonisation in the UN. He wrote:

A large body of non-aligned doctrine, derived from summit and ministerial meetings outside New York has...been translated, with little change and often over Western objections into resolutions of the General Assembly. These resolutions, in turn, are regularly invoked as terms of reference, whether on issues of decolonisation or of economic reform, to structure the thinking and approach of the United Nations to the world."⁷⁰

We know that the colonials observed this development with great apprehension.⁷¹ They were, therefore, compelled to pay attention to every gathering in the non-Western world because such activity necessarily influenced the dynamics of the decolonisation process in the UN.⁷² These resolutions,

speeches and proclamations effectively served to circumscribe the colonial prerogative to dispense piecemeal freedom to dependent peoples. As a consequence, Colonial Powers had the choice to either grant concessions in keeping with the international consensus or to hold on to their territories by force.

Brian Urquhart observed that, in this struggle to decolonise, "the United Nations acted as an instigator, a catalyst, a face-saver for the Colonial Powers and as a bridge between the old and the new countries."⁷³ These multipurpose roles complicate our effort to make conclusive assumptions regarding the underlying tendencies, which sustain state interaction, in the UN context. Innis Claude has reminded us that we must be aware of the fact that, the UN itself is "an organic development rooted in the realities of the system,"⁷⁴ and, as a consequence, it reflects the fundamental dynamics of any issue over time.⁷⁵ John Stoessinger and others have discovered that the "General Assembly reflects the interests and objectives of politically motivated governments."⁷⁶ Therefore, in practical terms, the assessment of national policy positions must rest on some sort of multivariate analysis. However, positions taken in an international organisation are in themselves a "product of the necessities felt by statesmen operating within the arena of international politics."⁷⁷ Thus, the degree and intensity of pressure to conform can vary on specific issues.

Human Rights and Self-Determination: A Catalyst

The process we discuss in chapter V is an excellent example of the need for a multivariate analysis. We will show that, much to the disquiet and distress of all the Western powers, the rest of the UN members found it necessary to design international instruments of human rights. These instruments were called the International Covenants on Human Rights. In the process, some members decided to include an article to the effect that self-determination is a fundamental human right. The Western powers vehemently resisted the pressure of this new development and concern with human rights. John Humphrey has argued:

Not that human rights can be divorced from politics. In a sense nothing could be more political; and it would have been quite unreal had the great international debate on human rights not reflected the deep differences which divide nations and groups."⁷⁸

Canadian officials in Ottawa and New York fully understood that this operation was basically driven by principles. Moreover, Canadian officials were greatly perturbed at the intensity with which this goal was pursued by the Latin Americans. Canada was compelled to design a policy to meet the challenges of this enterprise because it could neither be avoided nor ignored. This is how John Holmes described the period, 1950 to 1957:

The UN became more complex and more interesting because it was less a simple confrontation between the opposing camps. Although membership was frozen for most of the period [till 1955], the Asian, Arab and Latin American members were making their weight felt. Colonial issues dominated the agenda of the political committees and of the economic and social bodies as well.⁷⁹

Chapter V is concerned with the pursuit of anti-colonials, in the Economic and Social Council and in the Third Committee, to establish self-determination as a fundamental human right. The effort was seen as an attempt to derive a "standard of permissible action"⁸⁰ in the colonial world. This is a basis from which we can assess behaviour and policy on the decolonisation of empires. Decolonisation invariably found its impetus from one group of members who utilised certain accepted norms and standards, of the Western world, as justifications for their claims to end empires. The pro-colonials also utilised these same standards as justifications to more or less continue and prolong the status quo of colonial empires. The substance of chapter V is a detailed examination of why Canada refused to support the UN effort to universalise the right of self-determination in the colonial world.

A critical analysis of the arguments of members who co-operated in the evolutionary stages of the concept, as it ought to apply to dependent peoples, is set against a content analysis of those proposals by members who sought to hinder this development and to restrict its scope. Each evolutionary step was formally presented, discussed and voted upon in both organs. An examination of the debates and votes provide specific information on the expectations and predispositions of members, in regard to the operational limits of the principle of self-determination, in the decolonisation of empires. This information is of crucial value in our attempt to isolate factor variables which might have been operative in decision making in Ottawa. Our concern is official policy on the substantive aspects regarding the possible application of self-determination, in colonial areas.

In addition, this exercise to establish self-determination as a fundamental human right had operational significance, for the decolonisation process, because it was a parallel development with the UN effort to terminate the first Trusteeship Agreement. This is the concern of chapter VI. The UN process to terminate the second Trusteeship Agreement which was over French Togoland, immediately followed. The anti-colonials called into question the Charter categorisation of self-determination as a principle. They insisted upon the application of the right of self-determination as had been established in the International Covenant on Human Rights.⁸¹ We discuss this in chapter VII and we demonstrate, in extensive documentation, how Canada was compelled to design a policy in view of the narrow range of alternatives.

Ideology

In the opinion of John Holmes, "the Cold War struggle for propaganda and strategic advantage complicated the discussion of colonial issues."⁸² We have undertaken to show, wherever possible, how Canada perceived a functional role of the Communist factor in the kinds of decisions it had to make. Zartmann has pointed out "the opposite danger of unreal extremes," for at times in view of the tendency of analysts to rely too much on the explanatory power of any single variable. He has cautioned that, "no state operates entirely on the basis of ideology; such a policy would be one of self-abnegation and would run the risk of suicide. But neither do states act only on the basis of national interest."⁸³

Actually, in our attempt to identify operative variables, we ought to look at the substantive core of the issue itself. We are not just looking at a process which was solely concerned with ways of achieving the single goal of political freedom. We are also confronted with a situation in which members were embroiled in an attempt to alter the organising principles of an international structure of white dominance. And, under these circumstances, some variables could have had a more influential role than others in policy making.

In our attempt to define a national role conception for Canada, we need to draw from an official perspective, a "mental map which shows how the world society is structured and which aspects of it are the most significant,"⁸⁴ in the decolonisation of empires. And this entails knowledge of what Lawrence Falkowski has referred to as "the definition of a situation the decision maker uses." In addition, he has proposed that "it is rather important to discover what variables are central in shaping that definition."⁸⁵ Moreover, he has imputed a primary influencing role to this definition variable in any assessment of policy positions members take on any issue. As a matter of fact, Falkowski claims that it is "the most crucial aspect of ultimate behaviour."⁸⁶

According to Grimal, the Soviet's definition of the situation from 1947 required an anti-colonial role which was to function as "a political weapon against the West."⁸⁷ John Foster Dulles saw the USA definition of the situation requiring an anti-Communist role.⁸⁸ This was also the official Canadian policy. We will see that this very general anti-Western, anti-Communist ideological dichotomy had an operational function in the dynamics of the issue. However, it is only one of the

factor variables that has relevant explanatory power. On the whole, we hesitate to assign relative importance to any variable in Canada's decision-making process because there is really no way of actually discovering the interacting or intervening power of variables on any one single decision. If we are to take at face value the ideological diatribes that run through the decolonisation process at the UN, then:

An understanding of the consolidation function can avoid the interpretation of ideology as merely a cover for a power struggle among men or among states. Ideology is believed, before it is used. There is simply no evidence that...leaders...cynically use their ideologies without believing in them; were they to attempt to do so, they would soon find themselves prisoners of their tactics, forced to follow or to break ideological ranks.⁸⁹

In 1958, French President Charles de Gaulle decided that the ideological basis for the setting up of NATO in 1949 no longer had relevant operational implications for France⁹⁰. Consequently, he sought independent contacts with the states of the Communist world which, according to de Gaulle, were more in keeping with France's objective national interests. And in view of the unstable political and economic situation in France,⁹¹ De Gaulle apparently did not have any other alternative but to secure French interests in Black Africa.⁹² It is difficult to say whether, or how, the ideological factor had a functional role along with the political and economic factors in De Gaulle's offer in 1958 of full independence to the African colonies. The choice he gave them was a precise and clear one: either 'independence' within the French Union or full independence outside of it; this alternative was premised on a full break with France. Guinea, under Sekou Toure, voted overwhelmingly against remaining in

the French Union and for immediate and full independence. Accordingly, Guinea had to "face the consequences" which de Gaulle had laid out in his August speech.⁹³

Henri Grimal wrote that "...in less than three months the administrative Departments, the army, even the settlers left the country, not without having taken care to render public service and plantations useless...."⁹⁴ Five months later, Ottawa was informed that Guinea "was in bad straits economically and in the absence of Western assistance Ghana feels that it must step into the breach and give what help it can, particularly in view of the offers of assistance which are coming from Communist countries." The Ghanaian Minister "was worried by...the extent of their offers of assistance."⁹⁵ The information from Accra was that "the Guinea Government had sent an urgent request to the USA for arms for maintaining international security but so far the request had not been acted upon."⁹⁶ Therefore, Guinea decided to accept arms from Czechoslovakia.

The compelling question is, if the United States of America (USA) and Canada did actually perceive a communist threat to the new nations in the colonial world, why was no effort undertaken in Guinea?⁹⁷ We cannot say that the lack of action was due to ignorance of the facts of the situation. Actually, by choice, the Western powers decided to allow the Communists an unfettered access to a foothold in Africa.⁹⁸ This led Ghana to express "concern about the implications of Guinea's acceptance of this gift." Moreover, Adu, the Ghanaian Minister "was also inclined to be critical of the Western powers for not having acted quickly enough to give Guinea economic assistance."⁹⁹ Consequently, if

we were to make an objective assessment of the power and 'will' of the USA or Canada during this period, we must come to the conclusion that their anti-Communism was a 'mask' for their true intentions in the colonial world.

From the UK and French perspectives of the USA role conception in the decolonisation issue, we can make the claim for "the interest theory of ideology." It claims that "beliefs are only a 'mask and a weapon' in the struggle for power." However, this theory "does not imply that ideology is the sole motivation."¹⁰⁰ Throughout our study, we encounter voiced concerns from the other Colonial Powers over the USA occasional refusal to work towards a consolidated colonial front, in the UN. It is evident that the USA chose to work for such a front when it suited its own interests. This presented a problem for Canada's decision makers and this is clearly brought out in the study.

The most confusing aspect of attempting to identify separate functional roles for any factor variables is the fact that "a state acting for ideological reasons may make the same decision as a state acting for reasons of interest, or the same act may be decided for mixed reasons."¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, we can to a certain degree, rely on the "consolidation function" of ideology. We are also reasonably confident that we can properly assess the objective national interest of Canada in this one specific issue. Therefore, we should be able to suggest some causal or, at least, an influential connection. However, in the final analysis, we must accept the fact that "the mediations between the sphere of ideology, of world view and that of concrete action are many and are never clear." And most importantly, we must realise that "it is impossible analytically to break open the

self-confirmatory spiral that links consciousness to action."¹⁰² On the other hand, any consistency in action on any one specific issue, over time, indicates to us that there are some operative objective factor variables in the international system that might not be subject to bargaining and compromises.

We will utilise the anti-colonial concept as a organising device by which we can categorise characteristics and observable behaviour of states. We support the contention that, as an ideology, anti-colonialism: "...not only rationalises, explaining the reasons for the present situation; it also points the way to the future goal....It can sanction the rejection of present reality because it assures the way to an acceptable new order."¹⁰³ From a non-white ex-colony's point of view: anti-colonialism has to do fundamentally with "qualitative...conditions of our existence"; with 'realities' like the virulent form of nationalism which arose basically out of colonialism and racism and most crucially, national self-interest.¹⁰⁴ This anti-colonialism means that the state's own national interest is at once realised in the end of empires and a new international structure in which political freedom is only the beginning of a process of change.

When we use the term "anti-colonialism" we are mostly referring to national interest and rational choice. According to David Finlay and Thomas Hovet, "all these realities may be explained differently by competing ideologies, but they cannot be explained away."¹⁰⁵ Thus, in our analysis, we attempt to subsume the operative factor variables of race and culture under our conception of anti-colonialism in a sort of "consolidation function." In the opinion of USA Ambassador David Newson, "the versions of history, the traditions and the

frustrations of development...will probably continue to provide the glue of common experience and some degree of solidarity among those nations new to independence in the twentieth century."¹⁰⁶ This art of anti-colonialism was directed solely against the empires of white domination over non-white peoples; therefore, the focus is on colour distinctions. In addition, this anti-colonialism made a clear and finite separation between 'types' of empires. The empire of the Soviet Union, with white dominating whites, did not find a fit in this concept of anti-colonialism.

In addition to a finite separation, this anti-colonialism also rejected any indication of an emotional solidarity with the anti-colonial stand of the Soviet Union in 1960. The Nigerian delegate put it this way in the General Assembly:

My Delegation must express its appreciation to the Delegation of the Soviet Union for the interest and initiative which they have manifested in the problem of the speedy liquidation of the remnants of colonialism. However, my Delegation feels compelled to add that we, and by 'we' I mean the Africans and Asians who have worn the shoe of colonialism, know best how and when it pinches.¹⁰⁷

However, this attitude had not hindered the Africans and Asians from readily accepting the tangible role of this outside group which gave its support to radical resolutions and took a consistent anti-colonial voting position. And, how do we explain Moscow's support for the Nationalists in Asia and Africa, even though it might have inadvertently led to the elimination of loyal Communists?¹⁰⁸ Herein lies the functional roles of national interest and rational choice. And why did the Soviet Union with its own 'empire' have the audacity to display such impudent anti-colonial behaviour? We suggest that this was possible only because of the nature of the issue.¹⁰⁹ According to Jackson, "Soviet and non-aligned interests

have, in fact, coincided in challenging a post-war international order established by the United States and the rest of the West."¹¹⁰

The USA was, for all intents and purposes, a colonial power. However, this did not alter the fact that its official policy sought to project an anti-colonial image in the UN. Should we, then, not utilise these positions as indicators of a secondary functional role of ideology and the strategic and economic calculations of the Soviet and USA objective national interests as having primary influential roles in their policy on the decolonisation issue? We agree with John Spanier that:

This deemphasis of ideology, then, suggests that the analyst of world politics need pay little attention to what policy-makers say about their policies. Clearly, they will say whatever will make their actions look good. They will talk in terms of freedom, national self-determination, liberating peoples from Communist or Capitalist slavery, and bringing about a world of peace, law, order and justice. But such verbalisations should not be confused with the concrete interests that are the real, underlying reason for the state's behaviour.¹¹¹

The Soviet Union has taken a consistent anti-colonial stand on the decolonisation issue. This position sought an end to colonial empires in so far as it would serve to deny Western powers direct access and control to areas of the world in which avenues for Soviet interests were effectively closed. In this sense, the goal of Soviet anti-colonialism is identical to that of the non-White ex-colonies, in bringing to an end Western domination over subject peoples; Soviet anti-colonialism was also qualitatively similar in its intensity. The decolonisation issue provided the means by which the Soviet Union could explore opportunities

to pursue its objective national interest and the language of freedom and equality was utilised to serve that purpose. Going on the assumption that the perceived roles of the USA and the Soviet Union, on this issue, are the products of the dictates of rationality; we can logically conclude that both positions are qualitatively of a similar category. Conceptually, national interest and ideology are posited, in our analysis, as the organising dynamics of this main power relationship on the decolonisation issue at the UN.

Blocs

Conventional studies of state behaviour in the UN generally utilise the concept of bloc in organising the states into groups as 'types' and in categorising specific 'kinds' of behaviour. Structurally, "a bloc may be defined as a group of states that meet regularly in caucus, has some degree of formal organisation, and is concerned with substantive issues and related procedural matters that may come to a vote in plenary...."¹¹² According to Sidney Bailey, it is a way of expressing "the way States associate in the General Assembly." He has identified a "tendency of Member States to affiliate differently for different purposes."¹¹³ And, in "each of the two broad arenas of conflict, the Cold War and the anti-colonial struggle," Roderick Ogle has been able to clearly define a specific "spectrum of blocs," belonging to each issue.¹¹⁴ Since our concern, in this study, is fundamentally of a substantive and qualitative rather than a structural nature, we will not address the question of 'blocs' per se.

As an organisational factor, the concept of 'blocs' will serve the function of identifying and categorising groups. For our purposes, 'blocs' will be utilised as an indicator of the solidarity function of factor variables such as ideology, race, culture and national interest, on this one issue. The Afro-Asian bloc was the most important one for decolonisation. According to C.S. Jha,

the Afro-Asian Group was virtually a spontaneous growth. Such a group would have inevitably come about as a conclave or caucus of like-minded underdog nations, having a community of interest in the eradication of colonialism and racial discrimination....The latter half of the 1950s saw the establishment of the group as a force to be reckoned with in the United Nations.¹¹⁵

Innis Claude saw a qualitative characteristic in the typology and the grouping of this set of members;¹¹⁶ a typology that displayed its solidarity function in the immediate rank listing of the "eradication of colonialism" as the number one priority in a hierarchy of national interests.

This group arrived at the United Nations, "one by one...equipped with their own distinctive set of priorities. They want the final liquidation of Western colonialism and the repudiation of the racialism that has been so intimately associated with it...."¹¹⁷ In structural terms, it was this group that was to form the basis of the 'will' of the UN to act decisively in the decolonisation of empires.¹¹⁸

According to Claude:

They have the political bargaining power, derived largely from the circumstances of the Cold War, and the formal voting power, derived from the one-state-one-vote rule in the General Assembly, to translate these priorities into effective political demands upon the United Nations.¹¹⁹

India has been ascribed the role of "tracer nation" for the Afro-Asian bloc.¹²⁰

Hanna Newcombe characterised tracer nations as

...those nations which can be reasonably assumed to having stayed faithful to their blocs, to fix the identity of the blocs through time. This method of tracer nations is also useful in discovering the component blocs within the super-blocs or ad hoc (mergers) which often form...¹²¹

And, specific to the decolonisation issue, there was a merger between the Afro-Asian bloc and the Soviet bloc to form a "super-bloc." The reason which Newcombe has given for this solidarity or consolidation, between the two categorically different types or groups of members, was "because these two blocs tend to agree on such issues."¹²² We suggest rather that they merged for the simple reason of interest;¹²³ that it served the purpose of helping to achieve a specific goal and that agreement on the issue was not the overriding impetus. Clearly, the Soviet Union was a colonial power which had no substantial problem, in principle, with the existence of dominant groups over subject peoples.

Newcombe also concluded that "mergers tend to take place mainly between political "neighbours, i.e., blocs not too far apart ideologically."¹²⁴ We claim that this has not been the case in the merger of the Soviet bloc with the Afro-Asian bloc on the decolonisation issue. As a matter of fact, these new nations tended to distance themselves from the ideological confrontation of the Cold War period. We, therefore, agree with Howard Alker and Bruce Russett that "serious misperceptions may result from too great a preoccupation with the bloc phenomenon."¹²⁵ Consequently, we intend to concentrate on the solidarity function of the Soviet bloc in expediting the decolonisation process.

Since we are concerned only with the colonial issue and the functional role of relevant and specific factor variables in the policy of Canada, on this issue, we are not interested in any extrapolation of findings or in universalising specific types of behaviour. According to Russett:

...there are significant numbers of dimensions that characterise UN voting. These dimensions are uncorrelated; that is, knowing a state's allies on one dimension does not help in predicting with whom it will ally on another. Each Delegation or caucusing group must maintain certain co-operative contacts with every other Delegation or group, because it may expect to vote with them on at least one controversial issue or set of issues.¹²⁶

And a very precise example of this is the split in the solid Afro-Asian bloc in 1963. In the opinion of Jha, this group disintegrated for two reasons. The first one was the driving force of a racial identity. He wrote that, "the African members who numbered some forty countries at the United Nations, keen to establish their separate identity, broke away from the Afro-Asian Group and started meeting regularly as a separate African Group."¹²⁷ Secondly, he found that the pressing need that had led to the formation of the merger between the Africans and the Asians, in the first place, ceased to exist.¹²⁸ He claimed that, "...this development was inevitable since the cement of crusading zeal for decolonisation had all but disappeared with the successful emergence of most of the previously colonial countries into independence."¹²⁹

On the other hand, the coming together of members in the Western bloc¹³⁰ can be characterised as a consolidation function of race and culture, national interest, ideology and geography. This bloc has displayed characteristics of permanence over time. Canada was ascribed the role of "tracer nation" for this

bloc.¹³¹ On an overall basis, there is an obvious racial and cultural solidarity between the white ex-colonies and Western Europe. Bruce Russett suggested that:

Western Community in this context must be interpreted as a cultural and not just a geographical phenomenon, including the Old Commonwealth. The strength of this relationship is indicated by the fact that...35 are members either physically located in Europe or whose population is predominantly of European origin....¹³²

We propose that race and culture were also operational in a consolidation function among the pro-colonial members. Roch Pinard of the Canadian Delegation found "it is only natural and fitting that like-minded countries should work together."¹³³ The individual or collective interaction, of these different categories of members in the international system, is an inherent part of the dynamics of any issue in the UN.

Votes and Resolutions

We analyse all the resolutions on which roll-call votes were taken on relevant colonial matters in the General Assembly from 1946 to the late 1960s. Since a roll-call vote is the only recorded evidence of a member's position, we have concentrated on those resolutions which registered roll-call votes. In the opinion of Russett, votes in the General Assembly "do provide a unique set of data, where many national governments commit themselves simultaneously and publicly on a wide variety of issues."¹³⁴ And since resolutions which are brought to a roll-call generally deal with controversial or crucial matters, they are reflective

of the important concern of members on certain issues. Robert Keohane has suggested that "voting records in a quasi-parliamentary international organisation are often better guides to states' orientation than are speeches or even interview responses from their representatives."¹³⁵ For example, the process on human rights and self-determination in the Third Committee plays a crucial role in identifying the orientation of members on self-determination and, therefore, in the process of decolonisation. This is discussed in chapter V.

Although the resolutions which are adopted in the Third Committee are not necessarily approved or adopted in the General Assembly, they are significant indicators of policy because they influence the aim of process. If a resolution is adopted with an overwhelming majority in the Committee, then it is generally guaranteed adoption in the General Assembly. In this sense, members undertake certain measures, negotiations and behind the scene deals, in order to influence process in the Committees. As Kurt Jacobson acknowledged: "in a somewhat indirect way, we may regard the casting of votes as a form of interaction and the nations are also deciding on whose side they will stand."¹³⁶ As we will see in this study, Canada decided to stand, as a colonial, in a consistent voting position over a twenty year period.

Assessment of Votes

Our sample is based on a total of 88 resolutions with 128 roll-calls. These are in addition to those resolutions and votes we have encountered in the

processes discussed in chapters IV, V, VI and VII. The element of abstention in the voting process has served to complicate quantitative analysis. We agree with Frederick Gareau that "since abstentions are legitimate votes in the World Organisation, scores must take them into account."¹³⁷ Unless stated, reasons for abstentions cannot be deduced from previous pronouncements of policy because of extenuating circumstances.¹³⁸ Anthony Miller wrote that an 'anonymous' official in Ottawa had explained to him, that "to abstain is not a neutral act, with no policy implications, not a simple statement of lack of knowledge; it is a definite political act."¹³⁹ Therefore, an 'abstention' must be assigned a value in the total index. We interpret an abstention as an act of non-support. In our tabulation of votes, we have taken an 'abstention' to be a specific negative act and have counted it as such.

Another problem we have encountered in our voting assessment, is the factor of absences. This is relevant only in so far as Canada's voting position is assessed against that of the UK and France. We have also interpreted their absence from the process as an act of non-support, because we believe that when a member "boycotted in protest," it should be assigned an 'appropriate' vote.¹⁴⁰ We were able to establish from Department of External Affairs documents that the six instances in which France was absent and the two instances for the UK, in our total sample, were negative protests. Therefore, if we chose not to assign a value to these absences then, in effect, we have given these representatives "credit for being neutral on this issue," each time.¹⁴¹ This method serves to distort the end result.

The substantive choices and voting clearly demonstrate a consistent racial separation between the disputants. It is evident that even though the Soviet bloc was an anomaly, in its anti-colonial role, its position was perceived by officials in Ottawa to have significant implications for Canada's policy. Therefore, we have included the voting position of India and the Soviet Union in our final tabulation. These serve as the anti-colonial basis for comparison in our assessment of Canada's position. Because the USA was also believed to have played such a prominent role, we have included the USA in the final tabulation.

Assessment of Resolutions

An operative role of the 'consolidation' factor is best observed in Canada's arguments and substantive policies. At the end of the first part of chapter IV, we examine Canada's policy and voting on the resolutions as the General Assembly began with the approval of the Trusteeship Agreements. In this context, the General Assembly asserted its authority in the administration and supervision of Trust Territories. In the second part of chapter IV, we analyse Canada's voting position, on substantive matters, in those territories which were thought to be no business of the UN. These were known as Non-Self-Governing-Territories. We examine Canada's position on the attempt of some members to set up guidelines by which the UN could decide whether any Non-Self-Governing-Territories might be brought under the authority and competence of

the UN. Canada's position, on these colonial steps, are consonant with that taken on the human rights and self-determination question in chapter V.

The private arguments on the substantive parts of these issues and the voting position are reliable indicators of the intention and aim of Canada's officials, in regard to colonial matters, in the formative years. These early attempts to establish UN authority, in both Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing-Territories, were of crucial significance for our understanding and explanation of Canada's policy in the process of decolonisation. The Charter was quite specific as to the separation of responsibilities, of the UN and the administering authorities, in territories brought under the UN umbrella. Nevertheless, this process to approve the Trusteeship Agreements necessarily included questions on the attainment by Trust Territories of the objective of self-government or independence. This aspect was subject to interpretation and is fully explored in chapter VII.

We have organised this universal sample of resolutions into five distinct categories. Each category had a separate impact on the way the issue was perceived by Canadian officials. It was, therefore, necessary to analyse the progressive development in individual groupings in order to discover whether Canada's policy actually evolved or was static on significant aspects of decolonisation process. In chapter VIII, the first section is devoted to the question of authority and competence of the General Assembly in all aspects of the decolonisation process. The second section addresses the UN activity, after the breakpoint had been achieved with the Declaration of Independence in General

Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 12, 1960 in the decolonisation process. We concentrate on attempts by the UN to implement this resolution because it was generally considered to mark the beginning of the end of colonial empires and that it was no longer a matter of 'if' but of 'how' to terminate colonial rule. The third and final section deals with all the resolutions which not only recognised the inalienable rights of peoples to self-determination and independence but also included UN measures to prepare the territories so that this right could be realised. This comprehensive assessment enables us to interpret, as objectively as possible, the problems of the issue of decolonisation as Canadian officials saw them at the time. In the final analysis, we are able to conclude from the results of the votes that Canada did take a conspicuous colonial position on this issue.

The Functional Value of Votes and Resolutions

In 1967, Bruce Russett suggested that "UN voting, because it forces a country to take a public, recorded position on many kinds of issues, is a most valuable indicator of basic policy."¹⁴² Writing 25 years later, Steven Holloway asserted that UN roll-call votes "are used as indicators of foreign policy behaviour."¹⁴³ We will find that the substantive choices and voting positions clearly demonstrate a consistent racial dichotomy between the disputants. A study in the voting dynamics could in no way assess the functional roles of multiple variables in policy choices. Therefore, the conventional sort of voting

analyses which utilise mechanical counting etc., as a measurement of policy, could not adequately accommodate our Thesis concerns.

However, since resolutions are the results of the interaction of groups with contending interests in the decolonisation issue, then votes are the decisions which reflect the interests and operating principles of individual members, in interaction. According to Holloway, "the UN voting is important for showing how world politics is reflected in that body, hence the frequent use of UN votes as a dependent variable in the analysis of foreign policy behaviour."¹⁴⁴ It is the opinion of Alker and Russett that, in order to be able "to explain UN voting positions one is...forced deeper in the 'funnel of causality'." It is a specific reference to the interaction of multivariate variables. Alker and Russett claim that the analyst must go "back from the voting act to those regional, social, economic, and political forces affecting national foreign policies."¹⁴⁵

In other words, we can neither identify 'for,' 'against,' or 'abstain,' as just that, in our assessment of policy positions nor can we seek to isolate relevant factor variables, without paying special attention to the international operating context. Innis Claude has emphasised the significance of this context, especially for the issue of decolonisation. He wrote: "The United Nations is one of the major focal points for the interplay of states, a kind of institutional funnel into which significant parts of the international political process are poured. Not everything happens at the United Nations of course, but the politics of decolonisation has been notably concentrated in its jurisdictional funnel."¹⁴⁶

Resolutions are a reflection of the operational environment in which "motivated governments" perceive that their objective national interest can be addressed. How do we go about identifying which governments were 'motivated' to do what? According to Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr:

To understand world politics, we need to have a high tolerance for ambiguity, uncertainty, the imperfect state of human knowledge, and the 'whys' of human society and politics. The phenomena are extraordinary complex, and we know far less than we would like.¹⁴⁷

We propose that we can narrow, to a manageable extent, the politics of decolonisation. We suggest that the prospects for change which were visualised by non-white ex-colonies and the Soviet bloc involved not only the political aspect of national freedom or independence but also the attendant reordering of an old, encapsulated system of Western political, military and economic dominance on an international level.

Framework of Analysis

1. Definition of the Situation

Internal Considerations

Mind Set – Perceptual

Political and Social Structure

Economic Needs

Security Requirements

External Constraints

Anti-Colonial Pressure

Colonial Solidarity

Ideological Conflict

Alliance Obligations

2. Official Policy

Pre-dispositions

A Comfortable Colonial

Selective Allocation of Goods

Selective Distribution of Goods

Natural Choice

Obstructionist Policy

Negative Voting Position

Continuity of Status Quo.

3. Implications of Policy

Non-Support of Process

Deductive Explanation

The conclusion logically follows that, given the circumstances of the issue and the operational context, Canada had to take a colonial position.

Conclusion

This chapter is an outline of the process or methodology we have followed in order to make some sense out of Canada's policy on the colonial issue and the decolonisation of empires. We do not make attempts at theory building or seek to discover how variables are related to each other or to establish their relative potencies. We are neither interested in making predictions nor prescriptions. Our study concentrates on one single historical issue and it has a value in so far as it attempts to explain state behaviour in a limited historical context. Therefore, the environment, the process and the key players are necessarily restricted to this one issue and the patterns of interaction are, time and system, specific.¹⁴⁸ We have divided our work into three main areas of concentration:¹⁴⁹ Ottawa's definition of the situation, official policy and the implications of policy. The ultimate question is, did Canada have to take the policy position which it did take or was it more a policy of choice? Throughout the study, the official documents are utilised to relate most of what actually took place; they portray the perceived contextual realities, at this or that particular time, and they set out the official perception of the actual limits and constraints of policy.

The implicit goal of the decolonisation process was manifested in a protracted struggle between those who insisted upon change and those who vehemently resisted change. Our examination of the debates and content of resolutions will provide an indication of the substantive concerns of this

protracted struggle. The voting positions will be interpreted, in this context, to show which members supported attempts by the UN to initiate change and which members actively hindered those attempts at change. Such characteristic and observable behaviour are helpful in identifying linkages and the variables, that might have had an influential role, in policy. This study proposes that it is in the substance of the resolutions, which Canada chose to support for adoption, to vote against adoption or to abstain on adoption, that some of the operational elements of Canada's perceptual code on the decolonisation issue are to be found. In addition, we will seek to isolate those international and regional considerations which were expressly connected with the decolonisation issue, in official policy, in order to construct a perceptual code which is specific to Canada. In the process, we will attempt to sort out where the decolonisation issue found a fit in Canada's priorities and values.

This task necessarily requires some assessment of how consonant were Canada's values with those being espoused by non-white ex-colonies in the UN. According to Finlay and Hovet, the Afro-Asians "added a new dimension to...international politics as a whole."¹⁵⁰ In substantive terms, this dimension was circumscribed by certain explicit value judgements, especially as African ex-colonies appeared on the international scene. One of the most important moral imperatives was enunciated by Felix Houphouet-Boigny in 1957. He declared: "Today, no nation, however powerful, can pretend to impose its absolute will on another for long. By doing so, it would irremediably compromise its own future as

a great nation."¹⁵¹ Did such categorical statements have any conspicuous effects on Canada's policy?

Robert Wendzel suggested that "...the policy-maker's perception of other states' objectives will significantly influence his own. This means that many times objectives will be primarily responsive in nature."¹⁵² We will show which states did count in Canada's objectives on this one issue and whether, or to what extent, their objectives had any tangible impact on Canada's pre-dispositions and preferences. If we find that Canada's objectives were congruent with those of the Colonial Powers and that Canada made similar value judgements about the right and wrong ways of doing things in the colonial world, what kinds of conclusions can we reasonably make?

An assessment of substantive policy and votes show that Canada continued to take a public stand which was not a reflection of the temper of the times. How do we explain this discrepancy? David Wilkins has written: "Questions of race and race consciousness are intimately connected with some of the deepest and most difficult moral and political issues of our times...." We believe that the decolonisation issue brought, to the front, "these often neglected and frequently misunderstood connections";¹⁵³ this had significant value for international relations in the post-1960 world. Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, told the Canadian Manufacturers Association in Toronto in June 1965:

Over the past 20 years we have co-operated internationally over the whole range of human concerns and we have created the machinery to serve as the focus of that co-operation. We have co-operated to preserve peace and security; we have co-operated to meet the

problems of poverty, hunger and disease...we have co-operated to define and defend the rights of man. In short, we have created a whole new dimension in international relations.¹⁵⁴

USA Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared in Lusaka, in 1976:

"morally and politically, the drama of national independence in Africa over the last generation has transformed international affairs." He also asserted that the United States "was one of the prime movers of the process of decolonisation."¹⁵⁵

Why did Martin and Kissinger feel the need to claim that their countries had an instrumental role in this process? Kissinger must have known that Africans were aware, of the fact, that the USA was not a prime mover in the process.¹⁵⁶

Canada's behaviour was less conspicuous. And, why did Martin and Kissinger feel it necessary to talk about decolonisation and human rights?

In chapter V, we will see that the efforts to establish universal rights and mutually advantageous economic and political arrangements in the UN were not supported by either Canada or the USA. Yet, Kissinger told his audience:

I reaffirm the unequivocal commitment of the United States to human rights, as expressed in the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We support self-determination, majority rule, equal rights, and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa - in the name of moral principle, international law, and world peace.¹⁵⁷

Since this "unequivocal commitment" was not visible during the crucial years of the decolonisation process, were their speeches designed to fit the context of the times? Was their concern, with appearances, a result of the collective de-legitimisation of colonialism?

When we look at the colonial situation, we are confronted not only with the denial of political freedom but also with the accompanying lack of respect, dignity and equal treatment of colonial peoples. Therefore, those members who resisted the attempts in the UN, to dismantle such an unjust and unfair system of domination, may not have necessarily found such a system abhorrent or unacceptable. The lack of political freedom in the colonial world was predicated upon the belief in the incapability of non-whites to rule themselves. 'Incapability' was associated with phenotypic distinctions, inequality and questions of entitlement. Rights were not self-evident but 'given.' Here is the connection between race consciousness and moral and political issues. The anti-colonial imperative of the decolonisation of empires is clearly portrayed by Louis Henkin. He wrote:

Human rights are universal: they belong to every human being in every human society. They do not differ with geography or history, culture or ideology, political or economic system, or stage of societal development. To call them 'human' implies that all human beings have them, equally and in equal measure, by virtue of their humanity....Implied in one's humanity, human rights are inalienable and imprescriptible: they cannot be transformed, forfeited, or waived; they cannot be lost by having being usurped, or by one's failure to exercise or assert them.

He concluded: "Human rights imply the obligation of society to satisfy those claims."¹⁵⁸

The words of Ronald Dworkin give an apt description of the essential basis of the anti-colonial argument against colonial rule:

It makes sense to say that a man has a fundamental right against the Government, in the strong sense, like free speech, if that right is necessary to protect his dignity, or his standing as equally entitled to concern and respect, or some other personal value of like

consequence. It does not make sense otherwise. So if rights make sense at all, the invasion of a relatively important right must be a very serious matter. It means treating a man as less than a man, or as less worthy of concern than other men. The institution of rights rest on the conviction that this is a grave injustice....¹⁵⁹

We will show that officials undertook successive reassessments of policy but, in the final analysis, Canada's voting position on almost all aspects in this process of transformation remained a pro-colonial one. In light of this discovery, can we conclude that this policy was an implicit and explicit rejection of the claim that "all human beings have equal rights"? Morton Winston has observed that this "assertion...is not a bare tautology; quite the contrary, it makes a substantive nontrivial, moral claim."¹⁶⁰ Our concern with human rights is limited to the encapsulated form of human rights which was discussed in the colonial context of self-determination in the International Covenant on Human Rights. In this sense, the UN concern with the right of self-determination was seen as a human right which "all human beings have...equally and in equal measure."

In the final analysis, the resolutions are the only tangible and substantive products of the bargaining process. And although the bargaining dynamics of interaction among units in the international system imply a flexibility quotient, we suggest that a consistent, negative voting position of any state on the decolonisation issue, over any period of time, would, in fact, reflect an inflexible stand in a process of change. Our task is to discover how Canada saw the colonial situation; to outline official Canadian policy in the resolution of the moral and political problems associated with the decolonisation of empires and to explain why Canada took such a position.

¹ Joseph Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World, (N.Y.:Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 161. new ed.

² Schloming, p. 13.

³ Wendzel, p. 56.

⁴ Quoted in R.C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics (5th ed.: Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976), p. 4.

Escott Reid Papers, MG 31 E46 Vol: 7 File:16# 201.1. From: USSEA, Ottawa To: High Commissioner for Canada, Wellington, November 6, 1951. Secret. "Departmental Policy Papers: A Re-examination of Canadian Policy in the Far East." Sent with a cover letter asking for his comments and "suggestions for revisions," in regard to China, Korea, South East Asia and Japan; Jawaharlal Nehru at a Speech at the Concluding Session of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, April 24, 1955, in Jawaharlal Nehru's, Speeches: March 1953 – August 1957 (New Delhi: The Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1958), p. 288. He also said: "Obviously, the world looks different according to the angle from which you look at it. If you are sitting in the far east of Asia, you have a certain perspective of the world and the world's problems. If you are sitting in the far west of Asia, you have a different perspective. Again, if you are in Africa, it will be quite different."

⁵ Henri Grimal, Decolonisation (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press Inc., 1978), p. 170.

⁶ Michael Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 5.

⁷ Michla Pomerance, Self-determination in Law and Practice.

⁸ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), p. 39. A definition of political culture on the national level: "...the particular incidence of patterns of political orientation in the population of a political system," p. 32.

⁹ Garth Stevenson, "The Determinants of Canadian Foreign Policy," From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau ed. P.Painchaud (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1989), p. 46. "...the social determinants of policy may be important in two ways. First, those who do participate in making and implementing policy are drawn from, and continue to form a part of, the larger society. Their values, attitudes and perceptions are at least related to those of the general population. Second, the values, attitudes and perceptions of the general population, and the circumstances and characteristics from which they arise, are part of the environment within which policy is made." See also Gordon Schloming, Power and Principle in International Affairs (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Janovich, Publishers, 1990), p.13. "...a state's actions and perceptions are filtered through a national character or ideology rooted in the broad formative experiences of its history. Political cultures, national security bureaucracies, political economics – all national in character – form the 'personality' of the nation-state and explain its behaviour. At this level, we study decision making not as the interactions of individuals but as a process driven by the policies and sociopolitical dynamics of the state. The motive forces transcend individuals and constrain them to behave in ways delimited by institutional interests, government politics, and the bureaucratic process itself."

¹⁰ Robert L. Wendzel, International Relations: A Policymaker Focus (N.Y.:John Wiley & Sons, 1977), p. 219. "...a nation's historical experience influences the content of its policy-maker's perceptions of various features of the international environment such as ethics, law, and ideology," p. 217.

¹¹ George Shepherd Jr., and Tilden LeMelle, Race Among Nations: A Conceptual Approach (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1970), p. xv.

¹² George Shepherd Jr., "The Study of Race in American Foreign Policy and International Relations," Shepherd, and LeMelle, p. 11.

¹³ George Shepherd Jr., "Comparative Policy in White Dominance Systems," in Shepherd and LeMelle, p. 154.

¹⁴ Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (eds.) Margot Light and J.R. Groom (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1985), p. 8.

¹⁵ Alan Anderson and James Frideres, Ethnicity in Canada: Theoretical Perspectives (Toronto: Butterworth and Co., Canada Ltd., 1981), p. 205. "...institutional racism does not exist until the

processes that maintain domination – control of whites over non-whites – are built into the major social institutions."

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

¹⁷ Pierre L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism: Comparative Perspective (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 18.

¹⁸ Shepherd, "The Study of Race...", p. 5. (emphasis mine).

¹⁹ J.A. Robinson & R. Snyder, "Decision making in International Politics," International Behaviour: A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. H.C. Kelman (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), p. 436.

²⁰ Sidney Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice (N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1964), p. 6. [Emphasis mine]

²¹ Holmes, Shaping Vol. I, p. xi; Escott Reid Papers, MG 31 E46 Vol: 7 File: 16# 201.1. The re-examination of Canadian foreign policy in the UN in 1951 was a forty page document. There was no paper on Africa. The heading "Nationalism, Colonialism and Racism in the United Nations" was discussed in five pages only.

²² Holmes, Shaping Vol. II, p. 323.

²³ Canada, House of Commons. Debates, 1953 to 1954, Vol: IV, April 1, 1954. p.3557.

L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State, "...no government and no parliament can make its own foreign policy decisions exclusively under its own roof, not even the government in Washington." Pearson, Mike, Vol. 2., p. 169-170. USA pressure on Canada to support the USA resolution declaring China to be an aggressor: "We succumbed to that pressure, although I made it clear to the Assembly that we did not think that the course was the wisest." See also Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand days: John F Kennedy in the White House. (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 487. USA behaviour and reaction in the UN re: India's invasion of Portuguese Goa, December 17, 1961. "...Salazar had requested that we keep things to the narrow issue of aggression and that the Department had assured our Ambassador in Lisbon the night before that we would not raise the colonial issue. This commitment, undertaken without White House consultation, tied our hands at the United Nations." H. Alker & B. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 196. "To get support on things it thinks important, the United States has had to bargain and has had to show more concern regarding issues important to other states."

²⁴ John Garnett, Commonsense and the Theory of International Politics (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1984), p. 104.

²⁵ MG 26L, Vol: 171. File: C-18-17, 1956. Message from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of Canada. Personal and Secret.

Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1, From Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa. July 19, 1952. Personal and Confidential. "I expect that you were able to read a good deal between the lines of my Telegram No: 314 of July 17, reporting Council action upon the revised budget estimates of the Secretary General." See also, From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson Ottawa, July 25, 1952. He advises that discussion of NATO "considerations" should rather be done on a personal basis and not by written communication.

²⁶ Garnett, p. 105. See also Appendix for the problems of this nature which I encountered in Ottawa.

²⁷ Escott Reid papers, MG 31 E 46 Vol: V File: 8.II 1946-55, January 11, 1952. "...public statements which the Canadian Delegation has made...are clearly misleading;" Pearson Papers, MG 26 N1 Vol: 17 File: "Wrong, H. H. 1948-53." From: Hume Wrong, Washington. To: Pearson, Ottawa, March 7, 1951. Personal. "The current aim of the military operations [in Korea] is, of course, to teach the Chinese and the North Koreans the cost of aggression and that it is most readily calculated in terms of casualties. We do not quarrel at all with the aim, but we certainly ought not to gloat over the results. Nearly all Koreans, both North and South, must now rue the day on which they became victims of collective security"; UNGAOR, Seventh Session Plenary Meetings, 382nd Meeting, October 17, 1952. Martin (Canada): "The United Nations intervened in Korea for the sole purpose of resisting and defeating aggression. That was, I repeat, its sole purpose...."

RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/160 Vol:79 File No: 5475-GH-1-40 pt.1. Memorandum for Mr. Hardy: General Assembly Post Mortem, F.M. Tovell, United Nations Division, November 13, 1951. An important indicator of the kinds of information that go into decision making is Ottawa's Instructions for the Delegation to the UN: "It is important I think that such guidance for the Delegation should be as general as possible, for the trend of the debate may easily render useless a carefully drafted instruction. Further, if the guidance is too rigid, the Delegation will have less room for manoeuvring and will be less able to adjust itself to a situation in which tactics may be of importance. At times, for example, the order in which all resolutions on an item come up for vote may actually determine how the Delegation should vote." And in recognition of the value of the United Nations operational context, the Delegation was given this guideline for the preparation of its report: "Its most important feature...would be an introductory section which would attempt to give something of the atmosphere in which the General Assembly will be meeting. This would, I think, make the importance of some of the items stand out more than they do in the present form. I think that with the increasingly close relationship existing between the international problems of the day, any attempt to draft separate memoranda on Asian and Middle-Eastern problems, or the problems of any other area, before the Assembly is unrealistic."

RG 25 Vol: 3463 File 6/1955/1 pt.1. Introduction (1) Confidential. "...it is useful if the Delegation can submit occasional reports on the general trend and atmosphere of the session, the tactics and behaviour of the various blocs, etc....merely summarising the debates on particular items should be avoided, since their usefulness is very limited."

Debates are utilised in this study only to the extent that they are necessary to set the context of manoeuvrability. Instructive for our selection of 'evidence' is this directive to the Delegation: "For the maintenance of a permanent record of Canadian policy, a final report must be prepared by the responsible adviser for each item of the agenda. The including off-the-record discussions and confidential comments. The final report should be completed as soon as possible after the item has been dealt with." Therefore we have utilised only first hand accounts which were written at the time that the issue was under consideration and by those officials who were directly involved in the matter. This written record is our evidence. We have not sought interviews. Our recourse to published materials from officials in the Department of External Affairs was for comparative purposes only. The Commentary for the Delegation outlines policy – the logic, the aim, the projected plans of other governments and strategy for the Delegation at the UN. It, "is a document classified as Secret and when not in use it should be stored in a secure place...and properly guarded."

²⁸ We know that Ottawa placed much value on the input from specific allies and favoured members. However, inputs from the Missions in such countries were seldom traceable. Memorandum for Mr. Hardy, November 13, 1951. "It might be worth while sending copies of commentary articles on particular items of interest to us, even if such articles represent only tentative thinking, to our Missions in Commonwealth and NATO countries which are also members of the United Nations, and possibly Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, so that these Missions would be able to discuss the substance of our views with the local foreign office, either on their own initiative or the request of the Foreign Office. Such consultation would be in addition to the pre-Assembly talks in New York." RG 25 Vol: 7572 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.1.1. From: Acting USSEA, Ottawa To: All Missions. No. letter V, August 4, 1954. Subject: Agenda for Ninth Session UNGA; Distribution to Posts: Commonwealth, Mexico, Brazil, NATO, PERMDEL, New York and Geneva. "Preparation is under way for the Commentary for the Canadian Delegation in the Department and any information that you may obtain on the views of the Government to which you are accredited on the various items of the agenda will be most welcome." RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/160 Vol: 79 File: 5475-FA-41-40 pt.1. Informal Record of a Meeting held in Commonwealth Relations Office on Friday, April 26, 1957. Arnold Smith – Canada House: on topics requiring "serious discussions and perhaps working out some compromise...much of the discussion would, of course, take place in the corridors or through diplomatic channels."

²⁹ J.W.Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power (Toronto: McClelland and Steward Limited, 1976). "Our contemporary foreign policy is more closely concerned with the national interest, not because the collectivist policies of the early post-war period failed to serve the national interest in their time but because the big issues of the seventies – distribution of resources and population in

the world at large – cut closer to our bone. The decisions we have to take about food for Bangladesh and the extent of the continental shelf affect the basic preoccupation of the electorate in ways which the Suez crisis never did."

³⁰ Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 92-93.

³¹ D. Jackson and R. Jackson, Politics in Canada: Culture Institutions, Behaviour and Public Policy, (2nd. ed., Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1990), p. 623.

³² D. Goldsworthy, "Britain and the International Critics of British Colonialism, 1951-56," The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol: XXIX (March, 1991), No:1, p. 4.

³³ Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p. 88.

³⁴ Quoted from CO 936/318/176: "Pre-Assembly UK/USA Talks on Colonial Questions," held on October 11-12, 1956. Cited in Goldsworthy, p. 15.

RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.5. From: Hume Wrong To: J. Holmes, May 27, 1950. On a talk with Hickerson of the State Department, Hickerson mentioned that the British wanted a few State Department people to meet in London "mainly in order to talk over colonial questions...because of the availability there of Colonial Office people. He was strongly opposed...a conference in London would undoubtedly be represented by the Russians and others as having determined the American attitude..." Memorandum, Escott Reid To: H.B. Robinson. May 30, 1950. Secret. "UK – USA – Canada Consultations Prior to General Assembly."

³⁵ T.B. Millar, The East-West Strategic Balance (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. xvii.

³⁶ Waltz, p. 72. See for example: RG 25 Acc. 86-87/160 Vol: 77 File: 5475-2-40 Sub. Y, Chron. Y. pp.13-16, which deals especially with "the pros and cons of a horse trade re: applicants for membership from the polar sections of the world: Communist and Non-Communist."

³⁷ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.5. From: Escott Reid, Ottawa To: J. Holmes, PERMDEL, New York, No: 544, May 26, 1950. Top Secret. Reid wanted information "along what lines the UK and the USA intended to co-ordinate their policies on [trusteeship and colonial] matters in the UN as a result of bilateral talks...unofficially, of course." He explained that "this information would be of considerable value in formulating the policy to be followed by the Canadian Delegation at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. We would not, of course, wish to prejudice our position by having anyone present during the discussions." We were unable to trace any response from New York on this matter. A result of this communication was Memorandum, Escott Reid To: H.B. Robinson. May 30, 1950. Secret. "UK – USA – Canada Consultations Prior to General Assembly."

³⁸ Waltz, p. 73.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 72.

⁴⁰ Homes, Shaping. Vol.II, pp.295-296. See also: Edward T. Rowe, "The Emerging Anti-Colonial Consensus in the United Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII No: 3 (September, 1964), p. 229. "The choices which are made by the Colonial Powers are at least partially determined by the 'Cold War.' The fact that most of the Colonial Powers have policy aims arising out of the Cold War which are essentially unrelated to the question of colonialism is probably one of the most important factors helping to determine their positions on colonial issues." See also Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945, trans. Michael Shaw (N.Y.: Continuum, 1980), p. XIV. "Although the problem of decolonisation presented itself neither in the same way nor at the same time for Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France, the policy of the American government nonetheless pursued similar aims in all four cases and they can therefore not be treated as separate and purely national matters."

⁴¹ Howard Green, Foreword to the Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1960, p. v. Cited in R. Preston, Canada in World Affairs: 1959-1961 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 20.

⁴² Robinson & Snyder, p. 437.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Waltz, p. 72.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 69.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 69. "The repeated failure of attempts to explain international outcomes analytically – that is, through examination of interacting units – strongly signal the need for a systems approach." pp. 67-68.

⁴⁹ Kenneth Thompson & Roy Macridis, "The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy in World Politics, ed. Roy Macridis (3rd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 4.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ M. Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto, Ont.: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980), p. xi. Paul W. Fox, "Editors Foreword." And, Kenneth Waltz asks: "If changes in international outcomes are linked directly to changes in actors, how can one account for similarities of outcome that persist or recur even as actors vary? One who believes that he can account for changes in international politics must ask how continuities can be explained," p. 65.

⁵² Howard Bliss & Glen Johnson, Beyond the Water's Edge: America's Foreign Policies (N.Y.: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975), p. 97. They also add: "...we must not claim too much for national style....It is only part of the framework (as the national experience is part of the framework), a part of the milieu, in which the policy-maker works....It sets limits because it involves perceptions of what action is possible, but it does not control policy. Often, it conditions the way in which policy is articulated and explained and, as such, it becomes self-reinforcing."

⁵³ Russett, International Regions, p. 92.

⁵⁴ Thompson & Macridis, "The Comparative Study...." p. 4.

⁵⁵ J.W. Burton, International Relations (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 113. See also: L.P. Singh, India's Foreign Policy: The Shastri Period (New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 1980), p. 21. He was more explicit in explaining this 'intangible' aspect in the national mind of India. He found that: "...the legitimacy and symbolism of nonalignment had become so deeply rooted among the Indian political public or, at any rate, in much of the Indian political elite, that Shastri, even if he wanted to, could not deviate from the policy of nonalignment. The Voice of America agreement of 1963 had brought home to all concerned how nonalignment had become synonymous with national independence and self-respect."

⁵⁶ William Zartman, "National Interest and Ideology," African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy, ed. Vernon McKay (N.Y.: Praeger, 1966), p. 30.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 31.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Russett, International Regions....p. 92. "By and large the issues voted upon in the Assembly during the Session[1963, 18th Session] closely resembled those that prevailed in earlier years. A previous study (Alker & Russett, 1965) showed that three major issue dimensions or 'super-issues' could be identified in each of the four different Sessions spread over virtually the entire history of the United Nations. They were characterised as 'cold war,' 'colonial self-determination,' and 'supranationalism,' issues." p. 63.

⁶¹ Innis Claude Jr., The Changing United Nations (N.Y.: Random House, 1967), pp. 90-91.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ UNGAOR, Seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 382nd Meeting, October 17, 1952. p. 85. "Speaking for a country which grew up from colonial to independent status before the United Nations came into existence, I cannot guess how the development of Canada would have fared had those of our forefathers who pursued the family struggle for independence had such an organisation as this to which they might have appealed. I think it would be very difficult to say whether, looking back on our history, any kind of international organisation could, in fact, have speeded up the process. And I think it is even more difficult to say whether a speeding-up would from our purely national point of view, have been to our long-term advantage." Paul Martin (Canada)

Goldsworthy, p. 4, quoted FO Intel to Certain of Her Majesty's Representatives, "Colonial Questions at the UN," August 1954. Copy at CO 936/325/14. "Britain maintained that UN efforts to superimpose a further tier of authority in colonial affairs would upset the very delicate political

process of devolution of power in colonies. It would probably cause delays rather than accelerations, and thus be completely self-defeating."

Marc Lee, The United Nations and World Realities (London: Pergamon Press, 1965), p. 102.

"There is the persistent feeling among the imperial and former imperial powers that the UN has been, in some undefined way, the cause of the independence movement that has overtaken and left them with far fewer overseas possessions than once they had."

⁶⁴ Claude, p. 58. "Collective legitimisation is an aspect of the verbal rather than the executive functioning of the United Nations, and in some sense it is a result of the organisation's incapacity for decisive intervention and control of international relations." p. 88.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 59.

⁶⁶ H.G. Nickolas, The United Nations as a Political Institution (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 214.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 215.

⁶⁸ Waltz, p. 72.

⁶⁹ Claude, pp. 58-59.

⁷⁰ R. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers (New York: Praeger Pub., 1983), p.

9.

⁷¹ RG 25 Vol: 7792, File: 12529-40. pt. 1.1.

From: Embassy Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa No: 906, October 1, 1957. Confidential and Priority. Telegram No: 901 of September 30, under reference, not traceable. Davis speculated whether the defeat of the Bourges-Maunoury Government by a vote of confidence on the Loi-Cadre for Algeria, on September 30, may well have been partially influenced by "the uneasiness created by the call for federal institutions in French West Africa at the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain Conference being held at Bamako." Davis reported that Soustelle, the leader of the ex-Gaullist was "primarily responsible for the fall of the government" and he felt that Soustelle "played" this development in Bamako "very cleverly," during the debate. The RDA, the principal political party in French Black Africa, held its congress in Bamako, Sudan, from September 25th to 30th. There were 2500 delegates from ten territories and some 40 invited guests from other African parties and French parties.

RG 25, Acc: 86-87/360. Vol: 85, file: 9764-40-pt.3. From: Office of High Commissioner for Canada, London To: USSEA, Ottawa. No: 224, February 5, 1959. Confidential. "The Leopoldville riots have brought a new sense of urgency to the consideration by officials in the United Kingdom of the question whether British and indeed European influence can be maintained in Black Africa in the face of the present rapidly evolving situation....Because of these new developments Whitehall is at present under instructions from the Ministers to take a searching look at the United Kingdom's policy in what remains of its dependent territories in Africa....Ministers are seriously concerned at the turbulence of the atmosphere and the increase in nationalist demands since the All-Africa Conference held at Accra in December 1958, and officials are making this latest re-appraisal at their express instructions."

⁷² RG 25 Vol: 7792, File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. From: The Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa No: 892, October 10, 1957. Confidential. At Bamako "the most interesting debates were devoted to the nature of the relationship between Black Africa and metropolitan France...without going into the details of the debates, it is possible to make a number of general observations. In the first place, there is obviously a strong desire for the African territories to remain in close association with France. There was virtually no expression of a desire to break the links with France nor demand the full step towards immediate independence which has been the pattern in Ghana. A close association with the metropole is regarded by the RDA as an essential in the economic, social and political development of Black Africa."

RG 25 Vol: 5362 File: 10283-L-40 pt.2. From: Johnson, Yaounde To: Foreign Office, London. Telegram No: 32 Saving. October 24, 1960. Confidential: Canadian Eyes Only. Subj: Situation in Cameroun - External." President Ahidjo has accepted an invitation from M. Houphouet-Boigny to a conference in Abidjan of the Head of French-speaking African States on October 24, though he said that he would have preferred a meeting of Head of all African States. It appears that Algeria is the main item on the agenda and...it seems that Cameroun is bound to support Algerian independence, in principle at any rate.

RG 25 Vol: 5541 File: 12529-40 pt.2. From: Leopoldville To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 226, December 21, 1960. Unclassified. "A Conference of Heads of French speaking African states was held in Brazzaville from December 15 to 19. All except Guinea, Mali and Togo were represented. On Algeria Conference after paying homage to Gen. De Gaulle who they pointed out had been responsible for granting independence to 13 African states expressed sorrow that Algerian War had dragged on so long and demanded that France put an end to it in 1961. They suggested that after negotiations France should apply honestly principle of self-determination...Conference declared its opposition to a UN supervised referendum in Algeria a solution which it termed of little practical value...."

RG 25 Vol: 5541 File: 12529-40 pt.2. From: Pierre Dupuy, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Dispatch No: 270, March 29, 1961. Restricted. At the Congress in Bamako, Leon Mba (who was exiled from Gabon by French authorities from 1933 to 1946) "showed a strong preference for a Community status for ex-French colonies." He became President of Gabon on its independence in 1960. According to the Ambassador, Mba saw General de Gaulle as "the Champion of the black man."

RG 25 Vol: 5586 File: 12858-40 pt.2. From: Berlis, Dar-es-Salam To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 251, May 29, 1963. Confidential. Subject: "Colonialism Issue at ADDISABABA" conference. He reported that "Burden of anti-colonialist feeling at ADDISABABA was directed mainly against South Africa and Portugal. Now that most countries in Africa have achieved their own independence the emotional force of anti-colonialism has been redirected towards those areas where white minorities still control African majorities...."

⁷³ Brian Urquhart, "The Management of Change: The Role of the UN," Canada and the United Nations in a Changing World (Ottawa: The United Nations Association in Canada, 1977), pp. 43-44. Brian Urquhart was the Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, United Nations Secretariat.

⁷⁴ Innis Claude Jr., Swords Into Plowshares (4th ed., N.Y.: Random House, 1971), p. 6.

⁷⁵ Claude, Changing, p. 50. Claude felt that the three "major seismic disturbances...are not altogether unrelated to each other. All of them involve fission of some sort, suggesting that we are witnessing a chain reaction," p. 49. "There are obvious relationships between the first two; the development of thermonuclear weapons and their new-fangled delivery systems contributed to the mutual fear and mistrust that brought the sharp Division between the leaders of East and West. The clash between the latter led to the arms race that stimulated the continuing series of advances in the technology of destruction," p. 50. "The third phenomenon, decolonisation, is also intimately related to the other two. Perhaps it is fair to say that...a cosy Joint Directorate of the Big Five, a sort of Global Pentagon would not have been likely to encourage or to permit the kind of disintegration of the status quo that has in fact taken place. It may be that the liberation of colonial peoples could only have taken place in the interstices between the major powers."

⁷⁶ J. G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations: World Politics in Our Time (6th ed.; N.Y.: Random House, 1979), p. 337.

⁷⁷ Claude, Swords, p. 6.

⁷⁸ J.P. Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1984), p. 25.

⁷⁹ Holmes, Shaping Vol.II, p. 294.

⁸⁰ Humphrey, p.75. "As far as I know, no one has ever attempted to bring together and analyse the countless times that the Declaration has been invoked, either within or outside the United Nations or has been used as the standard of permissible action."

Escott Reid Papers, MG 31 E 46 Vol 7 File 16 # 201.1. A parallel development was taking place inside of Canada, see Provincial Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy. September 26, 1951. Confidential. A 60 page document with an Appendix "Extracts from the British North America Act 1867 to 1951."

⁸¹ Ronald Manzer, "Human Rights in Domestic Politics and Policy," Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. R.O. Matthews and C. Pratt (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), pp. 44-45. "Standards of human rights developed in international organisations have been adopted by Canadian legislation...the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants spurred constitutional entrenchment of rights in Canada. Even the struggle of Third World

countries for political and economic independence, one of today's primary expressions of claims to basic rights, resonated in Canada, where an analogy has been asserted to back claims for French-Canadian and aboriginal rights."

⁸² Holmes, Shaping Vol: II. p. 294.

⁸³ Zartman, p. 26; John Plamenatz, Ideology (London, Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1970), p. 15. "The word 'ideology'...is used to refer to a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community."

⁸⁴ Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory, ed. Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1985), p. 8.

⁸⁵ Lawrence S. Falkowski, "Evaluating Psychological Models," Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. L.S. Falkowski (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press Inc., 1979), p. 6.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Henri Grimal, Decolonisation: The British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires 1919-1963, trans. Stephan DeVos (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), p. 144.

Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73, 2nd ed.; (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974), p. 459. He sees Communism "both as an ideology and as a power system"; See also: Adam B. Ulam, "Communist Doctrine and Soviet Diplomacy: Some Observations," International Negotiation (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 4. His main concern: "Clash of systemic socialisation and style in foreign policy behaviour."

⁸⁸ Pearson Papers, MG 26 N 1 Vol 1: Acheson From: Hume Wrong, Washington To: Pearson Ottawa, January 18, 1949. Dean Acheson's confirmation hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senators were concerned with "the suggestions that Dean is or has been, inclined to appease the Soviet Union. They finally drafted together two sentences, which Dean agreed to having released, declaring his objections to Communism both as an economic doctrine and as an international force."

⁸⁹ Zartmann, p. 39.

⁹⁰ Charles De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (Trans. Terence Kilmartin, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p.200; Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs 1957-1959 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 6. He wrote of the period June 1958 when De Gaulle was brought out of retirement to lead the government: "Filled with justified confidence that he could restore his country to its rightful place in the world, De Gaulle pursued a policy completely different from that of Mr. MacMillan; reticent, withdrawn, unco-operative, he showed no desire to make the conduct of policy easier for his allies and no intention of doing anything to relax the strain of the Cold War."

⁹¹ MG 31, E6, Vol: 5, File: 57. Department of External Affairs, Summary Reports: French Political Scene, 1958- No: 7. January 24, 1958. Confidential. "Whether the Government of Premier Felix Gaillard will survive depends upon how well the Premier is able to hold together his broad coalition of nine parties, ranging from the Socialists on the left to the Independents on the right. Almost any issue is capable of upsetting this uneasy alliance, which was formed reluctantly by most member parties only to meet pressing problems.

There are three major problems facing the present French Government, two of which – economic retrenchment and the solution of the Algerian question – have confronted every French Government in recent years. The third, constitutional and electoral reform, while an underlying problem for years, has only become a major issue at this time since Gaillard has declared he will stake the life of his Government on it. In the economic field, France's position progressively worsened during most of 1956 and 1957. French production, suffering from an insufficient rate of investment during previous years, failed to keep pace with the rapid rise in domestic demand. As a result, imports rose sharply and exports dropped. In addition, extensive frost damage to agricultural crops, the demand on resources and manpower caused by the Algerian crisis, labour's pressure for wage increases and resort to general strikes, and the economic consequences of the Suez action, had the cumulative effect of nearly exhausting France's gold and foreign currency reserves piling up a huge deficit in foreign trade and increasing inflation on the home front. Indeed, last November the Treasury was approaching bankruptcy."

⁹² RG 25, Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40-pt.1.3. The French Community, Ottawa, March 31, 1960. Confidential. This is at least how officials perceived this move. "By conceding the right to independence the French hope to maintain good relations with the African leaders, and there is some evidence that they are succeeding. Many leaders appear more attracted by association with France than by Pan-Africanism and confidence in president de Gaulle is widespread."

⁹³ In August 1958 Charles de Gaulle toured Africa and promised a referendum at the end of September which offered a choice: to accept the "federal basis" of the French Community by voting "yes" or to make a complete break with France, if they did not approve of the new constitution; thereby attaining full independence as a sovereign nation. This situation was, of course, a direct influence on what was happening in British Black Africa.

RG 25 Vol: 7792, File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Canadian Embassy, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, No. 719, August 29, 1958. Charles de Gaulle "...spoke frankly and unequivocally, and in a way which made it abundantly clear that the choice between association and independence lay with the Africans themselves. France would abide faithfully by that choice. He hoped and expected that the territories would choose association with France, for while the association would lay heavy economic burdens on France itself, and certain limitations on the freedom of the African territories, it would be of great mutual benefit economically, politically and defensively...independence for any territory...was available for the taking now, and such a desire could be expressed by voting "no" in the referendum. If any territory chose this course, it should be aware that it could no longer expect to receive the extensive economic aid which France has poured into its African possessions since the war...."

RG 25, Vol: 7792, File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1207, November 12, 1959. Confidential. In an October 13, speech, French Prime Minister Debre explained to those opting to remain within the Community that "future aid will depend upon the maintenance of some formal community link whatever arrangements there may be for the common competences to be transferred." This, he believed, "was a reasonable and necessary price for the interests of Africa, the Commonwealth, France and the West."

⁹⁴ Grimal, Decolonisation, p. 374. RG 25, Vol: 7792, File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Paris To: Ottawa, No: 1202, November 11, 1959. De Gaulle "stated that should Togoland and the Cameroons wish to associate themselves with the Community after achieving independence next year, the Community would, he believed, give satisfaction to those two good partners. It is apparent that de Gaulle had utilised the carrot and the stick approach to keep the colonies within the Community and he was prepared to open its doors to all those British ex-colonies that were prepared to give up a bit of their independence for the benefits they would derive from 'association' with the French Community of Nations."

From Embassy Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1207, November 12, 1959. Confidential. "The latest development has been de Gaulle's comment in his November 10 press conference on the complementary nature of French aid and Community membership; his allusion to the possibility of association with the Community of Togoland and the Cameroons, when independent; and his explanation of the inherent political reason why Guinean association with the Community was unthinkable." In this speech, de Gaulle's "reference...to the Togoland and Cameroon Trustee status is somewhat surprising...because of the obvious practical difficulties...in arranging such an association, and especially in view of the fairly forthright indications from Olympio and Ahidjo that their respective status on independence would perhaps seek some cultural or other technical relations with France, but probably no repeat no political link such as Community status." For an example of de Gaulle's new carrot and stick policy which did not receive Canada's support. See also: RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12530-40 pt.2. From: Canadian Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1189, November 6, 1959. Info: Permanent Mission, New York, and Canadian Embassy Washington D.C. Subj.: "Visit of Community Leader to Canada." "The papers mention Houphouet's intention to pay a courtesy call on Eisenhower but omitted reference] to a possible Ottawa visit....We have not discussed this with the French in view of our understanding that the Department would not particularly be anxious to have a visit by African Leaders and we fear that to discuss it with the French might be to encourage them to raise possibility." This was in light of an earlier discussion of the same matter. See: From: Permanent Mission, New York To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1166, September 6, 1959.

Subject: "Suggested visit of French African Leaders to Ottawa." I feel some hesitation in suggesting that we raise this matter with Couve de Marville before having the benefit of your views and an appreciation of the anticipated French reaction. I shall await your comments." Ritchie.

See also: From: Canadian Embassy Washington D.C. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2914, November 20, 1959. Confidential. Cassilly of the West African Desk said "that the French had arranged visits to Canadian Embassy Washington D.C. for two of the African members of their Del[egation] to the General Assembly and a Rep[resentative] from Madagascar. These visits he said were clearly intended to counter-balance the effect of Sekou Toure's visit and to add to the Prestige of the African leaders who have not attempted to sever ties with France."

⁹⁵ RG 25 Vol: 7792, File: 12529-40-pt.1.1. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa. Dispatch No: 892, October 10, 1957. Confidential. Despatch No: 366, April 11, 1957. Under reference, not traceable. The embassy notified Ottawa that Pignon, Political Director in the Ministry of Overseas France found the attention and "flattery extended by Moscow to Black African delegates...very worrying for the future."

⁹⁶ RG 25 Vol: 4432, File: 12530-40-pt.1. From: Accra To: External Affairs, Ottawa, 68. Priority. From: London, April 29, 1959. Confidential.

⁹⁷ MG 31, E6, Vol:5, File: 45. From: The Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D.C. To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 1137, June 23, 1954. Secret. Teletype No: WA-643, April 13th. Under reference, not traceable. Re: "USA Mutual Security Program for 1954-1955." "Mutual aid remains an indispensable part of United States foreign policy...in light of the necessity to secure approval from congress for what has become an increasingly unpopular programme...new appropriations...is being requested for the Far East and for the Pacific...for Indo-China." He pointed out that the Administration was fettered by the necessity to take into account "the widespread determination in congress that United States foreign aid should be terminated without delay. He observed that this would most probably explain "the Administration's preoccupation with a few areas of critical importance in the Cold War."

⁹⁸ MG 31, E6, Vol:5, File: 57. Department of External Affairs, Summary Reports: Exchanges between the U.S.S.R. and the West, 1958- No: 31. May 8, 1958. Secret. Both the USA and Canada were convinced of "the Soviet aim of promoting the idea of peaceful co-existence," on two grounds. Although the Department admitted that "the motivation for this Soviet policy is complex," officials believed that Soviet "basic interest in recent technological developments in the West and a desire to secure technological information and materials...." were enough evidence of the earnestness of the Soviet new policy. The "possibilities of developing trade" was another factor.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Zartman, p. 39.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 25-26.

¹⁰² Robert Ross, "Reflections on a Theme," Racism and Colonialism: Essays on Ideology and Social Structure, ed. Robert Ross (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p. 9.

¹⁰³ Zartman, p. 38.

¹⁰⁴ David Findlay & Thomas Hovet Jr., 7304: International Relations on the Planet Earth (N.Y.: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975), p. 5.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Jackson, p. xiii. "Foreword" by the Ambassador.

¹⁰⁷ UNGAOR, 16th Session, 1066th meeting, November 27, 1961, paragraph 107. Quoted in David Kay, New Nations in the United Nations (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 173, fn. 67.

¹⁰⁸ Ulam, p. 29.

¹⁰⁹ Ulam, p. 331. "The provisions that all peoples have the right to choose the form of government under which they live and that territorial changes have to be made in accordance with the 'freely expressed wishes of the people concerned' were capable of many and possibly, from the Soviet point of view, uncomfortable interpretations."

¹¹⁰ Jackson, p. xix.

¹¹¹ John Spanier, Games Nations Play: Analysing International Politics (3rd ed.; N.Y.: Holt Rhinehart & Winston/Praeger, 1978), p. 69.

¹¹² Werner Feld & Robert Jordan, International Organisations: A Comparative Approach (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 142.

¹¹³ Bailey, p.9.

¹¹⁴ Roderick Ogley, "Voting and Politics in the General Assembly," International Relations Vol.II, No.3. April, 1961, p. 164.

¹¹⁵ C.S. Jha. From Bandung to Tashkent: Glimpses in India's Foreign Policy (London: Sangam Books Ltd., 1983), p. 165.

¹¹⁶ Claude, pp. 62-63. "Qualitative transformation has not been far behind quantitative increase. The key question is not how many but what kind of new members have crowded into the organisation...They tend generally to fall into one roughly definable category. They are, by and large, non-European, non-white, non-Western, so to speak; ex-colonial and more or less hotly anti-colonial; economically underdeveloped and socially unmodernised – poor, less strongly devoted to neutralism or nonalignment with respect to the East-West Cold War."

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 64.

¹¹⁸ RG 25, Acc. No: 86-87/ 160 Vol: 79 File: 5475-FA-41-40 pt.1. From: Permanent Mission, New York To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 904, March 22, 1957. Immediate. Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Under reference: Letter Holmes To: Murrey, March 18, and London Telegram To Ottawa, No: 499 March 18 on same subject, not traceable. On the whole the Delegation believed that there was a "lack of cohesion among the Afro-Asians. Many of them have insisted that they should not be referred to as a group or a bloc. Some of them have complained about the method used by their Afro-Asian colleagues to dominate the group and to create false impressions about its attitude on many issues. There was evidence at the Eleventh Session that there were strongly opposing factions and more than one attempt to control the majority through the use of more selective Afro-Asian meetings (not unlike the Old Commonwealth gatherings)."

¹¹⁹ Claude, p. 65.

¹²⁰ Hanna Newcombe, et al., Patterns of Nations: Interactions in the UN, 1946-1971 (Dundas, Ont.: Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1977), p. 5.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ No: 904, March 22, 1957. Draft Memorandum, Department of External Affairs, March 16, under reference, not traceable. The Delegation complained that the Draft Memorandum "does not give enough recognition to the fundamental fact that national self-interest is the strongest motivating force at the UN as elsewhere." The Delegation added that "It is just this national self-interest which operates against any consistent system of bloc voting in the Assembly. Even at the Eleventh Session when the Afro-Asians appeared to have the upper hand among the group that group decisions could frequently clash with national interest. The Indians, for example, where opposed to the Afro-Asians draft resolutions containing sanctions probably because they realise that if non-compliance with UN resolutions should be the basis for sanctions, India might conceivably be faced with them on some future occasion. In the economic field the Afro-Asians demonstrated their awareness that their economic well-being was ultimately more dependent on the West than on the USSR. Even in the field of human rights, where the Afro-Asians have traditionally behaved 'irresponsible', there was some realisation that extravagant claims might some day rebound."

¹²⁴ Newcombe, p. 7.

¹²⁵ Howard Alker & Bruce Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1965), p. 6.

¹²⁶ Russett, Trends, p. 85.

¹²⁷ Jha, p. 171.

¹²⁸ RG 25 Vol: 5586 File: 12858-40 pt.2. From: Berlis, Dar-es-Salam To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 251, May 29, 1963. Confidential. Subject: "Colonialism Issue at ADDISABABA" conference. All Africans can unite in condemning colonialism or white minority rule, and this is [a] powerful unifying force. It was thus natural that anti-colonial theme was used extensively at

ADDISABABA to demonstrate common approach of some 30 states which on many other issues were divided."

¹²⁹ Jha, p.171.

¹³⁰ Western Bloc: Portugal, Spain, UK, Sweden, Australia, Italy, Yugoslavia, Norway, Luxembourg, Turkey, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, France, Finland, Cyprus, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium. "West Europeans" as defined by Russett to "include United States, Canada, Australia; New Zealand and South Africa because of their similar cultural characteristics" and coincidentally identical racial origins. Trends, p. 90. fn. No: 2.

¹³¹ Newcombe, p. 6.

¹³² Russett, International Regions, p. 68. (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, New Zealand, Uruguay and United States) all outside the geographical area of Europe.

¹³³ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 609th Meeting, December 5, 1956. In reference to the Soviet Union he argued that "it is neither natural nor fitting when a group is forced to become - superficially at least - so united that it automatically votes as one, on even the most unimportant procedural issues."

¹³⁴ Bruce Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," The American Political Science Review Vol. LX, N.2 (June, 1966), p.327.

¹³⁵ Robert Keohane, "Institutionalisation in the United Nations General Assembly," International Organisation XXII No.4 (Autumn, 1969), p. 867.

¹³⁶ Kurt Jacobson, The General Assembly of the United Nations (N.Y.: Columbia Press, 1978), p. 148.

¹³⁷ Frederick Gareau, "Cold War Cleavages," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 32, (November, 1970), p.935.

¹³⁸ Robert M. Clark (ed.), Canadian Issues: Essays in Honour of Henry P. Angus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 87. For example in 1955 Frederick Soward pointed out that, in one instance Canada had changed a negative voting stand to an abstention "in order to avert a closer union between the Soviet bloc and the Afro-Asian on other important questions such as disarmament."

¹³⁹ Anthony Miller, "Functionalism and Foreign Politics: An Analysis of Canadian Voting Behaviour in the General Assembly 1946-1966," Ph.D. Dissertation, (Mc Gill University, 1971), p. 271, fn: 33.

¹⁴⁰ Gareau, "Cold War Cleavages...." He argued for a negative valence.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Russett, Trends, p. 87.

¹⁴³ Steven Holloway, "Forty Years of United Nations General Assembly Voting," Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol: 23, No:2 (June 1990), p. 279.

¹⁴⁴ Holloway, p. 259.

¹⁴⁵ Alker & Russett, World Politics, p. 219. "The notion of a 'funnel of causality' whose principal axis is a time dimension toward the centre of which at any time period are those causal events that are theoretically relevant, personally conscious, and perceived as increasingly political." is presented in Campbell et al., The American Voter, Chapter 1. and quoted in Alker & Russett, Ibid., fn. 2.

¹⁴⁶ Claude, Changing, p. 53.

¹⁴⁷ Alker & Russett, World Politics, p. 32.

¹⁴⁸ See William Coplin and Charles Kegley, Analysing International Relations (New York: Praeger Publications, 1975), p. 5. For a detailed examination on "how scholars seek to explain the observations they report." That is, the arguments between the 'realist' and 'traditionalist' schools.

¹⁴⁹ Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.1. "All foreign policy systems...comprise a set of components which can be classified in three general categories: inputs, process and outputs."

¹⁵⁰ Finlay and Hovet, p.23.

¹⁵¹ F. Houphouet-Boigny, "Black Africa and the French Union." Foreign Affairs.

¹⁵² Robert Wendzel, International Relations: A Policymaker Focus (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1977), p. 50.

¹⁵³ K. Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color Consciousness: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.5. "Introduction: The Context of Race" by David B. Wilkins. Anthony Appiah has argued that "Because...racial inequality is the product of an unjust history, propagated across the generations in part by the segmented social structure of our race conscious society, it is appropriate that our government should be especially concerned when economic disparity takes a concentrated racial form," p. 179.

¹⁵⁴ Statements and Speeches, No: 65/18 (Ottawa: Departmental of External Affairs), p.2.

¹⁵⁵ H. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (3rd ed.; New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1977). p. 367.

¹⁵⁶ Cecil V. Crabb, jr. Nations in a Multipolar World (New York: Harper and Row Pub., 1968), p. 500. "The African indictment of American Policy holds that the United States has judged colonial issues primarily in light of its Cold War interest...."

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 370.

¹⁵⁸ Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (New York: Colombia University Press, 1990), pp.2-3.

¹⁵⁹ Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 199.

¹⁶⁰ Morton Winston, "Understanding Human Rights," The Philosophy of Human Rights ed. Morton E. Winston (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. C., 1989), p. 9. He asks "what goods or interests ought to be protected by such rights?"

Chapter II: A 'Canadian' Mind Set

The first part of this chapter will consider the situation of the native peoples from Canada's early development to the period of our study. Therefore, our analytical construct takes as its starting point, the established, legal and institutional separation of native peoples from white Canada. We would make no attempt to go back to the details of how this was designed because Canada's decision-making elite grew up in a system that was already developed. They did not create it but they worked to maintain it. We are concerned with the characteristics of racism rather than with racial conflict. Canada's native peoples are considered to be not so visible because of their 'reserved' or territorial separation from white Canada. This is a result of their legal distinction or "judicial incapacity." The British North America Act of 1867, Section 91 (24) is evidence of this, and it is conceived here as a correlation to the UN Charter conception of trusteeship. However, we observe that the UN recognition of the goal of self-government or eventual independence, in the colonial context, is an implicit acceptance of the eventual removal of alien rule or occupation of dependent peoples.

On the other hand, the British North America Act, Section 91 (24) is premised on a permanent inferior status within a system of white dominance and, as such, an internal colonial construct has analytical utility and relevance. It is not a theory but rather a model. The concept of political independence for Canada's native peoples, in the whole territory that was once theirs, has no valid

application to the present constellation of contemporary Canada. The native peoples of Canada cannot remove or throw out all the aliens occupying Canada. So, in this context, 'freedom' from their subjugated status has a different meaning from the classic colonial sense of political freedom. Our analytical construct rejects the concept of 'minority' as a categorisation for the Canada's native peoples. From the outset, the British North America Act empowered the Parliament of Canada "to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to...Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians." This responsibility is conceptualised here as a 'trust,' in view of the categorical imperative of "good Government." Parliament was endowed with comprehensive powers in regard to territorial jurisdiction and issues involved in managing the well-being of its wards.

The focus of this chapter is the refusal of successive governments of Canada to acknowledge the colonial status of its native peoples; they were not minorities, they were dependent peoples. In the second part of this chapter "Canada, the UN and Non-Self-Governing-Territories" we will analyse Ottawa's concern with the relevance of the status of its own native peoples in regard to the UN Charter categorisation of dependent peoples, and the implications of this problem for Canada's policy on the decolonisation of empires. The second part deals with a very short process with a duration of only four months. But it took place at the very early stage of the UN concern with the colonial issue and, therefore, with the establishment of procedure, precedence and process.

The second part will deal with a matter that was of direct concern for Canada's own sovereign borders. Therefore, officials in Ottawa were pressed to clarify the meaning of Chapter XI of the UN Charter and, specifically, its operative part, Article 73. To this end, they sought to understand the intention of the drafters of this Article. As a result of this process, they decided how they would interpret significant legal concepts such as "integral part of" and "domestic jurisdiction" Article 2(7) to suit their own self-interest: this was justified by virtue of the British North America Act. This, in turn, established Canada's policy that Colonial Powers could effectively and legally designate a piece of territory as an "integral part" of their metropolitan state, if they so desired.

This short process helps us to understand how race may function in an intricately interwoven connection between national and international policy, in a causal way. Canadian officials had perceived that the sanctity of Canada's borders was contingent upon a satisfactory resolution of the issue raised in an enquiry by the Secretary General of the UN. According to O. Asamoah, "the flexibility of certain norms of the Charter...allow a variety of interpretations leaving the law-applying organ the opportunity to make policy choices that are open to the criticism of political opportunism."¹

The third part of this chapter attempts to assess Canada's attitude and policy in regard to the International Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted in the UN, in 1948. We assume that phenotypic distinctions and the authority-structure factor, which is associated with the 'giving' of rights to dependent peoples, were operative variables in Canada's ambiguous policy. We

suggest that the controversy over federal-provincial jurisdiction was just a smoke-screen for the real motives behind Canada's policy, and will attempt to show why this was so.

In our viewpoint, all of these three themes could be adequately explored and Canada's policy analysed on our internal colonial construct model. In the opinion of Robert Hind, "one might suggest...that political entities' internal and external policies are too frequently studied separately, and that because of this propensity, keys of understanding and explanation remain hidden."² He points out that "one of the concepts protagonists" has made the claim that internal colonial theses "could help to 'bridge the distinction commonly perceived between so-called international relations and internal social relations'".³

A belief in the inherent inequality of non-white peoples exist in the mind set of Canada during the relevant period of the study. This belief found an institutional expression in the British North America Act and a structural manifestation in 'reservations' for native peoples inside Canada.⁴ These reflect a racial and mental separation between the 'we' of white Canada and the non-white native peoples. On this basis, and because of the nature of the colonial issue in the UN, we make the assumption that race may be a relevant factor in Canada's policy position on the decolonisation issue at the UN. Race is one of the many factors which has been assigned an operative role in our multivariate analysis of Canada's policy on this one issue. It is our aim in this chapter to show that the continuing perceived right by white Canada to decide on the lives and future of its

native peoples, may be taken as indicative of a role of race as an operative factor.

The UN and Canada's Non-Self-Governing-Territories

The Secretary General of the United Nations sent a letter dated June 29, 1946 to the Canadian Ambassador to the USA. It requested information from Canada in regard to any Non-Self-Governing-Territories which may be under its jurisdiction.⁵ There ensued a four-month long flurry of activities in several Departments in Ottawa, before a reply was sent to the Secretary General of the UN. In a direct appeal against the Government of Canada, a petition was sent in early 1924 by the Tribe of the Six Nations, to the League of Nations. We suggest that this was one of the important factors which had contributed to this flurry of activities.⁶ The Yukon, Northwest Territories and the Indian Reservations in Canada were the basic reasons for the concern. The Canadian Embassy in Washington thought that since the Indian and Eskimo problems in Canada and the USA were "somewhat similar", they could "co-ordinate their policies in regard to what line" they should follow. Ottawa was therefore requested to inform the Embassy as to whether the State Department intended to submit annual reports to the UN on Indian affairs and the position of the Eskimo population of Alaska.

Wershof of the Legal Department in Ottawa decided on August 14 to take the position that although "there may be room for legalistic argument as to whether the Northwest Territories and the Yukon are Non-Self-Governing-

Territories within the meaning of Article 73...it would be absurd to regard Article 73 as applying to these territories." It was believed that it could not have been the 'intention' of the signatories of the Charter to include parts of the metropolitan territory as such.⁷ However, in light of the USA position, Canada was obliged to undertake a more serious exercise in determining its own position. According to Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State, the USA intended to include a report on Alaska and its Eskimo population with the annual reports of the Governors of various Non-Self-Governing-Territories administered by the USA. However, the USA did not 'contemplate' making any references to its Indians living in reservations "within the metropolitan territory."⁸

E.R. Hopkins, also of the Canadian Legal Department, agreed with Wershof but suggested to External Affairs that they "should attempt to formulate a Canadian line" on the factors to be taken into account in determining which are the Non-Self-Governing-Territories referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter. In addition, he did not think that Canada "should support any interpretation which would have the effect of including the Yukon or Northwest Territories, or the Indian Reservations." This would mean that Canada would "have to take the line" that Non-Self-Governing-Territories are territories, which are "separated geographically from the mother country."⁹ He recommended that the Department of Mines and Resources, which is responsible for Territories and Reservations, be asked for an opinion. Hopkins reminded the Department that Canada was not only "under an obligation" to reply to the Secretary General's enquiry, but that they should keep in mind two important factors. First of all, whatever position

Canada would choose to adopt "may be openly questioned at the Assembly meeting." And because of this possibility, the Canadian Delegation at the UN should be informed of all the alternatives which could be applied to the Canadian situation. And secondly, the Political Department at External Affairs should "throw some light on the intention of the drafters of Chapter XI" of the Charter.

On August 24, Escott Reid of the Department of External Affairs replied to Hopkins' note to MacCallum, in hand-writing, along the left-hand side of this note. He found it

hard to see any logical distinction between the Yukon or the Northwest Territories on the one hand and Alaska on the other. The USA decision that Alaska and Hawaii come under Chapter XI makes it difficult for us to say that the Yukon and the Northwest Territories do not.

The New York Times of August 22, had reported that the USA had included Alaska in its annual report on Non-Self-Governing-Territories to the Secretary General of the UN.¹⁰ Undoubtedly, this USA position not only contributed to establishing the guidelines and 'factors' that should be taken into account, it also presented a major and difficult problem for Canada. On August 26, Ealy of the Legal Department agreed with Reid that because of the USA decision, Canada would "find it difficult to draw a logical distinction between the position of Alaska and the Yukon." He claimed that it would 'never' have occurred to him that the Canadian Territories "could be considered" as Non-Self-Governing-Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. In his opinion, there was a fundamental and important distinction between the USA and the Canadian situation which could be identified "after only a cursory examination of the

problem."¹¹ This distinction was made in terms of possibilities and not in status, since both had dependent peoples.

According to Ealy, "it is conceivable that Alaska might become a separate sovereign state." On the other hand, the Yukon and the Northwest Territories and the Indian Reservations "are an integral part" of Canada by virtue of Article 146 of the British North American Act. In addition, he pointed out that "the territories of Canada which are not provinces are administered and governed by Parliament."¹² Because of these two factors, Ealy concluded that Canada "cannot be considered with regard to the Northwest Territories, the Yukon and the Indian Reservation, as a Member which has or assumes 'responsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government'."¹³ In other words, this Canadian interpretation of Chapter XI would serve to keep Canada out of the UN category of Colonial Powers. If the General Assembly accepted this interpretation, then Canada would not have to submit annual reports to the Secretary General on the conditions in these territories. And the UN would have no jurisdiction in these areas which Canada considered to be its sovereign territories.

Ealy explained that, in his interpretation of Chapter XI and of the 'factors' that should be taken into account, he was convinced that "the insistence is more on the 'administration of territories,' not on the status of the people." We submit that this logic in Ealy's interpretation was functionally operative in Canada's argument to escape UN supervision of dependent peoples inside Canada. For in Canada's national mindset, the institutional separation of

qualitatively distinguishable types of people is a perfectly acceptable proposition. The British North America Act, Section 91 (24), had successfully done so in regard to Canada's native peoples.

The Colonial Powers had also set up structural apparatus to reflect invidious distinctions between the white rulers and the colonised peoples. This was a simple matter of administrative convenience to secure the status of privilege and authority in colonial areas. However we would argue that even if the UN, as suggested by Ealy, had utilised the 'administration' of Canada's native peoples as a factor to be taken into account, it would have discovered that the British North America Act Section 91 (24) did not subscribe to the belief in the inherent equality of all persons. And that, in principle, this statute represented a status of judicial incapacity. The administration of native peoples in Canada was intrinsically comparable to the colonial status of dependent peoples within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter.

Ealy was convinced in his interpretation that the 'status' of the administered peoples should be a secondary matter in the enquiry of the Secretary General. But why should this be so, when the status is a direct result of the administrative structure? On what basis could Canada argue with any great plausibility that this is not so? It is clear that the context and premise of this argument by Ealy reflected an implicit acceptance of inequality between Canada's native peoples and white Canada. The fact is that native peoples were 'administered' by a government and under a system in which they did not have the right to vote. Therefore, they did not have the capacity to influence this

dominant arrangement. The native peoples of Canada were denied this right which is a self-evident one for white Canadians.

For Canada is a democracy and the right to vote is a right of the governed. But the native peoples were not 'governed', they were 'administered'. They did not ask to be 'administered' and were not consulted. We therefore submit that the distinction between 'administration' and 'status' which was made by Ealy, was an illogical and irrelevant one for determining whether Canada's native peoples were to be considered 'dependent' within the meaning of Chapter XI. Nevertheless, he decided to take the position that Canada with regard to the above territories "has not 'assumed' responsibilities; as a sovereign state, it has always had full jurisdiction over its own territory."¹⁴

Colonial Powers like France, Spain and Portugal also utilised the concept of sovereignty to claim that colonies were "integral parts" of their metropolitan territory or "overseas provinces". All of these arrangements were premised on the same line - states could legally decide for themselves what types of institutional administration they could make for their dependent peoples. Canada's legal Department suggested that "it would be absurd to regard Article 73 as applying to these territories." It is unfortunate for Spain and Portugal that they only became members of the UN in 1955. When they utilised similar arguments in their replies to the Secretary General's letter, which enquired whether they had any Non-Self-Governing-Territories under their jurisdiction, the UN refused to accept them as valid.

Therefore, in this sense, had the UN taken a more vigilant role in establishing which factors should define the situation in 1946, as it did in 1955, then Canada would most probably not have escaped UN supervision of its native peoples. The cardinal question remains, why did the seemingly militant anti-colonials like India, for example, not take a more active role in this specific aspect of control? Was it because of India's own native peoples? Had there been a more consolidated anti-colonial effort to scrutinise the replies of countries such as Canada, to the Secretary General's enquiry in this critical phase of establishing procedure, native peoples living within sovereign borders would have become wards of the UN. We must look at them as victims of the operational function of national self-interest of well known anti-colonial states, like India, which chose, like Canada, to define dependent peoples in a very subjective way.¹⁵

We might argue, on the other hand, that one ought not to group Canada's native peoples in the same bunch with other native or alternatively classified, dependent peoples. For if they were already considered to be wards of the Canadian Government, then there were no justifiable grounds to seek a transfer of guardianship. Or were there any in 1946? In principle, the concept of the category of Non-Self-Governing-Territories is one of a limited international administration of a trust. Is this in any way better than the constitutional imperative of the British North America Act Section 91(24)? Once we accept the fundamental assumptions of the need to set up trusteeship or guardianship arrangements of any kind over specific groupings of people, should we then concern ourselves with a qualitative distinction between different types of

administration? What purpose would that serve? For, basically, is it not implicit in the concept of a trust, that there ought to be a hierarchical distribution of entitlement to rights and fundamental freedoms?

The Charter had recognised that the distribution of such goods is a relative thing. This was accommodated in the phrase, "according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement."¹⁶ In this study, we will show what the functional implications of this phase are for dependent peoples. We will point out along the way, how careful Canada had to be in keeping "a watching brief" over developments, which could have operative relevance for its own native peoples and Canada's sovereignty.

During the summer of 1946, the Department of External Affairs was occupied with preparing the guidance document for the use of Canadian Delegation at the General Assembly meeting in September. On August 30, Hume Wrong brought to the attention of the Department of Mines and Resources the "wide interpretation" of Chapter XI by the USA. However, the Department of External Affairs was of the opinion that, in the context of the Charter, there were "three broad classes of Non-Self-Governing-Territories." The first were the Trust Territories to which Chapter XII apply; the second were the Non-Self-Governing-Territories that were "outside the borders of metropolitan States" and which come under Chapter XI, and the third category would encompass those that were "within the borders of sovereign states."¹⁷

According to Wrong, the Northwest Territories in Canada and the Reservations in which treaty Indians live, in both Canada and USA, belong to the third category. This group had no relevance for Chapter XI. However, he cautioned that Alaska was mentioned in the USA annual report and "may be cited by other Delegations as a reason for the Yukon and Northwest Territories coming within the meaning of Article 73 of the Charter."¹⁸ In order to prepare for this possibility, Ottawa wanted to know "how similar issues have been treated in Australia" and whether Australia had intended to submit annual reports on its Northern Territory.¹⁹ The Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra replied that Australia did intend to submit a report on Papua, but "had not even considered the idea" of reporting on the Northern Territory, until approached by Canada.²⁰

According to Hopkins of the Department of External Affairs, Australia had taken "a leading part in having Chapter XI on Non-Self-Governing-Territories written into the Charter". And since Australia did not deem it necessary to submit a report on its Northern Territory, Hopkins observed: "It seems likely therefore, that Australia will agree to a distinction being made in this manner between Non-Self-Governing-Territories within the borders of metropolitan states and Non-Self-Governing-Territories outside."²¹

On October 17, in Opinion No. 151325, the Justice Department, concluded that the Yukon and Northwest Territories "are part of Canada and consequently, that Chapter XI of the UN Charter does not apply thereto."²² And, in regard to the Indian Reservations, the Department argued that "while it is true that certain

classes of Indians are not ordinarily entitled to vote, it is misleading to say that the areas where they reside are Non-Self-Governing-Territories."²³

In August, Wershof found it 'absurd' and Hopkins decided that it was 'misleading' to categorise Canada's native peoples as 'dependent' peoples; in spite of that fact that they were both confronted with the legal distinction and structural separation of a specific group of peoples who are phenotypically distinguishable in Canada. It appeared perfectly normal and acceptable to talk of limited rights and entitlement which are tailored to a specific group which is set apart from the Canadian whole of a white 'we' or 'us.' In a more tangible way, they also found it perfectly acceptable to talk of "the areas where they reside." These are known as 'reservations'. This is what we are referring to in Canada's mind set when we talk about "racial discrimination." Moreover, implicit in this process is an obvious understanding among the officials that they had a continuing right to decide on the status of native peoples in Canada.

By October 19, 1946, the whole chain of command in Ottawa was involved in the preparation of the final letter that would be sent to the Secretary General of the UN in the form of a reply to his enquiry of June 29. Opinion No.151325 of the Justice Department was to form the basis of this letter. The Under Secretary and the Legal Department asked Escott Reid, of the Canadian Delegation to the UN, "to examine it critically." If Reid 'agreed' with the contents, then the letter would be sent to St. Laurent, the Secretary of State, who would decide whether it was acceptable.²⁴ St. Laurent "made one or two minor changes which did not affect its substance" after a discussion with Reid and Hopkins.²⁵

In its instructions to the Delegation to the General Assembly, Ottawa reiterated that "the issue of whether Canada should submit reports" to the UN on Non-Self-Governing-Territories "was brought into focus by a decision of the USA Government...to submit reports to the Secretary General on Alaska...." Although Alaska had voted in favour of statehood within the American Union and would, therefore, no longer have the status of a Non-Self-Governing-Territory, Ottawa claimed that "the fact that one report on Alaska has been submitted makes it desirable that Canada should state clearly the position it intends to take with regard to the Yukon and Northwest Territories."²⁶ Therefore, the Canadian 'line' in the reply to the Secretary General was that Article 73 and Article 74 of Chapter XI of the UN Charter, "taken together" make it very clear that Chapter XI "is not applicable to territories within the metropolitan area of a member state."²⁷ Approximately one month later, the Secretary General acknowledged the receipt of Canada's letter and notified the Secretary of State that it "will be communicated to the General Assembly."²⁸ On November 14, Robertson of the Canadian Delegation made his speech to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly:

We speak as the representatives of what was once a Non-Self-Governing-Territory, today a Self-Governing-Nation.... While a member of the British Commonwealth Nations, we speak as the representatives of a nation.... In subscribing to the Charter of the UN, we have all pledged ourselves to accept as a sacred trust the well-being of the inhabitants of all Non-Self-Governing-Territories no matter what form of administration they enjoy....²⁹

What, exactly, did Robertson mean when he used the word 'enjoy'?

The normal usage of this word has a positive connotation. It means that pleasure

is derived out of the 'doing' of some sort of activity. He gave the impression that, in Canada's understanding, all is well in the colonial world; that the situation which the UN had been addressing, was part of a normal course of events, in Canada's experience. This speech is fully in keeping with the process to decide how Canada should portray its internal colonial status as being not 'colonial.' It is a public denial of an intimate experience. For, if Canada did not have 'dependent' peoples within its borders, and if Canada was also a Non-Self-Governing-Territory of the white/white category, then it is obvious that Canada did not have knowledge of, and understanding about, colonial relationships which result in "destitution and distress." This policy was a dishonest one.

Causal behaviour has been established in this process which was examined in terms of a perceptual analysis. Canada was forced to undertake this activity because of its perceived 'colonial' situation at home. Had this not have been the case, Canada would not have felt obliged to undertake a comprehensive four-month exercise to clarify its position, because of the decision of the USA to report on Alaska to the Secretary General. The primary goal in this undertaking was to prevent the UN from obtaining any right of supervision in areas which Canada considered to be inside Canada's sovereign borders. The secondary aim was to secure Canada's international status as a non-colonial power. This had moral weight in the colonial world and the international organisation. The Western powers believed that this could be translated into tangible gains if Canada took an active part in the process.

In our detailed examination of Canada's "getting involved" in the colonial issue at the UN, we attempted to show Canada's perception of the dynamics of the UN operational context and the interaction of the forces at play at this time period. Negotiations at home and consultations with the other white settler colonies are made with an appreciation of the limits of choices and policy in the UN, specific to this one issue. Most important, is the discovery by Canadian officials in Ottawa, N.Y. and Washington that the USA was prepared to act not only in its own interest, but it was also unwilling to undertake any preparatory planning with Canada. The subject matter was a shared 'colonial' situation at home and the process was a parallel one in Washington and Ottawa. Working together, the USA and Canada could have made the process free from the dangers which Canada encountered as a result of the actions of the USA.

However, the behaviour of the USA served to alert Canada as to the preponderant consequences of any action that might become a precedent in the UN dealings with the colonial issue and, more specifically, how it might relate to Canada's 'colonial' situation at home.

In the next three sections of this chapter, we will concentrate on the state of affairs of native peoples in Canada. According to J. Hodgetts, by around 1859, "from highly useful military assistants they had become expensive impediments to the white man's search for Lebensraum. Their degenerate and sometimes depraved state of existence bore the embarrassing testimony to the neglect by the Great White Father who operated out of Whitehall."³⁰ What has happened to Canada's native peoples since then? We intend to paint a picture of

the situation only in so far as it is necessary to contribute to our understanding of whether Canadians were colonists, of a sort. In the opinion of E. Palmer Patterson, the above state of affairs "may serve as a general description of the results of European impact on non-Europeans in much of the world."³¹ He continued:

By the early twentieth century....The Indian as a separate cultural and biological identity had entered a period of irrelevance. Economically, socially, and politically, he had ceased to be a factor that needed to be reckoned with, and his presumed destiny of absorption or extinction seemed near.³²

This pattern of behaviour, which was based on a specific set of value judgements, ethical standards and rules of conduct, seemed to be a continuation of British colonial policy from 1850. Did the political leaders of the new nation attempt to change this state of affairs? Surely, they could not have been unaware of this situation. Or, is it possible that they were aware of it, but chose to continue to marginalise Canada's First Peoples? Are we to assume that the situation of the native peoples in Canada was obtained simply because there was a continuity in the political culture and the social character of colonial Canada? P. Reynolds suggests that, "as a tradition and a behavioural mode emerge they will normally attach to themselves ethnical norms and beliefs about the right and wrong ways of doing things."³³ It is crucial that we establish what were the acceptable rules of conduct in Canada's dealings with its native peoples. This will assist us in understanding Canada's pre-dispositions and preferences in the UN process to remove white, alien domination over most of the world's non-white peoples.

The Judicial Incapacity of Native Peoples

It is difficult to say whether the Secretary General's inquiry of June 29, 1946 and the UN concern with subject peoples had been the cause for Ottawa to undertake a revision of the Indian Act in early 1948. To the extent that we can establish a context, we intend to point out which interests were recognised by the St. Laurent Government as being an operative part of the framework of this revision, in the early stage. The purpose of this short exercise, in this section, is to arrive at a working definition of Canada's concept of "judicial incapacity" and of "good Government" as conceived in Section 91 (24) of the British North America Act. In a letter of October 14, 1948, the Catholic Bishop of Canada "urgently request[ed] of the Canadian Government, that, in the proposed revision of the Indian Act, the principle of denominational schools for Indians be maintained...according to Section 10, Subsection 2 of the Indian Act at present in force."³⁴

One month later, the Ministry of Mines and Resources sent the sections of the Act regarding schools to the Prime Minister, because he felt that education was "the only subject of the Bill where a religious issue might be raised."³⁵ He reported that with one exception,³⁶ "the religious rights of the churches are fully protected in the proposed new Bill." But, what of the rights of native peoples? In the files was a copy of The Thunderbird, August 1, 1949. Two articles seemed to be of great interest to the Prime Minister.³⁷ The first article, "Convention of Canadian Indians," announced the intention of the North

American Indian Brotherhood to "give leadership to the organised, and to the unorganised by calling a convention...to examine the revised Indian Act, when it is introduced during the coming session of parliament...as a bill for the first reading."³⁸ Frank Assu and Josef Delisle asserted:

The Indians must have a voice in the framing of the laws that will henceforth govern them, and which will also determine their destiny. The white men have promised the Indians a new day but the Indians want to look into the horizon, before twilight is again forcibly followed by darkness.

The second article, "North American Indian Brotherhood Stimulates Concerted Action," originated from Caughnawaga, Quebec. The North American Indian Brotherhood saw itself as "the motivating power for the largest gathering of Canadian Indians in Ottawa...." Delisle proposed that "a concerted unity of action" by all chiefs and every Indian organisation throughout Canada was "most necessary, so as to convince the government that the proper legislation for Indians should only be enacted after consultation with representative Indian delegates from coast to coast." This was a logical request in any democratic system. However, we will show, where the records permit, that several Departments did not agree with this premise of prior consultation. The article continued: "The old Act, which has been in force ever since Confederation, was enacted without consulting the Indians who had to abide by its mysterious and dictatorial clauses. But at this stage, and professed democratic age, the Indians want to have something to say before it is made law."

It is instructive to note that the North American Indian Brotherhood did not object to the principle of an Indian Act regulating their 'destiny.' This we take

to be an implicit acceptance of their status as wards of the Canadian Government.³⁹ And it seems to us that they were asking for even less than what the UN Charter had stipulated for Non-Self-Governing-Territories in Article 73 (b). In this newspaper article, the North American Indian Brotherhood expressed "the wish to assist the government in framing laws that come within the scope of the British Justice they have helped to sustain and for which they fought to protect in two World Wars...." These were the kind of arguments of entitlement which colonial peoples had utilised in their pursuit of a greater share in determining their political future. It is essential to point out that, by expressing the intention to work within the confines and context of an Indian Act, the starting point of the North American Indian Brotherhood's position continued to be Section 91(24) of the British North America Act. The newspaper article concluded with the question, "what kind of Canadians would deny them their fair and constitutional request?" This was an assertion that Indians belonged to Canada and it was a call for Canadians to recognise this fact.

As announced in the newspaper article, Andrew Paull requested information from the Prime Minister as to when he intended to submit the Bill to Parliament.⁴⁰ Paull explained that, "because the Indians are not sitting Parliament," and because they wanted "to confer with the Indian Act Committee in an effective and official way, it was necessary for them to study the Act before it was given First Reading." Since this "necessitated planning" he needed an estimated date "to gather the Indians in Ottawa." This letter was transmitted on August 10 with a Memorandum for the Prime Minister. It stated:

Mr. Keenleyside tells me that Mr. Paull is an unreliable and unpleasant man who, nevertheless, manages to get elected President of the North American Indian Brotherhood. Whenever he has come to Ottawa in the past he has been a source of considerable trouble and embarrassment to the Department of Mines and Resources, but the Department must deal with him as he is the President of the Brotherhood. Mr. Keenleyside suggests that Mr. Paull be not treated too gently."⁴¹

On the same day, Martin sent a reply acknowledging Paull's letter with the argument that, "...as to the time that such a Bill would receive attention during the session, it is impossible to say when this would be, as no one can estimate accurately how long it takes to deal with legislation."⁴²

On August 28, Paull wrote another letter to the Prime Minister asking him to "graciously accept" an Honorary Chieftainship from the many Indians who would be descending on Ottawa to meet him personally, "at the appointed time and place."⁴³ On September 6, Martin acknowledged the receipt of the letter and ignored the above request that the Prime Minister accept their "highest honour." Paull was notified that "at Mr. St.Laurent's direction," Paull's communication of August 8 was "being brought to the attention of the Minister of Mines and Resources."⁴⁴ In other words, the Prime Minister refused to meet with the Indians, and since they could not organise "for the most important gathering in [sic] Indians in the history of Canada since Confederation"⁴⁵ on short notice, it was unlikely that they would be present in Parliament for the First Reading of the Bill.

On October 1, the provincial administration of the Missionnaires Oblats, Edmonton, requested from the Prime Minister, information on whether the "Department of Indian Affairs" had planned to revise the Act specific to Prairie

Indians.⁴⁶ On October 5, St.Laurent personally replied to this letter.⁴⁷ He referred their enquiry to the Minister of Mines and Resources. On November 14, the Canadian Catholic Conference wrote to the Prime Minister concerning the revision of the Indian Act: "Of acute interest...in these amendments, are the clauses having reference to the education of Indians. They insist in the most absolute way upon a Catholic education being assured for Catholic Indian children...."⁴⁸ On what basis could they 'insist' upon the right to make decisions affecting the future and welfare of Indian children, when Indians themselves were not allowed to do so?⁴⁹ Is this evidence of an understanding that Indians were seen to not have any rights? Could this be an explanation for the 'wish' of the Canadian Indians "to assist" the government in this process of revision?

On January 12, 1950 the Prime Minister informed the Ministry of Mines and Resources⁵⁰ that he had corresponded with the Archbishop of Ottawa on the subject of the Indian Act revision.⁵¹ Two weeks later, at the request of the Prime Minister, the Secretary notified the Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration of the correspondence with the Archbishop.⁵² There were no further communication on this matter in the files. However, what we have is sufficient indication of the little value which the Government had placed on the input or involvement of Indians. As we have seen from the few documents that were in the files, the Prime Minister was personally involved in the communication with non-Indian interests in this process of revision.

Are political leaders able to ignore the wishes of the people in the making and the execution of laws in a democratic system? If a government is

able to regulate all aspects of a people's life without seeing the need to have their consent, could that be seen as an institutional judicial incapacity of the people? And, if the people do not have any recourse to alter such a state of affairs and the government is not held accountable to them, is such a situation a result of an institutional judicial incapacity of the people? Harold Cardinal wrote:

In Canada, a "comparatively small group" of "faceless bureaucrats" have for over a century...decided just about everything that will ever happen to a Canadian Indian. They have laid down the policy, the rules, the regulations on all matters affecting native peoples. They have decided where our sons will go to school, near home or hopelessly far from home; they have decided what houses will be built on what reserves for what Indians and whether they may have inside or outside toilets; they have decided what types of social or economic development will take place and where and how it will be controlled.⁵³

Diamond Jenness has traced the roots of situations like these all the way to the Indian Affairs Branch from the 1920s and 1930s. He found that, "parallel with this failure to promote political and economic welfare of the Indians was negligence," of the Indian Affairs Branch, "in providing them with educational facilities."⁵⁴ The Churches were given the right to educate Indian children. Therefore, the government perceived no need to provide additional facilities for them.

On the whole, this charge of 'neglect' in the Canadian context, was, according to Palmer Patterson, "the kind of charge frequently voiced by the nationalist leaders in the colonial and post-colonial eras of Africa."⁵⁵ Is this situation congruent with the categorical imperative of "good Government" in Section 91(24) of the British North America Act? On November 25, 1989 an article, "Canada has terrible history of aboriginal oppression," appeared in The Gazette. In it, David Susuki observed that "Canadians responded magnificently"

to Amazonian Indians who came to Canada to plead their case for international support in their struggle to end the destruction of the Amazon rainforest. He confessed that, "the horror stories befalling the Brazilian Indians are sadly familiar to Canada's original inhabitants." And how do Canadians respond to this state of affairs? In Suzuki's opinion, "Canadian bigotry...quickly disappears behind a veil of guilt, denial and continuing prejudice."

This prejudice was manifested in the B.C. context two ways. First, the government made "little more than a perfunctory attempt to inform the people of changes to come."⁵⁶ And secondly, "without native input, the government relocated an Indian band after the Minister for Native Affairs admitted in 1967, that their "living conditions are the most primitive I've ever seen."⁵⁷ Even if the British North America Act did view Canada's native peoples as wards of parliament, the imperative of "good Government" was surely perceived as the insurance against administrative neglect. Therefore, we must assess the state of affairs of Canada's native peoples in this light. Political leaders in Canada chose not only to continue to marginalise their native peoples; they also seemed to evade their ethical responsibilities in their administration of a trust, for almost 150 years.

Racial Separation and Cultural Accommodation

The guiding principle of this section is that "the longer a society has existed the more likely it is to have developed a tradition and a pattern of

behaviour emerging from the interacting geographic, economic, ethnic and politico-social conditions of life."⁵⁸ For all intents and purposes, Canadians either concede a negative role for native peoples in Canada's historical development or took no cognisance of them. In the words of Francois-Xavier Garneau:

When we contemplate the history of Canada as a whole, from the time of Champlain till our own day, we first remark its two great Divisions – the period of French supremacy, and that of British domination. The annals of the former are replete with the incidents of wars against the savages and the people of the coterminous British colonies, since become the United States; the other portion is signalised by parliamentary antagonism of the colonists to all infractions of their nationality and designs against their religion.⁵⁹

Secretary of State, Lester Pearson, also categorised the indigenous inhabitants in this way. He recalled from history, "...a situation...which confronted our forefathers in early colonial days when they ploughed the land with a rifle slung on the shoulder. If they stuck to the plough and left the rifle at home, they would have been easy victims for any savages lurking in the woods."⁶⁰

It is evident that this conceptual distinction between 'savages' and 'people' had an operative role in structural and attitudinal manifestations. The 'savages' were merely a hindrance to the successful colonisation of their land by European immigrants. Such interpretations of early Canadian history exemplify racial conflict. The role ascribed to native peoples in early Canadian history is the negative aspect of their presence, as the cause of this conflict. Can we attribute, to this attitude, an operational role of race? How did it function? David Hughes and Evelyn Kallen suggest that ideologies of "white supremacy...have served to endow the words 'primitive' and 'native' with a connotation of innate inferiority."⁶¹ Therefore, was it logical that 'savages' would not be included in a conception of

'nation-builders' of Canada? In others words, Canada began without their contribution to its development. Jack Pickersgill, the Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, was explicit in this speech in 1954:

...I think that all Canadians, from those who are descended from the earliest settlers to the most recent immigrants, share the feeling of being explorers, pioneers, builders and creators who have had a part and are having a part in transforming the wilderness."⁶²

Nonetheless, it is tempting to read into the speeches of Canada's political leaders an accommodation of the native fact, in Canada's history. For example, Prime Minister Louis St.Laurent said, in 1950:

Today we stand before a world in need of unity, and the striking thing is that this world faces a problem of racial differences, language differences, cultural differences on a far greater scale but essentially similar to the problem we faced in the early days of our national life.⁶³

However, he went on to add that the Canadian nation had "an added element of diversity because it is based on a partnership of two races and two cultures." This explanation of the usage of the word 'race' tells us that this historical scenario was a racially pure one. Canada's native peoples have been aware of this intentional exclusion. According to Harold Cardinal, "we listen when Canadian political leaders talk endlessly about strength in diversity for Canada, but we understand that they are talking primarily about the French-Canadian fact in Canada."⁶⁴ However, Alain Gagnon and Mary Montcalm have established that, "prior to the 1960s...Quebec's role in Canada was often nebulous and only dimly articulated."⁶⁵

Therefore, for our purposes, references to the French-Canadian fact will be limited to the extent that Canada's political leaders perceive any relevance

of the French factor for explaining their policy and behaviour. According to Gerard Bergeron, "it is impossible to project externally what does not exist internally."⁶⁶ We have discovered that, although English political leaders in Canada continue to dwell consistently and tediously, on the "two founding races" as the basis of Canada, the French Canadians also continue to vocalise their feelings of not "belonging to Canada" and to emphasise their uniqueness. In 1961, Marcel Chaput insisted that:

There is no Canadian nation....There is a Canadian state....The Canadian state is a purely political and artificial entity....On the contrary, the French-Canadian nation is a natural entity whose bonds are those culture, flesh and blood....We feel that French Canadians must be in control somewhere, in a country of their own, specifically in Quebec....Quebec is not a province like others; it is the national state of the French Canadians.⁶⁷

Rene Levesque, as Quebec Minister of natural resources, also expressed similar sentiments, in 1963, for a separate, physical basis for the "profound reality" which "lies in the human, cultural, and social entity, embodied in the French-Canadian nation."⁶⁸ Consequently, by the 1960s, it seemed that there could be no basis on which to build a bicultural Canadian policy, and French "separatism, for the first time, became an openly proclaimed cause."⁶⁹

What has become absolutely clear to us, is that, in this undertaking of co-operation and conflict, there is a total omission of any role or recognition of Canada's native peoples, in both the English and French 'nation' concept. This implicit and explicit exclusion of Canada's native peoples alerts us to private rules of conduct which might otherwise elude us. They help us to explain policy by exposing the essence of political actions. For example, in 1963, Lester Pearson

continued to ignore native peoples as he directed the Commissioners appointed under the Inquiries Act, "to inquire into the report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races."⁷⁰ It is instructive to refer to the context of the times in which such a position is taken, because it serves to emphasise the conviction of this intentionally exclusive directive.⁷¹

John Diefenbaker, in a speech at the Progressive Conservative Convention at Toronto in September 1967, neither recognised nor acknowledged the existence of Canada's native peoples in his "One Canada, One Nation" concept. He said:

Now I want to speak particularly to French Canada. I have never been unmindful of French Canada, of its heritage, its courage, and its devotion. If it had not been for your ancestors and forebearers in 1776, there would be no Canada today....Recognition of the two cultures, of the parent races, was and must remain the very base of Confederation.⁷²

He had categorically placed native peoples outside of this vision of Canada's heritage and Canada's future. According to Patterson, "the white man has made himself the norm against which must be tested those who are to be considered Canadians." Most importantly, "he has in fact declared himself to be the new native – and has defined the Indian into outsider status."⁷³ We suggest that the role of racial ideas has had an influential part to play in this phenomenon. The Quebec Act of 1774 was an explicit recognition of a partnership and an implicit value judgement on the place that both French and English would hold in Canada. In this frame of reference, there would be no non-white native peoples

sharing this partnership and belonging in the new nation. But this attitude was not specific to the Canadian context. It was also a fundamental characteristic of the moral order of the Anglo-American tradition.⁷⁴

The USA Situation

The mid-nineteenth century American political leaders had to contend with the dilemma created by a proclamation in the American Declaration of Independence that, "all men are created equal." In theory, this meant that the Negro inhabitants of the USA were equal in all respects to the white inhabitants of America. This position was an untenable one for the white establishment. In the USA, the role expectation of a Negro was posited in the system of slavery, an institutional niche. The Supreme Court decided in a "majority opinion" on March 6, 1857, "that a Negro slave, doomed as he was to slavery, could not become a citizen of the United States, could not sue in a Federal Court, and could not obtain his freedom simply by becoming a resident on free soil."⁷⁵ The organising premises of this judgement could be placed in two separate categories. The primary category was confined to the instrumental role of the Negro as a separate and unequal unit in this order.

Chief Justice Roger B. Tawney, in preparing the Court's opinion, insisted that it was "too clear for dispute that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included 'in this context of the whole human family.'"⁷⁶ At the same time, he reaffirmed what he thought was already obvious to everyone; that

Negroes were "beings of an inferior order, altogether unfit to associate with the white race."⁷⁷ The inherent incapability and immutable inferiority of the Negro were the systematic antecedents of the Supreme Court's judgement. The role expectation of the Negro in this order was derived out of the inborn character and disposition of the Negro. This was clearly brought out in Tawney's interpretation of the Court's judgement, and he sought to substantiate it in the second category of organising premises.

Tawney was convinced that the "men who framed this declaration were great men – high in their literary achievements – high in their sense of honour, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting."⁷⁸ Here he utilised a different set of ethical standards from those which he had applied to the Negro. His value judgements on the intention and capability of these men, provide us with an indication of the moral principles that were operative in this racial distinction between human types. Tawney was emphatic about the extent to which these rules of conduct are universalised. He added that these men

perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by others; and they knew it would not in any part of the civilised world be supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilised Governments and the family of nations....⁷⁹

We propose that it was not only the Negro race but also the native peoples of the settler colonies, and the non-white subject peoples who did not find a 'fit' in this family of nations. The justification for this racial separation of peoples was based, more or less, on the same organising principles, in all cases.

Jean Paul Satre described how this applied in the international colonial context.

He wrote:

Our soldiers overseas, rejecting the universalism of the mother country, apply the 'numerus clausus' to the human race; since none may enslave, rob or kill his fellow man without committing a crime, they lay down the principle that the native is not one of our fellow men.⁸⁰

This conception of "our fellow men" had an exclusive character and the distinction was a purely racial one. Tawney's concept of the "whole family" was also an exclusive one which was based on a phenotypic distinction. Its frame of reference was wholly white. What follows then is one inclusive and separate category of all the other non-whites. This category of peoples does not logically find a fit in the category of "our fellow men" as it is universalised in the white mental world.

According to Robert Klein, Stephen Douglas and his rival candidate, Abraham Lincoln, had thought it politically expedient in the summer of 1875, to take a public stand on the Negro question in the election campaign in Illinois for the Senate Seat. For Douglas, the framers of the Declaration did make a distinction between the two races, but it was specific to the USA context. His explanation is similar to Tawney's organising premises and assumptions. As Douglas saw it,

No man can vindicate the character, motives, and conduct of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, except upon the hypothesis that they referred to the white race alone, and not to the African, when they declared all men to have been created equal; that they were speaking of British subjects on this continent being equal to British subjects born and residing in Great Britain.⁸¹

Again, the racial distinction is clear and the intent of the framers to omit the non-white race from the Declaration is established, without a doubt, in Douglas' frame of reference. This is an application of Satre's "Numerus clausus" in a national context. We see that, in both the American Bill of Rights and the British North America Act, non-white persons were not considered to be 'men' as white men were considered to be 'men.' This unique interpretation seemed to solve the dilemma because men who were not considered to be equal, could not make claims that were consonant with an assumption of being "created equal."

Lincoln, on the other hand, had carried this racial distinction conception to a qualitatively different level in his campaign speech. His interpretation of the intent of the framers of the Declaration showed his willingness to accede to a certain degree of equality between the two races in the American context. Nevertheless, it was not to be a conception of absolute equality. He said that, "I think the authors of that noble instrument intended to include all men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects...."⁸² Moreover, he declared that this equality aspect was limited to "certain inalienable rights, among which are, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." But this equality aspect was qualified, in its operative function, in a non-white case. According to Lincoln, the framers neither addressed the actual situation in which the African race is posited in USA society nor the practical application of these specific rights regarding this race.⁸³ The Negro simply did not exist. Douglas and Lincoln publicly accredited to the African race an "outsider status."

The Canadian Situation

In 1952, the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation at the UN claimed that "the first essential point in our experience is that sovereignty emerged from within."⁸⁴ What did he mean by this? In the perception of Canada's political leaders, their sovereignty had an intangible quality. On this basis, the British colonial relationship with its white-settler colonies was set apart from the category of colonial rule which is the subject of our study in the decolonisation of empires. What is relevant, for us, is the public emphasis which was placed by Canadian political leaders on the inherent basis and the intangible qualities of their own colonial relationship. We could venture to say that this took priority over the "strictly political processes" in their hierarchy of values. They believed that this qualitatively distinct type of interaction could not emerge if the qualitative antecedents were missing, as for example, in the case of the Negroes in the USA. In chapter V, we will show how this belief functioned as a reinforcement mechanism of the colonial system, as it was applied to the non-white peoples in colonial empires. In the words of MacGregor Dawson, "the right to participate in legislation was an inalienable right of a British subject which could not be lost merely by crossing the Atlantic and establishing a settlement on another continent....Representative institutions were therefore the inherent right of all settler colonies."⁸⁵

Western peoples have chosen an exclusive racial basis for the actual allocation of what they identify as 'inalienable' and 'inherent' rights. A crucial

factor in this racial exclusivity is an inherent authority to dispense certain rights to non-white peoples. Western peoples unilaterally decided to whom, when, how and on what basis these rights were to be allocated. The situation of Canada's native peoples display the functional aspect of this separation which was a fundamental characteristic of a colonial relationship. A Survey on "the problems that the native person faces in the area of prejudice and discrimination" reported in 1967, that, "underlying all problems associated with Indians and Eskimos in this country are the prejudice and discrimination in the attitudes of non-Indians."⁸⁶ This report simply underscored the point made by Anderson and Frideres. They state very pointedly that "institutional racism is pervasive in our society."⁸⁷ In their opinion "the perspective of institutional racism places heavy emphasis on the importance of history. It is argued that historically, institutions defined and regulated norms, role relationships...which have now become part of the moral order."⁸⁸

The norm was that Canada's native peoples were 'wards' of a white Anglo-Saxon world and Parliament had an obligation as 'custodian' to see to the welfare and advancement of these people to "eventual citizenship."⁸⁹ In his assessment of the Canadian Parliament's fulfilment of this responsibility, Patterson saw "a point of similarity between Indian administration in Canada and British Colonial administration."⁹⁰ He observed: "no one considered the question of the length of time that would be necessary to accomplish these ends." It was obvious that the Parliament of Canada was endowed with the authority to take such decisions. However Diamond Jenness believed that "neither...Parliament

nor the Canadian people" were interested in these matters. He complained that "their attitude seemed to be that the less heard of the Indians the better."⁹¹

This situation could not remain static in view of the international developments at the UN. Patterson found that, already "in the late 1940s and 1950s,"

some Indians had begun to see themselves in a new light, that of non-Europeans elsewhere who in the two decades after World War II had gained political independence from colonial rule. References to the Indian as a colonial became more common, and concern with how to alter this condition began to be exhibited.⁹²

The fundamental concern of our study is to discover what Canada's perception of its role should be in this process that ran over two decades. Chapters IV and V identify the characteristics of the "new light" and show how Canada was involved in attempts to alter the substantive composition and structure of this "new light." Our aim is to disclose to what extent Canada's political leaders were aware of the 'situation' of colonial peoples and to what degree they were prepared to assist these peoples in their struggle for change.

Lester Pearson had documented that he was at least aware of the human condition obtained under colonial rule in Asia and Africa and the need to 'raise' in those areas, "the living standards." Before an international audience in Oslo, Norway, in his Noble Peace Prize Lecture, he admitted on December 11, 1957, that

...before 1939 there was little practical consideration given to the possibility of raising the living standards of Asia and Africa in the way that we now regard as indispensable. Perhaps only in North America every man feels entitled to a motor car, but in Asia hundreds of millions of people do now expect to eat and be free. They no longer will accept colonialism, destitution and distress as preordained. That

may be the most significant of all the revolutionary changes in the international social fabric of our times.⁹³

Pearson could not have avoided having knowledge of the qualitatively similar 'situation' of Canada's own native peoples. But he showed no concern about the need to improve "the living standards" of his own colonial peoples. In principle, this is more or less what James Eayrs must have meant when he said that, "declarations of human rights are cheap."⁹⁴ In 1961, he saw the basis for a "legitimate reproach" in this context, because "the Canadian Government continue to practise at home the policies they so loudly denounce abroad."⁹⁵

From the viewpoint of Canada's native peoples, their condition had worsened by 1969. Harold Cardinal declared that, "in the one hundred and second year of Canadian Confederation, the native peoples of Canada look back on generations of accumulated frustration under conditions which can only be described as colonial, brutal and tyrannical...."⁹⁶ In his opinion, this was a result of a continuous and systematic policy of "refusal...to honour commitments for treaties signed with the Indians." He added: "coupled closely with this is the unwillingness of successive governments to recognise the aboriginal rights" of his people.⁹⁷ This position was a categorical rejection of the concept of trust which was the basis of Section 91(24) of the British North America Act. This seemingly irreconcilable situation inside Canada continued throughout the period of decolonisation in the UN. Ronald Manzer wrote in 1988: the "...one problem with high visibility and great potential for embarrassment is the unresolved issue of aboriginal rights."⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the matter apparently did not have any priority for the Canadian Governments in the post-war world.

According to Hughes and Kallen, "ideologies of 'white supremacy' developed by European 'whites' depict 'white races' – variously defined – as superior to all other so-called races."⁹⁹ Believing in this superiority, white races tend to reserve for themselves a special place in the order of things. Very clearly, the Constitution of Canada was conceived on such an order in 1867. The British and French settlers were given a special place as the basis of the nation with rights and obligations. Diefenbaker declared it to be his "purpose in life to maintain the basic foundation of the constitution, to make the diversity of our national origin a source of pride to all."¹⁰⁰ However, this diversity was only of a cultural nature. As such, he feared that the Liberal Party's "two nations proposition" could not be in the best interest of the French inhabitants in Canada. He felt that this would serve to "establish a reserve." In his opinion, it would simply be an act of 'discrimination' which he was 'against.'¹⁰¹

But what of the Indian Act, a law of Canada, in which the functional role of 'reserve' is representative of the place of native peoples in Canada? This law was designed to apply solely to these people.¹⁰² In this sense, it was an act of discrimination. Diefenbaker claimed to have "ended discrimination." He added: "through the years I acted for the Indians and we were able to give them their rights for the first time."¹⁰³ Here is some evidence of the fact that, in Diefenbaker's perception, Indians had no prior or self-evident rights in the sense that the French and British settlers had rights in Canada. An examination of the way in which Diefenbaker believed that he had 'given' rights to Canada's native

peoples serves to show the differential in the values and rules of conduct that govern the relations between the rest of Canada and native peoples.

The Indian Act and the Drybones Judgement

Diefenbaker claimed to have designed the Canadian Bill of Rights.¹⁰⁴ Although the Indian Act was not "expressly declared by an Act of Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights,"¹⁰⁵ the functional relationship between the two depended, to a great extent, on subjective interpretations. According to Diefenbaker, the Drybones Judgement was "a landmark for freedom in Canada." Joseph Drybones, a Dogrib Indian, was charged under the Indian Act because he was intoxicated on April 8, 1967. Diefenbaker pointed out that this Act "provided more severe penalties than those specified liquor laws under which non-Indians would be charged." However, "Drybones was acquitted on the ground that conviction would impair his rights under the Bill of Rights."¹⁰⁶ But the matter did not end with this judgement. An appeal was brought in "Her Majesty the Queen v.s. Joseph Drybones," because his acquittal "of being 'unlawfully intoxicated off a reserve'" was found to be "contrary to the Indian Act."¹⁰⁷

Diefenbaker explained that, "the fact that there are no reserves in the Territories" where Drybones was found, was "quite irrelevant"; what was really of substance to the process of appeal was "the fact that in the Northwest Territories it is not an offence for anyone except an Indian to be intoxicated otherwise than

in a public place."¹⁰⁸ This case actually brought attention to the fact that, in the operative context of the Bill of Rights, the invidious distinctions which were entrenched in the Indian Act became even more deeply etched in the Canadian legal system. For example, an important consideration in the appeal was whether the necessary or sufficient condition, "on a reserve" or "off a reserve," was satisfied under Section 94 of the Indian Act. According to Diefenbaker, the problem evidently arose because Yellowknife in the Northwest Territory had "no 'reserve' within the meaning of the Indian Act."¹⁰⁹ Therefore the Bill of Rights would not be allowed, through legal interpretation, to have operative primacy regarding Indians, under all circumstances.

Diefenbaker knew that, in general, "the implementation of the Canadian Bill of Rights by the courts can give rise to great difficulties."¹¹⁰ This was expected in a system where different values were operative in the allocation of social goods. And he felt that the Drybones case had exposed those "laws of Canada which abrogate, abridge, and infringe the right of the individual Indian to equality before the law."¹¹¹ Diefenbaker was not only the leader of the opposition, he had also held the post of Prime Minister. In his opinion, "if those laws are to be applied in accordance with the express language used by the Parliament in Section 2 of the Bill of Rights, then Section 94(b) of the Indian Act must be declared inoperative."¹¹² What was the intention of Parliament? Was the Bill of Rights not meant to apply equally to all Canadians? No section of the Indian Act was declared to be inoperative by the Canadian Parliament. According to James Eayrs, "the test is not in the drafting but in the observing."¹¹³ Diefenbaker claimed

that he had ended discrimination in Canada although he knew that in the case of Canada's native peoples, the Bill of Rights could not supplant the Indian Act unless the Canadian Parliament declared it so. This was not done.

What was the value of a Bill of Rights when, as Diefenbaker wrote, there were situations "in which, under the laws of Canada, it is made an offence punishable by law on account of race, for a person to do something which all Canadians who are not members of that race may do with impunity"?¹¹⁴ Functional and structural distinctions between native peoples and "all Canadians" remained intact. In the words of Cardinal, "even more reprehensible than the man who does not act because he is ignorant is the man who does know the situation but fails to act."¹¹⁵ Did Diefenbaker fail to act or is Pickersgill's point a better explanation? He claimed: "What we have done is to create and develop a national sentiment while respecting the languages and traditions and cultures of two great races."¹¹⁶ On the other hand,

the History of Canada's Indians is a shameful chronicle of the white man's disinterest, his deliberate trampling of Indian rights and his repeated betrayal of our trust. Generations of Indians have grown up behind a buckskin curtain of indifference, ignorance and, all too often, plain bigotry.¹¹⁷

This is a testimony of a distinction made on the basis of race. It indicates an operational role of different ethical and moral standards, where the "trampling of rights" and the "betrayal of trust" are consonant with separate rules of conduct between whites and non-whites. It also allocates, to these actions, an element of rational choice. This would necessarily involve a functional role of distinctive value judgements in this interaction. We suggest that a relationship

such as this is mostly made possible in a system of dominance in which the underlying dynamics of race and culture are clearly operative. In addition, a hierarchical structure in the organising and the allocation of social goods is a necessary condition, in such a society. For our purpose, this situation serves as a 'reflection' of the Canadian "character and mind."¹¹⁸

After 27 years of public service, Diefenbaker wrote, "social justice, to me, meant dedication on a continuing and practical basis to the concept of fairness to each and fairness to all....It meant as well that government had a responsibility to bring about a higher standard of welfare for all Canadians."¹¹⁹ Diefenbaker had direct contact with the native peoples of Canada. He had first hand knowledge of their situation under bureaucratic administration since Confederation. He even wrote that, "I felt it most unjust that they were treated as less than full citizens of Canada, that they did not have the vote. I promised that if I ever had the power to do so, they would be given that right. This I carried out when I was Prime Minister."¹²⁰ However, Cardinal has argued that the democratic channels "theoretically works fine as a system of checks and balances, providing the necessary background knowledge and understanding of a situation to ensure proper and fair legislation...except that none of the above applies to Indians in Canada."¹²¹

It is obvious that Diefenbaker, who was a lawyer and political leader, knew that, in practical terms, he had not undertaken enough measures to ensure a 'just' arrangement for Canada's native peoples. According to Cardinal, "there is not one treaty that has not been broken by the white man, not one treaty

fulfilled."¹²² How else can we assess Diefenbaker's "dedication...to the concept of fairness to each and fairness to all," if not in the 'observing' of its imperatives? Or, were Canada's native peoples not included in these categories of 'each' or 'all'? Gregor Guthrie and Thomas Van Dusen, "long-time friends" of Diefenbaker, shared the opinion that his legacy is found "in an enhanced citizenship," and "a full comprehension of individual rights as embodied in his Bill of Rights and the body of jurisprudence which has grown up around it, and a new pride in being a Canadian."¹²³ But, from a 'native' viewpoint, "in the minds of most Canadians to be Canadian is to be white, Westernised, and/or comfortable to the pattern of life held by those who are white and Westernised."¹²⁴

A Policy of Racial Selection

Canada's immigration policy is seen as an attitudinal manifestation of a belief in the superiority of the White race. We will take a brief look at the various assessments of this policy, from the early days of nation-building to about the mid-1960s, in order to arrive at an indication of the ideas which were operative in this pursuit of a White Canada. Anderson and Frideres focused on Canadian "immigration policy – both proposed and implemented - as an indication of the extent of racism in Canada." They discovered that Canada "did not have any systematic immigration policies until the late 19th century."¹²⁵ This was attributed to the fact that, "because almost all of the migrants were from Great Britain and the United States, no restrictive policy was needed."¹²⁶ However, they found that,

from the late 19th century onward, "there was a more formalised structure created to help develop Canada."¹²⁷ it served to function as a "closed door" for non-Whites wishing to enter Canada.¹²⁸ The Anderson and Frideres study also showed that the Canadian government's restriction on Chinese immigration from 1878, Japanese immigration from 1894 and the immigration of Indians (from India) in 1908,¹²⁹ were pointedly counterbalanced by active 'recruitment' and "assistance given to British subjects who wanted to come to Canada in 1923."¹³⁰ This selective policy was so intensely pursued that, according to Anderson and Frideres, "information is available which shows that the Canadian government acted in near illegal manners in recruiting White immigrants."¹³¹ This rational, selective policy was based on an explicit exclusiveness of race.

The Chinese Immigration Act

As a Deputy Minister of Labour in 1908, Mackenzie King wrote in a report, "that Canada should desire to restrict immigration from the Orient is regarded as natural, that Canada should remain a white man's country is believed to be not only desirable for economic and social reasons but highly necessary on political and national grounds."¹³² However, developments in the UN had some influence from the mid-1940s, on how emphatic Prime Minister King would continue to be on the above points. The two political parties, the Progressive Conservative and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, had voted in the House of Commons on November 20, 1946 to support a resolution of

the UN General Assembly which requested its members "to conform both to the letter and spirit of the Charter...and to take the most prompt and energetic steps to put an immediate end to racial discrimination." This was to form the basis of the argument in a letter from the Committee for the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act. In citing this resolution and the Canadian support for it, the Committee asked the Prime Minister: "ought we to risk the chance that Canada may have to answer before the UN General Assembly or International Court for the Chinese Immigration Act?" In addition, the Committee referred to the issue of South Africa's discrimination against Indians living in South Africa, before the UN. They reminded the Prime Minister that, St.Laurent "had indicated in clear terms that he considered the case a proper one to be referred to the International Court of Justice."¹³³

The Committee argued that, because of the Act, Chinese males in Canada "are forced to be separated" from their families. This, they found "contrary to all principles of humanity, morality and social welfare." A most instructive characteristic of the Canadian mind set was evident in their protest to the Prime Minister: "what makes this Act in some ways even more objectionable is that it is a racial exclusion law and discriminates against the Chinese racially, singling them out for a kind of treatment which Canada does not apply to any other people." The British North America Act and the Indian Act have singled out Canada's native peoples and have discriminated against them. Were native peoples not included in this conception of "any other people?" And were the members of this Committee genuinely concerned about Canada's compliance

with international law? They told the Prime Minister, that the Act "places Canada in a position where she is clearly violating her covenant under the UN Charter 'to promote respect for all and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language and religion.'"¹³⁴

It was evident to this Committee that the immigration issue was not simply a matter of racial considerations or international instruments regulating relations among peoples. The letter reminded the Prime Minister:

Certainly it is no way to treat a nation which is to-day, the third largest importer of Canadian goods in the world, most of which come from British Columbia and the Prairie Provinces. Nor is it any way to treat a country whose potential market for Canadian surplus commodities is almost unlimited. For be it always remembered that China is a land of over four hundred million inhabitants, whose people are desperately in need of almost every surplus item Canada produces.

Finally, the Committee quoted Professor H.F. Angus of the University of British Columbia, in an attempt to convince the Prime Minister that "post-war Canada cannot afford the insulting provocation of the Chinese Immigration Act."

On March 13, the Victoria Labour Council 'urged' the government to 'eliminate' the "several discriminatory" clauses of this Act. In addition, the members of this Council "strongly recommended that the Chinese be placed under P.C. 2115."¹³⁵ This was an Order-in-Council of September 16, 1930 which restricted Asiatic immigration to the wife and children under 18 (not married) of Asiatic residents.¹³⁶ In principle, the Council was not against the retention of a restrictive immigration policy; its motion hoped to make it more humane. One week later, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation wrote to the Prime Minister:

You have announced the Government's intention to repeal the Chinese Immigration Act, but this does not necessarily mean that Chinese Nationals will be on an equal footing with those of European descent. There is still the Order-in-Council P.C. 2115 which is nearly as effective in its restrictions as is the Chinese Immigration Act.¹³⁷

The members of this Federation were unequivocal about the disadvantages of "singling out" the Chinese in such a discriminating way, for Canada's own interests. Consequently, they

respectfully suggest[ed] that the years of association of Canada and China have been profitable to Canada; that many Canadians of Chinese descent gave their everything in defence of those principles for which their white friends fought; that Canada's trade is largely linked in the future with China, and that recognition should be accorded to China as a Nation equally entitled to have her sons recognised as desirable citizens under Canada's immigration policy.¹³⁸

At the same time they also agreed to the necessity of maintaining, in principle, a restrictive and selective immigration policy. Accordingly, the racial factor should not be a pre-eminent one in a hierarchy of values especially when Canada's trade and industrial development were jeopardised in the process of designing a White Canada. In view of this, they "request[ed] that legislation be enacted to place all future Chinese Immigration under Order-in-Council P.C. 695 and thus bring it on an equal footing with more favoured Nations."¹³⁹ The Secretary of State let it be known that he was "pleased to co-operate with his Colleagues in giving the representation therein contained every consideration."¹⁴⁰

Approximately six weeks later, the Prime Minister made his 'famous' speech on immigration policy in the House of Commons. He agreed that "objectionable discrimination should be removed from existing legislation." Nevertheless, the principle that Canada was "perfectly within her rights in

selecting the immigrants she wants"¹⁴¹ would continue to be operative under P.C.695. Moreover, he insisted: that "an alien has no 'fundamental human right' to enter Canada," because in his government's opinion, that was "a privilege."¹⁴² This was a major break from his 1908 speech in which he declared that Canada "should remain a white man's country." It is obvious that this change in policy was also perceived to be "desirable for economic" reasons as it was for his position in 1908. Evidently, the Committee for the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act was not satisfied with the apparently superficial changes to which the Prime Minister had agreed.

At the end of November, they protested to the Secretary of State that the replacement of the Chinese Immigration Act with the Order-in-Council P.C.2115, "which, if not as unjust and cruel as the Chinese Immigration Act, nevertheless had much in common with its predecessor." In this second letter, they continued to judge Canada's behaviour by the international standards set out in UN instruments. The Committee observed: "because P.C.2115 discriminates against the Chinese...[it] is therefore contrary to Canada's obligations under the United Nations Charter and the resolution of November 20, 1946, condemning racial discrimination, adopted by Canada at the United Nations Assembly."¹⁴³ In other words, the members of this Committee were calling upon the government to give recognition to these instruments to which it had acceded. In this letter, they made no reference to the economic imperatives for a different policy, as they had done, in January.

By mid-1948, the Canada Council of Churches reminded the Prime Minister that it had "previously expressed its concern...with particular reference to the treatment of Japanese Canadians and the laws regarding the immigration of Chinese...."¹⁴⁴ In view of the government's position, as was set out in the Prime Minister's speech, the Council felt it necessary to "...urge that all Canadian citizens should be accorded equal rights and privileges, that all racial discrimination should be removed from our immigration laws and regulations...."¹⁴⁵ This appeared to be a recommendation for a comprehensive revision of immigration policy and the Indian Act seen as part of 'regulations.' Because the Council of Churches addressed the situation inside Canada, referring to "all Canadians" and "equal rights," it is instructive for us to recall that the churches of all denominations had insisted on securing their rights and interests in the process to revise the Indian Act. At the time, there were no considerations of giving native peoples rights which would have transferred them from a status of 'wards' to the category of "all Canadians" or "we ourselves." In practical terms, native peoples continued to be marginalized. Therefore, they did not receive the attention which immigrants had attracted in their endeavour for a better life in Canada.

In view of the 'discrimination' of the Churches against native peoples in Canada, how are we to understand what they intended to achieve by their request? Surely not an end to the arrangements which they had with the government in regard to native peoples? On what basis did the Council of Churches decide to include the Chinese and Japanese Canadians in this

category of "all Canadians?" Were they also selectively discriminating between non-whites? Or were the Chinese and the Japanese more White than Black?

George Shepherd suggested that:

Western culture has a particularly highly developed form of colour perception....Other cultures have similar distinctions, as that between Arab and African the Hindu caste system....But none of these other cultures has as fully developed and continuing tradition of merit in terms of colour distinction, particularly between black and white, as in the white dominance systems.¹⁴⁶

As we have already discussed, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation did not argue against the principle of rank-ordering or the categorising of peoples into different types. Moreover, they were concerned with associating the allotment of Chinese rights and privileges with entitlement rather than on considerations of merit.

A Preference for Systematic Selection

According to Freda Hawkins, "the most revealing source of information about Canadian attitudes to immigration after the war are the proceedings of the Standing Committee of the Senate on Immigration and Labour."¹⁴⁷ The Committee "came to some definite conclusions" in three annual reports.¹⁴⁸ In the opinion of Hawkins, "it is worth examining the conclusions carefully, as this is the first comprehensive statement we have from a group of informed Canadians after the war about the kind of immigration policy and program they wanted." Relevant for our study is this part of her assessment:¹⁴⁹

The Committee stated firmly that 'there should be no discrimination based on race or religion,' but its understanding of discrimination related entirely to Canada's traditional pattern of immigration and her strong European orientation at that time. It never envisaged, for example, the admission of large numbers of Asian immigrants....The possible discrimination which the Committee had in mind quite clearly referred to citizens and residents of Canada (i.e., in the sponsoring of relatives), the Jewish community, and discrimination between different European nationalities.¹⁵⁰

She continued:

The Canadian Congress of Labour firmly stated that 'racial discrimination should have no place in our immigration policy,' but pointed out that people from some countries would fit more easily into Canadian life than others and that this should be taken into account. Dr. Forsey made it plain that the Congress had never advocated 'an open door for Asiatic immigration.'¹⁵¹

Anderson and Frideres clearly brought out in their study the point that Canada's refusal to admit non-whites as immigrants, was justified by a resort to explanations on biological grounds. They claimed that "specifically speaking Canada's immigration policy after 1900 was a 'closed door' for non-Whites."¹⁵² On the one hand, "the federal government argued that non-Whites, and specifically Asians,¹⁵³ were unassimilable and had a lower standard of living than native Whites and thus would be disruptive to Canadian society. Obviously, the mosaic should remain White."¹⁵⁴ On the other hand, "Blacks were refused entry...because authorities argued that they were unable to function properly in cold weather."¹⁵⁵ According to Colin Thomson, "attempts to keep the Blacks out of Alberta and out of Canada became a political 'hot potato.'"¹⁵⁶

In his discussion of a century "of sustained persecution by a country determined to 'keep Canada white',"¹⁵⁷ he argued that, "prejudice, blatant and

subtle, was the real reason behind the desire to exclude Blacks."¹⁵⁸ He concluded that "the history of Blacks in Canada is sad because of what it reveals about a wider society's values."¹⁵⁹ His emphasis was on the role and impact of public opinion on government policy. This approach was similar to that of Peter Ward, who concentrated on "popular attitudes" and how they influenced "public policy." His premise was that, "economic strains, while in many instances important sources of racial conflict and prejudice, ultimately were subordinate to psychological tensions as the central locus of racial animosity." His 'task' was therefore, "to understand the popular mind and its response to Asian immigrants."¹⁶⁰

Canada's restrictive policy had a second operative arm which endeavoured to extricate those undesirables already ensconced in Canada. Anderson and Frideres referred to "a concerted effort" by the British Columbia Government "to force the existing Indian-Canadian residents back to India." They claimed that "the effect of the formal and informal policy implementation was devastating."¹⁶¹ As part of a comprehensive, selective policy, "two restrictions were passed concerning East Indian immigration" in 1908 by the government. The first requirement was that they "had to have \$200 upon landing in Canada." The second one was that they "had to come to Canada by direct passage (a continuous journey) from their country of birth."¹⁶² What may seem to be reasonable by Western standards, \$200 was an exorbitant amount at the time. It was a requirement that functioned to "keep most Indians out of Canada." Nonetheless, according to Anderson and Frideres, "there were some immigrants

capable of raising that much money."¹⁶³ Similarly, the second restriction could have also successfully served to stem the trickle of Indians coming into Canada, had they not found a way to circumvent the fact that no commercial "direct passage" connected both points.

Anderson and Frideres wrote:

in 1914, nearly 400 Indians attempted to challenge this restriction and chartered a boat to take them directly into Vancouver. All these people had met the two requirements set up above. After two months of legal battles and actual physical violence, the boat was taken out to sea and returned home without any of the people ever stepping on Canadian soil.¹⁶⁴

Like other writers, Simon Belkin made the point that "the basic principle of Canada's immigration policy was selection of desirable immigrants."¹⁶⁵ He also discovered that 'discrimination' was operative in the Canadian definition of the situation in a White context of choice. The choice was "between different European nationalities," and not between White and Orientals, for example. He explained that, "those who came from Northern Europe (Anglo-Saxons, Scandinavians) and citizens of the United States were preferred to immigrants from Eastern Europe; Southern Europeans and Orientals were considered undesirable."¹⁶⁶

This systematic, selective policy epitomised the Canadian concern with invidious distinctions among human types and was generally indicative of a functional role of race. In addition, an operational role of culture could be seen in the significant consideration of 'capability,' which was identified as an intrinsic and immutable quality associated with race. Apparently, the intensity of the concern with which policy makers sought to apply a hierarchy of values to the

one racial type was not universally accepted in Canada. According to Belkin, "the policy of 'selective' immigration was criticised by those who favoured an open door policy and was branded as 'racist'."¹⁶⁷ By mid-1952, the Apostolic Delegate to Canada "called for a bolder plan of immigration based on the fundamental right of men to migrate 'in an orderly but free manner' to obtain access to natural resources." The purpose of this call for a "step-up" in immigration was to relieve the world of "the pressure of overpopulation" which the Delegate felt was "pushing us into war...and instability."¹⁶⁸

A new Immigration Act came into being in 1952. According to Hawkins, "it exhaustively listed the prohibited classes,"¹⁶⁹ and it was premised on the new "notion of 'Ethnic Balance'."¹⁷⁰ In the opinion of Anderson and Frideres: "the idea behind this was that no new immigrant groups should disrupt the existing ethno-racial ratio. The implication was that since Canada had not allowed non-whites into Canada, no more should come now."¹⁷¹ However, Hawkins wrote that, "a broader operational base for the new immigration program was created through the enlargement of the existing categories for admission, permitting the entry of large numbers of European immigrants. Small quotas were introduced for India, Pakistan and Ceylon."¹⁷²

Conclusion: Toward a "Just Society"

Our task was to discover which beliefs and ideas were relevant to the maintenance of such a situation in Canada, in view of the international

developments on human rights and self-determination and international concern with the colonial situation in the UN. In this chapter, we have shown how it is generally believed that the ideals of social justice, political freedom and equality of opportunity have represented unattainable goals for Canada's native peoples. In the opinion of George Shepherd, these are ideals which "have been developed by Western culture and to some extent, espoused in the ideology and public policy of dominant whites."¹⁷³ We have also pointed out that public policy in Canada excluded native peoples from its operative framework. This internal colonial situation was of a comparable nature, although not in all respects, to the white-non-white colonial type which is the focus of the colonial issue at the UN. We have found that the ethnocentric concepts of 'trust' and the "white man's burden" were tools which were relevant and useful in our attempt to recreate the past in Canada. Generally, Canadians were in agreement that 'we' and "all Canadians" simply did not include native peoples. This was implicit and it was understood as the obvious way to talk. Canada's native peoples did not belong in the category of "one of our fellow men" as it is universalised in the white mental world. We have been able to isolate certain characteristics in an official mind set which were operative in a 'colonial' situation.

Characteristic of this mind set are certain kinds of value judgements that are consonant with the belief that the situation of native peoples is a direct result of intrinsic and immutable qualities of this race. Consequently, the members of this race are not thought to be capable of self-help. Any action to help or assist them are undertaken towards a goal of relativity and not one of

equality. The project of the Trudeau Government to develop a Just Society in Canada exemplifies the pattern of behaviour in which similar explicit and implicit value judgements are characteristic. In view of the international developments, did Pierre Elliot Trudeau have much of a choice in the 'menu' of possibilities when he replaced Pearson as Prime Minister in 1968? We have decided that his leadership and the dramatic changes which he brought about are relevant as a closing part to this chapter. We have found some answers and remain with many unanswered questions. Without any doubt, we are able to establish from public policy that there was a significant break in tradition because of the government's expressed goals for Canada's future.

According to Jacques Hébert,¹⁷⁴ the Canadian Parliament's adoption in 1971 of the new policy of multiculturalism was evidence that "we were declining to sacrifice our multicultural wealth and diversity in the name of national unity."¹⁷⁵ Was the issue of jurisdiction relegated to a lesser public priority than in the early post-1945 period? So it seemed. And why did this happen? Was this a reflection of a new collective will in Canada? Hébert claims that with this new policy the Canadian government "officially recognised ethnic groups other than those of French, British or aboriginal origin."¹⁷⁶ In other words, the 'new' Canadians were the target audience of this policy. In Trudeau's own words to Parliament on October 8, 1971: "a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework...can form the base of a society which is based on fair play for all."¹⁷⁷ However, this new policy served to consolidate the cleavage pattern of separation between Canada's founding peoples and its native peoples.

What is Trudeau's legacy for the native peoples of Canada? We are certain that he could not be charged with a policy of neglect. Hébert felt that although "the Trudeau Government did not find all the solutions any more than its predecessors had. It did more than the rest...."¹⁷⁸ Wherein lies the difficulty which successive Canadian governments have encountered in their dealings with Canada's native peoples? In our estimation, the difficulty lies in the government's definition of the situation. The difficulty is found in the continuing refusal of Canadian governments to recognise the racial equality of its native peoples with its founding peoples. Therefore, on this premise of inequality, native peoples do not have the same 'inherent' rights which the founding peoples claim to have. Political rights must first be given or granted to native people. But this self-appointed Administering Authority in Canada must first decide that its native peoples can have rights before it is agreed that they should be given. And then it must stipulate under what conditions any such rights may be accorded to these peoples that are less equal. This was also the fundamental logic underlying the Mandates system and later the Trusteeship System of the UN, which we will discuss in chapter IV. It is evident that native peoples were not perceived by the Trudeau Government as being an inherent part of Canada, in this process of change. Therefore, the government had to design a separate policy for them.

A Core Funding Program was set up in 1971. In the opinion of Hébert, "the Canadian Government had provided them with the financial means to organise their association at all levels, promote their cause with the public, do research and obtain the services of lawyers, economists, constitutionalists and

other experts." He found it necessary to explain that, "once again, the state was providing arms for Canadians who were fighting for their rights."¹⁷⁹ Why should Canada's First Peoples have to do this? In 1976, Trudeau's Government "presented the provinces with a draft charter that would embody a set of values common to all Canadians. Language rights were assigned directly to individuals rather than collectivities."¹⁸⁰ The Government had set, as its priority, the establishment of rights for its founding peoples. Trudeau explained that,

what we were seeking was for the individual himself to have the right to demand his choice of French or English in his relationships with the federal government, and the right to demand a French or English education for his children from a provincial government. And the individual himself would have access to the courts to enforce these rights.¹⁸¹

So, the Trudeau government voluntarily decided to establish rights, and at the same time, ensure that they could be exercised in the context of a white Canada. Whereas, the native peoples must 'fight' for their rights, whatever they were, through lawyers in their dialogue with this government. On what basis could we explain such an invidious distinction? This is how Trudeau justified this voluntary action: "it seemed clear to us that these matters would never be settled unless the individual language rights of each person were enshrined in the constitution of the country....Our approach was indisputably more effective and more respectful of the dignity of Canadians."¹⁸² And how did this government intend to approach these matters with its native peoples? Here is a brief summary of the major events of government action.

First and foremost, "the Trudeau government did what was essential: it recognised the fundamental rights of the native peoples and the injustices

inherent in their present situation."¹⁸³ The initial step in this process was taken by Trudeau in 1979, at the First Minister's Conference. He "proposed the addition of a new item on the agenda-'Canada's Native Peoples and the Constitution.'"¹⁸⁴ This was the first step in the process to allow Canada's dependent peoples to 'determine' themselves. Trudeau included them in a process of consultations with a specific goal in mind. In 1990 he wrote, "...throughout our negotiations with the aboriginal peoples, we refused to talk about 'self-determination,' and only envisaged the possibility of 'self-government' on condition that a heterogeneous population might still live in a given territory."¹⁸⁵ This could be taken as an admission that Canada was, in fact, a colonial power within the meaning of Chapter XI of the UN Charter.

Trudeau argued that because "the Canadian nation is composed of citizens who belong to minorities of many kinds..." the government was mindful of the 'danger' of "the balkanisation of Canada."¹⁸⁶ Therefore, in drafting the constitution, the government was careful to eliminate any possibility of interpretation that "minorities...are in a position to be identified with a given territory." He claimed that, "this is why sections 25 and 37 on the aboriginal peoples and section 27 on multiculturalism avoid any identification of these collectivities with a particular government."¹⁸⁷ However, we suspect that in order to eliminate any possibility of secession, the Trudeau government decided to categorise its native peoples as a 'minority.' But a minority has no right of self-determination, at least, under international law. On the other hand, could a minority claim to have a right of self-government? And how could the Trudeau

government consider self-government for its native peoples, when it refused to have such "minorities...be identified with a given territory?" Moreover, the other 'minorities' in Trudeau's category were not allowed the offer of self-government.

Therefore, native peoples were actually placed in a category which was different from that of the 'minorities.' And the basis of this special status were prior ancestral and treaty rights which the Trudeau government decided to 'recognise' in the Constitution Act of 1982. Hébert felt that, in so doing, this government had "opened the way for further negotiations that would result in an improved definition of these rights."¹⁸⁸ And according to Trudeau, the Métis had been recognised as aboriginals and, together with the Indians and Inuit, had begun to negotiate various forms of self-government."¹⁸⁹ In our opinion, this was perfectly in keeping with the desire of native peoples. They already had "a primordial attachment" to Canada and they did not envisage a future outside of their country. This found a fit in the Axworthy-Trudeau definition: "a nation is a group of people who share a feeling of belonging."¹⁹⁰ Native peoples felt that they 'belonged' in Canada. However, they were awaiting some recognition on the part of the founding peoples that this was so.

In 1984, native peoples acknowledged that "the aboriginal cause has been advanced under [Trudeau's] leadership."¹⁹¹ The Constitution had established a system of self-help for them. It was a progressive step in both tangible and intangible terms. Their status and rights "would be included on the agenda of future first ministers' conferences so that for the first time they could approach elected politicians as equals."¹⁹² However by 1991, the ex-Prime

Minister and his former principal secretary concluded that, "the plight of the aboriginal community is a national disgrace."¹⁹³ On the other hand, they pointed out that "the truth is that Quebeckers [meaning French Canadians] have progressed so fast largely because of their own efforts but also because they have had two governments - Quebec City and Ottawa - working on their behalf."¹⁹⁴ Herein lies the cause of different results that were obtained from the Trudeau government's attempt to design a "just society." The federal government must have known that the self-help system which was instituted for native peoples, in itself, was not a sufficient condition to obtain much progress without the active assistance of both governments. Therefore this arrangement was neither a 'just' nor a 'fair' one.

As a result, native peoples continued to retain a separate and unequal status in Canada, even though one of the essential goals of this government was "to promote a minimum standard of citizenship everywhere in Canada."¹⁹⁵ Axworthy and Trudeau observed that, in the final analysis, "the primary issue is...what kind of Canada endures."¹⁹⁶ What went wrong for the native peoples? Hébert cautioned in 1991 that, "the march toward a just society for all native peoples of Canada will be long, and will require an awareness on the part of all Canadians that is developing only slowly."¹⁹⁷ The operational context in which native peoples must 'fight' for their rights had become more complex than just treaties and prior rights. In the 1970s, new Canadians were given a functional role in this process. Axworthy and Trudeau declared that "nationalism springs from a sense of grievance" and they conceded that, "to combat nationalism we

must seek out the reasons for the disillusionment, understand why the alienation began and institute reforms that attack the cause of the injustice."¹⁹⁸

They also understood that there was an important distinction between the situation in regard to native peoples and Quebec nationalist thinking, which they claim, had served "to confuse language with ethnicity," and which gave "rise to expressions like 'the two founding nations of Canada'."¹⁹⁹ It is for this reason they spurned any French claims for self-determination which were associated with Quebec nationalism. This topic is, however, not relevant for our period of study and the French population were never perceived to be a part of the framework of colonialism in the UN. Axworthy and Trudeau were of the opinion that "native self-government...can proceed without debates over peoplehood, and in principle, Canadians have nothing to fear from this development, because of the territorial restrictions."²⁰⁰ Axworthy and Trudeau believed that "the claptrap of national self-determination must be discarded," and argued that "what counts is improving the life chances of every Canadian, not protecting the abstract rights of 'peoples.'"²⁰¹ Would the life chances of native peoples improve if the government did not protect their rights?

As we will see in chapter V, non-white ex-colonies argued in the UN that self-determination had to be the basis of any change in the colonial situation; that it is only after colonial peoples had 'determined' themselves could 'fair' and 'just' arrangements be obtained. In other words, the abstract or self-evident rights of peoples had to be protected, first. It is for this reason that these ex-colonies sought to include self-determination as a fundamental human right in the

International Covenant on Human Rights. They believed that it was only after political independence could life chances of dependent peoples be improved. We will show in chapter V why, in rejecting this premise, the Canadian government refused to support the objective of the ex-colonies. It is apparent to us that the Trudeau Government would have had a preference for a similar policy.

Did the life chances of Canada's native peoples improve through the efforts of this government from 1968 to 1984, especially in view of its policy that "the claptrap of self-determination must be discarded"? The native peoples of Canada were the only group that had not 'determined' themselves, in the sense that they had no representation in the Canadian political system. This is how a member of the Canadian Senate has described the situation in 1991.²⁰²

The native peoples of Canada, whose ancestors lived in this country for thousands of years before the arrival of Europeans, have been victims of injustice arising from discrimination, cultural isolation, illiteracy and economic and social problems. They are our very own Third World, created by the neglect and misunderstanding of non-native Canadians and governments. Under every government since Confederation, the problems of native peoples on and off the reserve were observed to be going from bad to worse, but other Canadians did not seem to care. And politicians seemed in no hurry to act. Our treatment of our native peoples will remain an indelible blot on Canada's reputation.

How do we explain that this situation is a result of an attempt by the government to build a "just society" in Canada over a period of 14 years? Was it because native peoples were not perceived to be within its conception of 'every' or 'all' Canadians? Could we attribute, to this exclusive distinction, an operational role of race? If not, then why not? Since native peoples could not be turned out of Canada, for it was their homeland, they were set aside. They were neither

allowed to share in nor contribute to Canada's development as a nation. We have shown how this development was to follow a design that was based on a policy of rational choice. For our purposes, Canada's immigration policy is conceived as an attitudinal manifestation of a belief in the superiority of the white race. We have viewed various assessments of this policy in order to obtain some knowledge of which factors may have influenced its formation and its organising premises in making invidious distinctions between human types.

We suggest that the speech given by Jack Pickersgill, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, in 1954, demonstrates the confidence with which the government pursued such a policy. We believe that it is necessary to quote it at length in order to show some of the value judgements that were applied in this process of selection. Moreover, the emphasis of the Minister on qualitative categories like "our own race," "the kind of nation we are" and the 'character' of the Prime Minister and the Canadian Nation were somewhat similar to those utilised by Lincoln and Douglas in the USA and by all the Canadian Prime Ministers from Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau. This speech by Pickersgill is a reflection of a mind set that was specific to Canada and which could be placed in the Anglo-American tradition. The first part of the speech is clearly indicative of the importance which Canada gave to its image in the world. Pickersgill declared: "it is mainly the result of the kind of nation we are and the kind of nation we have made here at home." However, he continued: "it is true that Canada is not a nation according to any previous pattern. We are different from any other

nation...." These are clearly contradictory positions which are reflective of the conflicting needs of policy, as we have already pointed out.

Immigration policy was designed with a special goal in mind. In this sense, the nation was 'made' in accordance with a set 'pattern.' He went on to say this: "If we could re-write history, no doubt many of us would choose to preserve Canada of our own race and our own kind....But we cannot re-write history and we cannot alter the facts of our environment." Here is his explanation of the 'history' which he would have liked to 're-write':

We have...in more recent times, had to find the means of accepting in our midst thousands of newer Canadians of other races and other tongues. These elements which make up our own population are all here to stay, and I think we have no choice but to make the best of it.²⁰³

So, the principle of selection in the immigration policy continued to be operative on the basis of race; the culmination of which was a very sophisticated "point system" in 1967.²⁰⁴ We have identified what kinds of interaction between white and non-white peoples are expected and tolerated, structurally regulated and rejected, in Canadian society.

Our study has indicated the kinds of moral principles and ethical standards which were operational in this interaction. Most importantly, we have been able to identify the rules of conduct that were generally accepted by Canadians in regard to native peoples. How credible is the claim and how sincere the intention when "dominant Whites" espouse certain ideals as the basis for the resolution of human problems? And why did Pearson need to make a value judgement on "raising the living standards of Asia and Africa" while, at the same

time, ignoring the similar conditions under which native peoples live in Canada? Did he really intend to universalise Western standards to such different parts of the world when he was not willing to tend to the needs of Canada's marginalised native peoples? What, for example, is the value of a treaty with native peoples when the other party to a treaty 'sees' native peoples as being unequal and inferior and, therefore, different rules of conduct and value judgements ought to apply? One of the characteristics in this mind set is a consistent, true willingness to express concern for situations outside of Canada and even the need, sometimes, to act. But the measure of intent and purpose must be in the 'observing' over time.

Taking all of the information which we have examined in this chapter into consideration, we can reasonably conclude that we have been able to identify certain enduring characteristics of a mind set, which is specific to Canada, within a certain time period and which might have been influential in Canada's policy position in the process to terminate alien rule over subject peoples in the UN.

¹ Obed Asamoah, The Legal Significance of the Declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, p.73. He referred to 'aggression' 'self-determination,' "sovereign equality" etc.

² Robert J. Hind, "The Internal Colonial Concept," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 26, No: 3 (July 1984), p.564.

³ Alvin W. Gouldner, "Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism," Telos, No: 34 (Winter 1977-78), 14, p.23, cited in Hind "The Internal Col..." p.564.

⁴ See: Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee in Indian Self-Government in Canada (Ottawa: House of Commons, Issue No: 40, 1983) for the controversy over the meaning of 'reserves.' The native peoples claim that these were lands that they never surrendered." It is generally believed, though, that these lands were "property provided to Indians by the government...." pp105 and 106.

⁵ From: Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. To: SSEA, Ottawa July 17, 1946, No: 874 transmitted the letter to Ottawa. See appendix for information requested by the Secretary General and Canada's reply to this enquiry.

⁶ RG 25, Vol 2659 File 5475-AT-40 pt.1. A paper entitled "The Red Man's Appeal for Justice" was distributed through unofficial channels to the Delegations at the Assembly of the League. On March 18, 1924 the Department of External Affairs sent a 32-page "prepared statement to the Secretary General and all members of the League along with a copy of the Indian Act.

⁷ M. Wershof, Memorandum for Mr. Hopkins, August 14, 1946. See also: From: Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London. To: SSEA Ottawa August 12, 1946, Circular Telegram D. 352. Saving. (asking what information should be supplied).

⁸ From: Canadian Embassy, Washington To: SSEA, Ottawa No: 1666, August 14, 1946. This information was given in an 'unofficial' context.

⁹ E.R. Hopkins, Note for Miss MacCallum, August 17, 1946. Legal Department to External Affairs.

¹⁰ Ibid. Reid instructed the Legal Department to work with the Department of Mines and Resources on this.

¹¹ Ealy, Memorandum To Mr. Reid, August 26, 1946.

¹² "provision is made in the British North America Act (1867) for representation by these territories in Parliament and this has been effected in the case of Yukon". Emphasis and capitalisation in the original.

¹³ Ibid., emphasis in the original

¹⁴ Memorandum, August 26. emphasis in the original. See: British North America Act, S.146: Northwest Territories Act, R.S.C. 1927, C.142; Yukon Act, R.S.C. 1927, C.215, which indicated that all parts of Canada not within the boundaries of the various provinces are in all matter under the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.

¹⁵ for a copy of India's explanation see: Appendix. All replies to the Secretary General's enquiry were transmitted From: the Department of Mines and Resources To: USSEA. See: RG 25, Vol 2659, File 5475-AT-40 pt.1. From: C.W. Jackson To: USSEA November 7, 1946.

¹⁶ UN Charter, Chapter II, Article 73 (b)

¹⁷ From: Wrong To: Department of Mines and Resources, Ottawa, August 30, 1946. Wrong was Acting Under Secretary. Alger Hiss of USA State Department had already commented on August 14 that the USA "would give an answer in very general terms. He argued that a too precise answer in regard to 'the factors' might result either in an unnecessarily restrictive definition or else might result in an unrealistically wide definition". See: No:1666, August 14, 1946. See also: From: Department of Mines and Resources To: USSEA September 21, 1946. "Justice Department has been studying for some time a revision of the legislation applying to the Northwest Territories and Yukon". This was taken in context of the Canadian conclusion that the Canadian Territories do not apply to the 'factors' under Chapter XI

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ From: SSEA, Ottawa To: The acting High Commissioner for Canada in Australia. Secret. Cypher No.220, October 10, 1946.

²⁰ From: The acting High Commissioner, in Australia, Canberra To: SSEA, Ottawa. Secret. Cypher No.239 October 12, 1946. Apparently Ottawa had also made enquiries as to the French position on the 'factors' to be taken into account in determining which are Non-Self-Governing-Territories under Chapter XI. But no documents were traceable except reference to the reply: From: M. Bidault, Paris To: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, October 17, 1946.

²¹ From: E.R. Hopkins To: Justice Department, October 15, 1946.

²² From: Justice Department To: USSEA, October 17, 1946. See: File RG 25, Vol 2659, 5475-AT-40 pt.1 for the complete communication on No. 151325 of October 17. From: Mr. W.R. Jackett, Acting Deputy Minister, Department of Justice To: SSEA. The communication From: R.G. Riddell for the Under Secretary To: C.W. Jackson, Department of Mines and Resources of October 26. And Memorandum for the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly. File No. 5475-AT-40C Sub 23, Chron.23 on this matter.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ From: Riddell To: Reid, Ottawa, October 19, 1946. (Lester B. Pearson – Under Secretary)

²⁵ From: Reid To: Riddell, N.Y. October 22, 1946.

²⁶ Supplementary Statement for Section IV/I of the Commentary, Memorandum for the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly, Department of External Affairs, October 19, 1946 See also: From: Riddell To: Jackett, W.R. Ottawa, October 26, 1946. From: Riddell To: Jackson, Ottawa,

October 26, 1946. To inform them that Canada would report Indian Reservations "as an integral part."

²⁷ From: SSEA To: Trygvie Lee, Secretary General of the UN October 22, 1946, identified as Letter No.3. This Letter No.3 was transmitted From: SSEA, Ottawa on October 22, 1946 as Despatch No:393 To: Canadian Embassy Moscow; No:1298- Washington; No: 1804- London; No:352- Canberra; No:244- Wellington and No:236- Pretoria.

See also: From: E.A. Cote To: Riddell, Ottawa, November 11, 1946 enclosing the weekly Report on the Fourth Committee dealing with Trusteeships and Non-Self-Governing-Territories.

²⁸ From: Trygvie Lee, To: Louis St.Laurent, Secretary of State, N.Y. November 20, 1946. No:1506-2-2/WB

²⁹ From: Canadian Consulate General N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch No.179, November 14, 1946. Emphasis added.

³⁰ J.E. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service: An Administrative History of the United Canadas 1841-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955), p.205. Quoted in E. Palmer Patterson, The Canadian Indian: A History Since 1500 (Don Mills, Ontario: Collier Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1972), p.26.

³¹ Patterson, p.7.

³² Ibid., p.25.

³³ P.A. Reynolds, Introduction to International Relations (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1971), p.87.

³⁴ MG 26 L, Vol:57, File No: I-35, 1948. Letter From: Catholic Bishops of Canada, Ottawa To: Louis St.Laurent, Secretary of State, October 14, 1948, "Indian Affairs- Confidential." All Schools: technical, residential and day schools were to be included in this category.

³⁵ MG 26L Vol: 57 File I-35-1. From: Jas A. MacKinnon To: L. St.Laurent, Prime Minister, Ottawa, November 15, 1948. Secret and Confidential. On this day St.Laurent succeeded Mackenzie King as Prime Minister and President of the Privy Council. Sections regarding schools: 125-131, 100 and 185.

³⁶ The new Section 125(1)(d) – this gave power to the Governor-in-Council "to enter into agreements with any Province for the education of Indian children."

³⁷ The Thunderbird is a newspaper edited by Andy Paul, Vancouver B.C. It is "a compilation of news and commentary of special interest to North American Indians and their many friends." The article was surrounded by large X's in a thick felt pen. On the right hand side, also written in hand "see p.8." On page 8, is another article surrounded by large X's to bring its attention to the reader.

³⁸ To this end, Andrew Paul was "instructed to make all arrangements...." F. Assu: President North American Indian Brotherhood, J. Delisle: Vice-President

³⁹ MG 26 L, Vol:116, File No: I-35-1, June 28. Letter From Robert Moosonee, Diocese. Schumacher, August 4, 1949 To: L. St.Laurent, Prime Minister. Personal.

paragraph 3.p.1. "I saw the splendid hospital now being built on the island of Moose Factory." Paragraph 4.p.1. "If anybody had told me then [as a young missionary on 1898] that I would live to see the day when a great modern hospital would be erected in that lonely spot and the Canadian people would contribute more than \$ 2,000,000 to save the lives of the original Canadians it would have seemed like a fantastic dream. Paragraph 5.p.1. "...I would like to tell you how much I admire the courage and fairness of the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of Health, in his decision to build the hospital....He must have risked his own political future but what he has done some of us will never forget." Paragraph 3.p.2. "...this letter...is written as a matter of conscience by one who feels that as far as the Indians are concerned, Canada has saved its soul." signed Robert Moosonee.

⁴⁰ Letter, From: Andrew Paul, President of the Grand Council, North American Indian Brotherhood, Vancouver, B.C. August 8, 1949. To: L. St.Laurent, Prime Minister.

⁴¹ Memorandum for the Prime Minister. W.R. Martin, Secretary, Prime Minister, Ottawa. August 10, 1949. This was initialled on the lower left-hand side: "OK StL." Dr. Hugh Keenleyside was the Deputy Minister in the Department of Mines and Resources.

⁴² From: W.R. Martin, Secretary, Prime Minister's Office To: Andrew Paul, Vancouver B.C. August 10, 1949

⁴³ From Andrew Paul, Private and Confidential, August 28, 1949 To: L. St.Laurent.

Mackenzie King had accepted such a title from them.

⁴⁴ From: W.R. Marten, Ottawa, September 6, 1949 To: Andrew Paull, Vancouver B.C.
a copy of this letter was "referred to Minister of Mines and Resources."

⁴⁵ The Thunderbird, p.8.

⁴⁶ From: The Missionnaires Oblats de Marie Immaculée, Edmonton, Alberta, October 1, 1949.
To: L. St.Laurent, Prime Minister. From: The Missionnaires Oblats de Marie Immaculée, Montreal,
Province Quebec. To: L. St.Laurent, Prime Minister, October 12, 1949. Also enquiring as to the
government's intent to 'amend' the Indian Act. No further communication on this in file.

⁴⁷ From: L. St.Laurent, Prime Minister, Ottawa To: Révérend Père A. Boucher, Missionnaires
Oblats....October 5, 1949.

⁴⁸ From: The Canadian Catholic Conference, Ottawa To: L. St.Laurent, Prime Minister,
November 14, 1949. There were 8 signatures on this 2 page letter.

⁴⁹ MG 26L Vol: 116, File:I-35-1. "Native Indians' Progressive Evolution," The Thunderbird. p.1. "In
the year 1927, we were able to secure a special grant, which in part provided for the higher
education of Indians, and eventually study of the professions. This great gain was nullified by
refusal of some Indian agents to permit Indians to enter high or technical schools. Up to the year
1945 there were only eight Indians attending high school in B.C. with an even smaller ration
throughout Canada. The Indian leaders were persistent with their representations to the Federal
Government for the implementation of the parliamentary decree to give to the Indian pupils the
attainment of higher education."

See also: File No: I-35-S, June 28, 1949, for "Indian Affairs-School-Indian Reserve at Seven
Island.General."

⁵⁰ From: L. St.Laurent To: Colin Gibson, Minister of Mines and Resources, January 12, 1950.

⁵¹ From: L. St. Laurent To: Mgr. Alexandre Vachon, Ottawa, January 11, 1950. This actual
correspondence was removed from the files. A white slip from Access indicated that such a
correspondence did take place.

⁵² From: Jules Léger To: Walter Harris, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, January 23,
1950.

⁵³ Harold Cardinal, The Unjust Society: The Tragedy of Canada's Indians (Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig
Ltd., 1969), p.9.

⁵⁴ Diamond Jenness, "Canada's Indians Yesterday, What of Today," Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science, Vol. XX, No: 1(Toronto: February 1954), p.99. Quoted in
Patterson, p.27.

⁵⁵ Patterson, p.26.

⁵⁶ The Gazette. In 1956, B.C. signed a Memorandum of intent to dam the Peace River and in
1959 established the Peace River Power Development Co. Only in 1962, when plans for a dam
were well under way, was an attempt made to contact and tell the Indians. By 1968, the dams
were finished and Ingenika land flooded. They were devastated as traditional hunting and
trapping grounds and sacred burial sites were flooded. The water was too polluted to drink and
the waterways unnavigable."

⁵⁷ Ibid., Stephen Rogers visited Ingenika Point. "Without native input, government officials chose
sites for reserves in 'foreign' territory far beyond Ingenika ancestral lands. The natives were
riddled with disease, were malnourished and lived in 26 shacks with no insulation, running water
or even the electricity for which their lands had been flooded. The reservoir gives access to the
forests so Fletcher Challenge and Finlay Forest Industries propose to log five million hectares in
the area while Curragh Resources is proposing to start a lead-zinc mine that could pollute the
water of the Ingenika even further." See also: Boyce Richardson, Strangers Devour the Land
(Toronto:Macmillan of Canada, 1975), p.327. Six months before the James Bay project was
launched, the premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa, said at a press conference: "The basic facts
seem convincing. There is a power shortage in the United States. There is a surplus in
Quebec....It is clear that the economic feasibility of James Bay will improve if we have the
possibility of making power sales to the United States at profitable prices. He then told the
Canadian Society in New York that the project would cost a staggering \$ 2 billion, which Quebec
itself could not afford to invest, but despite the cost Quebec feels it can have a major role to play
in solving the northeast United States' energy problem."

⁵⁸ Reynolds, p.87.

⁵⁹ Francois-Xavier Gameau, "Preliminary Discourse to History of Canada," French Canadian Nationalism, ed. Ramsay Cook.(Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada, 1969), p.78. (Emphasis mine.)

⁶⁰ Statements and Speeches, 1950, No.14, p.2. In a speech to the Empire and Canadian Clubs of Toronto, 1951.

⁶¹ Hughes and Kallen, p.81.

⁶² MG 26, File: N-1 Vol:60. Honourable Jack W. Pickersgill in a speech "the Character of the Canadian Nation," to the Richelieu Club of Shawinigan Falls, March 11, 1954. p.11.

1937:joined the Department of External Affairs.

1942 to 1945- served as Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.

1945 to 1952- Special Assistant to the Prime Minister

1953: elected as Member of Parliament, New Foundland.

1953-1954: Secretary of State

1954-1957: Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.

⁶³ Statements and Speeches, 1950, No:11, p.8.

⁶⁴ Cardinal, p.13.

⁶⁵ Alain G. Gagnon and Mary Montcalm, Quebec Beyond the Quiet Revolution (Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1990), p.135.

⁶⁶ Gerard Bergeron, "Foreign Policy: 1950-1976," International Perspectives, November/December 1975, p.60.

⁶⁷ Marcel Chaput. Why I am a Separatist (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1961), pp.4-5, quoted in Anderson and Frideres, p.87.

⁶⁸ René Levesque, Le Devoir, July 5, 1963. (Quebec Minister of Natural Resources), quoted in Anderson and Frideres. p.87.

⁶⁹ Blair Fraser, The Search for Identity: Canada, 1945-1967 (Toronto:Doubleday, Canada, Ltd., 1967), p.203.

⁷⁰ Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1976) Appendix I, p.36.

⁷¹ See chapters IV and V.

⁷² John D. Diefenbaker, "One Canada, One Nation," Those Things We Treasure (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1972), p.146.

⁷³ Patterson, p.4.

⁷⁴ Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959) Preface. "It has been my conviction that British rule in India...holds up a mirror to the nature reflecting the English character and mind." He claims that "Indian experience undoubtedly hardened certain traits in the English character." In the Indian colonial situation, when the natives kept within the limits of the confines which secured the superior-inferior hierarchical relationship, the British ruling class was tolerant of the Indian's presence. However, as soon as the Indians stepped out of this defined context, and attempted to assert or even imply, an equality of status, the British ruling class displayed a fundamental aversion to the non-white race. According to Stokes to understand the origin of these "certain traits in the English character...one needs to penetrate to the genesis of the nineteenth-century English middle class, and to the hidden springs setting its type. p.xiii.

⁷⁵ Klein, p.120. (Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S.393,407,410.)

⁷⁶ Klein, p.120.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Klein, p.129.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Jean Paul Satre, "Preface" in Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism (N.Y.:Grove Press, 1967).

⁸¹ A.H.Myers, Are Men Equal? (Ithaca, 1955), p.83. Quoted in Klein, p.121.

⁸² P.M. Angle and E.S. Miers (ed.), The Living Lincoln (New Brunswick, 1955), p.204, quoted in Klein, p.121.

⁸³ Klein, p.121.

⁸⁴ Statements and Speeches, 1952, No: 56, p.4.

⁸⁵ MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970) 5th ed. p.7.

⁸⁶ Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Indians and the Law (Ottawa: 1967) A Survey prepared for the Honourable Arthur Laing by the Canadian Corrections Association and the Canada Welfare Council. Quoted in Cardinal, p.4.

⁸⁷ Anderson and Frideres, p.209.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p.208.

⁸⁹ Patterson, p.27.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Jenness, p. 98.

⁹² Patterson, p.40. In chapter 5, "the UN and aborigines of North America" is one such concern we will address. Canada did not support this effort in the UN. S.M. Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall Inc., 1990), p.173. Seymour Martin Lipset wrote that, "Blacks, Québécois, Chicanos, native North Americans, and a host of other ethnic and racial groups have expressed more self-consciousness since the 1960s than at any time in the history of the continent. It has not always been thus. He claimed that the "recent concern for civil rights have activated the native populations in both Canada and the United States." p.176. In our opinion these changes did get some impetus from UN involvement in colonial matters since the late 1940s. This will become more evident throughout the study.

⁹³ Pearson, Four Faces, pp.7-8.

⁹⁴ Eayrs, Northern Approaches, p.100.

⁹⁵ Ibid., we know that the aim of speeches, like this one given by Pearson, were not intended to denounce. This was not characteristic of the behaviour of the Canadian Government in the post-war world, especially in situations which involved Canada's friends and allies. That was inclusive of all the Colonial Powers. The only speeches that intended to denounce, were those directed to the Communist regimes. In this sense, Eayrs' comment has significance for our substantive concerns here.

⁹⁶ Cardinal, p.1.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.12.

⁹⁸ Ronald Manzer, "Human Rights in Domestic Politics and Policy," Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. R.D. Matthews and C. Pratt. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988, p.44. Manzer, p.41. In section 25 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 "aboriginal rights are recognised...but those rights are in no way specified let alone protected. The negotiation of aboriginal claims and the entrenchment of aboriginal rights in the Charter remain the most important unfinished business of the constitutional negotiations."

⁹⁹ Hughes and Kallen, p.81.

¹⁰⁰ Diefenbaker, "One Canada, One Nation," p.153.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.149.

¹⁰² Patterson, p.81. -The Federal Indian Act of 1876 "grew out of the findings of the Indian Commission of 1857. The report called for compact reserves and separation from the white man without isolation from white influences. It was hoped by this means to prevent squatters and encroachment on Indian land, protect Indians from other undesired (by the administrators and missionaries) contact with whites, and still gave them the presumed advantage of European example as embodied in the administrators and missionaries."

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.145.

¹⁰⁴ See: St.Laurent Papers, MG 26L, Vol:15, 1947-49, File: 86-1 for documents showing several attempts by the Canadian Civil Liberties Union and the University of B.C. Civil Liberties Union, among others, to prod the St.Laurent government into producing a Bill of Rights for Canada. MG26 L, Vol:116, File No: I-35-1. The Indian Act was the subject of ongoing problems and concern for Canada's native peoples. A letter outlining the views of the Indians of the Punnichy Agency on the Indian Act was submitted to W. Tucker. He passed it on to Ottawa. From: Walter Tucker, Province of Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, September 4, 1980 To: Prime Minister, Ottawa. Transmitted to attention of Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.

¹⁰⁵ Diefenbaker, Those Things...p.166.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p.157.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.158.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.159.

¹⁰⁹ Diefenbaker, Those Things...p.158.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p.170.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Diefenbaker, One Canada. p-170.

¹¹³ James Eayrs, Northern Approaches. p.100.

¹¹⁴ Diefenbaker, "Those Things..."p.170.

¹¹⁵ Cardinal, p.7.

¹¹⁶ MG 26, N1 Vol: 60 "The Character of the Canadian Nation." Address to the Richelieu Club of Shawinigan Falls, March 11, 1954 by the Honourable J. W. Pickersgill. p.14.

¹¹⁷ Cardinal, p.1.

¹¹⁸ Eric Stokes, Preface: "It has been my conviction that British rule in India...holds up a mirror to the nature reflecting the English character and mind."

¹¹⁹ Diefenbaker, John G. One Canada:Memoirs of the Right Honorable John G. Diefenbaker Vol 3: The Tumultuous Years 1962-1967 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), p.111. The Progressive Conservative Party and Diefenbaker lost its position as Government Party in the Canadian Federal election.

¹²⁰ Ibid., Vol.1, p.29.

¹²¹ Ibid., p.6.

¹²² Cardinal, p.1.

¹²³ Diefenbaker, John G. One Canada:Memoirs of the Right Honorable John G. Diefenbaker Vol 1: The Crusading Years 1895-1956 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), p.287. Gregor Guthrie and Thomas van Dusen wrote that these were the "hallmark of the Diefenbaker years – years of conviction and responsibility in international and national affairs....Canada called on the USSR to grant self-determination to the captive nations – the Ukraine, the Baltic States and the countries of Eastern Europe. The policy of a 'colour-blind Commonwealth' given new shape and texture by Diefenbaker's convictions, represented new hope for millions black, yellow and brown human beings in the Commonwealth...." And what has relevance for our study, "he wrote large on the scroll of public policy a warning against tolerating concepts leading to a kind of second-class citizenship for those of neither English nor French background."

¹²⁴ Patterson, p.4.

¹²⁵ Diefenbaker, "One Canada, One Nation," p.148.

¹²⁶ Hughes and Kallen, pp. 80-81.

¹²⁷ Diefenbaker, "One Canada..." p.153.

¹²⁸ This was similar to Australia's White Policy. see Freda Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared (Montreal:McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989).

¹²⁹ Stanislaw Andracki, Immigration of Orientals into Canada with Special Reference to Chinese (New York: Arno Press, 1978) This was a Ph.D. Thesis submitted to McGill University Montreal, April 14, 1958. His assessment of the government's policy regarding Chinese immigration from 1870 to 1958 was presented in 4 clearly defined categories:

1. "The period of unrestricted immigration ending 1885;"
2. "The period of the head-tax system from 1885 to 1923;"
3. "The period of the exclusion of Chinese immigrants, ending in 1947;
4. "The period of limited admission of Chinese immigrants under the rules applicable to Asians in general."

He also considered that "the later period" in which "the legislative and administrative process of the Law dealing with Chinese immigration and the East Indian and Japanese question...[was] part of a broader Oriental problem, p. II.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p.157.

¹³¹ Ibid., p.158.

¹³² Ted Ferguson, A White Man's Country (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd., 1975), p.vii

¹³³ MG 26L. Vol:13, File:70-D. Letter, From: the Committee for the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act Toronto, Ontario. To: Prime Minister Mackenzie King, January 30, 1947.

¹³⁴ Ibid., See chapter V for a detailed analysis of Canada's position on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and how significant it was for understanding Canada's policy on the colonial issue.

¹³⁵ MG 26 L, Vol:13 File:70-D. From: R. Mezger, Secretary Tres., The Victoria Labour Council, B.C. To: Ministry of External Affairs, Ottawa, L. St.Laurent, March 13, 1947. The Minister's Office "duly noted for consideration" the above correspondence, on March 19.

¹³⁶ This arrangement was, of course, contingent upon the financial ability of the Asiatics residing in Canada.

¹³⁷ From: Harold Thayer, Secretary. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, Victoria, B.C.. To: Prime Minister Lyon Mackenzie King. March 20, 1947. cc. Secretary of State External Affairs, Ottawa, Ministry of Mines and Resources, M.J. Coldwell, M.P.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid., P.C.695: Order-in-Council (March 31, 1931) general restriction of admission.

¹⁴⁰ MG 26L Vol: 13 File: 70-D-1947-48. From: Jules Léger, Associate Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, Ottawa. To: Harold Thayer. Personal. March 26, 1947. Personal.

¹⁴¹ Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), p.79. "It is obvious that the Canadian fact of two founding races, two languages, two cultures, and two sets of historical traditions must have exercised an influence on this area of public policy when the moment came for active government development of immigration just after the war. And in the post-war period, the French fact in Canada did exercise an intangible but substantial influence on immigration policy of a negative kind for almost twenty years....[T]he known hostility of Quebec on this question would probably, in itself, have prevented the adoption by the Liberal government of an enthusiastic posture on immigration, similar to the one adopted by Australia immediately after the war, even if the Liberals had had stronger convictions on the subject."

¹⁴² Ibid., see pp.92-93 for the details of this policy. Mackenzie King's speech in the House of Commons was on May 1, 1947.

¹⁴³ MG 26L Vol: 13 File: 70-D. "Immigration Chinese 1947-1948." Letter, From: The "Committee for the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act." Toronto, Ontario. To: L. St.Laurent, Ministry of External Affairs, Ottawa, , November 26, 1947.

¹⁴⁴ MG 26L, Vol: 13, File:70-C. Letter, From: Canada Council of Churches To: Prime Minister Mackenzie King, August 3, 1948. We were not able to trace any such previous communication in the files.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. From: Memorandum For the Minister of Justice, the P.M.O Private Secretary, G.J. Matte, August 3, 1948 transmitted this letter to the Justice Department.

For Info on "Immigration cases: 1947-48." See: File 70-2, Eastern Europe and USSR, File 70-3, members of Religious Orders, File 70 D Chinese, In box:55; File: I-20-14 (1948-49) "Immigration Asiatic General" was missing, therefore it was not possible to follow any behind-the-scene discussion of policy in regard to the Chinese and Japanese and Indians.

¹⁴⁶ George Shepherd, "Comparative Policy in White Dominance Systems: A Framework of Analysis," Race Among Nations: A Conceptual Approach, eds. G. Shepherd and Tilden LeMelle. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1970), pp.154-155.

¹⁴⁷ F. Hawkins, p.80. This Committee "was appointed in 1946 and continued its investigations until 1953." See Can., Sen., Stand. Com. on Immigration and Labour, Proceedings, 1946-1953. She felt that this Committee "did its most important work between 1946 and 1949." p.82.

¹⁴⁸ Hawkins, p.80.Fn.15. Can., Sen., Stand. Com. on Immigration and Labour, Proceedings, no.11, Aug.13, 1946; no. 14, July 9, 1947; no.10, June 24, 1948.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p.84. Emphasis in the original. See also: MG 26L, Vol: 118, File:J-35. 1950-51-52-53. "Jews - Mr. St.Laurent's signature" This file is made up of invitations to functions- all declined; greetings to the Golden Jubilee of the Rabbinical Assembly of America and Birthday greetings from the Active Liberal Hebrew Association of Montreal. No documents on policy were open or available for examination; See: Simon Belkin, Through Narrow Gates, (Montreal: The Eagle Publishing Co., Ltd., 1966) For "a review of Jewish Immigration, Colonisation and Immigration aid work in Canada (1840-1940);" and also: MG 26L, Vol:15, File: I-20. In this Volume there are 28 Files in the I-20 Series which deal with communication to the Prime Minister personally or the

Prime Minister's Office regarding the restrictions and problems of potential immigrants; correspondence with M.P.s, displaced persons etc. For detail information into the kinds of problems encountered from 1949-1953. Most of the replies to these inquiries were simply acknowledgements and explanations.

¹⁵⁰ Hawkins, p.85.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., no.8, 1947, p.209.

¹⁵² Anderson and Frideres, p.226.

¹⁵³ See W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever (Montreal: MC-Gill-Queen's University Press, 1978).

¹⁵⁴ Anderson and Frideres, p.226. See, O. Bartolo, "Blacks in Canada: 1608 to Now." A Key to Canada: Part II (Montreal: The National Black Coalition of Canada, Inc., 1976). And, H. Tulloch, Black Canadians (Toronto: N.C. Press Ltd., 1975).

¹⁵⁵ Anderson and Frideres, p.224.

¹⁵⁶ Colin A. Thomson, Blacks in Deep Snow: Black Pioneers in Canada (Don Mills, Ontario: J.M.Dent and Sons (Canada) Ltd., 1979).p.82. This was amply demonstrated with newspaper articles and speeches of the Canadian Immigration Department. There is a detailed "Chronology of Blacks in Canada" from 1492 to 1978. See pp.95-107.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p.9.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p.80.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p.93.

¹⁶⁰ Ward, p.ix.

¹⁶¹ See: R. Srivastava, "Family Organisations and Change among East Indians of British Columbia," in G. Kurian (ed.), Family in India: A Regional View (The Hague:Mouton and Co., 1970), quoted in Anderson and Frideres, p.226.

¹⁶² Anderson and Frideres, p.226.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., for more details on this see: Hugh Johnston, The Voyage of the Komagata Maru: The Sikh Challenge to Canada's Colour Bar (Delhi, Oxford University Press: 1979) p.134."The exodus might well have been greater....However, at the Imperial War Conference of 1918, Prime Minister Borden agreed to admit the wives and minor children of men already in the country. He bent to the pressure of British officials who told him that the stakes were high, that the atmosphere in the Panjab, the chief recruiting ground for the Indian army, was being poisoned by agitators making skilful use of the Canadian situation; and he recognised the damage done by the Komagata Maru."

¹⁶⁵ Simon Belkin, p.100. Emphasis in the original.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ MG 26L, Vol: 114, File I-20. From: J. Levy, Private Sec. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration To: Pierre Asselin, Priv. Secr. to Prime Minister, Ottawa, September 5, 1952. transmitting a clipping from the Montreal Star, August 29, 1952, which quoted an article from St. Boniface, Manitoba, August 29. (B.U.P.) "Immigration Step-up Urged...." Levy wrote that Harris 'thought' that the Prime Minister's Office "might be interested in the attached clipping...even though it refers specifically to the activities of this Department." In the upper right hand corner of this letter is pencilled in "P.M. to see." No further communication on this was found. For information regarding Immigration and the International Question, see also: MG 26L, Vol:114, File: M-14-44;1951. L.S. Roberge, M.P. For information on Immigration-Correspondence with Members of Parliament and Senators, See: Cross-Reference Sheet, Vol: 114, File:I-20 (1951-52).

¹⁶⁹ Hawkins,p.102. In her viewpoint, "the House of Commons debates from 1946 to the mid-fifties, and particularly from 1950 onwards, record a deterioration in the support and respect which the Liberal government could command in the House for its immigration policy and program." p.107. She added that, "the basic issue of individual rights in immigration was particularly suited to the talents of Mr. Diefenbaker," in his role as Leader of the opposition. p. 108.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p.227.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Hawkins, p.117.

¹⁷³ G. Shepherd, p. 155.

¹⁷⁴ A career journalist, founder, publisher and editor of the daily newspaper *Vrai* (1954-1959). Founded two publishing houses- Les Éditions de L'Homme and Les Editions du Jour wrote 20 books on topics such as human rights and concerns of developing countries. Member of Canadian Senate since 1983. Also Officer of the Order of Canada. This is taken from the bibliographical information which preceeds his article, "Legislating for Freedom" in the Axworthy and Trudeau (ed.), p.173

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.179.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.180.

¹⁸⁰ Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society," in Axworthy and Trudeau, (ed.) pp.411-412.

Emphasis added.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.412 emphasis in the original.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p.412.emphasis in the original

¹⁸³ Hébert, p.180.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Trudeau, p.410.

¹⁸⁶ Trudeau, pp.409-410. He listed them as: "linguistic, ethnic, racial, religious, regional and so on."

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.410.

¹⁸⁸ Hébert, p.180. He explained that "section 25 of the Act is intended to prevent interpretation of any other section in such a way as to reduce the rights of the aboriginal peoples. Article 35 of Part II of the Act includes the Inuit, Indians and Métis in the definition of aboriginal peoples and confirms their 'existing' rights, meaning rights arising from treaties and ancestral rights."

¹⁸⁹ Trudeau, p.424

¹⁹⁰ Axworthy and Trudeau, "The Tempest Bursting: Canada in 1992," p.180.

¹⁹¹ Hébert, p.180.

¹⁹² Axworthy and Trudeau, "The Tempest Bursting..." p.27.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.14

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.17

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.10

¹⁹⁶ Hébert, p.181.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ Axworthy and Trudeau, "The Tempest Bursting...", pp.14 and 15.

¹⁹⁹ Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society," p.410.

²⁰⁰ Axworthy and Trudeau, "The Tempest Bursting...", p.27.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁰² Hébert, p. 179.

²⁰³ See: Hawkins, p.108. "By 1953 large numbers of immigrants have arrived in Canada, and both their needs and the problems which they might create were becoming more apparent. Overall unemployment figures in Canada were beginning to climb rather steeply. A few individual members drew attention to this in the House in the early fifties...."

²⁰⁴ Anderson and Frideres, p.227. Accumulation of 100 points were contingent upon the "subjective evaluation of the selection officer." Furthermore, the criteria for evaluation were "established for developed countries," with an automatic high failure rate guaranteed. In addition, accessibility of immigration offices in Africa and Asia were in direct proportion to the intended effect of their presence; and many other debilitating steps for prospective non-white immigrants to undertake. Immigration Offices in:

Europe: 30

USA: 13

Africa: 5

All of Asia: 8

David Hughes and Evelyn Kallen, The Anatomy of Racism: Canadian Dimensions (Montreal:Harvest Press, 1974), p.214. In 1974, found that racism was "deeply rooted in the Canadian hierarchy They found the same situation in the American "System." Diefenbaker, One Canada, p.287. He propagated the idea of "a new vision of Canada for Canadians." The Gazette, Montreal, July 30, 1991. "Group uses green arguments to oppose more immigration." John Meyer, President of Zero Population Growth of Canada Inc., argued that "net annual immigration should be reduced to 40.000- 60.000, not raised to 250.000 as the federal government planned." He "brush[ed] off critics who say sharply reducing immigration will have the effect of shutting Canada's borders to the world's disadvantaged, many of them with skin colors other than white." His argument was based on his understanding that "most Canadians want a stable population of 27 million."

Chapter III: Canada's Perception of the Operational Context and Role

Conception on Colonial Issues

The material in this chapter is organised, roughly, into three main themes – military, economic and the definition of the situation. We sought to respect chronological imperatives, however, the subject matter is a very complex one and the varied themes do not always fall into tidy categories. The fundamental question is, how did officials go about establishing the priority of their actions and what were the means by which they chose to resolve this issue? To which factor variables did officials attribute an influencing role on their capability to act on this one issue? According to W. Medlicott, foreign policy "is not the deployment of power but the exercise of influence based on power." And because of this, "it cannot function without a purpose, without problems, aspirations and challenges...."¹ What were the perceived interests, loyalties and constraints in which Canada's options were limited and its choices circumscribed? Our purpose is to establish what these were and how they coalesced in a design of Canadian foreign policy on the decolonisation of empires.

Among our concerns are the international military developments and the consequences which arose from the establishment of a security network by the Colonial Powers in the early post-war years. This is relevant and instructive for our study because the analysis points to the actual and perceived interests of the Western powers in colonial areas. How much should we attribute to the

Communist factor in Canada's decision to work for a regional military organisation? Was this due to the unilateral USA pursuit of a world-wide military presence which effectively made the UN concept of collective security an obsolete one? The section on NATO enlightens us on the various problems which confronted Canada, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, because of the financial difficulties of the UK and France and how that affected their ability to cope with colonial matters. In addition, we will seek to discover whether Canada perceived its own economic interests to be tied in with colonial trade and how that affected Canada's relationship with the UK. Because if we are able to separate, for example, the economic factor variable from the other factor variables, it may then be possible for us to identify the more ascendant ones. Moreover, we will consider what problems Canada had encountered due to its solidarity with the Colonial Powers and how these problems affected Canada's role and policy in the decolonisation issue. For example, how did South Africa's ongoing refusal to submit a Trusteeship Agreement for South West Africa affect Canada's position during the formative phase in the UN? Or, did Canada's knowledge of the unstable political and economic situation in France influence its preferences or choices in the process to decolonise the French empire?

Which factors were perceived by Canada's decision makers to be relevant to the colonial issue during this, or that, period of time? We know, for example, that the anti-colonials functioned as 'causes' of policy in the UN context. According to the Canadian High Commissioner to London, the British Colonial Office had complained, in early 1950, that the UN is "a cold and unfriendly world."

And although the USA is placed in this 'world' more often than not, the Commissioner reported that the British "tend to regard Canada as an impartial but not uninterested friend in these matters."² He reported to Ottawa that the Colonial Office was obliged to undergo "a good deal of hard thinking on the official level," mostly because of "the problem raised by the rising tide of feeling throughout the world against the Colonial Powers." He agreed with the British that "this sentiment is particularly strong among member states which previously were themselves colonial dependencies." The UK recognised that there was a direct relationship between colonial experience and a strong anti-colonialism in the UN and had placed this group of members at the top of the list of agitators. The Commissioner observed that "India itself has increasingly assumed the leadership of this anti-colonial movement and is in the opinion of the Colonial Office, its most able advocate."

The USA was criticised for its role in helping to create this "cold and unfriendly world" in the UN. The Commissioner pointed out that "even the United States is not entirely free of this bias and is often less helpful and understanding than the Colonial Office would like." Did this create a problem for Canada's decision makers? And how did this USA factor relate to the situation created by the third and clearly identifiable category of perceived trouble-makers, the Soviet Union and its satellites? According to the Commissioner, this group was "rather a different category" and its sole aim was to "seek to exploit any opportunity to embarrass the Colonial Powers." The most potent weapon, in this aim, was the effective use of propaganda. In the opinion of the Colonial Office, "the criticism of

these countries arises more out of prejudice and a desire to do mischief than out of any knowledge or experience or conditions in the colonial territories." Moreover, the Colonial Office argued that these delegates in the General Assembly and the Fourth Committee "are for the most part political figures with little or no technical training" and they "presume to make recommendations on the administration of individual territories."³

The Colonial Office believed that the most dangerous threat to UK interests came from the attempt by such delegates to intervene in the administration of Non-Self-Governing-Territories. The UK suggested that the Special Committee on Non-Self-Governing-Territories assisted in such action. The High Commissioner was, in effect, advising Ottawa to give little value to the input from these groups. He argued that their position lacked substantive value for process because "in many of their own countries...conditions are far from being what they advocate for colonial territories." The Colonial Powers were convinced that these antagonists were not necessarily working in the interests of dependent peoples. Nevertheless, the High Commissioner recognised that because this group of countries "can command an overwhelming majority of the votes in the Assembly, it can create the impression that the Colonial Powers are attempting to thwart the will of the United Nations."⁴

Did this situation motivate Ottawa to take an active role in the decolonisation process? Generally, in the perception of the Western powers, world opinion had a functional role in directing process. According to the High Commissioner:

the Colonial Office recognises that an increasingly vocal section of world opinion looks upon colonial status as an outmoded, and even immoral, vestige of the past which should be brought to an end as soon as possible. Until it is, the Metropolitan Powers will be held at least morally accountable before the bar of world opinion.⁵

In view of the above imperative, officials attempted to design a policy in accordance with this aim:

the task, as the Colonial Office sees it, is to convince the world that the United Kingdom does not dissent from the ultimate aim of self-government and independence for the colonies within the Commonwealth. It in fact expressly declared this to be its objective. It insists, however, on its prime responsibility for this task....⁶

From London, this was the nature of the forces at work in the UN. And the goal was to aim for the retention of the colonies within the Commonwealth at the end of the decolonisation process. In principle, this was similar to the French aim in its colonial territories. How did Canada go about defining its role in this context?

It is understood that the Charter was a reflection of the subjective needs of the principal nations after the Second World War. Specific to the colonial world, these subjective needs were recognised in Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter. It will become evident in the course of this study that on the one hand, there was an unmistakable continuity of interests and purpose of the Western nations, in the colonial world, despite the high-standing principles and purposes of the Charter. On the other hand, an Indian delegate has suggested that "the creation of the UN gave hope to millions of people for freedom from foreign domination and for the realisation of fundamental rights."⁷ It is obvious that, under these circumstances, the aims of the Colonial Powers were diametrically opposed to the hopes of colonial peoples. What kinds of challenges

did this situation of conflict present to Ottawa? And how much influence could Canada hope to exercise in a process which was generated by such categorically antagonistic goals? Or, did Canada share the same aims of the Colonial Powers? We have assigned a functional role to the decision makers' definition of the situation. The analysis is based on the premise of rational choice and intentional behaviour. For our purposes, Canada finds a fit in the Anglo-American tradition. This conception has an operational role. It helps to identify the pre-dispositions as they are manifested in certain types of arguments and preferred choices in a bi-polar context.

In the opinion of Innis Claude, "if one wants to understand what has happened to the colonial problem, one would do better to read the story of the Cold War than to read the Charter, or still better, of course, to read the Charter in light of the Cold War."⁸ Marc Lee has argued that "the colonial issue may aptly be considered the basis of a second Cold War in the contemporary world...."⁹ What is the Cold War and why was it seen to be so fundamental to the study of the colonial issue?¹⁰ According to Hans Morgenthau, the Cold War was "...an effective denial of the basic assumption upon which the Charter of the United Nations is based. This assumption is the permanent solidarity of the so-called five great powers which are the permanent members of the Security Council."¹¹ Secret documents show that Canada and the Old Commonwealth Colonial Powers had come to realise, from the USA action between 1945 and 1946, that the USA was apparently not interested in the principles of collective security as conceived in the Charter. In addition, the USA jockeying for a pre-eminent naval

and military presence in the immediate post-war world was perceived by the other Colonial Powers with great apprehension and misgiving. Did Canadian officials read the Charter in light of the Cold War? Did they give any credence to the dichotomy of military power and capability along purely ideological lines? In their perception, was there a need to protect democratic values against a Communist threat?

A Cold War context necessarily meant that the world powers were in pursuit of diametrically opposed objective national interests in the decolonisation of empires.¹² Actually, the Soviet interest was documented in a speech by the Soviet delegate to the UN on November 3, 1947: "the Soviet Government believes that the time has come to pose the question of the full and final solution of the colonial question of government in all its forms and varieties in order to make an end to this infamy, this barbarism, this savagery."¹³ We will show how Canadian officials assessed the value of this great power goal for the successful decolonisation of empires. The USSR did not function as a single state in the UN political process. The fidelity and the consistency of the members of this group, in following this directive, were instrumental in forgoing the necessary strength which the non-white ex-colonies needed to make the UN effective in this undertaking.

Marxism-Leninism as an ideology "views the world as bi-polar, a world of tension, conflict, and competition between capitalist and socialist countries."¹⁴ From the outset, the decolonisation issue served to create such a world in the UN and it presented the Soviet leadership with a new possibility to pursue Soviet

interests. T. Millar has cautioned us that "it is essential...to keep in mind that one is dealing less with objective facts than with perceptions about them." And, he added that "national interests, hopes and fears are all perceptions."¹⁵ This is the guiding principle and the rationale of the last section of this chapter: the definition of the situation.

The Military Factor

There has been an ongoing discussion in the academic world as to the causes of the Cold War and at whose feet the responsibility should rest. It has also been suggested that the Cold War influenced the decolonisation process in the UN. Henri Grimal felt that "this conflict placed the colonies at the centre of the post-war world drama."¹⁶ Did Ottawa believe this to be the case? We will show how, in Canada's perception, the USA did set out to establish itself as the world military power and how this development necessarily required the co-operation of Canada and the Commonwealth Colonial Powers in the early post-war period. John Lewis Gaddis "sought to analyse the evolution of United States policy toward the Soviet Union from the formation of the Grand Alliance in 1941 to the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947." He claims that "if there is a single theme which runs through this book, it is the narrow range of alternatives open to American leaders during this period as they sought to deal with problems of war and peace."¹⁷

On the other hand, Franz Schurmann wrote that, "since the end of World War II, the prime mover on the world scene has been the United States of America." As a matter of fact he asserted: "to eliminate any doubts from the minds of the Russians as to what areas America considered part of its empire and what areas it conceded to Russia, it undertook to draw demarcation lines which eventually encircled the Soviet Union from Northern Norway to the 38th parallel in Korea."¹⁸ Our aim is to try to establish to what extent Canada's publicly expressed fear of the Communist threat did have a functional role in the making of foreign policy on the decolonisation of empires. We argue that, if Canada was actually aware of the USA pursuit and establishment of military facilities all over the world, then we could reasonably conclude that there was no real or pressing threat to the degree that it would be an important causal factor in the making of policy.

The USA and The Commonwealth

By December 19, 1945, Ottawa was notified that the USA was seeking to secure military bases in the pacific, in those colonial territories administered by the UK, Australia and New Zealand. In addition, London informed Ottawa that the USA laid claim to "some 25 islands in which they dispute the sovereignty of the UK." In the Atlantic, the USA had already leased bases on Portugal's islands, Iceland, the West Indies and New Foundland and were seeking 'rights' in Ascension.¹⁹ Hume Wrong wrote from Washington, "it is obvious that the USA

plans in this field have a bearing on our own defence planning and on the demands they make of us."²⁰ Ottawa was beginning to realise that this USA pursuit would be a fundamental source of friction between herself and the USA.

The Canadian Embassy in Washington had undertaken a detailed examination of the question of USA territorial bases in order to assess to what degree it would involve Canadian interests. It was decided that "Canada has obviously an immediate interest in the rights secured by the USA to Atlantic bases...and a considerable interest in the Caribbean, Azores and other Atlantic locations."²¹ However, it was the USA interests in the Atlantic coasts of Africa which gave officials cause for deep concern. They believed that,

if the USA feel they need so much so far away, what are the scales of defence that they will regard as satisfactory in the Northern part of their own continent? What sort of action will they request of Canada, or what rights will they seek from Canada, to complete their system of extra-territorial defences?²²

Canada was aware of the value of 'extensive' USA rights in these areas for its own interests, those of the Commonwealth and of the UN. However, officials were "dubious about the timing of some of the requests which they have put forward especially as they may encourage the Soviet Government to make undesirable demands."²³ The Soviet Union was an important factor in Canada's assessment of the situation with regard to Soviet co-operation in the establishment of a UN Committee on Atomic Energy,²⁴ and in the UN process to authorise the Trusteeship Agreements over colonial territories.²⁵ In addition, this USA pursuit created a number of problems for the Commonwealth countries. Australia and New Zealand took the position that "under no circumstances should

British sovereignty or control of the Pacific Islands be surrendered or altered without unanimous consent of Australia and New Zealand." This stand did not 'preclude' even those USA - UK arrangements for joint use of bases on condition of strict reciprocity. The UK was therefore requested by Australia and New Zealand to abstain from any talks with the USA, if they were not present.²⁶ Australia had agreed with the UK and New Zealand that the UK would "be largely dependent" on the USA for the defence of British Commonwealth interests in the Pacific.²⁷ Consequently, they decided that they should allow USA interests to take priority there.²⁸

On the other hand, they felt that the USA should be "pressed to consider the vital interests and also the international position" of the UK in both the joint establishment and operation of the strategic bases in the Atlantic. They believed that "any other arrangements may be derogatory to British prestige in the eyes of the world and [would] have other harmful effects."²⁹ Australia realised that the USA had "meant to keep the Pacific bases to themselves," but the USA was eventually forced by the circumstances of the UN Conference to recognise the provisions of the Charter. In Australia's opinion, the USA had 'unwillingly' to place its strategic bases under the watchful eyes of the Security Council as Strategic Trusteeships. And, it was for this reason that the UK was 'anxious' to settle the matter, in regard to the bases, before it was brought up in the Security Council during the discussions on the Trusteeship Agreements. The UK did not want any open USA-UK disagreements on this issue. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin reported that Stalin and Molotov "had pressed him hard in Moscow

on arrangements concerning the Japanese Mandates." Therefore, the UK believed that it was essential for the discussions regarding the bases in the Pacific be held in "great secrecy."³⁰

A meeting was held one week later with the Dominion Delegation, Byrnes of the USA and Bevin to discuss the British possessions in the Western Pacific. Prime Minister Frazer of New Zealand notified Byrnes that several of the islands, the cession of which the USA was seeking, were New Zealand territory and "not for sale."³¹ And Australia 'pressed' the USA "to show their hand with regard to their aims in French, Dutch, Japanese and their own territories in the Pacific."³² On the other hand, the Canadian Secretary of State had announced at a Foreign Office meeting that, "Canada did not appear to have any direct interest in the particular requests made by the United States Government, except possibly in civil aviation facilities at certain points."³³ However, in recognition of the international operational context of the mid-1940s, Ottawa was 'confronted' with the same "basic problems" of foreign policy arising out of the discovery of the atom bomb and other methods of mass destruction, and the 'schism' between the Soviet world and the West. According to Escott Reid, these problems 'combined' presented a threat to peace.³⁴

Basically, the UK was concerned that if it made any 'concessions' in its territories to the USA for military bases, it "would annoy Australia and New Zealand."³⁵ This was because of the USA attitude toward 'joint' bases. The UK and the Commonwealth countries thought that they "should be entitled to use joint bases in the Pacific in a war in which the United States remained neutral."

And although the USA 'expect' those sharing joint rights to be responsible for the upkeep of these bases, the USA "contemplated an 'escape' clause which would automatically relieve them of all obligations in connection therewith, if at any time the American security interests is shown no longer to exist."³⁶ This was, of course, unacceptable to the Commonwealth Governments in view of the international situation. New Zealand was "quite opposed" to conceding any 'sole' rights to the USA in its territories, but was prepared to give the USA rights to use, 'providing' that the UK and Australia were allowed equal joint-rights.³⁷ In view of the USA atomic test at Bikini on July 1, 1946,³⁸ the Commonwealth realised that it was in their "long range interest...to keep in with the Americans while moderating their speed." This was in view of the "other more disquieting forces on the move - the Soviet Union."³⁹

The arrangements that were made for the USA use of the facilities in Portugal's Azores would have long-term significance for the decolonisation process after 1955. The Dominions Office had warned Ottawa in mid-1946, that Salazar had "attached the greatest importance to political implications of Portuguese co-operation."⁴⁰ He wanted to know,

whether the United States envisaged, or regarded as possible, any basis for a political agreement on which it might be reasonable and legitimate to build the hypothesis of co-operation in a certain way and for a certain period against a certain risk of for a definite objective?

According to the Dominions Office, Salazar made a distinction between its relationship with a colonial ally, the UK, and with that of the USA. He felt that with the UK, Portugal would work "in anticipation of a certain hypothesis and undertake mutual obligations for that eventuality:"⁴¹ that is, colonials helping

colonials. It was a rather difficult and confusing time for the Old Commonwealth because USA unilateral actions reflected its colonial intentions. Also important for our study, is the later implications which USA policy would have for Canada because of its membership in NATO, especially when the UN began to address Portugal's colonial empires after it became a UN member in 1955.⁴² For, in spite of international pressure, the NATO countries were obliged to give support to Portugal's intransigent position in the UN.⁴³

NATO Replaces Collective Security

According to Soward, "because of the waning confidence in the possibility of organising collective security between 1946 and 1948, Canadian emphasis shifted to the development of regional security in the North Atlantic region, the area of most immediate concern to Canada." In his opinion, Canada's active role "in creating NATO reflected the driving impetus resulting from alarm at the menace of Soviet imperialism."⁴⁴ A study was undertaken by the Joint Planning Committee and the Joint Intelligence Committee to assess "the military value of Portugal as a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty." In light of this study, the Chiefs of Staff Committee concluded that "from a military point of view the advantages accruing to the Allies," if Portugal was accepted as a signatory to the proposed alliance, would "outweigh the disadvantages." The study had assumed that "the only potential enemies" of the proposed members of the alliance, "are the Soviet Union and the countries in the Soviet orbit." This is a confirmation of

the Canadian perception of a bi-polar international operational context from the late 1940s. The Chiefs of Staff Committee recognised that:

In the implementation of peacetime aid to Portuguese armed forces such aid would be of value only if applied to the development of basis and installations which might be used by other Allied forces in war, or if such aid was aimed at assisting both Spain and Portugal in holding at the Pyrenees or seriously delaying Soviet forces in their effort to reach Gibraltar.⁴⁵

The Committee was impressed by the fact of the "large measure of control over traffic in the western approaches to the Mediterranean," which such bases would provide. Moreover, the Azores were seen as having "great strategic importance for control of trans-Atlantic sea and air lanes." In addition to the topographical factors, "the long-standing friendly alliance between Portugal and Great Britain," and the even more important fact of "the anti-Soviet character" of the Portuguese Government were seen as relevant considerations by the Joint Planning Committee. These factors encouraged the Committee to "suggest that Portuguese mainland and island bases might be made available to Great Britain in the event of war whether or not Portugal itself was threatened with attack." This was crucial for regional security and the Committee emphasised that "the unrestricted use of the Azores by the Allies will be of paramount importance to the maintenance of operations in the Mediterranean."⁴⁶ On February 4, 1949, it was decided that Portugal would be an asset to the new alliance. Under the leadership of the USA, an alliance of 12 countries was solidified in a treaty signed in Washington on April 4, 1949.⁴⁷ This fact of combined powers was to reinforce the strength of the Western democratic world relative to the Soviet world.

French President Charles de Gaulle wrote of the ubiquitous USA control emanating out of its own conception of leadership in the alliance. In his opinion, NATO was "a system of security whereby Washington controlled the defense and consequently the foreign policy and even the territory of its allies."⁴⁸ This pervasive control was actualised in terms of a hierarchy of priorities set by Washington. According to de Gaulle, "it never happened that a government belonging to NATO took an attitude that diverged from that of the White House."⁴⁹ We suggest that, in light of this comprehensive military and economic might and support, it is rather difficult for us understand why the Western nations continued to perceive any danger or threat from the Soviet Union. It was a very unbalanced bi-polarity in the international system, at least up to the mid-1950s. In 1948, the Canadian Government had already determined that "the fundamental objective" of foreign policy would be "to preserve peace and to seek a reduction of international tension."⁵⁰ What did this entail in tangible terms for Canada? The fundamental question is, did Canada view this extensive and exclusive military organisation as serving to reduce international tensions in 1949?

In January 1950, the USA President announced the decision that the USA would seek actively to develop the hydrogen bomb. In an address to the Canadian Society in New York on February 10, 1950, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent declared:

the North Atlantic Treaty...itself asserts that the North Atlantic community is not just a military alliance; the North Atlantic nations have undertaken to combine their economic, social and moral strength as well as their military resources. And if, the North Atlantic Treaty is to be an effective deterrent to aggression, that combination of strength must apply in all those spheres.⁵¹

Was this an attempt by St. Laurent to diffuse tensions, caused by the USA announcement, in the international arena?⁵² The second week of February 1950, the Canadian Secretary of State met in Ottawa with Hume Wrong, his Ambassador to Washington, to discuss what role Canada could undertake "to lessen the international deadlock with the Soviet Union."⁵³ The USA Secretary of State had confirmed, in a statement to the press on February 8, that there were "no effective method of action except continuation of the policy of containment." This disturbed Canadian officials. The Communists had come to power in China⁵⁴ and the untenable crisis situation in Indo-China made the need for stability, in Asia, all the more prescient for the West. And this also served to complicate the international dynamics of maintaining peace.

In a conversation with Hickerson of the State Department on February 16, 1950, Wrong "distinguished between a possible effort to negotiate with the Russians and propaganda move designed to influence opinion against the Russians." He was perturbed that the USA made no effort at negotiation and pointed out the "negative effect of the recent statements of policy by the USA."⁵⁵ This USA behaviour was antithetical to Canada's professed aim to "reduce tensions." According to Hickerson, the State Department did "not regard the Kashmir dispute as an issue of extreme gravity" but considered that communist 'infiltration' was "quite likely in India in any event."⁵⁶ Therefore, he did not think, that "a neutral bloc in Southeast Asia" had any alternative value for the policy of containment.⁵⁷ Wrong had communicated to Ottawa in February, that as a measure of the significance of the USA/USSR deadlock, it was "the subject of

very active discussion in the press" and a popular demand in the USA "for some new effort to negotiate with the Russians." In his opinion, this "public debate on the question was stimulated particularly by the President's announcement in January of the decision to seek actively to develop the hydrogen bomb."⁵⁸

Whereas the Canadian officials did not believe that the Russians wanted a war,⁵⁹ USA officials fully understood that the policy of containment did not help to create an atmosphere which was conducive to negotiation.⁶⁰ Therefore, the chosen alternative was to continue their pursuit of a world wide military consolidation. Pearson estimated that the Canadian public "would not be content for long merely with the achievements of the Kennan policy of containment, on no matter how wide a front that policy may be successfully applied." However, he argued "I do not think for a moment that there is any point to negotiation simply for the sake of going through the motions in order to satisfy public opinion."⁶¹ In order to escape this "encircling wall of frustration," Pearson suggested a co-operative effort by USA, UK, Canada and "possibly France" to obtain "some agreed programme for an approach to the Russians, either on a broad front or in some particular field." However, he cautioned Wrong, "there would of course have to be extremely careful preparation and agreement both upon our initial positions and upon the positions on which we are prepared to retreat if the Russians showed any disposition to negotiate."⁶²

Pearson's argument was based on a simple logic. He felt that "if there was any way of avoiding the dangers of a sudden, ineffective and therefore calamitous renewal of discussions through some dramatic gesture designed

simply to appease public opinion, it is through a considered policy of the kind I have in mind." He did not seem to have too much confidence that negotiations with the Russians would be successful. Nevertheless, he was prepared to undertake such an exercise "even if it did not secure any concrete results." He proposed that, "surely, if it were carefully planned and operated, it might secure important gains in the psychological war."⁶³ Apparently, the USA did not seek a renewal of discussions. On March 24, Pearson expressed his concern over the push by the USA Secretary of State for some sort of Pacific Alliance:

In regard to the Far East, at San Francisco, Acheson took a step of major consequence to us all when he drew or seemed to draw the line of Western defence firmly across the southern borders of China and hinted that some kind of Pacific Association should be formed for the purpose of holding this line.⁶⁴

Pearson enquired of his Ambassador, was Acheson "really thinking in terms of a Pacific Pact?" If this was indeed Acheson's intention, Pearson wrote:

I for one have very grave doubts whether at the moment an alliance or grouping of this nature would be practicable....I would need a lot of convincing that we were not simply being asked to repeat in South East Asia, through an international instrument, policies which the United States had followed with such unhappy consequences in China; and which are not working out too well in Korea.⁶⁵

He explained that NATO was a different situation altogether. It was a case where "we drew our line around an area of relative stability, within which there was a genuine community of interest, political, economic and cultural." But post-war Europe was not stable in 1949. At the time, St. Laurent expected NATO to serve as a deterrent in the cause of peace. And, most importantly, its survival as an organisation was a 'public' priority for Canada in terms of its hierarchy of

interests in foreign policy. But it is evident that NATO was perceived by Ottawa to have a secondary status. By mid-1950, Pearson attempted to explain to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, his conception of the value of NATO.

Pearson wrote to St. Laurent:

I told Bevin...that in our North Atlantic work we should keep emphasising that our regional arrangements were only a second best to an effective United Nations, and that if the larger organisation could only be made to work as it should, no one could be happier than North Atlantic countries. I don't think Mr. Bevin was very much impressed by this approach.⁶⁶

Did this mean that, from the outset, NATO was perceived by Canada to have a limited instrumental value?

The point is that, even if Canada and the USA had perceived a Soviet threat, both knew that this threat could have been adequately met. According to Adam Ulam, "from the point of view of the Kremlin, 1949 marked the opening of a most dangerous period for the Soviet Union."⁶⁷ Analysts attribute the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, in 1955, to the existence of NATO.⁶⁸ It is generally agreed that the creation of NATO served to 'solidify' the two major powers in a dangerous "bipolarisation of the international system."⁶⁹ These developments in the early post war period must have appeared rather sinister to the Russians. The USA had set up military installations and airbases "stretching from the Atlantic almost to the Persian gulf, from which American aircraft could reach Russia's interior and most of her industrial centres."⁷⁰ By early April 1950, the Canadian Secretary of State felt that the burden of international affairs "seem[ed] heavier than ever previously."⁷¹

Korea

Canada had an interest in Korea only in so far as it 'particularly' concerned the North Pacific security considerations. At the end of 1947, officials in Ottawa had agreed that Canada become a member of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in order to 'ensure' that the United Nations "does not drop the responsibility it has assumed." Even to the end of 1949, officials believed that the UN had "contributed in part to holding the line against Communism in the Far East."⁷² However, by Anthony Eden's account, the situation had been drastically altered by the end of 1949:

there is the triumph of the Communist revolution in China and the arrival of Chinese troops on the Indo-Chinese frontier....In Indo-China, as in Korea, the Communist could now play Tom Tiddler. The Vietminh rebels could find refuge, equipment, money and training facilities across the Chinese border; with this assistance, they built up their strength from disorganised guerrilla bands to an army highly skilled in Indo-Chinese warfare....⁷³

This was the context in which Canada saw its role in "encouraging the work of the UN Commission as a stabilising element." This involvement was perceived to be in Canada's direct interest.

However, it was not to be an easy task especially with the involvement of the USA and the USSR. The 1949 Report of the Korean Commission stated that "world wide antagonism between the USSR and the USA continued to be one of the basic factors underlying the present difficulties in Korea." Ottawa knew that the USA took 'exception' to this statement because in the USA perception, "such antagonism as exists is between the USSR and its satellites and all other

members of the United Nations."⁷⁴ This connection had significant implications for Canada in terms of financial and military commitments.⁷⁵ Officials did not have a choice in this matter.⁷⁶ And the United Nations Division suggested that all the other allies were in the same situation. In early 1951, Holmes wrote to the Under Secretary:

Whether the decision to intervene was discussed on a very high level with the British is not entirely certain, but there is no evidence on our files that it was. There seems to be no doubt at all that this was a decision entirely taken by organs of the United States Government....It was obvious that in such circumstances friends of the United States had no alternative but to endorse this decision. I am not necessarily suggesting that they did not approve of this decision or that it was a wrong decision. (Most of us, as I recall, were both elated and frightened by the decision.) It is important to recognise, however, that it was the only decision which could be taken without totally undermining the overall position of the United States.⁷⁷

It is evident that the Cold War implications of this crisis were uppermost in the minds of Canadian officials. The Secretary of State for External Affairs wrote to his Ambassador in Washington that any reference to "the two-power aspect of the present world conflict will be unpalatable" to the USA. Nevertheless, he argued that "the facts of this situation cannot be denied." He felt that the situation was "most worrying," in view of USA General MacArthur's statement in Congress and other public statements which "assume that in the Far East it is the United States versus Communism, and that the United Nations does not count."⁷⁸ Under these circumstances, it seemed that the USA, alone, had decided on the strategy and goals of action in this conflict.⁷⁹

Collective Security: Blocs in the UN

In early 1951, the Department of External Affairs decided to undertake an examination of the situation in the UN "in light of the reverse in Korea." Of importance, was an assessment of the role certain blocs play in collective security. Holmes concluded that "the Latin-American countries are not themselves prepared to support universal collective security with more than rhetoric."⁸⁰ Goldschlag of the UN Division observed: "Nor do they feel as immediately exposed to Soviet pressure as the bulk of the Asian countries, whose proximity to the Soviet Union tends to exert a mitigating influence on their interpretation of the responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to collective security."⁸¹ This was an obvious recognition, by officials, of an important operational role of geography as a factor in decision making on issues of war and peace.⁸² Goldschlag acknowledged that, "wherever the interest of the Soviet bloc were affected...the Asian countries displayed considerably more caution, both in their statements and in their votes, than members of the Latin-American bloc." More specifically, he recognised that "this attitude on the part of the Asian Delegations was fairly conspicuous...in respect of issues involving the application of the principle of collective security."

On the other hand, he felt that "the frankly expressed reaction of the Arab Delegations to all such issues" was similar to that of the Latin American. The Arab members believed that they "had very little to gain from closer co-operation with the Western democracies and that they were not prepared, at this

stage, to incur the displeasure of the Soviet Union."⁸³ The UN Division acknowledged that USA action in Korea was costing them valuable goodwill among the Asian members.⁸⁴ According to Goldschlag, "certainly the precipitate action initiated by the United States Government when the Republic of Korea was first attacked on June 25, 1950 made it a good deal more difficult for the Asian states to believe in the genuine international character of the enforcement action launched subsequently by the United Nations."⁸⁵ He added: "Whether we like it or not, the fear of colonialism is far from dead in Asia, and the Asian countries are extremely reluctant to take sides in any dispute which could conceivably be interpreted as involving the opposing interests of the Asian peoples on the one hand, and the major Colonial Powers on the other."

Goldschlag ventured to speculate that some of the Asian states might recognise "that the North Korean aggression and the subsequent Chinese intervention in Korea possibly form part of the same comprehensive pattern of Soviet policy." And he felt that this "is bound to prompt the countries of Asia to reconsider their own vulnerable position...." On this note, he concluded that they "will, in the future, take a somewhat more determined attitude toward the application of collective security measures." However, he conceded that this view should be "subject, perhaps, to two reservations":

In the first place, the Asian states may be expected to assume a more cautious position in the case of any act of aggression involving the danger of another global conflict which, for geographical reasons alone, is bound to be waged at least in part, on the Asian continent. In the second place, the Asian states, unlike the Latin-Americans, may in fact draw a distinction between countries like Indo-China, which to them represent a sphere of colonial rule inimical to the true interests of the native population, and countries like Iran or Burma, where

aggression would, by the very nature of the case, have to be more overt and could scarcely escape the charge of imperialist expansion.

Canada Searches for a Policy

In January 1951, the Canadian Ambassador to Washington agreed with American Congressmen that the North Atlantic plans were "obviously inadequate to meet a Russian attack in the near future." Hume Wrong reported that members of Congress "all evidently believed that the European efforts were wholly ineffective and half hearted."⁸⁶ Could this be the reason why the USA continued to pursue its unilateral policy of building military installations all over the world? In early May, Ottawa was notified by the UK High Commissioner that the USA Chiefs of Staff had a conference in Puerto Rico "to discuss command and liaison arrangements in the Greater Caribbean area in peace and war," with the UK Chiefs of Staff.⁸⁷ As already pointed out,⁸⁸ Canada had direct and important interests in this area but had not been invited to this conference. Two weeks later, the Canadian High Commissioner to London informed Ottawa that the USA had made a request for a lease of Torbay. He wrote in an 8 page message:

Our impression is that there will be found to be no uniformity (and little evidence of the desired 'pattern' referred to in Washington's message) in these various agreements. They appear to represent a series of improvisations developed in a variety of circumstances. If one case is cited as a precedent for a particular proposal, others can equally well be regarded as precedents for quite different courses.⁸⁹

This continuing development was observed by Ottawa with some apprehension, especially at a time when the Department of External Affairs was occupied with finding ways to build a consolidated front in the face of a perceived Soviet Threat. According to the Department, "the driving impulse is fear of Soviet imperialism." At the time, the Department decided that "the problem is to direct that impulse into the most useful channel, both for Western Europe, which is more immediately threatened, and for the Atlantic Community as a whole."⁹⁰ The task was to decide how this should be accomplished. Approximately one month later, Ottawa was informed that the USA had made a request for "base rights in Morocco." M. de Laboulaye had "negotiated the Franco-U.S. Bases Agreement with the American Embassy in Paris," and he told Ritchie that this request "had presented the French Government with a difficult political question." Ritchie did not hesitate to point out that "Morocco is, of course, outside the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty."⁹¹

What was the point of maintaining NATO if the USA continued to insist on bilateral military agreements? In early August, the UN Division had completed its first draft on "the Role of the United Nations in the Maintenance of Collective Security."⁹² Canadian policy rested on "the acceptance of the general principle of universal collective security, that is, on a conviction that aggression in any part of the world is a threat to the security of Canada." In the opinion of the Division, "cordial relations between the Communist world and the non-Communist are unlikely for a very long time." Officials were "not certain that 'peaceful co-existence' of the two worlds is possible." However, they were "prepared to try it,"

in view of the alternative of a possible and 'devastating' war. They also agreed that the Soviet Union "may have decided to pursue a more cautious tactic."⁹³

In view of this assessment, the draft concluded that "best suited to the particular interests of Canada," was a "policy of maintaining and even strengthening but at the same time limiting the role of the United Nations as the basis on which to maintain collective security." The draft also found it incumbent upon Canada "to use its influence to restrain the United States from impetuous action which might threaten international security." It is obvious that the emphasis was placed on the UN rather than on NATO. The Department of External Affairs also decided that Canada had to have its own policy in Europe. From the Canadian perspective, the Department argued: "it is essential to keep in mind that the ultimate objective of containment, as the building up of the strength in the West, is the negotiation of some tolerable, long-term basis for peaceful co-existence with the USSR."⁹⁴ The value of this goal is appreciated when viewed in the context of the third draft of the UN Division. In mid-1951, officials in the UN Division concluded that "the structure of international security at the present time is an extremely delicate framework and our aim is to prevent it from crumbling."⁹⁵

NATO in Trouble

We know that developments in NATO were certainly tied in with the international situation and the UN. And, by late 1951, Canada was even less consulted in the UN than at NATO. The Canadian Delegation's description of the

'atmosphere' of the General Assembly is an aid to understanding this change. The Chairman wrote: "the most prominent feature of the session to date has, of course, been the offer of the United States, United Kingdom and French Delegations to negotiate a disarmament agreement on certain stated principles." He observed: "This offer has coincided with the Rome meeting of the North Atlantic Council...a fact which has tended to make certain Western delegates...cynical regarding the sincerity of the West." From this observation, we can logically assume that these Western Delegations, like Canada, were not taken into the confidence of the major planners, although disarmament was an issue that involved their direct interests. The Chairman recognised that,

One tendency at this session has been the increasing propensity of the United Kingdom, the United States and the French Delegations to consult among themselves in an effort to reach full agreement prior to any discussions with other Delegations. Through our own efforts we usually manage to keep in the picture better than other Delegations which are often not fully briefed until the final stages of Big Three plans: but we are less frequently consulted than in previous years."⁹⁶

Since Canada was dependent upon some sort of collective security arrangement, this development was necessarily a distressing one as we will see later. Because of the principle of open consultation among the NATO members, this preferred inner circle did not bode well for the survival or the future of NATO. Was this a temporary situation? Or, was there really an expression of solidarity, which was based on an equal partnership, of the Big Three? Of significance for our analysis is this observation by the Chairman:

The Big Three concert on a wide number of issues is more marked than at previous sessions: and probably results in part from habits contracted among the Standing Group members in NATO. The fact that the three important agenda items – disarmament, collective

measures and German elections – are of particular interest to these three powers – is, of course, another factor re-enforcing this tendency to Big Three exclusiveness.⁹⁷

Pearson's visit to London revealed worrying developments. Churchill complained that the Americans "were building up too rigid and unwieldy a structure" for NATO. And he declared that he was "certainly not going to give in on U.S. command of the North Atlantic, on the basis of the present proposals."⁹⁸ Pearson had personal experience of the effect of the USA leadership role in world affairs⁹⁹ and, in view of the British diminished international stature,¹⁰⁰ he knew that the allies had to find a way to cope with the American dominant attitude.¹⁰¹

After Pearson's meeting with Churchill, he was briefed by Sir Percival Leisching the next day on the USA - UK Korean consultations. This is Pearson's report to the Prime Minister: Leisching "said that the Americans had told them that in these consultations, they should not pass on the information they received to the Dominions." According to Pearson, Leisching "found this unrealistic and irritating, and said that they would tell the Americans very forthrightly that they could not accept any such stipulations; that after all, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, to say nothing of Canada, had troops in Korea and were just as concerned with developments there as the United States was."¹⁰² Pearson wrote that, although Leisching "realised that we in Ottawa had our own sources of information in Washington," he sought Canada's help in presenting a solid front against the American policy. Leisching insisted that the rest of the Old Commonwealth "were to be kept informed of everything that went on between Washington and London in respect of this matter."¹⁰³ But, what about all the other

matters which might also affect Commonwealth interests? Pearson was fully aware of the fact that Churchill was "very occupied with Middle East questions";¹⁰⁴ the USA was engrossed with developments in Communist China; was concerned about Japan's situation in Asia¹⁰⁵ and had problems in Indo-China.¹⁰⁶ France was heavily involved in Indo-China.¹⁰⁷

In late April, Heeney wrote from Paris: "I have the impression, perhaps a wrong one, that the United Kingdom are not expending very much cerebral or political energy on NATO."¹⁰⁸ R. Holland has argued that because of "the loss of a credible unilateral capacity," the UK was subject to a "USA enforced – commitment to alliances." This might be taken as one explanation of the 'impression' about which Heeney wrote to Ottawa. Holland believed that UK participation in NATO was "a price for USA help."¹⁰⁹ Heeney had difficulty understanding the UK attitude about NATO. About one month later, he reported: "The general impression seems to be that these European arrangements [E.D.C. and NATO] constitute an important step in the consolidation of the West and the strengthening of the barrier to Soviet aggression."¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, none of these arguments altered the fact that the main concern for Ottawa was how these problems were going to affect the UK, USA and French involvement in the development of NATO because of their differing national interests. The Department of External Affairs suggested to the Prime Minister: "...it would seem that global planning of some sort is desirable under present world conditions." However, the Department argued that "it is probably in the general interest that planning is not done by the United States alone."¹¹¹ But was the USA prepared to

acquiesce in any such request for a co-operative effort? And most importantly, were the Europeans able to manage the situation in Europe? Before embarking upon any sort of global planning, the Atlantic area had to be secured.

By mid-1952, the Canadian representative to NATO notified the Secretary of State that he had discovered "a divergence between the process of European integration and the development of the Atlantic Community." The Europeans seemed to want an escape from USA dominance in NATO. Heeney felt that this was a 'tendency' which Canada must be "on guard" against.¹¹² He suggested that:

One need only consider the substantive reductions made by Congress in the United States aid programmes, the admitted inability of the United Kingdom to meet their targets (as you know, the very private news we have on this count is very disturbing) and the present confusion and pessimism concerning the ability of France to achieve the level of forces accepted at Lisbon. Other countries will doubtless fall short as well to a greater or less[er] extent.¹¹³

In view of this state of affairs, Heeney strongly recommended that the Council should do whatever it takes "to avoid the disclosure of what would certainly be taken to be the serious military weakness of NATO." Of course, this was almost impossible to achieve since the information would be brought out in the Annual Review. Heeney found some consolation in the fact that "there was one powerful asset which had not and would not appear in any formal NATO balance sheet, namely the A weapon."¹¹⁴ Six days later, the Canadian High Commissioner to London wrote: "the Chancellor is under pressure, not only from elements of his own Party but from most of the Opposition as well, to settle for such relief from defence spending as recast NATO plans may permit."¹¹⁵

By this time, the Canadian Secretary of State felt the need "to check the growing feeling that NATO is floundering and its members defaulting unilaterally on their commitments...."¹¹⁶ He added: "By far the most disturbing NATO question at the moment is the feeling...that we are not going to meet the commitments which were considered essential less than a year ago." The result of this situation was necessarily more reliance on the "A weapon." Pearson seemed to accept this as a working alternative and he conceded: "...for that purpose [we] will have to know more than we do at present about USA strength in this field." The USA naturally refused to supply this information.

If NATO members were really unaware of the "effectiveness of atomic defence," how are we to explain their decisions to default on their commitments? According to Pearson, "people in this country and in other countries will have to draw one of two conclusions from this: either our earlier planning was unrealistic and unwise...or the crisis is now past and expenditure on defence...is no longer necessary." Surely, the reduction in assistance from the USA could not be a sufficient condition for defaulting in face of a perceived Soviet threat? Or, was there no perceived Soviet threat? Or, were NATO members convinced that the USA would unilaterally respond to any such threat, in view of its atomic capability?

Pearson told Heeney that the British and the French purposely wanted to reduce defence expenditures. Moreover, he believed that those Governments "might very well use the American refusal to supply them with full information [on atomic defence] as one reason for such reductions." He added:

I have a suspicion, however, that if the British and the Americans themselves could get together on this problem they would not worry too much about the other members of NATO. In fact, I have been acquiring recently an uneasy impression, though it is only an impression, that the British attitude to NATO is cooling. That, if true, would be deplorable and would represent a fundamental mistake on the part of British foreign policy....¹¹⁷

Pearson saw "a real danger of public opinion turning away from NATO and thereby under-mining its authority and its value." He observed that there was "certainly evidence of this in Canada," and he expressed concern that "it will present the Government with a real problem at the next session."¹¹⁸ Of what value was NATO to Canada? For if the British, French and Americans did not seem to be apprehensive that NATO was 'floundering,' why was Ottawa so perturbed about this state of affairs? Was it because Ottawa was not fully informed about the strategy and goals of the USA, UK and France? Were they making alternative arrangements among themselves, or separately, which would serve to lessen the overall value of NATO?

Any hope that the situation could be rectified seemed to rest with the result of the American elections.¹¹⁹ Around mid-November, Heeney told Ottawa that the Annual Review of NATO was "a mess." In his opinion, "the delay in country replies to the questionnaire,¹²⁰ particularly about the nature and extent of USA aid," were the 'reason' for this mess.¹²¹ One month later, Heeney reported that the situation had worsened because Dean Acheson was "most insistent on the vital necessity of ratification of the E.D.C.[Treaty] – the essential next step if NATO itself was to move on as we all hoped."¹²² A quick glance at the dynamics

of the situation reveal that Canada was the only NATO member who seemed to be visibly distressed about the state of affairs.

At the end of November, John Foster Dulles was appointed USA Secretary of State and the Canadian Secretary of State expected him "to give the leadership so essential at this time."¹²³ There was a perceived 'malaise' in the OEEC and Heeney observed: "The Europeans are certainly worried lest the British somehow manage to do the dirty on them by making a private deal with Washington, which will have very important effects upon the future of European trade and payments."¹²⁴ Actually, by early 1953, we have a situation in which the Canadians and the Europeans feared and suspected a UK/USA military and economic deal which would naturally be detrimental to their interests. In addition, Dulles went one step further than Acheson in making progress on NATO even more difficult. He "related ratification of the E.D.C. [Treaty] to the Congressional aid Programme."¹²⁵ On the other, he brought great relief to Ottawa because he "emphasised the place held by NATO in USA foreign policy."¹²⁶

A New Role for NATO?

There was a 'change' in the operating principle of American foreign policy under the new administration and NATO was expected to be a valuable instrument of policy. After a meeting in February 1953 with the new Secretary of State, Pearson reported to his Prime Minister:

The Eisenhower Administration was determined not to leave the initiative in the Cold War to the Soviet Union. To do so would give

Stalin a great and gratuitous advantage since he could pick the time and place for new moves and since he would be left undisturbed in consolidating gains already made by the Soviet Union. It was President Eisenhower's policy to create situations which would worry the Kremlin by creating threats to Soviet influence at various points in the world.¹²⁷

This appeared to be a faithful continuation of Truman's policy. Pearson was pleased to inform Ottawa that the Eisenhower Administration "was anxious to maintain and improve consultation with the allies...particularly with the United Kingdom, Canada and France." He also pointed out that the USA felt that "consultation would be more useful and intimate if it were kept informal." To this end, Dulles had visited Europe to brief the allies on "how he saw world problems." And Dulles intended to keep the Canadian Government "fully informed on an informal basis of views and policies of the United States Government," much in the same way.¹²⁸

During the meeting, Pearson "suggested that it might be difficult to create uneasiness in the Soviet Union without at the same time creating uneasiness among the allies of the United States; and then, to allay the anxiety so created, it might be necessary for statements to be made which would also have the effect of removing uneasiness in the Soviet Union." What were the implications of such a situation for collective policy making? According to Pearson, Dulles "agreed that would be difficult for a coalition of democracies to conduct such a war of nerves as President Eisenhower's policy would require."¹²⁹ Dulles had an ingenuous plan to solve this logistical problem:

He hoped that the United States Government could rely on faith among its allies in its peaceful purposes and in its desire to seek them by sober and unprovocative means. It would be of great help if political

leaders in other countries could try to increase this fund of confidence even on occasions when it might not be possible for them to explain fully United States plans and intentions.¹³⁰

Did this devious rationale continue to subordinate the policies of the allies to a USA design?¹³¹

And what kind of possibilities did the Canadian representative to the North Atlantic Council see for NATO, under these circumstances? He wrote to the Secretary of State:

Next to worries about the policies of the U.S. Government, uncertainty concerning ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty is the most disturbing factor for NATO. It would be a bold bookie that would give any odds 'on' at this stage, and even the prospects of having anything very definite in the way of progress when the NATO Ministers meet here in April are not very good.¹³²

One week earlier, Pearson had suggested in the meeting with Dulles in Washington that Dulles' proposed informal consultations should "be effected in the North Atlantic Council." It is evident that Pearson was still searching for some sort of solidarity on collective security and NATO was the most appropriate instrument with which to achieve this goal. He was perturbed that "during the past few months, the Council had been in the doldrums." And he "hoped that Mr. Dulles would give consideration to the possibility of strengthening the role of the North Atlantic Council by making it one of the chief instruments for consultation between the United States and its principal allies."¹³³ This is obviously not what Dulles had in mind when he said that he wanted to keep Canada 'informed.' By early March, Heeney wrote to Pearson: "NATO has been an experiment. I have

enjoyed it and profited by it. But it is already clear that, short of some unforeseen series of events, it will not be of the first importance in Canadian affairs."¹³⁴

The Annual Review had to be completed as part of the preparation for the Ministerial meeting. Heeney complained to Ottawa that, "on the NATO front...events of the past few days have not been encouraging." Both the "defence efforts" of the fourteen members and "the recommendations for the improvement of national efforts" were problematic. There was a recommended addition of \$400,000. to Canada's contribution and a suggested addition of \$6 billion to the USA programme for the 1953-54 budget. In view of congressional cuts in the USA defence spending, this was an unrealistic goal. Heeney asked: "Could anything be farther from reality?" In his opinion, this was "a measure of the futility" of the activity of NATO's Secretariat.¹³⁵ Stalin's death and "the astounding and rapid series of developments which have taken place since Malenkov assumed Stalin's mantle," led Heeney to anticipate, in early April, that "the political atmosphere in which the North Atlantic will meet will be one of great uncertainty concerning Soviet intentions."¹³⁶ He wrote to Pearson:

It is all very well for us to say that any genuine desire for settlement that is contained in the change of the Russian attitude is the result of such strength and unity that the North Atlantic policy has achieved and that we must press on, not relax our efforts; only in united strength can we be secure, etc. etc. But when we have said that where do we go from there?

Heeney knew that, in light of these new developments, "the public aspect" of any "planned built up of forces...will be tricky because...the peoples in all of our countries, even the United States I should think, are going to be sorely tempted to relax their efforts." He reminded Pearson of the 'difficulty' which NATO

had been having "in maintaining an acceptable pace – even before Malenkov." Taking all of the above into consideration, Heeney felt that although NATO Ministers will have publicly, "to reassert the validity of the policy of strength, they will have to avoid giving the impression to their own people that they are not genuinely prepared to discuss with the Russians an overall settlement on a proper basis."¹³⁷ This was going to be a difficult task to accomplish. Heeney conceded: "The role of the USA Delegation has been very important in all this business....Their influence, quite naturally, is very great because of their predominant position in the Alliance and because of the hopes which all the European members have for sharing in American aid."¹³⁸

The Sterling World and Europe Recover

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in London in early 1955, Butler of the UK was pleased to report that the "deficit of £400 millions in 1951 had become a surplus of £175 millions in the first half of 1954." In his opinion, it was evident that the United Kingdom position "had been markedly strengthened,"¹³⁹ and the long argument over the E.D.C. "had been ended."¹⁴⁰ Although the Indo-China fighting was over, Churchill continued to be worried about the "storm clouds from the Far East" which he felt was continuing to cast "a grave and menacing shadow over the world." Because of "the great improvement" in the position of the sterling area,¹⁴¹ Churchill announced that the United Kingdom had "found means of bearing increased expenditure on

armaments." In early February, Pearson noted in his Diary: "One important statement did emerge from the morning meeting – the UK have decided to make the H-Bomb."¹⁴²

On the one hand, St. Laurent believed that "the difficulties ahead were small compared with those which had already been weathered and he had every confidence that they would be overcome."¹⁴³ On the other hand, Kent Hughes, the Australian Minister for the Interior, expressed great disquiet about the situation in the Far East. It is obvious from his letter to Pearson, that Hughes shared Churchill's apprehension which St. Laurent had apparently underestimated. Hughes wrote:

It is no use thinking about South East Asia, Formosa, Korea or Tibet as separate and individual problems, they are all part of the one picture. Mr. Chou-En-Lai is the smoothest-faced and the cleverest gambler at the international poker table today. He has very astutely been having one war in one place at one time. As soon as he reaches a stalemate in Korea he...starts a new war in Indo-China....If they really want peace the whole area must be dealt with at once and on the questions relevant thereto including partial disarmament.¹⁴⁴

In his opinion, this situation should be of interest to the West as a whole. He argued that the area should not be compartmentalised into British, French or American interest versus that of the Communists. Although he conceded that these problems were 'vital' to Australia's security and might seem less alarming to Ottawa, he ventured to add that: "...no Commonwealth Nation can stand aloof. If she does what next?"

In addition, Hughes felt that British trade interests in the Far East were responsible for "driving the wedge further and further in"; a wedge which he thought that Chou En-Lai had already been "very successfully driving" between

Britain and America.¹⁴⁵ He expressed "very grave fears" with regard to the Afro-Asian conference and asserted that "the main actor in front of the footlights will be Mr. Nehru, but the directing genius will be Chou-En-Lai." Did officials in Ottawa perceive a Chinese Communist design to influence Afro-Asians on colonial matters? And, how far was Ottawa prepared to work for a Commonwealth and international solidarity on security and colonial matters?¹⁴⁶ The Australian Minister suggested that the Americans were 'realists' in their perception and approach to Far Eastern questions.¹⁴⁷ He told Pearson: "the Americans are not trigger-happy top brass as Mr. Chou-En-Lai's brother Mr. Clem-Att-Lee would have you believe." On the one hand, the Australian and British definition of the situation, in regard to the Far East, were congruent. On the other hand, there was a divergence between their recommendations and attitudes towards American policy for international peace and security. Did that complicate matters for Canadian decision-makers?

The Communist Factor

Officials in Ottawa had realised that the policies of the Soviet Union had significant consequences for the Western powers in regard to their colonial empires. They were forced to become active in paying attention to their duties and responsibilities towards colonial peoples and they were made answerable to the UN. In preparation for the 1946 Assembly Session the Canadian External Affairs Departmental Committee prepared "some general considerations" for

Canada's policy in the UN. This Committee believed that the USSR "had decided to use the Assembly for all it was worth as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy" and warned the Delegation: "The Assembly contains a well-organised, able and vociferous Communist minority, which uses the procedures of the Assembly to the utmost for purposes of propaganda in an effort to depict the Soviet Union as the defender of coloured peoples, dependent peoples, small countries...." Officials had perceived Soviet behaviour as having an important functional role as to process in the UN. The Committee was aware that, at the London meeting of the Assembly, the Soviet bloc had "used every artifice" to debate these issues and to "force them" to a vote. Moreover, the members of this bloc "did not appear to mind being defeated, but wished to make all Delegations go on record on the proposals to which they attached importance."¹⁴⁸

Because of this perceived attitude, officials were apprehensive that "a series of propaganda victories" for the Soviet Union at the October Assembly will serve "to weaken further" the United Nations. But, more importantly, it could also "weaken the ability" of the democratic countries "to resist the present Soviet expansionist drive." We suggest that this perception was to function as a paramount consideration in framing the policies of Western members who knew that they could not abdicate the leadership role, in the UN, to the USSR. In recognition of the need for a new tactic, Ottawa decided on "a policy of firmness based on a concordance of United States and British policies on a moral plane." What was the basis of this moral plane? The purposes and principles enunciated in the Charter would be the guidelines. This policy would meet what officials

perceived to be the Soviet strategy of "stimulating and aggravating disunity...in the non-Soviet world."

Ottawa was concerned that Soviet propaganda in the colonial context was not baseless. The Committee pointed out that "in the Soviet world racial discrimination scarcely exists." Their "great, dynamic 1917 Revolution emphasised economic democracy, economic security, racial equality...and rejected the theory of master races." Therefore, the Committee decided that, "the best defence in the United Nations against Soviet propaganda is for the Western nations to use the Assembly and the other organs of the United Nations for all they are worth as agencies of promoting political and social stability and economic prosperity and for realising racial equality and self-government for dependent peoples."¹⁴⁹ Would these aims become part of the framework of analysis? If so, how did Canada intend to accomplish these goals? The Committee proposed that, in view of "the gravity of the present international situation and the sickness of the United Nations..."it would be unrealistic [for the West]...to pay any regard in framing its policies on the larger issues which will come before the Assembly to considerations of immediate national advantage or of national prestige." In other words, the international operational context would influence Canadian tactics and policy.

Because of the "strained international relations between the great powers" and because there were many other major problems to be solved on the international plane, the Committee decided that "for the effective operation of the United Nations...what is needed is a marked alteration in the climate of

international relations." For officials in Ottawa, speeches in the UN were not only to serve as indicators of policy they were also meant to create a certain atmosphere. In this sense, speeches did have a functional value in policy execution. In November 1946, the Spanish situation provided the first tangible instance of Canada's attempt to accommodate Soviet pressure "to go on record" on important issues. The Delegation had decided that it would not 'unduly' prolong the discussion and proposed to Ottawa: "It is desirable, however, that our view should be placed on the record in order that there may be no misunderstanding of our position. We do not wish to run the risk of having silence mistaken for indifference."¹⁵⁰ On the upper left hand side of the Draft speech, which the Delegation had sent to Ottawa for approval, the Under Secretary wrote of his "strong objections to the draft."¹⁵¹ He emphasised that certain kinds of words and expressions ought not to be used in any speeches by the Canadian Delegation. One week later, Pearson outlined Ottawa's direction for policy in terms of words and deeds; this set the stage for future speeches, not only by Canadian officials but also for the Canadian Delegation to the UN.¹⁵²

Although Pearson believed that the 'adjectives' used in the draft "correctly describe" the Franco regime, and agreed with Keenleyside that "action must be effective for the purpose indicated," he recognised that there were "other more important considerations" than personal feelings to guide state policy. He reminded the Delegation that Canada must be concerned with "the impression" which is created "in other Delegations by the words" which Canadians use in speeches at the UN. Essentially, it was a question of credibility. Pearson told the

Delegation: "I had in mind particularly the contrast between the strength of our language and weakness of our policy....The contrast seemed to me to be startling." In other words, speeches will have to be based on a recognition of the limits of policy; this would be an indication of how far Canada was prepared to act, on any specific issue. And because Canada was not prepared to remove Franco at all costs, Pearson suggested: "we should adopt a language a little more suited to our justifiable timidity in this matter."¹⁵³ In recognition of the importance and influence of the international operational context at the UN, Pearson allowed that the Delegation in New York might "feel differently and they may be right" in the forceful position which was taken in the draft speech. However, he proposed that "as we cannot do anything effective about Franco at the moment, we should say as little as possible; especially as the motives of our friends, the Russians, in this matter are certainly not above suspicion." But in the UN context, even though the speech should not underline "the incongruity of strong words and weak action," some of the members of the Delegation "were unwilling to settle for less violent words," at the time.¹⁵⁴

We have already seen how the Western powers began to pursue a course of militarisation which only served to negatively affect the operational context in the UN and international climate. It is obvious that, under these circumstances, the Soviet Union was expected to seek opportunities to strengthen its position wherever possible and the West had to be alert against Soviet adventurism in all flash point situations. On February 21, 1947 the UK communicated to USA Secretary of State, George Marshall, "that Britain could

not afford the 500 Million dollars it would take immediately to defend Greece and Turkey against communism."¹⁵⁵ According to Blanche Cook, "the future of the Middle East was at stake. In fact, the future of the entire colonial world was at stake."¹⁵⁶ She claimed that Stalin wanted a base in the Dardanelles because he could not rely on the friendly co-operation of the Turkish Government. In addition, USA Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith knew from a conversation with Stalin of "the desire of the Soviet Union for security and for a share of the world's raw materials."¹⁵⁷ In March, the Canadian Ambassador to Paris informed Ottawa of the chaotic state of affairs in France and he emphasised the political problems "especially with the always threatening tide of Communism."¹⁵⁸

In July, the Canadian Ambassador to Washington wrote to the Canadian Under Secretary that the State Department "had known for some time...that a crisis was approaching in Greece which would require drastic American action." In Wrong's opinion the British request in February "was the occasion and not the cause" of the Truman Doctrine.¹⁵⁹ The implication was that the USA was 'planning' containment in its own self interest. In other words, contrary to what is publicly expressed, the State Department was not forced by circumstances to get involved. It had already been planning to do so. And, without Dean Acheson's inclusion of the "anti-Communist aspects" in the proposals for financial aid to Greece, Wrong believed that the Republicans would not have agreed to congressional support.¹⁶⁰ According to Franz Schurmann,

the Truman Doctrine on Greece and Turkey aroused vigorous opposition within the United States, from both nationalists and internationalists. But when Truman invoked the spectre of Russian expansionism, the voices were silenced and 'bipartisan' support was

given to America's new global imperial role. Without the Russian threat neither...would have so meekly accepted the new American imperialism.¹⁶¹

The Western powers were fully aware of the potential for communist expansion and Canada saw its role as helping to thwart this move wherever possible.

By late 1947, the Canadian Delegation got the impression from the behaviour of the Soviet representative in the UN that the Palestine issue would give the Soviet Union an opening to make its presence felt in the Middle East. More specifically, the Delegation felt that the UK's early withdrawal from Palestine "would create a vacuum which might be filled by the Soviet Union" and saw this as the goal to which "a prolonged and unwarranted abuse of the United Kingdom by the Slav states" were working. In order to undermine this propaganda ploy, the Delegation suggested to Ottawa that it would be 'useful' if they took an active part in a counter-attack.¹⁶² During the following Assembly session which was held in Paris, Pearson proudly reported on the role of the Canadian Delegation in regard to the "burning question" of Palestine:

We have, as you will have noticed, been playing a modest part on the stage but an active one behind the scenes. My room has provided a neutral meeting place where the British and Americans have had long discussions and I think that this kind of participation on our part was been helpful. It has also been carried on without attracting attention.¹⁶³

Because of the unstable situation in France and in view of the "recent developments" in French imperial policy "particularly in regard to Indochina, Algeria and Morocco," in October Ottawa proposed that the Canadian Embassy in Paris undertake "a comprehensive study dealing with France's difficult imperial problems." Officials not only wanted information on French policy but also asked

especially for input on "the attitude of Moslems and the whole Arab world in regard to French policy." Moreover, officials wanted to know to what degree Vietnam was "influenced and backed up by the Soviets."¹⁶⁴ In the opinion of the Embassy, the re-shuffle in the Ramadier Ministry was evidence of the 'importance' of the colonial empire for France.¹⁶⁵ The Ambassador observed: "the centralisation of the functions of the Ministry and its direct subordination to the Prime Minister indicate that the Prime Minister himself, for political, military and economic reasons is desirous of being in immediate touch with the developments in the colonies."¹⁶⁶

South Africa: The Commonwealth Connection

Since the latter part of 1946, South Africa's refusal to submit a Trusteeship Agreement for South West Africa and its insistence on pushing for UN acceptance of the incorporation of this territory into the Union of South Africa had created significant problems between Commonwealth members. The refusal of the USA to support South Africa served to make matters more difficult for Canada. Senator Robertson of the Canadian Delegation reported to Ottawa that: "from the general trend of the discussion it was quite obvious that Field Marshall Smuts' proposal would receive a resounding defeat...." The debate throughout the week was acrimonious and protracted. The Soviet group attacked all mandatory powers on anything in sight."¹⁶⁷ The matter of incorporation was not pressed to a vote.¹⁶⁸ Robertson made a 'conciliatory' speech in which he

suggested that "we should encourage rather discourage those who brought their various problems to this, the bar of world opinion."¹⁶⁹ He reported that Canadian news correspondents "were bitter on this 'fence-sitting' attitude, and one is said to have reported 'once again I am ashamed to be a Canadian.'"¹⁷⁰

By mid-1948, Canadian officials were trying to establish a basis for foreign policy and they were concerned about how Canada's foreign policy might be affected by Canada's membership in the Commonwealth. In a meeting between Canadian officials and Sir Norman Brock, the Secretary in the UK Cabinet, it was understood that there was "no need for relations between all members of the Commonwealth to be identical," and that there was "scope for a wide variety" of policy.¹⁷¹ At that time, both countries were also "examining the possibility of having a 'two-class' Commonwealth of British and 'associated' nations." During this meeting, UK officials decided that a dichotomy between white and non-white Commonwealth members "would afford no satisfactory solution to the present problems. It would on the other hand raise a good many new questions of great difficulty."¹⁷² At the time, the only problem was India and the Delegation's complaint in the UN of racial discrimination of Indians in South Africa. But this matter had relatively little priority for the Old Commonwealth members in view of the pressing problems created by South Africa's stance on South West Africa in the United Nations.¹⁷³

In late 1948, the Canadian High Commissioner to the UK wrote to the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

...there is not much sympathy here for the bellicose attitude adopted by South Africa. This is regarded critically, not only as a rather

undiplomatic flouting of the United Nations, but as a policy likely to endanger intra-Commonwealth relations, and finally as unwarranted in view of South African policy towards the natives.¹⁷⁴

Of value for our perceptual analysis is the High Commissioner's assessment of the actual effect of South Africa's position on UK colonial policy in Africa. He continued that,

in this connection it is interesting to see practically the entire responsible press supporting the Government's recent decision not to relax any of its control over the Central African colonies in face of the strong pressure which has been brought to bear by the white inhabitants.¹⁷⁵

Because of the disproportionate ratio of non-white inhabitants to the white-settlers in these colonies, the Colonial Office was constrained to take international pressure into consideration.

In the beginning of 1949, Ottawa was compelled by international developments to establish what kind of relationship it should maintain with South Africa. The Under Secretary proposed that, "it would be extremely useful" if the UN Division would undertake "a thorough study...on what Canadian national interests are served by Canada giving even passive support to South Africa at the United Nations."¹⁷⁶ This is a good indication of a functional role of self-interest and the operational context in decision-making. The guidelines were very specific as to the intention of policy and the purposes which it should serve. Reid wrote:

It seems to me that the time has come for re-examination of the Canadian position and that a realistic study is required which takes into account the primary objective of Canadian foreign policy today - the creation of an overwhelming preponderance of military, economic and moral force over the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁷

In view of this comprehensive goal which policy should obtain, he expected that Canada would have to "adopt a new position in public." And because of this, Reid felt that the various Departments should have "confidential discussions" with some of the other Commonwealth Governments. But before this step was undertaken, the Canadian Cabinet had to make a decision in regard to this matter.

Since officials believed that Soviet expansionist policy could lead to a war with the West, this proposed study had to address strategic considerations. Reid suggested that the Chiefs of Staff at Defense should also undertake a study "of the importance of South Africa in a war against the Soviet Union." He estimated that the Department should be able "to judge what the South African contribution to such a war would be" from its files. However, he suspected that South Africa could possibly 'use' such a war "as an excuse for repressive measures against the Negroes, the East Indians, the coloured people and liberals in South Africa."¹⁷⁸ In Reid's estimation, this matter was of fundamental importance to Canada's strategic considerations.¹⁷⁹ While working on the draft instructions for the Canadian Delegation to the April session of the Assembly, Reid protested to Holmes: "I would have thought that it is no longer realistic to expect that we can escape from having to take a stand on the substance of the question by pleading the preliminary question of jurisdiction."¹⁸⁰ And although the Charter was very clear on Article 2(7), Reid thought that the matter was important enough to be brought to the attention of Cabinet. He proposed to Holmes: "We must put up to Cabinet briefly the considerations which are involved, of which it

seems to me that the most important is the danger of the North Atlantic Community further alienating the coloured half of the world." Reid found no supporters in Ottawa for this approach.

Even though Canada had taken an essentially legalistic position on this issue in the UN, Reid's proposal to design a new policy was grounded not on moral, but on strategic considerations. Race was seen to have a functional role, in the categorising of peoples, in Reid's argument for a change in policy towards South Africa. He believed that "on purely strategic grounds the support or at least the friendly neutrality of the coloured half of the world is necessary if we are to create and preserve an overwhelming preponderance of force over the Soviet Union."¹⁸¹ In this definition of the situation, he proposed that the arguments that "no legal obligation existed" and that South Africa should not be faced with an 'ultimatum' to submit a Trusteeship Agreement for South West Africa were no longer acceptable in Canada's interests. In Reid's perception of the international operational limits on Canada's policy choices, the perceived Communist threat had functional priority over possible continued support of South African policies in the UN.

The Canadian Delegation had taken no part in the debate in the Fourth Committee and General Assembly on the question, "whether the South African government was bound - legally and morally - to submit a Trusteeship Agreement." The Delegation began to abstain rather than vote against these resolutions which insisted that South Africa had a legal obligation to submit a Trusteeship Agreement. However, in 1949, the Canadian Delegation reported to

Ottawa that, because of South Africa's intransigence, the situation in the UN was becoming "more acute." As far as we can tell, this was the first time that Ottawa felt compelled to address the moral aspects of the issue. Ottawa decided that "in view of" the declaration in Chapter XI of the Charter in which the Administering Authorities recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants are paramount, "there would seem to be" a moral obligation upon the South African Government "to safeguard the rights of the native inhabitants of South West Africa."¹⁸²

What were the consequences of such a conclusion for Ottawa's policy? No one knew how to interpret the situation because of the transitory nature of the process from the Covenant of the League of Nations to the UN Charter. And because the legal "implications...have never been defined," Ottawa felt that, "the present uncertainty regarding the status of South West Africa might be considerably clarified by an authoritative opinion emanating from the International Court."¹⁸³ Actually, there were two legal questions that needed clarification. First of all, there was the question of the obligation regarding submission of a Trusteeship Agreement. The second question was whether South Africa was legally obligated to continue to submit reports on South West Africa to the UN as has been the case under the Covenant.

In spite of this perceived need for clarification, officials decided that "it would not be wise" for the Canadian Delegation "to propose" a referral to the International Court of Justice. However the Delegation was instructed "to support any move to refer these questions to the Court."¹⁸⁴ In addition, the Delegation

"could likewise support any move to establish a United Nations plebiscite commission to determine impartially the wishes of the inhabitants of South West Africa." Officials pointed out that any such undertaking would, of course, be contingent upon the "co-operation" of South Africa.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, the Delegation was cautioned that both of the above actions were to be taken, "only...if a substantial majority of the Assembly seem to favour them." Nevertheless, the most important factor which influenced Canada's policy on this one issue, at this point in time, was the pre-Assembly discussion with the United Kingdom, South African and the United States Delegations. The Canadian Delegation was directed to "seek every opportunity" to consult with them "before taking any action" in regard to the above points in question.¹⁸⁶ It is clear that, in 1949, the operational context of the UN was a factor which influenced in Canada's policy towards a fellow Commonwealth member. Because all of the Old Commonwealth members except Canada, were Colonial Powers, issues in the UN continued to affect and influence Canada's relationship with them.

This is how the international operational context for Canada's foreign policy was perceived by the Canadian High Commissioner to London, in early 1951:

In this field of intra-Commonwealth racial relationships, divergent and powerful forces are exerted on the United Kingdom Governments; African and Asian nationalism, anti-colonialism both within the Commonwealth and within the United Nations, the threat of Communist penetration [in] Africa, the contributions that South Africa can make to Western strategy and to technical progress in Africa and conversely the harm that South African policy can do both to colonial policy and to the East-West relationship....¹⁸⁷

Because of this, Ottawa sought to obtain a position of solidarity on the question of South West Africa in the General Assembly Session in October. The Secretary of State enquired from the Canadian High Commissioner in London about the USA and UK strategy and explained Ottawa's position, at the same time. He wrote: "We are now inclined to consider voting in favour of a moderate resolution critical of South Africa's refusal to accept the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. If the resolution is of an extremist nature...we will not support it."¹⁸⁸ In other words, Ottawa was not prepared at this point in time to undertake a major reversal of policy in regard to South Africa.

The Economic Factor

Canada's Economic and Financial Foreign Policy in the period following the Second World War "has been shaped by...the necessity of fitting the Canadian economy into the post-war world economy characterised by extreme disequilibrium between major world trading areas." This situation was "caused partially by the economic policies of the allies and partially by physical devastation and dislocation of industry in battle areas."¹⁸⁹ According to R. Holland: "Part of Canada's problem [during the 1930s] was that, as the fifth largest trading power, she was especially sensitive to the contractions of international commerce...."¹⁹⁰ And since colonial areas were in the centre of post-war world trade, it is instructive to understand how officials in Ottawa perceived

Canada's interests to be tied in with developments in these parts of the world. We do not intend to undertake a comprehensive examination of Canada's economic policy. We only need to know if officials believed that Canada's interests were affected, one way or another, by the way conflicts were resolved in important areas in the colonial world.

Indonesia: Canada-A Pacific Power

The Indonesian situation in 1947 directly involved Canada's interests. For this reason, we find it helpful to take a detailed look at the "Instructions for the Canadian Delegation" to the 1947 Assembly. This will enable us to understand how, in Canada's perception, relevant factors such as race, religion, culture, geography, strategic and economic interests, ideology and the potential of the Indonesian situation to 'prejudice' or influence other colonial relationships, were operational in determining the policy of UN members.¹⁹¹ Because this incident arose at the very beginning of the process of decolonisation, Ottawa felt it necessary to explain the dynamics of the situation and the reasons for its policy to the Permanent Delegation in New York. The instructions explained Canada's interest this way:

Canada, as a Pacific power, is concerned that conditions of political and economic stability should prevail in the Far East. Stability in this area cannot be secured by refusing to recognise the strength and legitimate aspirations of the rising nationalistic movements in Asia. Nor will it follow from permitting irresponsible elements to create conditions of administrative and economic chaos prejudicial to the well-being of local populations and the food and raw material requirements of the world at large.

The Indonesian problem was an intricate and complex one because of the varied international interests. In the opinion of Ottawa, the Netherlands East Indies,

are of considerable strategic and economic importance as they straddle the main shipping and air routes between Europe and China and Japan. Their natural resources make them among the most important sources of rubber, tin, oil, drugs, manila hemp, sisal, certain minerals and jewels in international trade. The fertility of the soil and mineral wealth of the sub-soil, combined with cheap labour, have long made Indonesia the most profitable colonial possession of its size in the world.

Before the war, the main commercial markets were the USA, Singapore, the Netherlands, the British Commonwealth, Japan and China in order of importance. The inter-war period witnessed the rise of nationalist movements throughout colonial Asia. During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia its policy of "Asia for the Asiatics" was instrumental in helping to undermine the 300-year Dutch rule. According to Ottawa, under the Dutch "little progress towards achieving self-government was made in the islands." The Netherlands Constitution of 1922 had simply made the Netherlands Indies "an integral part" of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and, therefore, its sovereign territory.

The Japanese had lost the war. Before their departure, they set up the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945 under Sukarno. By November 30, 1946, the Netherlands forces retook control of this territory with the aid of the United Kingdom forces of the Southeast Asia Command. Negotiations between Sukarno and the Netherlands broke down shortly thereafter, and the Netherlands military operations began on July 26, 1947. This was severely condemned by the

Soviet Union, India, Australia and the Arab States. India and Australia took the matter to the Security Council through letters invoking Article 34 and 39 of the UN Charter. Basically, officials perceived the dispute as "one with the most widespread implication, not only [for] Southeast Asia, but [for] all of Asia and the Near East as well" and they believed that racial and religious factors were influential in the later UK policy, in "exercising great care in maintaining an attitude of strict impartiality."¹⁹² The Western powers suspected that "Soviet Russia was making an effort to establish her influence wherever possible in the Pacific area by the use of local Communist parties all the way from Korea to Australia."¹⁹³

The Instructions for the Delegation pointed out that UK, USA and Australia all "have substantial economic interests" in Indonesia. Officials knew that the UK and USA were "vitally concerned that international trade with the Indies should be resumed as quickly as possible in order to relieve some of acute world shortages of much needed commodities" from the islands. However, the international repercussions of the Indonesian situation gave everyone cause for concern because the Western democracies "badly needed the trade to assist in their own economic recovery". But most important was the fact that if the Netherlands lost these "monopolistic sources of profit...the standard of living in that country would drop from 30 percent to 35 percent."¹⁹⁴ In other words, Ottawa knew that from the financial and economic point of view the Netherlands East Indies must remain under some sort of Western control.

of the Netherlands the Soviet could take over 'control.' Canada expressed excessive concern over this situation which could result in the "weakening of the international power of the Western Democracies." In this summary, we have seen how Canada had perceived the operative and interacting factors which coalesced to determine the policy of the relevant states, in a colonial context. There was a clean break in the ranks of the Old Commonwealth countries. However, that seemed to be an obvious and acceptable rift because of geographical, national security and economic interests of Australia.

By 1949, Canada claimed that its policy had been based on an attempt "to balance its friendship with the Netherlands and its sympathy for what is considered to be the legitimate aspirations of Indonesian nationalism."¹⁹⁶ This was admirably accommodated in a 'colonial' policy. But, under the circumstances, could Canada have acted differently? Ought foreign policy not to take the national interest into consideration? During this period, it is evident that the international operational context was perceived to have a dichotomous character. This influenced policy choices. In 1951, the Economic Department announced that Canada had a "NATO responsibility to consider" in the formulation of foreign policy. More specifically, this responsibility was seen more as a "desire to provide materials for maximum production in all NATO and Western Countries, and to deprive the Communist countries."¹⁹⁷

UK-USA and UK-Canada Loan Agreements

Canada had benefited from the trade arrangements before the war. The Economic Department concluded after an assessment in 1951: "Canadian trade was balanced on a triangular basis. We exported more than we imported from the United Kingdom. We imported more than we exported to the United States. Since dollars were freely converted into sterling in the pre-war period, we were able to balance our payments by converting our excess of pounds into dollars."¹⁹⁸ In the opinion of Bernard Wood, Canada "emerged strengthened politically and economically from World War II."¹⁹⁹ However, Duncan Cameron has pointed out that, during this time, Canada's "international trade was in jeopardy due to the improvishment [sic] of its European trading partners, particularly Great Britain...."²⁰⁰ Therefore, the repercussions for Canada's economy and overall well-being were not minimal. According to the Economic Department, the 'triangular' trade arrangement was "disrupted by the war: the Sterling Area and Europe set fairly rigid exchange rates and began losing reserves and contracting large international debts. The situation gave rise to strict exchange controls. The convertibility of the United States dollars and sterling, which was essential to the Canadian pre-war trade pattern, lapsed."²⁰¹

Franz Schurmann wrote: "when the war ended [Britain]...was heavily in debt, not only to the United States but to many of its colonies as well notably India." And he claimed, that, for over a year after the war, "Britain tried to struggle along with monetary infusions from the United States and Canada, but by early

1947 it was facing economic collapse."²⁰² Because of this crisis, "the Labour Government's reaction was to revert to a highly insulated imperial economy, in which the countries of the Sterling Area...traded freely with each other but rigorously controlled purchases from outside, especially dollar goods."²⁰³ What did this mean for Canada? It is important to point out that Britain had seen a pressing need for such a policy; there was no other alternative. According to von Albertini,²⁰⁴

At the end of the war...Great Britain was extremely short of dollars, and of raw materials and certain foods. Since it seemed either impossible or impractical to buy the latter from dollar-bloc countries, it was obviously desirable to forcibly increase agriculture and mining within the Empire, i.e. in the sterling zone. Under the Labour government's austerity policy the colonies were turned into dollar 'earners' and their production had to be increased as rapidly as possible to overcome the crisis at home."

This brief background is essential to an understanding of how priorities were set and to what extent Canada's economic interests were perceived to be tied in with the colonial world, at this point in time, and in the long term. Apparently, it is with this picture in mind that Canada's Mackenzie King "took some exception" to the British comment about the "Western European system being backed by the power and resources of the Commonwealth."²⁰⁵ Did this mean that he was not particularly concerned about the dire situation in Britain? The following incident would seem to indicate that this was indeed the case. On June 9, 1949 a Memorandum was prepared by several Departments in Ottawa and forwarded to the Secretary of State. It outlined the disadvantages of the UK request that Canada 'waive' Article 5 of the UK-Canada Loan Agreement of 1946. The Memorandum pointed out that the article was originally "designed to protect

[Canada] from possible discrimination against Canadian imports."²⁰⁶ However, the Legal Department had decided that it had "no legal ground for objection to relaxations applying to countries whose economies have been disrupted by war."²⁰⁷

Officials in Ottawa knew that the UK had also requested that the USA waive Article 9 of the Anglo-American Loan Agreement of 1946.²⁰⁸ The Memorandum pointed out that the Canadian Embassy in Washington was attempting to discover the USA 'position' while at the same time avoiding any situation "which might invite questions as to the Canadian position." The Intra-European Payments negotiations were currently under way in Paris. At the time, Canada and the USA were aware of the fact that the UK proposal, there, was "stated to hinge on the reaction of the USA and Canada." This should have indicated, to both countries, that the request was of a crucial and urgent nature. Several Departments in Ottawa recommended to the Secretary of State a "wait and see" attitude. Their logic was that, "if the USA agree to the UK proposal, and waive their rights under Article 9, we will be under pressure to do likewise. We should, however, insist on our own freedom of action. There is no need to reach any decision before we know what the USA is going to do."²⁰⁹ The Under Secretary had concluded that "the net effect in both cases would be to permit the United Kingdom to discriminate on a wide scale of commodities against imports from North America."²¹⁰

In view of the crisis in Britain and the Sterling Area, the decision to be taken both in Canada and the USA entailed economic, moral and ethical

considerations: to help or not to help, that was the question. All the relevant Departments in Ottawa collectively decided that, "the matter was of such importance that no reply could be given until there has been an opportunity for consideration by [the] Ministers." B.S. Keirstead wrote of the early post-war period that, "it cannot be too often emphasised that Canadian federalism and the success of our experiment in nation-building depends on the well-being of all Canada's economic regions, and some of these regions depend for their well-being on the British market."²¹¹ A young nation is obviously concerned about its unity and national prosperity, but was nation building an exclusive goal irrespective of obligations? Canada's connection to its 'guardian' was still of a relatively recent historical nature. Had this no tangible value for officials in Ottawa?

The Canadian Ambassador communicated from Washington that "the USA administration are unlikely to accede to the UK request. They feel that, in any event, they could not do so without Congressional approval."²¹² In view of this decision, the Under Secretary reported with relief to his superior: "fortunately, it is unlikely, that we will have to do anything until the USA authorities have spoken."²¹³ It seemed that, at the time, Ottawa was not concerned about freedom of action and an independent policy. In ignoring the urgency of the situation in Britain, officials decided not to act in helping to alleviate the condition. However, by November 8, Plumptre of the Finance Department in Ottawa reminded the Canadian Ambassador in Washington that the United Kingdom was in "desperate straits." Waiting for the USA to take the initiative, Plumptre suggested to the

Ambassador that the UK "should probably be in a position to force the issue by telling the United States that they were on the verge of having to dishonour cheques from India, Pakistan, et al. "²¹⁴ Had this factor no influencing role in Canada's process to decide on its reply to the UK's request?

With six months gone by and with Canada's "wait and see" policy in effect, Plumptre ventured to express this sentiment: "clearly there is a good deal of feeling in political circles in England that...in some sense Canada is not bearing her share of the burden, and is altogether too prosperous." Graham Towers from the Bank of Canada was reported to have "felt that at present we should firmly reject all advances."²¹⁵ It was clear that he had perceived no obligation, on the part of Canada, to carry a share of the burden. For, if this was the case, he would have proposed some formula whereby Canada could make a partial contribution. However, Towers argued that, "nothing we could do by ourselves was going to remedy the United Kingdom position." This was a plausible argument which one could accept, at face value, had it not been for the comment by Towers that, "if he gave them one form of help this Monday, they would be back for new assistance next Monday."²¹⁶

It was decided that no action should be undertaken by Canada, "since there was a likelihood of a general new deal involving the United States in the Sterling balance situation." And in spite of the urgency of the British situation, Plumptre felt that "we should certainly wait to see what came out of that for the United Kingdom, for the United States and for ourselves."²¹⁷ In making such a recommendation, Plumptre had anticipated some sort of visible reaction from the

UK and was "very concerned lest pressure from this source produces violent reaction in Canada in the opposite direction and throws us into the arms of the United States."²¹⁸ What does this interpretation tell us about Canada's value judgement and priorities? Which factors could help us explain such nonchalance and self-centredness in view of this 'desperate' and critical situation? And what about the danger of the spread of communism if the UK was unable to stabilise its economy and that of its colonies? Were Canada's own interests not tied in with the stability and security of colonial areas?²¹⁹

It would seem that Canada was occupied with an ongoing concern over the matter of complete freedom from the UK which was perceived by Ottawa to be jeopardised, at the same time, by an overwhelming pull from the USA.²²⁰ In early 1948, Prime Minister King wanted a closer contact with the UK in order to evade pressures from the USA to undertake extraneous responsibilities. Pearson wrote, at the time, that King's anxiety over United Nations and United States commitments "has become so strong, and with some reason, that he is beginning to counsel close contact with the United Kingdom, notably at Lake Success, to make sure that we are not pushed too far by the United States."²²¹ In 1949, the USA expansionist appetite had not been reduced. Nothing had changed in this aspect, yet, for illogical reasons, Plumptre was concerned that UK demands, on Canada's resources, could force Canadians to seek comfort from the USA. Was there a tendency for Ottawa to perceive its place in the conceptual context of a UK-USA axis?²²²

This short exercise has shown that, during these formative years it is difficult to place any emphasis on consistency in aims of policy. Canada has claimed responsibility for the insertion of Article 2 in NATO's Charter. It was intended to accommodate an economic program of co-operation among its members. The State Department did "recognise that Article 2 may be a useful tool at the appropriate time."²²³ Yet, in the same year in which NATO was formed, both showed little concern in a matter that required consequent action in the economic field for assistance to a NATO member. Was this a simple lesson in the way the factor of self-interest was operational? In view of the Prime Minister's speech on February 10, 1950, NATO was supposed to represent an exercise in a comprehensive programme for peace and development. The members had undertaken "to combine their economic, social and moral strength...." How, in Canada's vision, was this supposed to function? Was this 'public' scenario an intentional misrepresentation of the facts, at the time?

Because of the post-war situation in Britain, "a highly insulated imperial economy" had evolved; this Britain saw threatened by UN involvement in colonial affairs. According to Darwin, "more completely than ever before, economics and empire had come together...colonies like the Gold Coast or Malaya earned precious dollars with their cocoa, tin or rubber."²²⁴ We suggest that the behaviour of the USA and Canada regarding the British request for a waiver, at such a critical time, must have served to reinforce the British in its belief that its colonies were its most reliable partners.²²⁵ According to R. Holland,

"the colonial connection provided monetary stabilisation and a counter-inflationary hedge."²²⁶

In early 1950, there was a combined effort by all the Divisions to define the aims and functions of Canadian policy in regard to the colonial world. J.M. Weld of the Commonwealth Division expressed the wish that the High Commission in London should "gain an even more intimate insight into Colonial Office thinking" in view of the "direct contacts" that the staff at the Commission had established.²²⁷ In setting down the fundamentals for "guidance in reporting," the various Divisions stated that they were "perhaps more intimately concerned with the events in the British West Indies than with those in the African colonies."²²⁸ They felt that the Despatches from the High Commission "are helpful in putting developments in this area in the context of the United Kingdom's overall Colonial policy."

Trade was the primary Canadian interest in the British West Indies.

The important factor of economic self-interest was explained this way:

Our interest in economic developments in the United Kingdom colonies naturally varies with the extent of our trade in the areas concerned, the investment opportunities open to Canadian capital and the Canadian interest in sea and air traffic to principal parts of the large centres among the UK colonies.

At that point in time, Canada had its 'closest' economic ties with the British West Indies but was quite open to additional avenues of trade possibilities. The High Commission in London was, therefore, requested to supply "any general economic reports of other colonial territories in which Canada has or might

develop an interest."²²⁹ In other words, Ottawa did not seem to have a direct and specific economic interest to protect in the British and French colonial world.²³⁰

The Situation in Europe

In late November, the Canadian High Commissioner in London wrote to Ottawa: "in the last 2 weeks discussion about the economic policies appropriate to the United Kingdom's changing trade and financial position has gathered further momentum."²³¹ He pointed out that "raw material shortages [were] beginning to arise in consequence of rearmament and increased industrial production." Moreover, he expected a "continuation of this trend."²³² By the end of 1950, "it had become increasingly clear...that none of the major economic problems of Europe could be solved in a purely European context." This was the conclusion of a conference of OEEC officials and senior officials from Trade and Commerce, Finance, the Bank, and External Affairs in Ottawa. The major concern was centred on "economic matters connected with rearmament and the scarcity of raw materials."

Although "the most pressing problems" were those of raw materials, they were still at a subordinate level in relation to the need for a "well integrated organisation for taking top level decisions: on rates of rearmament and on the levels of national income to be devoted to it."²³³ According to Pearson, the problem was that "in view of the present emphasis on rearmament...there was no central forum for discussing the relationship between the military and economic

aspects of defence." And even though Article 2 of NATO had been inserted, in anticipation of such a need, Pearson argued that NATO "has neither the facilities nor the personnel to undertake economic planning." In addition OEEC members, who were not in NATO, were not briefed on military matters.²³⁴

A merger of both organisations was out of the question because their written constitutions "were hard to change." Marjolin of the OEEC found relations between the OEEC and NATO 'difficult' and 'unsatisfactory.' Economic planners had to be fully informed of defence developments and requirements and vice versa. We have already seen that the USA was not prepared to share military information, especially on the H-bomb, with its NATO partners. Marjolin "suggested that Canada might play a leading role in bringing [a merger] about." He advised against submitting to a "pull towards Washington" on the grounds that "grave damage would be done to Western European morale if all major decisions were transferred to Washington."²³⁵ However, because "not all decisions would be made in Europe," Marjolin suggested that Washington "should become the focus" for raw material issues. This was an illogical decision. But it showed how sensitive the Europeans were to the USA assumed leadership of the 'free' world, because if "decisions regarding raw materials would be subordinate to the general policy decisions,"²³⁶ it was obvious that Washington would inevitably be at the centre of the decision-making process.

At the end of 1950, Canada and the Europeans had come to realise that they could not escape the preponderant American presence in all aspects of their military and economic matters. At the time, Ottawa had to acknowledge that

there was limited potential for NATO to undertake any collective planning or co-ordination of matters that were outside the military field. All members were, in fact, in a clearly subordinate position to the USA in this organisation. Yet, in a speech in early 1951, Pearson expounded on the virtues of belonging to NATO. He claimed that it was,

an association of the United States and Canada with the free countries of Europe, particularly, though not exclusively, in a great trading area that will span the Atlantic, which will have the maximum of trade and minimum of restrictions between those who accept the responsibilities as well as the privileges of membership.²³⁷

In view of what we have discussed in this chapter, this speech was neither a true representation of Canada's perception of the situation nor of the facts. He explained to his audience that the government found it necessary "to convince the United States by deeds rather than merely by words that we are, in fact, pulling our weight in this international team."²³⁸ For the Europeans, it was not a privilege to be in this team and the restrictions were not 'minimum.' In the early post-war world, they did not have much of a choice.

In his speech, Pearson seemed compelled to explain, to his audience, the imperative basis of Canada's subordinate position in this "international team." He felt that,

if for instance, each member if the Atlantic Alliance insists on making its own moves in foreign policy, without consulting with other members, and irrespective of their views, then the coalition will weaken and eventually disappear as an effective agency for collective political action.²³⁹

St. Laurent and Pearson outlined an organisational vision for social, moral, economic, political and military solidarity. Which international issues could have

been anticipated as requiring such a comprehensive program in this period of time? Of primary concern were issues of war and peace. But, for what reasons would Western democratic nations contemplate going to war? Would Soviet imperialism and Chinese expansionism into established colonial domains be a sufficient cause? Were there any other contemporary international developments that would require "collective political actions"? The decolonisation of Empires at the UN was the major international development which required collective political action by the Western powers. Colonial Powers were dependent upon the support of Canada and the USA to assist them in maintaining some semblance of control in this process.

Canada's Definition of the Situation

On the whole, Canadian officials were "anxious to follow constitutional developments in the colonial territories...in the direction of self-government"; these were "being carefully watched." However, UN involvement in colonial affairs had the potential to influence these developments.²⁴⁰ In recognition of the functional role of context for policy formulation, Ottawa wrote to London in early 1950: "we have a close interest in United Kingdom Colonial Policy in so far as it is likely to become the subject of debate at the United Nations." More specifically, officials felt that,

while we are able to gauge United Kingdom thinking to some extent from official statements delivered in the Trusteeship Council and elsewhere, we are interested to learn from you of any changes in the trend on thought or any hardening of opinion at the Colonial Office with

reference to particular points of policy. If you foresee a question on which we may be required to define our attitude at the United Nations we should wish the matter fully reported.²⁴¹

Officials were aware of the transience of any fixed policy in a dynamic process and changing operational context. Nevertheless, UK official 'thinking' seemed to have had a functional role in the formulation of Canadian policy, on this one issue.

According to Bow of the UN Division, the Canadian representative at the 1949 Assembly "took an active part" in the debates of the Fourth Committee. This activity "consisted of an effort to promote compromise and conciliation" between the Colonial Powers and other members "who indulged in unwarranted or irresponsible criticism."²⁴² He pointed out that "on more than one occasion, our representative championed an objective approach to the problems." And because the Division anticipated the same sort of behaviour in the next Assembly, Bow advised London that,

when transmitting information concerning developments in the trust or Non-Self-Governing-Territories, it would be most helpful if the High Commissioner would comment concerning the degree to which these developments represent real progress, and whether or not this progress has been hastened or retarded by recommendations of the General Assembly.²⁴³

It is evident that Canadian officials had taken their perceived role quite seriously. They wanted to be fully informed in order to be successful in countering the "false impression" created by the mischief makers. It is apparent that the British complaint against criticism and also the UN context were influential factors, at least in this period, in the shaping of Canadian policy.

The UN Division was aware of the operational limits on action, in the Fourth Committee, because of the fact that the Administering Authorities were "a small minority." Bow complained that "the volume of criticism levelled at them is such that it is difficult to win friends for, and influence people toward, the objective approach which we advocate." In view of this, the UN Division "have wondered why the United Kingdom and the other administering members have not taken the offensive by anticipating and forestalling criticism, instead of continually being in the position of answering it."²⁴⁴ Specific attention was brought to paragraph 8 of Despatch No:747. It referred to the UK's refusal to transmit information relating to 'political' conditions in the colonies under Article 73(e),²⁴⁵ on the grounds that it is a question of sovereignty under Article 2(7) of the Charter. The UK insisted that it had "not surrendered, and cannot surrender to the United Nations any part of its sovereign responsibility for its colonies." The Despatch pointed out that the Charter "certainly does not make any provision for such surrender."²⁴⁶ However, if Ottawa was planning to answer criticism in the UN, then officials could no longer interpret Charter stipulations in a narrow way.

According to Bow, the position taken in paragraph 8 were "of particular interest" to the United Nations Division. He allowed that "the objective of the Colonial Office is commendable but it might be reached more readily if the United Kingdom were somewhat less adamant on certain trusteeship questions." Because of the ample evidence which had come to its attention, the Division insisted that:

By no means all of the criticism in the General Assembly is insincere and irresponsible, and some of the critical non-administering members

might be won to an objective approach by a practical demonstration of the good faith and good intentions of the administering powers....²⁴⁷

Therefore, the UN Division told the High Commissioner that they "would be most interested in learning of any disposition on the part of the Colonial Office to consider practical ways and means of winning support for an objective approach to trusteeship problems." Without any doubt, this Canadian approach had taken into account the "increasingly vocal section of world opinion" against colonial empires. At the same time, it seemed that the Division had accommodated the Colonial Office "expressly declared" objective of working toward self-government and independence for its colonies, in its strategy. In Ottawa's perception, the attainment of a stable and well developed economic status, in the colonies, was an adjunct to stable political development towards self-government and independence.

Bow let it be known that economic developments in the colonies administered by the United Kingdom were also "of interest" to the United Nations Division. The UK concept of 'development' meant that "substantial educational, social and political advances cannot be expected until economic progress in the colonies is such that efforts to improve educational and social welfare can be paid for from surplus production."²⁴⁸ What were the implications of such a comprehensive requirement for the decolonisation process? In this conception, colonial empires should remain intact for a long while to come. On July 12, Griffiths, the British Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, expounded on the Government's "central aim" in the House of Commons. It intended

to guide the Colonial Territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth and, to that end, to assist them to the utmost of our capacity and resources to establish those economic and social conditions upon which alone self-government can be soundly based.

His rationale was solely one of self interest: "the past year had shown how great a contribution the Colonies could make to the economic life of the world, particularly in their dollar-earning and dollar-saving production."²⁴⁹

He explained that according to his plan, "after economic development, and essential to it, came social services and standards." Moreover, he believed that "it was against this background of economic and social progress that the steady advances made in the political and constitutional field took on their proper significance." This position was congruent to the one proposed by Ottawa to its High Commissioner, on April 26. The UK and Canada had recognised the value of colonies for world trade and, of course, in their own interests. The colonial relationship therefore had international significance, in a reciprocal way. According to Griffiths, "it was also vital to try and protect the colonies against violent fluctuations in demand and price for their products." He declared that his government "in its international activities always had the importance of stable markets to the colonies in the forefront of their thoughts."²⁵⁰

However, in the international dynamics of 1950, the security factor had primacy in the formulation of foreign policy. This aspect was a compelling reason for the retention of colonies even if their trading value were negligible. Southeast Asia was the centre of strategic concerns. At that time, Anthony Eden told the House of Commons that, Malaya, Singapore and Hongkong "figured today more appropriately in terms of defence and foreign policy." He explained that, because

"they stood in the frontline in the war against Communism in the East," it was understood that "staff and money had to be diverted from internal development."²⁵¹ Again, not for altruistic reasons, Eden reminded the House that "it was important that their [colonies] internal services should continue to progress, because to raise their standards of life was essential to a sure defence against Communism." This public position attributed a direct and relevant functional role for the communist threat in the decision making of British foreign policy. His premise was that "the issues in the Far East would react on every part of the colonial territories," and could therefore have direct consequences for the Western Democracies. A copy of this speech was on file in the Commonwealth Division and it is difficult to say whether there was universal agreement, in Ottawa, with the British definition of the situation in Southeast Asia.

Consequently, the Commonwealth Division felt that it was 'unfortunate' that the developments in Malaya "do not conform to the more peaceful pattern of colonial constitutional evolution."²⁵² Therefore, this Division found that, "apart from the West Indies (and Malaya), it is difficult to give these colonial affairs priority over, or even parity with, for example, Southeast Asia." The topic under consideration was the United Kingdom colonies: "One gathers material on Africa and has talks, but the analysis and focussing of the information too often emphasises the fact that, important as they are in the long term, African colonies affairs are not of direct and immediate interest to us."²⁵³ We suggest that the primary factors in the evolution of Canada's foreign policy on colonial issues during the late 1940s and early 1950s were a fear of Soviet imperialism, Chinese

communism and economic considerations. The focus was on Asia, Southeast Asia and the Communist threat. As a consequence, the status of Anglo-American relations preoccupied Canadian officials. Their antagonistic relationship was an additional burden on Canada's decision makers by late 1950. They had to contend with the anti-colonial front in the UN and they sought to minimise the pressures arising out of this conflict.

The perceived "anti-colonial feeling in the United States" was distressing to Canadian officials. They were told that the UK Embassy in Washington had "found only a blind alley in discussing colonial affairs with the State Department, after two years of struggle by a special man sent out to improve the situation."²⁵⁴ John Holmes of the UN Division wrote to Reid in the latter part of 1950: "I believe that recent events in the Far East²⁵⁵ make it all the more important to preserve unity of the free world." In his estimation, "no other question so deeply and often divides the free world as the problem of Non-Self-Governing-Territories." In view of this, he suggested that it was "important that no efforts be spared to bridge the gap separating the administering from the non-administering countries."²⁵⁶ The colonial issue had been assigned a relatively high priority in Ottawa. Officials resorted to foreign aid as an instrument of conciliation between the two worlds. They also expected aid to work towards the goal of stability in Asia.

The Colombo Plan, launched in January 1950, was one means by which to achieve this goal.²⁵⁷ However, by late 1950, the Economic Division

recognised that there was a 'changing' attitude in Ottawa towards "the cost of defence plus foreign aid."²⁵⁸ This Division acknowledged that:

In the past two or three years, there have been signs that we were changing our attitude. Instead of a willingness to do our share, there has grown the tendency to discredit, to discard and to delay. Reluctance, and at times sheer retreat from the realities of the cost of remaining free, have replaced our earlier cleancut and vigorous acceptance of the same type of obligations.²⁵⁹

All the Departments in Ottawa had agreed that there was a "growth of the external menace of Communist Imperialism." And since foreign aid and economic assistance were seen as indispensable tools for maintaining stability, the Economic Department had undertaken an assessment of Canada's efforts in relation to those of its "main partners, the United States and the United Kingdom." Officials concluded that, "a few years ago we were on an equal plane with the United Kingdom and the United States in exerting ourselves in efforts necessary to our safety and to carrying out our foreign policy. We are now performing with what Insurance Companies would call 50-60% disability."²⁶⁰

Murray of the Economic Department, argued that the conclusion "strongly supports the case that we must pay our fair share of the cost of co-operating with others in trying to remain free and strong." However, he was not only recommending action on the basis of national security. This argument was a moral one which called for an "acceptance of real international obligations." He added: "more than that, we must want to pay our fair share."²⁶¹ Particular reference was to foreign economic aid. In 1946, national income was \$9,765 million and \$850 million was 'allowed' for foreign credits and official relief. Murray wanted to know, "why should there now be such signs of terror at the prospect of

giving \$25-50 million through the Colombo Plan, to one of the most important but poorest regions on earth, when our national income is approaching \$14 billions"? The Division believed that it was important and relevant, to the argument, to point out that this 'spectacular' growth was taking place "at the same time as the danger to the survival of the free world has been growing at an alarming rate." Therefore, in his plea "to extend some real economic help to friendly areas of the world," Murray suggested that Canada not wait to see what kind of USA Congressional "aid with strings" would be provided for India and Pakistan.

The Division felt that Canada's approval of the Colombo Plan ought not to be made contingent upon USA choices and decisions. Furthermore, Murray argued that: "With Britain's recovery continuing, could we not reasonably contemplate giving India and Pakistan half the amount annually which we used to lend to the United Kingdom?"²⁶² It is evident that, to some extent, the Colombo Plan was also the result of a sort of reactive policy. Is it logical to assume that foreign aid contributions may be taken as a measure of a perceived danger? Did the West not agree that foreign aid was a form of defence against the Communist menace in certain parts of the non-Western world? In view of this, officials in Ottawa found it "preferable if the organisation of participating governments of external finance...would all meet to consider the problem of development as a matter of common interest."²⁶³ Was this common interest mainly an outgrowth of a perceived Communist menace?²⁶⁴ And if this threat did not exist, would Canada have felt the need to address the problem of development? What was Ottawa's thinking on this?

In mid-1951, the Department of External Affairs submitted a draft paper "Financing of Economic Development" for Ministerial approval before its inclusion in the U.N. Policy Papers. The Department conceded that:

There is a general agreement on all sides that economic development is a desirable objective, essential to the achievement of higher standards of living and international economic stability. However, it is becoming increasingly evident to the governments of the industrialised democracies that if large and important areas of the world are not to be lost to the Communist imperialism of the USSR, it is a strategic necessity to bring such areas to our side and to develop their powers of resistance, inter alia, through economic and social assistance.

However, to this guiding principle was attached the qualifier: "It is naturally essential to resist the understandable but dangerous tendency of the have-not nations to regard the more fortunate nations as milch cows."²⁶⁵ This was apparently an important factor in Canada actively seeking membership in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN, because the Department believed that "responsible action in ECOSOC can prove a major factor in keeping these demands within reasonable proportions, in canalising both the demands and the corresponding activities into fields where the highest return can be expected."²⁶⁶

In the opinion of the Department, the operating dynamics in ECOSOC consisted of "a continuing and increasing pressure" by the so-called Third World nations which was countered "by defensive tactics"²⁶⁷ of the wealthy nations, "including Canada." Officials were equally aware of the fact that ECOSOC faced similar problems which NATO had been encountering. Countries like Canada had to come forth with "advance assurances of financial backing," in order to ensure some success of UN activity. As already pointed out in our discussion of NATO,

Ottawa knew that the USA Congress was exercising fiscal contraction. Therefore, Canadian officials suspected that there was "little chance, at least in the foreseeable future, of Congressional acceptance of any such plan," for international economic assistance. What were the practical implications of this situation for strategy? At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting in early January, India's Prime Minister Nehru said that, in Asia, Communism "was the product of bad living conditions and that the Commonwealth countries should therefore devote more of their energy to improving economic conditions than to preparing for war."²⁶⁸

British Prime Minister Attlee saw "the main danger-point" in the Far East. He argued that although "attention was focused" at the time on Korea, it was important to remember that "there was also danger in Indo-China and if things went wrong there, the trouble might spread to Burma, a new State struggling with great internal difficulties, and also to Malaya and Indonesia."²⁶⁹ He reported that, in his talks in Washington, "he had to bear in mind that the present tense situation in the Far East must not be allowed to obscure the actual or potential dangers in the world." And China was expected to play a crucial role in any major war in the region. Attlee believed that "such a war...must inevitably be a long-drawn struggle and would immobilise the American and Allied forces in Asia, thus leaving Russia a free hand in Europe." St. Laurent agreed with Nehru that "the emergence of a new China had significantly altered the balance in the Far East." These factors must have had some influence on Canada's perception as to how the West could combat the Russian and Chinese threat. St. Laurent

agreed with New Zealand's Prime Minister Holland that Western Europe "was the area in which the Soviet Union was most interested." Holland argued that: "If the Soviet Union could secure control of the manpower and resources of Western Europe this would greatly alter the present balance of power between Russia and the free World."²⁷⁰ In other words, such a situation would involve Canada's direct interest and survival.

Although Europe was geographically remote from the colonial world its security was contingent upon developments in the colonial world. Where did Canada's priorities lie? And what kind of demands did Canada's relationship with the rest of the free world make on policy? In the early part of 1951, the Department of External Affairs had undertaken the task to define Canadian policy "with respect to the Commonwealth." By late August, a 34 page document was produced in which there was not one single mention of the colonial problem. One paragraph was devoted to the Commonwealth and the UN. Trade and military considerations were the important aspects of the Commonwealth relationship.²⁷¹ Actually, the Department perceived a need for the Commonwealth connection only in so far as it could balance the USA presence and concluded that: "United States policy at times displays a disturbing tendency to try to break down all links throughout the non-Communist world except those that have their head and centre in Washington; the United States attitude, on various occasions in the past, towards the sterling area might be taken as an example of this. It is useful to maintain the Commonwealth connection as a check on such tendencies."²⁷²

Nevertheless, policy was not shaped by the single factor of Canadian self interest.

A new Context: Reassessment of Policy

During late 1951 and early 1952, the Department of External Affairs was involved in a re-examination of Canadian foreign policy. This process led to several conclusions.²⁷³ Trade and defence were the two most important considerations. The Department concluded that since Canadian industry "is to a great extent controlled by United States industry," it was most obvious that Canada "is very much dependent on United States channels of trade." Did this mean that the USA pursuit of its own economic interests, in the colonial world, was also in Canada's self interest? The Department discovered that:

In the economic field the external limitations on Canadian freedom have increased by the use of other countries of protective tariffs, import quotas, and exchange regulations to protect their economic position. The most important limitation on Canadian freedom in the field of economic policy has been the existence of the sterling area, of which Canada is not a member. The policies of the sterling bloc have resulted in the partial exclusion of Canada from its traditional markets.²⁷⁴

It is evident that the USA had full control and access to necessary markets which were important for Canadian trade, at the time.²⁷⁵ In addition to the policy of the USA, that of the Old Commonwealth were not perceived by officials to "constitute a restraint on Canada as their aims and ideas are basically similar to Canada's."²⁷⁶

As far as security matters were concerned, the Department acknowledged that Canada "is ultimately dependent" for its defence upon the United States.²⁷⁷ As we have already shown in this chapter, officials knew that the USA was very capable of defending the North American continent.²⁷⁸ The other significant conclusion was that Canada's direct interests and concerns of foreign policy were tied in with the destiny of Western Europe. The Department observed:

Canadian policy is conditioned by the recognition that the preservation of Western Europe (and that part of the Middle East bordering on the Mediterranean) from Soviet control is of greater importance to the free world than preserving Asia from Soviet or Chinese control. This recognition flows from the deduction that Europe is more important to both the free world and the Soviet Union than the Far East is, for economic reasons if for no others.²⁷⁹

In view of these conclusions and because the empires were perceived by the Colonial Powers to be important and necessary, at the time, how much of a choice did Canadian officials have in determining Canada's policy on colonial issues?

A principal theme in the formulation of policy was "how much assistance rich countries should give to poor countries." After reading several communications from the Delegation, the Deputy Under-Secretary expressed concern "that a natural feeling of irritation against Asian and other under-developed countries may be clouding the judgement of the Delegation on tactics and strategy."²⁸⁰ International issues were perceived to be interwoven in a complex matrix of demands and pressures. Reid acknowledged that "the pressure that the poor countries are putting on the rich countries in the debates

over Morocco, South West Africa, economic development, human rights is, on the whole, serving the interests of the poor countries."²⁸¹ It is evident that the Deputy Under-Secretary believed that these countries could collectively play an important functional role in narrowing the range of alternatives open to Canadian decision makers. He observed: "While this pressure is annoying to the West, if it is kept up, it is probably going to make it increasingly difficult for the West to refuse to increase the pace of the granting of self-government and to increase the pace and extent of the economic aid which it grants."²⁸² The operational dynamics and this context of the colonial issue made the execution of policy in the UN a difficult task.²⁸³

It is evident that the colonial issue was characterised by conflict and the Soviet pressure for disarmament was perceived to be an inextricable component of this context. The Deputy Under-Secretary suggested that the conflict which was caused by the Western priority on disarmament propaganda and the economic and political demands of the poor countries, could have been avoided. He suspected "that insufficient efforts have been made by the principal Western Delegations in Paris to try to reach agreement with the Asian Delegations on compromises which would not diminish greatly the propaganda value of the resolutions in Western countries and might increase their propaganda value on other countries."²⁸⁴ In other words, this official had assigned to the Communist factor a direct and functional role in strategy and policy.

First of all, he felt that the Western nations were able to undertake a more generous plan of economic assistance if they really wanted to do so.²⁸⁵ Secondly, he proposed that a more rational attitude was needed in the Western definition of the situation. For example, he found "too simple a view," the point that Islamic nationalism "created problems...in areas which are of strategic importance to the Western world." He took the liberty of airing this heretical opinion:

There may be cases where the defence requirements of the Western world require us to satisfy Islamic nationalism at the expense of a metropolitan power. We have, for example, to weigh the possibility that a continuation of present French policy in Morocco might provoke so much disorder there as to constitute a greater strategic danger to us than a grant of self-government to Morocco....Indeed on purely realistic if inglorious considerations, it may be in the interests of the West to throw to the wolves to two million white people in South Africa if it should become clear that our continued support of them would increase greatly the danger of Communists getting the support of the billion or so coloured people in the world.²⁸⁶

It is obvious that Reid's argument was based on the premise of a self-evident right, of the West, to determine when and how colonial rule should be terminated in Africa. In his definition of the situation, Western defence requirements had an important role to play in the making of colonial policy whether it was in regard to Morocco or to South Africa. He conceded that "strong strategic arguments" could also favour a defence of the French in Morocco or of the White South Africans. Was this view representative of the thinking in the Department of External Affairs, on the whole? And, taking all the above factor variables into consideration, which ones were actually more ascendant in

determining policy on Morocco and Tunisia during this period? According to Ottawa, before 1955:

The Western Europeans, allied with the USA and the Latin Americans, were able to dominate the General Assembly in almost every field. They controlled the clear majority of votes and for the most part they were concerned with scoring victories over the USSR. They were also concerned, of course, with keeping colonial issues from becoming too troublesome. These ends were accomplished without too much difficulty and without requiring any major adjustment of policies at the UN.²⁸⁷

Therefore, we can logically conclude that officials were not necessarily faced with a narrow range of alternatives, on Morocco, for example. When we examine Canada's definition of the situation in Morocco, from the early 1940s to mid-1950, we find it difficult to explain why Canada would 'favour' any defence of French policy in Morocco,²⁸⁸ in view of the military strength of the West and its control of an automatic majority in the General Assembly. Under these circumstances, Canada's vote in support of UN actions to remedy the situation could not have had an adverse effect on the Western position in the UN. Would this not have been an objective approach to the problem or, at least, seen an attempt at compromise?

A Western majority in the UN

A Canadian proposal to defer General Assembly consideration of the question of Morocco, in the 1951 session, was adopted. This was the first significant step in a Western strategy to keep the question of Morocco out of the UN. Did Canada's move to defer consideration of the matter not actually enable

the situation in Morocco to deteriorate into the crisis of the winter 1954 – 1955? The French refusal to agree to the March 1952 proposal of the Sultan, to establish a provisional Moroccan Government which would negotiate with France a new Franco-Moroccan treaty, resulted in riots in December 1952.²⁸⁹ The crisis deepened and the French deposed the Sultan on August 19, 1953. The Arab-Asian states were unable to get the Security Council to consider the Moroccan question. It is evident that one veto from any one of the Colonial Powers was sufficient to thwart this effort. Their control of the General Assembly also defeated the Arab-Asian resolution in the First Committee.²⁹⁰ Canada voted against adoption although this resolution sought a democratic solution to the crisis in Morocco. The Bolivian Delegation introduced a much milder resolution in the Plenary session of the General Assembly, in an attempt to diffuse the situation, but it failed to obtain the necessary two-third majority. Canada's abstention was a contribution to its defeat.²⁹¹ Was this an attempt to keep the Moroccan issue from becoming too troublesome? In 1954, terrorist activity increased in Morocco.

Because of the situation in Tunisia,²⁹² the African and Asian members wanted the Security Council to intervene in early March 1952. This was rejected by the Council and the Afro-Asians then 'requested' the General Assembly to call a special session in June. Canada voted with the Colonial Powers against a special session; the two-thirds majority could not be garnered. The General Assembly did include the Tunisian item on its agenda but, in view of the operational context at the time, a compromise resolution which expressed the

'hope' that the parties continue to negotiate was all that could be achieved.²⁹³ According to Ottawa, between 1952 and 1953. "physical force rather than political negotiation dominated the scene."²⁹⁴ Would the Committee of Good Offices, which was proposed by the Afro-Asians, not have been able to support and sustain efforts at negotiation? Surely the Afro-Asians were not acting irresponsibly? Did officials in Ottawa not realise that their policies were not contributing to diffusing the situation in either Morocco or Tunisia? Acts of terrorism throughout 1954 led the new French government under Mendès-France to consider a change of policy. At the end of July 1954, he was prepared to transfer complete internal sovereignty to Tunisia reserving for the French Government defence and foreign affairs.²⁹⁵

According to the Canadian Delegation, when the Tunisia question came up in the ninth session, the 14 Afro-Asian members "did not wish to have to repeat the retreat which they had made on the Moroccan question and therefore agreed to a moderate resolution."²⁹⁶ This is an obvious recognition of a functional role of the pro-Western context in setting the limits of UN action in the colonial world and on policy choices. Instructive for understanding the dynamics of process in the UN is the fact that, although the French Delegation had been absent from the proceedings, they "worked behind the scenes to obtain certain amendments which were put forward privately by the Latin Americans to the Asians." Canada supported the adoption of the resolution on Tunisia, a result of French efforts, which 'noted' the negotiations in progress and decided to postpone any further consideration of the item. Ottawa believed that a "not

insignificant factor" in the above process was "the lack of enthusiasm of the Latin Americans for strongly condemnatory resolutions." This was an important consideration in the UN dynamics of the Moroccan question at the ninth session.²⁹⁷

According to Ottawa, since the Afro-Asians realised that resolutions "which contain implied criticism of the French Government are not likely to be accepted," they were aware of the fact that resolutions on Morocco "should be couched in more moderate terms" than the one they had introduced at the ninth session. And since the French efforts behind the scenes had been so successful during the eighth session, the French Delegation continued to absent themselves from the discussions while they "worked effectively in the corridors," during the ninth session. Canadian officials believed that this was possible only because of the attitude of the USA Delegation whose help was "of great importance to the French."²⁹⁸ Ottawa was also convinced that "the confidence of many Latin American countries in the pledges of the French Government was one of the decisive factors in deciding the outcome of the Moroccan debates."²⁹⁹

In preparation for the tenth session of the General Assembly, Ottawa sent letters to Canadian Missions instructing them to contact the Foreign Ministry of the Governments, to which they were accredited, for their views.³⁰⁰ It is of interest to note that, in all replies, the reasoning and strategy were similar to those which were utilised by Ottawa in its Instructions for the Delegation. On the whole, officials in Ottawa believed that:

The tenth session of the General Assembly is likely to be interesting but difficult. It is possible that, in accordance with their new policy of

promoting a détente in the international atmosphere, the Soviet bloc may adopt more moderate tactics during the session, and that certain controversial issues may not be revived or pressed unduly. The Canadian Delegation should respond to such tactics if they are adopted and attempt to encourage a further relaxation in tension. Major difficulties can however be expected to arise in connection with the so-called 'colonial' items involving strains in the relations between the western nations as well as between these nations and those of the Asian-African bloc.³⁰¹

In anticipation of such a development, the Delegation was instructed to see that colonial issues did not give the Soviet bloc avenues to exploit. Ottawa observed:

Some of the issues which are to be discussed have been raised repeatedly in the past and resulted in acrimonious and unsatisfactory debates. When such issues are debated it will be particularly important for the Delegation to bear in mind that divisions between non-communist countries will provide propaganda advantages to the Soviet bloc even if no special effort is made to exploit them. The need for a conciliatory and mediatory role on the part of the Delegation will be greater than ever. Unless these problems can be dealt with satisfactorily there is a real danger that the Soviet and the Western blocs may be drawn into the discussion on opposite sides and that détente may be compromised.³⁰²

It is evident that Ottawa did perceive a direct connection between a satisfactory resolution of colonial issues in the UN and peace and security matters. To what degree, if any, were the officials prepared to address the reasons for the acrimonious debates? Officials decided that the Delegation "should concern itself primarily with the unity of the free democracies and their relations with the non-committed nations." What, exactly, did this entail? Here is where knowledge of the potential positions of the interested parties, to colonial disputes, were essential and helpful. Ottawa reminded the Delegation that it was "necessary to bear in mind the possible implications of any course adopted on relations with the Soviet bloc." Did détente have priority in Canada's policy on

colonial issues? Was the anti-colonial position of the Soviet bloc seen to have an operational role in affecting the substantive parts of policy or was Ottawa considering solely tactical options? The Delegation was instructed that:

In all disputes between non-communist countries, the essential role of the Canadian Delegation will be to advocate restraint and moderation....To perform the task successfully the Delegation will have to be as objective as possible and seek a compromise between the legitimate security preoccupations of the Colonial Powers and the aspirations in many parts of the world for better political, economic and social conditions.

Did the conflicts in Morocco and Tunisia alert officials in Ottawa to the 'aspirations' of colonial peoples? Clearly, officials in Ottawa were aware of the impact of colonial rule on subject peoples.

In addition, officials in Ottawa knew that the Western Democracies had to address this situation; that it could no longer be ignored nor continued to be side-stepped. Was this a direct result of Soviet pressure and support of the anti-colonial cause in the UN? What, in Ottawa's opinion, was an objective policy? And how much influence or function did the financial uncertainty and future of NATO have in Canada's policy to pursue détente with such earnestness, especially in light of the possibility of mutual destruction? Under these circumstances, did Ottawa discover a need to change its strategy or show any inclination to alter its substantive policy on colonial matters? If we discover that substantive policy did change, could we attribute, to this change, a functional role of the Soviet and anti-colonial pressure in the UN and Soviet ideological and military challenge in the international arena? What kind of conclusions can we make on the operational role of these factors on Canada's policy?

It is important to remember that even if the West did utilise the Communist threat factor for solely propaganda purposes,³⁰³ this fact did not necessarily eliminate a perceived need for strategic bases in colonial areas. In Churchill's assessment, by 1955, the United States "had probably at least five times the nuclear power of Soviet Russia."³⁰⁴ Yet, he argued that "bases should be established in as many parts of the world as possible." In addition, he felt that "camouflage should be used to convey the impression of numbers as well as to disguise reality." In his opinion, "so long as the strategic air bases of the Western Powers were widely distributed, so that an enemy had little chance of knocking out every one of them with his first blow, the power of retaliation could not be wholly extinguished." In other words, in the mid-1950s, the retention of colonies was perceived to be necessary for the maintenance of the security of the West. And as Prime Minister Attlee had pointed out in 1951, "preparations for defence also raised questions of the supply of raw materials throughout the world."³⁰⁵ Colonies were the main source of supply.

Agenda Items

The nature of the discussions of colonial issues varied with the operational context of the UN. Therefore, it was not unusual that those issues which involved the security interests of the colonial and Western powers were invariably controversial ones beginning with the battle over inscription of the item on the agenda. One of the most applied tactics by the Colonial Powers was the

resort to Article 2(7). Under cover of this domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter, they hoped to keep the UN out of their colonial territories. It is obvious that the process over inscription was a very crucial one because if an item was placed on the agenda, it automatically became the business of the UN. Therefore, in cases where members rejected the validity of the resort to Article 2(7), bargaining and behind the scene negotiations became effective methods of gathering support.³⁰⁶

On the question of Cyprus, Canada had very little choice on options.³⁰⁷ The Greek Government requested inscription on the agenda of "the future of Cyprus" in regard to the application of the principle of self-determination.³⁰⁸ The UK invoked Article 2(7),³⁰⁹ Turkey was against any Greek assumption of sovereignty over Cyprus³¹⁰ and Ottawa believed that "arguments against inscription remain strong," in view of the recent tripartite conference on Cyprus. Officials in Ottawa speculated that: "In the context of the improved relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, it is entirely possible that Soviet spokesmen at the General Assembly will not exploit the Cyprus item by attacking the 'Western Imperialists,' but will adopt an attitude of sweet reasonableness calculated to win them new friends." Ottawa reminded the Delegation that, "the propaganda advantage which would accrue is a further reason for not providing the Russians with that opportunity."³¹¹ Because of "the aggressive attitude" of the Greek Government; the adamant opposition of the Turkish Government; the UK concept of "the island's strategic importance" and the possibility of some future negotiations on the basis of the UK proposals at the

tripartite conference, Ottawa expected that "the item will undoubtedly be the subject of close consultation between Delegations."³¹² Therefore, Canadian tactics "will depend largely on the aims of the three states most concerned, particularly the United Kingdom." In addition, "as a result of consultations" with other Delegations, Canadian policy "can be re-examined."³¹³

On the question of Morocco the Delegation was instructed to "pursue a policy similar to that adopted at previous sessions"; that is, no 'attempt' should be made to prevent discussion of the problem. This was a change from Canada's motion to defer General Assembly discussion of the question in 1951. The instructions were specific in setting down Canada's role: the Delegation "should not play a prominent part in the debates on the question." In order to minimise any propaganda advantage for the Soviets, the Delegation was told "to oppose any resolution that would condemn French policies or recommend intervention which would be prejudicial to the French efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement in Morocco."³¹⁴ On the other hand, the Algerian question was perceived by officials to be "both more complex and more worrying than the Tunisian or Moroccan questions." Since the Algerian question had not been discussed at any previous sessions of the General Assembly, Ottawa had to be much more specific in its guidelines for the Delegation.

The most significant factor was the constitutional status of Algeria. The Western Powers argued that Algeria was an integral part of metropolitan France³¹⁵ and that Article 2(7) applied to the situation in Algeria. Therefore, it was no business of the UN. However, the presence of an active Communist Party and

a relatively large percent of French immigrants served to complicate the issue. The anti-colonials took the position that the question of Algeria could not be kept out of the UN through a resort to Article 2(7). Ottawa was aware of the fact that the Communist Party was "legal and active in Algeria," whereas in Morocco and Tunisia, it did not have "much influence."³¹⁶ This had functional significance for Canadian decision makers because of their assessment of the internal situation in Algeria: "The European colons possessed approximately 80 per cent of the wealth of the territory, while the vast majority of the indigenous inhabitants of Algeria lived in abject poverty."³¹⁷

As we have discussed earlier in this chapter, officials were aware of the appeal of communism in such circumstances. Moreover, from the point of view of France, the nationalist drive for independence was "strong and well organised" and had "gained alarming momentum."³¹⁸ Because the French authorities outlawed the Nationalist Party after the rebellion of November 1, 1954 and arrested its leaders, Ottawa felt that, in addition to this action, the "repressive measures....left the Algerian Communist Party an open field" and as a consequence, it became "the principal legal Moslem Party." Supposedly, there was evidence of Communist assistance for the underground Revolutionary Committee.³¹⁹

According to Ottawa, the Afro-Asian concern with the Algerian question was based on the assertion that: "The right of self-determination occupies a position of decisive importance in the structure of the United Nations." They contended that "a denial of this right or undue delay in its application in

Algeria is a potential source of international friction." At the time Officials speculated that, in view of this context, the French Delegation "will probably take an even stronger stand" against a United Nations discussion on Algeria than that taken on the Moroccan and Tunisian questions.³²⁰ Ottawa explained to the Delegation that it was 'necessary' for Canadian policy on Algeria to be "carefully synchronised with the attitude which it decided to adopt toward the question of Morocco and Cyprus."

However, "because of the very fluid nature of the situation" in Algeria, Ottawa had taken the position that "a degree of consistency in the development of our overall policy on questions of this nature is desirable."³²¹ An assessment of the merits of the case was also perceived to be necessary, but how much value was placed on this aspect in the decision-making process? There were two factors that were specific to the Algerian question and which had significance for Ottawa. First of all, the Department concluded that the Algerian problem "is not capable of a quick solution and there is at present no alternative to French authority in Algeria other than anarchy or civil war."

This conclusion had an operative role in policy making because of the fact that the Mediterranean Departments of Algeria had been 'within' the North Atlantic Treaty area and the "whole territory [was] of great strategic significance in the maintenance of Mediterranean communications and for the Strategic Air Command." Secondly, the Department believed that a discussion in the United Nations "would probably inspire increased unrest."³²² In addition, officials knew that the Algerian question could not be dealt with in isolation. They feared that

"the inevitable criticism" of French policies would serve to undermine the 'constructive' approach, which the French Government was pursuing 'elsewhere' in North Africa.

Officials acknowledge the relevance of this situation for Canada's own interests in that:

The outcome of events in French North Africa directly affects NATO as well as North African security, and France's future as an international power depends to a considerable extent on a favourable and peaceful settlement of this difficult situation. It is not in our interests at this stage in world affairs, that French power and influence in Europe and NATO should be weakened.³²³

"For these reasons," Ottawa instructed the Delegation to 'discourage' any Assembly discussion of the Algerian question, "at this time." Canada's policy on colonial issues continued to be a pro-colonial one, that is, the proposed solutions were not necessarily in the best interests of the inhabitants of the colonies.

In recognition of the "gravity of the situation," officials felt it necessary for the Delegation to explain Canada's policy,³²⁴ especially in view of the Afro-Asian Memorandum³²⁵ to the Secretary General of the UN requesting that the Algerian question be included in the agenda of the upcoming session. Ottawa explained to the Delegation: "An attitude of this kind would support the French position while underlining our view of the desirability of moving forward with the political reforms in Algeria."³²⁶ In the opinion of officials in Ottawa, this could best be achieved outside the framework of the UN. Although, in the Delegation's speech, the aspirations of Black Algerians were described as 'legitimate,' we must conclude that these aspirations had been assigned a low priority in Ottawa's decision-making process in view of the Report of the French

Parliamentary Mission to Algeria.³²⁷ Which factor variables were actually influential in the decision to support the French position especially under such circumstances? Because "the delicate situation" in Algeria was seen to be "still very fluid," officials notified the Delegation that "further information may be required in light of later information on the intentions of the French Government and the attitude of other governments."³²⁸

Disarmament

It is obvious that, because of the strategic importance of North Africa to NATO and to Canada's interests, the attitude of the Soviet Union was perceived to have a significant role to play in the UN context. During this period, the Soviet Union had begun an aggressive push for disarmament in the UN Disarmament Commission.³²⁹ The Commonwealth countries knew that, at the time, the UK was entertaining visions of extending Western military installations all over the world and was also in pursuit of its own nuclear arsenal, much to the disquiet of the Canadian Prime Minister and the distress of the Asian Prime Ministers, especially Nehru.³³⁰ In early 1956, the Canadian Ambassador reported from Washington:

Dulles said that he was not at all satisfied with 'our' position on disarmament. We were constantly put in the position of having to raise objections to proposals put forth by the other side. However good might be the 'technical' reasons for such objections...we must somehow manage to devise a positive programme which will win support....It is obvious, however, that he is worried at the political, as well as practical consequences of the West's continuing failure to agree on a positive programme in this realm.³³¹

Less than two months later, the Canadian Ambassador to New Delhi realised that the Soviets were showing interest in Asia. He wrote to the Secretary of State that the upcoming UNESCO conference in New Delhi "will be the first big U.N. Conference to be held in Asia. The indications are that the Russians are likely to use it for all it is worth in their campaign of peaceful penetration into this part of the world."³³² It is evident that any anti-Communist or military posturing by the West would appear misplaced in view of these new peaceful overtures by the Russians. Did this new approach have any functional implications for Western decision makers?³³³ Most importantly, how did Soviet behaviour affect their definition of the situation?

Another Reassessment of Policy

Officials in Ottawa believed that the attitude of the Indian Delegation on colonial matters had even greater significance for influencing the international operational context, in a negative way. This was perceived to be an additional burden and they saw an opportunity to approach the Asian Prime Ministers at the Commonwealth Meeting in London. The Department argued that:

While it would be wrong to question the sincerity of India's, Pakistan and presumably now Ceylon's interest in the welfare of dependent territories, and while we must acknowledge that some critical pressure on the colonial or administrative power is not undesirable, we cannot but question the wisdom of some of the tactics adopted by the anti-colonial countries and their stubbornness in insisting on United Nations actions which may not be in the best interests of the inhabitants.³³⁴

In view of this verdict, the Department of External Affairs felt the need to undertake a 'reassessment' of Canadian policy on colonial issues "as a whole," for the 1956 fall session of the General Assembly.³³⁵ This resulted in a 'suggestion' to the Minister that Canada "try to persuade some of the Colonial Powers to show greater willingness to co-operate with the United Nations on self-government issues, and to consider, for instance, placing under trusteeship certain of their non-self-governing territories."³³⁶ The Minister found the Department's explanation, as to how this categorical mixing should function, a 'vague' one. The recommendation was that:

The Colonial Powers would not be required to agree that the United Nations should decide whether independence is to be granted; but once the decision to grant self-government had been made it might be possible in certain cases to get the organisation into the act and to involve the Trusteeship Council, for instance, in the subsequent discussions on procedure and timing.³³⁷

In the opinion of the Department, this recommendation had operative potential for process in two ways. First, the Colonial Powers "might thus relieve a certain amount of pressure on themselves." Secondly, the Department believed that, by showing a willingness to accommodate anti-colonial wishes, the Colonial Powers might "elicit reasonable and constructive reactions on the part of the more responsible anti-colonial countries."

Of course, "strategic and other considerations" would serve to limit the extent to which the recommendation might be executed. Nevertheless, the Department argued that, "if we consider that we will, in any case, be faced with more pressure as years go by, new initiatives seem essential." The Delegation to the UN had pointed out that the British position "vis-a-vis the anti-colonials has

been steadily deteriorating recently," and the Department suggested that, under these circumstances, the British "may be prepared to consider new suggestions." On the whole, the Department was not satisfied with its own past "policy of general non-alignment concerning colonial problems."³³⁸ As we have seen, Canada's position on Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Cyprus was unquestionably a pro-colonial one.³³⁹ It is, therefore, difficult to understand how the Department could conclude that it was following a policy of non-alignment. The reassessment came to the conclusion that:

We should continue on our middle course, but perhaps in a somewhat more active and positive way. This need not, however, be overly systematic or obvious, but closer consultation and co-operation with countries which are not directly concerned in colonial issues could, we believe, be profitable. It does not seem sufficient to go on instructing our Delegations that we must be circumspect and tactful so as to balance our European ties with the need of retaining the friendship of the Asians.

We cannot be sure to what extent the new Soviet approach and the need for developing a better relationship with the anti-colonial world were influential in the formulation of this new proposal for Canada's policy.³⁴⁰ As we have already discussed in this chapter, the colonial world was perceived to be an essential element in the economic stability and security of the West. The Department recommended that:

While being careful not to lose contact with our traditional friends and not to do anything which might lead them to consider that we are withdrawing our sympathy, we could do something occasionally to bring closer to each other the 'good colonials' and the more 'sophisticated' anti-colonials, and thus make a contribution in the urgent task of preventing the new countries and dependent areas from falling prey to communism. If we wait until each particular case of emancipation becomes an international issue it will then be already too late.³⁴¹

This vision of Canada's 'contribution' was mainly one of "listening and conveying,"³⁴² although officials also sought the Minister's permission for Canada to "make a definite effort, whenever possible, to find compromise solutions and to persuade the countries concerned of the necessity of adopting reasonable attitudes."³⁴³

The Department was specifically concerned with the matters pending at the time and officials expected to achieve practical results from their proposed strategy. They expected that "such effort would be well rewarded if, for instance, we were able, with other like minded countries, to bring the more intransigent anti-colonials to realise that no advantage can possibly be gained by pushing France out of the United Nations on Algeria." However, our brief analysis of the situation show that the Department was fully aware that it was highly unlikely France would alter its position and policy on Algeria. The proposed strategy also indicated that the intended target group of Canada's "definite effort" at the UN was not France. The Department suggested that, "at the next Assembly our Delegation might play occasionally a more active and constructive role than in the past on colonial issues by making greater use of the moral influence which we have with both sides. Closer contacts with as many Asians and Arabs as possible may provide the required framework for what we have in mind."³⁴⁴

After Suez

The situation in the UN after the Suez crisis must have provided the Delegation with ample opportunity to make greater use of Canada's moral influence in affecting process on important issues. In late December, the Chairman of the Delegation wrote: "the British and French are 'in the dog-house' over the Suez and naturally are inclined to be retiring on other matters as well." He added that the Americans "have not stepped into the breach except in the case of Hungary." By also pointing out the actual and potential role of the Indian Delegation in his assessment of the operational context of the UN, at that point in time, the Chairman had indicated that the British, French, USA and Indians were the relevant players on the scene.³⁴⁵

Approximately three months later, Murray of the Permanent Delegation wrote to Ottawa: "Western Europeans, particularly Colonial Powers, have found themselves more and more on the defensive, a position which they heartily dislike because it is such a reversal from their previous role at the Assembly."³⁴⁶ In his opinion, this "situation was made much more acute because of the Middle East Crisis." This was perceived to have ominous consequences for the operational context of decolonisation in the UN. According to Murray, the crisis "shattered the pro-Western faction and provided the Afro-Asians with an easy opportunity for dominating the Assembly."

In the perception of the Delegation, this development was definitely a major break in the traditional alignments and interests of members which,

undoubtedly, had significant implications for policy and for strategy. Murray observed that "the rapidly changing balance of world power, with resulting changes in the policies of the two great powers, have produced new patterns in the General Assembly." Moreover, he recognised that "the shift from Cold War to co-existence has tended to break up the voting alliances which formerly followed pro-Western policies." What did this entail? Should we expect to see any shift in emphasis of Canada's goals and strategy? The Departmental reassessment of Canada's policy on colonial issues in the third quarter of 1956, before the Suez crisis, provided suggestions for radical measures. The Department's post-Suez definition of the situation required an even more accommodating attitude on the part of the pro-Western faction if they hoped to retain any semblance of control in the process, on colonial issues, in the UN. Murray wrote:

We believe in particular that the UK, France and the small number of European countries who consistently follow them, instead of forsaking the UN should try to recover their position of leadership in the organisation. They will not accomplish this by wringing their hands deplorably about the increased voting power of the Afro-Asians. Probably what is required is an adjustment not only in the policies but in the attitude of these West Europeans as regards UN matters.³⁴⁷

The Delegation had also discovered that a process of change had been taking place within the Latin American bloc. Murray reported that the Latin Americans "have shown a desire to pursue not group, but national policy at the UN." As we will show in chapter V, Ottawa had attributed an influential role to this bloc, not only in directing process but also in acting irresponsibly, on specific issues. On the other hand, this bloc was partially responsible for the comfortable pro-Western majority in the early post-war UN. On a positive note, the Delegation

acknowledged that, "some Latin American states...have at recent Assemblies shown a disposition to be more responsible."³⁴⁸ Instructive for our analysis is the parallel development that was taking place in the structural context of policy making in the UN. At least, from the perception of the Canadian Delegation, this evolution had significant implications for decision makers. The view from New York was that: "The trend in the Latin American group away from group policies and group tactics is encouraging." Murray speculated that such a process "is likely to develop more rapidly in the so-called Afro-Asian group."

Was this opinion based on a recognition of the tenuous alignment of such an artificial association? And, did the Delegation perceive an opening for an active Canadian role, in such an altered environment? The changing dynamics of the UN operational context was welcomed by the Delegation. Murray wrote: "The break-up of these large groups would ultimately benefit the UN because it would put a premium on the effective promotion of sound policy rather than on sentimental group action. In these circumstances majorities in the Assembly, and consequently recommendations of the Assembly, would be the result of responsible leadership in support of wise policies."³⁴⁹ What, in Ottawa's opinion, were "wise policies" on colonial issues?

French Colonial Policy

When Defferre was appointed Minister of Overseas France, he made it known that it was in Black Africa where France had its "last chance as an

administrative power of the first rank." It is obvious that France intended to consolidate its position in its colonial world. In an appreciation of the context of the times, Defferre believed that France

must act quickly if she is to avoid acting under duress; that events in North Africa and political change in British West Africa are beginning to make their influence felt in French Territories; and that the "Loi Cadre" technique chosen by the government is the only way to launch the necessary reforms expeditiously, having in mind the delays invariably experienced in parliamentary discussion of normal legislative proposals.³⁵⁰

The British Ambassador to Paris believed that the proposed reforms in the Loi Cadre for French West and Territorial Africa would give them "a degree of constitutional autonomy comparing them favourably with British colonial territories." In his opinion, the step "represents a tremendous advance from the principle of 'assimilation' which two years ago was virtually supreme."³⁵¹

In an answer to his question, "why have the Government moved so far and so fast?" Sir Gladwyn Jebb wrote to the Foreign Secretary: "...the greater realism in foreign affairs that successive disasters seem sometimes to have bred, the fear of Islamic infiltration in Africa, the example of North Africa, the balance of political parties and the tact of the African deputies in the National Assembly who were careful to profess their attachment to France," together help to explain the origins of the Loi Cadre. The new French colonial policy would serve to enlighten the task of the Canadian Delegation at the UN. According to Jebb, the change in French policy "represents a most satisfactory development which can be used in argument to refute the charge levelled by the 'Arab-Asian' group that France is a

decaying and muscle-bound imperialist State engaged in denying freedom to 'emergent nations'.³⁵²

The Canadian Ambassador to Paris shared this sentiment. He informed Ottawa that the local political leaders of the territories were "virtually unanimous in welcoming the new dispositions of the 'Loi-Cadre'".³⁵³ However, he warned officials of the limited operational context of the proposed reforms and of possible criticism in view of the international situation and expectations of the anti-colonials in the UN. Nevertheless, France had the general support of public opinion in the territories.³⁵⁴ He wrote:

The local political parties are in agreement that a form of domestic autonomy within the framework of the French Republic is the best that can be hoped for at the present time. Independence for the territories is not an immediate goal of French leaders although they are careful not to rule it out as an ultimate objective.³⁵⁵

Under these circumstances, and in light of the disposition of the Latin Americans to be more helpful in the UN, we could expect the Colonial Powers to recover some control in the UN process on colonial matters.

Both the French and the British had a policy of distinction between territories with settlers and those without a significant amount of settlers. This necessarily created a problem which was reflected in the dynamics of process.³⁵⁶ We have seen the difference in French preparedness to capitulate on Morocco and Tunisia and its stubbornness on Algeria.³⁵⁷ It is without any doubt that the continuing problem of Algeria negated whatever positive effects the Loi Cadre could have had in influencing process in the UN. In spite of this, the Commonwealth Division in Ottawa anticipated that French African colonies would

"progress faster and faster toward independence" and suggested, in early April, that a reorganisation of the files on French colonial policy would facilitate the decision-making process.³⁵⁸

The Canadian Ambassador in Paris informed Ottawa that the result of the elections, held on March 31 for the Territorial Assemblies in the French territories, "indicate general approval for continuing community with France in the manner outlined in the Loi-Cadre." He made reference to Le Monde in support of his interpretation. The editorial asserted that "the overseas peoples mean to pursue their evolution not against but with France."³⁵⁹ The Ambassador concluded that the French "can, on the whole, be well pleased" with the results of these elections.³⁶⁰ The Commonwealth Division concurred on this point, since the elections were seen as "a test of the acceptance of the Loi-Cadre."³⁶¹

However, the French continued to insist that, "when the peoples are ready for it," further political authority would be granted to them. This was a continuation of an accepted and working premise of French colonial policy.³⁶² In late April, the Ambassador compared the expressed objectives of British and French colonial policy.³⁶³ He felt that the Loi-Cadre of June 23, 1956 "points the direction" in which the French Overseas Territories were intended to go and the basis of his comparison was the status of the Trust Territories of British and French Togoland. French Togoland became the Autonomous Republic of Togo after the implementation of the reforms and the French have considered it to be their "pilot territory for the other French territories in Africa." Ghana was the pilot territory for British Africa. In his estimation, "the methods chosen" by both

Colonial Powers for granting any form of political authority in African territories "differ considerably." He recognised that both Colonial Powers actually envisaged "eventual and complete self-government" for these territories and that both were 'hopeful' that they would continue to have a 'close' and 'cordial' relationship with them.

Whereas the British intended to grant "full independence rather quickly" the French approach was to move "more gradually" towards self-government. The French were of the opinion that immediate and full independence for their territories "is premature and that it would be less advantageous to the peoples of the territories than a more gradual withdrawal of 'la présence française' in the institutional sense." However the Ambassador cautioned officials in Ottawa:

It should not be inferred from this that the French are deliberately withholding greater independence merely to maintain their positions in Africa. They have stated that they are quite willing to proceed further once the African territories acquire the ability to govern themselves....To concede independence pure and simple, as Great Britain has done, and to withdraw French functionaries, technicians and investment credits, would be to expose the populations of the overseas territories to possibly insurmountable difficulties and to regression in certain fields.³⁶⁴

In principle, officials in Ottawa agreed that the ability of dependent peoples to govern themselves was an important pre-requisite of self rule. As we will see in the following chapters, the French approach was more in keeping with Ottawa's preference as to how the colonial issue should be resolved.

In this post-1956 period, the French position was a credible one to support, in the UN, in view of the fact that it had the full backing of the African

leaders in the territories. The Ambassador believed that two factors were crucial for this professed support. First, these territories were given increased political 'autonomy.'³⁶⁵ Secondly, France had promised to increase financial assistance to them. Officials in Ottawa welcomed these arrangements because they preferred not to have the new nations looking to the United Nations for development assistance.³⁶⁶ The Ambassador pointed out that universal suffrage and the single college "were effectively used for the first time" in general elections in the French territories and he considered this move "to represent an important period" in the history of the Overseas Territories. In addition, it had significant implications for the devolution of power because it did "not lead to the elimination of successful candidates of European origin in the Assemblies." Apparently, Paris had feared that the single college would be disadvantageous to the French presence in the territorial elections.³⁶⁷

In early May, Bourdillon had speculated during his visit to Ottawa that the French Overseas Territories were going to "develop with startling rapidity in the political and constitutional fields during the next few years." He confided in Dawson of the Commonwealth Division that French Colonial officials "expect[ed] the various French territories in Africa to achieve complete independence within the next two to five years."³⁶⁸ In other words, as of mid-1957 the short term goal of both British and French colonial policy seemed to be independence for the territories. How did this knowledge affect Canada's policy choices? We will attempt to determine and outline the development of Canada's policy on all aspects of the colonial question. Was Ottawa's predisposition to take a pro-

colonial stand a rigid one? If we discover that Canada did maintain a consistent pro-colonial policy, from the formative years to the later years when the decolonisation process had achieved a momentum of its own, can we logically conclude that the successive reassessments of Canadian policy were mainly concerned with tactical rather than substantive matters? What were the perceived tasks of policy during this period of change in the UN operational context?

At the beginning of 1957, the Canadian Delegation observed: "What is needed is a determination to win Assembly support, not through the domination of voting blocs but by skilful and wise campaigning both on the Assembly floor and behind the scenes."³⁶⁹ It is obvious that speeches for the Delegation would be designed with this purpose in mind. With the disappearance of the relevant bloc support, it was imperative that a new strategy be developed. The working premise was that the Western Powers had to "adapt themselves to the new situation,"³⁷⁰ because in this "nuclear age," the task was to make the UN work "more effectively."³⁷¹ The Delegation was emphatic that the Charter "must remain as it is" in view of their conviction that there was "scope for improving the work of the UN...within the existing framework."³⁷² The subject matter of the next chapter is to discover in what way officials wanted the stipulations, in Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter, to become operational in the UN work on colonial issues; from this basis, we will seek to explain how Canadian policy was designed and executed in light of their definition of the situation.

¹ W.N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles 1919-1963. Second Edition (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1968).

² From: Office of High Commissioner for Canada, London To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch No:747, April 1, 1950

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., we will show that until about mid-1950 Canada's decision makers knew that the Assembly had a pro-colonial functioning majority which influenced how the United Nations set its priorities in dealing with the colonial issue.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ C.C. Jha, From Bandung...p.99.

⁸ Innis L. Claude, Jr. The Changing United Nations. p.53. "The provisions of the Charter relating to the colonial problem are less significant for what they say – what mechanisms they establish and what procedures they set in motion – than for their simply being there. Their inclusion dramatises the inescapability of the acknowledgement that colonialism is a matter falling within the general international domain."

⁹ Marc Lee, The United Nations and World Realities. (London: Pergamon Press, 1965), p.103.

¹⁰ Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power. p. 76. "...one can say that the cold war began the day that Roosevelt died....Only two months later, Truman lashed out at Molokov in Washington. That behaviour in the past of the supreme leader of the United States gave the signal for a profound ideological change in the United States that was to determine the character of the following quarter century."

¹¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Impact of the Cold War on Theories of International Law and Organisations," Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance, ed. Abdul A. Said. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968), p.182.

¹² Schurmann. The Logic of World Power. p. 95. "With the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947, the United States formally became an imperial power by assuming the mantle of empire from faltering Britain."

¹³ UNGAOR. Second Session, 108th Plenary Meeting, November 3. 1947, p. 726.

¹⁴ W. Raymond Duncan (ed.) Soviet Policy in Developing Countries. (Waltham, Mass: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), p. xv.

¹⁵ T.B. Millar, East-West Strategic Balance. pp. xiv-xv. In his judgement, the Cold War "and its continuing and potentially catastrophic nuclear confrontation are the result of perceptions and fears entertained in the United States and the Soviet Union...."

¹⁶ Grimal, p. 153.

¹⁷ John L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p.vii.

¹⁸ Franz Shurmann, The Logic of World Power (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p.xix. "It was the American monopoly of atomic weaponry that propelled the terrified Russians to embark on a crash program of their own to produce an atomic bomb, thereby creating the world's second greatest military power." p.xx.

¹⁹ For detailed information on the USA description of places in the Territories it wished to obtain long-term military base rights, see: From: Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, To: SSEA, Canada, December 11, 1945. Circular D.2215, Top Secret. A two page document. See also: From: Secretary of State, Dominion Affairs, London To: SSEA, Circular D.2138, November 22, 1945. Top Secret.

²⁰ RG 25 Vol: 5917 File: 50199-40 pt.1.1. From:Wrong.. To: Macdonnell, December 9, 1945. Top Secret.

²¹ From: Wrong To: Macdonnell, December 15, 1945. Top Secret. New Foundland, Bermuda, Iceland and Greenland were the other Atlantic locations. R.J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation," International Journal, Vol: XVII, No. 3, (Summer 1962), p. 205. "Canada is also a Pacific power. Her interests in the Pacific area have led her to take part in two wars: the war against Japan and the war in Korea."

²² Ibid., see also: Heeney, Memorandum to the Prime Minister, Ottawa, January 10, 1946 "USA Proposals for bases." Top Secret and Important.

²³ From: SSEA, Ottawa To: Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, January 16, 1946. Top Secret and Personal.

²⁴ Escott Reid Papers, MG 31 E 64, Vol: 6 File: 10:201.2. From: Hume Wrong To: Mackenzie King, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, December 14, 1945. Confidential. See also Holmes, Shaping II, p.42.

²⁵ RG 25 Vol: 5917 File: 50199-40 pt.1.1. From: Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London. To: SSEA, Ottawa No: D.2230, December 14, 1945. Top Secret and Personal.

²⁶ From: Government of Australia To: Dominions Office, No: 22, January 12, 1946. Immediate. Top Secret.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ RG 25, Vol: 5917, File: 50199-40 pt.2. Top Secret- "Note" - USA Request for Bases in the Pacific. January 28, 1949; From: R.A. Mackay To: Heeney, Ottawa, January 24, 1950. Reported that the USA and the UK made "Reciprocal Arrangements" regarding "Overflight and Landing privileges for Military Aircraft." He felt that "these arrangements do not appear to be related to either the North Atlantic Treaty or the Mutual Defence Assistance Act." See: Annex IV for the administrative details approved by the Chiefs of Staff of both USA and UK. Also a "List of Bases which the USA Airforce and USA Navy are prepared to make available to military aircraft of the Royal Airforce and Royal Navy on a reciprocal basis."

²⁹ RG 25, Vol: 5917, File: 50199-40 pt.1.1. No: 22, January 12, 1946. Field Marshall Smuts from South Africa "was in agreement" with the above decisions.

³⁰ From: High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain, To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 168. January 18, 1946. Cypher - Top Secret and Personal.

³¹ From: Wrong, High Commissioner To: Robertson, SSEA. London: No: 209, January 23, 1946. Top Secret and Personal. See also: Blanche Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, (New York: Doubleday and Co, Inc., 1981) for a comprehensive discussion of the USA colonial aims and interests.

³² RG 25, Vol: 5917, File: 50199-40 pt.1.1. From: Secretary of State, Ottawa To: Canadian Ambassador, Washington, No: EX-446, February 11, 1946, Cypher - Top Secret. Because of these disagreements, the UK suggested that a joint Committee of political and military experts from USA, UK, Australia and New Zealand be appointed to examine:

1. "the status and use of bases established by the USA in territories administered by Commonwealth Governments."
2. USA suggestion concerning possible transfer of sovereignty of certain islands."

³³ From: Vincent Massey, Canadian High Commissioner to London, To: Viscount Addison, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, February 13, 1946. See: J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982) "At the Chicago conference on post-war civil aviation...the great powers jockeyed for post-war routes and advantage, civil aviation was a major issue."

³⁴ Escott Reid Papers, MG 31 E46, Vol: 6, March 25, 1946. For an elaboration of these ideas, see: File: 12 of this Vol.

³⁵ RG 25, Vol: 5917, File: 50199-40 pt.1.1. From: Holmes, High Commissioner, London To: Robertson, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. March 28, 1946. Top Secret.

³⁶ From: Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London To: SSEA, Ottawa April 4, 1946. Circular D.316, Top Secret.

³⁷ RG 25, Vol: 5917, File: 50199-40 pt.1.2. From: High Commissioner for Canada, Wellington To: SSEA, Ottawa No: 27, April 9, 1946. Secret. See also: Minutes of Meeting - British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. M.M. (S) (46) 21, March 13, 1946, Top Secret. For details of the British claim versus the American claim to exclusive rights in Canton, Christmas and Funafuti islands. Attached is a document with "Relevant facts regarding base areas under negotiation- Manus, Ascension, Tarawa (seizure from the Japanese) Espiritu Santo, Viti Levu, Guad al canal-Tulagi area...."

RG 25 Vol:5917 File: 50199-40 pt.2. From: Wershof To: Canadian Embassy, Washington D.C. No. Letter: D-1516, December 28, 1953. "May 30, 1946 - the UK - USA airfields in the Azores were handed back to the Portuguese subject to transit facilities until the end of 1947. In February 1948, the USA and Portuguese exchanged not by which transit facilities for USA Military aircraft were extended for a further three years."

³⁸ Shurmann, p. 91. This "...was a bad sign, indicating that America was pushing the development of new atomic bombs to the hilt with the ever-present threat that might be used against Russia."

³⁹ No. 22, January 12, 1946. See also: From: New Zealand Government To: Dominions Affairs, No: 420, December 17, 1946; and, MG 26L Vol. 170 File: C-18-11. Conferences – Commonwealth Prime Ministers – London. Personal and Confidential. Regional Defence Discussion, February 8, 1955. "Throughout these regional defence discussions it was accepted that military plans must be concerted with other countries involved in the defence of these areas. The Commonwealth countries concerned also recognised the need for the closest association with the United States in all defence measures...."

⁴⁰ RG 25, Vol: 5917, File: 50199-40 pt.1.2. From: Dominion Office, London To: SSEA, Ottawa, Circular Dispatch D. No: 56, July 8, 1946.[Emphasis added] See: Cypher No: 168, January 18, 1946- Bevin recommended that the "UK should negotiate with Portugal" regarding "full users rights" for airbases. See: J.S. Whitaker (ed.) Africa and United States: Vital Interests, (New York: N.Y. University Press, 1978), p.1-2. "...the two Middle East wars drew the United States into a role as indirect military supplier for Portugal's counterinsurgency in Africa because Portugal's Azores bases had become the main refuelling depot for USA planes flying to Israel."

⁴¹ Circular Despatch D. No: 56

⁴² From: L.A.G. Fry, British Embassy, Lisbon, To: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, Despatch No: 184, September 11, 1951. Confidential. "My telegram No: 253 of 7th September 1951, reported the signing in Lisbon, on the previous day, of an agreement between the Portuguese and the United States governments for the use of defence bases in the Azores."

⁴³ See: Dennis C. Beller, The Portuguese Territories Issue in the United Nations: An Analysis of Debates: 1956-1965. Ph.D. Thesis. University of California, Los Angeles. 1970.

⁴⁴ Escott Reid Papers, Vol: 7, File: 16# 201.1. From: Glazebrook, Memorandum to DEA "Canadian External Policy, 1946-1952." August 12, 1957. Secret. Subject: Professor F.H. Soward's Studies in 1952 On Canadian Foreign Policy. He was a member of the Canadian Delegation to the UN and the Department of External Affairs. "The purpose of this examination was to provide a series of documents which would be useful to the Minister and to the Officers of the Department; and it was particularly desired that Professor Soward should point out, where there existed apparent inconsistencies in our foreign policies, as well as inconsistencies between our declared and our actual policies." Soward wrote that "by 1948 it was hoped that the development of sufficient strength by the West would create an equilibrium between the two worlds and make possible a period of peaceful co-existence...." Is the word 'equilibrium' not usually used in the context of two equal strengths?] See: Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977). J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, p.227. "Reid's tough position eventually led to Canada's playing a major role in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty and the military alliance of North America and Western Europe."

Pearson Papers. MG 26 N1 Vol: 12 File: Escott Reid. From Pearson, Ottawa To: Reid, New Delhi, March 8, 1957. Personal and Confidential. "I am wondering whether we had quite so much responsibility for the birth of NATO as you suggest. Perhaps you are right in this regard, though it might be challenged in other places." Reid had sent a speech, on Canadian foreign policy which he intended to make, for approval to Ottawa.

George Ignatieff, The Making of a Peacemaker (Ontario: Penguin Books, 1987), p.99. He joined the Canadian Foreign Service during the World War II. "...there was no denying the fact that the [1948] coup in Czechoslovakia marked a watershed in relations between East and West and a main setback to the course of collective security. It was the first tangible indication that the Soviets were willing to use force to tilt the balance of power in their favour and that the United Nations was unable to do anything about it. I believe that the concept of a regional security pact and the eventual birth of NATO can be traced, more than anything else, to the communist take-over in Czechoslovakia."

Beal, Pearson Phenomenon. p.101. St Laurent had a "strong belief in the collective - security principle."

⁴⁵ Hume Wrong Papers, Vol:7, File: 38. From: G. Green, SSEA, Ottawa To: Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador to Washington, Despatch No: 360, February 7, 1949. Top Secret.

Transmitting the Chiefs of Staff Paper, No: 11(49) dated February 4, 1949. "The Military Value of Portugal as a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty." It was prepared by the two Joint Committees identified above. All of this was done before the Communists came to power in China. On file attached to Despatch No: 360. Copy No:19, JPC.22-2, January 27, 1949. Top Secret.

Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, p.275, NATO "was created...to contain the USSR and USA, and even the Commonwealth would again be summoned forth in an attempt to seek succour from American embrace." We disagree with this interpretation for the simple reason that by agreeing to have Portugal as a signatory to NATO, Canada effectively served to ensure that the USA-Portugal strategic arrangements would have long-term repercussions for all of the NATO members because of Portugal's colonial problems, and its initial insistence on the political implications of a joint-venture.

⁴⁶ Hume Wrong Papers, MG30, E101 Vol:7, File:38. Ambassador's File. See also North Atlantic Treaty, Supplemental File: Appreciation's of the military value of: Italy, Portugal as signatories to the Treaty, 1949. See also: additional files in this volume for in-depth information on the stages of NATO's development, negotiation and planning: File No: 36-"Ambassador's File- North Atlantic Treaty, April 1-15, 1949. File No: 36-Transcript of Proceedings: Ambassador's Meeting , December 10, 1948- April 2, 1949. File 40- Appendix to File-Security pact-Tentative Draft of a Collective Defence Agreement for the North Atlantic Area- Escott Reid, June 26, 1948. File No: 41- Security Talks, Minutes of Meetings, July 6, 1948- March 15, 1949. And the complete File No: 27 to 31 in Volume 5. Also for in-depth detail on the Security Pact development from August 1948 inclusive to December 1948 in the Ambassador's File.

⁴⁷ NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) Canada, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, the United States, Portugal, Luxembourg, Norway and Italy.[later additions were Turkey and Greece and Federal Republic of Germany]

⁴⁸ de Gaulle, p. 199.

⁴⁹ Ibid., "if the idea of European integration found so much favour with our partners, it was largely because a stateless system, incapable by its very nature of having its own defence or foreign policy, would inevitably be obliged to follow the dictates of America." MG 26 N1 Vol: 5 File: Heeney. From: Heeney, Canadian Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, To: Pearson, Ottawa. April 29, 1952. NATO-Secret. "I think the record at least will show that the Council performed with due deliberation and without complete abasement to Washington....For my part I was satisfied for the United States were making almost painful efforts to appear not to be imposing their will."

MG 26 NI Vol: 5 File: Heeney. From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa, February 21, 1953. Personal and Secret. On the question of "burden sharing," "the French representative spoke as if he had been armed with a 'big stick'; in fact, all that he had been given was a 'hat' to pass around. He was in no position at all to tell governments what to do and any suggestions by him would be resented....I think there is a risk of our losing sight of the real possibility of an active alliance of sovereign states in our reaction from the unrealistic supranational theories [the Council as a 'cabinet of the North Atlantic.'] of the French."

Ignatieff, The Making of a Peacemonger, p.211. "I shared Diefenbaker's concern about an alliance where subordination to American defence planning and decision making was the price to be paid for huddling under the nuclear umbrella. President de Gaulle clearly felt the same way." He was told by Admiral Denison, the American Head of NATO's naval forces in the Atlantic what was "self-evident, namely that under NATO's integrated command, all national units were subordinate to the supreme commander. Did this mean that, had hostilities broken out [during the blockade of Cuba], French forces might have been involved, without the specific consent of the French Government? Indeed, it meant just that...de Gaulle announced that never again would anyone other than the President of France be in a position to send French forces into battle. ["the President was dumbfounded" to know that that could happen without his permission] Being an ally did not mean taking orders from the head of another government, and if that was what NATO's integrated command was all about, he wanted no part of it. France would withdraw from the military alliance and build its own nuclear deterrent. As for NATO headquarters, it would have to find a home somewhere other than France."

⁵⁰ Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No: 23, 1963, p.13. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

⁵¹ Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No: 3. 1950, p.4. B. Cook, Eisenhower Declassified. p.155. Eisenhower "deplored the fact that so many Americans failed to understand that 'our political and economic life are so intertwined that we cannot separate them'."

⁵² Dale Thomson, Louis St.Laurent: Canadian (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p. 279. St.Laurent "deplored the almost hysterical fear of Communism in the USA and Canada," at the time.

⁵³ MG 30 E 101 Vol: 7 File: 42 Memorandum, From: H. Wrong, Washington To: Pearson, Ottawa, February 16, 1950. Secret.

⁵⁴ This presented a problem for Canada, from the outset, because the USA was adamant in its refusal to recognise the Communist Government in Peking as the legitimate representative of the people of China instead of the Nationalist Regime in Formosa. Ottawa was also aware of the harmful effects and implications, for Canada's position, of such an aggressive policy. This occupied Canadian officials during the entire period of our study. See: MG 26 L Vol: 85 File: C-18. From: The Secretary of State for External Affairs, New Delhi To: Prime Minister, Ottawa, January 24, 1950. Secret. Subj: Recognition of new Government in China. "I was much impressed during the Colombo Conference by the number and force of arguments marshalled by the United Kingdom and the three Asian Commonwealth representatives in support of the decision taken by their Governments to give early recognition to the new Government in China....Bevin pointed to the failure of policy of non-recognition of Soviet Government after World War 1 and said that some of the misunderstanding and suspicion which now existed between the Soviet Union and the West could be traced back to this policy; the United Kingdom had, therefore, decided to recognise promptly and to make effort to get along with the new Government. If this policy failed and relations broke down it would not be the fault of the United Kingdom." See also: MG 31 E 6 Vol: 12 File: 14. From: Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa To: Canadian Ambassador, Washington D.C. Outgoing Message, Cypher. February 8, 1951. Secret. Apparently, Wrong had reported the conversation with Dean Rusk about the American discussions with China over Korea in Telegram WA-397 of February 1, under Reference and not traceable. Pearson replied: "I was glad, in particular, to receive this evidence that the Americans are genuinely anxious to continue the work of negotiation with the Chinese Communists and are no longer thinking in terms of a limited war with China." See also: MG 26 N 1 Vol: 13. From: Office of High Commissioner for Canada, London To: Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa September 2, 1954. Secret and Personal. By late 1954, Robertson could not ignore "the heightening of tension over Formosa, as a result of Chou En-Lai's insistence and explicit demands for its integration within the territories of the Chinese People's Republic." Because Dulles was opposed to this, Robertson suggested to Pearson: "it might be a good thing for Canadian-American relations* if you could have a shot at answering Chou En-Lai in terms wide enough to be picked up afterwards and applied to some other danger spots in the world." There is no evidence that this was done in regard to Formosa, but was certainly applied to the Korea situation. See: MG 30 E 163 Vol: 17 From: Holmes, Canadian Delegation to UN To: Robertson USSEA, Ottawa. November 14, 1958. Personal and Confidential. Subj: "...our heresies on Korea." "The heretical view on the necessity for 'negotiation and conciliation' which we introduced were well balanced by some pretty harsh words about the Communists....I suspect it was not until our views on this subject and on the need for greater flexibility...and the necessity for a realistic approach to reunification were picked up and quoted with approval by the Representatives of Ceylon, Poland and even the Soviet Union, as well as more respectable countries like Ireland and Japan, that they had another look at what we said. I do feel strongly that we were right in what we did, that the note we struck served a useful purpose...."

* MG 26 N 1 Vol: 5. From: Heeney, Washington To: Pearson, Ottawa, December 9, 1954. Personal and Confidential. "Of late, however, I have thought I have detected in certain expressions of view on our side evidence of something approaching prejudice, and even mistrust, of United States intentions." Correspondences between the Canadian Ambassador to Japan and Ottawa in early 1956 give some indication of the international repercussions of the USA refusal to recognise the Communist Government in China. See: MG 26 N 1 Vol: 3 From: Davis, Tokyo To:

Pearson, Ottawa, January 23, 1956. Strictly Personal and Private. Colonel David Dean Barrett, formerly American Assistant Military Attache in Peking, a leading figure in Chung King during the war years and commanded the USA Army Liaison Detachment in Yenai during the war. He was in close contact with Mao Tse Tung and Chou En-Lai. "I am of the opinion that he knows more about the fall of the Chang Kai Shek Government, the rise of the Communist Party and activities of the USA from 1941 onwards than possibly any other man who went through that period in China." Barrett wrote "that if the USA had treated China after the war half as well as did the Japanese, the Communist could not have won in China." See also: From: Davis, Tokyo To: Pearson, Ottawa, January 31, 1956. Private and Personal, for one point of view for the reason the USA refused to recognise China and Davis' account of the role of Henry Luce in the impasse. Davis speculates "whether or not if recognition of China, prior to the Korean war, would have prevented that war from starting....If there had been recognition, and even if the Soviets had started the Korean venture...it would have been possible to prevent China from intervening therein."

⁵⁵ Memorandum, From: H. Wrong, Washington To: Pearson, Ottawa, February 17, 1950. Secret.

⁵⁶ Ibid., MG 26 N1 Vol: 13 File: Robertson, N.E. From: Pearson, Ottawa To: Robertson, London. Copy sent to Hume Wrong, Washington. At the end of January 1948, Philip Noel-Baker, the UK delegate in the Security Council had instructed Clutterbuck of the UK High Commission to Ottawa, to ask Prime Minister King whether Canada would participate in any conciliatory machinery that would be set up to deal with the Indian-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Pearson informed the Canadian High Commissioner to the UK that this request got a "chilly reception" from King, who felt that it was "quite inappropriate for us to serve as a Dominion, on a Committee which is investigation the affairs of two other Dominions." Although, according to Pearson, the Indian Cabinet "was anxious to have Canada as its representative on the Commission of Three." It is only after the Commission failed to get any results that General McNaughton was asked to arbitrate. His suggestions were not acceptable to India. See: S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. Vol: 2, pp.58-59 and also MG 30 E 101, Vol: 7 File: 42. Hume Wrong Memorandum, February. 16, 1950. McNaughton "was irritated especially by Noel-Baker's constant pressure on him." During the month of February, 1948, the Canadian Delegation headed by Andrew McNaughton was to sit as Chairman of the Security Council and would therefore be involved in this dispute. Pearson told Robertson that "Noel-Baker also tried to insist" that Pearson make a personal effort "to help in this matter" at the UN meeting at Lake Success. Nevertheless, King was of the opinion that Canada was doing "more than" its share of the United Nations work. And, he preferred that Canada should "play as minor a role as possible...in all Security Council questions." This was not just a point of view; it was rather a directive for policy. Consequently the Department of External Affairs sent a Memorandum on what role Canada should play in the Security Council, to Cabinet for its approval. This was an indication of the importance of the matter in terms of setting clear limits for Canada's functional role in early 1948. Would this attitude change in view of the international developments in 1949?

⁵⁷ MG 30 E 101 Vol: 7 File: 42. From: H. Wrong To: Pearson, February 23, 1950, Secret. Reporting on a proposal in the Washington press by Mr. Lippman: "The idea of creating a neutral bloc "between" the Soviet sphere and the West, running in a great arc from Sweden and Finland through Greece, the Middle East, the Indian peninsular, perhaps to the Philippines." Wrong believed that 'neutrality' was "an empty term which is no shield from attack whenever it is in the interests of a great power to make use of neutral territory."

⁵⁸ From: Wrong, Washington To: Pearson, Ottawa, February 23, 1950.

⁵⁹ MG 26 N1 Vol: 17. From: Wrong, Washington To: Pearson, Ottawa, March 14, 1950, p.2. "in conversation with Webb of the State Department who asked whether I thought there was a real risk of a violent crisis with Russia in the near future. I said that my guess was that the Russians would continue to stir up as much trouble as they could short of war....Adverting to Russia, he felt that the danger period would be during the next year or two when we were getting strong. Russia would not, he thought, deliberately provoke a war."

⁶⁰ MG 26 N1 Vol: 17. From: Wrong, Washington To: Pearson, Ottawa, March 16, 1950. Personal and Secret. "...sending a letter reporting an interesting talk with Rusk on the difficulties and

dangers of attempting any general negotiation with Russia at present." Letter not found in file and also not traceable.

⁶¹ MG 26 N 1 Vol: 1. From Pearson, Ottawa To: Wrong, Washington. March 24, 1950. Pearson had gathered from Wrong's letters that both Dean Acheson and Dean Rusk "reject or at least are sceptical about all the current proposed high level meetings, special assemblies in Moscow or elsewhere, special meetings of the Security Council or a special conference on disarmament-because they are convinced that any of these would simply be activity for its own sake."

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid., there is a clear train of thought throughout the secret documents as to the advantages of propaganda for the Western powers in regard to the decolonisation issue.

⁶⁴ From: Pearson, Ottawa To: H. Wrong, March 24, 1950. Secret and Personal.

⁶⁵ Ibid., but within 18 months Pearson had changed his mind and was actively seeking to join a Pacific pact with Australia and New Zealand. MG 26 N 1 Vol: 17 File: Wrong. From Wrong, Washington To: Pearson, Ottawa, November 17, 1951. Personal and Confidential. Pearson had asked Wrong to "sound out opinion in the State Department on the question of Canadian adhesion to the tripartite Pacific Treaty with Australia and New Zealand." In discussing "the prospects of a general Pacific Security Pact...[Dean Rusk] agreed that he could not see any solid foundation for a multi-lateral treaty which might be roughly analogous to the North Atlantic Treaty." Rusk saw "no difficulty at all" with the State Department. But "he would expect opposition from the United Kingdom, since the Labour Government had not seemed to be at all happy about a separate agreement between the U.S., Australia and New Zealand."

⁶⁶ Pearson Papers, Vol: 19, File: British-Canada Relations, Memorandum, Pearson to Prime Minister, May 12, 1950. Top Secret.

⁶⁷ Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73 (2nd. ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1974), p.498.

⁶⁸ Ulam is one among many writers who utilise the cause-effect concept in explaining the international operational context of this period. See also A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organisations: Principles and Issues (3rd. ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1984), p.370. The entry of Germany into NATO was seen as the trigger for the establishment of the Warsaw Pact.

⁶⁹ J. Lee Ray, Global Politics (2nd.ed.; Boston: Houghton Miffling Company, 1983), p.297. See also: Blanche Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, p.86. The Russian diplomats called "the creation of NATO abusive, belligerent and warmongering."

⁷⁰ Ulam, p. 499.

⁷¹ MG 26 N1 Vol:4 File: Dulles, John Foster. USA, Secretary of State. From: Pearson, Ottawa To: Dulles, Washington, April 8, 1950.

⁷² RG 25, Vol: 3458, File: 6-1-1949/1, p.6. See Dennis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974). Originally a Ph.D. Thesis, this is a comprehensive account of Canada's interests and role. Temporary Commission on Korea set up on November 14, 1947, Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria (and the Ukrainian S.S.R. which refused to participate in the commission's work). Canada withdrew and Resolution 195(III), December 12, 1948, reconstituted the Commission of 7 members.

⁷³ Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p.88.

⁷⁴ RG 25, Vol: 3458, File 6-1-1949/1, p.6. [Emphasis in the original]

⁷⁵ MG 26L Vol: 118 File: K-20-I. From: A.R.M. Lower To: Prime Minister St. Laurent, August 5, 1950. "I just want to make the point that the Canadian people ought to know far more clearly than at present what they are sending ships and planes to Korea for, especially as I imagine will happen, these are reinforced with fighting troops." It is not enough to talk about resisting aggression....The history of the two World Wars makes it abundantly clear that the Western world only knows how to win wars, not the peace. In each case, we have thrown away, with remarkable speed, the fruits of victory. This will happen again if the North Koreans are pushed out of South Korea – we won't know what to do when we do get them out." MG 26L Vol: 4 File: K-20-I. See: Special Session of Parliament re: Korean situation, August 7, 1950. MG 26L Vol: 5 File: K-20-I.

From: St. Laurent To: A.R.M. Lower, August 15, 1950. "...I know you must realise that he who pays the piper calls the tune and that it would not be wise for us to be too specific about the future of Korea when Canada is in no position to determine it. I can, however, assure you that we are trying to exercise all the influence we have in Washington in a direction which I am sure you would approve....I think the whole government is, in thorough agreement with the...point regarding the long-range objectives of opponents of Communism particularly on the continent of Asia." See also: St. Laurent's Speech to the Canadian Club of Toronto of March 27, 1950 and also to St. Louis University on June 6, 1950 re: Canada's position on Korea.

MG 31 E 6 Vol: 2 File: 14. From: LePan, Memorandum For Mr. Reid: Korean and Palestine Relief, February 10, 1951. cc. Mr. Holmes. "Mr. Pearson asked me this morning to let you and Mr. Holmes know that he is thinking of recommending to Cabinet early next week that they should seek an appropriation from the House of \$5,250,000 for Korean relief. There are two reasons why Mr. Pearson would prefer to ask for this minimum figure:

- It now seems likely that the brigade in training at Fort Lewis will go to Korea. In view of the relatively high military commitment which this will involve for Canada, Mr. Pearson thinks that other countries not making such a high military contribution should be expected to contribute more heavily to the relief scheme.
- The situation in Korea is still so uncertain and obscure....At the same time as he tackles Cabinet on Korean relief, he would also like to raise the question of Palestine relief and to recommend a contribution of \$750,000. The two contributions would total \$6,000,000. He feels reasonably sure that, in spite of the opposition there is in Cabinet to requests of this kind, he will be able to secure approval for this amount, particularly in view of the prior Cabinet approval of a maximum of \$7,500,000. for Korean relief."

⁷⁶ From: Pearson To: Wrong. April 16, 1951. Personal and Confidential. Thinks it important that the USA "understood the anxiety and hesitation with which the majority of people in Canada watch the development of USA policy, especially in regard to the Far East." This comes from "the deep-seated...feeling of dependence on the United States and frustration over the fact that we cannot escape this no matter how hard we might try."

⁷⁷ RG 25 Acc: 86-87/160 Vol: 77 File: 5475-FA-40 pt.1. From: Holmes, Ottawa. Memorandum For the Under Secretary. March 9, 1951. Secret. "The Role of the United Nations in the Decision to Take Action in Korea." MG 26 N1 Vol: 4. From: Dulles, Washington: To: Pearson, Ottawa, March 29, 1955. Personal and Confidential. Subj: "Formosa et als." It is evident that Dulles was aware of this resentment by USA allies and later sought to remedy this somewhat: "...while we might wholly agree, I am confident that you would agree with our own motives and purposes in taking it."

⁷⁸ From Pearson, Ottawa To: Wrong, Washington, May 2, 1951. Confidential.

⁷⁹ Stairs, pp. 286-87. "...in the informal meetings of the United Nations group where attempts were made to hammer out an agreed policy, the differences were wide and the arguments vigorous. Their intensity was compounded by personal irritations which had resulted from disagreements between the British and Americans on the question of Indo-China, and which had accentuated the animosity latent in the relations of Anthony Eden and John Foster Dulles. The Eden-Dulles conflict was particularly distressing to Mr. Pearson, partly because of the importance of Anglo-American amity in the conduct of Canadian external affairs generally...."

MG 26 N1 Vol:5. From: Heeney To: Pearson, Ottawa. June 28, 1950. Personal and Confidential. "...here and in Washington and New York I think the reserved conclusion is being drawn that, for whatever disreputable reasons, the Russians really do want to stop the fighting." MG 26 N1 Vol: 19. From: Pearson To: Prime Minister. December 8, 1951. Secret. Memorandum: "Discussions with Mr. Eden, December 7, 1951." "Eden said that they appreciated the fact that the Americans had consulted them in Rome, something which he had been assured by his advisers had not previously happened, at least in this way, about Korea. He felt that as a result of this early consultation, it would be easier to work out a common policy." However, "Eden expressed some general worries lest the United States should push him and the present government too hard in the direction of backing their Far Eastern policy generally." Pearson reported that by going to Paris, Eden and Churchill "wished to remove, before they went to Washington, French suspicions

that some Anglo-American deal might be cooked up there without sufficient regard to French interests."

MG 26 L Vol: 164, File: U-10, June 28, 1949-50-51-52-53. United Kingdom, Vol: 1. Personal and Confidential. Cross Reference Sheet: Subject: United Kingdom, Personal and Confidential, File U-10 V.I. 1953. Date: March 16th, 1953. regarding: "Mr. Wrong has learned on strictly confidential basis re: remark of President Eisenhower at his final meeting with Mr. Eden re fully intended to maintain 'continuous consultations' with United Kingdom and Canada." See: From Mr. L.D. Wilgress, File No: U-15, V.4. 1953. Memorandum For Prime Minister. See also: Eden, Full Circle. p.86. "The restoration of peace in Indo-China was the most dangerous and acute of the problems with which I had to deal during my last four years as Foreign Secretary[1951-54]. The long series of diplomatic exchanges with our French and American allies, the discussions at Berlin and the final negotiations at Geneva in 1954, involved the security of the non-Communist world in South-East Asia."

⁸⁰ RG 25, Acc: 86-87/160 Vol: 77 File: 5475-FA-40. pt.1. Memorandum for UN Division, Holmes, Department of External Affairs referred to in Memorandum For Mr. Holmes, Goldschlag, UN Division. January 18, 1951. Confidential. Not traceable.

⁸¹ Ibid., see chapter V for the same kind of difficult problems which the Latin American members presented to Canada on the issue of human rights and self-determination. Their strength and determination to act on this issue strongly influenced the dynamics of the process and Canada's choices.

⁸² MG 26 N1 From: Reid, New Delhi To: Pearson, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Paris, September 13, 1956. Personal. "During my five years in the Department as second-in-command or acting Under Secretary, I was immersed for the most part in North Atlantic and UN affairs. I think my four years here in entirely different surroundings with different sets of problems have helped me to correct my perspective. I am bold enough to prescribe this treatment for others who have been pretty much confined to pre-ambulating the North Atlantic triangle."

⁸³ Memorandum for Mr. Holmes, January 18, 1951.

⁸⁴ RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/160 Vol: 79 File: 5475-GH-40 pt.1. From: Reid, New Delhi To: Pearson, Ottawa. No: 1770 December 5, 1956. Confidential. "The present crisis [Suez] also dictates a need for much increased consultations with the new members of the Commonwealth....We should most certainly insist on the holding of meetings attended by all members of the Commonwealth whenever a matter is coming up before the Security Council or the General Assembly which of direct concern to Asia. Such meetings can have more than good-will value if they in some way affect the values of those attending and, just as important, are clearly seen to do so."

⁸⁵ Ibid., see: From: Pearson To: Wrong. February 18, 1951. Secret. "I have been seriously concerned by what appears to be a lack of direction in [U.S.] Far Eastern policy." MG 26 L, Vol: 170, File: C-18-6. 1954. Conferences – Geneva Conference – Secret and Personal. File – sole contents a 5 page letter from Pearson, Secretary of State to St. Laurent, Prime Minister, dated May 6, 1954. Geneva; Secret and Personal. re: "Indo-China talks", p.1. Citing grounds of domestic political considerations, Pearson writes that "It is particularly unfortunate that at this critical moment the French Government should be so weak, and the American Government so divided."

p.2. "We certainly should be interested, because if the Indo-Chinese question goes very wrong, serious and widespread conflict might result, from whose consequences we would not be able to escape. Even if that ultimate tragic contingency did not result, there is a real danger of serious division between the United Kingdom and United States over this matter...."

⁸⁶ From: Wrong, Washington To: Pearson, Ottawa, January 16, 1951. A Dinner Party at Congressman Herter's house, Senators Lodge and Nixon, Josef Alsop and a Belgian financier. "Lodge, Nixon and Herter all belong to the so-called internationalist wing of the Republican Party," p.1.

⁸⁷ RG 25 Vol: 5917 File: 50199-40 pt.1.2. From: Office of High Commissioner for UK, Ottawa To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 1085/144, May 8, 1951. Top Secret. "Caribbean Command Arrangements." Conference October 2, 1950.

⁸⁸ See From: Wrong To: Macdonnell, December 15, 1945 in section Military: The USA and Old Commonwealth.

⁸⁹ RG 25 Vol: 5917 File: 50199-40 pt.2. From: Canadian High Commissioner to the UK To: SSEA, Ottawa, Message No: 1244, May 21, 1951.

⁹⁰ MG 31 E 46 Vol: 7 File: 16# 201.1 Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, June 29, 1951. Secret.

⁹¹ RG 25 Vol: 5917 File: 50199-40 pt. 1.2. Memorandum. From: Ritchie To: USSEA., July 24, 1951. Secret.

⁹² RG 25 Acc. 86-87/160. Vol: 77 file: 5475-FA-40. pt.2. United Nations Division, John Holmes, August 8, 1951.

⁹³ Ibid., see also: MG 26 N1 Vol:19. British-Canadian Relations. Memorandum Pearson to Prime Minister [St. Laurent]. Secret. "Discussion at Dinner given by Mr. Eden, December 10, 1961. Eden's and Lord Woolton's view that the pace of U.K. rearmament should be slowed down and present plans reduced. They "felt that the USSR was not likely to provoke a war now that they knew that an attack on, say, Norway, would mean atom bombs on Moscow."

⁹⁴ MG 31 E 46, Vol: 7 File: 16# 201.1. Department of External Affairs, Some Aspects of Canadian Policy in Europe, August 9, 1951. Secret.

⁹⁵ RG 25 Acc. 86-87/160 Vol:77 File: 5475-FA-40 pt.2. From: USSEA, Ottawa To: High Commissioner for Canada in the UK, London. Letter No: V-2849, August 15, 1951. Confidential. Letter under reference No: V-2016 of May 16, 1951, not traceable. From: USSEA, Ottawa To: Canadian Ambassador, Washington D.C. Letter No: V-2729 August 15, 1951. Letter under reference No: V-1970 of May 16, 1951, not traceable.

⁹⁶ RG 25, Vol 6405 File 5475-N-40 pt. 6.1. From: The Chairman, Canadian Delegation, UN Assembly, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 125. December 3, 1951. See: MG31 E 6 Vol 2 File 17. Douglas LePan Memorandum for the Minister: Attitude of Australia and New Zealand towards the North Atlantic Community. September 25, 1951. Secret cc. USSEA, Commonwealth Division, Defence Liaison Division and European Division. After a visit from David Hay of the Australian Office and Perry of New Zealand, LePan wrote: "But it is only natural, I think, that Australia and New Zealand should both be very interested and, indeed concerned over the steps that are being taken to foster the North Atlantic community. I myself feel that in the course of urging forward this important development we should try not to make Australia and New Zealand feel isolated and should, therefore, take them fully into our confidence. I think that is primarily the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government to keep the Australian and New Zealand Governments informed about developments in the Middle East and to attempt to carry them along with the plans that are brewing. However, I feel that we in Canada have a clear responsibility to inform the Australian and New Zealand Governments fully of each step that may be taken to develop the North Atlantic community and also to listen sympathetically to whatever they may have to say on this subject."

⁹⁷ Ibid., consultations on colonial matters continued to take place. See: RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.2. From: C.S.A. Ritchie To: Collins, European Division, Ottawa. September 23, 1952. Subj.: Meeting with Sir John Martin "members of the Department can hear from and exchange views with Sir John Martin, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the UK Colonial Office." He was in Washington "to exchange views with the State Department on matters concerning Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing-Territories which will be discussed at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. The same sort of discussions are planned for him here...On the following day conversations will be arranged for Sir John with Commonwealth, European and United Nations Divisions."

⁹⁸ MG 26 N1 Vol:19- British-Canada Relations. "Discussion with Mr. Churchill". Five Memoranda for the Prime Minister. From: Pearson, London To: Prime Minister St. Laurent, December 9, 1951. Secret.

⁹⁹ From: Pearson To: Wrong, Ottawa, May 2, 1951. USA perception of Canada discharging her role as an effective broker "is to stay on the American side, without question, and to keep interpreting the policy of that side to the British." MG 31 E 46 Vol: 7 File: 16#201.1. See also: "Recent and Current Questions in the Relations Between Canada and the United States." August 10, 1951. Secret. A comprehensive 8 page document covering Defence, Foreign Policy, Economics, etc. See: MG 31 E 46 Vol: 7 File: 16#201.1. "A Survey of Relations between Canada and the United States." June 20, 1951. Top Secret. A 14 page Document: Under aspects of USA leadership: "If there had been no fundamental divergence of views on such issues as the support

of Nationalist China or the attempt to negotiate with the Chinese Communists, the methods which seem to us at times to be rather crude and which have been adopted by the United States to bring its allies and associates into line would have been avoided."

¹⁰⁰ From: Pearson To: St. Laurent, December 9, 1951. Churchill "admitted that Great Britain was not now the powerful country she once was, and probably would not be so again." RG 25 Vol: 3465 File: 6-1960/1 pt.1; Part 1. By 1960 the Department of External Affairs had concluded that: "The United Kingdom ranks among the Great Powers; it is also a leader among the West Europeans."

¹⁰¹ From: Wrong To: Pearson, January 16, 1951. Belgians "sadly remarked...how difficult it was for Americans to see any point of view but their own." MG 31 E46 Vol: 7 File: 16# 201.1. From: Louis Roger, Ottawa To: Escott Reid, High Commissioner to New Delhi, November 10, 1955. Top Secret. Reid wrote about a meeting of March 22, 1951, which he attended as Deputy Under Secretary, to discuss the Memorandum. "Recently there has been a series of fairly sharp differences with the United States." Holmes, Shaping II. p. 297. "...much the art of diplomacy at the UN in the fifties was in exploring ways and means of working with, exploiting, or trying to tame this powerful force at the heart of the system. It was not easy to deal with the Soviet Union, but it was a good deal simpler than calculating how to assess the amphibolous state that was like no other - the USA."

¹⁰² From: Pearson, London To: St. Laurent. Conversation with Sir Percival Leisching, December 10, 1951. Secret. From: Heeney To: Reid, No: 228, January 17, 1951. "...describes USA handling of the Korean crisis as "a country whose people, remote themselves from immediate external dangers, have little knowledge and experience of global strategy...."

¹⁰³ Conversation with Sir Percival Leisching, December 10, 1951.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., Schurmann, The Logic of World Power. p. 93. "In the five years following 1945, Britain had to keep a powerful military presence in Greece, Malaya, the Suez Canal, Jordan and Iraq, and had to maintain far-flung naval and air units to preserve its credibility as a world military power. In addition, it had to maintain occupation forces in Germany and other parts of Western Europe. In Greece and Malaya, Britain fought Communist revolutionary movements which threatened to bring into power governments that could not be counted on to co-operate with Britain. In the Middle East (which included Greece) nationalist unrest and Arab-Jewish conflict threatened to spill over into regions from which most of the world's oil came. Iran was turbulent because of a left-wing government in Aserbaijan. Rebellious Kurds threatened the Mosul oil fields. King Farouk's rule in Egypt was unstable. Southeast Asia had the same kind of turbulence. Indonesian nationalists were threatening Dutch rule and Vietnamese insurgents would not let the French back into Indo-China." MG 26 N1 Vol: 19 From: Pearson To: St. Laurent. "Discussion with Mr. Eden, Ottawa, January 13, 1952". Top Secret. "...things were deteriorating in the Suez Canal Area. To halt this deterioration Mr. Churchill (though he was advised by Eden not to do so) had suggested to the [USA] President that a regiment of Marines should be sent to the Suez to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with British troupes. This, as might be expected, was rejected by the President."

¹⁰⁵ MG 26 N1 Vol: 5, File: Greene. From: Greene, High Commissioner for Canada, Canberra To: Pearson, Ottawa. April 7, 1948. Personal. Burton, of the Australian Department of External Affairs, believed that: "Japan is being built up by the United States industrially at the moment and perhaps will be later, in a military sense, with the idea of creating a buffer state against Russia...if Japan was so built up it was a future menace to this country and that could not be overlooked. He went on to say that in the event of serious trouble between Russia and her satellites and the rest of the world that Australia could never forget that some of their neighbours might well be a serious menace to them."

From: Pearson, Ottawa To: Greene, Canberra, April 22, 1948. Personal. "I can certainly understand the pre-occupation of the Australians with the United States policy towards Japan...because of geographical considerations, the fear of Japanese resurgence as a great power which they are bound to have. In a sense, the attitude towards Japan is similar to that of the French towards Germany. Both countries must realise the immediate menace of Russian aggression...."

¹⁰⁶ MG 26 N1 Vol: 19 From: Pearson To: St. Laurent. "Discussion with Mr. Eden, Ottawa, January 13, 1952". Top Secret. "Acheson did his best to persuade Eden that the British should tell the Japanese that there was no objection to an agreement between Japan and the Chinese Nationalist Government covering Formosa...." MG 26 N1 Vol:1, File: Acheson. From: Pearson, Ottawa To: Dean Acheson, Washington, Under Secretary of State. January 15, 1952. Churchill seemed willing to support the USA in Asia and Pearson felt that Churchill "would go a little faster and further in trying to enlist [Acheson's] active co-operation than Eden would," in the Middle East. As a Pacific Power, Canada was very much interested in the USA pursuits; MG 26 N1 Vol: 3 File: Davis, T.C. From: Davis, Bonn To: Pearson, Ottawa, October 17, 1952. Strictly Personal and Confidential. "Japan...has a definite interest in seeing that Korea is an independent state not within the orbit of either Russia or China. Korea therefore is bound to be a bone of contention between Japan on one side and China and Russia on the other. It may also ultimately be a bone of contention between China and Russia as I doubt that China would want Russia in control of Korea."

Cited in Grosser, The Atlantic Alliance, p. 131 and quoted from the Pentagon Papers (N.Y. Bantam Books, 1971), p. 29 and 31. The National Security Council decided that it was in the USA's interest "to assure the French that the USA regards the French effort in Indo-China as one of great strategic importance in the general international interest...and as essential to the security of the free world." In 1953 the NSC claimed that "the loss of Indo-China 'would be critical to the security of the U.S.' and that 'any negotiated settlement would mean the loss of Indo-China and the whole of Southeast Asia.'" This had special significance since the Communist came to power in China in 1949.

¹⁰⁷ From: French President Auriol To: J.F. Dulles, Republican Adviser of the State Department on May 6, 1952. Quoted in: Grosser, The Atlantic Alliance, p. 130; "We were the supporting pillar of the defence if the West in Southeast Asia; if this pillar crumbles, Singapore, Malaysia and India will soon fall prey to Mao Tse-Tung. You have understood that perfectly well, and I thank you for it." MG 31 E 6 Vol: 5 File: 45 From: Canadian Ambassador, Washington To: SSEA, Ottawa. No: 1137, June 23, 1954. Secret. By mid-1945, the USA Secretary of State told a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "that, in almost any conceivable contingency, very substantial assistance would be required for South-East Asia." Anthony Eden, Full Circle, p.89."In 1949, the French...invited the ex-Emperor [Bao Dai] to be head of the new Associated State of Vietnam and hoped, by recognising its independence within the French Union, to break the Communist monopoly of Vietnamese national aspirations. Grants of independence within the Union were later made to the Associated States of Cambodia and Laos. Despite this, Vietnamese distrust of the French remained Ho Chi Minh's strongest ally. French plans for independence came too late and appeared to be squeezed out of them. Even after the Pau Agreements of 1950, France retained powers so extensive that the Vietminh could label Bao Dai a French puppet. The transfer of local authorities from French to native officials was still made with obvious reluctance. In the last years of French rule, there were more French officials in Indo-China than there had been British serving in all India at any period of our rule."

¹⁰⁸ MG 26 N1 Vol: 5: Heeney. From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Canada House, London. April 23, 1952. Personal and Secret. There were very few discussions on NATO in the Cabinet from the early 1950s to the early 1960s. See: RG 2 Series: A-5-a. Cabinet Conclusions Agenda/BoxList.

Volume	Date	Subject
2652	03-26-1953	NATO – Canadian Mutual Aid Programm, 1953-54; Modification in Canadian Contribution to infra-structure
2659	12-07-1955	NATO Council of Ministers; Policy and Mutual Aid; Common infra-structure and priorities within NATO.
5775	06-14-1956	Reduction of NATO Aircrew training; Offer of F-86 Aircraft as mutial aid to Germany.
5775	06-28-1956	NATO: UK proposal for re-appraisal of defence policy.
5775	09-20-1956	NATO meetings – Suez Canal dispute, report of SSEA.
5775	11-22-1956	International Situation – discussion with General

Gruenther, retiring NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe.

5775 12-05-1956 Mutual Aid program 1957-58.
 1892 04-25-1957 NATO, Ministerial Meeting in Bonn.
 1893 12-12-1957 NATO: Meeting of Heads of Government; stockpiling of nuclear weapons in N.A.T.O. countries; Policy.
 1893 04-09-1958 NATO: Conference of Defence Ministers; stockpiling of food.
 1899 10-03-1958 Food stockpiles for European NATO countries.
 1899 12-09-1958 NATO: Mutual Aid Program, 1959-60.
 2745 06-30-1959 NATO: Agreement on Status of Canadian Forces in Germany
 2745 10-17-1959 Exchange of Defence Science Information between NATO Countries.
 2746 03-01-1960 Canadian Policy on East-West Contracts: Reply to NATO.
 2746 04-01-1960 NATO Summit Preparations: East-West Trade.
 2747 07-09-1960 NATO Strategy – Statement by Minister of National Defence.

¹⁰⁹ R. F. Holland. "The Imperial Factor in British Strategies from Attlee to Macmillan, 1945-63." The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol: XII (January, 1984), No.2, p.181.

¹¹⁰ MG 26 N1 Vol: 5. From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa, May 31, 1952. Personal and Secret.

¹¹¹ RG 25 Vol: 5917 File: 50199-40 pt.1.2. Memorandum for Brief for the Prime Minister, DEA, Ottawa, June 14, 1952. Top Secret.

¹¹² MG 26 N1 Vol:5. From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa, July 25, 1952. Personal and Confidential.

¹¹³ MG 26 N1 Vol:5 File:Heeney. From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa, July 30, 1952. Secret and Personal. See: Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vietnam. "French public opinion would allow Paris to commit only France's professional army to the battle for Indo-China. Because of this heavy commitment from her professional army, France had fallen seriously behind in her commitments to NATO," p.36.

¹¹⁴ From: Heeney To: Pearson, July 30, 1952.

¹¹⁵ MG 26 N1 Vol:13 File: Robertson, N.A. From: N. Robertson, London To: Pearson, Ottawa, August 6, 1952. Secret and Personal.

¹¹⁶ MG 26 N1 Vol: 5 Heeney. From: Pearson, Ottawa To: Heeney, Paris, August 13, 1952. Secret and Personal.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., "this is a long and disjointed letter but may help to fill in some of the spaces between the lines of official communications. Best regards." It is evident that official communication do not always tell the full story.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., "for some time now we have shared, I think, the same feeling in regard to the attitude of the USA Administration to NATO, a feeling, however, which may alter – I hope so – after the forthcoming election."

¹²⁰ MG 26 N1 Vol:5. From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa, October 30, 1952. Secret and Personal. "The Americans...have not completed Table 12, arguing that in their case the provision of the information requested in one document would be too dangerous from the security point of view." The French Delegation "at once served notice that the French would want to discuss this question...." From: L.D. Wilgress, Ottawa To: Heeney, Paris, November 5, 1952. Secret and Personal. Canada's preference "for the supply of more end item military products as mutual aid" or economic aid in the recommendations of the Annual Review Report of NATO.

¹²¹ MG 26 N1 Vol:5. From: Heeney, Paris To: Dana Wilgress, Ottawa, November 19, 1952. Secret and Personal.

¹²² From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa, December 19, 1952. Personal and Secret.

¹²³ MG 26 N1 Vol:4 File: Dulles. From: Pearson, New York To: Dulles, Washington. November 23, 1952. 'Congratulations' on appointment. "It is encouraging to all of us who believe in free-world co-operation as the foundation of peace to know that there will be at the State Department a Secretary qualified by experience, understanding and ideals...."

¹²⁴ MG 26 N1 Vol: 5. From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa, January 27, 1953. Personal and Secret.

¹²⁵ From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa, February 5, 1953. Personal and Secret.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ MG 26 N1 Vol:4 File: Dulles John-USA- Secretary of State. From: Pearson, Washington To: St. Laurent, Ottawa. Memorandum of a Conversation Between John Foster Dulles and L.B. Pearson, Washington, D.C. February 15, 1953. Top Secret. Present at the informal meeting at the home of the Canadian Ambassador: USA Government: John Dulles, H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary, and John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs. Canadian Government: L. Pearson, Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador in Washington and D.V. LePan, Canadian Embassy, Washington.

¹²⁸ Ibid., this document was the only one of any value in this file. Most of the file is taken up with correspondence between Pearson and Dulles on 'interference' from a radio mast on the island where Dulles has a country house. This matter involved direct involvement of the Canadian Secretary of State, the Minister of Transport etc. The File on Acheson was filled with similarly useless material. See for example: MG 26 N1 Vol: 1: Acheson. From: L.S. Amery, London To: Pearson, London, May 17, 1950. London, p.2, re: Pearson's speech to the Canada Club. London, England. "I think I heard you say something last night about Communist economics being obsolete. I venture to think that that is equally true of the American attempt to resuscitate [sic] nineteenth century trade economics as embodied in the Geneva and Havana Agreements. I know both your Government and ours...have pledged themselves to these Agreements. But I think in most cases it was done in order to win favour in American eyes...."

¹²⁹ From: Pearson To: St. Laurent. Memorandum, February 15, 1953. Dulles argued that "the press in all countries had a vested interest in putting about alarming stories that could only have the result of sowing distrust between the United States and its allies."

¹³⁰ Memorandum, From: Pearson To: St. Laurent, February 15, 1953.

¹³¹ MG 26 N1 Vol: 19. Memorandum, From Pearson To: Prime Minister St. Laurent. "Discussion with Mr. Churchill", December 9, 1951. Secret. By 1951 it was clear that the UK was no longer taking an independent line of the USA in its relationship with the Soviets. Churchill "would be quite willing to see Stalin again, but would not do so if the Americans objected."

¹³² MG 26 N1 Vol: 5 File: Heeney. From Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa, February 21, 1953. Personal and Secret. MG 26 N1 Vol: 4 File: Dulles. From: Pearson, Washington To: St. Laurent, Ottawa, February 15, 1953. Top Secret. On his trip to Europe, Dulles had gotten the impression that the EDC Treaty faced a 60 to 40 chance of ratification. He "had some doubts about the political tactics the French Premier was following in order to secure support for the Treaty and eventual ratification...." In London he had told Mr. Eden that the close association which the United Kingdom intended to form with the European Army and the European Defence Community "seemed to go far towards meeting France's legitimate wishes on this subject." Pearson felt that the NATO powers "could assist in obtaining of the ratification of the EDC Treaty by extending the life of the North Atlantic Treaty from twenty to fifty years. In the Treaty signed between the United Kingdom and the EDC countries on the 27th May, 1952 the United Kingdom had undertaken to grant to the European Defence Community a more automatic security guarantee than that extended in the new protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty. Already the United Kingdom was coming under some pressure from France to alter this guarantee so that it would run for the full duration of the EDC Treaty, i.e. for fifty years."

¹³³ From: Pearson To: St. Laurent, February 15, 1953.

¹³⁴ MG 26 N1 Vol: 5. From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson Ottawa. March 11, 1953. Personal and Private. Written by hand, Heeney requested to be relieved from his NATO posting. He suggested that Dana Wilgress should replace him and that Heeney should take Hume Wrong's place in Washington when Wrong is brought back to Ottawa. From: Pearson, Ottawa To: Heeney, Paris.

March 14, 1953. Personal and Confidential. Cabinet approved the diplomatic changes discussed above.

¹³⁵ From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Canadian Delegation to UN General Assembly, New York, March 26, 1953.

¹³⁶ MG 26 N1 Vol: 5. From Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, New York, April 7, 1953. Secret and Personal. See: Schurmann, The Logic. p.76. "It is generally accepted that the death of Stalin in March 1953 led to major changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policies."

¹³⁷ From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, New York, April 7, 1953.

¹³⁸ Ibid., since NATO was set up, Ottawa had stressed its potential for co-operative efforts in the non-military aspects of defence. The Secretariat's list of recommendations in this area for the Ministerial meeting, was, according to Heeney, "a modest statement of the lines upon which governments may proceed if they really want to do something in this field." MG 26 N 1 Vol: 5. From: Heeney, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa, April 29, 1952. He had sent for Pearson's attention some considerations which "underline the importance of some fresh start being made for relating military plans to politico-military capabilities." But we were not able to find any undertakings to this effect.

MG 26 L Vol: 86 File No: C-20. Commission Cross Reference Sheet. See also Dispatch No: WA-1143 File No: U-15-11, May 8, 1953. Personal and Confidential. "Communiqué issued at conclusion of Prime Minister's visit to Washington – re: emphasis given to recent developments in the USSR – Communist intentions – necessity of maintaining momentum of vigorous support for NATO – re: expansion of world trade...."

MG 31 E 6 Vol: 5 File: 45 From: Canadian Ambassador, Washington To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 1137, June 23, 1954. Secret. He reported that "he had been assured that the new funds being requested from Congress will enable the United States to fulfil all its present planned and approved commitments under NATO." However, he observed that: "Little or no provision is being made for the modernisation of the arms and equipment now being held by NATO forces in Europe that were originally provided as end-item assistance."

MG 26 N 1 Vol: 12 Reid. From: Pearson, Ottawa To: Reid, New Delhi, May 8, 1956. Pearson was appointed to the 3-man 'Royal Commission' of NATO, "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend to NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community." From: Reid, New Delhi To: Pearson, Ottawa. May 9, 1956. Personal and Confidential. "...slowly but surely, you seem to be gaining ground in your efforts to make the North Atlantic Treaty the foundation of an economic and political Commonwealth. Your must be glad that you never lost hope eight years ago when virtually everyone was lukewarm or sceptical or opposed to our efforts to get an Article 2 into the Treaty."

See also: MG 26 N 1 Vol: 5. From Pearson, Ottawa To: Dag Hammarskjöld, New York. May 19, 1956. "I am anxious to look into the possibility...of bringing the non-military aspect of NATO into closer association with the UN."

¹³⁹ MG 26 N 1 Vol: 23: 4th Meeting, February 3, 1955. Mr. Holland of New Zealand "rejoiced in the growing strength of Britain." And, "he welcomed the strengthening of Sterling, as this increased British influence throughout the world." The Deputy Prime Minister of South Africa said that South Africa 'realised' the implications of her strategic position. "In addition, her economic position was very sound."

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., "in August 1954, the French Assembly rejected E.D.C. This was a great blow both to Europe and to the United States....The United Kingdom view then was that, as E.D.C. had failed, Germany must be brought into NATO, but it was clear that the French Assembly would not agree to this unless effective safeguards were available...." The decision by the UK "to maintain a close association with Europe" and "to give an undertaking to keep four Divisions and a tactical Air Force in Europe" was decisive in convincing Mendés-France to agree to admit Germany into NATO.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., Sir Godfrey Huggins, Prime Minister of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: "The economic position of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was now much better, and these had been a marked improvement in the standard of living of the bulk of its African people.... Copper exports had now become a valuable source of dollar earnings. Tobacco production resulted in dollar savings."

¹⁴² MG 26 N 1 Vol: 23 File: Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference 1955 London, Diary. Secret. Commonwealth Meeting, 1st Meeting, January 31. "Anthony Eden pointed out that they were in an "age of nuclear destruction." According to Churchill, "the United States was, at present, the strongest Power in the World. While the Russians had superiority in conventional weapons, the United States had superiority in unconventional weapons." Wednesday, February 2. "They think that their own process, which they had worked out without any help from the United States, is probably better and cheaper than that of the Americans. Churchill was pleased about this, because of the refusal of the United States to live up to their war-time pledge of atomic co-operation obviously still rankles."

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ MG 26 N 1 Vol: 6 From: Minister of the Interior, Canberra To: Secretary of State, Ottawa, March 24, 1955. Personal and Unofficial. Chou En-Lai "gets far more than he should have done in Indo-China and starts fresh disturbances in the Formosan Straits. Peace in the Formosan Straits will merely allow him to start war in Nepal or some other place of his own choosing."

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., this has been an ongoing concern. See: MG 30 E 101 Vol: 7 File 42. From: L.D. Wilgress, Office of the High Commissioner, Canada House, London, To: Pearson, Ottawa. No date, could possibly be sometime between April 19 and May 5, 1950. Secret. Dening, Superintending Under Secretary in charge of the Far Eastern and South East Asian Departments of the Foreign Office, confirmed to Wilgress and Rae in an informal luncheon, that Japanese competition in textiles "was a subject of serious concern to the United Kingdom. He distinguished, however, between the views of the Government, which were...broadly speaking in line with those of the USA about the importance of Japanese economic and trade recovery...." Under reference: Dispatch No: 884 of April 19. MG 26 N1 Vol: 19. From: Pearson To: St. Laurent "Discussions with Mr. Eden, Ottawa, January 13, 1952." Top Secret. Eden pointed out that there were "USA charges that British trade to Japan was increasing in such a way as to be a threat to USA policy in that area." USA Congressmen believed that "the British were deliberately keeping Japan out of the Chinese market so that they could increase their own trade there."

¹⁴⁶ MG 31 E 6, From: LePan To: Pearson, Memorandum, March 1, 1951. Subj.: Pacific Security Arrangements. "Canadian participation was not very likely." From: Pearson To: Forde, High Commissioner for Australia in Ottawa. March 15, 1951. Top Secret. "We in Canada have always regarded our participation in North Atlantic defence as part of the defence of the free world, including even countries such as Australia, which are far from the North Atlantic area."

¹⁴⁷ MG 26 N 1 Vol: 6 From: Minister of the Interior, Canberra To: Secretary of State, Ottawa, March 24, 1955. "Formosa itself is the keystone of the arch of the Western Pacific defence. Give away Formosa and Okinawa becomes untenable and the Philippines are wide open to infiltration."

¹⁴⁸ RG 25, Vol: 3691, File 5475-AD-40 C pt.1. "Minutes of 9th Meeting of Departmental Committee," September 30, 1946.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., MG 26L Vol: 118 File: K-20-I. From: A.R.M. Lower To: Prime Minister St. Laurent, August 5, 1950. Subj: Korea. "Perhaps the situation may cause us to talk pretty straight to our American Friends. Our long-range objectives are the same, and clear enough to people of insight. But they don't seem obvious to many among the yellow peoples, who loath the white man, despite his alleged ideals of freedom and justice....One of the major difficulties is that democracies find it hard to shape a social programme; the Communists have one ready to hand for each situation. That means that, somehow or other, we must be ready, for transmutation into practical form, the high political and social ideals which we believe to lay behind our Western civilisation."

¹⁵⁰ MG 26 N1 Vol: 6. Dr. H. Keenleyside, Draft Canadian Delegation Text on Spain, November 15, 1946.

¹⁵¹ Lester B. Pearson telephoned to Escott Reid, N.Y. November 16, 1946; 5.30 PM. He made reference to the following:

- "In its detestation of the actions of the present ruler of unhappy Spain, the Canadian Government....
- "General Franco has defiled the history of a great and noble people...."

- "We...hope that there would be an early termination to the activities of this malevolent regime."

- Summarising Canada's attitude, "we detest and deplore...."

¹⁵² From: L.B. Pearson, Ottawa To: Hugh Keenleyside, Canadian Delegation to the UN. November 25, 1946. Secret and Personal. "I have just received your personal letter...and am extremely sorry over the disappointment that my intervention in the Franco draft speech has caused you." Under Reference: From: Keenleyside To: Pearson, November 20, 1946. Personal. Not traceable. See: From: K.A. Greene, Canberra, Australia To: Pearson, April 8, 1946.

¹⁵³ From: Pearson To: Keenleyside, November 25, 1946. Secret and Personal.

¹⁵⁴ From: Hugh Keenleyside, Canadian Ambassador to Mexico. To: Pearson, Ottawa, January 6, 1947. For a discussion of the value of speeches, see: MG 26 N1 Vol: 13 From: Robertson, Canadian High Commissioner to London To: Pearson, Ottawa, December 27, 1947. Secret and Personal; "After Truman's speech last Friday, I don't think...." From: Pearson To: Robertson, January 29, 1948. Top Secret and Personal; See also From: Robertson, Paris To: Pearson, Ottawa, September 27, 1948. Subj: The Prime Minister's Speech to the General Assembly in Paris. "The speech has wandered a certain distance from the original Departmental draft. For one aberration I am chiefly responsible. I did not feel that under the present conditions and before the Assembly audience it would be wise for the Prime Minister to adumbrate the subject of a North Atlantic Defence Pact in the explicit way the first draft suggested. Other elements in this conglomerate effort you will easily recognise." See: MG 26 N1 Vol: 12 From: Leger, Ottawa To: Reid, New Delhi Dispatch No: G-39, February 28, 1957. Restricted. Subj: Speech on Canadian Foreign Policy in India, dated February 15. "We would feel happier if you gave a little less weight to revolution and a little more to evolution. Revolution is not a customary Canadian practice. You may wish to recast your text somewhat to bring it more in line with ministerial pronouncement in this regard." And From: Pearson, Ottawa To Reid, New Delhi, March 8, 1957 "The Department thinks that 'revolution' is un-Canadian." See also: RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12530-40 pt.2. From: Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 947 September 24, 1959. Confidential. Subj.: The Community. Reference was made to the 'tone' of statements. It emphasised that "close attention should be paid to the words used...."

¹⁵⁵ Blanche Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, p.55. She claimed that because Turkey and Greece "were the first line of defence to Britain's interests in the Middle East, these countries were key to Britain's continued imperial status." However, it was a "fact by 1947 Britain could no longer afford to administer or secure its empire." p.54

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p.55.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p.54.

¹⁵⁸ From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: USSEA, Ottawa. March 3, 1947. Ritchie was emphasising the widespread misery, racketeering, and corruption. He wrote: "It seems to me that the French people are not only deeply discontented with their material conditions but that they are passing through a moral crisis. This is a gloomy picture." He added: "There is danger that if leadership is not forthcoming, the political and economic situation may deteriorate rapidly. The next two or three years will be critical...."

¹⁵⁹ Acheson and other USA officials gave the impression that the crises was the cause of the Truman Doctrine. See for example The Gazette, Montreal, March 12, 1997 for an article by Robert Shogan, Los Angeles Times: "'They were shockers,' Acheson wrote later of the British Messages...within three weeks President Truman responded to the crises. Today marks the 50th anniversary of his proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, a speech to Congress that pledged USA support for Greece, Turkey and other Nations threatened by Communism. It was a decision that fully engaged the United States in a face-off with the Soviet bloc and changed the course of history."

¹⁶⁰ From: Wrong To: Pearson, Washington July 5, 1947. Because this information was "extremely confidential," Wrong recommended that "it should be seen only by Clark, Bryce, Towers, Rasminsky and perhaps Norman and Le Pan in London."

¹⁶¹ Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power (New York: Pantheon books, 1974), p.96.

¹⁶² From: Canadian Consulate General, Drury N.Y. To: SSEA. No. 1296. October 11, 1947. Secret. "Apparently the Soviet Union...has given a free hand to satellite states who have, to date,

expressed differing views." It is generally believed that the Soviet bloc had always spoken as one solid voice.

¹⁶³ From: L.B. Pearson, Paris To: L. St. Laurent, Ottawa, November 25, 1948. Personal and Confidential. Memorandum. From: Pearson To: Prime Minister, May 24, 1950. Top Secret. Re: Pearsons talk with Mr. Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, UK. p.2. "It is interesting that in the last three private interviews I have had with the Foreign Secretary, he has begun each time with Palestine and then moved from that country to other Arab and Middle Eastern states. There is no doubt that these problems are very much on his mind."

¹⁶⁴ From: SSEA, Ottawa To: Canadian Embassy, Paris, No: 737 October 14, 1947. At this stage, Ottawa also wanted to know "how far is France's imperial policy influenced by the evolution of the British commonwealth?"

¹⁶⁵ From: Embassy Paris To: SSEA Ottawa, No: 549, October 23, 1947.

¹⁶⁶ From: Embassy Paris To: SSEA Ottawa No: 722, November 3, 1947. This was circulated in Ottawa, the Hague, Washington, Nankin and Rome. See also: From: Embassy Paris, To: SSEA, Ottawa No:735. November 7, 1947. Complained about "paucity of material appearing in the local press" on colonial topics, and therefore asked if they could subscribe to Agence France Press Publication called "Bulletin Quotidien d'Outre – Mer." It is a daily collection of Despatches from Agence France Presse representatives throughout the colonial world. The Embassy felt that it provided "much material and documentation that is not available in the daily press." From: Escott Reid, Ottawa To: Canadian Embassy Paris, No:894. November 22, 1947. Ottawa wanted "periodical surveys...on French imperial policy as a whole." And "short memoranda or Despatches summarising the situation in each of the most important French Overseas Territories, so as to throw light on the general evolution of the French Union...." See: RG 25, File 9764-40-pt and Acc: 84-85/019. From: Office of High Commissioner for Canada, London To: SSEA, Despatch No:747. April 1, 1950, p.3. The British Colonial Office gave courses to educate foreign governments on its colonial policy. This was a sign that the UK is interested in "ensuring that colonial policies are more thoroughly understood...."

¹⁶⁷ RG 25 Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40. From: Canadian Delegation, New York, To: SSEA, Ottawa. November 11, 1946. Confidential. Weekly Report- Committee IV. Mr. Novikov of the USSR "attacked the proposed incorporation...by stating that it was an annexation under the guise of a 'fictitious' declaration. He stated that the Charter requires all the territories to be brought under the Trusteeship system." The Delegation saw the Russian's role as "creating meddlesome interference." The Canadian Delegation "expressed the viewpoint to the United Kingdom and the South African Delegation that the Assembly cannot be called upon to 'rubber stamp' national actions of 'annexation'; this would be setting a very dangerous precedent for the United Nations." RG 25 Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. Weekly Report of Committee IV. Week ending November 9, 1946, Report No: 1. In the General Debate, Field Marshall Smuts made a lengthy speech on the position of South Africa with respect to the incorporation of South West Africa into the Union. Nine Speakers (led by India and including Denmark, Honduras, China, Norway, Haiti, Czechoslovakia and Guatemala) questioned the propriety of the 'annexation' of South West Africa by South Africa. Six speakers (including the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the USA, New Zealand and the Philippines) spoke principally on the Trusteeship Agreements and skirted the South West African issue. At the end of the week, the Chairman announced that twelve more speakers were inscribed on his list.

¹⁶⁸ On the possibility of a vote, Prime Minister King and his Secretary of State St. Laurent decided that Canada should abstain from voting and give credit to the Union of South Africa for having brought the issue before the Assembly. Under Secretary Pearson conveyed the instructions by telephone. RG 25 Vol: 7573 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.3.2. From: Assembly Delegation New York To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 211. November 1, 1955. Important and Confidential. Under Ref: Delegation Telegram No: 193 of October 26, not traceable. "Only since 1950 had there really been serious allegations of incorporation and these were mostly from the Soviet bloc."

¹⁶⁹ The Delegation felt that Robertson's speech "had a good moderating effect upon the South Americans, at least, who would have been prone to vote immediately on the issue and probably against South Africa." See chapter V for Ottawa's perception of the important functional role of the South Americans for process on decolonisation and how it affected Canada's own role on this

issue. In the course of the week, the members of the Canadian Delegation assigned to this Committee (Senator Robertson, Mr. McIlraith and Mr. Cote) have not been inactive in attempting to have the South Africans modify their position in such a way that they could be supported.

¹⁷⁰ Apparently Canadian officials were touchy about accusations of 'fence-sitting'. See: MG 26 N1 Vol:5 File: Greene. From: K. Greene, Canberra To: Pearson, Ottawa. August 16, 1948. Confidential: Mr. Pearson Only. Subject: Australian reaction to the present United States attitude to Japan in a talk with John Burton: "He went on to say that Australia was learning to be a 'fence sitter' like some of the other Dominions. I replied that if he felt that way about some of the Dominions it must be pleasant for him to deal with one like Canada that always let other countries know where she stood. I thought there was a certain note of sarcasm in his voice as he said 'oh yes'." See: From: K. Greene, Canberra To: Pearson, Ottawa, April 7, 1948. For Australia's view on USA policy in Japan.

From: K. Greene, Canberra To: Pearson, Ottawa. March 14, 1949. Confidential: Mr. Pearson Only. "Dr. Evatt suffers under the delusion, I think, (of course he is not as vehement as Burton in expressing it) that Canada likes sitting on the fence. Always I have tried to have to suggest to them both that we are just as devoted to the ideals of the United Nations as Australia but our goal is to make the organisation work and that it is an old adage that frequently the least said the soonest mended...."

¹⁷¹ A.D.P. Heeney, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, Ottawa, August 30, 1948. Secret: A report of this meeting.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ MG 26 N1 Vol: 23. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, London, January 4, 1951. St. Laurent felt the need to establish some operating limits for future Meetings in view of the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir. He agreed with Menzies of Australia that members might help towards finding a solution. St. Laurent observed that: "It was important, however, to avoid conveying the impression that the Meeting, as a Commonwealth Group, had authority to deal with matters domestic to one or more individual members. The Meeting could not exercise any supra-national functions in this matter."

¹⁷⁴ RG 25, Vol:2659, File: 5475-AT-40, pt.1. From: N.A. Robertson, London To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 1684, September 3, 1948. Subject: Memorandum, issued by the Colonial Office, "Information on Non-Self-Governing-Territories," August 29, 1948. Copies of this Despatch were sent to the Canadian High Commissioner in Dublin, Pretoria, New Delhi, Canberra and Wellington. To Ambassadors in Paris, Brussels, the Hague and Washington.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., RG 25 Acc. No: 85-86/551 Vol: 23 File: 1-1956-3. Canadian Papers Prepared for Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, June-July 1956. Canadian Eyes Only: Top Secret. Subject: Admission to Commonwealth membership: Gold Coast (Ghana). "The United Kingdom Government is publicly committed to supporting its claim to membership, and is plainly intent on securing agreement to admitting the Gold Coast simultaneously with the achievement of independence."

"Prime Minister Strijdom and the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Eric Louw, have both made public professions of their Government's desire to have friendly relations with non-European governments in Africa."

"The views of Australia, New Zealand and Asian members are not expected to conflict with those of the United Kingdom."

"It thus appears that Canada should not oppose entry of the Gold Coast to full Commonwealth membership. Failure to admit the new state might be interpreted as the erection of a 'colour bar.' This would disrupt the Commonwealth and impair its moral stature, and would reduce its effectiveness as a bridge between East and West."

"Canada perhaps has a special opportunity and obligation in this respect since it is less clearly associated than some other Commonwealth countries with racial attitudes which appear reprehensible in African eyes."

¹⁷⁶ Escott Reid, Memorandum for Mr. Mackay, February 3, 1949. This support would be "in the debates and votes on South West Africa and the treatment of Indians in South Africa."

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Escott Reid, Memorandum For Mr. Mackay, Confidential. February 3, 1949. See: J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.227. Escott Reid "brought a powerful and moralistic mind to bear on the problems of shaping Canadian policy in the postwar era." His moralism was questioned by an Outsider. See James Eayrs, Diplomacy and its Discontents (Toronto, 1971) p.71. cited, Ibid., p.251. Arnold Heeney complained to N.A. Robertson of Reid's "natural impulses and his natural disposition to carry the torch high in every direction simultaneously."

N.A. Robertson Papers, Vol: 2. Correspondence of February 16, 1949. Cited and quoted in Granatstein, p.252. And Pearson wrote in 1947 that Reid was "emotionally unstable." Ibid., p.252. Granatstein concludes, "unfortunately not everyone trusted his ability to separate the wheat from the chaff, and Reid's influence, while strong, was never as great as he might have wished." Ibid., He made it to the position of Deputy USSEA. See also Escott Reid, On Duty: a Canadian at the Making of the United Nations, 1945-1946 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983) for his vision of the post-war world.

¹⁷⁹ From: E. Reid To: J.Homes, March 24, 1949. Secret.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² RG 25, Vol: 3458, File: 6-1-1949/1, T/2.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., [Emphasis in the original]

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ From: High Commissioner for Canada. London To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch No:942, March 6, 1951. Confidential. Copies sent to Canadian High Commissioners to Cape Town, Karachi, New Delhi. Circulated to UN Division, Commonwealth Division in Ottawa, Mr. Pick, Mr. Rau and Miss McKenzie.

¹⁸⁸ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.1. From: SSEA, Ottawa To: Canadian High Commissioner, Canada House, London, October 12, 1951. Secret. Subject: "USA-UK talks on Colonial and Trusteeship Questions in the UN." Under Reference Ottawa's Telegram No: 2525 of October 10, 1951, not traceable. From: Office of High Commissioner for Canada. London To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch No: 4531, November 2, 1951. Secret. Under Reference: High Commissioner Telegram No: 2589 of October 18, 1951. Not traceable.

- "Attached hereto in duplicate is a summary of the discussions outlined by Mr. John Martin of the Colonial Office to representatives of this office and the South African, Australian and New Zealand Offices on October 17."

- A 4 page document "Anglo-American Discussions of the handling of colonial and trusteeship Questions in the United Nations (Held in London 10th - 12th October 1951.)"

Page 2 No:3 "Ways of Improving the Atmosphere of the Fourth Committee." is blank under Exemption 15(1) Access to Information Act. This whole section is blanked out to the top of page 3.

¹⁸⁹ MG 31 E 6 Vol: 3 File: 24. F.C. Hooton, Canada's Economic and Financial Foreign Policy, June 16, 1951.

¹⁹⁰ Holland, "Anglo-Canadian Disengage....," p.166.

¹⁹¹ RG 25, Vol: 3458, File 6-1947/1. There is extensive secondary material available on the decolonisation process in Indonesia.

¹⁹² Ibid., otherwise it would look like "a Christian, European colonial power is attempting to maintain at least partial control over a large Asiatic Moslem population."

¹⁹³ The Western Powers believed that the 1928 and 1936 revolutions in Indonesia "were materially encouraged and supported by Soviet agitation."

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., The Economist, July 26, 1947. "Before the war, the Netherlands controlled the economic life of the islands, all exports and imports, price levels and shipping between the islands. The KPM shipping line had a monopoly of the inter-island trade, and controlled the bulk of the industries." This information was included in the Instructions for the Delegation.

¹⁹⁵ This support was "partly due to pressure from the left wing and trade union supporters of the labour government."

¹⁹⁶ RG 25. Vol: 3458, File: 6-1-1949-1, pp.4-5.

¹⁹⁷ MG 31 E 6 Vol:3 File: 24. International Materials Conference, June 16, 1951.

¹⁹⁸ MG 31 E 6 Vol: 3 File 24. Canadian Economic and Financial Foreign Policy, Hooton, June 16, 1951.

¹⁹⁹ Bernard Wood, "Canadian Policies on North-South Relations," From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau, ed. P. Painchaud, (Quebec: Les Presses de L'Université Laval, 1989), p. 129.,

²⁰⁰ Duncan Cameron, "Canada in the World Economic Order," From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau, ed. P. Painchaud (Quebec: Les Presses de L'Université Laval, 1989), p. 146.

²⁰¹ MG 31 E 6 Vol: 3 File: 24, Canadian Economic and Financial Foreign Policy.

²⁰² Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pp.93-95.

²⁰³ J. Darwin, "British Decolonisation since 1945: A Pattern or a Puzzle?" The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol: XII, January 1984. No: 2. p. 197. Dominions excluding Canada, the colonies and certain Associated States were in the Sterling area.

²⁰⁴ Rudolph von Albertini, Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919-1960. (New York: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1971), p.182. See also: Michael Crowder, West Africa under Colonial Rule (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968),p.9. He saw, after the war a "significant growth in industry...in Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana and the Ivory Coast," which "has increased a hundred-fold since 1955."

²⁰⁵ MG 26 N 1. From: Pearson, Ottawa To: N.A. Robertson, London, January 29, 1948. Top Secret and Personal. Referred to a Message form Alec Clutterbuck which was not traceable.

²⁰⁶ Memorandum, From: Heeney, USSEA To: Pearson, Secretary of State, Ottawa, June 9, 1949. Top Secret. "Enquiry from the UK. re. Waiver of article 5 of the Anglo-Canadian Loan Agreement Concerning Trade Discrimination." A 3-page document. Copies sent to the Prime Minister, C.D. Howe and Abbott. (Finance). N. Robertson, Dr. Clark, Towers, Macenzie and Heeney prepared the Memorandum.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., see: Peyton Lyon, "The Evolution of Canadian Diplomacy since 1945," in Painchaud. p. 13. "Canadians were willing and able to assist in the reconstruction of battle-scarred Europe."

²⁰⁸ The Secretary of State was officially notified on June 11. See: From: Heeney To: Pearson, Ottawa, June 11, 1949.

²⁰⁹ Memorandum, June 9, 1949.

²¹⁰ From: Heeney To: Pearson, June 11. 1949.

²¹¹ B.S. Keirstead, Canada in World Affairs, September 1951 to October 1953 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1956), p.225. He was a Professor of Economics, University of Toronto.

²¹² MG 26 N 1 From: Heeney To: Pearson, June 11, 1949.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ MG 26 N 1 From: A.F.W. Plumptre To: H.H. Wrong Ottawa, November 8, 1949.

²¹⁵ Ibid., Plumptre and Towers were both members of the Canadian Delegation at Bretton Woods, in July 1944 were the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid., I was unable to find any further information as to the position that Canada had finally taken in an official, secret capacity.

²¹⁸ From: Plumptre To: Wrong, November 8, 1949.

²¹⁹ MG 31 E 6 Vol: 3 File 24. Department Policy Paper. In explaining Canada's economic policy, the Department wrote: "in the economic field there is a whole nexus of international relationships, formal and informal with which the government has relatively little to do: the whole field of international trade and finance. Hence, economic foreign policy can and does move on, even if the government does nothing: indeed, the negative act of doing nothing is in a sense, an important policy." LePan Papers. Memorandum for USSEA, J.R. Murray, Economic Division, November 15, 1950.Indeed, by late 1950, the UK economy was already showing signs of recovery. Substantial evidence of this was the \$65 million undrawn balance of the British loan.

²²⁰ Escott Reid Papers, Vol: 5, File:10 "The United States and Canada." Memorandum, April 16, 1943.

²²¹ From Pearson To: Robertson, January 29, 1948. The UN convened at Lake Success.

²²² Pearson Papers, Vol: 12 File: Reid, Escott. From: Delhi To: Department of External Affairs No: 723, November 9, 1956. Top Secret. For example, in November, 1956, Reid wrote from Delhi

that the 'gulf' that had emerged between India and the UK, and the perceived threat from Russia, "are driving India and especially Nehru into more and more reliance on Eisenhower."

²²³ Pearson Papers, Vol: 17, File: Wrong, Hume. From: H. Wrong To: Pearson, Washington, February 24, 1950. Personal and Confidential.

²²⁴ Darwin, p.197. "This system had three merits: - it preserved sterling as a world currency, allowed British Sterling debts to be discounted by exports and it secured markets and supplies for Britain which might otherwise have been lost...."

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 199. "Ghana, on independence, remained firmly in the Sterling Area, and it was difficult to see what British interests were damaged by her constitutional progress....As in Ghana, it was hard to see what damage independent Nigeria, bound to the Sterling Area, reliant upon British markets, British Capital and British expertise, could possibly inflict on British interests, and easy to see the benefits...." Malaya was seen as the "most important source of dollars in the colonial empire." At independence in 1957, the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement allowed Malaya "to call on British assistance against internal subversion and external attack....In exchange, Malaya consented to remain in the Sterling Area and to keep its commodity earnings in London's dollar pool." In other words, "independence signalled a new phase of co-operation, not the end of empire." Darwin pointed out that: "This imperial economic solidarity was accompanied by a marked new emphasis upon colonial economic development to earn more dollars for London's dollar pool and to supply Britain with urgently needed commodities that could be paid for in Sterling."

²²⁶ R.F. Holland, "The Imperial Factor in British Strategies from Attlee to Macmillan, 1945-63," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol:XII, (January, 1984), No: 2, p. 181. RG 25 Vol:3442 File: 1-1952/9. Commonwealth Economic Conference: Background Papers, prepared by the Bank of Canada. September 15, 1952. Secret. "...the United Kingdom and five other independent members of the Sterling area incurred deficits totalling roughly £2,700 millions over the period. The remaining members (chiefly the colonies) earned surpluses totalling about £700 million, which, in effect, they put at the disposal of the deficit members in return for Sterling balances....The mechanism which distributed among the deficit countries of the Sterling area the additional sources represented by dollar aid and the colonial surpluses was the overflow of capital from the United Kingdom....The gross inflow of capital to the UK came mainly from the colonies, in the form of rising Sterling balances."

²²⁷ RG 25,84-85/019, File No: 9764-40 pt.1. From: Commonwealth Division To: High Commission, London, April 17, 1950. This "draft" had several corrections and additions and was submitted formally as Despatch No: 1649 on June 12 1950. But it is important to utilise here as a source of information in order to understand how policy was formulated between April 17 and November 1950.

²²⁸ Draft Despatch April 17, 1950 [Emphasis added] Their source of information from the British West Indies were reports from both Canadian Trade Commissioners in the Caribbean and from the UK.

²²⁹ RG 25, Acc: 84-85/019, File No: 9764-40 pt.1. UN Division, Memorandum for Commonwealth Division, April 26, 1950. "Reporting on United Kingdom Colonial Policy."

²³⁰ RG 25 Acc: 86-87/360 Vol: 85 File: 9764-40 pt.3. Memorandum: "Consultations with U.K. Colonial Office Officials." From: G. de T.Glazebrooke, Commonwealth Division To: Department of External Affairs Divisions To File. September 22, 1959. Confidential. "Mr. Eastwood, one of the deputy under-secretaries in the Colonial Office...began his remarks yesterday by expressing pleasure that we had become interested in Africa and asking if he should assume that we knew nothing about it. After this engaging opening, he told us nothing that when we attempted to have something resembling a discussion, got in reply nothing but the published party line. At a second meeting today, we gathered with representatives of Finance and Trade and Commerce and discussed technical assistance programmes....In future I shall make every effort to avoid a further visit of this kind, not because the people are in any way uncongenial but because they waste our time. They obviously are quite unwilling to give us any confidential information, or to engage in any serious discussions. In other words, they want to give us unclassified briefs rather than to have discussions. Australia had also complained to Canada, in confidence, of a similar situation. See MG 26 N1 Vol: 5 File: Green. From: Greene, Office of High Commission for Canada,

Canberra To: Pearson, USSEA, Ottawa, April 7, 1948. Burton "left no doubt in my mind that he feels that in London Australia is not as close to the Foreign Office as it should be and intimated that his Department was not being advised as completely as it should be."

²³¹ MG 31 E 6, Vol:3 File: 24. From: L.D. Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada, London To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 3019, November 24, 1950.

²³² Ibid., DEA Minute, December 6, 1950 on "U.K. Trade and Payments Position," discussing Despatch No: 30/9.

²³³ From: SSEA, Ottawa. To: Canadian Representative to OEEC, c/o Canadian Embassy, Paris. December 22, 1950. Despatch No: E 214. Confidential.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid., Stanley Hoffmann, 'Foreword'. Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945 (N.Y.: continuum, 1980), p.vii. "For the West Europeans, whether they see in the American alliance a protection or a factor of domination, it has been a determinant of their own foreign policies." MG 31 E 6 Vol: 3 File: 27. From: Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D.C. To: SSEA, Ottawa, April 30, 1952. Confidential. (Under reference Despatch No: 969 of April 23, not traceable. Also not found a "separate Despatch" containing information "which was of wider application than the subject immediately under discussion.") Subject: Psychological strategy. Meeting with USA officials – Public Affairs, Western European Affairs and Voice of America. Canadian officials – Hume Wrong, LePan and Malone. Concerned with "the strength of anti-American feeling in Italy and the fears of American domination." Gene Caprio of the Office of Western European Affairs "wondered whether it might be possible for the C.B.C. – International Service, occasionally and unobtrusively, to draw attention to the fact in its Italian broadcasts that Canada had been able to maintain its independence in spite of its proximity to the United States. Reminders of this fact could be of very considerable assistance in Italy, he thought, in combating the charge that the United States wished to bring other nations into subservience. The same was true of a number of other countries in Western Europe." The Ambassador observed to Ottawa: "I cannot see that we would have anything to lose in giving some slight aid and comfort to the Americans in this way. You will observe that what we are being asked to do is not to bring our policy into closer alignment with that of the United States but, rather to stress our independence from the United States....It would seem to me proper for the International service occasionally to add, when circumstances make it seem natural, that Canadians do not believe that the exercise of their independence has been thwarted or obstructed by the United States....And from the point of view of the North Atlantic alliance as a whole, I think that it might serve a useful purpose by damping down unreasonable and unreasoning fears in Western Europe of United States intentions."

MG 26 N1 Vol: 12. From: Escott Reid, New Delhi To: Pearson, Ottawa. March 8, 1954. Prime Minister St. Laurent visit to India. "I was a bit apprehensive for a while that we had laid on a bit too thick the friendly references to the United States in the Prime Minister's speech to Parliament [India]."

²³⁶ Despatch No: E 214.

²³⁷ Lester B. Pearson, "Relations with the United States," Four Faces of Peace (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1964), p.215. A speech to the Empire and Canadian Clubs of Toronto, on April 10, 1951. The sub-title of this topic is "Independence is not Enough."

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Pearson, "Relations with the United States," p. 215. Emphasis added.

²⁴⁰ These are some of the concerns in regard to the direction which the UN was taking in the colonial world. RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.5. From: Canadian Delegation to European Office of the UN, Geneva To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 46. April 18, 1950. Examination of Petition: "the Council dealt with about 150 Petitions during the course of this Session. The Administering Authorities want a 'revision of procedure...in order to reduce the number of Petitions' to the Council. Non-administering members 'are reluctant to agree to any procedure which would effectively reduce the number of petitions handled by the Council.'" RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.1. From: SSEA, Ottawa To: Permanent Representative to UN, Despatch No: V-102. January 13, 1951. Confidential. "Of particular interest: those aspects of the Council's work which bear particularly on the constitutional relationship between the Assembly and the Council."

Judging from contents of Report of Assembly Delegation Despatch No: 152 of November 21, 1950, the items most eligible for examination from the constitutional standpoint are the following on all of which the Delegation abstained with a view to the general objective of permitting the Trusteeship Council more flexibility in its procedures:

- a) the form of the future Annual Reports by the Trusteeship Council
- b) the organisation and methods of functioning of Visiting Missions
- c) examination of Petitions.

We should be grateful, however, if you could do whatever is possible to let us have your impressions of the debates on the items listed above and on any other subjects which you consider to be of special interest." Signed: Holmes.

From: F.X. Houde, UN Division To: Holmes, Memorandum February 19, 1951, notified Heads of Divisions of membership of Ad Hoc Committee on Petitions: UK, France, Belgium, the Dom Rep., China and the USSR to deal with conditions in the various Trust Territories.

RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.2. C. W. Hooper, UN Division, The Tenth Session of the Trusteeship Council. March 26, 1952. "One of the most important decisions of the Council was to set up a Standing Committee on Petitions, composed of three administering and three non-administering members of the Council, to meet between Sessions of the Council to screen all communications from individuals or bodies in the Trust Territories to decide which, if any, should be treated as Petitions. The Committee will also conduct a preliminary examination of the Petitions in consultation with the Representative with the Administering Authority concerned. On March 21 the Committee began to examine the 302 Petitions placed before this Session of the Council."

²⁴¹ RG 25, 84-85/19, File: No: 9764-40 pt.1. From: Commonwealth Division To: High Commissioner, London, April 17, 1950. This 'draft' had several corrections and additions and was submitted formally as Despatch No: 1649 on June 12, 1950. But it is important to utilise here as a source of information in order to understand how policy was formulated between April 17 and November 1950.

²⁴² Ibid., at the end of April, Bow of the UN Division sent a Memorandum to the Commonwealth Division with some ideas which this Division "may wish to incorporate" in the draft Despatch of April 17.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., [Emphasis in the original]. This underlining was done by hand on the original copy with 2 parallel lines on the left hand column, and the comment "initiative"? next to the word 'offensive' in the text.

²⁴⁵ The USA had voluntarily submitted political information on its Non-Self-Governing-Territories and therefore set a precedent for such. In 1960 - Spain voluntarily decided to transmit political information. In 1961 - UK decided to do the same.

²⁴⁶ Despatch No:747, April 1, 1950.

²⁴⁷ Memorandum, signed by J.H. Cleveland for D.V. LePan. April 26, 1950, p.2. paragraph 3.[Emphasis in the original]. Words underlined by hand in the original and a parallel line on the left hand side column with the remarks in hand "implies U.K. NOT objective." Thus, Bow agrees to change. The final product of this combined effort at policy-making was Despatch No: 1649, submitted by G.Rau, Commonwealth Division. The words were retained exactly as they were in the UN Division Memorandum of April 26. However the following was added: "This has been evidenced by the warm commendation in the Trusteeship Council, on the part of the Non-administering members even including the Philippines, of the New Zealand administration of Western Samoa. Although this refers to Trust Territories and not to Colonial areas there might be reason to expect a similar attitude towards the latter."

²⁴⁸ Ibid., again, emphasis is underlined by hand in the original and on the left hand column two parallel lines are drawn. Also written in hand: "This is precisely UK policy as defined by present Government. Therefore they are emphasising Research and Development Programmes." See also: From: Holmes To: Reid, N.Y. May 16, 1950. The permanent Delegation "shall have to give a priority" to the activities of the Interim Committee, the Technical Assistance Conference, and preparations for the Economic and Social Council over the meetings of the Trusteeship Council. - Canada was, in fact, giving emphasis to these areas of development. It was an important context

of concern regarding its role in the UN and wanted officials to keep an eye on the costs Canada can be faced with as a member. Canada made it a priority to stand for membership in the Economic and Social Council.

²⁴⁹ Department of External Affairs; File on UK Colonial Policy: Extract from Circular Document No: C.58, September 25, 1950, p.11. The Canadian copy started with p.11, paragraph 46- on "colonial affairs" and ends with p.15. The bottom half of p.15 was cut off in the original document. No signature. p.12. "(at Question Time in the House of Commons, Mr. Shinwell gave these figures: dollar imports to the Colonies for the last 12 months, \$175 million with \$260 million in 1948-49, and dollar earnings \$375 million compared with \$462 million). The United Kingdom must give them every help in their production, which meant maintaining a high rate of export to them. There fortunately had been a steady increase in the supply of consumer and capital goods from sterling and soft currency countries." It is apparent that this closely interwoven relationship was a continuous cause for concern as decolonisation progresses. Not only for the UK but for the other Colonial Powers. See: RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6738-B-40 pt.1. From : Accra To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No:298, December 25, 1959. Restricted, Canadian Eyes only. "Guinea is experiencing currency difficulties and Jaimeson speculated whether Guinea might leave the AOF Franc Area and join either the sterling or dollar areas. Jaimeson is I think a little concerned that if Guinea were to join the dollar area, Ghana might follow suit and thus remove from the sterling area one of the largest earners of dollars. This seems to be an Australian nightmare." Jaimeson-Australian High Commissioner (London) had visited Conakry and Dakar. See also: RG 25, Acc: 84-85/019, File: 9764-40 pt.1.

²⁵⁰ Extract from Circular Document No: C.58, September 25, 1950, p.12.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² From: Mr. Horne To: J. Weld, Commonwealth Division, Ottawa August 3, 1950.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., the UK complained that State Department officials were "cordial and communicative but without any very effective connection with a policy-making authority."

²⁵⁵ L. Pearson, Memoirs, Vol:2 (1948-1957) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp.158-162. -June 1950 - North Korean forces invaded South Korea. In September - "the real Korean Crisis...came"; October 6 - "UN support for USA pursuit of North Koreans into China"; Mid-October "Chinese troops moved into Korea to protect electric plants on the Yalu which provided power for Manchuria"; November 5 - "MacArthur announced that the Chinese [communists] appeared on the battlefield."

²⁵⁶ John Holmes, Memorandum For Reid, Ottawa, November 7, 1950. This is the subject matter of Part 2 Chapter IV: "Non-Self-Governing-Territories" of this thesis.

²⁵⁷ MG 26 N 1 Vol:23 File: Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, London. January 4, 1951. In a "General Review of the International Situation," British Prime Minister Attlee blamed the Communists for creating "a very grave world situation," and whose "definite policy and objective was to undermine the free democracies...." He agreed that "the Colombo Plan was only one example...of the efforts which were being made by the free countries to raise standards of living throughout the world." Canadian Prime Minister St. Laurent "said that there were two particularly threatening features in the international situation. One was Communist expansion and the other was the risk that legitimate aspirations in Asia might be exploited in a way which favoured Communist expansion." RG 25 Vol: 3441 File: 1-1951/3-3A. Canadian Policy with Respect to the Commonwealth. July 26, 1951. Secret. "We should maintain contributions to the [Colombo] Plan at a high level as long as our assistance helps the standard of living in the East and serves to further the Western cause against Communism. Contribution should be directed to those projects which will bring to the West the maximum of sympathy."

RG 2 Series: A-5-a. Cabinet Conclusions Agenda utilised here as an indication of the importance and use of the Colombo Plan from early 1950s to the early 1960s for attaining Canada's policy objectives: -

<u>Vol</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
2651	12-10-52	1952-53 Program for India.
2652	03-26-53	Projects for India and Pakistan.
2659	12-07-55	India Atomic Reactor Project.

- 2658 04-29-55 Possible Provision of a NRX Reactor to India under Colombo Plan.
- 5775 11-28-56 Canadian Contribution 1957-58.
- 1893 10-04-57 9th Consultative Cttee Mtg, Saigon, Ministerial Rep.
- 10-12-57 Canadian Contribution for 1958-59.
- 1898 07-01-58 Wheat for India and Pakistan (Sale of...)
- 1899 10-01-58 Wheat donation to India.
- 12-16-58 Pakistan: Further allocation of \$2 million for wheat.
- 2744 01-10-59 Capital Aid to India 1958-59.
- 01-27-59 Capital Aid to India 1958-59.
- 01-30-59 Capital Aid to India 1958-59.
- 2744 06-04-59 Pattern of Colonial aid in 1959-60.
- 2745 07-22-59 Indus Waters Project.
- 2746 04-20-60 Capital Aid Program for Pakistan, 1959-60.
- 2747 07-21-60 Pattern of Aid 1960-61.
- 10-09-60 Capital Assistance for India, 1960-61.
- 6176 01-05-61 Projects in Pakistan; Projects in India.
- 6177 07-15-61 Pattern of Aid, 1961-62.
- 6192 01-26-62 Capital Assistance for India, 1961-62.
- RG 25 Vol: 3445 File: 1-1958/5A. From: S.D. Pierce To: Minister, "Brief for the Canadian Delegation to the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, September 15-26, 1958." Secret. "The value of the Colombo Plan in promoting economic development was recognised by all."
- ²⁵⁸ LePan Papers: From: J.R. Murray Memorandum For the USSEA, November 15, 1950.
- ²⁵⁹ Ibid., this attitude had to change because of the crisis situations in Asia and the Middle-East, as will be shown in the Cabinet Conclusions Agenda, cited in the relevant footnotes in the rest of this chapter.
- ²⁶⁰ Ibid., p.2. paragraph 6. He explained that the 'disability' was "not physical" because Canada's national income has risen at a faster rate than either the UK or the USA since 1946." For 1950, a budgetary surplus of \$300 Million was expected; \$20 Million surplus was budgeted.
- ²⁶¹ Ibid., emphasis in the original text.
- ²⁶² Ibid., reference was made to Mr. Johnson, Despatch No: 389, October 26, 1950 from Karachi where Mr. Gulam Mohammed commented that the Western democracies were "not willing to share with less fortunate countries on any substantial scale." See: MG 31 E 6, Vol: 3 File: 24. Memorandum From: A.F.W. Plumptre To: Mr. Ford and Mr. Mackay, December 14, 1950. Confidential. For "Canadian contribution to External Relief, Development and Mutual Aid."
- ²⁶³ MG 31 E6 Vol: 3 File: 24. Memorandum From: LePan To: Pearson, February 21, 1951. Also gives "a breakdown of the forecast for United States military and economic assistance during the fiscal year 1951-52."
- ²⁶⁴ A. Porter and A. Stockwell, British Imperial Policy and Decolonisation, 1938-64, Vol.2: 1951-64. (London: Macmillan Press, 1989), p. 134. Document 6: South-East Asia: Extract from the Minutes of the Cabinet For East (Official) Committee, January 8, 1952. CAB 134/897. "The danger of Communism lay, not in its appeal to the peoples of the area, nor primarily perhaps, in the possibilities of armed aggression, but in the number of issues – racial, religious and political – which were ripe for exploitation by trouble makers and seekers after power."
- ²⁶⁵ RG 25, Acc. 86-87/160 Vol: 77 File: 5475-FA-40 pt.2. Survey of Canadian Policy Towards Particular Aspects of ECOSOC, August 2, 1951.
- ²⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁶⁷ Ibid., "whenever this issue has come up in United Nations bodies our objective has been to secure agreement on harmless resolutions which refer or defer the issue without committing our government to positive action. So far these tactics have been successful and, as a result of various studies and surveys by ad hoc groups of experts and by the Economic, Employment and Development Commission and its sub-commissions, a mass of documentary material has been accumulated. It looks as though the industrialised countries may have exhausted all the means for side-stepping the main issue and that the claim of the under-developed countries cannot much longer be satisfied by pious resolutions and requests for further studies."

²⁶⁸ Circular Doc. No: A 61/51. MG 26 N 1. Vol: 23: Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, January 4, 1951; MG 26 N 1 Vol: 23, January 5, 1951. Secret. MG 26 N 1 Vol: 5. From: Greene, Canadian Consul General, New York. To: Pearson, Secretary of State, Ottawa, November 14, 1951. Subject: Lord Halifax's speech at the Pilgrim's Dinner "...he didn't fail to point out what Britain had been doing in Malaya and the East to battle Communism. With the very great interest here in Korea, I think there is a tendency to forget that Malaya and Indo China exist."

²⁶⁹ MG 31 E 46 Vol: 7. File: 16#201.1. From: A.J. Pink for SSEA, Ottawa To: The Heads of Canadian Posts Abroad, Circular Document No: A. 61/51, August 23, 1951. Secret. Commonwealth Prime Minister Meeting, January 4, 1951. RG 2 Series A-5-a Cabinet Conclusions Agenda: From early 1950s to early 1960s. Canada's concern with these topics give some indication of the realities of the time:

Vol	Date	Subject
2651	07-08-1952	Korean Political Crisis.
2651	07-31-1952	Mutual aid for France; Div. of certain Items to Indo-China.
2651	08-21-1952	Mutual aid: To Indo-China.
2654	01-11-1954	Korea – Reduction in commonwealth Forces.
2654	04-14-1954	South East Asia; U.S. Proposal for Security Arrangements.
2654	04-26-1954	Indo-China.
2655	08-11-1954	Indo-China Supervisory Commissions.
2655	08-18-1954	Korea – withdrawal of Canadian troops.
2656	09-08-1954	Korea – withdrawal of Canadian troops.
2657	03-08-1955	Korea – withdrawal of Canadian troops.
2658	07-28-1955	Korea – withdrawal of Canadian troops.
5775	10-25-1956	Colombo Plan – Canadian assistance to Malaya.
5775	04-12-1956	Export of Radar Equipment to Pakistan.
1892	04-25-1957	Korea – withdrawal of Commonwealth Forces.
2745	08-06-1959	Situation in Laos.
2745	08-10-1959	Situation in Laos.
2746	03-29-1960	Capital Assistance to Malaya.[Independence 1957]
6177	08-09-1961	Financing of Laos Commission.

²⁷⁰ Circular Document No: A. 61/51, August 23, 1951

²⁷¹ Ibid., Mr. Menzies (Prime Minister Australia) "...the Commonwealth must decide where it stood in relation to Asia generally. This involved not only questions of broad policy, but acute practical problems of national defence." Mr. Attlee: "The Middle East was of interest to all the Commonwealth countries."

²⁷² Ibid., this perception of USA attitude and behaviour was shared by others: Sir Godfrey Huggins, Southern Rhodesia: "...favoured the closest possible co-operation with the United States despite their tendency by precipitate action to involve the Commonwealth in undertakings which, given time for consideration, they might have preferred to avoid. He had never known, for instance, why the police action in Korea was turned into a war by the decision to cross the 38th Parallel, thus giving China an excuse to intervene." Dr. Dönges, Minister of the Interior, South Africa: "Nothing would suit the Communist Powers better than an estrangement between the Commonwealth and the United States."

²⁷³ MG 31 E46 Vol: 7 File: 16#201.1 Memorandum. From: Escott Reid To: R.M. Macdonnell. January 1, 1952. Secret. "Re-examination of Canadian Foreign Policy," prepared by R.L. Rogers, November 21, 1951. Secret. "Under the Canadian constitution, the powers of sovereignty are so divided that except in time of war, real or apprehended, or other unusual emergency threatening the existence of the State, the Canadian government is unable to operate internationally in some spheres. This is because power to deal with certain matters is reserved to the provinces, but the power to act on the international plane resides in the Federal Government. Canada's disability for several reasons in these fields has by now come to be accepted."

²⁷⁴ Ibid., this is not to say that Canada was not working to penetrate some of these barriers through Commonwealth contacts. See: MG 26 L, Vol: 85, File#C-10-19, 1953. Commonwealth. Economic Conference – London, England, 1952 – Vol:10. Secret and Personal. From: Sir Archibald Nye, Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Ottawa To: St. Laurent.

February 11, 1953. Top Secret and Personal. For details; see: RG 2 Series: A-5-a Cabinet Conclusions Agenda Vol: 2655, 06-03-1954 "USA Foreign Economic Policy"; Vol: 1893, 07-09 and 07-16, 1957. "Commonwealth Meeting on Trade – Preparation." And 10-03-1957, "Commonwealth Finance Meeting at Mount Tremblant: Report by Finance Minister"; "Canadian – UK Trade Discussions"; some contacts were made to the USSR. Vol: 2746 01-22, 03-08 and 04-08-1960 "Canada – USSR Trade Agreement"; Vol: 6176 02-17-1961 "USA – Canada Joint Economic Committee"; Vol: 6177 09-26-1961 "Commonwealth Economic Conference"; Vol: 6193 08-31-1962 "Canada's Attitude to Britain's Entry into the EEC – View of Ministers" and 09-03-1962 "Commonwealth Common Market Policy – Preparations and Current Questions."

²⁷⁵ However, by 1958, the USA became a crucial connection for the Commonwealth. See: RG 25 Vol: 3445 File: 1-1958/2. From: S.D. Pierce To: Minister, "Brief for the Canadian Delegation to the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, September 15-26, 1958." Transmitted as Memorandum to Cabinet. Secret. "The prosperity and overseas earnings of all Commonwealth countries depend heavily upon the prosperity and purchasing power of the United States. The more confident they feel that their earnings of USA dollars will be rising rather than falling, the more plausible it is for them to move forward with their own development plan and to consider relaxation in their restrictions against imports." However, by then, Canada sought diversification in the commercial area. See: RG 25 Vol: 3445 File: 1-1958/6. Background Papers for the Canadian Delegation to the Commonwealth and Trade Conference, September 15-26, 1958. "These comments are based entirely on Canadian commercial interests. They disregard any defence of United Kingdom or Commonwealth interests which, at times, seem to have overshadowed our own interests." Background Papers; "Canadian views on the Trading Arrangements of the EEC and the proposed industrial Free Trade Area." – "Memo: C.M. Isbister To: Minister, re: U.K. Position on the Free Trade Area", May 25, 1958. A 6 page document has been withdrawn from the file under Access to Information Act 13(1)(a).

²⁷⁶ Ibid., South Africa was seen as "the exception" because its "racial policies are a source of embarrassment." MG 26 N 1 Vol: 17 File: Wrong, H.H. 1948-53. From: Wrong To: Pearson, Washington, January 18, 1952. Restricted. In introducing Churchill at the Mayflower Hotel, Mr. Paul Wooton commented that "a union between the might of the United States and the prestige of Great Britain was unconquerable." Churchill went on to demonstrate that Britain still had a good share of might to throw into the common pool. In doing so, he added, as he has done so often before, the white population of other members of the Commonwealth to that of the United Kingdom in order to arrive at a total of over 70 millions. He will certainly continue to talk and think of the older Commonwealth members as sure to be united in action against danger in any circumstances."

²⁷⁷ RG 25 Vol: 3445 File 1-1958/2. Memorandum to Cabinet. Secret. "This is a circumstance of which the United States is increasingly well aware."

²⁷⁸ A survey of the Cabinet Conclusions Agenda/BoxList from early 50s to early 60s show that Canada's contribution to the security to the North American Continent was first addressed by the Cabinet in mid-1955. RG 2 Series: A-5-a.

Volume	Date	Subject
2659	12-07-1955	National Defence; Policy on Air Craft Development; CF-105. Programme; Improvement of CF-100; Procurement of 'Sparrow' Missile.
5775	01-11-1956	D.E.W. Line; re-supply of Western Arctic.
5775	06-14-1956	Cabinet Defence Committee Report of Meeting. Additional Regular Force Air Defence Squadrons and Bases; Joint Site surveys for Nothward extention of air defence combat zone; U.S.A.F. request for surveys for S.A.C. Tanker Bases in Northern Canada; Continued Authority for U.S.A.F. to station forces at Frobisher Bay.
1892	02-14-1957	Cabinet Defence Committee – Report of Minister of Defence: U.S. Airforce request for Tanker Base facilities in Canada; Improvement to prime radors; CF-105 Aircraft. programme; R.O.N. Shipbuilding programme; National

		Aeronautical Establishment; construction of high speed Wind tunnel and transfer of National Aeronautical Establishment (Uplands) from National Research Council to Defence Research Board; U.K. proposal for the establishment of a "Canada Station"; Procedures.
1893	11-19-1957	Statement by USA Secretary of State that the USA stored nuclear warheads in Canada.
1898	01-24-1958	Nuclear Power Development Program to March 31, 1962.
1898	01-24-1958	USA Missile Warning System; request for terminal facilities.
1898	04-23-1958	USA Ballistic Missile Early Warning System; request for concurrence in ordering cable equipment to be installed in Canadian territory
1898	04-29-1958	Atomic Weapons; stockpiling in Canada.
2744	02-10-1959	CF-105 Arrow Programme: Report of Cabinet Defence Committee.
2744	02-14-1959	Arrow (CF-100) Aircraft: Decision to terminate development.
2744	02-17-1959	Arrow (CF-100) Aircraft: Decision to terminate development.
²⁷⁹ MG 31 E 46 Vol: 7 File: 16#201.1. <u>Memorandum</u> . From: Escott Reid To: R.M. Macdonnell, January 1, 1952. <u>Secret</u> . "Re-examination of Canadian Foreign Policy Papers 1951-52," in this batch is a paper "Factors Conditioning Canadian Foreign Policy," prepared by R.L. Rogers. November 21, 1951. <u>Secret</u> . For an indication of the importance of these areas for Canada's policy objectives, see: RG 2 Series: A-5-a Cabinet Conclusions Agenda (early 1950s to early 1960s):		
<u>Vol</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
5775	04-12-1956	Export of arms to Israel; Mediterranean Situation Progress Report
5775	06-21-1956	Arms for Israel; Export of F-86 Aircraft.
5775	07-27-1956	Aircraft for Israel; USA Reply to Canadian Proposal.
5775	08-07-1956	Export of Aircraft to Israel; Suez Canal.
5775	09-13-1956	Suez Canal Dispute.
5775	10-11-1956	Sale of Aircraft to Israel.
5775	10-18-1956	Middle East; Suez Canal Dispute; Israeli-Arab Tensions.
5775	10-25-1956	International Situation: - Israeli Invasion of Egypt; UK and French ultimatum to Israel and Egypt.
5775	10-31-1956	Suspension of Arms Shipment to the Middle East.
5775	11-14-1956	International Situation: - Canadian Component of UN Force: Suez.
5775	11-16-1956	Contribution to UN Emergency Force.
5775	11-20-1956	Contribution to UN Emergency Force in the Middle East.
5775	12-05-1956	Canadian Contribution to UNEF.
1893	07-26-1957	UNEF: Agreement between Canada and UN.
1898	02-07-1958	Middle East: Israeli troops concentrates on Syrian border.
1898	02-18-1958	Tunisian Border Incident; French Attack on Sakiet Sidi Youssef.
1899	07-15-1958	Middle East Crisis: Lebanon and Iraq Emergency Meeting.
		UNSC
1899	10-23-1958	Turkey Embargo: USA Request for Easing Restrictions.
1899	10-24-1958	Turkey Embargo: USA Quota for 1958 and 1959.
²⁸⁰ MG 31 E 46 Vol: 5 File:#8.II. Escott Reid, <u>The Delegation's Assessment of the United Nations General Assembly</u> , January 11, 1952. <u>Secret</u> . Especially Telegram from the Paris Session of the General Assembly No: 252 of December 21 and No: 272 of December 29, 1950. Under reference but not traceable.		
²⁸¹ <u>Ibid.</u> , "a good deal is made of the so-called irresponsibility of the poor countries. I assume that an irresponsible Delegation is one which supports policies which are not in the interests of that Delegation's country."		

²⁸² Ibid., a perusal of Cabinet Conclusions Agenda BoxList from the early 1950s to the early 60s show that not much effort was expended on economic aid outside the framework of the Colombo Plan and the Mutual Aid Program for NATO. In the UN context this policy was followed with consistency. See, for example, Canada's position on the "Question of Assistance to Libya," UNGA, Tenth Session as explained in RG25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. "Canada has not taken a very active part either in discussion of the Libyan question or in direct dealings with Libya." Ottawa's Policy Guidance: "When the question of assistance is raised...the Delegation should resist any suggestion of a special UN fund being created for technical assistance to Libya on the...grounds that the general principle of setting up a special fund would open up an unfortunate precedent for other countries which might request and expect similar preferential treatment." It is only in mid-1960 that aid to African Countries was being discussed in the context of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. See: RG 2 Series A-5-a Vol: 2746, 05-05-1960. In late 1961 a discussion of Canadian contribution to International Programs of Aid – UN Special Fund. See Vol: 6177, 19-09-1961.

²⁸³ MG 26 N 1 Vol: 12. From: Escott Reid, New Delhi, December 5, 1952 To: Pearson, Ottawa. "You must be having a pretty grim time at the Assembly."

²⁸⁴ MG 31 E 46 Vol: 5 File: #8.II.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., "there is no economic bar to Canada, for example, increasing its Colombo assistance from \$25 million to \$100 million a year. We could do so either by reducing our defence expenditures by \$75 million or by reducing the investment boom in Canada by \$75 million or by cutting down civilian consumption in Canada or by borrowing from the United States or by a combination of all five methods."

²⁸⁶ Ibid., Holmes Shaping, Vol II p. 327. "Issues concerning South Africa posed the hardest decisions." Strategy and tactics were clearly influenced by the primary consideration of self interest. There was an on-going dialogue among officials of the Commonwealth, especially in the early to mid-1950s, about the complex international situation and how it affected or could affect policy formulation. See for example; MG 26 N1 Vol: 3. From: K.M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to Cairo To: T.C. Davis, Canadian Ambassador to Bonn, November 9, 1953. "I do think you are neglecting the Middle East....Your should...submit a note to the Government about the importance of the Middle East just now and the unwisdom of neglecting it." From: Pearson, Secretary of State, Ottawa, To: Davis, Bonn. December 7, 1953. Personal. "We cannot afford to be ignorant of or neglect, the views of our good friends in Asia." MG 26 N1 Vol: 19. Pearson's Diary – Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference London, January – February 1955. Secret. Australia's Prime Minister "Menzies' criticism...that we were spending too much time on Formosa and not enough on Japan, South East Asia and other Far Eastern problems...." MG 26 N1 Vol: 3. From: Davis, Canadian Ambassador to Japan To: Pearson, Secretary of State, Ottawa, February 3, 1956. "The visit of Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev to India and Burma has prompted me to believe that more Western leaders should visit this part of the world." The assessment of policy in terms of national interest is a fundamental part of decision making. Even in late 1982, the same type of cost-benefit analysis, which was made in 1952 in regard to the colonial issue, was applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict. See: The Gazette, Montreal, Wednesday, November 17, 1982. Mid East policy harms our interests: Ex-envoy. "Canadian interests have been harmed in recent years by a Middle East policy generally viewed...as being the most pro-Israeli, William Barton, former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations said yesterday. Barton told the Senate foreign relations committee that as a result, Arab and other Delegations to the UN interpreted Canadian support for the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people as insincere. As a worker at the UN, I think I can say that most of our delegates felt that this situation was not in the best Canadian interest, said Barton, who served as ambassador from 1976 to 1980. He told the committee all Canadian votes on the Middle East were political decisions cleared by the external affairs minister of the day, often ignoring the recommendations of those closer to the scene."

²⁸⁷ RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/160, Vol: 79. File: 5475-FA-41-40 pt.1. From: Permanent Mission, N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 904 Immediate, March 22, 1957. Confidential: Canadian Eyes Only. Subj.: The role of the UN.

²⁸⁸ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1. pt.1. Suppl. Item 2; Chapter I (9). Confidential.

- "The occupation of Morocco by French forces began in 1907 and led eventually to the conclusion of a protection agreement with the Sultan on March 30, 1912, at Fez.
- The pacification of Morocco took 27 years and ended in 1934.
- In January 1944, the Istiqlal (the most important Nationalist Party) issued a manifesto demanding complete independence.
- Tangier 1947 - The Sultan openly acknowledged his sympathy for nationalist objectives and called for the revision of the Treaty of Fez. Backed by the Sultan, Istiqlal demanded:
 - (a) an elective framework for a purely Moroccan system of local self-government;
 - (b) a greater number of civil service administrative posts for Moroccans;
 - (c) equal civil rights for Moroccans and Europeans;
 - (d) Equal trade union rights;
 - (e) higher subsidies for education, health and housing.
- They protested against the system of taxation and abuses of it.
- They called for judicial reforms
- They protested discrimination in determining the salaries of French and Moroccan officials.

By February 1951: non-co-operation of the Sultan with French demands to disavow Istiqlal led to the point of him being dethroned.

November – December 1951: Afro – Asian bloc indignant about the trend of events attempted to bring the Moroccan question before the General Assembly – Latin American, France and Western powers in control of General Assembly – mild resolution on continued negotiation.

December 1952: August 1953: riots and crisis, Sultan deposed.

1954 – Afro-Asian make no headway in UN to compel France to implement reforms. USA and Latin America in control of General Assembly.

1954 – 1955: terrorism and counter-terrorism in Morocco. Crisis in June 1955 – rioting and violence by European mob. French Cabinet under strong pressure to resist accommodating Moroccan nationalists.

July 1955: Afro-Asian Memorandum to Secretary General: France to remedy the situation. Resolution must be "sufficiently moderate" to be adopted by the necessary 2/3 majority in the Plenary."

²⁸⁹ The French authorities declared the Nationalist and Communist Parties illegal and suspended the nationalist newspaper.

²⁹⁰ "The resolution recommended the revocation of police measures in Morocco, the restoration of public liberties, the establishment of representative institutions through free elections and the pursuance of a policy leading to full sovereignty and independence for Morocco within five years."

Votes: 22 for; 28 against; 9 abstentions.

²⁹¹ Votes: 31 in favour; 18 against and 10 abstentions.

²⁹² The demands of the French settlers conflicted with those of the Muslim Nationalist in regard to reforms. Because the settlers had a powerful ally in the Right wing in Paris, only limited allowances were made for Tunisian representation in the Cabinet. In December 1951 the Tunisian Union Leader, Ferhat Hached, was murdered; January 18, 1952, Bourguiba arrested with other Neo-Destour leaders. Tunisia wanted their situation discussed in the UN.

²⁹³ The Afro-Asian members wanted an establishment of a Committee of Good Offices to assist Franco-Tunisian negotiations. But, the Colonial Powers argued that the matter was outside the competence of the UN.

²⁹⁴ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/I pt.1. Chapter 1 (19a). Confidential.

²⁹⁵ September 1, 1954 – the legal status of the Neo-Destour Party was restored; some political prisoners were released and the state of siege was lifted in large areas of the land.

September 11, 1954 – Negotiations began in Paris.

²⁹⁶ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. Secret. Report of the Canadian Delegation to the Ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., the Latin-American and USA opposition to the Afro-Asian attempt to press France to negotiate with Morocco forced them to take a less aggressive position.

²⁹⁸ This might be due to the United States Air Force Bases in Morocco.

²⁹⁹ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. Secret. CH:I (19). The Faure Government indicated its 'intent' to introduce a large measure of local autonomy to Morocco. RG 25 Vol: 7572 File: 5475-

DW-39-A-40 pt.1.1. Memorandum, From: United Nations Division, Ottawa To: Department of External Affairs, August 3, 1955. The French denial of the right of self-determination to Morocco was the 'reason' for the request from the Arab-Asian bloc to put Morocco on the agenda. "As might be expected, the explanatory memoranda attached to the request...gave a completely one-sided picture of the situation in Morocco...." "Our general policy of encouraging France to develop freer institutions in their North African territories should presumably remain unchanged."

³⁰⁰ RG 25 Vol: 7572 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.2.1. Ottawa's letter No: V-403 of August 12, 1955 was under reference in all the replies. We do not know the exact content of this letter. However, we have a general idea of the kind of information which Ottawa had sought. On file were replies from Australia, Brazil, Turkey, The Netherlands, Sweden.

³⁰¹ RG 25, Vol: 3463, File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. Secret.

³⁰² Ibid., instructions approved by the Cabinet.

³⁰³ MG 26 N 1 Vol: 23. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting: 8th Meeting. 1955. Menzies (Australia): "The world was being kept by the Communists in a perpetual state of undulant fever, in which the solution of one problem merely exacerbated the next. The danger was that people in the democratic countries might not be prepared to bear indefinitely the burden of expenditure on defence which this required. Our propaganda needed to be strengthened, so as to emphasise that the threat of peace came exclusively from the Communist Powers." At the 1951 Prime Ministers' Meeting, Prime Minister Attlee warned the Prime Ministers that the decision "to build up the defensive strength [of NATO] sufficiently to deter aggression in Europe...inevitably imposed heavy burdens on the countries concerned."

³⁰⁴ We know from the NATO correspondence that the USA did not share any information on its nuclear capability with the NATO allies. Therefore Churchill was merely speculating in this assessment. MG 26 N 1 Vol: 23. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting: 8th Meeting. 1955. "...the balance of power, especially in thermo-nuclear weapons, was so decisively in favour of the Americans." On the other hand, he said "that there was clear evidence that the Russians would be able to mobilise forces which would be seven, or even ten times as great as those of the combined NATO powers. This situation was only balanced by the great superiority of the United States in nuclear weapons...."

³⁰⁵ MG 26 N 1 Vol: 23; File: Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, 1951. RG 25 Acc. No: 85-86/551. Box:21, File No: 1-1951/5. Canadian Policy with Respect to the Commonwealth. Policy Paper No:7. July 26, 1951. Secret. Policy Paper No:7. July 26, 1951. D.E.A. For details with all aspects of this relationship re: Trade, UN; Settlement of disputes on the Commonwealth; Mutual Defence commitments; A common foreign policy; Consultation and exchange of Information. RG 25, Acc. No: 85-86/55, Box:22, File No: 1-2-1-1952/1. See: Commonwealth Liaison Committee. Confidential Meetings in London, chaired by the Commonwealth Relations Office, in the early 1950s, for a comprehensive discussion of core concern of this group of nations, regarding subjects such as: Colonial Development, Colombo Plan, Raw Materials Developments in Washington, Future Business of the Committee. Basically on Trade, the Sterling Problem, Agricultural Problems and Restrictions.

³⁰⁶ RG 25 Vol: 7573 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.2.2. From: Chairman, Canadian Delegation, New York. To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 5, September 27, 1955. Confidential. His assessment of the debate on the question – whether the Cyprus Item should be inscribed on the agenda: "The vote against inscription by such countries as Iraq, Pakistan and Thailand, and the abstention by the Philippines, may reflect the closer co-operation of those countries with the West, principally with the United States, in other fields."

MG 26 L, Vol: 130 File: P-14. Commonwealth Division, Memorandum for the Prime Minister. c.s. A. Ritchie. April 21, 1953. Secret. Suggested that the new government of Mohammed Ali of Pakistan was "disposed toward close association with the West, in particular the United States, as a means of solving economic problems...." RG 25 Acc.No: 85-86/ 551 Vol: 23 File: 1-1956-3, pt.2. Department of External Affairs, KASHMIR. May 31, 1956. Top Secret, Canadian Eyes Only. Officials realised that this disposition was also based on military needs. Pakistan "raised the question of Kashmir at the SEATO Council Meeting in Karachi in March and later the Baghdad Pact Meeting in Teheran in April. It received from both bodies support for the United Nations resolution of 1949 that a plebiscite be held to determine the fate of Kashmir."

³⁰⁷ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.1. From: Office of High Commissioner, London To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch: 4531 November 2, 1951. Secret. In Anglo-American Discussions in London "the Americans agreed that it was undesirable that it should be raised and would use their influence to dissuade other Delegations from doing so....On principle the USA never opposed the inclusion of Items which a number of states wanted to see on the agenda....The United States entirely endorsed the United Kingdom view that strategic considerations precluded any idea of a surrender of United Kingdom sovereignty."

³⁰⁸ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1. pt.1. Intro:(2) Secret. Canada voted against inscription at the ninth session on two grounds. "Procedurally the wording of the item pre-supposed intervention, contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. Politically a general debate on Cyprus appeared undesirable."

³⁰⁹ Ibid., CH. I(18). "The UK is continuing its programme for developing Cyprus as a base for strategic command and apparently has no intention of changing these plans." The Cyprus impasse, "largely because of Greek insistence on a public airing has produced irritations and dispute in NATO and in the Balkan alliance."

³¹⁰ RG 25 Vol: 7572 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.2.1. From: Chargé d'Affaires a.i. Canadian Embassy, Ankara To: USSEA, Ottawa. No. Letter: 371, September 7, 1955. Subject: Cyprus - Tenth Session, UN General Assembly. "Bearing some unforeseen and unexpected development at the London Conference, it is Turkey's intention at the UN to challenge the re-admissibility of the Item and, if it is nevertheless inscribed, again to argue that the question is one of UK domestic jurisdiction and therefore not within the competence of the UN....They intend to press their viewpoint with greater vigour [than last year]." Under reference Ottawa's Letter No: V-263 of August 12, 1955.

³¹¹ Vol: 3463; CHI(18).

³¹² RG 25 Vol: 7572, File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.2.1. From: Canadian High Commissioner, Canberra To: SSEA, Ottawa No: 158, September 6, 1955. Subject: Agenda: Tenth Session. Under Ref: Ottawa's Letter No: V-361 of August 12, 1955. "In general, Australia's line will not depart from last year's....On Cyprus, thinking is that question may not come up with tripartite talk now under way...." From: Canadian Chargé d'Affaires A.I. The Hague, To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 450 September 8, 1955. Subject: Provisional Agenda, Tenth Session. Under Reference, Ottawa's Letter No: V-403 of August 12, 1955. Dr. Patijn, Head of the International Organisation Division of the Foreign Ministry. On Cyprus: "The Dutch have much more sympathy for the position of the UK and Turkey than that for Greece....Have no definite views. Their tactics at the Assembly will be governed entirely by the manner in which the items are placed on the agenda and by the nature of the debate which follows." From: Canadian Legation, Stockholm To: SSEA, Ottawa. Incoming Message No: 43, September 13, 1955. For the Scandinavian position on general agenda Items of the Tenth General Assembly. See also: From: R.P. Cameron, Stockholm To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch No: 326, September 14, 1955. Mr. Bergström (Sweden) met the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Norway and Iceland in Stockholm in a Conference with the Swedish Foreign Minister. He 'provided' Cameron "with a summary of the general views expressed on the main UN agenda Items." Bergström "was careful to point out that he was speaking as a Swedish delegate but on the majority of the questions the Swedish view was shared by Norway and Denmark. The same could not be said for Iceland which reserved its position on many of the questions."

³¹³ RG 25 Acc. No: 85-86/551 Vol: 23 File: 1-1956-3. Canadian Papers Prepared for Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, 1956. Top Secret, Canadian Eyes Only. Part 1, Paper 3 European Security (d) Cyprus. June 14 1956. "There is no evidence that the United Kingdom is consulting her NATO allies and the United Kingdom Government is firmly opposed to a 'NATO solution' in Cyprus. The present mood of Ministers who believe that the real difficulties of the problem of Cyprus are not adequately understood, even in friendly countries, is rather angry and hurt. Our High Commissioner, therefore, advises against any high level representation from Ottawa or Washington." (b) Washington: "The State Department...is prepared to do what it can...keeping the British aware of United States' growing concern....Mr. Dulles also told Mr. Pearson that he was not being kept too well informed by the British." Vol: 3463; CH I(18). Ignatieff, p. 218. "Why, after 20 years is there still a need for a peacekeeping force in

Cyprus?....The military establishments in the United States and in Britain are reluctant to disturb a status quo which provides them with important advantages. The Americans don't want a settlement that might offend Turkey, their staunch ally and host to their missile bases, while the British hope Cyprus may allow them to keep their naval installations. In a very real sense, this little island has become a microcosm of many of the tensions and ambitions which make world peace so difficult to achieve or maintain."

³¹⁴ Vol: 3463; Intro.(2) "If political pressures in France should force the French Government to postpone further its proposed reforms in Morocco or if there should be a serious deterioration in Moroccan internal affairs before this question is discussed at the General Assembly, the Delegation should seek further instructions." No: 312, September 7, 1955. Australia's policy was consistent with its past policy; No: 450, September 8, 1955 the Netherlands chose to develop policy in view of the operational context: "no definite views."

³¹⁵ Vol: 3467, Intro (2) Four Departments on the Mediterranean coast – Oran, Algiers, Constantine and Bone – are administered under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior in Paris. No: 312, September 7, 1955 – Australia "will probably oppose placing Algeria on the agenda in view of the constitutional issue involved." No: 450, September 8, 1955 – the Netherlands had "no definite views," and wanted to decide during the debate on what position they should take.

³¹⁶ Vol: 3463; CH: IV(2).

³¹⁷ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. CH: I(20). Confidential. Supplementary Item 3.

³¹⁸ RG 25 Vol: 6977 File: 5475-FA-78 40 pt.1. From: Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa No: 689. August 2, 1957. Confidential. Info: London, Washington D.C. PERMISNY, NATO Paris. Under reference: Embassy Paris No: 682 of August 2, 1957, not traceable. Langlais said that the French "were less apprehensive than they were a month ago. They estimated that the recent public reiteration by Mr. Yazid, the New York Representative of the FLN to the effect that the rebels were prepared to talk with the French only on the basis of Algerian independence had, through its intransigency, helped the French cause." RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. From: Embassy Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 818. September 6, 1957. Confidential. "No Party other than the Communist would recommend independence for Algeria now....None would dare admit that it looks to eventual independence....For independence would be a betrayal of the European community, a snare and a delusion for the muslim population and in general the 'abandonment' of Algeria."

³¹⁹ Vol: 3462; CH:I(20). Vol: 3463; CH:IV(2): Apparently the Communists were active on other fronts, in Africa, at the same time. May 1955: French Camerons "became the scene of outbursts of violence allegedly arising out of the Administering Authority's failure to institute satisfactory constitutional reforms. As a result of these outbursts, said to have been instigated by the Union des Populations de Cameroon (UPC) under Communist directives, the UPC was outlawed." After this happened, the UN was inundated with petitions from this Trust Territory. See also: RG 25 Vol: 7573 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.3.1. From: Assembly Delegation, New York To: SSEA, Ottawa. Incoming Message No: 64, October 4, 1955. For requests for oral hearings before the Assembly. RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. CH:IV(2). "Any consideration of the UPC petitions...would almost certainly prejudice certain members of the Council against the Administering Authority." But was it not the purpose of oral petitions to reveal perceived failings of the administration in Trust Territories? And did Ottawa not have moral obligations to carry out Charter stipulations on this? Did Ottawa object to these oral petitions because "the French Permanent Delegation have made it clear that they would fight the request tooth and nail?" Could we explain Ottawa's choice as emanating from a pro-colonial predisposition? In both Algeria and the French Camerons, French colonial policy had led to rioting and violence almost simultaneously. The French Government reacted with repressive measures in both cases. And, in both instances, Ottawa chose to support the French Government. How do we explain these choices? Surely, suspected Communist involvement cannot justify the resort to repressive measures under all circumstances? Would Communism flourish in situations of equality with democratic institutions?

³²⁰ Vol: 3463; CH: I(20).

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Ibid., RG 25 Vol: 6977 File: 5475-FA-78-40.1.. From: Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 689 August 2, 1957. Confidential. Hammerskjöld has shown an "apparent desire to keep the Algeria debate from developing into a sharp criticism of France." This was explained in detail in Embassy Paris Telegram No: 633 of July 17, 1957 under reference, but was not traceable.

³²³ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1. Pt.1. CH: I(20). The French Minister of National Defence, General Koenig, "has repeatedly stressed the strategic importance of North Africa and particularly of Algeria...a vital base area without which North Atlantic security would be in jeopardy."

³²⁴ Ibid., "although...a discussion at this time might be more effective in preventing violence than in bringing about reforms and that in view of the constructive policies and the concessions on both sides which have brought about reforms in Morocco and in Tunisia, we are confident that measures will be taken to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Algeria as well." Ottawa knew that the Algerian situation was in no way comparable to Morocco and Tunisia, because of the large presence of the French citizens resident in Algeria and because of the military aspects and the commercial connections: "75% of Algeria's commerce is with France and the territory provides an important market for French exports." More importantly, Algeria was an integral part of France. RG 25 Vol: 7572; Despatch: 326, September 14, 1955. "Mr. Bergström explained that there was a general awareness of the dissimilarity with the Moroccan question for Algeria was a part of territorial France. Accordingly, there was a general lack of sympathy [by the Scandinavians] for having this matter discussed in the UN."

³²⁵ RG 25 Vol: 3463; CH: I(20). "The mass arrests which have taken place in Algeria, the outlawing of national political parties, the imposition of censorship, the outright banning of certain newspapers and the seizure of homes by the French armed forces are typical consequences of the failure to grant the Algerian people their legitimate rights. Matters have now reached the point which, according to the Prime Minister of France himself, the only method of affirming France's presence in Algeria is by a show of force. The employment in this region of massive armed forces totalling over 150,000 and including French troops of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation testifies vividly to the grave situation existing. The continuance of this situation is creating a serious threat to peace in the Mediterranean area." RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. From: Canadian Embassy Washington To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1920, September 11, 1957. Confidential. The USA State Department felt that the threat had passed by late 1957. "Recent military successes in which the French troops have engaged in Algeria and the Quasi Political Detente which has settled on the question pending the presentation of the Loi Cadre to the French Parliament appear to have served to surround the Algerian question with a lesser sense of urgency than was the case last year." Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs 1957-1959. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.6. "By May 1958 the Europeans in Algeria were in revolt against the government in Paris, which seemed unable to rely on any of its armed forces. The catastrophe of a military seizure of power in Paris was averted by summoning General Charles de Gaulle from retirement to lead the nation in June."

³²⁶ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. Intro (2).

³²⁷ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1. Pt.1. CH: I(20). A French Parliamentary fact-finding Commission investigated conditions in June 1955, after the Arab League asked the Secretary General of the UN "that steps be taken to end the situation." The Commission "was critical of privileges enjoyed by the wealthy colons and reached the general conclusion that if a condition of rebellion existed in Algeria, this was primarily due to the defects in French policy and administration during past years....The Commission reported that members of the French armed forces stationed in Algeria had misgivings about the nature of their mission and some expressed fear that the errors of the French policy in Indochina might be repeated in Algeria. The Commission also emphasised that in the climate of economic and social injustice that prevails in Algeria, the development and future of the territory are seriously prejudiced."

³²⁸ Intention of French Government:

Apparently the French Minister had begun to travel to those countries which were perceived to have some influence in affecting process in the UN. According to Ottawa, Pineau had been seeking to inform them of the problems and possibilities as France saw them. Department of External Affairs, Canadian Papers Prepared for the Commonwealth Meeting. Part II, Paper 13. "

As Mr. Pineau pointed out to Mr. Nehru in New Delhi earlier this year, there is a relatively high proportion of Frenchmen in Algeria: It is as if in 1945 the United Kingdom Government had had to consider the future position of 47 million British residents in India." The Department felt that, at the meetings in London, "it might also be pointed out to Mr. Nehru that the French policy on Tunisia and Morocco which he has commended was criticised by a considerable number of deputies in the French Assembly during the recent debate on Government policy." On May 22nd, Nehru made it known that his Government "viewed the conflict in Algeria with deep concern and regret." Ottawa suggested that Nehru should be made aware of the fact that the situation in Algeria was "aggravated by the sudden acquisition of independence by Morocco and Tunisia." No: 689 of August 2, 1957. Canadian Embassy Paris reported that Pineau "would be travelling to Latin America before the opening of the General Assembly and would make another determined effort to line up Latin American votes on the Algerian Item. In preparation for the General Assembly debate the French will make determined efforts to publicise the reforms both physical and political which they have effected to date in Algeria in spite of the continuance of the rebellion....At the UN itself, the French intend to reiterate their adherence to the famous Mollet Tryptique of cease-fire, elections and negotiations...." No: 818, September 6, 1957. Subj: Loi-Cadre for Algeria. "the most important point of disagreement remains the nature of the central organisation in Algiers. The Independents, the Social Republicans and the Dissident Radicals recognise the need for a co-ordinative structure, but they would limit its competence to economic, social and technical fields and exclude political questions." In other words, the French political parties continued to insist on administering Algeria from Paris and independence for Algeria, was out of the question. Ottawa was constantly informed by its Embassy in Paris of the efforts of the French Government and the difficulties which it faced in the French Parliament on Algeria. See: RG 25, Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. From: Canadian Embassy Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 842, September 12, 1957. Restricted. "Bourges-Maunoury will undoubtedly make much of the necessity of obtaining as wide a measure of support for the Loi-Cadre as possible in order to strengthen the French position at the General Assembly." The UN was due to discuss the Algerian question shortly thereafter.

Political Situation in France: From: Canadian Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 859, September 17, 1957. Confidential. Bourges-Maunoury is "under fire from both the right and the left, he is having great difficulty finding a text for the Loi-Cadre for Algeria which will command a parliamentary majority....Those to the right of the government who are the most critical of the Loi-Cadre...are the ones who are likely to be the least concerned over the government's plea for an expression of national solidarity in preparation for UN debate on Algeria. To them, the danger of a too liberal Algerian policy which would lead to the 'loss of Algeria' for France is of greater significance than any adverse vote for France in an international body which they tend to distrust in any event....One need hardly emphasise that a cabinet crisis at this stage would entail grave consequences in Algeria and for the economic and financial situation in France, as well as for French prestige in New York." The Government was facing "severe criticism" of its economic policy and its moratorium on wages and prices. From: Canadian Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 866, September 19, 1957. "At a round table meeting of all centre parties...Mr. Pineau has not failed to point out, he will be in an impossible position in the UN if a Loi-Cadre [for Algeria] cannot be voted before the UN Debate." From: Canadian Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 901, September 30, 1957. Priority: Confidential. Info: To: London, Washington D.C. PERMDELNY, NATO Paris. Under Ref.: Embassy Telegram No: 883, September 24, not traceable. Subj: Algerian Loi-Cadre and French Political Situation. "After three days of stormy Parliamentary debate...Prime Minister decided to put vote of confidence...today. Social Republican spokesman of the right-wing elements in Parliament, Soustelle...has played skilfully on the emotional theme...of 'abandonment.' The old analogy with Tunisia and Morocco was drawn in, an analogy dear to the hearts of right-wingers who still think that independence for Tunisia and Morocco could have been avoided if a firm line had been taken by France....Soustelle was also able to conjure up the bogey of 'loss' of France's Black African territories...." From: Canadian Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 906, October 1, 1957. Priority: Confidential. Info: To: London, Washington, D.C. PERMDELNY, NATO Paris. Under Ref: Telegram From: Embassy Paris No: 901 of September 30 not traceable. "Last night the vote of

confidence on the Loi-Cadre for Algeria was defeated by 279 Votes to 253.* Bourges-Maunoury has offered his resignation to President Coty but as the constitutional majority is lacking, he will probably not accept it definitively until the new government is ready for investiture by Parliament. But the crisis has now opened....The conclusion to be drawn from the defeat of the Government on Algerian policy, with all of the attendant and inevitable difficulties for France both at the UN and in Algeria itself, is that it is impossible, given the present arithmetic and sentiment of the National Assembly, to find a majority for even a small step forward in Algeria."

"only the Socialists and the MRP gave virtually full support to the Government. It was also supported by a little over half of the following groups: The Radical Socialists, the Dissident Radicals and the Independents. Lined against the Government were the Communists, the Social Republicans, the Poujadists and Peasants, plus the reminder of the Radical Socialists, the Dissident Radicals and the Independents."

Attitude of Other Governments: RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. From: Canadian Embassy, Washington D.C. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1920, September 11, 1957. Confidential. Repeated To: Embassy, Paris and PERMISNY. Horace Torbert, Acting Director of the Office of Western European Affairs in a talk with the Charge d'Affaires. "The USA Delegation would certainly not oppose formal inscription of the Algerian Item on the Assembly Agenda nor would it take an active part in the debate. The State Department hope, of course, that no condemnatory resolution will be passed and if one is presented they will oppose it or seek to get it sufficiently watered down to the point where it would be acceptable to the French. While generally the USA would be willing to go along with any resolution acceptable to the French, they do not feel that they should tie their hands in advance to any commitment on this score." In other words "the USA position has not yet been finally determined." From: Canadian Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 862. September 18, 1957. Confidential. Info: London, Washington D.C., PERMISNY, NATO Paris. Jacques Roux, Mr. Pineau's Chef du Cabinet told Davis that, from his trip to Washington, the Minister "came away with the impression that the South American countries he visited and the USA believe that France is making a real effort to solve the Algerian problem and that the present Government could demonstrate some progress when Item is discussed in NY...." The South American Governments 'rejected' the idea of immediate independence for Algeria "...as a solution, since this would lead...to chaos in North Africa and increase danger of extension of Soviet influence in that part of the world which could then easily extend to Atlantic coast."

"While Roux said frankly that Americans would not commit themselves as to attitude they would adopt in NY, Mr. Pineau had been reasonably satisfied with Mr. Dulles' reception of the French case...." MG 31 E 6 Vol: 5 File: 57. Department of External Affairs, Summary Reports: French Political Scene. January 24, 1958. Confidential.

The Economy: France still is not free from financial troubles. Months of unfavourable trade balances have exhausted French credit with the European Payments Union (EPU), the central clearing house for intra-European trade among OEEC members. In order to keep the economy functioning while staying within the budget limits, France now requires approximately \$ 400 million in foreign credits....Although some doubts still exist concerning the adequacy of the Government's recent measures, it seems likely that France will receive the necessary foreign aid."

Algeria: "The problem of Algeria also looms large. The National Assembly in November passed a modified Loi-Cadre, which is designed to provide a legal framework for the future political organisation in Algeria, while maintaining it as a part of the French Union. The bill at present is before the Senate, from which, in all probability, it will emerge severely watered down, owing to modifications being made by right-wing elements in the upper house. When it returns to the National Assembly for second reading, the debate is expected to be heated, particularly as the modifications may prompt the Socialists to desert the Government....It is the view of the Canadian Embassy in Paris that the latest close vote has already weakened the Gaillard Government and may well be the handwriting on the wall with regard to its continuance in office."

³²⁹ This strategy, which was sustained by frequent Russian questions on nuclear tests in USA territories in the Pacific, created additional problems for the Colonial Powers. See: RG 25 Vol: 6922 File: 5475-N-40 pt.12.2. From: M. Cadieux, UN Division To: Legal Division, March 28,

1956. Secret. Under reference: From: PERMISNY To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 137. March 7, 1956. Confidential, not traceable. The African colonies also started to bring up the subject of French nuclear tests in the Sahara. See: RG 25 Vol: 7792 file: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa No: 832. August 26, 1959. "In our view the protest [against French atomic tests in the Sahara] is...significant in demonstrating that African leaders will not...be willing for long to support the status quo in the Committee." See also # 897 September 14, 1959.

³³⁰ MG26 N 1 Vol:23 File: Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting 1955. St. Laurent "asked whether the United Kingdom Government had any views on the possibility of securing a limitation on armaments." See file for views of the other Prime Ministers on this.

³³¹ MG 26 N 1 Vol:5 From: Heeney, Washington To: Pearson, Secretary of State, Ottawa. Memorandum for File: Disarmament, January 25, 1956. Confidential.

³³² MG 26 N1 Vol:12 From: Reid, New Delhi To: Pearson, Ottawa, March 5, 1956. Personal and Confidential. The ongoing problem of the USA refusal to recognise Peking served to complicate the UN context for Canadian decision makers and relations with Asian countries. RG 25 Acc. No: 85-86/551 Vol: 23 File: 1-1956-3. Canadian Papers Prepared for Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, June 27th-July6th, 1956. Canadian Eyes only – Top Secret. Subject: "Future Relations with China." "...there is a genuine and widespread feeling in the United States that it would be actually immoral to recognise the Peking regime. No doubt this is an offshoot of USA dislike for Communism in general – a feeling which is comparable to Asian dislike for colonialism....The opposition to Communism is a live issue in the United States, where there is a tendency to regard those who are not actively opposed to Communism as being actively or potentially allied to Communism." "...In the United Nations...if action were taken too rapidly to face the United States with the alternatives of remaining in the UN with Communist China or of withdrawing from the UN because of the seating of Communist China, the result might be most unfortunate."

MG 26 N 1 Vol: 12 From: Reid, New Delhi To: Pearson, Ottawa, July 27, 1954. Secret. Reference: Canada's recognition of the Chinese Government in Peking. #10. "What must worry you about the way in which Americans have used the threat of withdrawal from the UN is the damage which this does to the self respect of the United Nations. It is humiliating for the UN to give the appearance of being blackmailed or bludgeoned into following a course of action which a great majority of its members disapprove of."

³³³ A search in the Cabinet Conclusions Agenda BoxList for discussions on disarmament revealed that this matter was discussed only 4 times over a nine year period. (1950 to 1962) See: RG 2 Series: A-5-a. Vol: 2654 04-29-1954, "UN Disarmament Commission; Canadian Representation on Sub-Committee"; Vol: 1893 08-27-1957, "Disarmament: Draft Four Power Proposal"; Vol: 2746 01-22-1960, "Disarmament – Position to be taken on Soviet Proposals"; Vol: 6176 02-14-1961, "Disarmament – Canadian Policy 1961 – Nuclear Weapons – Meeting with President USA."

³³⁴ RG 25 Acc. No: 85-86/551 Vol: 23 File: 1-1956-3. Department of External Affairs, Canadian Papers Prepared for Commonwealth Ministers' Meeting, June 27th to July 6, 1956. Top Secret-Canadian Eyes Only. Part II, Paper 11: "The Anti-Colonial Issue and the Possibility of Urging Asian Commonwealth members to Exert a Moderating Influence." It might be pointed out to them that "...the governments of most Colonial Powers are anxious to further the development and independence of their colonies but...they must take into account public opinion at home and a number of other factors. Any pressure which can be interpreted as an attempt to humiliate the Colonial Powers make the position of the governments vis-a-vis their voters much more difficult and can lead to a stiffening of their attitude. For our part, we would measure the sincerity of Asian countries' interest in the welfare of colonial peoples against the degree of restraint which they exercised as suggested above." See for example: Part II, Paper 13: Mr. Nehru's Proposal for a Cease-fire in Algeria. June 8, 1956. Confidential. Of importance were a) "all concerned should recognise the equality of all peoples in Algeria; b) it should be recognised that Algeria is the homeland of all the people in Algeria; irrespective of race and all should be entitled to the benefits and share the burdens arising from the recognition of Algerian national entity and personality." "In his statement which was on the whole a moderate one, Mr. Nehru paid tribute to France in bringing about a solution of the problem of Morocco and Tunisia and said that he realised the Algeria problem was an especially complex one....Mr. Nehru might be reminded that the strength

of French public opinion on the Algerian question poses grave difficulties for the French Government." In spite of this effort, the Delegation reported 3 months later, from New York, that Menon of India had taken an active role in seeking to place the Algerian Item on the agenda. See: RG 25 Vol: 7573 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.2.2. From: Assembly Delegation, New York To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No:22. September 23, 1955. Confidential. Repeated as No: 73 To: High Commissioner to London; as No: 13 To: Canadian Embassy, Washington and as No: 38 To: Canadian Embassy, Paris. Subj.: Algerian Question in the General Assembly. "The General Committee recommends not to include Item in the agenda. We understand that Menon [India] has been urging every member of the Afro-Asian group to speak against the recommendation...there are 14 sponsors of the Item [to include]...We propose to vote in favour of the General Committee's recommendation but not to participate in the debate. A Canadian intervention against the inscription of the Item might assist the French Delegation, although, as you suggested it is clearly difficult to make a strong statement in favour of the French position."

³³⁵ RG 25, Acc.: 86-87/336, Vol: 127 File: 5475-W-13-40-pt.2. Jules Leger, Memorandum for the Minister. October 12, 1956. Confidential.

³³⁶ Ibid., in chapter IV we explain in detail the Charter distinctions between Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing-Territories. We can therefore appreciate how radical and blasphemous was such a recommendation to blur this distinction between Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing-Territories; although this was what the anti-colonials sought to accomplish from the outset. Ought we to take this drastic measure as an indication of Ottawa's perception of the seriousness of the matter?

³³⁷ Ibid., "although it may be premature to submit these views formally to our friends, we were wondering whether you would have any objections if the appropriate officers were to try the idea out informally on Mr. Bourdillon, the Under Secretary of State in the Colonial Office, who will be visiting Ottawa shortly for discussions on colonial matters." On the left hand column, the Minister wrote: "No, there is no objection."

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Chapters IV-VIII will bring out this pro-colonial policy in a more detailed way.

³⁴⁰ Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p.9. He wrote of the period 1951 to 1957 "The relations between Russia and the Western powers were vituperative and bad. Meetings of the United Nations were often the occasion of slanging matches, never of negotiation. This was not only a disagreeable state of affairs, it was also dangerous."

³⁴¹ RG 25, Acc.: 86-87/336, Vol: 127 File: 5475-W-13-40-pt.2. Jules Leger, Memorandum for the Minister. October 12, 1956. Confidential. The Minister wrote: "a very delicate operation" next to the proposed effort, "to bring closer to each other the 'good colonials' and the more 'sophisticated' anti-colonials...."

³⁴² The Department suggested that "in some cases we should be able, with the assistance of countries like New Zealand, Norway and Denmark, etc., to assist both sides in solving their problems and understanding each other."

³⁴³ Ibid., the Minister agreed to this undertaking.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., the Memorandum informed the Minister: "before any action is taken, however, detailed briefings and recommendations will be submitted for your approval in each case." At the bottom of the Memorandum, the Minister wrote in hand: "I certainly agree with the thesis and suggestions of this Memorandum – the details of implementation through...and procedures on our part at the UN will, of course, have to be very carefully thought out – as opportunity offers. We could get into a lot of trouble with both sides – in our honest and intelligent broker role!"

³⁴⁵ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Canadian Delegation New York To: USSEA, Ottawa No: 29, December 3, 1956. Subject: British Togoland "The general debate which occupied the meetings of the latter part of the week was highlighted by the United States and Indian contributions. Both speeches carried vigorous shots in the arm for the United Kingdom as the administering power. The two speakers obviously wished to take advantage of the opportunity to help heal some of the wounds engendered by the Suez crisis. Mr. Frank C. Nash, the United States representative, was loud and warm in his praise of the Administering Authority for its action in this first case in history of the accession of a United Nations Trust Territory to freedom

and independence. MG 26 N 1 Vol: 9 From: Mackay, N.Y. To: Pearson, Ottawa, December 27, 1956. Personal and Secret. "Krishna Menon is of course only too willing but his influence so often has been on the wrong side and my impression is he has less might with the Arab-Asian Group than he had hoped and certainly his influence with the Western Group is no greater than it has been."

³⁴⁶ RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/160 Vol: 79 File: 5475-FA-41-40 pt.1. From: PERMISNY To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 904. Immediate; Confidential – Canadian Eyes Only.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., "it is worth remembering that the Eleventh Session was the first for about a third of the Assembly membership. A lack of experience in UN affairs on the part of the new members undoubtedly contributed to the confused situation in which the Assembly frequently found itself. Many of the new members searched in vain for leadership from older members. The traditional leaders of opinion, the UK, France, Australia and New Zealand, were more or less in disgrace. The Western Alliance was sharply divided and the USA, The Scandinavians and Canada were too busy patching cracks and improvising solutions to give much thoughtful advice to the new arrivals."

³⁴⁸ Ibid., for example: Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Peru. See: Section "NATO in Trouble" of this chapter for more on this. RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/160 Vol: 79 File: 5475-FA-41-40 pt.1. "Informal Record of a Meeting held in the Commonwealth Relations Office on Friday, April 26, 1957." Present: Foreign Office - I. Pink and J. Murray; CRO – R. Jasper and C. Diggins; Canada House – Arnold Smith and G. Riddell; Australia House – O. Davis; New Zealand House – F. Corner, A. Burnett and H. Francis; South Africa House – W. Dirkse Van Schalkwyk and C. von Hirschberg. Mr. Smith: "...the most Afro-Asian and Latin American Delegations found it difficult in a recorded vote to take a stand which could be interpreted as supporting colonialism, those Delegations were often prepared to co-operate prior to a vote in developing responsible compromises acceptable to the West." He cited the debates on Algeria and Cyprus, Fall Session, as examples.

³⁴⁹ RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/160 Vol: 79 File: 5475-FA-41-40 pt.1. From: PERMISNY To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 904. Immediate; Confidential – Canadian Eyes Only.

³⁵⁰ RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40 From: Canadian Ambassador to Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 859, July 30, 1956. Defferre took this position in February.

³⁵¹ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. From: Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Paris To: Selwyn Lloyd, London. WF/511/1. February 18, 1957. Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution. White sticker: "Not to be sent out of Ottawa. Circulation in Ottawa restricted to Canadian Ministers and Senior officials dealing with Foreign Affairs."

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch No: 313, March 26, 1957. Restricted. Under reference Paris, Letter No: 306 of March 25th, not traceable. "On March 31 important elections will take place in the twelve overseas territories of French Africa and in Madagascar. The elections are important for two reasons. First, according to the provisions of chapter 3 of the 'Loi-Cadre', they will take place on the basis of a single electoral roll and of universal suffrage. These provisions were applied for the first time to the municipal elections held in French overseas territories last November but they are of greater significance still in relation to the territorial elections. Secondly, the territorial assemblies to be elected will have new and increased powers by virtue of legislation in application of the 'Loi-Cadre' which the French Parliament has approved in the course of the last two months. One of their new responsibilities will be to elect territorial, or government, councils, the power of which have also been significantly increased by recent legislation."

³⁵⁴ The most powerful French African Party 'Le Rassemblement Démocratique Africain,' led by M. Houphouët-Boigny, who was a Minister in the Mollet Government, had given its full support of this policy.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., M. Defferre "has made it plain that, as far as he is concerned, the only obstacle to the development of internal autonomy into some form of Commonwealth or federal relationship with France is the French constitution which, as presently drafted, makes constitutional independence for the territories impossible....He speaks frankly of the different policies which France and the United Kingdom have adopted in Black Africa and makes it clear that, for his part, he prefers a

more gradual approach to the problem of independence for African colonies than that adopted by the United Kingdom for the Gold Coast."

³⁵⁶ RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40. Report No: 00-W-25049. Abidjan, December 3, 1952. Restricted. Security Information: Central Intelligence Agency USA. Subject: Proposal of Increased Autonomy for French African Communities. "The bill, submitted by Konate, representative from French West Africa, and Mitterand, former Minister of Overseas France, would give increased autonomy to the indicated communities." Article 1: "The following communities in the territories of French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, French Togoland, and the French Cameroons are hereby raised to the status of 'communes de plein exercice' [communities with 'plain exercise' status have a greater degree of self-government than so-called mixed communes, which have a greater proportion of native population.]" Square brackets in the original report. There is a paucity of material on British policy in regard to its White settler colonies in the files. RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. Memorandum. From: Commonwealth Division To: McInnes. May 8, 1957. Confidential. Mr. Bourdillon of the Colonial Office in a visit to Ottawa, informed Dawson that "first direct elections "will be held in certain constituencies in Tanganyika that summer. He said that this step was visualised "as being the first in a fairly rapid series of constitutional developments" in this territory. Uganda was "developing rapidly and comparatively peacefully on the political front." He also volunteered information that "official thinking visualises that the Congo will eventually become completely independent and that it is the hope that it will be possible for Belgium to establish something akin to the Commonwealth link with the Congo."

³⁵⁷ Morocco got its independence on 03-03-1956; Tunisia on 20-03-1956; by 1960, all French territories in Africa had become independent except Algeria (French Somaliland and the Comores were under full French control.)

³⁵⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. From: McInnes, Commonwealth Division To: Glazebrook, European Division, April 10, 1957; RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. Memorandum From: European Division To: Commonwealth Division, September 18, 1958. Restricted. Subject: French Overseas Territories. "This Division is following closely the development of the French constitutional reform. The present and future position of the French Overseas Territories is of importance in any consideration of this question and we are therefore particularly interested in seeing as soon as possible the letters coming from Paris on this particular subject. Under the present arrangement whereby your Division has primary responsibility for communications having to do with French African Territories, we have found distribution procedures delay reports from Paris with the result that they have been reaching us too late to be taken into account in the general assessments which we have been preparing on constitutional reform. Canadian interests and developments in the A.O.F. and A.E.F. and Madagascar will, I think, continue to centre on Constitutional Problems for some time to come. It therefore seems to us that this Division could logically...take responsibility for affairs in those territories. This would relieve your Division of a responsibility to which I understand you cannot give a very high priority. I would suggest, therefore, that for the time being at least the files on this subject be transferred to European Division. From: Commonwealth Division To: European Division, September 19, 1958. Restricted. "In agreement that both the subject and files concerned could be transferred...."

³⁵⁹ From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch No: 366, April 11, 1957. In the opinion of the Ambassador: "The R.D.A. favours close cooperation with France, and a large degree of autonomy within the territories. It considers the human and social emancipation of the African people more important than national independence. The Convention africaine is grouped around M. Léopold Senghor, the leader of the Bloc populaire sénégalais, a deputy belonging to the Indépendants d'outre-mer (I.O.M.) group in the National Assembly. It favours a territorial regroupment with a federal government and Parliament for A.O.F. in Dakar, itself part of a large Franco-African federation. It fears that the R.D.A. platform will lead to the 'balkanisation' of A.O.F. The Mouvement socialiste africain, which is linked with the French Socialist Party, is opposed to a fusion of parties. It has spoken in favour of 'independence of the individual before independence of peoples', though certain militant socialists in Sénégal have spoken of 'the right to independence of peoples'."

³⁶⁰ Ibid., for details of the elections in the individual territories.

³⁶¹ RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40. Dawson, Commonwealth Division, Weekly Divisional Note. April 24, 1957. "Election results in French Overseas Territories."

³⁶² RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. Dispatch No: 366. April 11, 1957.

³⁶³ From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa. Dispatch No: 398. April 27, 1957. Restricted.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40. Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Summary of Despatch No: 421 of May 9, 1957. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa. Unclassified. This Summary was given this Security Grading because the original document contained sensitive material and was removed from the file. On April 4, 1957, the French Government issued a series of decrees which, according to the Ambassador, "will move to decentralise French territories in Central and Equatorial Africa and Madagascar and will at the same time accord each of these Territories a degree of internal self-government. Under the new arrangement...more effective power will rest with the individual unit."

³⁶⁶ The Colonial Powers had been aware of this problem and were already active in the technical field. See: RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. DEA Memorandum. From: Dawson To: McInnes. May 8, 1957. Confidential. Bourdillon of the Colonial Office briefed Dawson in Ottawa on the CCTA (Commission de Cooperation Technique en Afrique du Sud du Sahara), a very 'effective' co-operative effort by the UK, France, Belgium, Portugal, South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in the Technical Assistance field. Office in London and run by a French Secretary General. Since this organisation "carried some stigma of colonialism," Bourdillon was 'doubtful' whether Ghana would join after gaining independence.

³⁶⁷ From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: Commonwealth Division, Ottawa. No: 530, June 13, 1957.

³⁶⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. DEA Memorandum. From: Dawson To: McInnes. May 8, 1957. Confidential.

³⁶⁹ RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/160, Vol: 79. File: 5475-FA-41-40 pt.1. From: Permanent Mission, N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 904 Immediate, March 22, 1957. Confidential: Canadian Eyes Only.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., and RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/160 Vol: 79 File: 5475-FA-41-40 pt.1. Informal Record of a Meeting held in the CRO, London, April 26, 1957. Mr. Pink - Foreign Office: "In the 81 member body...the Western Powers could not count on securing the passage through the General Assembly of any resolution which was not acceptable to the Afro-Asian group. It was clear that the Assembly was not a reliable or effective organ for dealing with questions of national security."

³⁷¹ No: 904 Immediate, March 22, 1957 and Meeting held in the CRO, London, April 26, 1957. Mr. Smith - Canada House. "In the Canadian view it could be very costly to all of us if, in fact, the United Nations were weakened, either through cynicism or a deliberate policy of by-passing it. There was also danger, in the Canadian view, that West European hostility toward the United Nations might serve to isolate those countries from other parts of the world and to encourage those tendencies in the United Nations which we all regret...i.e. to alienate the Afro-Asians and to weaken rather than strengthen Western influence among the uncommitted parts of the world. If the West did not take an active part in the United Nations the field would be left to others who would do so....Moreover, it seemed to Canada illusory to believe that better solutions could be found outside the United Nations to most of the difficult problems which we faced."

³⁷² No: 904. Immediate, March 22, 1957.

Chapter IV: Canada's Interpretation and Policy - The UN Charter on Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing-Territories

The Mandate System was more or less a justification of the retention of the spoils of war. According to Plano and Riggs, "independence did not satisfy the security demands of some of the allies, and there was general agreement that most of the territories outside of Europe were not ready for it."¹ What, in Ottawa's perception, was the real purpose of the Trusteeship System? Was this system, in principle, a continuation of the Mandate System in a more sophisticated way? The task of the first part of this chapter is to discover how Canada interpreted Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter, which they explicitly recognised the authority of Colonial Powers in Trust Territories. Actually, these two chapters sanctioned the right of ownership under the illusion of a trust. There is no inherent reason why such a right should have existed in the first place. In general, anti-colonials did not accept the claim by Western powers to this right. For example, Sir Maharaj Singh of India suggested that the UN should become the Administering Authority for all colonies. In practice, anti-colonials repudiated the idea of a trust as the white man's burden and attempted to give their own meaning to the concept of a trust, international obligations and responsibilities towards dependent peoples.

On the other hand, Canada seemed to have accepted the premise of a self-evident right of ownership and, therefore, sought to design its policy in keeping with the Charter in regard to Trust Territories. These were two

fundamentally rigid attitudes that were diametrically opposed in terms of means and goals; they represented conflicting demands and interpretations of fundamental standards such as 'progress' and 'development' in Trust Territories. In the second part of this chapter we will concentrate on Canada's interpretation of Chapter XI of the Charter which was specific to the rest of the colonial empire. We will seek to discover which factors were influential in the evolution of Canada's policy in this area and on the colonial issue as a whole. Our endeavour, in this chapter, is to understand how officials saw this issue and what kind of ideas were associated with it. This will enable us to explain policy; that is, the aims and means and how they were intended to influence the process and goals of the UN.

Part I: Trust Territories

Chapter XII and XIII of the UN Charter set up the Trusteeship System for a selected group of dependent peoples.² It seemed to reflect a recognition of a collective and international responsibility in this area. The principle of trust was never intended to have a generally indiscriminate application. And because it allowed for UN involvement, albeit a limited one in the progressive 'development' of Trust Territories, the Trusteeship System was also not a very popular one. South Africa's adamant refusal to place South West Africa under this system is a case in point. This was also an understandable position because the Trusteeship System was an implicit rejection of the concept of sole ownership of colonial

territories. To some extent, it made these territories the business of the UN. This actually meant that the international community had a share in deciding when the inhabitants of Trust Territories had achieved "a state of political advancement enabling them to choose the form of government they want and to decide on the relationship which they wish to have with other political entities."³ Only then, is sovereignty conferred upon them.

The exact nature of this collective and selective international responsibility of a trust was outlined in Article 76; Article 83(1) dealt with 'strategic' trusteeship. The basic objectives of the Trusteeship System, laid down in Article 1 of the Charter, were to:

- a) to further international peace and security;
- b) to promote the political economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories, and independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its people and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each Trusteeship Agreement;
- c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world;
- d) to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

In Article I(2) of the Charter, members were to 'strengthen' international peace. According to the first operative principle, they were to 'further' international peace and security.

What did this system of 'trust' have to do with these aspects of international relations? We will undertake to explain Canada's interpretation of

how the Charter intended that Trust Territories be used in securing international peace. The qualifier in the second operative principle, "as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory," effectively left the Colonial Powers relatively unfettered in their interpretation of 'advancement' and 'development' in their territories. The third operative principle recognised the need "to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world." What exactly did this mean? And who would determine in what way and under what terms 'interdependence' would function? In view of the history of unequal colonial relationships, could the Colonial Powers be trusted to be fair and just in determining how their territories would serve in this vision of interdependence?

Evidently, the drafters of the Charter did perceive some sort of inter-relatedness between Trust Territories and the ability of Colonial Powers to maintain and secure international peace. How was interdependence translated into tangible terms in the military sphere? And what were the implications of this interdependence? Surely such arrangements were not supposed to be of a permanent nature because subject peoples could eventually 'advance' and become sovereign nations. Or, were they not supposed to 'advance' too rapidly? Considerations of international peace and security were of a primary nature because they were fundamental to the stability of international economic and commercial relationships and the standard of living in Western democracies. Therefore, security matters could not be subject to the vagaries of peoples who were not sufficiently advanced to be able to 'determine' themselves. Could this be taken as a motive for designing a system of trust? The other basic objective of

this system was "to ensure equal treatment on social, economic and commercial matters for all members of the United Nations and their nationals and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice...." This comprehensive program of "equal treatment" was, in fact, intended to secure the rights for aliens inside Trust Territories. All prior pretensions to carrying out the white man's burden in colonial areas were dropped. Instead, the "basic objectives" were outlined and legally secured under the Charter.

The objective of the fourth operative paragraph was to 'ensure' that the system of trust functioned in the service of the international community. It gave an open right of passage not only to UN members, that is, sovereign nations, but also to their nationals. We suggest that this was a revolutionary idea in international relations whereby the concept of sovereignty became a very fluid and relative one. In addition to the classic meaning of sovereignty, as understood in Article 2(7), there was a different interpretation of sovereignty in the new UN concept of trust. The UN now gave not only all UN members rights in Trust Territories, it also specified that nationals of members had rights as individuals, under international law, to engage themselves inside Trust Territories. This arrangement was to "ensure equal treatment" for these alien individuals even "in the administration of justice" inside Trust Territories. The UN was securing individual rights at the international level. But these individual rights were only operative inside Trust Territories and not in member states. This implied that Trust Territories were, in fact, the property of the international community.

The UN system of trust laid upon the Administering Authorities, the responsibility to 'ensure' a just and fair treatment of 'alien' individuals and nations that chose to engage in an interdependent relationship with Trust Territories. But if we are to accept the assumption that peoples of Trust Territories were not yet 'civilised' but must 'develop' and 'advance,' for this was the justification of the Trusteeship System, then we must also accept the premise that they were not capable of determining whether they were treated fairly and justly in this relationship of interdependence. In the final analysis, it is still the Administering Authority that would be the 'capable' party in determining the operational limits of 'interdependence.' How did this new UN system of trust differ in substance, from the old colonial relationship? And why was there a need to put a new label on this old system? And how is this new and even more exploitative arrangement concomitant with the principle that dependent peoples were a sacred trust of the civilised world?

Any appreciation of the ultimate purpose of Canada's policy necessarily requires an awareness of its guiding principles and motivation. According to Holmes, officials in Ottawa "clung, more or less, to the liberal concept...that 'every state, by pursuing the greatest good of the whole world, is pursuing the greatest good of its own citizens, and vice versa'."⁴ The cardinal question is, can we expect to find that officials were concerned with designing a policy which would contribute to "equal treatment" and 'interdependence,' in colonial areas? How much flexibility did Chapters XI, XII and XIII allow for such a goal? In chapter V of this study, we seek to identify what the actual goals of the

Colonial Powers were in setting up the system of trust. In our analysis of the positions in the battle over very tangible assets: control over natural resources and access to markets, we discover what officials in Ottawa meant by "equal treatment" and 'interdependence' in their substantive policy on the international distribution of goods. But first, we must establish which rules were operative in Canada's understanding of the purpose and function of the Trusteeship System and Chapter XIII in regard to the Non-Self-Governing-Territories.

According to Lincoln Bloomfield, "colonial rule, however enlightened, carries with it the attributes of racial superiority, economic exploitation, and social humiliation."⁵ Our subject matter is a complex one and we must avoid the danger of oversimplification when searching for explanation of policy. Nevertheless, it is impossible to discuss Canada's preferences on how the structural mechanisms should function in the resolution of this issue, without having to consider the underlying and substantive concerns which were inherent in a colonial relationship. The words of Louis Henkin admirably portray how the attributes of colonial rule are interrelated:

Every human being has, or is entitled to have, 'rights' - legitimate, valid, justified claims - upon his or her society; claims to various 'goods' and benefits. Human rights are not some abstract, incoherent 'good;' they are defined and are particular claims listed in international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the major covenants and conventions. They are those benefits deemed essential for individual well-being, dignity, and fulfilment, and that reflect a common sense of justice, fairness and decency.⁶

Trusteeship Agreements

Article 79 of the Charter stipulated that the terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the Trusteeship System "shall be agreed upon by states directly concerned." Important points of issue were agreements that allowed for administrative, customs or fiscal unions which considered each Trust Territory "as an integral part" of the neighbouring colony, the right of Administering Authorities to set up military installations in their Trust Territories and the need to "preserve a clear distinction" between the functions of administration and of supervision.⁷ We will examine the conflicting positions in order to discover where Canada's policy rested in the process to establish this new system of trust.

The Colonial Powers repudiated anti-colonial claims to have the right to alter Trusteeship Agreements that were presented to the General Assembly for approval.⁸ According to Côté of Canada, the Sub-Committee entrusted with this job "was not there to negotiate but to ascertain whether or not the agreement was in accordance with the Charter and whether it could be approved or not."⁹ The colonials also argued that only members "which had legal title" to the territories "had the right" to oppose the enforcement of Trusteeship Agreements.¹⁰ This position provided a major incentive for members to have themselves categorised as being "directly concerned."

Krishna Menon sought to establish such a status for India. He claimed that, after the First World War, the UK government had considered "the

possibility of giving" to India the administration of German East Africa under a League of Nations mandate. He explained that because of India's "anti-imperialistic feelings," at the time, "the matter had been dropped." However, in view of "the considerable amount of resources, in men and material, which constituted the overwhelming Indian contribution to the conquest of German East Africa," Menon felt that India should be considered a state "directly concerned." Moreover, he argued that India also had a 'right' to be considered because of 'strategic' reasons and the large "permanently established" Indian population in Tanganyika: 35,000 to 40,000 versus only about 8,000 Europeans. Most important was India's belief that legislative or administrative policies "threatened Indian interests" in Tanganyika.¹¹ According to Menon, in the Mandates, a latent title rested with the people; operatively, however, title laid with the Allied and Associated Powers. India, having been one of those powers, therefore had a claim as a state "directly concerned." Menon argued that since the demise of the League of Nations, the territory reverted to the allied and associated powers or to the United Nations.¹²

In principle, this was an argument for the justification, rather than a rejection, of the system of ownership of peoples and territories as spoils of war. From the above premise, we can deduce that India wanted to be considered a state "directly concerned" in order to secure its own interests. This was not necessarily in the interest of the inhabitants of Tanganyika. Menon explained that India "was very much interested in the part that the territory could play in the system of common defence of that area." Moreover, he pointed out that

"considerable trade was also maintained between the two countries." In admitting that Indian interests "were very great indeed," Menon went on to explain why India was pressing for the status as a state directly concerned: "...a state directly concerned was entitled to the right of negotiation with the administering power, in order that a suitable Trusteeship Agreement might be produced."¹³ An agreement suitable to whom? In view of India's interests here, could the well-being of the inhabitants of Tanganyika have priority over that of India's? What made this position any different from that of the Colonial Powers under these circumstances? Because of the provisions for international supervision of the administration of Trust Territories, would it also not be in the interest of colonial peoples to limit the number of states that might be "directly concerned" in Trust Territories? In the opinion of Dulles of the USA, the onus was on the members to come up with arrangements in which the inhabitants would be "enjoying the benefits of the Trusteeship System."¹⁴

Military Installations

According to Ottawa, the Mandate System "was designed to guarantee the well-being and development of inhabitants of territories under foreign control."¹⁵ These were classified according to their assessed status of 'development.' The Trusteeship System also operated on the premise of 'development.' However, it went one step further than the Mandate System in that it was "expected to further" international peace and security "as well as"

promoting the development of the inhabitants. According to Ottawa, "fortifications and the establishment of military and naval bases are therefore permitted" in Trust Territories¹⁶ whereas, in the mandates, "they were either not mentioned at all or were expressly prohibited."¹⁷

What was the catalyst for this dramatic change? The Trusteeship System became a contentious issue from the outset between the Soviet Union and the Colonial Powers. Self interest was the basis of contention. In the words of Sir Carl Berendsen of New Zealand:

The result of the neutralisation of the mandated territories had been almost tragic and as a result New Zealand had been gravely imperilled during the war. At San Francisco, however, the view had been accepted that those neutralising provisions should be omitted from the trusteeship chapters of the Charter. As a result, the Trust Territories were now free from that restriction.¹⁸

This new arrangement was obviously designed with the interests of the administering states in mind. And it is for this specific reason that Sir Maharaj Singh of India introduced a resolution in 1946 proposing that the United Nations should 'become' the Administering Authority for all Trust Territories.¹⁹ He argued that this organisation "would be more impartial in its administration than any single State, which would tend to consider its own interests."²⁰

Theoretically and practically, this arrangement would have been in the specific interests of the inhabitants of Trust Territories. And as the Indian delegate further suggested, "by exercising a greater control over the establishment of military bases," the UN would effectively "limit the dangers to world peace and security." If the above were the expressed goals of the Trusteeship System, and since the recommendations of the Indian delegate

could have adequately achieved these goals, why were they rejected?²¹ In principle, India's proposal to replace the Colonial Powers with an international civil service was an anti-colonial one. It was obvious that the Colonial Powers would not agree to such a proposal which relieved them of their burden of trust. Singh claimed that India "did not want the Trust Territories to be treated as colonies or even as mandated territories but rather as peoples to be prepared for independence at the earliest possible moment."²² To what degree did the Colonial Powers consider such a recommendation as worthy of any consideration? They could not have felt compelled to take such a position into consideration when Menon insisted that India be recognised as a state "directly concerned" in the British Trust Territory of Tanganyika.²³

By the end of November 1946, the Fourth Committee was occupied with an examination of the draft Trusteeship Agreement for Western Samoa which was submitted for approval by the New Zealand Government. Because fundamental questions of the purpose of the Trusteeship System were addressed, in great detail, this draft became a basis from which other Trusteeship Agreements were to be assessed and approved. According to Ottawa, the Canadian Delegation at San Francisco did not participate actively in the drafting of the trusteeship sections of the Charter, "since the administration of dependent territories outside the metropolitan area was a matter of which Canada had no direct experience."²⁴ Therefore, the Delegation concentrated on giving its interpretation of the meaning of Charter stipulations in areas of contention. Article X of the draft agreement for Western Samoa dealt with the

question of military bases and fortifications in Trust Territories. This was a major issue on the interpretations of the Charter by the USSR, India and the Colonial Powers.

In view of the neutralisation provision in the Mandate System and "great strategic importance" of some of the Trust Territories,²⁵ the Administering Authorities were determined to establish an unfettered right to have military installations in their Trust Territories. It was obvious that this was a primary motive in replacing the Mandate System with the Trusteeship System. At issue were the degree of militarization, the purpose of such and to whom the Administering Authorities would be answerable. The USSR Delegation initiated the contentions dialogue by attempting to set stringent limits on the right of the Administering Authorities to utilise their Trust Territories for military purposes. According to Dulles of the USA, in the Soviet interpretation, Article 84 of the Charter was clear in that "except for purposes of local defence and the maintenance of law and order, no fortifications could be erected except as part of a universal system based on specific agreements to be negotiated under Article 43 of the Charter, on the initiative of the Security Council."²⁶ This position obviously sought to ensure direct Soviet involvement and a veto right in the Western system of militarisation.

Thomas of the UK interpreted the intent of the drafters differently. First of all, he rejected the Soviet recommendation that the Administering Authorities should categorise those Trust Territories in which military installations are established as strategic areas. Thomas explained that in Article 82 "there was no

intimation concerning what constituted a strategic area." Berendsen also agreed with Thomas that the classification of Trust Territories "was clearly left to the discretion" of the Administering Authorities concerned. Moreover, Thomas pointed out that Article 84 "was entirely general in its application and there was no suggestion that it was limited to strategic areas."²⁷

Dulles rejected the Soviet stand and, like the UK Delegation, insisted that Article 84 "required the participation" of the Trust Territories in the "maintenance of world peace." In this view, it was clear that military installations had to exceed anything that was necessary for local defence. In addition, Dulles submitted that Article 51 "recognised the inherent right of self-defence, which surely applied equally to Trust Territories," especially in light of the experience of the last war, he wanted to know if the Soviet Union "wanted those territories again to be defenceless." For Naggia of France, the USSR-USA dialogue "had application beyond" the issues raised in the draft agreement under consideration. Any involvement of the Security Council or reference to "strategic areas" would automatically include Articles 82 and 83 of the Charter as a frame of reference and that would alter the context in which Trusteeship Agreements must be approved. He argued that

If Article X of the draft agreement for Western Samoa was considered to come under Article 82, then all the other Trust Territories would likewise have to come under the Security Council. That would in effect, be a decision that the General Assembly was incompetent with respect to Trust Territories and that the Security Council was the competent authority.²⁸

But this was not the intent of the Charter in regard to Trust Territories. The veto of the Soviet Union, in the Security Council, would effectively alter the

operational context of the Trusteeship System. Built in safeguards, like the proposed composition of the membership in the Trusteeship Council, would become irrelevant. Moreover, this new categorisation of Trust Territories would allow direct Soviet involvement, in the actual situation, in each Trust Territory. Naggiar felt that "it was clear" that the General Assembly "did have authority" in the Trusteeship System and he cautioned the members not to "propose anything which tend to diminish the power of the General Assembly and increase the power of the Security Council." In his opinion, Article X was in conformity with the Charter. Moreover, he was careful to point out that Article X was concerned with provisions for local security. He argued that whatever 'participation' which might be needed in "a world security scheme" did fall within the limits and jurisdiction of the General Assembly. It was therefore essential "that the powers of the General Assembly in approving the draft agreements should be maintained."

The French Delegation rejected the Soviet attempt to alter the structure of the Trusteeship System as it was conceived at San Francisco. For the Colonial Powers and Canada, the Charter conception would continue to determine the operational context of the Trusteeship System. From the outset, this was the central issue. Berendsen of New Zealand was adamant that the Charter "made it clear" that the Administering Authorities "had not only the right, but the duty," to provide for the defence of the Trust Territories. Moreover, he pointed out that Article 82 "left to the Administering Authorities the decision as to whether a Trust Territory should be designated as strategic." His government had decided that Western Samoa should not be a strategic area. He believed that if

the members understood what the Charter intended to do, with a strategic trust, then the entire controversy would not exist. Simply put, "the concept of strategic areas had not been adopted in order to give the Administering Authorities the powers necessary for defence of the Trust Territories." Like Dulles of the USA, he believed that that right was an 'inherent' one and in any case, Article 84 had provided for local defence.²⁹

According to Berendsen, the idea of strategic areas "was intended to permit the great powers, who enjoyed the right of veto in the Security Council, to ensure that there would be no unnecessary interference in territories where such interference could not be tolerated." That was clearly "a restriction on full supervision" of the international community which was logistically impossible to implement. He wanted to know how could New Zealand "be expected to place Western Samoa under the Security Council, in which it was not represented, had no vote, and in which any one of five members could stop any action, not only by an adverse vote, but by abstention or mere absence."³⁰

It was in the interest of the inhabitants that the UN should be able to utilise its full supervisory powers in colonial areas. Therefore, it is somewhat puzzling that any member, claiming to be interested in the well-being of the inhabitants, would press for a strategic trusteeship or show preference for the authority of the Security Council over that of the General Assembly in the Trust Territories. Here is evidence for a functional role of the self-interest of the Soviet Union. And because of the bi-polar configuration of the period, it was obvious that

what was deemed to be in the interest of the Communist sphere could not necessarily be in the interest of the Western democratic nations.

And what did India's objections to the Trusteeship Agreement intend to achieve? This is relevant for establishing the anti-colonial definition of the situation and the framework for Canada's decision makers. In India's perception, the Trust Territories were to have a different status from previous colonial arrangements.³¹ Menon argued that Article X would allow Trust Territories to be used as military bases for the Administrative Authorities; the result would be "to remove the basis of trusteeship and of collective peace." This sort of argument laid the onus on the Administrative Authorities to show that this was not their intent in the Trusteeship Agreements. And Canada had to find an explanation to support them in this task. Menon did not want to approve an agreement that "would be merely a re-hash of the imperial system." He was convinced that the concept embodied in Article X...was intended primarily for the defence of the metropolitan Country." And his concern centred around Colonial Powers "developing armaments in Territories which had previously been neutralised and which did not belong to them."³²

In principle, the argument of the Indian Delegation approximated that of the Soviet Union. Menon argued that "the only condition" under which Trust Territories could become military bases "would be if that were necessary" for peace and security, and they 'should' then come under the authority of the Security Council.³³ However, India did not 'object' to the militarization which was required for "local defence" under Article X. Administering Authorities were to

observe the 'restriction' of any militarization to "volunteer forces, facilities and assistance." On the other hand, Menon proposed that if the General Assembly decided not to approve the Trusteeship Agreement for Western Samoa, then "the situation would revert to mandate status and New Zealand would have no basis for arming the territory." It is obvious that such a proposal was not acceptable to Western members.

This was the operational context in which Canada felt compelled to take the position that Article X was 'consistent' with the Charter and therefore any 'request' to alter the agreement will not be supported by Canada. Countering the interpretation of the Article 43 by the Soviet delegate, Coté of Canada simply argued that all members of the UN "undertook to make available" to the Security Council necessary military support under special circumstances and Article 83 to 85 were operative in such cases. He did not agree with the interpretations put forward by the Soviet and Indian Delegations. It was implicit that, in both the strategic areas and all other Trust Territories, the Administering Authorities "might use" volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the Trust Territories in the fulfilment of obligations undertaken towards the Security Council "as well as" for local purposes.³⁴ Coté reiterated the views expressed by the Colonial Powers and proposed that "the question at issue was whether the Administering Authorities would be required to declare as strategic areas the parts of Trust Territories in which military installations were to be established."

This was a different interpretation from that given by Menon and the Soviet delegate. Coté ignored the fact that they were referring to Trust Territories,

as a whole. At no time did they make reference to "parts of" Trust Territories. In addition, Côté reminded the Committee that "the attempt to introduce such a concept at San Francisco had been rejected" by twenty-six votes to two. And in order to retain the substance of the original Charter concept, the Canadian Delegation "could not subscribe to an attempt to introduce that concept" in a Trusteeship Agreement. Côté reasoned that "the approval of that principle would inevitably lead to the conclusion that all Trust Territories should be strategic areas, which was clearly not the intention of the Charter."³⁵ Berendsen had already pointed out the significance of categorising all Trust Territories, as Strategic Areas, especially in view of the fact that some Administering Authorities were not permanent members of the Security Council. The approval of such a categorisation was tantamount to removing certain Administering Authorities from their colonial territories. Surely this was not the intent of the Charter.

The Canadian argument, in regard to the rights and duty of the Administering Authorities, corresponded very closely to that of the USA and was, logically, diametrically opposed to those of the Soviet Union and India. According to Côté,

The Trusteeship System differed from the Mandates System in that an Administering Authority would have the duty, under Article 84, of ensuring that the Trust Territory for which it was responsible should play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. That duty was inserted deliberately for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories. They would not in the future be left unprotected and they must be encouraged to play a part in the system of international peace and security.³⁶

He dismissed the suggestion that, if Article 43 were not to become operative under Article 84, the Trust Territory had no function in the international system of

world security. He was adamant that, even in this case, the Administering Authority "would still have the duty of ensuring participation by the Trust Territory" in the international system. He therefore concluded: "since the Administering Authority had that duty, it also had a corresponding right to the means to discharge the duty."

This was an argument in defence of the Trusteeship System as embodied in the Charter. Coté felt that Article X 'provided' for those means which New Zealand needed as an Administering Authority to "discharge its duty" in Western Samoa. Most interesting was the 'Canadian' interpretation that, "although [Article X] did not require the Administering Authority to utilise the powers granted, [it] clearly established the powers which the Administering Authority had." In addition, Coté declared that each Trusteeship Agreement "was a contract between two juridical personalities - the General Assembly and the Administering Authority concerned." This position was a crucial element of support for the Administering Authorities in face of the anti-colonial onslaught in the UN. Coté claimed that, if the Soviet and Indian proposals were successfully integrated in the Trusteeship Agreement to bring Western Samoa "within the orbit" of the Security Council, the Trust Territory would become "a strategic pawn." And he suggested that the only way to avoid this 'danger' was "if Western Samoa remained indisputably under the constant supervision of the General Assembly and of the Trusteeship Council, and if the Administering Authority had the power to discharge the duties conferred upon it by the Charter."³⁷

Administrative Unions

Another controversial aspect of some Trusteeship Agreements was the Administrative Union of the Trust Territory with its neighbouring colony. Under this arrangement the Trust Territory was considered, for all intents and purposes, "an integral part" of the colony. In early 1947, Ottawa explained its position to the Delegation this way:

Canada yielded to the wish of the Administering Authorities to retain the right to administer Trust Territories "as an integral part" of their own territory, on the understanding that the phrase did not imply sovereignty over the Trust Territory and that it did not diminish the political individuality of the Trust Territory.³⁸

In 1949, Ottawa realised that the interpretation of the phrase "as an integral part" had become "a political issue which occupied much time" in both the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly.³⁹ Three years later, the USA saw it as "one of the important and continuing problems" confronting the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly."⁴⁰

Ottawa believed that the concept of Administrative Unions became a political issue because of the Soviet suggestion, in the Fourth Committee, that existing or proposed Administrative Unions "should be dissolved." The Colonial Powers rejected this notion, outright, and argued that a Trusteeship Agreement could include customs, fiscal or Administrative Unions with adjacent colonies, provided that they were not 'inconsistent' with the purposes of the Trusteeship System and the Charter.⁴¹ For Canada the sole point at issue was whether or not such unions were 'compatible' with the Charter.⁴² On the other hand, Dulles of

the USA was concerned about the legal status of the arrangement. He wanted to know how international trade might be affected because of monopolies.⁴³ He also wanted to know whether "he was correct in understanding" that the words "as an integral part of New Zealand," in Article III of the proposed Trusteeship Agreement over Western Samoa, "should be interpreted to mean 'as if it were an integral part'."⁴⁴

Menon complained that "the interpretation advanced by Mr. Dulles seemed to him actually to strengthen the meaning which he questioned."⁴⁵ Menon submitted that because the trusteeship over dependent peoples were intended to be "only for a temporary period," the status "as an integral part" would present problems for the Trust Territories at a later date. In his opinion, "if the Trust Territories were to be made integral parts of the administering states, rebellion or secession would be necessary for the realisation of their independence." He concluded that the concept of administration "as an integral part" was 'inconsistent' with the Charter. Furthermore, he argued that it was not incompatible with the Trusteeship Principle "that the relation of the Administering Authority to the Trust Territory was temporary and external, namely, that of a trustee to a ward."

In the case study on British Togoland, we will show how Menon conveniently forgot these fundamentals which he attempted to secure, as operational guideline, in the establishment of the Trusteeship System. This had disastrous consequences for the people of the Trust Territory and a functional role in setting a precedent whereby a Trusteeship Agreement could be

terminated. The cardinal question here is, if the Indian delegate was genuinely concerned with operative principles and the well-being of the inhabitants in the setting up of the Trusteeship System, why did these concerns not arise during the process to terminate the first Trusteeship Agreement?

Berendsen of New Zealand assured the Indian delegate that his government "did not claim and had never claimed that Western Samoa was an integral part of New Zealand; it merely wanted the right, which it already had under the mandate, to administer Western Samoa as an integral part of New Zealand." He also rejected Menon's suggestion that "a tentative time limit" should be set for the attainment of Samoan independence on the ground that it would be "completely impractical."⁴⁶ The draft agreement submitted by Australia for New Guinea was the next subject under consideration. Article 5 of this draft 'allowed' for the administration of New Guinea as part of a customs or fiscal union. Menon wanted to know if this arrangement "was not contrary to the principle of trusteeship," for two reasons. First, because this provision "might bring" the Trust Territory "into the sphere of colonial rule" it could not be for the benefit of its inhabitants. This was typically an anti-colonial assumption. And because of the danger that this arrangement could effectively 'assimilate' the Trust Territory, he sought some 'assurance' in the draft agreement that "no loss of identity would be involved."

Bailey of Australia argued that "it might not be beneficial to New Guinea to be administered separately from other territories having similar conditions." After all, was not the interest of the inhabitants at the heart of the

Trusteeship System? The second reason which Menon gave was not necessarily in the best interest of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. He claimed that the union "would operate against the rights of other members" of the United Nations.⁴⁷ Who were they and why should other members have rights in a Trust Territory? Was Menon actually seeking to secure Indian interests in that part of the world? He specifically referred to Australia's "discriminatory legislation concerning immigration" and wanted to know how this would "conform with Article 76(d) of the Charter which ensured equal treatment in Trust Territories for members of the UN."

Bailey explained that because Australia intended to administer this trust "in accordance" with the Charter, Article 76(d) was applicable. Nevertheless, he insisted that his government would continue to "control immigration in the interest of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories." As in the past, that control of entry would continue to apply to "nationals of all countries, including Australia itself." In spite of this explanation, Menon complained that "he was not satisfied with the provision concerning the application of Australian Laws...as it affected Member States." He "would appreciate some accommodation on the part of Australia" in this respect. Clearly, a major part of his concern centred on this aspect of the proposed union in the draft. The aim was to clarify points of potential conflict which would involve the rights and self-interest of UN members in Trust Territories. It was definitely not a position which could, in principle, be characterised as anti-colonial. Menon sought to establish alien rights in colonial

territories where the inhabitants were deemed not yet capable of deciding what is in their best interest.

Menon declared that "although he subscribed fully to the doctrine of trusteeship, [he] refused to subscribe to the violation of its essential principles."⁴⁸ And he explained that his opposition to certain aspects of the draft Trusteeship Agreements did not have the aim of preventing the approval of the agreements: "on the contrary, they [members of his Delegation] were insisting that the Trusteeship System conform to the basic principles and the expressed provisions of the Charter."⁴⁹ Because the Trusteeship Agreements set conditions for the administration and supervision of Trust Territories, the process to approve the Trusteeship Agreements was an important one for showing how the members chose to interpret the Charter stipulations in light of their own interests and preferences. This jockeying of interests and professed principles set the tone for the decolonisation of empires. Some members were not content to concern themselves with whether Administrative Unions were inconsistent or compatible with the Charter stipulations.

Additional anti-colonial suggestions were adopted by the Fourth Committee but rejected by the General Assembly. One recommendation was that "any final decision in regard to Administrative Unions should be 'deferred' until the inhabitants of the Trust Territories could actively participate in creating the kind of political arrangement they wanted."⁵⁰ This would automatically entail an indefinite waiting period until the international community could establish political maturity of the inhabitants. In other words, deferral would serve to kill the idea of

Administrative Unions. Another suggestion was that the Administering Authorities consult the Trusteeship Council "before establishing or extending the scope" of Administrative Unions. This was clearly an attempt to interfere with the formulation of the conditions of these unions and Ottawa felt that this was no business of the international community, as long as unions were not in contravention of the Charter objectives of the Trusteeship System.

In 1946 the UK expressed the opinion that a 'primary' criterion was whether any proposed amendments "would result in a Trusteeship Agreement more advantageous to the inhabitants of the territory concerned."⁵¹ And the UK Delegation had reminded the Fourth Committee then, that it was not "a drafting body, but a body charged with the duty of advising the General Assembly whether the texts of the Trusteeship Agreements should be approved or not." This was the task before the Committee, and the various attempts to alter the text of the proposed agreements were perceived by the Administering Authorities to have the sole aim of political controversy.

At the time, the UK Delegation felt "justified in pointing out that the texts of the draft agreements have been under careful preparation over a period of sixteen months, and that a number of amendments were made as a result of suggestions by other governments before the texts were submitted to the Secretary General,"⁵² for approval. In spite of this, the Delegations of the USSR and India had proposed that reference to an "integral part" should be deleted from the draft agreements for both the Cameroons and Togoland under British mandate. Whereupon the UK Delegation brought to their attention "the specific

circumstances" of these two Trust Territories which he felt did "justify the retention" of the integral part, in the paragraph.⁵³ Menon declared that the provision in the Trusteeship Agreements for administration "as an integral part" was a violation of fundamental principles. He saw no legal guarantees against assimilation for the inhabitants because "declarations made in that regard had little value, as they were not part of the agreements;" moreover, the agreements "contained provisions to the contrary."⁵⁴ More specifically, Menon pointed out:

The statements of the French representative affirming that this phrase did not imply French sovereignty over the territories covered by the French agreements were invalidated by the appearance before the Committee of a member of the French Parliament who was a citizen of the Cameroons, a territory under French administration. It would have been impossible for him to be elected to the sovereign Parliament of France, unless the Cameroons were under French sovereignty.⁵⁵

This interpretation was similar to the one which Ottawa made to its Delegation to the UN on August 23: "...the mandated territories [Cameroons and Togoland] have already been partly assimilated to the French Empire." The evidence for such a conclusion was the fact that, after the re-organisation of the French Empire, both territories "were invited to elect representatives to the French Constituent Assembly;" additionally, they were to be "represented permanently" in the French National Assembly.⁵⁶ In spite of this situation, Article 4 A1 of the French draft to the Trusteeship Agreement for these two Mandates stated that the French Government "has clearly expressed its determination not to annex the two territories under French Mandate since it has offered, with a full knowledge of its obligations and responsibilities, to place them under the Trusteeship System."⁵⁷ Since no alterations were made to the existing

arrangement for representation, did France expect that the provision "as an integral part" would facilitate the process of assimilation even under the Trusteeship System? Menon saw this as a point of contention. And since France was, in fact, proceeding towards incorporation or assimilation of these Trust Territories, in a systematic way, how credible were the assurances of the Administering Authorities?

In functional terms, this was not necessarily a relevant consideration. In the opinion of Bailey, "distinction had not been adequately drawn between the constitutional nature of the draft agreement and the subsequent exercise of legislative and administrative functions thereunder."⁵⁸ In other words, the critics of the Trusteeship Agreements were ignoring the very fundamental criterion of international supervision in the Trusteeship System. They were arguing from the assumption that Trusteeship Agreements would stand alone as operative imperatives. Bailey explained that a draft agreement "was an attempt to avoid future doubts concerning the Administering Authority's powers in reasonable foreseeable contingencies." Certain basic rights and obligations were being established. He argued that "it was obviously desirable to make possible common services," under normal circumstances. However, he insisted that the critics should not forget that the 'application' of provisions for a custom or fiscal union "would be subject to discussion and supervision" by the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly.⁵⁹

In 1948, the General Assembly decided that it was the 'duty' of the Administering Authorities to promote the development of the Trust Territories in

political, economic and social fields, including education. Ottawa reasoned that, since the Trusteeship System was expected "to promote the development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories" in such a comprehensive way, they must be integrated into the international system. The Delegation was told: "the principle of non-discrimination with respect to tariffs, business opportunities, residence, establishment, travel and position before the Law Courts, as between nationals of Member States of the United Nations...applied to all Trust Territories."⁶⁰ How could the UN adequately supervise the administration of Trust Territories under these circumstances? By 1948, the USSR still did not feel content to let the matter of Administrative Unions rest.

The third proposal which was adopted by the Fourth Committee but rejected by the General Assembly, sought to bring any Non-Self-Governing-Territories with which a Trust Territory was administered under the scrutiny of the UN. The Charter expressly left the Non-Self-Governing-Territories mostly out of the UN control.⁶¹ The proposal was that "the entire area" of an administrative union should be subject to the Trusteeship Council's jurisdiction "if it became impossible to obtain separate data on the trust area." Such potentially hypothetical situations should not arise because the Charter stipulated that Administering Authorities must submit annual reports, on their Trust Territories, to the Trusteeship Council. And because the anti-colonials chose to ignore these important Charter guidelines, the Delegation voted against all three proposals which Ottawa believed would "unduly restrict rights given to the Administering Authorities in individual Trusteeship Agreements."⁶²

Since all the above efforts did not bring any satisfactory results a Fourth Committee resolution proposed, in early December 1952, that the Trusteeship Council should refer all Administrative Unions to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the question of their compatibility with the Charter. The Delegation needed instructions as to what position it ought to take on this matter and suggested to Ottawa that since this was 'principally' a legal question they should vote for the motion.⁶³ The UN Division in Ottawa disagreed with this interpretation and saw "the problem as essentially political and practical." Summers, of this Division, argued that there was a possibility that the Court might make an adverse decision which might 'jeopardise' the administrative arrangements.

He pointed out that these arrangements had a functional role in that they were 'likely' to help the Trust Territory to self-government "rather more quickly" than if they were not so associated. And he argued that, up to that point, no member had made the claim that Administrative Unions were 'inefficient.' Because of the "consequent dislocation and reduced efficiency" which this whole exercise may cause, Summers recommended that the Delegation not vote for the referral to the Court. Since a negative vote "would be difficult to explain" and Canada did not want to imply 'doubt' as to the capability of the Court, Summers suggested that "an abstention, preferably unexplained " was the only answer to send to New York.⁶⁴ On that same day, Ottawa explained to the Delegation in New York that the proposed motions would not necessarily obtain "any real immediate or potential benefit to the inhabitants."

Since the fundamental distinction between the Trusteeship System and the administration of other colonial territories was clearly set out in the Charter, officials believed that this dispute over Administrative Unions should not lead to an encroachment upon the rights of the Colonial Powers in their Non-Self-Governing-Territories. Ottawa concluded that,

in any case, the nuisance caused by the possible undoing of the existing Administrative Unions would almost certainly outweigh the rather theoretical advantage of maintaining the crystal clarity of distinction between the status of neighbouring Trust Territories and colonies.⁶⁵

The Delegation was told that it was 'preferable' to leave the abstention 'unexplained'. However, if it was felt that an explanation was 'necessary', the Delegation was "to follow the line" that the controversy over Administrative Unions 'appears' to Canada to be "a practical and political problem rather than an essentially legal one."⁶⁶ On December 8, the Delegation informed Ottawa that the co-sponsors, Brazil and Iraq, had withdrawn the proposal to refer to the Court "after a majority of the Committee had indicated they did not consider such a reference timely."⁶⁷

So, at the end of 1952, Ottawa had decided that because of their administrative efficiency and their value for political progress, Administrative Unions were of benefit to the inhabitants of the Trust Territories. Therefore, the question of the compatibility of specific unions with neighbouring colonies had become an irrelevant one for Ottawa. This is diametrically opposed to the initial Canadian policy. Was this controversy in regard to Administrative Unions only over the interpretation of the Charter and compatibility of the Trusteeship

Agreement or was it more than that? Surely Administrative Unions were not set up solely for the sake administrative convenience? What about the self-interest of the Administering Authorities and other members of the UN?

Our first case study will show how it was also in Canada's interest to maintain the Administrative Union of the Trust Territory of British Togoland with the Gold Coast, as one unit, at the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and the independence of the neighbouring colony. It was obviously in the interest of the Soviet Union to dismantle colonial empires and it is evident that the Trusteeship System was one sure way of consolidating colonial territories in a more efficient way through the brilliant concept of Administrative Unions.

The question of whether the Administering Authorities could be trusted to stand by their assurances in Administrative Unions, was a significant one in the dynamics of the process to set up the Trusteeship System, and later, in the decolonisation process. This factor was an operational one in the "anti-colonial" position and was well utilised by the Soviet bloc. It is difficult to say whether Ottawa's decision makers laid much stress, if any at all, on this question of trustworthiness of the Administering Authorities. There is sufficient evidence that considerations of "easing the way" for the Administering Authorities took precedence over Ottawa's need to judge colonial policies or intentions in their Trust Territories. One such effort, at easing the way, is the selection process and the preferred 'kind' of members which Ottawa wanted to seat in the Trusteeship Council. This is the subject matter of the next section.

The Trusteeship Council

Chapter XII and XIII of the UN Charter provided for international supervision of the administration of Trust Territories. Articles 86 to 91 of Chapter XIII contained specific instructions for a supervisory body which was called the Trusteeship Council.⁶⁸ The membership of this Council differed greatly from that of the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, which was an independent body of permanently appointed experts. Members were not restricted from criticising their own governments, neither were they to speak for their governments. The majority were Colonial Powers and, as agreed, nationals of the mandatory powers were in the minority. Most importantly, all members were Europeans.

On the other hand, the concept of international supervision in the Trusteeship System required geographical and racial representation in the Trusteeship Council. The principle of a "balance of interests" was introduced and members held their seats as representatives of their governments. These alterations in the composition of the supervisory body necessarily produced a radically different operative environment for the Colonial Powers. And because members were compelled to make policy on such a contentious issue, Ottawa placed great emphasis on the selection process for the members of the Trusteeship Council;⁶⁹ it was one way in which the Colonial Powers and their supporters hoped to influence process in the UN in view of their minority position. This was a significant factor for process because the Trusteeship Council was

the main centre of activity and UN interest in colonial affairs during its first thirteen years of existence.

It is generally agreed that, by 1960, there was "a steady shift of active concern with colonial problems from the Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly."⁷⁰ What are the implications of the shift for our analysis? We will show in this chapter, how Ottawa chose to design its policy on colonial issues with this structural fact in mind. And later in the case studies, we will also show how the composition of the Trusteeship Council continued to be an important factor in Ottawa's decision-making process. Each member was aware of the precedent-setting implications of early UN activity in the colonial sphere. And it was obvious to the Colonial Powers and their supporters that they had to take the initiative in setting the operational standards for UN action in these formative years.

Membership

The size of the membership of the Trusteeship Council was determined by the number of powers who were Administering Authorities. This number was balanced by a corresponding number of non-administering members. In addition, all permanent members of the Security Council were also automatically members of the Trusteeship Council. This being the case, a certain number of members were elected to three-year terms by the General Assembly in order to ensure that the total number of Trusteeship Council members were equally divided between Administering Authorities and non-administering powers.

Through an analysis of the various 'interests' involved in the Trusteeship System, Ottawa arrived at five 'categories' of states which the officials believed should be taken into consideration in 'planning' the membership of the Council.

A brief glance at the list of categories give credence to the functional role of recent colonial and historical experience of states in Canada's perception.⁷¹ Ottawa's choices in the types of candidates for membership displayed a pro-colonial predisposition. The Canadian preference in the 1946 election "was to strengthen Category C at the expense of category D."⁷² However, Ottawa admitted that there "might be strong pressure" for a Category D Candidate. Therefore, the Delegation was instructed to look into the possibility of supporting either India, Iraq or Egypt instead of the preferred Western European 'neutral' like Denmark or Sweden. The dynamics of choice reflect Ottawa's recognition of the operational and contextual limits of policy, on this one issue. The Delegation was also instructed to be prepared in case the Latin American states "insisted on having" one of theirs on the Council. Brazil would be the Canadian choice.⁷³

In the 1947 election, the Assembly had decided to accredit two temporary seats to categories D and E. Denmark continued to be Ottawa's choice for Category E, the 'neutral' Western European state. The most important criterion was that Denmark "had some experience in colonial administration." Interestingly enough for mention, is Ottawa's expressed preference for Pakistan as the Category D candidate, instead of India.⁷⁴ In its 1949 "policy

recommendation" to the Delegation at the UN, Ottawa laid out the guiding principles and preferences this way:

despite the tendency of the Assembly to support a Category D and a Category E from the Latin American States, as the most acceptable candidates, the possibility of filling one seat with a Category C state should not be overlooked. If the opposition were to arise to elect a state representing this Category, the 'balance of interests,' upset in 1947 when the United States ceased to be a 'Colonial Power not acting as a United Nations trustee,' would be restored.⁷⁵

This effort was expended on every possibility to create a friendlier or, at least, a less antagonistic climate in the UN. The Netherlands was Canada's choice for "the most likely" candidate. Ottawa felt that, like Denmark, the Netherlands "would no doubt bring valuable experience into the Council" but because of the Indonesian dispute with the Dutch,⁷⁶ it was unlikely that the Assembly would support this candidate. The next Canadian choice was Norway - already serving on the Security Council; Denmark was on the Economic and Social Council. Both would have reservations on accepting additional responsibility. Sweden was the remaining 'neutral' in the Western European group, but because of its refusal to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, Ottawa suspected that the USA "may advance it as a reason for opposing the candidature of Sweden" for the Trusteeship Council. The Foreign Office expressed its desire to support Norway for this seat.⁷⁷

In anticipating the General Assembly's 'wish' to include a state from Category D, Ottawa told the Delegation that Pakistan would be its "first choice" for this seat, although UK officials had indicated their preference for Turkey or Iran "presumably because they represent Moslem groups." On the other hand,

Ottawa felt that, "on balance, Lebanon would appear to be the better choice." This conclusion was in keeping with Ottawa's operative principle that a candidate or a strategy could only be successful in the UN if a "general backing" was expected.⁷⁸ Although Pakistan was a Moslem and pro-Western state, it did not have the 'international' connections which Lebanon enjoyed.

Officials were also very aware of "a strong possibility" that the Soviet bloc would push for one of its members to be elected to the Trusteeship Council. The Canadian Delegation had to keep an eye on this development because the Soviet representative had finally taken its seat on the Trusteeship Council⁷⁹ and Ottawa warned: "it cannot be assumed...that a candidate from the Soviet bloc would not receive support from states outside 'the bloc'." The Delegation was told that 'many' of the other Assembly members were of the opinion that the individual satellite states of Eastern Europe "ought in fairness to have their own representative" in addition to that of the Soviet representative in the other organs of the UN.⁸⁰ Ottawa was aware of the implication of this for the "balance of interests" principle which would allow these states to seek a seat in Category E for the Trusteeship Council.

By mid-1955, E.R. Warner of the British Foreign Office had expressed disquiet over the probable expansion of the membership of the UN. The concern centred on the distinction between the types of potential candidates and the present membership and also the eventual role they were anticipated to play in affecting process. He felt that,

the admission of any large number of the present candidates for membership would almost inevitably have an adverse effect on the

voting position for the Colonial Powers in the United Nations. The likelihood of obtaining a third of the votes in the General Assembly to block unwelcome resolutions on trusteeship items would, for instance, be less than ever.⁸¹

By 1960, the 'balance' in the Trusteeship Council's membership began to change. France was no longer an Administering Authority. Italy was no longer an Administering Authority and since Italy was not a permanent member of the Security Council, it had to give up its seat on the Trusteeship Council. The problem arose as to how the 'balance' could be maintained because one non-administering state had to go. A new procedure had to be developed, but that is not relevant for our analysis.

Functions of the Trusteeship Council

The Trusteeship Council operated under the authority of the General Assembly and its main function was to supervise the administration of Trust Territories. There were three areas in which this function was exercised. The first function was the examination of annual reports which were submitted by the Administering Authorities on the basis of questionnaires formulated by the Council. The Charter authorised the Trusteeship Council to draft questionnaires for this purpose. The Trusteeship Council had to submit a report, on these annual reports on the situation in the Trust Territories, to the General Assembly in the form of 'observations' and 'recommendations.' It is generally believed that "in the early years" of the UN, the Colonial Powers "could usually rely on a safe voting majority against any proposed resolution that they regarded as unacceptable."⁸²

However, this majority was a very unstable one which depended on how each issue affected direct USA interests and the way in which the Latin American bloc choose to go. Nevertheless, efforts such as the following proposed by the Chinese and Indian Delegations were observed with great apprehension by the Western powers.

In the second week of December 1946, the Chinese delegate attempted to have the information on Non-Self-Governing-Territories which was submitted annually to the Secretary General of the UN, also examined by the Trusteeship Council.⁸³ The Delegation reported to Ottawa that this was "one of the very serious attempts to modify the Charter and to mould it in accordance with the views of a number of states which pose as the champions of the rights of the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing-Territories."⁸⁴ The Charter was explicit in its categorisation of colonial territories and, as we will show in the second part of this chapter, it gave the UN a very limited right of interference in the bulk of these territories called Non-Self-Governing-Territories. The Delegation added with great misgiving: "it is equally clear that the Trusteeship Council will be used as a political sounding box and that every attempt is being made now to distort the Charter by confusing Chapter XI,XII and XIII."⁸⁵

In 1951, the Indian Delegation made a similar effort in a proposal for combined discussions in the Fourth Committee and Trusteeship Council on Special Committee matters. This would entail simultaneous discussions of the developments in both Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing-Territories, thereby nullifying the clear and separate categories of territories in the Charter. It

was obvious that the Colonial Powers would not agree to such a procedure. The UK acknowledged that although the proposal "drew attention to the 'marked difference' between the position of the Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing-Territories," the UK recognised that "the distinction might in practice become blurred" if the Indian proposal was accepted.⁸⁶ Canada was not prepared to encourage such a development.

The second and more important function of the Trusteeship Council was to hear oral petitions; it was also authorised to examine written ones.⁸⁷ This aspect of supervision gave members direct contact with the representatives of the peoples administered. However, the Colonial Powers believed that petitions were utilised in a manipulative role to affect the pace and quality of process, as will be shown in both case studies later on. The third and most important function of the Trusteeship Council was to examine the conditions in the territories and to assess whether the Administering Authorities were complying with the conditions set out in the Trusteeship Agreements and Chapters XII and XIII. To this end, the Trusteeship Council sent a Visiting Mission every three years to the Trust Territories. A summary of each Visiting Mission Report to the Trusteeship Council was submitted to the General Assembly.⁸⁸ Because of these arrangements, all members were kept fully informed of developments in the Trust Territories.

In view of the innumerable problems that had arisen during the process to approve the Trusteeship Agreements in the late 1940s, the Canadian Delegation was relieved to report to Ottawa, in early 1951, that the proceedings in the Trusteeship Council had been "marked by a less hostile attitude" on the

part of the non-administering members. The only exception was "the usual attacks" by the Soviet member. These were not sufficient to influence what the Delegation described as a "much improved atmosphere over the previous sessions."⁸⁹ As pointed out in the earlier part of this chapter, Ottawa was very concerned about the potential of the disruptive anti-colonial forces to influence direction and process in regard to Trusteeship questions.

The Canadian Delegation was assigned a very specific role in this process and Ottawa expressed the hope in 1949, that the Delegation,

will recognise the importance for the success of the Trusteeship System of giving full support to the Council in its efforts to secure constructive work in the fields of education and health as well as in economic and social matters as the necessary prerequisite of political progress in backward areas.⁹⁰

However, in recognition of the role of the UN operational context in the process to approve the Trusteeship Agreements, Ottawa notified the Delegation that its "full support" had its own functional limit in that,

any proposed measures which would extend the functions of the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly, in relation to the Trust Territories, beyond those envisaged in the Charter, or which would encroach upon the rights accorded to the Administering Authorities by the terms of the individual Trusteeship Agreements would be rejected by Canada.⁹¹

This was a position from which Ottawa would not waver, especially in view of the complaint by the Colonial Office, in early 1959, to the Canadian High Commissioner in London. He reported to Ottawa at the time: "one of the chief problems for the Administering Authorities...is the way in which the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly insists on trying to 'back-seat' from Lake

Success."⁹² It was essential that the members respect the Charter stipulations in regard to the division of rights and responsibilities. Therefore, in its preparation for the Instructions for the Delegation to the 1951 Session, the Secretary of State informed the Canadian High Commissioner in London that his Department was "particularly interested in hearing of any views expressed" on these specific items: "ways of raising the prestige of the Fourth Committee" and "relations between the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly."⁹³

The Secretary outlined the Canadian view on what was expected of the Trusteeship Council in its functional role:

we do not wish to see that body become a mere rubberstamp for Assembly decisions. While there is no doubt about the overriding authority of the General Assembly, it should, on our opinion, restrict itself to broad policy and leave to the Trusteeship Council a reasonable freedom of action in matters of detail.⁹⁴

This was a functional imperative in light of the fact that even Galsworthy of the Colonial Office was, "on balance inclined to think that the Trusteeship Council has certainly exercised a beneficial influence on the Administering Authorities in encouraging them to take a more active interest in the development of the trusteeship territories."⁹⁵ In this sense, the system as conceived in the Charter was operating successfully in the Trust Territories.

Ottawa sought information in regard to the strategy that had been worked out in London between the USA and the UK in preparation for the 1951 session.⁹⁶ And it is without any doubt that the summary of this meeting⁹⁷ which was prepared by the Colonial Office served to reinforce the policy which Canada had outlined for the Delegation. According to the summary, "by the end of 1949 a

position had been reached in the United Nations in which the United Kingdom was seldom able to vote in favour of any resolution dealing with Colonial or Trusteeship questions." The USA and 'other' Administering Powers were partly responsible for this "unfortunate state of affairs."⁹⁸ The document pointed out that "criticism of the UK attitude was widespread in the United Nations and prevented any appreciation of the real progress being made in the colonies."⁹⁹

In an attempt to 'remedy' this situation, the UK had decided in 1950 to adopt a policy of "greater flexibility"¹⁰⁰ in which it would do two things. First, the UK delegate "whenever possible would vote in favour of any resolution, when necessary stating in explanation of his vote those points in the resolution which were unacceptable."¹⁰¹ This new tactic had functional implications for Canada's policy. Secondly, the UK's 'contribution' to the debates would be 'positive' and the delegate was instructed to give "maximum publicity" for the 'achievements' of UK's colonial policy. The UK sought "to enlighten" the USA about those achievements by sending UK specialists to the State Department, in May 1950, to obtain American "co-operation in the new tactics." By 1951, the Colonial Office could claim that the members in the Fourth Committee "showed less inclination to indulge in irresponsible attacks" on the Administering Authorities. Was this the result of the UK efforts?

A thirteen-power resolution in the Fourth Committee 1951 Session called for "the participation of Natives in the work of the Trusteeship Council." The General Assembly asked the advice of the Trusteeship Council on this proposal which suggested an arrangement not envisaged in the Charter. The

Delegation suggested to Ottawa what they "should oppose the most important operative clause" on the grounds of its 'impracticability.' In addition, the Delegation reasoned: "as we trust the Trusteeship Council and wish to uphold its prestige we should follow its advice unless we are vehemently persuaded to the contrary." Of course, this persuasion must come from the Administering Authorities. And the Delegation felt that the 'willingness' of the Administering Authorities to accept such a proposal should be an important factor in the decision it should make.¹⁰² And because the starting position each Administering Authority was an important factor in Canada's decision-making process, the Delegation suggested that Ottawa "certainly need not oppose what all the administering states will accept." This implied that Ottawa did actually entertain the possibility of making an independent decision. On the other hand, this independence of choice "need not oppose what the milder Administering States will accept." The Delegation noted that the USA, New Zealand and 'perhaps' Denmark belonged to this category.¹⁰³

Did this mean that even after the policy change at the Colonial Office in 1950,¹⁰⁴ the Canadian Delegation still continued to view the UK position with some reservations at the end of 1952? Ottawa addressed neither the merit of the case nor the implications of an independent position. In view of the complex operational context of this issue, Ottawa "agreed with the general line" which was proposed by the Delegation and "also agreed with the factors "which were set out as potentially influencing indices¹⁰⁵ in the "unlikely event" that this resolution would come to a vote.¹⁰⁶ The UN supervision of the administration of Trust

Territories had to operate in a context which varied with the whims of some of its members and the lightness with which such recommendations were made. The next section on annual reports supports this estimation.

Annual Reports

In early 1950, the Canadian Delegation reported to Ottawa that the discussion of the UK Annual Report on British Cameroons "evoked criticism" by the non-administering powers concerning the 'integration' of British Cameroons with Nigeria.¹⁰⁷ Victorio Carpio of the Philippines claimed that "this action was a breach of the Trusteeship Agreement, destroyed the identity of the territory and was an obstacle to progress."¹⁰⁸ Four months later, the Trusteeship Council set up a Standing Committee on Administrative Unions.¹⁰⁹ This was a necessary step because unions of any sorts involving Trust Territories continued to be a source of ongoing problems for the Administering Authorities and their supporters. At its seventh session, the Trusteeship Council appointed a Four-member Committee to undertake a revision of the provisional questionnaire which was submitted in a hurry to the Administering Authorities for the preparation of their initial annual reports.¹¹⁰ It was indicative of the functional importance of the questionnaire that the process of revision took two full years of work before it was sent to the Fourth Committee for approval. Ottawa informed the Delegation that, because they had "very little experience in dealing" with

questionnaires, three basic requirements had to be fulfilled in order to obtain Canada's support for any final document proposed by the Fourth Committee.

First, the substantive parts should be based on the 'recommendations' of the Committee appointed to address this matter. Secondly, there must be 'evidence' that the Trusteeship Council "favoured it." And finally, the "merits of the scheme" must be sufficiently 'demonstrated' in the Fourth Committee debate. If, however, the Fourth Committee was prepared to refer any amendment it had proposed back to the Trusteeship Council for its consideration, Ottawa instructed the Delegation to then consider either support or abstention.¹¹¹ These detailed instructions are evidence of the precautionary measures which Ottawa had undertaken to prevent the Fourth Committee from usurping the powers accorded to the Trusteeship Council.¹¹² Officials seemed to be satisfied that their choice for the Trusteeship Council membership had contributed to ensuring that the rights of the Administering Authorities would be respected.

The discussion of the Annual Report on Western Samoa in early 1951 was a less controversial one than the report on the British Cameroons one year earlier. The Delegation informed Ottawa that "except for the not unexpected charges of the Soviet Representative that the Administering Authority had not taken the necessary measures to fulfil its obligations under the Charter and had 'ignored' the 'legitimate' claims of the indigenous inhabitants for self-government",¹¹³ the atmosphere was encouraging. The Delegation was pleased to report that 'all' the members of the Council expressed their 'satisfaction with New Zealand's compliance with the Council's recommendations.'¹¹⁴ However, as

with the situation in all cases of colonial rule, "it was recognised that there was room for further improvement in political, social and economic conditions." Nevertheless, the Administering Authority was 'commended' for whatever progress that had been achieved so far.¹¹⁵

From the outset, Ottawa showed great interest in how the Trusteeship Council was planning to utilise the various UN organs and other inter-governmental organisations in promoting 'development' in the Trust Territories. This was especially important in the formative years as the UN struggled in the establishment of its new system of trust for two reasons. First of all, unnecessary additional costs were to be avoided in the duplication of agencies and bureaucracy.¹¹⁶ Secondly, Ottawa felt that development was a crucial base for political growth; the annual reports were intended to reflect the process of development in Trust Territories. The Trusteeship Council was initially active in ensuring that the Administering Authorities fulfil their 'duty' in this area. This activity was part of an initiative by the under-developed countries involving all UN actions. The Delegation claimed that India and Chile were seeking to develop "grandiose schemes for international economic assistance to backward regions." This was a 'feature' of all of the sessions.¹¹⁷

At its Fourth Session, the Trusteeship Council had recommended that all specialised agencies of the UN 'study' the annual reports on the administration of the Trust Territories to enable them to make suggestions that might facilitate the work of the Trusteeship Council. And the Secretary General of the UN was 'requested' to oversee the collaboration of specialised agencies with the

Trusteeship Council in its supervisory function. At its fifth session, the Council recommended specific action for the improvement of educational facilities in African Trust Territories and sought collaboration with UNESCO and private organisations for assistance in financing scholarships etc.¹¹⁸ Annual reports were to serve as the basis of this work.

The Delegation asserted that the Annual Reports were "mainly the targets of Soviet attacks." However, by the early 1950's, it became noticeable that the atmosphere in the Trusteeship Council had improved considerably. This was so because not too many of the non-administering states "followed the Soviet with any consistency." The exception was Iraq. The two Latin American members "adopted a fairly neutral approach" to the various questions under discussion. In the opinion of the Delegation, "on the whole, 1952 was very much like" 1951 in that the criticisms of the anti-colonial states against the Administering Authorities were 'milder' than in the previous sessions.¹¹⁹ What were the reasons for this change? And were they relevant for Canada's decision-making process?¹²⁰ In the estimation of the Delegation, "the tendency" of the USA Delegation to 'differ' in public with the other Administering Authorities "was at times a source of mild annoyance to the latter."¹²¹ Undoubtedly, a combination of all these attitudes contributed to the working atmosphere and in this sense, they were important.¹²²

The Delegation made the assumption that the Arab states "had very little to gain from closer co-operation with the Western democracies and that they were not prepared, at this stage, to incur the displeasure of the Soviet Union."

Because this attitude "did not accord with the fundamental interests of the Arab states," the Delegation concluded that the policy of this group of states had the characteristic of "blackmailing the Western nations." However, the Delegation speculated that "one of the factors...which might have brought about a change in the Arab attitude was the complete lack of sympathy for the condition of the Arab refugees displayed by the Soviet Union." In other words, it was pointed out that "their policy on non-identification had not earned them the expected Soviet support on Palestine issues."¹²³ This argumentation clearly supports the 'give' and 'take' assumptions in international political behaviour. It also demonstrates the complexity of the operational context in which decision makers had to formulate policy.

Around mid-November 1951, the Chairman of the Delegation notified Ottawa that in regard to trusteeship matters the Administering Authorities were in for some reprieve. Both Malik and Soldatov had told Bunche that the Soviet bloc "would not be concentrating much attention" on the Fourth Committee that year because Soldatov, the Soviet spokesman on trusteeship matters, was being assigned to another Committee. As a result, Bunche concluded that the USSR would be represented by a "second rater."¹²⁴ Three weeks later, the Chairman made an assessment of the "activities and atmosphere" of the General Assembly. He discovered that "an earlier tendency among some of the Middle-East and Latin American Delegations (but significantly not India or other Asian Delegations) to intervene critically and excessively in the colonial affairs of the leading Western European nations, has abruptly given way to a sudden and

perhaps temporary, moderation."¹²⁵ In his estimation, this 'change' was attributed to the walk-out of the French Delegation from the Fourth Committee.¹²⁶ This was seen as an effective method of influencing the operational context in the UN.¹²⁷ But at the time the Canadian Delegation considered that such tactics were of a limited value. The Chairman wrote: "Naturally, the Canadian Delegation did what it could to discourage a Western walk-out on trusteeship questions and to induce some moderation among the critics."¹²⁸ This was evidently not a too difficult task, at the time, because the Delegation believed that any more walk-outs "would have been too reminiscent of the Soviet walk-out of 1950, which not only won world-wide disapproval, but, as Korea showed, became a notorious flop."¹²⁹

In fact, in early 1952, the Delegation found the debates on the four Annual Reports for Nauru, New Guinea, Western Samoa and the Strategic Trust Territories of the Pacific Island, "were less acrimonious than usual and much of the comment made by non-administering states was constructive and helpful to the Administering Authorities."¹³⁰ In preparation for the next session, the Delegation suggested in mid-1952 that it "was not expected that any highly controversial subjects" would be discussed at the coming session, even though the Trusteeship Council was scheduled to deal 'mainly' with a study of the Annual Reports for 1951 from the Administering Authorities of the seven Trust Territories in Africa.¹³¹

The first phase in the attempt to establish the Trusteeship System had come to an end with the General Assembly approval of the Trusteeship Agreements in 1946. From the beginning of 1947 to about the early 1950's, the

UN was occupied with establishing the operational limits of UN supervision in Trust Territories. We have attempted to outline the dynamics of these two phases and how they were perceived to have influenced Canada's strategy and policy choices. We have also shown, where possible, how Canada's action was circumscribed by the operational context of the organisation.

Was the double role of the USA, as Colonial Power and as an "anti-colonial" critic, also functional in contributing to a more accommodating attitude of the antagonists? In late October, the Delegation communicated to Ottawa their 'impression' that the USA was 'striving' at the time "to conciliate the non-administering members."¹³² And, how much did the policy of greater flexibility of the UK, or even Ottawa's process to choose the right kinds of members for the Trusteeship Council have to do with this change in the post-1946 normalisation process of supervision? In Canada's perception, there was a pattern of fluctuation in this process because of the double role played by the Indian Delegation. On the one hand, India behaved like a colonial in seeking to establish certain rights for itself and members of the UN in Trust Territories. On the other hand, India's anti-colonial role was that of a vanguard working in the interest of the inhabitants of these territories.

The discussion of the Annual Reports in the Trusteeship Council was one avenue in which the Indian delegate could influence public opinion in the UN. In early 1954, Khan of India observed in the Trusteeship Council:

it had become clear from the debates which had taken place in the Council that all the Trust Territories had certain problems in common. They arose from the desire of the African peoples for greater freedom,

better health, more food, a better way of life and, above all, for dignity and self-respect.¹³³

He singled out the Trust Territory of Togoland under French Administration for specific attack. He observed that in all the above respects, the situation in this Trust Territory was 'disappointing.' Moreover, he complained that the Administering Authority "appeared to lack a sense of urgency."¹³⁴

The Annual Reports were a problem for the Colonial Powers because they served to keep these issues alive on a selective and continuous basis. Through the device of Annual Reports, the members were able to assess to what degree the Administering Authorities were fulfilling their responsibility of a trust. In this sense, international accountability became operational and the Administering Authorities knew that these contentious matters could not be ignored. Khan declared that the electoral system in French Togoland "was still inadequate" and that the goal of universal adult suffrage "was far from being attained." In addition he found it 'disappointing' that "so few" Africans were actually employed in their own administrative apparatus.¹³⁵

How was Ottawa to react to such critique? And was there a perceived need to undertake any specific course of action to influence UN action in this regard? This is the concern of the second case study. The instructions to the Delegation to the 1955 Session of the General Assembly were simple:

In Trusteeship matters it has been the Canadian view that the details of the administration of Trust Territories should be left to the Trusteeship Council, and that the General Assembly should concern itself with broad principles. The Delegation should maintain this attitude. It should seek to moderate the inevitable disagreements between those countries that administer Trust Territories or Colonies and those that are critical of the Administering Powers.¹³⁶

But how could a member who consistently took a pro-colonial public position adopt a conciliatory role? And how credible would be such a role?

In the spring of 1955, Menon complained in the Trusteeship Council that political development in Tanganyika was very slow and he argued that it should be possible to speed up the process and move the Trust Territories towards self-government or independence. It was obvious to all that Menon's concern in this particular Trust Territory was connected to India's self interest there. The Canadian Delegation reported to Ottawa that "it was particularly at India's insistence" that the Visiting Missions Report on Tanganyika, which was before the Council at the time, "called for a review of the constitutional reforms about to be implemented, the multi-racial policy fostered by the United Kingdom and problems of land alienation."¹³⁷

Shortly before the Trusteeship Council began to discuss the Annual Report of the UK on the Administration of Tanganyika for 1954, the Canadian Delegation informed Ottawa of a new development in India's attitude; according to 'rumours' in the UN, Menon was reported as being "much impressed with the degree of political advancement that had taken place in Tanganyika." Apparently, this change of heart was the result of a meeting between Menon and Sir Richard Twining, the British Governor of that Trust Territory.¹³⁸ The Delegation wrote:

to our Australian, Belgian and New Zealand colleagues this change of policy on the part of India, if such there is, is connected with the idea that self-government or independence for the Trust Territory will be achieved as quickly, if not quicker, through contacts with the Administering Authority rather than by United Nations resolutions.¹³⁹

In addition, the Delegation reported that this new Indian position had found great resonance in other Trust Territories and the inhabitants were 'impressed' with this proposed "line of action." How did Ottawa react to this information? And what were the practical implications of this apparent change of policy for Canada's position on the UN role of supervising colonial administration in Trust Territories? This is the concern of our first case study.

Assessment

A scholar on India's foreign policy wrote that 1949-50 "was the time when the position India took at the United Nations mattered for the world powers." In his opinion, "what Krishna Menon was saying in New York was often the best test of which of them was winning what points among newly emerging nations of Asia and Africa."¹⁴⁰ As we have tried to point out in this chapter, in Canada's perception, the contextual realities of the various stages in the process to set up the Trusteeship System arose out of conflicting interpretations of the Charter and needs of the members. Progress was made only when compromise was sought. But how did the members define 'progress'? If the Charter claimed that the interests of the indigenous inhabitants were a paramount consideration, why did the Trusteeship System become such a retrograde alternative to the Mandate System?¹⁴¹

We suggest that in the formative phase the conflicting interpretations accorded to the Charter stipulations by the varying interests inadvertently

developed a system that did function in the interests of the inhabitants in spite of the one designed in the Charter. How else could we explain why the United Kingdom first opposed the recommendation for the compulsory application of trusteeship to all territories and then rejected the USA suggestion that a partial strategic area should be included in the Trusteeship Agreements for the Trust Territories?¹⁴² This proposed arrangement would have taken the military aspect of the Trusteeship Agreements out of the meddling hands of the international community while granting the permanent members of the Security Council a veto over administration in the Trust Territories. For all the other Colonial Powers, which arrangement was the lesser of the two evils: international supervision or Security Council control?

It is not our concern here to decide what role did the self-interest of Colonial Powers play in designing this system of trust. In Canada's perception, the Soviet Union,¹⁴³ India¹⁴⁴ and the USA¹⁴⁵ were instrumental in influencing world public opinion on how the Trusteeship System should function in achieving the goals set out in the Charter. This was an important factor in the dynamics of the international operational context for officials in Ottawa and the evolution of policy. In 1961, Asselin of the Canadian Delegation declared in the Fourth Committee that "one of the main elements needed" for the attainment of the objectives of the Trusteeship System was an Administering Authority "which was sensitive to world public opinion."¹⁴⁶ To what extent was such a speech helpful in creating an appearance of accommodation? How are we to determine what the concept of international trusteeship meant, when even so called anti-colonial

members sought to guarantee their own rights and interest in colonial areas where those of the inhabitants should have been paramount?¹⁴⁷ The process from 1946 onwards did bear substantial results in establishing some basic guidelines for the operation of the Trusteeship System. We have shown how officials in Ottawa displayed a predisposition to make pro-colonial choices.

The General Assembly eventually endorsed the Trusteeship Council's recommendation that Administrative Unions "must remain strictly administrative and that they must not create conditions which would obstruct the separate development of any Trust Territory as a distinct entity." This applied to all fields, political, economic, social and education. Furthermore, the General Assembly requested that the Trusteeship Council undertake the following measures:

1. investigate the effects of the Administrative Unions already constituted or proposed, and to recommend safeguards needed to preserve the distinct political status of the Trust Territories and to facilitate its own supervisory functions;
2. ask the International Court of Justice, where necessary, for an opinion on the compatibility of any union with the terms of the Charter and the relevant Trusteeship Agreement;
3. report the results of the investigation to the General Assembly at its Session in January 1949.

In spite of the Report of the Investigative Committee that the Administering Authorities had given their 'assurances' to retain the political identity of their administrative wards, the Trusteeship Council requested that the

committee should continue to examine "the effects" of all administrative arrangements involving Trust Territories. Moreover, the Administering Authorities were asked to submit 'separate' information on Trust Territories which were administratively united with colonies. These were significant steps in ensuring the quality of trusteeship over dependent peoples.

However, as we will show in the first case study, in spite of all the above measures, the British Trust Territory of Togoland was not able to retain a separate political identity. And with India's collusion, this Trust Territory was eventually absorbed into the neighbouring colony of Ghana. The Special Committee was also specifically directed to investigate "the relation between France and its Trust Territory within the framework of the French Union." In the second case study, we will show that with India's persistent anti-colonial effort, the UN was able to secure an independent status for the French Trust Territory of Togoland outside the French Union. In other words, even though the effort of the "anti-colonials" initially did create political havoc in the UN it had a critical role to play, in the long run, by effectively balancing the supervisory role of the UN and the administrative function of the Colonial Powers in the UN Trusteeship System.

Policy as Reflected in Roll Call Votes:

Seven resolutions which Canada supported for adoption in the Trusteeship Category were essentially closed cases. That is, those aspects

which were basically technical and substantially non-controversial. The roll call resolutions were:

- General Assembly Resolution 63 (I) of December 13, 1946
- General Assembly Resolution 322(IV) November 15, 1949
- General Assembly Resolution 652 (VII) December 20, 1952
- General Assembly Resolution 656 (VII) November 21, 1952
- General Assembly Resolution 1046 (XII) October 23, 1957
- General Assembly Resolution 1182 (XII) November 29, 1957
- General Assembly Resolution 1605 (XV) April 21, 1961

Four of the above resolutions dealt with the General Assembly's approval of either setting up or terminating a Trusteeship Agreement. The Administering Authorities had the authority, basically, to set the terms of the Trusteeship Agreements and this they did in keeping with their own interests. The draft agreements for the seven Trust Territories contained clauses which authorised the Administering Authorities "to constitute" them into customs, fiscal or Administrative Unions."

Resolution 63(I) proposed the approval of one such Trusteeship Agreement. Actually, Canada voted with the Colonial Powers for the General Assembly approval for all the Trusteeship Agreements. India and the USSR voted against approval of the form in which they were submitted. As a matter of fact, the Canadian Delegation "asked for assurances" that the agreements should be considered, after being approved by the Assembly, "as in full force." Belgium and France supported this move but it was not accepted.¹⁴⁸

Another two examples of closed cases are 322(IV) and 652(VII). The first dealt with a rather innocuous matter of "a greater involvement of indigenous peoples in the economic development of their territories." The aspect of "greater

involvement" was open-ended and relative in its operational function. The second one was in the nature of a request for a "report on the development." Again, 656(VII) provided a purely administrative aid to the Administering Authorities because the date of independence had already been set for the territory.

Resolution 1182 (XII) requested "proposals for the early attainment of the final objective of the Trusteeship System" from the Administering Authorities in light of the legislative development in the territory. And the Trusteeship Council was to supervise the full implementation of the transfer of powers, before the General Assembly's final approval of termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. Nevertheless, this procedural aspect had the full co-operation of the Administering Authorities and was therefore non-controversial.

Canada supported Resolution 1605 (XV) which specifically recognised the separation of General Assembly responsibility and that of the Administering Authority, in the attainment of the objective of self-government or independence in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, as conceived in the Charter. Canada had consistently supported such resolutions whereby the General Assembly did not over-step its competence. In this case the General Assembly's unconditional pronouncement was an acceptable step which Canada supported.

The next five resolutions (six roll calls) which Canada did not support for adoption dealt with the General Assembly's attempt to assert its authority in regard to the administration and supervision of Trust Territories.

General Assembly Resolution 141(II) 1947
 General Assembly Resolution 463 (v) 1950
 General Assembly Resolution 558 (VI) 1952 (2 roll-calls)
 General Assembly Resolution 946 (X) 1955

General Assembly Resolution 1064 (XI) 1956

Canada's negative voting position was a categorical rejection of the following progressive steps undertaken by the General Assembly in the decolonisation process. The time span is approximately ten years. The first is the General Assembly's attempt to bring the last Mandate Territory under the Trusteeship System, in light of the fact that the Administering Authority refused to do so voluntarily. Resolution 141(II) urged South Africa to propose a Trusteeship Agreement for South West Africa.

By Resolution 436(V), the General Assembly sought to do three things. First, it aimed at building a consensus, through a cumulation of its past resolutions, on operative limits and guidelines regarding Chapters XII and XIII. Secondly, it utilised the Secretary General in its functional capacity to police the compliance of the Administering Authorities with these resolutions. And thirdly, the General Assembly made explicit in this resolution that non-compliance would be subject to further measures of control; that non-compliance was not a successful method by which they could evade accountability to the UN in these areas.

The third category of action which Canada refused to support in the decolonisation process could be seen in the next three resolutions (4 roll-calls) which dealt exclusively with the "attainment by the Trust Territories of the objective of self-government or independence." Resolutions 558(VI), 946(X) and 1064 (XI) were confined to three specific areas that would lead to a rapid decolonisation: the measures by which the Administering Authorities intended to

achieve this objective; the means utilised to determine the projected goal of self-government or independence; and time-limits and the importance of fixing them.

During the discussions of the draft Trusteeship Agreements, in 1946, Sir Maharaj Singh of India asserted that "past experience indicated that administering states usually delayed the advancement of the peoples under their control," because of the inherent incapacities of colonial peoples. And it was "for this reason" he proposed the setting of a time limit for the attainment of independence by the Trust Territories.¹⁴⁹ Canada did not share this premise of wilful action on the part of the Administering Authorities. By 1952, Ottawa realised that the "non-administering powers appeared to be more inclined than they have been in the past to accept the view of the Administering Authorities that significant changes in the Trust Territories cannot be achieved over night and that constitutional evolution does not lend itself to rigid timetables."¹⁵⁰

In 1954, the President of the Trusteeship Council brought to the attention of its members General Assembly Resolution 752(VIII) which 'reaffirmed' General Assembly Resolution 558(VI). It urged all Administering Authorities to submit information in each Annual Report on the measures taken or contemplated towards self-government or independence; on the estimated period of time required for such measures and for the attainment of either self-government or independence. Menon felt this to be a "legitimate request, which did not run counter either to the Charter or to the Trusteeship Agreements."¹⁵¹ Moreover, he asserted that "the question was important, and indeed fundamental to the concept of trusteeship." Forsyth of Australia

was of the opinion that adequate information had been provided by the Administering Authorities in the annual reports on the Trust Territories on all matters referred to in the two resolutions, with the exception of that of the length of time required. Furthermore, he recalled that all the Administering Authorities had been opposed to the adoption of those resolutions in the Fourth Committee...."¹⁵²

Pignon of France and Burns of the UK both 'shared' these views.¹⁵³ Asha of Syria¹⁵⁴ "believed with the representative of India that some more positive action was required of the Council and, particularly, of those members which were Administering Authorities."¹⁵⁵ The refusal of the Administering Authorities to budge on this aspect was obviously reflected in the inability of the Trusteeship Council to act, due to the 'balanced' composition of its membership.

In early October, 1955, Weishhoff, the Secretary of the Fourth Committee warned the Canadian Delegation, privately, that the anti-colonials had decided on a new tactic in light of the intransigence of the Administering Authorities and their supporters. He suggested that "not only" will the anti-colonials,

see to it that the Fourth Committee will have before it for consideration a factual report describing the political situation in the Trust Territories, but they may well invoke the Council's delay in complying with Resolutions 558(VI), 752(VIII) and 858(IX) to propose the setting up of a Committee of the Assembly whose duty it will be to consider the measures taken or contemplated by the administering powers for the Trust Territories' attainment of self-government or independence and to make recommendations, suggest time limits, etc.¹⁵⁶

Without any doubt, this action could have been a significant step in altering the Charter perception of how the Trusteeship System should function. The Delegation acknowledged that "since the consequences of such a move would strike at the heart of the Trusteeship System, it will bear watching."¹⁵⁷ The drive

to set a time limit or target dates for self-government or independence illustrates the fundamental dichotomy between the colonials and the anti-colonials on the concept of trusteeship.

Apparently, Scott of New Zealand felt that the time had come for the Administering Authorities to set the tone and to make an attempt to influence process. In a second message on October 6, the Delegation wrote that, in his statement to the Committee on Information, Scott made a case for "a more realistic understanding by the non-administering members" in the UN's consideration of colonial matters, "particularly those of interest to the Fourth Committee," on the following grounds:

- a) the issues involved
- b) the benefits derived by the dependent peoples from the action of the administering powers and
- c) what would be the results if these same administering powers were now to withdraw their aid and assistance to these peoples.

In this undertaking to influence the climate of opinion in the UN, Scott "felt that there should be less insistence than had hitherto been the case on prejudices against colonialism which belonged to another era."¹⁵⁸ The members should therefore concentrate on the benefits of colonial rule and the threat by the Administering Authorities to desert their wards was expected to be a helpful device in this effort. This tactic did not reap any results. For in late November 1959, after discussing the Report of the Trusteeship Council, the Fourth Committee requested in a resolution that the UK and Belgium set "final target dates" for Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi. The issue would be addressed at the

15th Session. In addition, the Committee 'invited' the other Administering Authorities "to formulate earlier successive intermediate target dates."¹⁵⁹

The Delegation reported that the UK and Belgium "objected to the wording of the paragraph which concerned them, not so much because it called for the final target dates as because its wording implied that the Administering Authorities have to present their programmes to the General Assembly for approval." However, in principle, the idea of setting target dates was unacceptable because, even though the Fourth Committee called for 'intermediate' targets in the other Trust Territories as opposed to 'final' ones in the British and Belgium territories, all the Administering Authorities, Canada and the Scandinavians voted against the separate paragraph on Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi,¹⁶⁰ and on the resolution as a whole which was adopted by 48 votes, 16 against with 10 abstentions. It is evident that the premise of General Assembly competence to direct process was rejected by all of the Administering Authorities on a consistent basis. Canada chose to support this policy. Even by the end of 1960, "the question of whether or not" to set a target date for independence was one of "the most remaining difficulties" in drafting the resolution for Item 87.¹⁶¹

In the resolutions in which the General Assembly had turned to the assistance of Member States to actively participate in one form or another in the Trust Territories, with an aim to decolonisation, Canada either 'abstained' or voted 'against' adoption. For example, in the case of Resolution 323(IV), 626(VII) and 1410(XIV), the General Assembly's concern with aspects of abuse of human

rights and denial of fundamental freedoms; with economic exploitation, and its own perceived responsibility under Chapter XII and XIII to propose avenues through which the indigenous inhabitants are involved in "responsible positions."

The General Assembly sought to control the extent to which Trust Territories were utilised for military purposes by their Administering Authorities. Resolution 1578 (XV) directed the Administering Authorities "to refrain from using the Territory [of Ruanda-Urundi] as a base," for purposes which were not strictly required for internal security. The General Assembly had decided that, in the context of the future of Ruanda-Urundi, its priority lay in achieving "an atmosphere of peace and harmony" for the legislative elections that would "furnish the basis for the territory's independence." To this end, the General Assembly sought to restrict the Administering Authority's right to decide on the military constellation in this Trust Territory in 1960. Canada chose to abstain and therefore refused to support this initiative. The kinds of UN action which found a fit in Canada's perceptual code regarding the functional role which the UN ought to fulfil in the Trusteeship System were clearly of a pro-colonial nature.

Part II: Non Self Governing Territories

The UN Charter made a distinction between the two categories of colonial territories and left the authority of the Administering Authorities in the Non-Self-Governing-Territories rather 'intact'. Chapter XI of the Charter is devoted to Non-Self-Governing-Territories and it is just a 'declaration'. Article 73

of this chapter drew up guidelines for the Administering Authorities in a voluntary acceptance of a 'trust'. Actually, there were no formal UN control mechanisms for direct supervision of the obligations, voluntarily undertaken, because this was "the real empire."¹⁶² In very general terms, under Article 73, Colonial Powers which have assumed

responsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount or accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost...the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories....

In tangible terms, this obligation was to manifest itself in specific ways: In the context of the well-being of the inhabitants, these Colonial Powers were:

- a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
- b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
- c) to further international peace and security.

How did the UN intend to assess whether the Administering Authorities were addressing these responsibilities and fulfilling these obligations so enumerated? They were requested under Article 73(e),

to transmit regularly to the Secretary General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible....

According to the Charter directives, the Administering Authorities were required to 'transmit' or inform the UN of the conditions of their wards in a very limited and

voluntary context. In other words, the interest and well-being of the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing-Territories rested primarily in the hands of their keepers. The obligations undertaken by the Administering Authorities "to promote to the utmost...the well-being" could be effectively circumscribed by security considerations. These territories were perceived by Colonial Powers to be part of an international support system. They were expected to provide naval and military bases and were essential suppliers of natural resources and open markets.¹⁶³ Therefore, it was essential that control of these areas remain in the custody of the 'free' world.

These arrangements were premised on the assumption that the inhabitants would continue to acquiesce in their 'subject' condition. The Colonial Powers also underestimated the disruptive potential of the communist world and the ex-colonies to undermine these anticipated privileges. Because the Charter had given "primary responsibility for the maintenance of internal peace and security" to the Security Council and, because the Non-Self-Governing-Territories were expected to play a fundamental role in this area, it was in the direct interest of the communist world to actively support the process to involve UN authority in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. And according to Henri Grimal, the Security Council "more than any other agency of the UN, was susceptible to the difference of ideologies and interests which divided the world into two blocs and to the opposition between the colonialist and anti-colonial forces."¹⁶⁴

This part of the chapter will show that almost all matters involving Non-Self-Governing-Territories in the UN had to address the two "apparently

conflicting articles" 2 (7) and 14 of the Charter.¹⁶⁵ The early attempts in a process to decolonise Non-Self-Governing-Territories were fundamentally matters of the UN right to intervene in areas where Colonial Powers claimed complete sovereignty. This claim was based on the recognition of such, in Chapter XI of the Charter. But the conflict was not based on clearly drawn lines. It involved questions of perception and definition of the situation and of interpretation of the intent of the anti-colonials. It also involved conflicting claims and accusations which were premised on the concern for the well-being of subject peoples. However, the ultimate motives were mostly derived from self-interest: intangible ones such as prestige and the more important and tangible benefits such as open markets, guaranteed military bases and airfields, natural resources, etc. The conflict was generated out of an atmosphere of trust and distrust.

The dynamics of the process in regard to Non-Self-Governing-Territories were sustained by controversy over the following substantive areas:

1. The transmission of information by the Administering Authorities under Article 73 (e), which would be circumscribed by:
 - a) principles which should guide members in deciding whether an obligation exists to transmit;
 - b) the intention on the part of the Administering Authorities to cease transmission on the basis of the objectives that have been achieved.
2. The functional utilisation of this information:
 - a) involving the specialised agencies of the UN in an advisory capacity, or functional role inside the Territories;
 - b) by the Committee to recommend on procedures and means of attaining the objectives of Chapter XI.
3. Identification of Territories to which Chapter XI applies, that is, the factors which should guide in categorising Non-Self-Governing-Territories.

Here are some of the questions which would guide our analysis of Canada's policy in regard to the decolonisation process in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. To what extent did Canada feel that the Colonial Powers should have a free reign in their territories? Did Canada take an active role in trying to influence the anti-colonial effort to make Colonial Powers accountable to the UN for their Non-Self-Governing-Territories? Did Canada see a connection between absolute colonial authority in Non-Self-Governing-Territories and the maintenance of international peace and stability? Where did Canada place the Soviet Union in all of this? In this part of the chapter we will attempt to isolate the operational factors in Canada's policy position in regard to the Non-Self-Governing-Territories.

The Request For Political Information

It was evident that the Charter-sanctioned arrangements in regard to Non-Self-Governing-Territories intended to eliminate any prospect of accountability by the Administering Authorities to the UN. Because the information to be transmitted to the Secretary General were intended to be of a non-political nature and "for information purposes" only, there were neither supervisory mechanisms nor allowance made for processing this transmitted material. Therefore, at the first session of the General Assembly, Resolution 66(I)¹⁶⁶ was adopted on the initiative of Cuba calling for an ad hoc Committee "which would assist the General Assembly in recommending what should be

done concerning information" transmitted under Article 73(e). Although the resolution dealt only with information addressed in Article 73(e), the Administering Authorities saw the resolution as an attempt to involve the UN more closely in the affairs of Non-Self-Governing-Territories. On the whole, the debates centred on the lack of desire on the part of the Administering Authorities to transmit political information.¹⁶⁷

Nonetheless, the USA along with all the other Colonial Powers voted 'against' this proposal. In the opinion of the Canadian delegate, "they fear that it is the thin edge of the wedge for the future establishment of a subsidiary organ of the UN along lines similar to that of the Trusteeship Council."¹⁶⁸ Both Canada and India supported the adoption of this resolution. The Canadian Delegation wrote, "we were unable to see anything unconstitutional and incorrect in the establishment of an ad hoc Committee for one year."¹⁶⁹ The Indian Delegation did not see anything permanent about this arrangement.¹⁷⁰ The operative part of paragraph 4 'invited' the Secretary General to 'convene' this committee with an equal number of administering and non-administering members "on the basis of an equitable geographical distribution." This principle of equal representation ensured it a reasonable chance of success. In the opinion of Ottawa, the frame of reference of this committee should be as follows:

It may make recommendations on procedures to be followed by the United Nations in dealing with information on conditions in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. It may suggest methods of ensuring that advice, expert knowledge and experience of the specialised agencies are used to the best advantage in any studies that the United Nations may make of this information. It may also make recommendations on policy in functional fields applicable to wide geographical areas, but it is not

to make recommendations relating to individual territories as the Trusteeship Council does.¹⁷¹

An ad hoc Committee was thus established "without prejudice to the decision whether it should be continued or discontinued thereafter." The suggestion by this Committee that its functions be expanded was rejected by Canada on the belief that it was the aim of the non-administrative members to "set up in dependent territories...a body resembling the Trusteeship Council." This was a clearly perceived goal and Canada argued that "such a concept had been rejected first when the Charter was drafted and again when the question of establishing the Special Committee was decided."¹⁷² According to Ottawa, "the main task" of this Committee was a limited one, 'normally' to be undertaken in the form of "the preparation of a report to the Fourth Committee...on the Secretary General's analyses of information on 66 different territories received under Article 73 (e)."¹⁷³

During its meetings in the week of November 11, 1946, the Fourth Committee decided to establish two sub-committees. The First Sub-Committee was to deal with Trusteeship Agreements. The Second Sub-Committee was to address matters pertaining to Chapter XI.¹⁷⁴ At the time, a Philippine proposal for a conference on non-self-governing peoples was up for consideration.¹⁷⁵ This proposal was not accepted by the Fourth Committee. Côté of the Canadian Delegation wanted to have its vote "formally recorded that the Canadian Delegation did not consider that this resolution was 'on all fours' with the Charter." Nevertheless, the attempt had an important functional value for process. It resulted in "a series of declarations by France, the United Kingdom,

Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Belgium to the effect that nothing...could affect the sovereign rights of these Governments in their domestic affairs."¹⁷⁶

The Administering Authorities declared, from the outset, that any attempt to intervene in areas not sanctioned by Article 73(e) would be confronted with Article 2 (7).¹⁷⁷ Most importantly, France, Belgium and the UK began to feel compelled to undertake a collective exercise in order to find "the best means" to deal with criticism of Colonial Powers in the United Nations. "To this end," the Paris Conference on Colonial Matters in Africa, "would discuss policy in relation to Non-Self-Governing-Territories and Article 73(e) of the Charter." These were the main topics to be addressed:

- a) Definition of Non-Self-Governments;
- b) Nature of information to be submitted;
- c) Policy towards the ad hoc Committee of the Assembly which is to examine this information.¹⁷⁸

The ad hoc Committee had become a significant factor in the operational context of UN involvement in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. Although the USA had also voted against the adoption of Resolution 66(I), at the time, there were no consolidated effort on the part of the UK, France and Belgium to work with the USA. However, in recognition of the potential danger which this new Committee could pose for the Administering Authorities in their Non-Self-Governing-Territories, this situation had to be addressed. Six months later, Canada was informed by Addison of the Dominions Office that, at the

Conference, the three Colonial Powers had agreed on "the principle that discussions with the United States Government should be held on the subject of the ad hoc Committee." In addition, they were in favour of making contact with the non-Colonial Powers on the Committee. However, they did "not think it advisable to take the initiative in concerting action with them."¹⁷⁹

The 'fronts' were beginning to solidify in the UN. And as part of the process of consolidation of the Colonial Powers, France and Belgium were in favour of extending the tripartite conference to include Portugal. However, the UK Delegation had to be briefed by its government on this.¹⁸⁰ A crucial aspect of this process of consolidation was the attempt by the Colonial Powers, especially the USA, to include the Soviet empire under the colonial banner at the UN. Had they succeeded, they would have accomplished two things. They would have effectively destroyed an advantage for the Soviet to utilise this issue for its own self-interest. And, in addition, they would have served to weaken the anti-colonial 'front' in terms of debating value and voting numbers provided by the Soviet bloc.

In mid-October, the Canadian Delegation informed Ottawa that, "the United States Delegation has been pressing for the implementation of Article 87 (b) as a matter of principle and, while not naming any particular country, has given the impression that dependencies of the Soviet Union, such as the Kuriles and the Baltic States are the areas which it has in mind."¹⁸¹ This was an attempt to place the Soviet empire under the Trusteeship System and not the safer haven of Chapter XI. If the USA had succeeded, the anti-colonial movement would most probably have had altogether different characteristics.

In the early years of process, the Indian and Soviet Delegations appeared to work together in the anti-colonial efforts at decolonisation as a united front. They singly intended to influence process and implement change in the Charter prerogatives and the Colonial Powers perceived their actions as such. Around mid-October, the Canadian Delegation notified Ottawa that there was a "combined Soviet-Indian offensive against the Colonial Powers to obtain information regarding political conditions" in the Non-Self-Governing-Territories. Moreover, the Delegation felt that they wanted "to have the Assembly recommend that all Non-Self-Governing-Territories be administered under a Trusteeship Agreement."¹⁸² This would have been the most direct path in which to accomplish the goal of obtaining political information and it was clearly the intent of the proposal put forward in an Indian resolution. It argued that,

whereas at the time of the creation of the United Nations it was intended that the Non-Self-Governing-Territories be voluntarily placed under the international Trusteeship System; The General Assembly hopes that the members of the United Nations responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing-Territories will propose Trusteeship Agreements under Article 77 (c) of the Charter of the United Nations for all or some of such territories as are not ready for self-government.¹⁸³

The Canadian Delegation reported that this initiative was favourably received in the Fourth Committee and suggested to Ottawa that it "might oppose the Indian proposals on the grounds that they were, in fact, an amendment by interpretation of the Charter."¹⁸⁴ At the same time, the Delegation pointed out that, "in the past, we have supported the contention that the Charter should be broadly interpreted when such interpretations lead to increased influence of the United Nations."¹⁸⁵ The cardinal question here is, did Canada actually want to

have an increased UN influence in the Non-Self-Governing-Territories? The obvious answer is no, because Canada did not support this resolution in the Fourth Committee or in Plenary.

The Canadian position was evidently reinforced by the attitude of the UK Colonial Secretary, Creech-Jones. The Delegation wrote to Ottawa that Creech-Jones "accused India of attempting to rewrite the Charter." Moreover, he was alarmed that India "was implying that the Trusteeship System was inherently superior and more liberal than the 'Chapter XI System'."¹⁸⁶ Undoubtedly, from the point of view of the anti-colonials, Chapter XII and XIII of the Charter which established the UN supervisory role and authority in the Trusteeship Territories were preferable to the obvious Charter accommodation of an exclusive Administering Authority jurisdiction in Non-Self-Governing-Territories under Chapter XI.

Between the time of the introduction of India's resolution in the Fourth Committee and its consideration by the Plenary Meeting, the Canadian Delegation wrote to Ottawa that, "there was no evidence as yet to support India's contention that the Trusteeship System was 'the surest and quickest means towards self-government or independence'."¹⁸⁷ It was becoming clear to the colonials that India's goal seemed to be a quick end to colonial rule and that its Delegation were prepared to circumvent the preferred colonial arrangement in regard to the Non-Self-Governing-Territories.

In the Plenary Session, India's resolution ran into a consolidated colonial front. The USA Delegation described India's effort in this resolution as a

new 'pastime' which India enjoyed by "throwing verbal darts at the Colonial Powers," and suggested that the General Assembly treat this resolution as an "important matter."¹⁸⁸ Under the rules, a two-third majority was necessary for adoption. This was not obtained and the resolution was not accepted, even though the Indian delegate amended the last paragraph of the resolution to 'hopes' rather than 'requests' members to submit Trusteeship Agreements under Article 77 1(c) of the Charter. By doing so, he had hoped that he would obtain greater support for his resolution.

The Special Committee: A Centre of Conflict

On the recommendations of the ad hoc Committee, a Special Committee was appointed by the Fourth Committee on August 28, 1948. Its task was to examine the Secretary General's routine analysis of information from Non-Self-Governing-Territories with the aim of the preparation of a report to the Fourth Committee of the Assembly. This information was transmitted on 66 different territories under Article 73(e) from 8 members of the UN.¹⁸⁹ In the opinion of Canada, Article 73(e) of the Charter "was adopted in the hope that an exchange of information on conditions in Non-Self-Governing-Territories might lead to a gradual improvement of methods of colonial administration, particularly in areas which have been poorly administered up to the present."¹⁹⁰ Ottawa had recognised that there was a need for political development in Non-Self-

Governing-Territories but was convinced that, in their own time, the Administering Authorities would properly fulfil this obligation.

However, the Delegation realised that "what has been going on in the meetings of the Special Committee," would have operational implications for Canada's policies and also for any hope for a 'gradual' process of change in regard to Non-Self-Governing-Territories. Officials observed that

the Soviet delegate is using his position on the Special Committee to attack Colonial Powers rather than to make practical suggestions for the improvement of colonial administrative practice....In the circumstances it is perhaps important that the Canadian delegate should be sufficiently fortified in advance to play a more active part in the discussions of the Fourth Committee than has been the Canadian policy in the past.¹⁹¹

In view of the perceived need to reduce international tensions, Ottawa decided that "continued non-intervention by Canadian delegates may not be possible, in fact, if the attitude of Soviet delegates on the Special Committee and in the Fourth Committee should become increasingly destructive, as seems likely to be the case." Evidently, Soviet behaviour was a crucial factor in Canada's decision-making process and policy. Ottawa found it necessary to undertake an in-depth examination of the situation in order to decide on the policy it should adopt, in view of the developments in the UN.¹⁹²

In the 1948 Session, the General Assembly had adopted two resolutions which dealt with the provision of information from Non-Self-Governing-Territories.¹⁹³ Resolution 143 (III) expressed the view that "the voluntary transmission of information on the development of self-governing institutions was in conformity with Article 73." This Article had directed the

Administering Authorities "to develop self-government" etc; however, paragraph (e) which dealt specifically with the obligation to transmit information, omitted political conditions. The other four paragraphs were concerned with other aspects of administration in the Non-Self-Governing-Territories, but only paragraph (e) addressed the issue of transmission of information. This resolution attempted to disregard this important distinction.

The UK High Commissioner in Ottawa informed the Canadian Secretary of State that the UK Delegation had "made it clear" in the UN its Government "were not prepared" to transmit such information under Article 73 (e) of the Charter.¹⁹⁴ In other words, the UK would definitely not accept this wide interpretation of Resolution 143 (III) that the transmission of information was addressed in Article 73. The UK insisted that information of a political nature was not included in the list of categories of topics on which information was to be transmitted. Canada was told that "the reason for the attitude of the United Kingdom Government in this matter was simply that they were not prepared to allow the intervention of a Third Party in a relationship which they considered to be essentially a matter between themselves and the peoples of the dependent territories."¹⁹⁵

Moreover, the UK High Commissioner had argued that the colonial peoples "themselves were equally resentful of any attempt at outside interference." Because of this, the UK Government "have decided that they cannot comply with Resolution 143 (III)." It not only "goes far beyond" the provisions of Article 73 (e), it also requires "something which was clearly not

contemplated at the time of ratification of the Charter." Ottawa was notified that the UK Government "felt compelled to 'resist' all attempts to widen the scope of this Article by Assembly Resolution."¹⁹⁶ In view of this uncompromising policy, the Canadian High Commissioner in London was directed by Ottawa to send a copy of the White Paper to the Canadian Delegation on the Fourth Committee meeting in Paris.¹⁹⁷ UK policy would be an important factor in Canada's decision-making process.

Resolution 222 (III) was the result of an Indian initiative and would have had serious implications and consequences for Canada, if the General Assembly had accepted the original Indian draft. Because of India's predisposition to distrust the Administering Authorities, it is doubtful if the Delegation would have accepted the argument of the UK that colonial peoples were 'resentful' of the attention and attempts to have some degree of UN involvement in the political development in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. India's behaviour in the UN, in this early phase of process, seem to indicate that the Indian Delegation did not feel compelled to take the wishes of the Colonial Powers into consideration. One scholar has explained the dynamics of the process to establish UN competence in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. According to L.P.Singh,

the decision of some Administering Authorities not to transmit information raised a protracted debate on the question as to what was meant by the term 'non-self-governing' and who was the competent authority, the administering state or the United Nations, to decide whether a territory had ceased to be non-self-governing and information need not be transmitted.¹⁹⁸

As we have shown in Chapter II,¹⁹⁹ it was crucial for Canada's future status as a non-Colonial Power that the definition of a Non-Self-Governing-Territory and the competence to decide if a sovereign nation has Non-Self-Governing-Territories under its jurisdiction, remain with sovereign states and not the UN. Moreover, any application of India's definition of a Non-Self-Governing-Territory would have significant relevance for Canada's native peoples. India defined a Non-Self-Governing-Territory as "a territory inhabited by a people of a different race, culture and language from its own in the metropolitan country."²⁰⁰ This phenotypic categorisation would logically make India's own native tribes less relevant and, therefore, not subject to UN jurisdiction. India took the position that it was for the UN to 'decide' and that competence was not with the sovereign nations. And, in recognition of the difficulty of pursuing such a position, India proposed that "if necessary" the UN should resort to the International Court of Justice for a ruling.²⁰¹ It was obvious that the Colonial Powers would object, vehemently, to the UN following such a policy and would counter with Article 2(7).²⁰²

Canada also had sufficient grounds to reject such an interpretation of Non-Self-Governing-Territories and the unquestioned competence of the UN to decide. But it was the further explication of the Indian proposal in the Fourth Committee that would serve to dissociate Canada's native peoples from UN jurisdiction and competence. According to Singh, Shiva Rao of India explained that the General Assembly "had a right to know whether a territory was or was not self-governing especially if the administering power, after once furnishing the

information provided for, ceased to transmit it."²⁰³ Canada had decided in 1946 that it had no Non-Self-Governing-Territories and, therefore, never 'furnished' information. But in light of the UN operational context, it was understood that India's proposal would undergo "a good deal of modification" before it could be adopted as a resolution. The attempt to define Non-Self-Governing-Territories had to be sacrificed in the process although the resolution did succeed in establishing some UN competence.²⁰⁴

The Colonial Powers did not accept that "it was essential that the United Nations be informed of any change in the constitutional position and status of any such territory prior to cessation." Canada, along with 16 nations abstained on this resolution.²⁰⁵ It was the opinion of the Canadian Delegation that the Administering Authorities, "can reasonably apprehend in this demand for additional information a first step towards the assertion of a right to interfere in the administration of these territories far beyond anything which is sanctioned by the Charter."²⁰⁶ According to M.N. Bow of the Canadian UN Division, "some members (notably the U.S.S.R) have been pushing the principle that only the United Nations is competent to decide when a territory becomes self-governing and hence when the administering power may cease to transmit information on it." This sort of direct control by the UN in the Non-Self-Governing-Territories were not anticipated in Chapter XI. Consequently, the Administering Authorities claimed that "only they are competent to say at what point a dependent territory becomes self-governing."²⁰⁷

Logically speaking, without information on the political developments in any Non-Self-Governing-Territory, the UN is not competent to decide on its political status regarding advancement to self-government or independence. Therefore, by trying to establish UN competence in this matter, the anti-colonials would indirectly force Administering Authorities to submit political information deemed necessary because of this competence. In its instructions to the Canadian Delegation to the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ottawa was adamant on this point: "nothing in Chapter XI of the Charter gave the United Nations the right to supervise colonial administration." And in view of the prevailing atmosphere in the UN,²⁰⁸ the Delegation was instructed that any "renewed attempt...to subject colonial administrations to a degree of international supervision not contemplated in the Charter" should be met with a Canadian effort, "to continue, as in the past, to favour implementation of the existing provisions of the Charter rather than the adoption of a concept of the position of Non-Self-Governing-Territories which was rejected at the time when the Charter was drawn up."²⁰⁹ In his book, John Holmes explained Canada's conception of the "other territories," that is, those other than Trust Territories. He wrote: "they were of concern to the United Nations because of the Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing-Territories contained in the Charter." He observed that "they were the subjects of reports to the United Nations, but this was a consequence of obligations voluntarily assumed by the administering states in response to the Charter."²¹⁰

Burns of the Canadian Delegation reminded the Fourth Committee that it was the Charter which set the limits of state behaviour in regard to this specific issue. He reiterated that Article 73 (e) "lays down specifically the kind of information which Administering Authorities agreed to furnish." And he suggested that the members ought not to forget that Chapter XI was, in effect, "an agreement which neither party...should endeavour to vary without the full consent of the other party."²¹¹ In other words, it was no business of members to attempt any alteration of a legal contract voluntarily entered into by two parties which intentionally omitted any consideration of accountability. Burns felt that if the Administering Authorities are "reluctant to submit additional information," which would be a voluntary act anyway, "it must be due in part to the feeling, based on sad experience, that the information will be used by certain Delegations for the purpose of misrepresenting the situation."²¹²

Could it be that without having to defend and shield the Colonial Powers against these propaganda attacks in the UN, that Canada would have undertaken a more positive role in working for tangible, even though gradual, progress in the colonies? Would Canada have had the opportunity to function as a moderate, anti-colonial for the benefit of colonial peoples? Judging from the type of arguments and concerns of the Canadian Delegations and Ottawa correspondences, it could be assumed that that could have been the case. In its defence of the 'reluctance' of the Administering Authorities to act voluntarily in submitting political information, Burns of the Canadian Delegation suggested in the Fourth Committee that,

another reason...can be found in some of the speeches...the constant effort on the part of certain Delegations to interpret the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreements as giving them the right to criticise, with inadequate information and knowledge...all aspects of administration, and thereby to interfere with the good government and orderly progress on Non-Self-Governing-Territories.²¹³

In October 1947, the idea was that a Special Committee to deal with reports from Non-Self-Governing-Territories should be a Committee of the Assembly 'itself.' However, this Committee would be "outside the Trusteeship System" as conceived by the Charter. According to Ottawa, the Colonial Powers 'feared' that it "might soon come to regard itself as being in many ways the counterpart of the Trusteeship Council, with authority to review and comment upon the administration of individual Non-Self-Governing-Territories."²¹⁴ Nonetheless, in recognising the useful functional purpose this Committee might serve, the Assembly decided that it should be appointed by the Fourth Committee instead.

On September 8, 1949, the Special Committee adopted a USA resolution recommending to the General Assembly that the Special Committee should be continued for 3 more Years. In a joint resolution, India pushed for an indefinite period of time.²¹⁵ The Belgian amendment to the USA resolution wanted an extension of the present Special Committee with the same terms of reference for one more year.²¹⁶ According to the Canadian Delegation, the USA resolution was "a compromise," reflecting the operational context of the 1949 General Assembly.²¹⁷

The High Commissioner for Canada in London reported that the Colonial Office viewed this extension in the idea of a Special Committee as

"merely a step in the direction of establishing the Committee on a permanent basis as a parallel organ to the Trusteeship Council."²¹⁸ Moreover, John Martin, Permanent Secretary of the Colonial Office, protested that "in so doing, the anti-colonial bloc was tending to duplicate the functions of the specialised agencies." He added, that "for these reasons, the British have long considered ceasing all co-operation with the Committee."²¹⁹ But in recognition of the tenacity of the anti-colonials they decided to retain a presence in this Committee. Martin noted that "although they would have wished to see the Committee abolished, they have gradually swung to the view that if this were accomplished, the anti-colonial bloc would find some other escape valve for their antagonism." However, he also stressed the importance of the USA position as a significant factor in their decision to co-operate with the Committee, and added that the French and Belgians were also influenced by the USA decision to work with the Committee.²²⁰

The USA resolution of September 1949 asking for an extension of the Special Committee for a period of three years was a dramatic change from its 'against' vote on the setting up of the ad hoc Committee for one year in December 1946. In terms of process, the USA move was a compromise in view of India's demand for an indefinite period. And because the life of the Committee was continuously extended on a yearly basis, it did not approach any status of permanence. The USA did not intend to alter this status in any way. According to Martin, the British did "see some merit in the position taken by the United States that the life of the Committee be extended for three years as a final experiment."

However, the USA had already privately declared "that they do not consider themselves bound to the Special Committee after that trial period."²²¹

The UK vote against the adoption of the USA resolution was premised on the same principle of consistently refusing to include information transmitted to the Secretary General under Article 73(e) relating to political conditions in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. Both instances involved "the question of sovereignty."²²² And Article 2(7) of the Charter was very explicit on the question of domestic jurisdiction. The UN dynamics in regard to Non-Self-Governing-Territories involved, to a large degree, a question of interpretation of accountability and competence. And in the perception of both colonials and anti-colonials, the USA had an instrumental role to play in this interaction and process.

On the question of accountability, Martin reported that the State Department "are in accord" with the United Kingdom that the United Nations "has no role of supervision over the Non-Self-Governing-Territories, contrary to what the anti-colonial bloc seem to believe."²²³ What was the significance of this for the UN operational context of this issue? The USA behaviour in regard to UN competence gave the impression, at times, that the USA was an anti-colonial. On the other hand, on critical issues that could serve to establish UN authority in Non-Self-Governing-Territories, the USA was an unwavering colonial. The anti-colonial concern with a definition of Non-Self-Governing-Territories was a case in point. This might seem to be an insignificant consideration but in terms of process, British perception was noteworthy. According to Martin, the UK "see a

danger in the United Nation's effort to draft a definition." It involved a matter of establishing UN competence in an area in which it had no business, according to the Charter. He argued that, "it is not within the purview of the United Nations to decide whether a given territory is to be classified as Non-Self-Governing-Territory."²²⁴

The Question of Competence

As we have shown in chapter II, the Secretary General's letter to all members had requested them to take a position on whether they had any Non-Self-Governing-Territories on which they would wish to report.²²⁵ This procedure was to become a precedent. The UK, therefore, held the view that "it is up to the Administering Power to decide regarding on what territory information is to be furnished to the United Nations." Basically, this view "was shared" by the State Department. Nonetheless, the USA expressed "no objection" to the UN effort to draft a definition of Non-Self-Governing-Territories.²²⁶ This is the explanation for the USA 'abstention' in General Assembly Resolution 334 (IV) December 2, 1949, which established UN responsibility in "enumerating the territories" and "factors which should be taken into account in deciding" whether a territory is a Non-Self-Governing-Territory.²²⁷ Canada, the UK and France voted 'against', while India and the USSR 'for' the adoption of this resolution.

According to Ottawa, this resolution "exhibited the tendency to extend the rights of the General Assembly over Non-Self-Governing-Territories farther

than was necessary and legitimate."²²⁸ Had the UN asserted such a 'right' in 1945, the Secretary General could have requested that Canada place the North West Territories in the Non-Self-Governing category under the Charter. For Canada, this was a question of transmission in "the optional category" and therefore no presumption of UN rights in determining "whether any territory is or is not a territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government." Consequently, Canada supported the administering nations "in resisting this tendency."

The perceived colonial role for Canada in this anti-colonial effort to extend the UN authority and competence in the decolonisation of Non-Self-Governing-Territories, was an important one for the UN process. Ottawa's Policy Guidance for the Delegation to the 1950 General Assembly Session was very explicit as to the operational limits of the newly appointed Special Committee:

The Canadian Delegation should not support attempts by members of the Special Committee to elevate the Special Committee to the status of a United Nations organ comparable, in the field of Non-Self-Governing-Territories...with the Trusteeship Council in its function regarding Trust Territories. It should not accept the principle of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Special Committee.

On the other hand, the Delegation was instructed to express "the hope that there will be an increasing voluntary co-operation by the metropolitan states with the Special Committee with regard to Non-Self-Governing-Territories."²²⁹ Canada wanted to demonstrate that it had not actually chosen to support any one side in this battle and sought to lessen the tension between the 'fronts' of interests. At the time, the Department of External Affairs had been undergoing a 're-examination' of Canadian policy in the United Nations.²³⁰ During this exercise,

the Department was beginning to realise that specific to "dependent territories," the operational context was not necessarily one of a democratic-communist genre; it was more complicated than that.

The re-examination addressed the possibility of "how Canada could assist in whittling down the existing differences between Administering Authorities and their critics." According to Reid, "here is not merely a question of the free world versus the Cominform, although this fundamental conflict is, of course, present. But even more disturbing is the fact that on matters pertaining to dependent territories our friends are divided and the harmony of the Commonwealth relations seriously threatened." Reid also pointed out that there were 'differences' between the United States and the other Colonial Powers "over the degree to which the United Nations should be permitted to intervene in the affairs of Non-Self-Governing-Territories." In sum, by 1951, Canada had concluded that the decolonisation of empires continued to involve its own interests in a very direct way.

Reid suggested that, "while we cannot hope for a complete change of face by Administering Authorities or by their critics, we can hope and work for greater understanding among those of our friends who do not see eye to eye." In support of a perceived role for Canada in this confrontation, Reid reminded his colleagues that "we have built up a reputation as honest brokers and successful negotiators." More specifically, he recommended that, "we might, for instance, attempt to reduce the differences between the Indians and the British by urging the Indians to recognise the general desirability of constructive criticism of the

administering powers and by urging the British not to insist too rigidly upon their rights where minor concessions would lead to fruitful compromise."²³¹

In what ways might such a recommendation be implemented in practical terms? G.C. McInnes of the UN Division wrote, "we...agree...that the issues involved are so serious that it is impossible for a country like Canada to ignore them...."²³² In the opinion of this Division, these were the conflicting interests: "the non-administering powers...have given the Charter the broadest and most strained interpretation possible.... Regarding Article 73(e), they have argued that the Colonial Powers should submit political information." He expressed concern over "the efforts of the non-administering powers to place the Special Committee...on the same plane as the Trusteeship Council, despite the much more limited functions which properly came within its jurisdiction." The resolution of these conflicting interests would not involve "minor concessions."

On the other hand, because the Trusteeship Council had a balanced composition, the Administering Authorities had "violent objections to any reduction in the status" of the Council which, of course, would result if the anti-colonial members were successful in their goal of "consistently asserting the complete supremacy of the General Assembly."²³³ How did officials perceive their role as honest brokers in this 'clash,' when the Delegation had "studiously avoided getting elected to the Trusteeship Council or the Special Committee?"²³⁴ The remaining avenues were either speeches in the General Assembly and the Fourth Committee and behind the scenes negotiations.

The Colonial Office had already reported in mid-1950 that it was "agreeably surprised by the amount of comprehension and sympathy displayed by the State Department."²³⁵ In other words, under these conditions, the perceived Canadian role was made easier because of the attitude of the USA towards the other Colonial Powers. In the 1951 Session, Egypt indicated its intention to include the discussion of Morocco's independence in the Agenda of the Assembly. However in the Acheson-Schuman talks in Washington, "it was agreed...that the USA Government would use 'its best influence' to try to prevent this matter being raised in the UN."²³⁶ The only tactic was to prevent its inclusion on the agenda and, by October, the USA was "considering what it could usefully do to help the French Government." What could have been the cause of this new USA attitude towards the French?²³⁷

Of course, the Ambassador reminded Ottawa that the attempt to keep the item off the Assembly Agenda "will present obvious difficulties to the USA and other Delegations which have interpreted rather broadly the Assembly's right to consider political questions," in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. And because the anti-colonial effort to establish UN competence was still in the stages of infancy, it was necessary that the colonial interests work for a united front in order to prevent the anti-colonials from establishing any precedent in an Non-Self-Governing-Territory. George Vanier, the Canadian Ambassador to France warned: "it is in the interest of the free world to avoid, if at all possible, a bitter debate which could have little practical result beyond stirring up bad feeling and offering the Soviet bloc tempting opportunities for trouble-making." Moreover, he

declared that "there is sound judicial argument for opposing the inclusion of this item on the Agenda on the ground that the Assembly is not competent to intervene."²³⁸

However, in view of the re-examination of Canadian foreign policy and the Canadian Government's perceived goal of working for a greater understanding among its friends who do not see eye to eye, Vanier realised that the special interests of the anti-colonials must be accommodated in Canada's policy. He cautioned that "care must be exercised not to leave the impression that an attempt is being made to stifle consideration, without a hearing, of a problem which concerns the rights and aspirations of politically immature people." Another important factor was the position of France. Vanier suggested that, "if this item is included we believe it would be in the general interest to oppose a resolution denouncing France."²³⁹ This was in keeping with Canada's belief that "an atmosphere of mutual confidence" would serve the best interests of the Non-Self-Governing-Territories.²⁴⁰ At the same time, it was obvious that France did "expect support" from its allies.

In Paris, Vanier had consulted the UK and USA Ambassadors whose views were "very similar to ours." Both Governments were of the opinion that a debate before the General Assembly was "most undesirable at this time."²⁴¹ The UK Foreign Office had 'assured' the French Ambassador in London that the UK Delegation in New York, "will give full support to the French and will vote against the inclusion of the item on the Assembly's agenda." If this effort failed, like the Canadians, the UK "will oppose any denunciation of the French."²⁴² In spite of the

USA promise to take an active part in this process to prevent Morocco from being placed as an item on the Assembly agenda, Vanier reported that the USA Delegation, "as a matter of principle, will abstain from the voting on the question of placing Morocco on the agenda." However, the USA promised again, as it had done in the Acheson-Schuman talks in July, to "do everything possible to postpone a debate through procedural means...." In the event this effort fails, the USA Delegation intended to "support the French and oppose any resolution condemning them."²⁴³ Because the UK, USA, France and Canada shared the belief that the UN had no competence in the Non-Self-Governing-Territories, there was a unified purpose in keeping the item off the agenda and, therefore, no debate in the Assembly.

Definition of Factors and Cessation

General Assembly Resolution 648 (VII) of December 10, 1952 represented a major break-through for the anti-colonials. Identified in Canadian correspondences with Ottawa as the draft resolution on 'factors,' it was opposed, naturally, by all Colonial Powers. The resolution approved a list of factors which would be utilised in determining whether a territory was a Non-Self-Governing-Territory; whether a Colonial Power had an obligation to transmit information and when a Colonial Power decided to cease transmission of information in regard to its Non-Self-Governing-Territory. The Canadian Delegation wrote to Ottawa: "the UK tells us their stand is that the whole exercise is absurd and could have no

bearing on the course of events or on their policy."²⁴⁴ In view of such an intransigent position, did Canada attempt to negotiate any compromise between the fronts of interests? Or was Canada convinced that the Non-Self-Governing Territories were, in fact, no business of the UN?

According to the Canadian Delegation, the USA was against the resolution on two grounds. First, the USA felt that now the Colonial Power "would be obliged to transmit information under Article 73(e) until the territory was self-governing, not only economic but also political information." This was indeed a dramatic break for the anti-colonial effort. Secondly, in the opinion of the USA, the resolution "appeared to maintain that authority to decide when a territory had attained self-government and therefore need no longer be reported on, rested not with the Administering Authority alone but in some way with the General Assembly and the Administering Authority together." This was definitely not the intent of the Charter and in a total disregard of this new development, the USA continued to "maintain that this authority rests solely with the administering power concerned."²⁴⁵ This was a pro-colonial interpretation.

In view of the above interpretation, the USA had come to realise that its estimation of the substance of Resolution 334 (IV) was an incorrect one. By abstaining on this resolution, the USA had inadvertently assisted the progress from this resolution to Resolution 648 (VII). It was a cumulative process which the colonials believed ought not to be encouraged or supported. In the roll call on the resolution "as a whole," Canada, USA, UK and France voted 'against', India and the USSR 'for' the adoption of this resolution. The day following the adoption of

this resolution, the Canadian Delegation notified Ottawa that a Fourth Committee draft resolution was tabled in regard to, "the cessation of transmission of information on the Antilles and Surinam which should be referred to the Committee on factors for examination." The Delegation took the position that, "since the Netherlands do not object to this procedure, we propose to support the resolution."²⁴⁶

The process of direct UN supervision in any decolonisation attempts in Non-Self-Governing-Territories had begun. UN competence in the real empire had been recognised by an Administering Power. Canadian policy had always been premised on the co-operation of the Colonial Powers in any UN action. After witnessing the UN involvement in the developments in the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam from 1952 to 1955,²⁴⁷ Ottawa felt compelled to re-assess its policy to ensure that it was fully aligned with that of the Colonial Powers. The first three General Assembly resolutions which insisted on recognising UN competence to decide on the cessation of transmission of information were partially responsible for the shaping of Canada's policy in regard to the decolonisation process in Non-Self-Governing-Territories.

General Assembly Resolution 748 (VIII) of November 27, 1953 dealt with the cessation of the transmission of information in respect to the Non-Self-Governing-Territory, Puerto Rico (USA). There were two separate roll calls. The first one was on the Preamble: "Bearing in mind the competence of the General Assembly to decide whether a Non-Self-Governing-Territory has or has not attained a full measure of self-government as referred to in Chapter XI of the

Charter." Canada, USA, UK and France voted 'against'; India and USSR 'for' the retention of the Preamble in the resolution. The operative parts of paragraph 5 and 6 recognised that Puerto Rico had attained the status of self-government and that Chapter XI of the Charter no longer applied. This meant that the UN no longer had any jurisdiction over this territory. Canada and the USA voted 'for' and the UK and France 'abstained;' whereas, India and the USSR voted 'against' adoption, in a roll-call vote on the resolution "as a whole." The two 'abstentions' of the Colonial Powers could not prevent the adoption of the resolution. However, their vote were indicative of the unwillingness of both the UK and France to support any effort to establish UN competence in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. India felt that Puerto Rico had not achieved an equal status with other parts of the United States of America and that cessation did not alter this colonial relationship; further UN involvement was necessary to terminate its colonial status.²⁴⁸

General Assembly Resolution 849 (IX) of November 22, 1954, recognised the cessation of transmission in respect of Greenland (Denmark). It referred to General Assembly Resolution 222 (III) of November 3, 1948 in considering it 'essential' that the UN be informed of any change in the constitutional status and, therefore, the decision to cease transmission. Moreover, it considered it "appropriate that transmission...should now cease." However, the last paragraph of the Preamble had a significant and operative role for process and was, therefore, brought to a separate roll call. It stated: "Bearing in mind the competence of the General Assembly to decide whether a Non-Self-

Governing-Territory has or has not attained a full measure of self-government...." Canada, the USA, the UK and France voted 'against'; India and the USSR voted 'for' the retention of this paragraph in the Preamble. Canada, the UK and France 'abstained'; the USA, India and the USSR voted 'for' the adoption in a roll-call on the resolution "as a whole." The Canadian Delegation "voted without any reservation against the resolution...as it considered that a favourable vote would vest the Assembly with a power it did not possess."²⁴⁹ This was a categorical pro-colonial position from which Canada would not waver. And, in anticipation of a similar resolution which would be tabled in respect of the Netherlands Surinam and Antilles at the tenth session, Ottawa instructed the Delegation: "if it seems to convey upon the General Assembly power to make the decisions" in regard to cessation or the achievement of self-government in a Non-Self-Governing-Territory, the Delegation should vote against such a resolution.²⁵⁰

General Assembly Resolution 945 (X) of December 15, 1955 was the result of the notification by the Netherlands of its intent to cease transmission on Surinam and Antilles. The first paragraph of the Preamble gave prominence to "Recalling....General Assembly Resolution 222 (III) of November 3, 1948" and also "Takes note of the documentation submitted...[and] of the new constitutional order...." In the operative part of paragraph 2, it "Expresses the opinion that...cessation of transmission of information...is appropriate." In a separate roll call on this operative part, the USA was the only colonial to agree that the General Assembly could, in principle, express upon cessation. Canada, the UK and France 'abstained.' India 'abstained' for a different reason. Its Delegation

argued that, on the basis of the status achieved as 'provinces' of the Metropolitan country, it was not appropriate that the Netherlands should cease to transmit information.

India believed that the UN ought not to sanction "unequal relationships" by consenting to cessation of transmission of information. Furthermore, its Delegation felt that it was more important to insist upon the point that self-government or independence should be the only basis for cessation of transmission of information from Non-Self-Governing-Territories.²⁵¹ By abstaining on this operative paragraph, India inadvertently opposed the equally important effort to establish UN competence or power to make political decisions in regard to Non-Self-Governing-Territories. This is evidence of the complicated and complex development in regard to the process to decolonise Non-Self-Governing-Territories. It is possible that India felt it necessary to prevent the establishment of a precedent whereby cessation would be accepted on all or any terms by the UN; the Indian Delegation seemed to have given this aspect priority over the need to establish UN competence at this stage in the process.

In the case of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, the UN was embroiled in a battle between anti-colonials and colonials to establish UN competence in Non-Self-Governing-Territories.²⁵² We saw in regard to Morocco that even the simple instance of placing the matter as an item on the agenda to allow for discussion was countered by the colonials with Article 2 (7) of the Charter. At this stage in the process the UN had to establish whether self-government or independence was the basis on which cessation of transmission of information from Non-Self-

Governing-Territories would be accepted. And it is for this specific reason that Canada, France and the UK had abstained on the operative part of paragraph 2, General Assembly Resolution 945 (X).

Although they were all in agreement that cessation was 'appropriate,' and that the Netherlands' intent to cease transmission should be unquestioned, they all refused to concede UN authority or competence to decide, or to pronounce, on this particular aspect of process in regard to Non-Self-Governing-Territories. As a reflection of the significance of this fundamental disagreement, the fifth paragraph of the Preamble: "Bearing in mind the competence of the General Assembly to decide whether or not a Non-Self-Governing-Territory has attained the full measure of self-government...." was brought to a separate roll call. Again, Canada, the USA, France and the UK all voted 'against'; India and the USSR voted 'for' the retention of this Preamble in the resolution.

The dynamics of voting on this resolution serve to demonstrate the complexity of the process. The colonials were uncompromising in their collective rejection of the two operative parts of this resolution.²⁵³ However, they were in agreement that the transmission of information should cease from the Netherlands Surinam and Antilles. Therefore, in a roll call on the resolution "as a whole," Canada, the USA and France voted 'for' its adoption; the UK and India 'abstained' and the USSR, 'against'. The British 'abstention' was a reflection of a seemingly ambiguous position on a double-issue vote.

Had the resolution been a simple, straightforward one "taking note" of the Netherlands' notification to cease transmission, the UK would certainly have

voted in support of this resolution. But, because the UK was not offered such a simple choice, the 'abstention' was a 'yes' for cessation of transmission of information and, therefore, an end to UN 'interference'. At the same time, it was a 'no' for any UN pretension to jurisdiction in any process in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. This position was fully in keeping with the UK communication to Ottawa on March 20, 1948 in which Canada was informed of the UK's compulsion "to resist all attempts to widen the scope of this Article [73 (e)] by Assembly Resolution."²⁵⁴

On the other hand, India's 'abstention' was, in principle, consistent with its position on Puerto Rico.²⁵⁵ India's Delegation supported recognition of UN competence in Non-Self-Governing-Territories and rejected the attempt to cease transmission on any basis other than the attainment of self-government or independence in Resolution 748 (VIII). Canada insisted on the paramountcy of the Administering Authorities in the Non-Self-Governing-Territories thereby refusing any recognition of UN jurisdiction in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. Why did officials take such a position? In view of the significant developments and the process in regard to Non-Self-Governing-Territories from 1946 to 1955, Ottawa's interpretation of the Charter stipulations in Chapter XI was a very pro-colonial one.

Around mid-1955, officials explained to the Delegation that, "in the Canadian view the right to decide to cease transmitting information belongs to the Administering Authority and not to the Committee, and the timing of the cessation of information is a matter for the Administering Power to decide." As if

officials had in mind the distrustful and objectionable attitude of the anti-colonials, their Instructions to the Delegation continued:

Furthermore, it is regarded as evident that the statement by an administering power to the effect that a subordinate territory has become self-governing, when supported by the appropriate evidence, is not subject to question by the United Nations, either in plenary session or in committee or sub-committee. Instead, such a statement must be regarded as being within the executive power of the state concerned and the recognition of the territory as self-governing must be subject to normal diplomatic action.²⁵⁶

Officials believed that the Committee on Information could possibly usurp the relatively intact power of the Administering Authorities in their Non-Self-Governing-Territories and they complained that the "case surrounding this pseudo-organ was one in which the United Nations is getting the worst of every world." As far as Ottawa was concerned, the Committee

was established in order to allow the non-colonial members room to express their wholly legitimate interest in the Non-Self-Governing-Territories, yet by its very existence it derogates from the sovereignty of the Colonial Powers. It is therefore an arena in which is displayed the less beneficial aspect of governments. Hostility is the keynote of the discussion.²⁵⁷

Herein lies the basis of the fundamental, antagonistic starting positions of Canada and the anti-colonials. In the perception of officials, the process in regard to Non-Self-Governing-Territories had to do with a conflict between "the legitimate interest" of the anti-colonials and "the sovereignty of the Colonial Powers." It was a conflict over the recognition of specific rights in the Charter on the one hand, and self-evident rights, on the other. Actually, the Colonial Powers had conferred their 'sovereignty' over Non-Self-Governing-Territories on

themselves; anti-colonials refused to recognise this status and Canada's policy was designed on this premise.

Therefore, there was no question in Canada's mind that the Colonial Powers possessed the sole right to make any decision in regard to political developments in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. This was stipulated in the Charter. It necessarily follows that, when an Administering Authority did make a decision that a certain political status had been obtained, in what is solely its domain, it should be understood that such an action ought not to be "subject to question" by the United Nations. However, this is exactly what the Indian Delegate did his speech on Puerto Rico and the Netherlands Surinam and Antilles.

In the opinion of Ottawa, the decision of an Administering Authority to cease transmission of information in regard to any Non-Self-Governing Territory ought to be taken as a categorical imperative. This necessarily required members to undertake certain steps as part of an established process. In other words, when a Colonial Power announced that a Non-Self-Governing-Territory had achieved self-government, in Canada's mind, it had unquestionably achieved self-government. It meant that the members of the UN were obliged to recognise that the UN no longer had jurisdiction, real or apparent, in this ex-Non-Self-Governing-Territory. This is a pro-colonial argument and was an important basis of Canada's policy. The issue here was a question of trust.²⁵⁸ This perception was shared by the Colonial Powers.

Committee on Information

It is for the above reasons that colonial policy towards the Committee on Information was made on an ad hoc basis. By mid-June 1955, Bourdillon, Assistant Under Secretary in the Colonial Office informed the Canadian High Commissioner for London that "no final decision could be taken until consultations had been held with the French and possibly the Belgians." The question of the renewal of the Committee was on the agenda of the up-coming General Assembly Session and, at the time, the British were "prepared to support the continuation for the same period of time and under the present terms of reference, subject to the following conditions":

- a) that parity of membership is maintained between administering and non-administering powers;
- b) that the provisions of Article 73(e) are respected and that no political matters are discussed by the Committee;
- c) that the Committee's recommendations are couched in general terms and are not related to specific territories.²⁵⁹

Of course, the final decision would be strongly influenced by the assessment of "whether the Committee had done more harm than good."²⁶⁰ By mid-summer, the Colonial Office had "come to the conclusion that on the whole it had perhaps performed some useful function in reducing the temperature of anti-colonial Delegations."

Therefore, in terms of the operational context and its influence on the process of decolonisation, the British saw a functional role for the Committee on Information at the 1955 Session of the General Assembly. This was a radical departure from its earlier position.²⁶¹ According to Bourdillon, it was a 'fact' that

"some of the anti-colonials had indicated their resentment at the 'lightening conductor' function of the Committee on Information on the grounds that its deliberations tended to encourage anodyne resolutions." He pointed out in a meeting at the Commonwealth Relations Office, that the Committee "had done nothing about the two resolutions" which had been adopted by the General Assembly in the 1954 Session asking the Committee: First, to consider procedures which might be adopted in relation to the cessation of the transmission of information to the Committee. These resolutions included the suggestion of Visiting Missions to Territories about to attain self-government. And, secondly, to conduct its studies on a regional basis. This inactivity of the Committee on Information was, of course, encouraging to the Colonial Powers. However, Bourdillon was sceptical that the Fourth Committee "would also be prepared to let matters rest...."²⁶²

He was apprehensive about the second resolution adopted by the General Assembly and observed that it "was the more dangerous since on the surface it appeared fairly reasonable." He argued that the instruction "to conduct" any studies would "involve a change in the Committee's terms of reference." It was also obvious that the UK "would not be prepared" to accept any extension in the terms of reference simply because "it would bring the Committee one stage nearer to intervening in individual Colonial Territories." Although the UK had recognised at this point in time that it was in its own interest to recommend a continuation of the Committee, Bourdillon declared that the UK would do so "only on condition that there was no question of extending its terms of reference."²⁶³

In its assessment, the Colonial Office had also become "fully aware that if the Committee on Information is discontinued it is highly likely that an ad hoc Committee would be appointed to take its place." And in recognition of the UN dynamics of the colonial issue, Bourdillon suggested that it was "also probable that the membership of such a Committee would not have the present parity between administering and non-administering powers and would be made up largely of anti-colonial countries."²⁶⁴ The Committee on Information held its meetings in the late spring to prepare its recommendations for the General Assembly. Ottawa was informed by mid-summer of the topics discussed. These would be accommodated in "Instructions for the Delegation" by mid-September.

There were three subjects which, according to Ottawa, "were vital to the existence" of the Committee: the renewal of, and representation on, the Committee; and on the instigation of India, Burma and Iraq, the participation of indigenous inhabitants as 'observers' to the Committee.²⁶⁵ These three subjects were discussed under one heading in the Committee: "Future Studies Relating to Non-Self-Governing-Territories." This anti-colonial attempt to seek direct contact with the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing-Territories and the pressure to extend the Committee indefinitely, "offended all the administering powers." And 'because' this situation "will unquestionably provoke debate in the Fourth Committee where the Administering Powers are outnumbered," Ottawa thought it normal under the circumstances "to speculate" that each of the above three items, "may appear separately" as topics for discussion in the Fourth Committee.

This distinction had important significance for Canada's policy position and for process.

The Delegation was specifically instructed to "abstain from voting if an omnibus proposal is couched in terms of the existing resolution." In general, Ottawa was wary and apprehensive as to the direction which the Committee had taken so far. According to the Charter, the Secretary General had the responsibility to process the information transmitted from Non-Self-Governing-Territories. But, Ottawa was aware of the fact that "for some years" the transmitted information was being processed instead by this Committee which was a "non-permanent organ" of the General Assembly. The Committee had gradually taken on a direct responsibility on its own, unconstitutionally. Therefore, in keeping with its principle of not voting against matters which the Administering Authorities had decided to accommodate, Ottawa instructed the Delegation "to abstain on any move to make the term of the Committee indefinite." The basis for an 'abstention' instead of an 'against' vote was Ottawa's argument "that the Committee on Information has been able to function at all is a tribute to the co-operation of the Administering Powers, which, with one exception, have not pressed the issue of constitutionality of the Committee to a conclusion."²⁶⁶

If brought up as a separate item, the Delegation was instructed to vote "against any proposal that would permit the Committee to study functional fields in relation to regional groups of territories." What was the aim of the anti-colonials in pushing for such a right? There was no evident value in undertaking further study when "in actual fact...the United Nations has, under the terms of its Charter

(Chapter XI), no authority to make recommendations on the information transmitted" under Article 73(e). This was the UK interpretation²⁶⁷ of Charter stipulations and all the Administering Authorities had already declared their opposition to any attempt of the Committee to expand its frame of reference to work with transmitted information that had already been processed by the Secretary General.

Besides, "functional fields" fell within the jurisdiction of the Specialised Agencies of the UN which were working with the Administering Authorities. The UK had already pointed out in 1950 that "a great volume of detailed information on the colonies" was already being voluntarily transmitted to the Secretary General by the UK and that "recommendations are often drawn up without regard to, and even without knowledge of" this vast amount of information.²⁶⁸ In other words, this proposal would serve no functional purpose either in terms of practical UN work or for the process of decolonisation in the Non-Self-Governing-Territories.

The final item, if successfully adopted, would in fact serve to expand the frame of reference of the Committee by establishing a direct contact with the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing-Territories. The Charter made stipulations for this in the Trust Territories but not in the Non-Self-Governing-Territories. Therefore, the Delegation was instructed to "vote against any resolution that would recommend that the Administering Powers should include indigenous inhabitants among its representatives on the Committee on Information." This would effectively serve to upset the balance of interest in the Committee to the

advantage of the anti-colonials. Because membership of the Committee had a direct and critical role in determining the function of the Committee and therefore the decolonisation process, Ottawa also gave specific instructions to the Delegation for the 1955 Assembly Session. At the end of the year, the terms of Brazil, India, China and Iraq were to expire; India and China declared their intention to seek re-election and the USSR announced its candidacy. The instructions were to support the re-election of India and China; a Latin American country to replace the seat vacated by Brazil, and "seek advice of the Department as to a suitable choice" for Iraq's vacated seat after all the candidates had made themselves known. The USSR candidacy was not addressed.

At the time, Ottawa did not anticipate Belgium's return to the work of this Committee. However, after a discussion with Fenaux, Head of the UN Division at the Foreign Ministry in Belgium, the Canadian Embassy notified Ottawa in mid-September that Belgium did not intend to return to the Committee. Fenaux also said that the British Government was "apparently expected to oppose the renewal of the Committee of Information" at the coming General Assembly and he expected that Belgium "would vote with the British on this."²⁶⁹

From the outset, this Committee - the unconstitutionality of its existence and its operation, the hostile atmosphere and its aims up until 1955 - has been an important and relevant factor in Canada's decision-making process in regard to Non-Self-Governing-Territories. There were two reasons for this: the recognition it had been given by the Colonial Powers and the operational effects

it had on the decolonisation process in the UN. Therefore, Canada was forced to take a position in this on-going conflict between the anti-colonials and the Colonial Powers in the UN because of the existence of this Committee. In its Instructions for the Delegation to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly, this is how Ottawa explained its new policy in light of a reassessment:

because the Canadian Delegation represents a country which has no outside dependent territories, it does not need to participate in this tug-of-war between the administering powers and the anti-colonial bloc. In general the Delegation should confine its activities to voting....Generally speaking, the attitude of the Delegation should be non-committal.²⁷⁰

Assessment

It was important that the Delegation understood that Ottawa's instruction were specific "to Item 31 in its entirety," that is, "Information from Non-Self-Governing-Territories transmitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter etc." Officials felt it necessary to reiterate the Department's clearly defined and consistent interpretation of Article 73: "The Canadian attitude on this point is that an attempt to extend the scope of Article 73 by requiring the submission of political information, etc., would, in effect be an attempt to amend the Charter." In addition, they explained that "the very existence of the Committee is subject to the same legal doubt and it is therefore apparent that the political realities of the situation must take precedence over the legal side so long as the co-operation of the Administering Powers is not damaged." Nevertheless, by 1955, Ottawa took the position that "there is little question that the United Nations is entitled to

observe the progress towards self-government being made by the Non-Self-Governing-Territories."²⁷¹

But how was the UN to ensure that there was, indeed, any progress taking place in the Non-Self-Governing-Territories?²⁷² Officials were aware of this discrepancy because there was no obligation on the part of the Administering Authorities to transmit political information. Nevertheless, in keeping with Canada's propensity to trust the sincerity of the Colonial Powers, officials pointed out that in Non-Self-Governing-Territories, "the Administering Governments have undertaken the solemn obligation to advance their charges in accordance with a set of criteria and principles."²⁷³ And they admitted that, "we are inclined to assume that the principles are being followed and the criteria met; however, this assumption is not common to all countries, particularly those who have recently attained self-government." This was a clear recognition of a functional role of non-White colonial experience in the behaviour of anti-colonial states and an instrumental factor in Canada's decision-making process, specific to decolonisation.

Most importantly, our assessment of Canada's involvement in a 10 year conflict show that Canada's concern about the possibility of a rift between the UK and the USA, inter-Commonwealth disagreements, opportunities for Soviet mischief-making, and perceived security dangers among others, were operational factors in the formulation of Canadian policy on this one issue. It's continual revision of policy to meet the needs of an evolving international context is evidence of this. In regard to colonial questions, Ottawa's earlier emphasis on

the resort to the International Court of Justice was revised in favour of a 'flexible' policy emphasising "practical and political considerations," is just one case in point. On January 12, 1956, Cadieux of the Canadian UN Division, in reply to criticism of Canadian policy on Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing-Territories wrote to Holmes: "Personally I believe we have perhaps gone as far as we could in this direction, you may agree that it would be useful to review our policy between now and the next session of the General Assembly."²⁷⁴

The question of the competence of the General Assembly to discuss matters pertaining to Non-Self-Governing-Territories had important significance for Canada's policy on the colonial issue. In view of the perceived operational limits in the UN, the Instructions for the Canadian Delegation to the Eleventh Session was sent to the Canadian Cabinet for its approval.²⁷⁵ Consisting of two pages, it explored the limits and possibilities of giving a liberal interpretation to Article 2(7) in recognition of Article 14. This article which established the Assembly's right to discuss and make recommendations "for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations." In simple terms, any matters of conflict that is brought to the UN automatically involve a question of national sovereignty versus the General Assembly's limits of operation. The Department had, "more recently [by 1956]...recognised that this right [of the Assembly], among others, would be seriously impaired if too great an effect were given to the domestic jurisdiction laws set forth in Article 2(7)."²⁷⁶

Therefore, it was decided that Article 2(7) "should in general be brought into the balance only...as a measure to determine whether the proposed action by the Assembly is of such a nature as to qualify it as intervention." The practice was to "weigh each case on its merits" and the final decision should be made on the following criteria:

whether inscription and discussion would serve a useful purpose or harmful purpose either in finding a solution or in reducing the tensions which the problem has brought about among member states....In other words, our decision whether the Assembly should discuss the item should be decided on the basis of practical and political considerations rather than legalistic ones.²⁷⁷

On the other hand, legalistic aspects "should nevertheless be given due weight in casting a vote on any resolution resulting from the discussion."

These were two separate sets of considerations and those intended for the sole purpose of discussion were distinct from those intended to register a vote. This was in recognition of the binding obligations of a UN resolution on a member while in a most extreme case, discussion might lead to an unpleasant atmosphere in the UN, at most. The Department explained to the Delegation that the new "flexible policy" as outlined above had served as "the basis of the instructions on Tunisia, Morocco, Cyprus Algeria, West New Guinea, and race conflict and the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa." Finally, the instructions recommended that "in view of the above the Delegation should avoid giving support to proposals seeking an opinion from the International Court of Justice on these apparently conflicting Articles [2(7) and 14] of the Charter."²⁷⁸

In this chapter, we have tried to show which factors were operational in a process of change in Canada's policy on Non Self Governing Territories.

Officials felt compelled to adopt a flexible policy in regard to UN authority and competence in Non-Self-Governing-Territories because of their main concern with maintaining the strength and value of the UN as an institution. In their perception, international operating pressures of the colonial issue had functionally altered the voluntary nature of obligations which the Administering Authorities had assumed under the Charter in their "real empire." These pressures had manifested themselves as a source of conflict among the disputants. Officials progressively recognised that they could not continue to assign a lower priority to the legitimate claims of dependent peoples than that accorded colonial interests in their policy in the UN.

¹ J. Plano and R. Riggs, Forging World Order, p. 355.

² Singh, Birth, p.23. For an extensive analysis of step by step development and procedure towards the approval of the Trusteeship Agreements. See also: James N. Murray Jr., The United Nations Trusteeship System (1957). Originally a Ph.D. Thesis, based solely on secondary sources and a few interviews, "describes the process by which the Trusteeship System of the UN came into being." The UN Charter: In Article 77(1), the drafters intended that the Colonial Powers retain some freedom to decide whether they would subject any part of their empire to UN scrutiny. This Article directed that the Trusteeship System "shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of a Trusteeship Agreement:

- a. territories now held under mandate
- b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
- c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for the administration."

A list of the territories placed under the Trusteeship System and the Administering Authorities:

<u>Administering Authorities:</u>	<u>Trust Territories:</u>
Australia	New Guinea (Nauru);
Belgium	Ruanda-Urundi;
France	French Cameroons
	French Togoland
New Zealand	Western Samoa
United Kingdom	British Cameroons
	British Togoland
	Tanganyika
United States	Territory of the Pacific Islands
	(Strategic Trust Territory)
	Carolines, Marshalls, Marianas

Most importantly, Article 77(2) declared that "it will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing category will be brought under the Trusteeship System and upon what terms." Eight draft Trusteeship Agreements were submitted to the UN and after

considerable and lengthy debates, "they were adopted almost in the form [in which] they had been proposed." Singh, p.23. Article 78 is significant for our analysis. It declared that "the Trusteeship System shall not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality." Therefore, excluded from this study are questions dealing with minorities and any group of peoples within sovereign borders seeking secession. This Article, in conjunction with Article 2(7), established a legal system whereby the sovereignty of national borders was reinforced, and the "legal title" of Colonial Powers to their Territories was recognised. * Terminology used by Mr. Ryckmans (Belgium) UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second Part of the First Session, Twenty-eighth Meeting, December 10, 1946, p.212.

³ RG 25, Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.2. Memorandum, McDougall To: Summers, October 28, 1952. Restricted. Transmitting an AIDE-MEMOIRE, From: Foreign Service of the United States of America "USA Embassy on Dependent Territory Questions." October 22, 1952, p.3.

⁴ Holmes, Shaping II. p.x. Citing: E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, 2nd ed. (London, 1946), p.62.

⁵ Lincoln Bloomfield, The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy (London: University Press, 1969), p.204.

⁶ Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p.2.

⁷ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second part of First Session, November 21, 1946, p.21. Bailey (Australia)

⁸ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Sixth Meeting, November 23, 1946. P.32. Menon (India) "the discussion of the draft Trusteeship Agreements was intended to achieve accord on Trusteeship Agreements which should be as close as possible to those envisaged by the Charter."

⁹ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second Part of First Session, Sixth Meeting, November 23, 1946, p. 38. Parodi (France) 28th Meeting, December 10, 1946 p. 218. "either the agreements were in regular form and should be approved, or they were not and thus, could not be approved." UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second Part of First Session, Annex 14, p. 275. (UK) The Fourth Committee "is not a drafting body, but a body charged with the duty of advising the General Assembly whether the present text should be approved or not." (Canada) "it was not a matter in which the Fourth Committee could properly intervene." (157th Meeting)

¹⁰ Ibid., Ryckmans (Belgium), p.212.

¹¹ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second Part of First Session, December 10, 1946, pp.210-211.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ RG 25 Vol: 3458, File 6-1-1949/I; T/I:A

¹⁶ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second Part of First Session, Tenth Meeting, November 27, 1946. USSR: the 'right' to use the Trust Territory to further world peace and security was a 'restricted' one, p. 71.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second Part of First Session, Tenth Meeting, November 27, 1946, p.60.

¹⁹ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second Part of First Session, Annex 12b, (doc.A/C.4/33).

²⁰ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second Part of First Session, Second Meeting, November 18, 1946, p.6.

²¹ Rowe, p. 228. "In the early years of the UN the position of the Colonial Powers was secure enough and the number of states taking an extremely anti-colonial position small enough that only moderate proposals involving extensive concessions to the Colonial Powers could be expected to receive adequate support."

²² Ibid.

²³ RG 25 Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. From: Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London. To: Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Secret Cypher, Circular D. 925, London October 12, 1946. The British "declared intention" to place Tanganyika, British Cameroon and Togoland under Trusteeship.

²⁴ RG 25, Vol 3458 File 6-1-1949/I, T/I.

²⁵ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second Part of First Session, Tenth Meeting, November 27, 1946, p.67.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second Part of the First Session, Ninth Meeting, November 26, 1946, p. 60.

²⁸ Ibid., p.68.

²⁹ Ibid., p.69.

³⁰ Ibid., Berendsen said that New Zealand "would not accept trusteeship under the Security Council."

³¹ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Second Part of the First Session, Third Meeting, November 20, 1946, p.15. India's addenda to the draft agreement for Western Samoa:(1) a tentative time limit be set for independence, (2) a time be set for automatic revision of the agreement, (3) an article on immigration favourable to the inhabitants, (4) an article "defining the nationality" of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory.

³² Ibid., Ninth Meeting, November 26, 1946, p.60.

³³ Ibid., Tenth Meeting, November 27, 1946, p.70.

³⁴ UNGAOR, Second Part of the First Session, Fourth Committee, Eleventh Meeting, November 28, 1946, p.74.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 75. See: UK view that the role of the Trust Territories in international peace and security "was necessary in the evolution of the Trust Territories...for them to be trained to play their part..." Ibid., Ninth Meeting, November 26, 1946, Mr. Thomas.

³⁷ UNGAOR, Second Part of First Session, Fourth Committee, Eleventh Meeting, November 28, 1946, p. 75.

³⁸ RG 25 Vol: 3458 File: 6-1947/I, p.2. This interpretation was an obvious one. See: Henri Grimal, Decolonisation (Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), p.157. He claims that "by asserting the obligation to respect the cultural heritage of the peoples 'administered,' the Charter strongly condemns assimilation and integration."

RG 25 Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.I. From: Robert MacEachen, Chairman Canadian Delegation to General Assembly. To: SSEA, Ottawa, December 17, 1946

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p.3. paragraph 8. The Soviet amendment to delete the words "as an integral part" (A/C.4/Sub.1/70, p.21) "Mr. Novikov stated the task of the Committee was to attempt to approve the agreements and that certain states which were bound by bilateral ties to mandatory states had taken an attitude of not putting to execution the provisions of the Charter and everybody would know with whom the responsibility for the defeat of the Trusteeship System would rest." Côté of Canada "objected formally to any insinuation which might be thought to apply to his country as a result of this remark by Mr. Novikov. The French and United Kingdom delegates subsequently registered protests along those lines."

³⁹ RG 25, Vol: 3458, File: 6-1-1949/1; T/1:C.

⁴⁰ RG 25, Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt. 6.2. Foreign Service of the United States, Aide-Memoire, October 22, 1952, p. 2.

⁴¹ The Trust Territories which are in varying ways united administratively with neighbouring colonies:

- Tanganyika with Kenya and Uganda;
- Ruanda-Urundi with the Belgian Congo;
- British Cameroons with Nigeria
- British Togoland with the Gold Coast;
- New Guinea with Papua, under Australian administration;

⁴² RG 25 Vol: 3458 File: 6-1-1949/1; T/1:C

⁴³ UNGAOR. Second Part of First Session, Fourth Committee, Annex: 9a.p.262 (Document A/C.4/ Sub.1/55) USA enquiring into drafts re: French Togoland and Cameroons. The Delegation of France pointed out that the French Constitution "prohibits the establishment of private monopolies."

⁴⁴ UNGAOR, Second Part of First Session, Fourth Committee, Third Meeting, November 20, 1946, p. 11.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ UNGAOR, Second Part of First Session, Fourth Committee, Fourth Meeting., November 21, 1946, p. 21.

⁴⁸ UNGAOR, First Part of First Session, Fourth Committee, Summary Records of Meetings January 11-February 7, 1946.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ The USA interpreted it this way: Aide Memoire, p. 3. "The present status of Trust Territories must be maintained until, in accordance with Article 76 of the Charter, the inhabitants of those territories reach a state of political advancement enabling them to choose the form of government they want and to decide on the relationship which they wish to have with other political entities."

⁵¹ UNGAOR, Second Part of First Session, Fourth Committee, Annex 14. p. 274.

⁵² Ibid., Document A/C.4/Sub.1/72. Delegation of the UK: Comments on modifications proposed to the draft Trusteeship Agreements for Tanganyika, the Cameroons and Togoland under British mandate.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ UNGAOR, Second Part of First Session, Fourth Committee, Twenty-six Meeting, December 11, 1946.p. 169.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ RG 25 Vol: 2659. File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1.p. 3. paragraph 9. Although the title page to this file listed 8 pages of contents, page 3 was the only page in the folder; all others were missing.

⁵⁷ UNGAOR, Second Part of First Session, Fourth Committee.(doc. A/C.4/Sub.1/602). p. 264.

⁵⁸ UNGAOR, Second Part of First Session, Fourth Committee, Fourth Meeting, November 21, 1946. Trusteeship Agreement for New Guinea (doc.A/153)

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ RG 25. Vol: 3458. File:6-1-1949/1. T/1.p.1.

⁶¹ See: Part II of this Chapter Non-Self-Governing-Territories

⁶² RG 25. Vol: 3458 File: 6-1-1949/1; T/1:C

⁶³ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.7.1. From: The Chairman, Candel New York To: SSEA, Ottawa, Message No: 447. December 4, 1952. Confidential.

⁶⁴ G.B.Summers, Memorandum For Mr. Ritchie., Ottawa, December 5, 1952. Confidential.

⁶⁵ RG 25 Vol:6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.7.1. From: SSEA, Ottawa To: The Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly, New York, December 5, 1952. Confidential.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.7.1. From: The Chairman, Canadian Delegation To: USSEA, Ottawa, Telegram 477. December 8, 1952.

⁶⁸ John Holmes, Vol: 2. "according to the functionalist principle [Canada] did not want to be" a member on the Trusteeship Council. p. 326.

From: PERMDELEGN, New York To: Under SSEA, Ottawa, Letter No: 145, February 26 1952. Confidential. "Dr. Bunche expressed the hope that Canada might take a more active interest in the Trusteeship Council and in colonial problems generally; he pointed out that we are in an enviable position to do so something constructive because of our record of impartiality, and our strategic position vis-à-vis both the Administrating Powers and the anti-colonial states." MG 31 E46 Vol: 7, File:16 paragraph 201.1 Professor H. Soward, Canada External Policy 1946-1952. Secret. He was a member of the Department of External Affairs. He was asked "to provide a series of documents for the use of the Minister and Officers of the Department." In 1952, he undertook an examination of the files. The result is a 4-page document. He concluded that because King's principle of functionalism did not find "adequate recognition" in international affairs, Canada "ceased to lay stress upon it."

⁶⁹ RG 25 Vol: 6921 File: 5475-N-40 pt.11.2. From: M.A. Crowe, Permanent Delegation to UN To: USSEA, Ottawa, Numbered Letter:723, August 10, 1955. Confidential. Informed Ottawa, in a

good analysis and description, of the method which all states continued to go through in choosing members for the Trusteeship Council.

⁷⁰ David A. Kay, "The Politics of Decolonisation: The New Nations and The United Nations Political Process." International Organization, No. 4.(Autumn, 1967), pp.788-789. "Thus, by the start of 1960 the Assembly through a decade and a half of active, probing concern with colonial problems had established for itself a dominant position in the Organisation with respect to these problems."

⁷¹ RG 25 Vol: 3458 File:6-1-1949/1A; G/4.p.2 paragraph 7 to p.3.

Category A: All states administering Trust Territories;

Category B: Permanent members of the Security Council who do not administer Trust Territories and who may be expected to present themselves as champions of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories;

Category C: Colonial Powers not acting as United Nations Trustees;

Category D: States representing peoples whose independence has been recently recognised;

Category E: "Neutral" states, that is, those which have never been in any of the first three categories, or which have long since emerged from the fourth.

⁷² In Category C- Netherlands, in Category D- Denmark or Sweden instead of a Latin American member.

⁷³ The 1946 Trusteeship Council membership had 10 members:

Category A: Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, UK

Category B: China, USSR

Category C: USA

Category D: Iraq

Category E: Mexico

⁷⁴ Neither of the two states were chosen. RG 25 Vol: 3458 File: 6-1-1949/1A; G4. The 1947 Trusteeship Council membership changed in view of the USA strategic Trusteeship Agreement in April 1947.

Category A: Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, UK, USA;

Category B: China, USSR;

Category C: nil;

Category D: Iraq, Philippines;

Category E: Mexico, Costa Rica;

⁷⁵ RG 25 Vol: 3458 File:6-1-1949/1A; G/4.

⁷⁶ See Chapter III for more on this.

⁷⁷ RG 25, Vol: 3458, File:6-1-1949/1A; G/4, paragraph 13.

⁷⁸ This is fully brought out in the case study on French Togoland. RG 25 Vol: 3458 File: 6-1-1949/1A; G/4:10. Ottawa believed that Lebanon "might be a good candidate" because of the 'probable' support from France, by the Arab bloc and 'perhaps' by the Latin American states "as a result of" a voting agreement with the Arab states.

⁷⁹ April, 1948.

⁸⁰ RG 25 Vol:3458 File: 6-1-1949/1A; G/4:paragraph 10.

⁸¹ RG 25 Vol: 7572 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.1. From: N. Reddaway, Office of the High Commission for UK in Ottawa To: M. Cadieux, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, WES. 73/16. July 6, 1955. Confidential.

⁸² Canada and the United Nations: 1945-1975, (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1977),p.88. "The situation changed rapidly with the admission of 18 new countries in 1969, followed by a veritable flood of new member states from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, which were products of colonial emancipation and at the same time its most vigorous advocates."

⁸³ From: SSEA, Ottawa To: Secretary General of the Canadian Delegation to UNGA, Paris, Despatch No: 26, September 9, 1948, transmitted Despatch No: 1684, London, September 3, 1948, which contained a copy of Colonial No: 228 of 1948- a White Paper on the treatment by the United Nations on information on Non-Self-Governing-Territories furnished in accordance with Article 73(e) of the Charter. In transmitting this document to Ottawa, the Canadian High Commissioner in Despatch No: 1684 observed: "By a wise and imaginative use of the information placed at the disposal of the Trusteeship Council, it could become a great source of progress. But

few members, it says, have shown so far much inclination for this laborious work, preferring to chastise the colonisers in the name of first principles than to learn enough about what they are doing to be able to make useful criticisms. The Council's proceedings so far have not always been such as to encourage any colonial nations to invite it to extend its activities beyond its frontiers."

⁸⁴ RG 25 Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40.pt.1. From: R. MacEachen Chairman, Canadian Delegation To: SSEA, Ottawa, December 17, 1946.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ RG 25, Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.1

Anglo-American Discussions of the Handling of Colonial and Trusteeship Questions in the United Nations, London, October 10-12, 1951. Secret, p.4. "The Indian proposal for combined discussion in the Fourth Committee of Trusteeship Council and Special Committee matters."

⁸⁷ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File 5475-N-40.pt.6.2. From: Chairman, Canadian Delegation, N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa, Cypher- Auto No:59, October 23, 1952. Subject: Fourth Committee: Requests for Oral Hearings.

-The Canadian Delegation "did not dispute the right" of the Fourth Committee to hear oral petitions from Trust Territories.

-Most members of the Arab-Asian, Latin American and Soviet blocs: "a very liberal view that requests should be granted."

-The administering powers agreed that the Trusteeship Council or its Standing Committee on petitions could "more effectively" deal with these, thereby releasing the Fourth Committee to deal with other important matters.

-The UK and other Administering Authorities decided not to oppose the request.

-Canada "followed their lead in abstaining."

-The USA voted with the majority for allowing the petitioners from the Wa-Meru Tribe (Tanganyika), 33 for, 0 against, 11 abstentions.

-The Australians decided to oppose the request by the "Union des populations du Cameroon" for oral hearings on "procedural" grounds in order to "expedite the work of the Fourth Committee," and suggested that "initial hearing" should be undertaken by "more appropriate organs." In other words, a similar argument as in the case of the Wa-Meru Tribe.

-The Canadian Delegation "found this argument lucid and powerful and joined with the Administering Powers and a very few other states in voting against" hearing the Cameroons' petitioners. It was granted (37-10-5)

-"The debate on this subject was moderate and sensible throughout and seemed to neglect these differences of opinion."

⁸⁸ From: Office of High Commissioner for Canada, London To: USSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 1070, June 17, 1955. p.5. Mr. Bourdillon (Colonial Office) complaining of the "many unsatisfactory features of the Trusteeship Council" which "were not getting any better as time went on." "A good example of the sort of error the Trusteeship Council can be led into was the report of the visiting mission to Tanganyika. There were one or two well organised pressure groups in Tanganyika who managed to have a representative wherever the visiting mission held hearings and the mission had therefore received a completely distorted and unrepresentative picture of public opinion in the territory."

⁸⁹ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.1. Memorandum, From: F.X. Houde To: Holmes, February 19, 1951.

⁹⁰ RG 25 Vol: 3458 File: 6-1-1949/1; T/1-F.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² From: Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch No: 832, April 17, 1950. A.N. Galsworthy, Assistant Secretary at the Colonial Office, "an expert on the subject of the problem of trusteeship and the UK position in the Trusteeship Council." See: Singh, p.81. "The anti-colonialists who were no better than beggars of self-determination at San Francisco, and who remained largely defensive for several years, were on the offensive in late 1950s." This offensive began much earlier.

⁹³ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.1. From: SSEA, Ottawa To: Canadian High Commissioner, Canada House, London. Secret. October 12, 1951.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Despatch No: 832, April 17, 1950.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.1. From: Office of High Commissioner for Canada, London To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch No: 4531, November 2, 1951. Secret. Transmitting a duplicate of a summary of the discussion obtained from John Martin of the Colonial Office. Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand representatives were briefed on October 17. The High Commissioner wrote: "we might remind you that this information has been given to us in confidence and that it is not known moreover to the Indian, Pakistan or Ceylonese authorities." A clear distinction was being made here between the 'Old' and the rest of the Commonwealth. This Despatch was copied to the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly in Paris.

⁹⁸ A 4 page document "Anglo-American Discussion of the Handling of Colonial and Trusteeship Questions in the United Nations," London, October 10-12, 1951. Most of the relevant policy decisions were blanked out under the Access To Information Act, Exemption 15(1) at the Archives in Ottawa. All of page 2 and part of page 3 which contained a summary of "the more important topics considered" were blanked out. For example, "Ways of Improving the atmosphere of the Fourth Committee" was blanked out from page 2 which continued on to page 3.

⁹⁹ Ibid., no details of 'criticism' were given in this document, but the controversy over South Africa's refusal to place South West Africa under the Trusteeship System involved New Zealand's Peter Fraser questioning "the moral right" of South Africa's claim, is just one instance of Administering Authorities disagreeing or criticising the other. For details on this see: Singh. See also, Gwendolen Carter, "The Commonwealth in the United Nations," International Organisations, IV, No:2, (May, 1950), pp. 247-260.

¹⁰⁰ Holmes Shaping Vol:II, p. 324, has suggested that "denunciation by speech or by resolution had a place, but it was a last resort. It often made the sinner more stubborn." We suggest that, in this case, criticism compelled the UK to become more accommodating which eventually had a functional role in the contextual atmosphere.

¹⁰¹ This action was of course restricted "only when matters of principle were involved on which there could be no yielding." In such cases, the delegate was instructed to "abstain or as a last resort oppose." Whereas in 1949 the UK voted for 1 resolution, abstained on 4 and opposed 12; in 1950 the new tactic was 'successful' in that the figures were 12-3-3. In spite of this immediate effect, the Index of Support of the Decolonisation of Empires in the Conclusion show that out of 128 roll call votes from 1946 to 1967, the UK voted 18 times for and 110 times against.

¹⁰² RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.7.1. From: Chairman, Canadian Delegation, New York. To: SSEA, Ottawa. Cypher:475, December 8, 1952. Confidential.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ RG 25, Acc. 84-85/019. File: No: 9764-40 pt.1. Vol: 331. p.13 paragraph 55. On File in Ottawa, a statement from Mr. Griffiths, the UK Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs in the House of Commons, Annual Debate, London, July 12, 1950. "Our policy is to help the Africans to develop politically, socially and economically so that they can play their full part in the central government and in the local administration of their territories." Ottawa was aware of this policy. Apparently the Colonial Powers wanted to guide this 'development' in their own preconceived way. We must assume that the UK rejected the means with which to accomplish this rather than the idea itself.

¹⁰⁵ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.7.1. From: SSEA, Ottawa To: Chairman, Canadian Delegation to General Assembly, New York. Message: 231, December 9, 1952.

¹⁰⁶ Cypher 475, December 8, 1952.

¹⁰⁷ Stewart Easton, The Twilight of European Colonialism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p.224. He has pointed out the degree to which this administrative union finally determined the destiny of the Trust Territory in 1960. Some members had already foreseen this result in 1946. Easton wrote: "In Northern and Southern Cameroons the General Assembly ordered plebiscites...the first plebiscite held in November, 1959, rejected the option of union with independent Nigeria in 1966 by a substantial majority. Such a result suggests that the last United Nations Visiting Mission was sadly mistaken when it reported that there were no significant opinion against union with Nigeria. If the Cameroons had not been a Trust Territory no plebiscite would have been held. The whole of the Cameroons would have become independent at the

same time as Nigeria, and united with her, since this would have been administratively the most convenient course for Britain." Easton, Twilight, p.224.

¹⁰⁸ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.5. From: Canadian Delegation to European Office of the UN To: Acting Under-SSEA, Geneva, March 16, 1950.

¹⁰⁹ China, New Zealand, Thailand and USA were the four members of the Committee established in July. Its purpose was to oversee the compliance of the Administering Authorities with the requisites of the Trusteeship Agreements.

¹¹⁰ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.1. Memorandum. From: F.X. Houde To: Ford, January 22, 1951, for information to Heads of Division in preparation for the eighth session of the Trusteeship Council. Belgium, Dominican Republic, United Kingdom and Iraq were the members of the Committee.

¹¹¹ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.7.1. From: USSEA To: Chairman, Canadian Delegation to UNGA, Numbered Letter:91, December 12, 1952.

¹¹² From: N. Reddaway, UK High Commissioner, Ottawa To: M. Cadieux, Ottawa, July 6, 1955. In mid-1955, Bourdillon of the UK Colonial Office pointed out "the dangerous tendency in the Fourth Committee to try to dictate to the Trusteeship Council the terms on which the Council should operate...".

¹¹³ The inhabitants of Western Samoa expressed the desire for political unification and independence for the Samoan Islands under the protection of New Zealand instead of the status of a Trust Territory. During its first session held in March and April, 1947, the Trusteeship Council arranged to send a visiting mission to Western Samoa.

¹¹⁴ RG 25 Vol: 6922 File: 5475-N-40 pt.12.1. From: PERMISS, New York To: USSEA, Ottawa, Numbered Letter 102, February 3, 1956. Reporting on the contents of a confidential letter from the Ministry of Island Territories, dated December 26, 1955 regarding New Zealand's proposals for further constitutional development in Western Samoa. In the opinion of the Canadian Delegation, they 'indicate' that by 1960 the UN may be called upon to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement in regard to this Trust Territory.

¹¹⁵ Memorandum. From: F.X. Houde, UN Division To: Holmes, February 19, 1951.

¹¹⁶ RG 25 Vol:6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.1. From: G.C. McInnes, UN Division To: S. Pollock, Department of Finance, Ottawa, April 10, 1951. Pollock requested from Houde documents regarding the establishment by the Trusteeship Council of the Committee on Rural Economic Development: "I think that these documents will help to give you a clear picture of the Committee...of its aims and of the task assigned to it. Regarding the question which you raised with Mr. Houde, as to whether the new Committee would overlap the work of ECOSOC, or if it would be a co-ordinating body, you will note, from Press Release TR/557, that the Committee has requested the Secretariat to provide it with a report on similar land economic studies by such bodies as ECOSOC, the specialised agencies and the Special Committee on NSGTs."

From: S. Pollock To: Nutting, Under-SSEA, Ottawa, July 5, 1951. "The Committee is apparently in touch with ECOSOC and other United Nations bodies who are making somewhat similar studies of land policies. The Committee presumably confines its study of land policies and practices to the Trust Territories. It would appear, therefore, that efforts are being made to avoid any serious overlapping of work in this field."

¹¹⁷ From: The Chairman, Canadian Delegation UN Assembly, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Message No: 125. December 3. 1951. See: RG 25 Vol: 7572 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.2.1. From: R.A. Mackay, PERMDEL, New York To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 519 September 9, 1955. For Australia's arguments on Eugen of Norway election to ECOSOC.

RG 25 Vol: 7572 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.2.1. From: Cadieux Ottawa To: Holmes, Ottawa. September 12, 1955. "attached is a copy of a note on UN elections for inclusion in the Memorandum for Cabinet." -This is an indication of the importance which Ottawa put on having the right people in the right positions.

From: Canadian Embassy Brussels To: USSEA Ottawa No: Letter 507, September 12, 1955. M. Fenaux, head of the UN Division, Foreign Ministry Belgium. He told us that Belgium "is somewhat concerned at the candidature of certain small or irresponsible countries, such as Costa-Rica and Indonesia, and would much prefer to support more responsible countries (i.e. India instead of

Indonesia for ECOSOC) but as things are working out Belgium may find itself forced to vote for some countries otherwise distasteful to it."

¹¹⁸ The International Labour Organisation, UNESCO and the World Health Organisation sent representatives to the session of the Trusteeship Council.

¹¹⁹ RG 25 Vol:6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.2. Memorandum for Heads of Divisions Meeting, S. Morley Scott. April 7, 1952. Confidential. The two Latin American states were El Salvador and the Dominican Republic.

¹²⁰ Memorandum For Mr. Holmes, K. Goldschlag. UN Divisions, January 18, 1951 Confidential. "...on the basis of my very brief and circumscribed contact with the work of the United Nations, I should like to add some peripheral comments."

RG 25 Vol: 3700 File: 5475-DW-2-40 pt.1. From: George Ignatieff, Canadian Delegation to the UN, N.Y. To: Holmes, UN Division, Ottawa. March 19, 1949. "I appreciate the difficulties...concerning the constantly changing membership of the United Nations Division. Changes of personnel in the UN Division has, of course, always been one of the major difficulties standing the way of having the report done in the Division on anything but an ad hoc basis." This was a problem in the early days of policy formulation and it is for this reason that the UN Division in Ottawa requested, on an ongoing basis, that the Delegation give "considerable detail "on" the expected and/or previous position of the United States, United Kingdom and other important Delegations including the USSR; and insofar as possible an indication in general terms of what course the Canadian Delegation should follow."

Memorandum For Mr. Hardy, F.M. Tovell, UN Division, November 13, 1951. "General Assembly Post Mortem". p.1.

¹²¹ Memorandum, S. Morley Scott. This was an on-going problem. See also: RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt. 6.1. From: High Commissioner for Canada, London To: SSEA, Ottawa, Message 2525, October 10, 1951. Reported that because Jack Hickerson was not heading the USA Delegation to the UN, "there was some disappointment on the United Kingdom side in view of his grasp and understanding of the United Kingdom problems in the colonial field."

-It was generally believed that the Latin American States had a relatively powerful role in the dynamics of the UN system in the late 1940s and early 1950s. MG 26 N1, Vol: 5.

From: Pearson To: Greene, Ottawa, August 17, 1948. He speculated that because the Latin American States had 'decided' that they would not lend their support to the candidacy of Australia's Dr. Evatt for the presidency of the Assembly, "he would have no chance" to win. Evatt did win. See also: B. Kierstead, Canada in World Affairs, 1951-1953 (Toronto; Oxford University Press, 1956), p.65. Referred to the Ottawa Journal and the Globe and Mail editorials which "sharply criticised the American use of the Latin American bloc in the Assembly to prevent the invitation to India [to participate in the Korean Peace Conference]."

-apparently the Latin American bloc allowed itself to be influenced by the USA. The Canadian Ambassador in Washington informed Ottawa that at a meeting of the 'Old' Commonwealth, the State Department and British officials to "exchange views" on the various colonial problems in the Fourth Committee which took place on July 8, 1950, "the United States have accepted to use their good offices in trying to persuade their Latin American friends and the Philippines to 'behave' in Committee 4."

RG 25 Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. From: Canadian Ambassador, Washington To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch No: 1788, July 17, 1950. Secret.

¹²² Memorandum for Mr. Holmes, K. Goldschlag. In "a re-examination of the United Nations in light of the reverse in Korea" he concentrated on the position of the Latin-American and Asian countries in the organisation, and the use the USA has made of specific countries like Brazil, Turkey and the Philippines to show a "broad geographical support" for its policies. In addition, he suggested that the Latin-American countries do not "feel as immediately exposed to Soviet pressure as the bulk of the Asian countries."

¹²³ Ibid., p.4. He observed that "the Soviet insistence that Arabs and Israelis engage in direct discussions rather than through the United Nations Conciliation Commission. To this might be added the Soviet Union's prior abandonment of the principle of full territorial internationalisation for Jerusalem, which the Arabs have consistently championed."

¹²⁴ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.1. From: Chairman, Canadian Delegation to UN. To: Acting SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch No: 14, November 11, 1951.

¹²⁵ Message No: 125. December 3, 1951.

¹²⁶ Ibid., the occasion for this walk-out was the insistence of some members on discussing Morocco even though it was not on the agenda. See part II of this chapter. "The Question of Competence" for a brief discussion of this.

¹²⁷ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: CanDel, N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa No: 29, December 3, 1956. "South Africa has withdrawn from the Fourth Committee – statement made in Plenary by South African Delegate to this effect last week. Its absence will no doubt shorten the discussion of these items...."

¹²⁸ Subject: French boycott of the 10th Session of the General Assembly.

RG 25 Vol: 7573 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.3.1. From: PERMDELEGN, Geneva, October 4, 1955 To: Under-SSEA, Ottawa No. Letter 386. The Delegation reported that this "has in no way affected the participation of various French Delegations now attending meetings in Geneva."

RG 25 Vol: 7573 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.3.1. From: Assembly Delegation, New York To: SSEA, Ottawa. October 5, 1955. Message No: 76. Canada's discussion with "friends of France" to come up with some way that "the Assembly might be able to deal with the matter [Algeria] in such a manner as to make it easier for the friends of France to approach the French Government about re-considering its decision to withdraw from the present Assembly." Israel, some Latin American States and "perhaps behind the scenes, the United States, have been canvassing various possibilities."

¹²⁹ Ibid., the United Kingdom and other Administering Authorities had instructed their Delegations to 'withdraw' from the Fourth Committee "if certain anti-colonial resolutions were passed." Apparently, these instructions were "leaked, and as a result of this threat, the extreme anti-colonial resolutions were withdrawn."

¹³⁰ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.2. Note For External Affairs: 10th Session of the Trusteeship Council, April 25 1952.

¹³¹ Memorandum for Heads of Division Meeting: 11th Session of the Trusteeship Council. S.Morley Scott, June 5, 1952.

¹³² RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.2. From: Chairman, Canadian Delegation to General Assembly, New York. To: SSEA, Ottawa. Cypher Auto: 59, October 23, 1952.

Jessup (USA) had "specific criticisms" in the Fourth Committee on the information on the Aden protectorate transmitted by the UK and contested by the Yemen government which considered Aden an integral part of its territory. This was taken as an indication of the USA motive to 'conciliate'. Since members of the Trusteeship Council were also sitting in the Fourth Committee, it is difficult to separate influential factors that might be responsible for the policy of these specific states in one or the other organ. The important point of consideration was the subject matter under discussion.

¹³³ UNTCOR. Thirteenth Session, 503rd Meeting, February 25, 1954, p.166.

¹³⁴ Ibid., Khan argued that, "the proposals for certain measures of political reform had been before the French Parliament for fifteen months, so far without result. Even were such reforms to be carried out however, the Togolandese would still play no direct part in the administration of their country, for the Territory's elected bodies would remain purely consultative...."

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1; pt.1. Secret. General Instructions for the Canadian Delegation To the Tenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Approved by Cabinet, September 16, 1955. paragraph 25. Question of Dependent Territories.

J. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order: 1943-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p.326. "The Canadian belief was that the Administering Powers should be carefully scrutinised and held to their pledge to bring the territories to self-government as soon as possible." And that the Assembly was authorised by the Charter to scrutinise "the way in which the Trust Territories were administered."

¹³⁷ RG 25 Vol: 6922 File: 5475-N-40 pt.12.1. From: PERMISS, N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa. No: Letter: 102, February 3, 1956. Confidential.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid., in principle this interpretation was very much similar to the policy which Canada had decided to take on the motion to refer Administrative Unions to the International Court of Justice.

¹⁴⁰ K.P. Saksena. "The United Nations in India's Foreign Policy Strategy," The Nonaligned and the United Nations, eds. M.S. Rajan, V.S. Mani and C.S.R. Murthy, (New York: Oceana Publications Inc. 1987), p.202.

¹⁴¹ Ernst B. Haas, "The Attempt to Terminate Colonialism: Acceptance of the United Nations Trusteeship System," International Organisation, Vol:VII, No: 1 (February 1953), p.2. "The acceptance of the Mandates System was due to the need for reconciliation 'between' clashing aspirations." Also: Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). Duncan Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship (Washington:1948) also saw these arrangements arising out of the need for 'compromise' in order to retain their position of power.

¹⁴² For these developments see United Nations Conference on International Organisation, Documents (London and New York, 1945)

¹⁴³ RG 25, Vol:2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. From: Canadian Delegation To: SSEA, Ottawa, December 19, 1946. Final Report on the Fourth Committee (Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing-Territories) Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly. H.E.M. Nikolai V. Novikov (USSR). Ambassador to United States, and Professor Boris E. Stein his principal adviser: "the two constituted without a doubt, the most impressive team on Committee IV." See: Syed Jafar Raza Bilgrami, India's Role in the U.N. with Special Reference to Trust and Non-Self-Governing-Territories (New Delhi: Jamia Millia, 1969). He freely attributes all sorts of motivations for India's anti-colonial behaviour from speeches and the kinds of resolutions initiated by the Indian Delegation in the UN.

¹⁴⁴ RG 25, Vol:2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. From: Canadian Delegation To: SSEA, Ottawa, December 19, 1946. Final Report on the Fourth Committee (Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing-Territories) Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly. "Mr. V.K. Menon of the Indian Delegation was probably the most disturbing influence during the whole of the Fourth Committee's existence. A highly-strung individual, well known for his Communist sympathies, he played hand in glove with the Soviet Delegation and did not miss an occasion to play to the gallery and to single out the United Kingdom for criticism."

¹⁴⁵ Although the UK and Ottawa were briefed on the USA private position which was in principle the same as theirs on colonial questions, the USA public position was at times not congruent with theirs. See: RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.2. Memorandum From: P.A. McDougall To: Summers, UN Division, October 28, 1952. United States on Dependent Territory Questions: "...seems to be very much in accord with our view on the same problems. As there would appear to be no marked differences of opinion...we agree in principle with the United States' views on the more important questions that will probably arise in the Fourth Committee."

¹⁴⁶ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, Sixteenth Session, 1165th Meeting, October 10, 1961. p.3. Bruce Russett, Trends in World Politics (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965), p.87. The General Assembly "a propaganda forum to influence world opinion."

¹⁴⁷ Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965) p.xii, shows that the "profit motive" in colonisation "is basic" and rejects the moral and cultural mission.

¹⁴⁸ From: MacEachen To: SSEA, Ottawa, December 17, 1946. p.6. paragraph 17.

¹⁴⁹ UNGAOR, First Part of First Session, Fourth Committee, Second Meeting, November 18 1946.p.6.

¹⁵⁰ Memorandum for Heads of Division Meeting, S. Morley Scott. April 7, 1952.

¹⁵¹ UNTCOR, Thirteenth Session, 517th Meeting, March 16, 1954.p.283.

Resolution 752 (VIII) requested the Trusteeship Council to include in its reports to the General Assembly a separate section dealing with the implementation of both resolutions.

¹⁵² Ibid., See Sixth Session, 239th Meeting and Eighth Session, 390th Meeting of the General Assembly

¹⁵³ Ibid., p.284. Canada, House of Commons. Debates. 1953-54. Session, Vol:II, January 29, 1954. p.1613. Because the opposition parties, especially the C.C.F. brought up the "problems relating to the development of self-government" among others with which the UN was confronted; L.B. Pearson (SSEA) replied: "These are not merely avid, constitutional debates. They relate to

issues which, in a dynamic world, arouse strong passions and directly concern the fate of many millions of human beings." "Here Delegations faced alternatives not easy to resolve or reconcile. Here were problems on which the Asian and Arab states feel particularly strongly, because to them the rights and wrongs of the case are so clearly defined. Because of this they perhaps find it difficult to understand why, in the voting in the General Assembly, the Canadian Delegation was not able to stand always fully on their side, and at times to oppose them...." Referring to Canada's own history, he continued, "...it is our duty to look with sympathy upon problems of the same nature which are facing other peoples who are also trying to attain maturity and independence. But we also have our duty to the United Nations. Our intervention in matters of that kind must not be of a kind which would endanger the peaceful relations of people in those areas." Pearson reminded John Diefenbaker, who became the official opposition 'critic' in matters of external affairs: "...on the fundamental objectives of our foreign policy, as opposed to details and methods, there is a great and fortunate degree of unity on all sides of the house."

¹⁵⁴ By mid-1955 Syria is perceived by the Administering Authorities as a militant anti-colonial. In a meeting of the Old' Commonwealth members at the Commonwealth Relations Office, the subject of discussion was the potential candidates for the "Arab bloc seat" on the Trusteeship Council. Syria was 'standing' but Warner of the Foreign Office insisted that the UK's "preference would be Iraq or Egypt," in spite of the recognition that the Colonial Powers "had little influence in this matter." The Arab bloc insisted on having their own seat in the Trusteeship Council. Note of Meeting of CRO, June 15, 1955.

¹⁵⁵ UNTCOR, Thirteenth Session, 517th Meeting, March 16, 1954.

¹⁵⁶ From: Assembly Delegation, New York To: SSEA, Ottawa. Cypher No: 82, October 6, 1955. Confidential. Under reference telegram No: 78 of October 6. Not traceable.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., an Ad Hoc Committee was set up in 1946 to study information transmitted from Non-Self-Governing-Territories; Resolution 334(IV) December 2, 1949 set up a Special Committee to examine 'factors' in Non-Self-Governing-Territories in regard to the attainment of self-government; Resolution 850 (IV) dealt with the question of populations in Non-Self-Governing-Territories having the same rights as populations in Trust Territories. It is no wonder that Weischhoff expected the attack to come in the Trust Territories in view of the inaction of the Trusteeship Council.

¹⁵⁸ From: Assembly Delegation, New York To: SSEA, Ottawa, Message No: 83, October 6, 1955. Telegram under reference No: 82 of October 6 1955. Scott was the Chairman of the Committee on Information. Jaipal of India was the Rapporteur, who "insisted on the cordiality, frankness and collaboration which marked its deliberations."

¹⁵⁹ UN. Document (A/C.4/L 603)

¹⁶⁰ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1. From: CANDEL, New York, November 30 To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1856. The Delegation reported that "private attempts to have the wording of this paragraph slightly modified so as to meet the point of view of the Administering Authorities were not successful."

¹⁶¹ RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: CANDEL, New York, November 17, 1960 To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2231. Confidential. At the Commonwealth Meeting, the UK, Australia and New Zealand "hoped that [the proposals] would be realistic in terms of the actual needs of colonial populations." The Africans did not attend the Meeting.

¹⁶² C.S. Jha, From Bandung to Tashkent: Glimpses of Indian Foreign Policy (London: Sangam Books Ltd., 1983), p.138. Entered Indian Civil Service in 1932; Secretary in the Foreign Office under Nehru, Shastri and Indira Gandhi. Permanent Representative of India to the UN (1959-62). India's ambassador to France in 1968.

¹⁶³ Blanche W. Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1981). A theme that runs through the whole book.

¹⁶⁴ Henri Grimal, Decolonisation: The British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires 1919-1963 (Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), p.160.

¹⁶⁵ RG 25, Acc. No: 85/86//55. Vol.23, File: 1/1956/3. Annex II. Secret.

¹⁶⁶ See Chapter 8 for details of resolutions and voting positions.

¹⁶⁷ UNGAOR, First Session, Pt.II, Fourth Committee Pt.I p.123 India took this position.

¹⁶⁸ RG 25, Vol: 2659, File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. From: Canadian Consulate General To: SSEA, Cypher No: 434, December 16, 1946.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ UNGAOR, First Session, Fourth Committee, Pt.I, p.125.

¹⁷¹ RG 25, Vol:3458, File: 6-1-1949/IA, T/3. p.1. "Information from Non-Self-Governing-Territories other than Trust Territories."

¹⁷² RG 25 Vol: 3458 File: 6-1-1949/ IA, T/3/ Supp. p.2.

¹⁷³ RG 25, Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1.

¹⁷⁴ From: Canadian Consulate General, N.Y To: SSEA, Ottawa. Confidential. Weekly Report-Committee IV No:2. 19.11.46. Members of First Sub-Committee: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia (Rapporteur), France, India, Iraq, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, USSR, UK, USA, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. Members of Second Sub-Committee: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Union of South Africa, UK, USSR, USA.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ RG 25, Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. Robertson and Cote, Weekly Report of Committee IV, December 17, 1946. p.3, paragraph 6. Not a roll-call vote, therefore no details on individual voting. General Resolution A/c.4/68 adopted 18 for, 15 against (Canada) with 3 abstentions. Canada was "not certain of the constitutionality of the resolution."

¹⁷⁷ Article 2(7) of the Charter: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under present Charter."

¹⁷⁸ RG 25 Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. From: Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs To: SSEA, Ottawa, Circular D.91.Saving. March 24,1947 and Circular D 90. Saving. March 22, 1947. The Colonial Office was approached by French Colonial Office with "a proposal that had previously been agreed with the Belgian Colonial Office to hold a Conference in Paris." The initial idea was "to regularise and expand on technical collaboration." See also Dispatches, Circular D.39, April 24, 1946 and Circular D. 86, August 21, 1946.

¹⁷⁹ Addison (Dominions Office) Memorandum to SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch: D.No:51, June 30, 1947. Asking to keep contents of Memorandum "strictly confidential."

¹⁸⁰ Because of Addisons's request for confidentiality, no further correspondences were found in regard to this immediate matter and how it was solved in regard to Portugal.

¹⁸¹ From: Drury, Consulate N.Y. To: Pearson, USSEA. No: 1330 N.Y. October 14, 1947. Secret. Article 87(b) deals with the Functions and Powers of the Trusteeship Council. "The General Assembly and under its authority, the Trusteeship Council in carrying out their functions, may accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the Administering Authority." Kuriles and Sakhalin were annexed by the Soviet from Japan.

¹⁸² RG 25 Vol: 3687 File: 5475-N-1-40C pt.1. From: Canadian Consulate General N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa. Immediate Cypher No: TK.No:1314. October 13, 1947. Secret.

¹⁸³ UNGAOR, Second Session, Annex 5a-5b, p. 218.

¹⁸⁴ No: 1314, October 13, 1947. Resolution: Doc: A/C. 4/98 was adopted 25-23-3 and referred to the Plenary.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., there were no traceable communication on this matter from Ottawa in regard to instructions, written or otherwise. And because the Delegation did not give examples as to when and in what cases, we could only speculate. For example, when UN competence under Articles 10,11,14 or 35 of the Charter has been cast in doubt by the provisions of Article 2(7). These dealt mostly with matters of international peace and security; peaceful settlement of disputes; and to permit a wide inscription of items on the agenda.

¹⁸⁶ Creech-Jones, headed the UK Delegation to the UN. RG 25, Vo: 3687, File: 5475-N-1-40c pt.1 From: Canadian Delegation To: USSEA-October 18, 1947. Fourth Committee Weekly Summary, October 13th to 18th inclusive, 1947.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., see also: RG 25 Vol: 6922 File: 5475-N-40 pt.12.1. From: Permiss, N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa.No: 102 February 3, 1956, p.1.paragraph 3, Confidential. Discussed in Thesis Chapter on Trusteeship System.

¹⁸⁸ UNGAOR, Plenary Meetings, November 1, 1947, Vol: I. see pages 654-657 for the position of other Colonial Powers on this resolution.

¹⁸⁹ This Committee met for the first time: 8 members which transmit under 73(e): Australia, UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands, New Zealand, USA, Denmark and 8 non-colonials who were elected by the Fourth Committee at the 1948 General Assembly. China Egypt, India, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Sweden and the USSR.

¹⁹⁰ RG25 Vol: 2659, File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. DEA, Non-Self-Governing Territories: Adequate Briefing of Canadian Delegations to Sessions of the United Nations Assembly, September 10, 1948, p.1. Information transmitted in "Incoming reports go first to the Trusteeship Section of the Secretariat, where they are summarised and analysed for the convenience of a Special Committee appointed by the Fourth Committee....The Special Committee examines the analyses and summaries prepared for it by the Secretariat and suggests to the Fourth Committee...the uses to which the information may be put. Political information is not submitted unless a Colonial Power specially wishes to do so." The Department set up a detailed structural arrangement in Ottawa to handle information submitted under Article 73 (e) of the Charter. This is a reflection of the importance which Ottawa had attached to the UN involvement in Non-Self-Governing-Territories.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ General Assembly Resolution 142 (II) set the conditions under which the Administering Authorities should transmit information to the Secretary General on social and economic progress but not political.

¹⁹⁴ RG 25 Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. From: Alec Clutterbuck To: St. Laurent, March 20, 1948. No: 6. Information on "political and constitutional conditions" in British colonial territories were already available in the Library of the UN.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ No: 6 of March 20, 1948.

¹⁹⁷ From: SSEA, Ottawa To: High Commissioner for Canada-London, , September 9, 1948. Despatch No: 2691. Colonial No: 228 of 1948- A White Paper on the treatment by the United Nations of information on Non-Self-Governing-Territories furnished in accordance with Article 73 (e) of the Charter.

¹⁹⁸ Singh. Chapter 4.

¹⁹⁹ See: Chapter II. Thesis text. (The process as a result of the Secretary General's enquiry of June 29, 1946 to members in respect of Non-Self-Governing-Territories).

²⁰⁰ cited in Singh, p.137. A "Working Paper" by India identified as UN Doc. A/AC.17/W.10 (September 4, 1948), p.2.

²⁰¹ Singh, p.137.

²⁰² Ibid., The Special Committee "rejected the Indian proposal."

²⁰³ Ibid., UNGAOR, Third Session, Fourth Committee, Pt.I.

²⁰⁴ Singh, p. 138.

²⁰⁵ RG 25, Vol.3458, File:6-1-1949/IA, T/3. p.3. And specific to cessation and process, this resolution would be cited as the basis of UN authority and competence in regard to the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam in General Assembly Resolution 945(x), December 15, 1955.

²⁰⁶ RG 25, Vol: 2659, File: 5475-AT-40 Pt.1. Appendix I, November 5, 1949- Explanation by Burns.

²⁰⁷ RG 25, Vol: 2659, File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. UN Division, M.N. Bow, Memorandum for Mr. Holmes, November 18, 1949.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

a) Memorandum for Mr. Holmes, November 18, 1949 From: Bow, UN Division. p.2. "The nations administering Non-Self-Governing-Territories have been taking quite a beating in the Trusteeship Committee [Special Committee] sessions and have been faced throughout with the necessity of opposing resolutions which appear to be in the interests of the indigenous inhabitants of these territories, but which actually contain clauses which would involve unwarranted interference in the administration of these territories."

b) File: 6-1-1949/IA, T/3 p.2. "Proposals Rejected by the Fourth Committee."

- Require members to submit information on the development of self-government in Non-Self-Governing-Territories,
- Provide for visits to Non-Self-Governing-Territories at regular intervals by UN representatives.
- Allow the Special Committee to consider communications from local populations, [petitions etc.]
- Permit the Secretariat to use information from private organisations or individuals as well as from official sources in preparing its summaries.

²⁰⁹ RG 25 Vol. 3458, File: 6-1-1949/IA, T/3. "Information from Non-Self-Governing-Territories other than Trusteeship Territories."

²¹⁰ Holmes, Vol. 2, p.326.

²¹¹ RG 25, Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. Appendix I, explanation by the Canadian Delegation in Fourth Committee, re: Draft Resolution A, November 5, 1949, proposed by Sub-Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing-Territories.

²¹² "...by presenting isolated sociological statistics without reference to the related historical and geographical conditions, and by meretricious argument, creating distrust in the administration." In the Briefing for the Delegation, an article published in Montreal Gazette on September 8, 1948 was quoted. It explained the situation best:

"There are several delegates present who would like to put pressure on the Colonial Powers to speed up programs of sanitation, medical training and education in colonies but they are unable to do much because time is taken up in countering Soviet indictments such as that infant mortality in Kenya is higher than in Britain." p.2.

²¹³ RG 25, Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. Appendix I. November 5, 1949.

²¹⁴ File: 6-1-1949/IA, T/3.

²¹⁵ File: 6-1-1949/IA, T/3/ Supp. India-Egypt-Venezuela-China (doc.A/AC.28/W.19)

²¹⁶ Belgian amendment (doc. A/AC. 28/W.22)

²¹⁷ Voting results of USA Resolution on a roll call vote. For: Brazil, China, Denmark, Egypt, India, USSR, USA, Venezuela. Against: France, UK, Belgium and Netherlands. Abstentions: New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Dominican Republic.

²¹⁸ RG 25, Acc. 84-85/019, Vol: 331, File: 9764-40 pt.1. From: London To: SSEA, Ottawa, April 1, 1950, Despatch No: 747. Confidential.

²¹⁹ RG 25, Vol: 2659, File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. From: Ignatieff, Washington To: Pearson, Ottawa No: 1788, July 17, 1950. Secret. A meeting at the British Embassy in Washington, the Canadian Embassy and a meeting of the representatives of the Commonwealth countries (except India, Pakistan and Ceylon). Interestingly enough there are fewer references to the distinction of 'Old' Commonwealth. This meeting was presided by Galsworthy of the Colonial Office, with J. Martin, Walker of the British Embassy, Laskey of UK Delegation to UN, to report on talks between British officials and the State Department in Washington earlier in the week. In this briefing, Martin complained about the anti-colonial attempt to make the Special Committee a parallel organ of the Trusteeship Council.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid., USA position explained at the secret talks in Washington [Emphasis added.]

²²² Despatch No: 747, April 1, 1950.

²²³ Letter No: 1788, July 17, 1950, p.3.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Thesis text, Chapter II.

²²⁶ No: 1788, July 17, 1950, p.3.

²²⁷ See: Thesis Pocket details of this resolution.

²²⁸ RG 25 Vol: 2659, File: 5475-At-40 pt.1. "Information from Non-Self-Governing-Territories." September 10, 1950, p.1, paragraph 4.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ RG 25, Acc. 86-87/160, Vol: 77, File: 5475-FA-40.pt.2. From: Escott Reid To: Ritchie, Le Pan, MacKay, Pick, McInnes, Robinson. Draft "Re-examination of Canadian Policy," May 11, 1951. Secret.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/160 Vol: 77 File: 5475-FA-40 pt.2. G.C.McInnes, Memorandum for Mr. Pick. Confidential. August 30, 1951, p.1.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid., "even if we had sought such membership, our chances of getting elected would be remote because of the fact that three 'White' members of the Commonwealth (UK, New Zealand and Australia) are permanent members of both bodies."

RG 25. Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.7.1. From: The Chairman, 7th Session of the General Assembly To: Under Secretary of State, Candel, N.Y. Post File No: 272, December 5, 1952. Confidential. Subject: Membership of Canada in UN Committee on Factors. Two page copy of Memorandum for Mr. Pearson outlining Canada's position. Post File No: 272 is Pearson's reply: "I do not think that we should refuse to serve on this Committee if we are pressed to do so - but we should certainly show no desire to be chosen." Canada was not approached to sit on the Committee.

²³⁵ RG 25 Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. No: 1788, July 17, 1950.

²³⁶ RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40. From: Canadian Ambassador to USA To: SSEA, Ottawa No: WA-3656, October 10, 1951.

²³⁷ Ibid., see: Douglas A. Ross, "The Dynamics of Indochina Diplomacy..." Acceptance of Paradox, ed. K.R. Nossal (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982) p.56. "The USA pressed the French to keep fighting [in Indochina] and financially underwrote the cost of the war after 1952." See also: Thesis Chapter:III on international operational context. See: Sar Desai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 1947-1964. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Blanche Cook. The Declassified Eisenhower; George Kahin and John Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (New York: Delta, 1967), p.31. Did USA interest over-ride all other concerns? According to Kahin and Lewis, USA interest was concentrated on developments in Asia. The "major support" for France in Vietnam became necessary as Communist rule was established in China in 1949. And Peking's armies entered the Korean battlefield: "A policy leading to a containment of China increasingly preoccupied the Truman administration....In accordance with these new American priorities, France's position in Vietnam was now described in terms of the Free World's stand against communist expansion and Washington ceased to perceive the war in Vietnam as primarily a local colonial conflict. Now linked to the Cold War, Vietnam was regarded as an area of strategic importance to the USA."

²³⁸ RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40. From: Vanier To: Pearson, Despatch No: 1568, October 30, 1951. Secret. Under Reference, Paris Telegram No: 423, October 20, 1951, not traceable.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ RG 25 Vol: 2659 File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1. Appendix I. November 5, 1949

²⁴¹ France walked out of the Fourth Committee in 1951.

²⁴² No: 1568, October 30, 1951.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.7.1. From: Candel, N.Y. To: SSEA, No: 275, November 15, 1952. N.Y. Telegram No: 261, November 15, 1952 under Reference, not traceable.

²⁴⁵ No: 275, November 15, 1952.

²⁴⁶ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.7.1. From: Candel, N.Y. To: SSEA Ottawa, No: 502, December 11, 1952.

²⁴⁷ A letter from the Netherlands to the Secretary General, March 30, 1955, informing him that the Netherlands' "responsibilities under Chapter XI in respect of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles as having terminated." Resolution 748(VIII) adopted with 22 to 18 and 19 abstentions.

²⁴⁸ UNGAOR, 8th Session, Fourth Committee, p.256.

²⁴⁹ RG 25, Vol: 3463, File: 6-1955/I. pt.1. p.5. "Information from Non-Self-Governing-Territories..." Chapter IV (5). 10th Session.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ UNGAOR 10th Session, Fourth Committee, p.281.

²⁵² RG 25 Acc. No: 85-86/551 Vol: 23 File: 1-1956-3. Department of External Affairs, Canadian Papers Prepared for Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, June 27th to July 6th, 1956. Top Secret, Canadian Eyes Only. Annex I Paper II. "The attitude taken by India* and Pakistan in the course of the last General Assembly [1955] on items such as Algeria, West New Guinea, Cyprus and Morocco appeared deeply influenced by some geographical and historical factors – geographical in the sense of their desire to lead the Asian-African group as they did at the

Bandung Conference; historical as they are deeply concerned with all Non-Self-Governing-Territories in light of their own development. India and Pakistan have insisted that the General Assembly was competent in the study of colonial issues and that there were no reasons to invoke the limitations contained in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter in such cases."

* "...the Indian representative, Mr. Krishna Menon, helped to settle the question of West New Guinea and his influence was not negligible in the drafting of the resolution which deleted the Algerian item from the Assembly's agenda."

²⁵³ An 'abstention' is a 'no' and it is understood as such by members in the UN. Each is aware of the policy position of the significant players and an abstention is utilised when two aspects are involved in one vote whereby one issue is supported and the other is rejected.

²⁵⁴ See: The White Paper. Col. No: 228 of 1948.

²⁵⁵ UNGOAR, 10th Session, Fourth Committee. The USA claimed that Puerto Rico was part of a "commonwealth of states."

²⁵⁶ RG 25 Vol: 3463, File: G-1955/I pt.1.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ RG 25, 86-87/160, Vol: 79, File: 5475-FA-41-40 pt.1. From: Office of High Commissioner for Canada, London To: USSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 1070, June 17, 1955. Confidential. Note of Meeting in Commonwealth Relations Office June 14, 1955 of Old Commonwealth members. Bourdillon (Colonial Office) saw "the suspicious attitude" of the anti-colonials as the cause behind their attempt to extend the UN role of supervision in all territories. Present were the Old Commonwealths; Bourdillon and Hanroft of Colonial Office; Warner and Scrivner of Foreign Office and Hunt, Storar and O'Leary of the Commonwealth Relations Office.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., the UK laid great value and emphasis on the generality of supervision and recommendations for actions in Non-Self-Governing-Territories.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., Bourdillon, (Colonial Office) pointed out that "this suspicion attitude towards the Administering Authorities was...evident in the Committee's insistence on hearing petitioners and their refusal to regularise the procedure or to allow the Trusteeship Council to act as a filter....This situation had to be watched."

²⁶¹ RG 25, Acc. 84-85/019, Vol: 331 File: 9764-40 pt.1. See: Despatch No: 747, April 1, 1950 and No: 1788, July 17, 1950.

²⁶² Despatch No: 1070, June 17, 1955.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ RG 25 Vol: 3463, File: G-1955/I pt.1. Policy Guidance: "The general policy to be adopted by the Delegation should mirror the attitude of the Canadian Government towards colonial questions. Canada is not a Colonial Power, nor has she aspirations to become one. She has many common interests shared with the great Colonial Powers, yet she is sympathetic to countries who have recently been released from colonial status. Her interest in the colonial territories is benevolent, but indirect, and she has no desire to become known as the champion of either Colonial Powers or colonial territories. Canadian foreign policy is founded on support of the United Nations, however, and we cannot afford to see that organisation placed in a position or series of positions which cannot but detract from its dignity or efficiency. In limiting their co-operation the Administering Powers have declared their opposition to the suggestions that the Committee should be made permanent, that the submission of political information received should be discussed in terms of territories or groups of territories within a region, or that the participation of indigenous inhabitants from the territories should be sought by the Committee. The argument of the administering powers is that these suggestions, if carried out by mandatory resolutions would effectively amend the Charter."

²⁶⁶ Ibid., Belgium was the exception.

²⁶⁷ Despatch No:747, April 1, 1950 p.2.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ From: Canadian Embassy, Brussels To: USSEA, No:507, February 12, 1955. Under Reference: Ottawa's Letter No; V-406 of August 12, 1955, not traceable.

²⁷⁰ Vol: 3463, File: G-1955/I pt.1.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² See: thesis chapter III, sub-section on 'Indonesia', for Canada's assessment of the situation where "no progress was made," even after 300 years of Dutch colonial Rule.

²⁷³ Vol: 3463, File: G-1955/I.

²⁷⁴ RG 25 Vol: 6922 File: 5475-N-40 pt.12.1. From: Holmes To: Cardieux, Memorandum, January 5, 1956, and From: Cardieux To: Holmes, January 12, 1956.

²⁷⁵ Part II-Annex II RG 25, Acc. No:85-86/55/ Vol: 23 File:I-1956-3. Secret. Was found in Canadian Papers prepared for Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, June 27 and July 6, 1956, Top Secret. Canadian Eyes only.

²⁷⁶ File: I-1956/3, Annex II. See: David Goldsworthy, "Britain and the International Critics of British Colonialism, 1951-56," The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol: XXIX (March, 1991), 1-24. claims that "much of the effort in this matter was necessarily legalistic, revolving around interpretations of the UN Charter." p.5.

²⁷⁷ File: I-1956-3, Annex II

²⁷⁸ File: 1-1956-3, Annex II, Article 2(7) and Article 14. West New Guinea was considered a "straightforward legal question" which was exempted from this restriction.

Chapter V: Human Rights and Self-Determination - Catalysts in the Decolonisation Process

The subject matter of this chapter is our attempt to arrive at some estimation of Canada's perception of its role, the limits and the possibilities of its action in the UN effort to achieve an operational consensus on the principle of self-determination as it was recognised in the Charter and further developed in the Covenant on Human Rights.¹ We have utilised the official correspondence to retrace and assess to what extent Canada chose to be actively involved in steering the direction which the UN should take. In discussing process, we will attempt to show how the attitudes of the disputants were diametrically opposed. A content analysis of the debates in the Third Committee identify an operative role of factors such as race, culture, geography, economics and security needs in directing process and setting goals. The substance of the resolutions are indicative of the conviction anti-colonials they were acting within the confines of the Charter. It was an anti-white, anti-colonial operation which made an artful use of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "as the standard of permissible action."²

Our analysis is based on the assumption that this 'effort' was circumscribed by predominant racial and ethnocentric perceptions of the members as they sought to define the meaning of self-determination as it should apply, or ought not to apply, in a colonial context. The classic justification of the domination and ownership of non-white peoples was expressed as "the white

man's burden." Racial and ethnocentric connotations were implicit in this self-appointed care-taker system of colonial rule. This system was based on the assumption that certain standards of 'white' civilisation, in terms of political 'advancement' and economic 'development', must be attained before the application of the principle of self-determination could be considered. The Charter had recognised that it was more or less the responsibility of the Colonial Powers to dispense judgement as to whether or not colonial peoples were indeed fit to rule themselves. Anti-colonials begun to question this premise of racial superiority as UN operations got under way.

According to John Humphrey, the question of self-determination of peoples, one of "the most highly controversial issues...became a real issue only in 1950."³ He was the director of the Division of Human Rights during the first 20 years of the UN. He believed that the General Assembly's request to have the Commission on Human Rights study the ways and means which would ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-determination was one of the decisions which "marked the beginning of the politicization of the Covenants."⁴ He wrote:

The developing countries were in revolt, and new voices were beginning to be heard....Although I believed in self-determination as a political principle in the sense which it is mentioned in Article 1 of the Charter, I did not think it should or indeed could be made into an enforceable legal right; and I was worried by the politicization of the Covenant, which was becoming a pawn in the fight against colonialism.⁵

He claimed that Mrs. Roosevelt "agreed that the Third Committee was in revolt, a revolt, she said, of dark-skinned peoples against the whites." She believed that

"the mood" of the Third Committee was a reflection of what they "really think" of the 'whites'.⁶

General Assembly Resolution 545(VI) of February 5, 1952 directed the Commission on Human Rights to include an article in the Covenant on Human Rights with the words: "all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."⁷ This step was the means by which the anti-colonials could challenge the ethnocentric application of 'trust' as conceived in the Charter. The Covenant on Human Rights categorically placed the responsibility of 'advancement' and 'development' squarely on the shoulders of colonial peoples who, after the application of the right of self-determination could, as sovereign peoples, subsequently determine their own destiny. Hence, the 'civilised' standards were to be pursued after the peoples had 'determined' themselves and not in the reverse order as conceived in the Charter whereby 'development' was to be the prerequisite for the application of self-determination in the colonial context.

It is our contention that this radical development was the first most crucial and significant catalyst in the decolonisation of empires, in terms of aims, tempo and tone.⁸ According to Humphrey, the text of the resolutions from the Commission on Human Rights "already contained the essential features" of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.⁹ In our opinion, this was the second most crucial and significant catalyst in the process of decolonisation. We are, therefore, interested in establishing who the key players were in directing this exercise which went to the heart of colonial

empires. In this process which we are about to analyse, non-White ex-colonies rejected the premise that colonial peoples must have the consent of the Colonial Powers to terminate colonial relationships. These ex-colonies renounced all colonial pretensions to a self appointed authority over colonial peoples and they sought to replace this with a right of self-determination.¹⁰

The effort involved not only the political aspect of power but the more cardinal concerns of economics. It challenged the established rights of colonial and Western Powers. This development was perceived by them to contain dire economic and military consequences for Western industrial stability and growth and, therefore, the well-being of the free world. Since this matrix of concerns was the foundation and dynamics of the process, members were forced to take a clear and definitive stand in order to influence the kinds of decisions and direction which the UN should take in this matter. The positions of members were evidence of either an anti-colonial or pro-colonial predisposition which were functional in their policy preferences, as to means and aims, of this revolutionary process. Therefore, more than a passing reference will be made here to the key arguments of 'relevant' members in order to establish a context for understanding Canada's approach, preference and choice.

The Commission on Human Rights¹¹ decided that the article which was the subject of the directive of Resolution 545 (VI) should become Article 1 in the Covenant on Human Rights. We will show that the argumentation and the voting, on the basic and non-substantive part of the whole operation in the Third Committee to include Article 1 in the Covenant, were reflectors of attitude. The

mitigating question is, why should self-determination not have been a universally applicable self-evident right, in the non-white colonial context, as it had been previously operational in the white-settler colonies, for example? The words of Ralph Bunche, written in 1936, are relevant here:

...the vital issues involved in the practices of our contemporary political and economic life more and more imply the inequality of peoples. One of the rocks on which the noble philosophy of human equality has run afoul takes shape as the frightful bogey, race. No other subject can so well illustrate the insincerity of our doctrines of human equality and the great disparity between our political theory and our social practice as that of race.¹²

In the Preamble, the Charter signatories pledged to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small...." What did it actually mean to have 'faith' in these things? For the anti-colonials, this was not a sufficient condition for changing the status quo.

The issue of contention here, was, as long as colonial peoples were not allowed to 'determine' themselves, they were not considered to be 'nations' under international law. But what did self-determination have to do with human rights? The purpose of the inclusion of Article 1 in the Covenant, was not only to transcend the limited notion of sovereignty which was selectively dispensed to colonial peoples under the guise of self-government, but also to accomplish in a tangible way, a "common standard of achievement" in rights and freedoms. The anti-colonial pursuit to have self-determination recognised as a fundamental human right derived its impetus from the idea of equal 'entitlements' in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹³ This was premised on a self-evident

right. The pro-colonial stance had to do, intrinsically, with the way colonials chose to define the operative parameters of the principle of self-determination. Colonial peoples were implicitly categorised as being distinct from non-colonial peoples. Therefore, the basic premises of equality, non-discrimination and entitlement, as set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, were found to be not functional in the pro-colonial position in regard to an operational consensus on the application of the principle.

For our purposes in this chapter, the evident dichotomy in the interpretation of concept of self-determination, be it a 'principle' or a 'right', will serve as a function of race and culture and these are utilised as operational indices of policy. The significance of the decision of the Commission on Human Rights on Article 1, was such that the procedure to agree simply on the order in which the articles of the draft Covenant should be discussed, occupied the Third Committee from the 633rd to the 636th Meeting. A total of seven proposals and amendments to the proposals were submitted. The Western powers showed unusual concern with the priority of the order of discussion of the articles and the substance of the proposals and amendments. This seemed to originate from the fact that the Covenants were intended to be legal instruments under international law. The crucial concern was with which article should the discussion begin. This was the most salient point which signified intent and motive of policy.

Some members suggested they postpone the discussion of Article 1 or not discuss it at all; others recommended that it should not be included in the draft Covenant and a good number of members insisted that it was an

indispensable part of the draft Covenant. These positions were indicative of the importance they had placed on securing self-determination as a fundamental human right for all people within the confines of the Charter 1(2).¹⁴ The significance of this process, to include Article 1 in the Covenant was its instrumental role in helping to invalidate the old operative norms and to establish standards of permissible action in the colonial world. In this chapter, we will encounter the effort of one side to revamp and modify these standards and the retaliation of the other side to hinder or impede any progress in this exercise. According to the Delegation of New Zealand, "every UN member in subscribing to the Charter has necessarily accepted the standards established by the Charter in relation to dependent areas."¹⁵ The anti-colonials contested this assertion.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Canada's Ambiguous Policy

For our purpose in this chapter, it is instructive and essential that we establish from the outset Canada's attitude towards the principle on which the Covenant of Human Rights would rest. General Assembly Resolution 217 A(III) of December 10, 1948 recognised the principle that "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." This resolution adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The first step in making the principle operative was the Preamble of the Declaration which proposed that "human rights should be protected by the rule of law." This was only the first step in the process, which began with the

decision of the Human Rights Commission in late 1947, to design the 'convention' or human rights 'instruments.'

John Humphrey wrote, in 1984, that "there has never been a more revolutionary development in the theory and practice of international law and organisation than the recognition that human rights are matters of international concern."¹⁶ His first assignment was to prepare the draft which was to become the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Jan Stancyck¹⁷ and Humphrey, "wanted to be sure that economic and social rights would be included" in this Declaration. According to Humphrey, they both believed that "human rights without economic and social rights have little meaning for most people, particularly on empty bellies."¹⁸

This idea of such of a comprehensive Declaration of Human Rights would have significant implications for the process to terminate colonial relationships. Humphrey pointed out "that the non-governmental lobby in favour of human rights for which there is no parallel in the history of international relations...was largely responsible for the human rights provisions of the Charter."¹⁹ This explains the fact that, although there is not one single reference to human rights in the League of Nations, "reference to human rights run through the Charter like a golden thread."²⁰ He wrote that Stettinus, the USA Secretary of State, "in a dramatic last minute session...agreed to support the minimum demands of the lobbyists." And, in Humphrey's estimation "not much thought was given to the revolutionary character of what was happening."²¹

However, several Latin American Delegations were interested in including an international Bill of rights in the Charter and, according to Humphrey, "the great majority, including the great powers without whose assent no decision of importance could be taken, were not ready for such a step." He believed this was the reason that the Charter neglected purposely to "define or even list" human rights.²² Nevertheless, the Charter did allow for the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) to set up a commission on human rights which would eventually "draw up an International Bill of Human rights."²³ In mid-1946, the Department of External Affairs was already beginning to concern itself²⁴ with the legal aspects of the Canadian position to be taken in the UN, in regard to the draft Declaration of Human Rights under design at ECOSOC.²⁵ Around the same time, the Canadian House of Commons was discussing a proposed national Bill of Rights and, naturally, the Department was anxious to retain a 'correct' perspective on both national and international developments.

From Paris, the Canadian Delegation wrote to Ottawa at the end of 1946:

The Draft Declaration, because it contains a statement of general principles, is often worded in vague and imprecise language. We do not believe in Canada that legislation should be placed on our statute books unless that legislation can indicate in precise terms the obligations which are demanded of our citizens, and unless those obligations could be interpreted clearly and definitely in the courts.²⁶

Therefore, from the outset, Canadian officials were examining the document through a legal 'prism' and in terms of its functionality. This Canadian attitude would continue to accompany the Declaration of Human Rights²⁷ and the Covenants, through the successive stages at the UN. The first part of the

International Bill, that is, the draft Declaration of Human Rights, was completed in 1947 by the Commission. In mid-1948, the Canadian delegate to the UN told the Standing Committee on External Affairs: "in some ways the most abstract activity of the United Nations at the present time is the effort which it is undertaking to lay down a charter of human rights which can be accepted internationally."²⁸

Ilisley, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee concerned with the activities of the UN Human Rights Commission, spoke after the delegate to the UN, in the Standing Committee. The very detailed explanation of the consequences and repercussions if Canada was to become a signatory to the International Declaration of Human Rights indicate that the work of the Human Rights Commission, at the time, was not so 'abstract' after all. Ilisley argued that:

if a declaration was made by the United Nations and Canada voted in favour of that declaration that was so made I would think continually when we introduced legislation in the House of Commons, or in the Senate of Canada, you would have members who would get up and say, if the legislation did depart from the declaration. 'This legislation is faulty. It departs from that declaration.' The declaration has a continual living binding effect upon your federal legislation, and in all probability it would have some effect on provincial legislation, too....It may be as far as the country will ever go. It may be they will never enter into a covenant. A nation must be pretty careful about entering into a covenant, of course. It is not too pleasant to have yourself impeached as a violator of a covenant by other nations, and have to argue your case out before a tribunal consisting of all the nations of the world, but the declaration might have a very real and beneficial effect upon legislation in your own country.²⁹

However, up until November 1948, Department of External Affairs officials were still trying to interpret the articles, singly and collectively, to ensure themselves of what Canada would be asked to commit itself. Escott Reid wrote to the Legal Department on October 9:

I would have thought, as a layman, that all the other articles in the proposed Declaration have to be read subject to the qualifications in these two articles [2 and 23], and that these qualifications should remove much of our worries about the Declaration even in its present form.³⁰

After a Cabinet Meeting of November 24, Hume Wrong reported to the Department of External Affairs that "the government relied upon the provisions of Article 28 as a safeguard against any unacceptable interpretation of certain other Articles of the Declaration."³¹ Apparently, after the entire process, the Cabinet decided to not support the whole effort. By the end of 1948, the draft Declaration was being considered for adoption by the General Assembly. The Delegation warned Ottawa that if Canada voted against adoption it would be "amongst the minority."³²

Apparently, in anticipation of this problem, Ottawa had instructed the Delegation to take a certain line. Therefore, the Canadian statement referred to the "constitutional difficulties" especially as they arose out of Federal-Provincial relations" and the limits of international action on the part of the Federal Government. The speech was, however, "to avoid implying that in general there is nothing that the Federal Government can do, constitutionally or otherwise, about international obligations which happen to lie within the field of Provincial jurisdiction."³³ It is obvious that such an ambiguous position would be reflected in the policy choices. The Delegation decided on two contradicting positions of voting:³⁴ to abstain in the Third Committee³⁵ on the draft, but to vote for the resolution in the General Assembly plenary for adoption, explaining its position.

The usual Canadian tactic "to postpone consideration" was not supported by the USA and UK. The Delegation reported that, "without their acquiescence it would be difficult to persuade other states to agree."³⁶ The reason given by the Canadian Delegation to postpone consideration at the 1948 session was to enable the General Assembly to seek the advice of the International Law Commission on the "drafting points." However, the International Law Commission "could not properly decide upon the principles to which expression should be given." In addition, the Assembly would "first have to give at least provisional endorsement to the draft Declaration,"³⁷ before it could be transferred to the International Law Commission. As anticipated, Canada's abstention on the roll call in the Third Committee on December 7, resulted in placing Canada in the company of the six Slav States - there were only 7 abstentions.³⁸

Needless to say, this position "was an immediate subject of remark" and the Delegation reported to Ottawa that they were "urgently approached by the UK and USA Delegations."³⁹ Even though they disagreed with the content of the document, both the USA and UK Delegation "considered [the] propaganda importance of getting on record some statement of the rights which were being denied to people daily within the Soviet bloc as so great that they were prepared to accept the declaration in its present form." With great dismay, both Delegations regarded the Canadian abstention "as a serious weakening of the propaganda position which they were hoping to achieve."⁴⁰ The Canadian Delegation notified them that it had planned to support the resolution in the

plenary "with an appropriate explanation."⁴¹ The USA and the UK had succeeded in dragging the Cold War into what was supposed to be a non-political Committee of the UN. This, however, did not affect Canada's decision. The cardinal question, is, whether Canada would have changed its vote to accommodate the demands of its allies, had it not originally planned to support the adoption of the Declaration in the General Assembly.

Four days after Canada's abstention in the Third Committee, Professor A.R.M. Lower of Queen's University wrote to Prime Minister St. Laurent expressing his 'disappointment.'⁴² He declared that

it is mortifying in the extreme to have this country lined up in the public opinion of the world with Russia and her satellites on such an issue. We should be foremost in proclaiming for the world the civil liberties we ourselves enjoy and which, I trust, we believe in....And all for a miserable domestic controversy....It is mortifying to have it allowed to become the occasion of our public disgrace.⁴³

This is an exclusive, 'white' perception of Canada's peoples. Canada's native peoples do not find a fit in Professor Lower's conception of Canada as interchangeably used, "we ourselves." Moreover, Canadian officials knew why Canada could not "be foremost in proclaiming for the world the civil liberties" which 'white' Canada enjoyed. The letter to Lower expressed 'surprise' that "even by implication," he would suggest that the Prime Minister was "adopting an attitude of exaggerated support of provincialism."

The Canadian position in the UN reflected a deeper concern that such declarations "are apt to arouse hopes we are in no position to fulfil."⁴⁴ If, in the opinion of Canadians, the rights which the declaration had proclaimed were already being enjoyed by Canadians, meaning 'white' Canadians, then in which

quarter would this declaration "arouse hopes?" Could it have been the peoples inhabiting Canada or parts of territories that were claimed by the Government of Canada as belonging to the sovereign entity that is called Canada? For it is only under these conditions that the Government of Canada would have, if not a legal, at least a moral obligation to fulfil the hopes which may be aroused, as a result of Canada's support for the adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights. Implicit in this explanation to Lower is the admission by some officials that the element to which they were referring is separate as to "we ourselves" in Canada. It was a mental, unintended expression of discrimination which was based on phenotypic distinctions. It was understood without explanations and accepted as the obvious way to talk. This is a fundamental category in the characteristics of a mind set.⁴⁵

If the officials were thinking of Canada's native peoples, then they had ample grounds for perceiving a threat to the structural separation set up in the British North America Act Section 91 (24) by the adoption of the Declaration. The letter to Lower observed: "it is at least arguable that more is done to maintain human rights by scrupulous respect for the rights which are established by law than by subscribing to declarations which, it is well known, few, if any, of the subscribers intend to implement." And since the Declaration was first "a statement of general principles," Ottawa had no intention of doing anything about implementing it. According to John Humphrey, the attempt by the Egyptian and Uruguayan Delegations, in 1952, to have ECOSOC deal with "communications alleging violations of human rights," was sabotaged by Canada. He wrote:

the two Delegations put up a good fight, but the Canadians had already moved that the Council take no action on the matter; and

since their motion had priority under the rules of procedure, it was voted on first....I was disgusted that the Delegation of my own country should have taken the lead in thwarting an initiative which might have helped give some reality to the great words of the Charter.⁴⁶

As we have shown in chapter II, it was important, in 1946, that Canada establish its international status as a nation with no "dependent peoples" within its sovereign borders. This status was a crucial factor in the international operational context of limits and possibilities of Canadian action on the colonial issue in the UN. Canada is a democratic nation and it is assumed that, under the constitution, all of its citizens have equal rights. This is how Canada would like to appear to the outside world. The Delegation's explanation in the UN on its ambiguous position, in regard to the adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights, seemed logical to all members. It is a common problem which many federal systems share because of the constitutional allocation of powers.

However, John Humphrey disagreed with this explanation of Canada's position. He wrote: "it is difficult to believe that it could have been a compelling reason. For in 1948 everyone agreed that the Declaration would not be binding in international law and would not, therefore, impose any legal obligations on member states."⁴⁷ In his book, he supported his point of view with a comment by the international lawyer, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht: "the Canadian delegate in the Third Committee refrained from voting for the Declaration for reasons which could have had validity only if the Declaration were legally binding."⁴⁸

However, in an earlier article written in the year in which the Declaration was adopted, Lauterpacht wrote that "the practical unanimity of the members of the United Nations in stressing the importance of the Declaration

was accompanied by an equally general repudiation of the idea that the Declaration imposed upon them a legal obligation to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms which it proclaimed."⁴⁹ Although Canada was aware of the fact that the Declaration was not legally binding, the Delegation could not ignore its moral implications.⁵⁰ In the rest of this chapter, we will see how significant this Declaration was for the substantive foundation of the Covenant on Human Rights. In our estimation, the Delegation at the UN did understand that the Declaration was indeed a "response to the deepest aspirations of mankind,"⁵¹ and that this was the very reason for Ottawa's ambiguous policy. It is our contention that, in the perception of Canada's decision-makers, this Declaration would also have specific relevance for Canada's native peoples.

The British North America Act bestowed sole jurisdiction on the federal government for Canada's native peoples. This was an instrumental guarantee that the federal government was not restricted in its work towards achieving any desired goals in regard to native administration. This is a positive interpretation of the 'intent' of the drafters of the British North America Act. And MacGregor Dawson has asserted that, even Treaties "made with, and about, Indians," cannot take precedence over acts of Parliament.⁵² He cited a legal authority on the ruling of the courts, which decided that "Federal legislative competence with respect to Indians is unfettered by treaties - either Indian treaties or international treaties - or by the Royal Proclamation of 1763."⁵³ This legal ruling serves to reinforce our very simple claim that Ottawa could have chosen to implement the Declaration of Human Rights in the "Lands reserved for Indians" or native 'areas,'

without jurisdictional conflict, if it so desired. Any argument for not implementing this Declaration, in these areas, cannot lie in the legal or jurisdictional field.

The UN and Aborigines of the American Continent

At the beginning of 1949, the Bolivian representative submitted a resolution in the UN calling for the "Creation of a Sub-commission of the Economic and Social Council on the study of the social problems of the aboriginal populations of the American continent".⁵⁴ The Under Secretary notified the Finance Department on February 19, that if the proposal is approved it would "entail considerable expenditure of United Nations funds." In any case, it was decided that the proposal "will be opposed" by the Canadian Delegation "for various reasons including the financial ones."⁵⁵ On March 8, Bryce of the Department of Finance agreed with the proposed line. As a matter of fact, he felt that the Canadian Delegation "should strongly oppose" the proposal. In his opinion, the matter was one of "an extremely low priority."

However, he saw a danger in that "it provides encouragement to, and possibly an unhealthy precedent for...suggestions of a similar kind at a time when the resources of the organisation are required for projects of greater urgency and importance."⁵⁶ The Instructions to the Canadian Delegation to the UN on this issue was not included under the list of matters brought before Cabinet for approval. This is an indication of its low priority rating.⁵⁷ In the opinion of the Department of External Affairs,

it is not likely that Canada or the United States would derive much benefit from the studies of such a body even though it did concern itself with the problems of North American Indians and Eskimos. The Canadian and USA Governments have already given considerable attention to such problems, which are, in many ways, peculiar to these two countries.⁵⁸

Although the Department took the position that the subject matter had no relevance for them, the Bolivian resolution recommending the creation of another sub-commission of ECOSOC was a concern for Canada. And part of the problem was the doubt in the Department that "the Human Rights Commission were doing sufficiently useful work to justify their existence."⁵⁹ The specific critique was "the multiplication of subsidiary organisations within the United Nations with the consequent increase in expenditures and in problems of co-ordination which it entails constitutes a serious problem for the United Nations." Therefore, the Department decided that, "if it is not possible to defeat the proposal in the General Assembly the Canadian Delegation should support any move to have it referred to the Economic and Social Council or to the Social commission." The tactic was intended to shelve the proposal. Ottawa believed that "it is not likely that the proposal would be adopted by either body."⁶⁰

The "strong stand against this proposal" was grounded on the following factors: "that the project has a low priority, that it has not been definitely shown to be of general interest to Member Nations and that for both budgetary and administrative reasons it is not wise to multiply the number of subsidiary organisations within the United Nations."⁶¹ Why did the Department make a distinction between the "social problems which are, apparently, to some extent peculiar" to Bolivia and the social problems of the aboriginals of the USA and Canada? Was it because they were in reservations in both Canada and the USA, whereas in the rest of the American continent they were the majority and therefore considered to be an 'integral' part of society? Albeit, on a different

hierarchical, social and economic level. The instructions to the Delegation concluded that, "studies which were sufficiently general to cover aboriginal problems for all the Americas would be of little immediate use to us, therefore, and studies concerned with South American problems of no particular interest."⁶² Canada had decided that its native peoples were no business of the UN.

A USA Propaganda Move

On the same day that the Finance Department and the Department of External Affairs agreed on the policy to take on the aboriginal issue in the UN, the Prime Minister received a letter from the Committee For a Bill of Rights. It recommended that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "should be carefully considered to see what legislative action is necessary in order to give effect to its provisions in Canada." In the opinion of this Committee, Canada, along with "other Governments of the civilised world...have solemnly undertaken to strive to secure universal and effective recognition of the rights set out."⁶³ Furthermore, the Committee believed that "a constitutional amendment...would be a most useful and important assurance that the Government of Canada proposes to give full effect to the Charter of Human Rights to which it has already subscribed." But, was the Government prepared to act on implementation? Much time was not given for thought because three weeks later the Prime Minister received another letter. It was from the Committee For a Bill of Rights, but this was in conjunction with the newly set up Association for Civil Liberties (Toronto).

This time, a statement by former USA Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle in the New York Herald Tribune, March 22, was the catalyst for action. He claimed that the State Department "was drafting a treaty...to include minimum provisions of the original UN Declaration of Human Rights in a stronger form for embodiment in international law."⁶⁴ According to Berle, "the minimum would be roughly what is contained in the American Bill of Rights." And the USA intended to submit this treaty to the April meeting of the General Assembly. The letter pointed out, that Canada, in voting for the adoption of the Declaration on Human Rights had,

recognised that the Declaration had no binding legal effect, but was in essence, a matter of moral obligation. In that sense, it was regarded as a stepping stone to the day when the Declaration would be a covenant, legally binding upon all nations subscribing to its provisions.

Because the signatories of this letter believed that this proposed USA treaty "brings this day closer at hand," they impressed upon St. Laurent the need for Canada to express its 'willingness' to the Americans "to become a party to it." This step was, of course, contingent upon Ottawa's acquiescence in the effort to secure these fundamental rights in the Constitution.⁶⁵

The signatories stressed the propaganda value of doing such things "in these trying times, when so much of our attention is directed to the challenge to freedom across the sea." Canadians had therefore understood the national and international implications of the new attempts to secure human rights. The letter finally advised that,

we would do well not to loose sight of the fact that the most powerful argument we have against the opponents of freedom, is that for our own people, Canada is a country where fundamental freedom and

human rights are, in addition to be recognised, honoured by their observance.⁶⁶

It is obvious that Canada's native peoples were not included in this category of "our own peoples." But because of the international attention being given to the status of human rights and a parallel occupation with the situation of colonial peoples, in the UN, Canada's decision-makers did feel some pressure to prevent this racially exclusive perception of white Canadians from surfacing in the image they wanted to project abroad.

Jurisdiction, Utility and Morality

An assessment by F.R. Scott of the operational limits of the British North America Act in regard to "Dominion Jurisdiction Over Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," was published in the latest issue of the Canadian Bar Review. This was brought to the attention of the Prime Minister because it argued that Canadian legislatures "can do many things which are denied to American legislatures," on the premise that "what Parliament gives it has the legal power to take away."⁶⁷ The spheres of jurisdiction assigned to both federal and provincial areas in the British North America Act concede only a partial principle of sovereignty. And according to Scott, the courts' responsibility is to clarify issues of jurisdiction and "may not decide upon the morality or justice of the law." This was their "sole function."

Therefore, to what extent could the Government of Canada, in all honesty, utilise the British North America Act as the reason for its ambiguous

position in regard to human rights? Simply put, we are dealing with questions of morality and justice on the one hand and jurisdiction on the other. Or, is the dichotomy so clear? We are concerned to show that the Declaration of Human Rights was one way of ensuring that the world would begin to set some acceptable and uniform minimum standards of values by establishing basic principles. The Declaration was meant to promote the recognition and concern for human rights. However, it could not enforce the implementation of them.

We have pointed out in chapter II, that the government of Canada was forced to confront its internal colonial situation because of international developments. In this connection, the government did not perceive the need to implement the Declaration. We have to remember that 'need' is normally assessed against permissible standards. And, we would argue, here, that moral considerations become important in establishing a situation of 'need' because it has to do with the mind set of a people. Are all peoples of a nation entitled to the same rights because they all have the same obligations? Does a government have the right to decide that some of its people do not belong to this category of equal obligation and therefore, equal entitlement? We have pointed out that, in general, the Canadian public also shared this exclusive racial categorisation of 'Canadians'. For all intents and purposes, native people did not find a fit in this conception of Canada.

It is important to understand the unusual context of our discussion. The Canadian government was constrained to address its own colonial situation at a time when the international community was grappling with the pressing

demands of the political freedom of subject peoples which conflicted with the interest of Colonial Powers.⁶⁸ A significant part of this contextual dynamics was the concern with the equality of peoples and human rights. The situation presented the Government of Canada with an opportunity to attempt a modification of the seemingly immoral and invidious system of racial distinction of peoples inside Canada. Since any issue determines the allotment of priority, we have tried to show that, aside from the flurry of activities to prove that Canada did not have "dependent peoples," the internal colonial situation in Canada was not generally a 'live' issue for Canadians and their government.

Therefore, the national context of concern with human rights seemed to be circumscribed by considerations of jurisdiction between the federal and provincial governments. The UN Division in Ottawa complained to the Department of External Affairs, that

Canadian representatives are repeatedly embarrassed by the British North America Act when they seek to explain their position at international meetings. It seems unlikely that in the near future there will be satisfactory machinery established which would permit ratification on behalf of the whole of Canada of any type of international convention which deals with matters affecting the person and property of individuals.⁶⁹

Without any doubt, this conception of "person and property of individuals," was an exclusive one in which Canada's native peoples did not find a fit. Cleveland asked Holmes, "why...should we stultify ourselves and make a poor figure in public when indeed we are among the most advanced people in the world in the very matters under discussion?"⁷⁰ In this framework of analysis of "the very matters under discussion," Canada was not a colonial power, neither at home nor

at the UN. However, these 'matters' involved an international concern for rights of all peoples, regardless of their colour and their status.

By 1950, John Humphrey was trying to find a private way "to move the Canadians away from their negative position in the matter of the international protection of human rights" in the Third Committee of the General Assembly.⁷¹ In 1984, he confessed publicly: "I knew that the international promotion of rights had no priority in Canada's foreign policy...."⁷² It is therefore necessary to consider the government's public justifications of its position on human rights which appealed to utilitarian principles and the Government's perceived need to maintain national unity, as relevant for our multivariate analysis of behaviour. We have already considered the question of federal-provincial jurisdiction as having an operational role in decision-making in regards to human rights in general. Writing of the post-war period, John Holmes attributed a functional role to utilitarian considerations. He claimed that, "if there is one element of consistency in Canadian policy at that time, it was the constant concern for the health and strength of the institution." However, we question his public claim that, "in the determining of policies, concern for the institution, unconsciously perhaps, had priority over the merits of the case."⁷³ We will argue that it was much more than that.

For, if we are to accept this explanation as a motive of policy, then, it follows logically that we must also accept the argument that Canada was therefore not prepared to support efforts to strengthen the moral foundation on which this institution was erected, especially if they were perceived as going

beyond the confines of the Charter. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was one such operation which Canada did not originally intend to support. In the opinion of John Rourke, the results of the last war contributed to the decision to set up the United Nations and this "marked the beginning of increased idealist influence on international conduct."⁷⁴ And, he explained, that in terms of the nature and conduct of international relations, "idealists tend to be more optimistic that the global community is capable of finding ways to live in harmony and has a sense of collective rather than national interest."⁷⁵ It is our assertion that the UN Charter looked like a tangible reflection of an attempt at co-operation to secure global harmony. In essence, it contained idealistic imperatives. Were they intended to be taken at face value or to set the standards of future international behaviour of states? And was it a matter of pure coincidence that the "friendly relations among nations" and the "appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace," were placed in the same sub-section of an article dealing with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples? Were they recognised by the drafters of the Charter as being inter-related? The Charter contained one hundred and eleven articles.

The cardinal question here is, how could Canada, in view of this operational imperative, place 'priority' on the "health and strength of the institution," while at the same time refusing to work towards the goal for which the UN stood? Clearly, the financial over-extension of the organisation was a legitimate concern for Canada, or, for that matter, all of its members. And the national issue of federal-provincial jurisdiction was also important in the making

of foreign policy. But what about the crucial categorical imperatives of the Charter? Ought considerations of fairness, justice and equality, as addressed in the Declaration, not have priority over the secondary, mundane factors such as the budget or jurisdictional limits inside sovereign borders? According to F.R. Scott, the "sole function" of the courts was to clarify issues of jurisdiction. And what was the responsibility of the government? This question can best be answered by two questions which were posed by Pierre Elliot Trudeau in 1991. He asked:

for where is the justice in a country in which an individual has the freedom to be totally fulfilled, but where inequality denies him the means? And how can we call a society just unless it is organised in such a way as to give each his due, regardless of his state of birth, his means or his health?⁷⁶

These two questions, combined, serve to reflect the concerns of this and the previous chapter. Our guiding principle in the last chapter was to assess the beginnings of a political tradition that had to do with the mind set of a nation that calls itself Canada. John Humphrey wrote:

it was not until 1963, under the Diefenbaker administration, that Canada became for the one and only time during my twenty years at the United Nations, a member of the Human Rights Commission, which, by that time, had finished its most important work, including the drafting of the Universal Declaration and of the two covenants.⁷⁷

As we have tried to show in the first part of the previous chapter, John Diefenbaker was the first prominent, former Member of Parliament and ex-Prime Minister who addressed native concerns in a public forum. He talked about this subject, he worked towards a goal and he wrote about it. He traced this concern to his childhood years. They are, generally speaking, the formative years in a

person's life and they help to form the character of the adult person. Would Canada's role in the UN process to establish international protection of human rights have been different had John Diefenbaker been its Prime Minister in 1946 instead of 1957?

And even if it were possible to attribute some definite functional role to Diefenbaker in contributing to the decision to change Canada's policy position in regard to the human rights issue in the UN, how could we then account for the fact that he came to power in 1957 and the change took place only in 1963? Since we have been emphasising the importance of a multivariate analysis, we are not about to assign a primary, functional role to one person as an explanatory factor of policy. Could we also assume that this new Canadian policy was more a response to the international pressures and development in the UN? Nevertheless, taking the post-1945 international operational context into consideration, may we safely presume that a Diefenbaker administration probably would have been more predisposed in this period to work with the international community in the field of human rights, than to work against it, like his predecessors did? In spite of the revolutionary international developments in this period, Canadian Secretary of State Pearson still continued to refer to Canada's native peoples as 'savages' in his speeches in 1950.

The Draft International Covenants: Definition of the Situation

After his 20-year directorship of the Human Rights Commission, John Humphrey concluded that "the struggle for human rights has always been and always will be a struggle against authority."⁷⁸ It was a struggle that was mainly fought in the UN colonial context,⁷⁹ therefore, Canada was compelled to address the issue. An essential element in policy formulation is the decision-makers' perception of the available alternatives and the operational context in which policy must be executed. At the end of June 1949, the Commission on Human Rights circulated the re-draft of the Covenant to members of the UN and requested their inputs before January 1, 1950. The UN Division in Ottawa prepared an informative Memorandum for the Department of External Affairs in late November. It explained that

whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a statement of general principles, and as a resolution of the General Assembly has simply the force of a recommendation to member states, it is intended that the Covenant, when complete, will take the form of a multilateral convention which, if approved by the General Assembly, will be submitted to member states for signature and ratification. The two documents thus cover much the same ground, though the text of the Covenant, which is to have the force and effect of an international treaty, will necessarily be more precise and detailed.⁸⁰

In mid-1950, the Delegation complained to the Under Secretary that "the increased concentration on the production of noble but empty declarations" was becoming a 'worry' to them. At the time, it seemed to them that "this type of exercise [was] getting completely out of hand." They added that "from the Declaration on Human Rights we have proceeded to the Covenant on Human

Rights."⁸¹ However, at issue for the Delegation was the functional value of the declarations and most, important, the motive of the states in drafting and supporting them.⁸² The Commission on Human Rights spent two months working on the Covenant, it had a small membership and no Soviet representation. Yet, Holmes anticipated that the much larger membership of ECOSOC would "reopen every argument used in the Commission." The problem, in his opinion, was "not just a question of economy" but rather "a question of principle."

For many Delegations, the process itself seemed to take on more importance than the value of the substantive parts. To demonstrate "the absurdity of the situation in which we find ourselves," Holmes cited an excerpt from the Summary Reports of a meeting of May 16 in the Commission on Human Rights: "A United Kingdom amendment to include a provision that states should give full and complete effect by law to the provisions of the Covenant before ratifying it was rejected by 10 votes to 1 in favour (U.K.) with 3 abstentions (Denmark, India and Lebanon)." In explaining their votes, "several Delegates pointed out that such a provision would be contrary to normal international practices of ratification of covenants and conventions. They added that the ratification of the covenant would be delayed or prevented if the states were to be required to adopt or alter their legislation in compliance with the provisions of the covenant." But, Canada had utilised a similar argument in 1948. Ottawa's preference was for a postponement of adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights until the International Court of Justice could rule on it. However,

the members had to provisionally adopt it before it could be transferred to the International Court of Justice for consideration.

What was the reason for the rush by some members to adopt or ratify the Covenant? Would the members not have to go through this procedure after ratification? And what was the point of the process to draft a covenant when some members did not intend to comply with it? Holmes believed that, for some members, the ratification of covenants "has become so important that the carrying out of the terms of the covenant cannot be allowed to stand in the way." He was at pains to explain to the Under Secretary that it was "not so much hypocrisy as an entirely different attitude to these declarations." Again, he brought out the distinction between the significance of adopting a declaration and ratifying a convention, which many members seem to ignore without any severe consequences. For them, declarations represented "intention or definition of aspirations" and he agreed that these were 'acceptable' conceptions for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but they were certainly "not an appropriate attitude towards a covenant to be ratified."⁸³

On the one hand, some members believed that covenants could 'give' human rights. On the other hand, the UK delegate found it 'objectionable' to hold such a belief.⁸⁴ Is this UK position not inconsistent with the assumption that, through treaties, the parties acquire rights? And what about the rights which were 'given' to Colonial Powers in their territories, by Chapters XI and XII of the Charter? Did Article 2(7) not also 'give' to Colonial Powers sovereign rights in their colonies? The 'given' right under this Article functioned in the distinction that

was made between Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing-Territories. We have shown in chapter IV that, as a result of this distinction, Non-Self-Governing-Territories became the real empire.

J. Halstead, a seasoned Canadian Representative on ECOSOC, agreed with Holmes that, "undoubtedly the misbegotten idea that a convention, such as the Covenant on Human Rights, actually 'gives' human rights in some obscure way...is one of the basic reasons for the unreality of much of the Human Rights Covenant in its present form."⁸⁵ In his assessment of Canadian policy "in connection with this general problem," the following point was made: "it is clearly impossible to guarantee to people all things that are desirable as inalienable rights without at the same time dealing with the commensurate obligations, without which these rights cannot be secured."

During the whole of 1950, the Department of External Affairs was involved in working out a strategy of attack and policy in regard to the draft International Covenant. It was felt that the difficulty with "empty phrases" in the text "could be overcome if agreement were first sought not on limitless numbers of desirable objectives, but on a restructured list of specific 'don't's'." Halstead pointed out that, it is "probably human nature to make grandiose speeches and adopt empty resolutions as long as it is easier to talk than to act."

Therefore, he recommended that "the only solution" was for the "responsible countries to seize every opportunity to repeat the twin themes that implementation must accompany declarations and obligations must go with rights."⁸⁶ He rejected the claim made by Holmes that Canada was not a member

of the Human Rights Commission and, therefore, "cannot be held responsible" for its activities.⁸⁷ He argued that, "we do not absolve ourselves of all responsibility merely by avoiding membership on such bodies."⁸⁸ And furthermore, if Canada wanted to convince others of its views, then the Delegation would have "to adopt tactics appropriate to a determined minority, rather than continuing to regard ourselves as a natural member of the majority." Would Canada's interests be served in this new proposed role?

Serious consideration was given to Canada's accession to UN conventions involving matters under provincial jurisdiction. Any consultation with the provinces before taking a decision was rejected because it "would paralyse all action." The Department believed that a General Reservation Clause to accommodate the jurisdictional problem for Canada was "likely to allow too wide a loophole for escaping from acceptance of the convention's obligations." Could this be taken as evidence of some earnestness in regard to implementation? Towards the end of 1950, the Delegation found it "disheartening to observe the loss of prestige" which resulted from time wasted on 'high-sounding' resolutions, declarations and conventions. These had "little functional value" for Canada, because the Charter arrangement served Canada's interests best. More 'dangerous' was the appearance that the UN intended to "deal in words which fail to describe current practice."⁸⁹ In view of the Delegation's assessment of the situation in the UN, and after a re-examination of Canadian policy the Department of External Affairs decided in January 1951 that the matter required a Ministerial decision. In respect to "Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom,"

the Minister of Justice and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, both decided in May, 1951, that the Delegation should "not support the objective of an International Covenant on Human Rights."⁹⁰

Shortly thereafter, the United Nations Division in Ottawa complained to the Deputy Under Secretary: "in light of the policy decision taken by the Minister of Justice and concurred in by our Minister that we do not support the objective of an International Covenant on Human Rights, it is difficult to see how Canadian policy in this field can be directed toward promoting the international observance of human rights." He protested that, "any positive action on our part...seems to be precluded by the attitude taken by the two Ministers."⁹¹ As already pointed out in chapter II, the Justice Department had an instrumental role in the evolution of Canada's policy with respect to the colonial issue in the United Nations from 1946.

It is evident that Canada had recognised that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the later instruments of human rights would serve as legal standards for governments in the legislative process within sovereign borders. Moreover, in the perception of the Minister, this would place an onus on all governments to ensure that national legislation were attuned to the standards set out in the UN instruments on human rights. How, for example, would Canada explain to the International Court of Justice, the situation in regard to its native peoples in view of the recognition of "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

Canadians generally believed that their "own people have already attained" the objective to which these instruments had endeavoured to achieve.⁹²

In early 1952, the UN Division in Ottawa felt it was necessary to undertake another survey of the situation in the UN, in view of the direction which international concern with human rights was taking.⁹³ All the Heads of the Divisions in the Department of External Affairs were to meet to discuss the findings of this survey. Certain "principles of guidelines...set forth by the Minister" were to form the basis of the discussion. One of these principles was that Canada "should consider the United Nations...as the forum for the expression of the conscience of the world."⁹⁴ How was this to function in Canada's policy on the colonial issue? And, what were to be the characteristics of this 'conscience', in the perception of these decision makers?

According to the survey, because of the UN's concerns with human rights in the past, Canada had "tended to take a negative attitude towards the United Nations in this field." There were two reasons for this: the constitutional division into federal and provincial jurisdictions and because it was not in Canada's "tradition to promote or protect individual rights by means of declarations or a bill of human rights." As a result, the Delegation had been instructed from the outset to 'avoid' membership in the Commission on Human Rights. As a logical consequence of this, the Delegation adopted "a non-committal and unconstructive attitude towards attempts to draft an international covenant on human rights."⁹⁵ During the preparation of the survey, the UN Division recognised that, if the draft covenant was finally adopted "on a wide

measure of agreement," there was no doubt that it "would mark an important step in the universal observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms."

In view of this potentially significant development, the Division concluded: "we would find it extremely embarrassing in that event to deny our support to such an instrument." And, in view of this assessment, the Division suggested: "it would seem desirable, therefore, that in order to give positive co-operation to a work which may help to promote human rights, and in order to take advantage of the opportunity to help produce a text acceptable to us, Canadian policy towards this particular activity of the United Nations should be revised."

Since the Department seemed to have concurred with Canadians that fundamental human rights are already "honoured by their observance" in Canada, then any Canadian activity in this field in the international arena would serve an altruistic purpose. Did the decision of the Ministers to not support the 'objective' of a Covenant prevail? And, what would an 'acceptable' text look like? Paul Martin of the Canadian Delegation gave an indication of their understanding of the limits of action. There was no point in seeking to influence the goal of process, Canada's task lay in working towards the consensus on how to achieve the eventual goal of self-determination. He said that

Since the Second World War...this surge towards self-determination is an historic trend. It is the goal...now recognised also, for the first time in history, by all civilised free States, those which control dependent territories as well as those which do not. The point at issue, therefore, has become increasingly one of means rather than of ends, of timing rather than ultimate objectives.⁹⁶

It is obvious that, in Ottawa's perception, there were some members which were instrumental in seeking to guide the UN in the direction it was taking

on human rights. Officials believed that they were acting not only on the basis of self interest but also on the conviction of principle. There was a "re-examination of the UN" in early 1951. At the time, the Delegation had 'recognised' that even though there were "certain fundamental divergences in the attitude" of the Latin American countries and that of the 'majority' of the Asian states towards the United Nations, they were aligned with the Arab states "on issues relating to human rights, colonial policy and all broader problems involving principles explicitly set forth in the Charter."⁹⁷ Ottawa was made aware of the combined effort and strength of its adversaries in this issue.

However, what was most relevant for the decision-makers in Ottawa, was the Delegation's perception of the potentially influential position which the Latin Americans could take on these issues. In the estimation of the Delegation:

there is a general tendency on the part of the Latin Americans to regard such documents as the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as juridical instruments of mandatory validity rather than as mere formulation of principles and objectives. They hold this view not only in regard to more innocuous subjects such as human rights and the right of self-determination of peoples, but in regard to collective security as well. To them Article 1(1) of the Charter constitutes an injunction which must be adhered to at all cost even, I should think, if it entailed the demise of the United Nations in its present form.⁹⁸

Ottawa believed that anti-colonialism was "a matter of principle" for the Russians and, because of this, they were able to "enlist the support of the Asian, African and some of the Latin American nations" in their attack on the Western powers. By mid-1950s, Ottawa acknowledged that the Soviet Delegation had "usually lined up with the anti-Colonial Powers" on colonial issues.⁹⁹ If Ottawa had really placed more priority on the survival of the institution than on the merits of this

case, then this situation would most certainly have had a primary and influential role in Canada's decision-making.

The Process: Conflicting Objectives

General Assembly Resolution 545 (VI) of February 5, 1951 was followed by Resolution 637 A (VI) of December 16, 1951 in which the General Assembly decided that the right of peoples and nations to self-determination ought to be "a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights." Resolution 738 (VIII) two years later was therefore a logical step in which the General Assembly 'requested' ECOSOC to ask the Commission on Human Rights, "to give due priority to the preparation of recommendations concerning international respect for the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination." One year later, by Resolution 837 (IX) of 1954, the General Assembly 'requested' the Commission on Human Rights to "complete its task." Pursuant to this resolution, the Commission on Human Rights presented two draft resolutions FI and FII to ECOSOC for consideration.¹⁰⁰ After a discussion in ECOSOC, these two drafts were returned to the Commission on Human Rights for 'reconsideration' instead of following the usual procedure to transmit them to the Third Committee, because they were 'unacceptable' to the Colonial Powers.

According to the Delegation, several members 'deplored' ECOSOC's action. Consequently, the Third Committee undertook, in two draft resolutions, to ensure that ECOSOC comply with the instructions of the Third Committee. The

Council was directed to submit its final recommendations on FI and FII to the Third Committee at the Tenth Session of the General Assembly. During a long procedural wrangle as to whether the issue of permanent sovereignty over the natural wealth and resources should remain in FI, the USA-designed amendment to the two draft resolutions in the Third Committee was rejected. It was later accepted, after a three-power amendment inserted the words "the rights and duties of states under international law...."¹⁰¹

In May 1955, the Commission on Human Rights sent FI and FII back to ECOSOC for transmission to the General Assembly for consideration and adoption.¹⁰² Whereupon, the USA Delegation argued that ECOSOC was "entitled and indeed bound, under Article 55 of the Charter, to consider the substance of the question before it and submit alternative proposals if it saw fit." In Ottawa's judgement, the USA recall to Article 55 was an avenue whereby Western powers could seek to circumvent FI and FII. Specifically, Ottawa believed that the USA was concerned that FI "would raise serious questions in the mind of private investors and potential investors." Moreover, this draft resolution "would tend to neutralise the beneficial effects of General Assembly Resolution 824 (IX), the purpose of which was to encourage the international flow of private capital and might even retard the economic development which all desired."

Ottawa argued that the "reference to the rights and duties of states under international law" was not sufficient to 'allay' what they felt were "apprehensions naturally aroused" by FI. In addition, Ottawa observed that the Western powers were "equally opposed" to FII because "it was indefensible to

leave the identification of such a situation to any ten member states, particularly in view of the wide divergence of views on the attributes of the concept of self-determination."¹⁰³ The UK insisted that it would be "unable to recognise or participate in the working of a commission as envisaged," in FII. This position was later revised.

Norway and Turkey declared their opposition "to the establishment of any new bodies with a restructured membership which might claim competence in a field not provided for in the Charter." France and Australia shared "much of the same views." Because both FI and FII were 'unacceptable' to the USA, Ottawa believed that the USA Delegation was 'encouraged' by the opposition of the Western powers in ECOSOC against FI and FII, to formally introduce its own proposal as an ECOSOC 'alternative' to FI and FII.¹⁰⁴ This was presented as draft Resolution 586 (XX)D; III along with FI and FII to the General Assembly for its consideration.¹⁰⁵

The opposition to the USA initiative and procedure to have its proposal adopted came from the Arab, Asian and Soviet representatives. Ottawa noted that this opposition "ran much along the lines of those advanced in the Human Rights Commission."¹⁰⁶ The opposition in both the Commission on Human Rights and ECOSOC was a portent of the anti-colonial resistance which the USA proposal would face in the General Assembly. In addition, Ottawa was fully aware of the dissent and the disparity which the USA resolution had caused within the ranks of Western powers. The situation had major implications for

Ottawa's decision-makers, from this point, in the process to include the article in the Covenant.

According to Ottawa, "it would appear from the debate that all of those who voted in favour of the transmission of the United States proposal to the General Assembly for consideration did not necessarily mean by this action that they were subscribing to it in its entirety." For all intents and purposes, Ottawa seemed to be saying that, for these powers, 'appearance' had a functional role in their position and also had priority over the 'substance' of the matter in their policy. The practical effect of this action was to support the best of a bad lot by including the USA proposal in the context of the discussion of FI and FII. In Ottawa's opinion, the Western powers "appear to have expressed themselves merely in favour of the proposal's consideration in the General Assembly rather than on its merits."¹⁰⁷ Under these circumstances, we make the assumption that the position which most of the Western powers were to take on this issue would be congruent with the Canadian position. But what, in Ottawa's estimation, was the real goal of the USA initiative? And how would this affect Ottawa's policy and decision making?

The Canadian Position

Ottawa took the position that the USA was 'obliged' to make such a proposal for two major reasons and officials believed that the USA had only one aim in mind. On June 23, the USA House of Representatives had taken a clear

anti-colonial and anti-Communist stand which accused the USSR of 'imperialist' intentions in colonial areas and the new nations. Therefore, the USA could not reject FI and FII outright. Its own proposal served that purpose. Ottawa conceded that, "a study such as the one contemplated by the United States would at least have the merit of disposing of the issue for some time to come, and saving the United States and other countries which have doubts about the other two resolutions, from the accusation of wishing to kill it outright...."¹⁰⁸ In addition to the functional role of 'appearance' rather than 'substance' in the positions of the Western powers, Ottawa saw an operative role of the "Communist factor" in the USA position and also in its own policy decisions.

The Instructions for the Tenth Session of the General Assembly warned the Canadian Delegation that the Soviet Union "will still try to split the Western alliance and to isolate the United States." And since the colonial issue provided the means by which the Soviets could achieve this aim, Ottawa reminded the Delegation: it is "still important, therefore, that we achieve as great a degree of unity as possible within the Western bloc, and that we do not leave the United States to answer alone charges which are in reality levelled at the West as a whole."¹⁰⁹ This perception was especially relevant to the context of discussion of FI and FII. Ottawa had concluded around the same time, that "the undesirable aspects of United Nations action on this subject have become more evident, in particular, the proposed establishment of two fully fledged commissions," in FI and FII.¹¹⁰

In its assessment of the situation, Ottawa concluded that FII "had paid insufficient regard to the rights of states and had sought to impose on them duties which they had not accepted under the Charter or under general international law." Furthermore, FII was "incomplete because it failed to define its terms." In view of the operative potential of FI and FII, Ottawa decided that "an agreement on terminology was an essential prerequisite for any further work."¹¹¹ Therefore,

the Delegation, while making clear its adherence to the principle of self-determination, should give its full support to the USA resolution as a welcome alternative to the other two controversial resolutions, drawing attention to the fact that, however academic the proposed study to be carried out by ad hoc commission may appear, this preliminary work of definition, etc. is essential if the Assembly is to be able to take further legitimate and useful steps.

How was the Delegation to actualise this "full support" for the USA resolution? And what should be done in regard to FI and FII? What kind of 'appearance' should Canada seek to accomplish in these positions? Ottawa was very specific on these 'questions' in its Instructions:

Our policy is one of delaying and restraining precipitated and questionable action, never, however, to the extent of throwing into doubt what is our sincere belief in the principle, if not the 'human right' of self-determination. The Delegation should be at pains to stress henceforth the more appropriate term, 'principle', rather than 'right'.¹¹²

However, the anti-colonials were no longer prepared to accept verbal assurances relating to the potentially functional role of self-determination, they sought to establish self-determination as a right which would have operational consequences in the colonial world. We have given some indication of where Canada's choice might lie.

In the next section of this chapter, we will assess to what extent Ottawa was prepared to work against the majority in the UN in order "to produce a text acceptable" to Canada. Would this be the only goal of Canada's policy? And what of the decision by the Minister in 1952, "to consider the United Nations...as the forum for the expression of the conscience of the world?" Was this principle to become functional in endorsing this meaningful exercise of which we are about to make an analysis?

The anti-colonial undertaking to establish self-determination as a 'right' that could actually be claimed by colonial peoples was not an "abstract activity." As Abdel Ghani of Egypt had pointed out in the Third Committee, the article that "all peoples shall have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development," was "the only article in the Drafts [FI and FII] the inclusion of which had been subject of an explicit directive of Resolution 545 (VI)."¹¹³ We are concerned to discover how Canada felt about the implications of such a significant act of the General Assembly. This sanctioned an undertaking in which not only alien rule over subject peoples would be undermined, it also addressed the privileged status of Western powers which gave them economic and military freedom and benefits associated with that rule. All these aspects were interwoven in the matrix of the process to establish self-determination as a 'right'. Were these conspicuous considerations ever become a part of Canada's framework of analysis in its "definition of the situation?"

Article 55 of the Charter provided that, "with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being...the UN shall promote certain fundamental prerequisites." To ensure the fulfilment of these, Article 56 required that "members pledge themselves to take a joint and separate action in co-operation with the organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." The anti-colonials held the conviction that colonial peoples must have the right of self-determination. In their opinion, this was a crucial prerequisite for the successful termination of alien political, military and economic domination over subject peoples. On the other hand, Ottawa decided in early 1955 that the exercise to secure the right of self-determination was 'questionable'.

We propose to examine Canada's position in light of the anti-colonial arguments that their actions were not 'precipitated', but were based on the conviction that all peoples ought to have the right of self-determination and, that, not just a selected group of people should have a claim to a self-evident right of self-determination. We hope to discover if and in what way Canada intended to operationalise its "sincere belief in the principle" of self-determination in this context. We also intend to look for Canada's motivation in stressing the distinction between self-determination as a 'principle' and self-determination as a 'right' and the perceived value of this strategy in the process to establish self-determination as a 'right'.

Question of Procedure

By Resolution 833 (IX) of December 4, 1954, the General Assembly had recommended that during the Tenth Session, "the Third Committee should give priority and devote itself mainly to the discussion, article by article, in an agreed order, of the Draft Covenants with a view to their adoptions at the earliest possible date." The frame of reference of this resolution left it to the discretion of the Third Committee to decide on the order in which each article should be discussed. On October 11, 1955, the Canadian Delegation informed Ottawa that UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld had 'opened' the discussion on the Covenant on Human Rights in the Third Committee, that "he was somewhat sceptical" of FI and FII and "was not much more attracted" by the ECOSOC proposal in the USA alternative draft resolution.

In recognition of the "existing political impasse," the Secretary General "thought it was necessary first to reach an agreement on the basic principles involved in self-determination and to have these principles set out in generally acceptable terms." To this end, he recommended that an ad hoc committee should be set up "with a mandate to draft a 'declaration on self-determination' for approval by the General Assembly." Was this proposal not similar to the USA 'alternative' proposal, in principle? This was obvious to the anti-colonials.¹¹⁴

The Secretary General believed that "the chief immediate need was to provide the basis of understanding between the protagonists of different points of view." His suggestion was made with this need in mind.¹¹⁵ But how was such a

goal attainable in view of the diametrically opposed positions of the members? Several Delegations had intimated that if Article 1 of FI was included in the Covenants, "their governments would be unable to accede to the Covenants."¹¹⁶ Nunez of Costa Rica pointed out the incongruence of the starting positions of the members: "some Delegations had wished to delay the final examination of the Draft Covenants in order to make additional studies; others wished to see the texts approved as soon as possible." In the opinion of his Delegation, the Draft Covenants, FI and FII, were instruments "which were intended to guarantee to every person treatment in keeping with human dignity." Consequently, he felt that the Committee "must do all in its power to adopt them without delay."¹¹⁷

In rejecting this interpretation, the Swedish delegate insisted that "the notion of self-determination did not come within the sphere of human rights covered in the Draft Covenants."¹¹⁸ His Delegation's main concern was not of a substantive nature but rather one of a technical nature; the sort of rights ensconced in the Covenants fell under the domestic jurisdiction of States whereas the right of self-determination was of another category.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, because "the concepts of 'people' and 'nation' were not yet clearly enough defined," he concluded that "it was hard to know precisely with whom the right of peoples and nations to self-determination rested."¹²⁰

The anti-colonials were not confused about the universal and equal applicability of the right of self-determination. Krutikova of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic claimed that the provisions of Article 1 of FI were "in accordance with those of the United Nations Charter, especially as regarded the

equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination." She added that Article 1 "set forth in clear and concise terms a right which meant the freedom of all peoples to decide their own political, economic and social destinies."¹²¹ Consequently, in Krutikova's view, self-determination "must be regarded as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of all the fundamental human rights."¹²² The anti-colonials agreed that, in the final analysis, self-determination did involve each individual; that "to be deprived of the right of self-determination entailed the loss of individual human rights."¹²³

Pazhwak of Afghanistan found that, "while Article 1 was no doubt extremely controversial, the Committee should not for that reason refrain from discussing it first, but should rather, on the contrary, be induced to do so." He added that the main reason why the Committee dealt with the subject at all, was "to try to reach agreement on points on which the views of Delegations differed."¹²⁴ He sought the "most logical method" and recommended the Preambles as the starting point for the discussion, then with the "numerical order" of the articles following.¹²⁵ On the other hand, Hoare of the UK recommended what he saw as the "most logical case" which would be to "adhere to practice." He felt that the Preambles¹²⁶ were only "a summary of the purposes and principles embodied" in the text. Most importantly for Hoare, they "imposed no legal obligation" and therefore should not be the first to be discussed. In his opinion, the text was the most important consideration; especially "that part of the text which could properly be said to have legal force." In other words, the UK Delegation found that "the Committee would be considering the introduction to a

text before it had determined what was the text to be introduced."¹²⁷ By implication, the emphasis of the UK Delegation to place priority on the legal aspects of the text gave the principles underlying the Covenants less importance in its policy position on this issue.

In his analysis of the situation, Dag Hammarskjöld concluded that "the whole confused question of self-determination had again intervened to prevent the Committee from going ahead with what, at the stage that had now been reached, should be primarily a technical matter."¹²⁸ But the UK delegate expressed the concern that, in such an operational context, the right of self-determination meant "in essence" that "populations in disputed territories" and minorities could be free to choose their own government¹²⁹ and therefore, it was not a technical matter. Consequently, Hoare felt that it "would be impossible to discuss Article 1 without going to the roots of the whole question of self-determination."¹³⁰

In the opinion of the Canadian Delegation, "the whole confused situation regarding self-determination was delaying further progress towards adoption of the Covenant on Human Rights." Would this not have ideally served Canada's policy of not supporting the objective of an international Covenant on Human Rights? The Delegation observed that the Secretary General's proposal could serve to 'remove' the contentious article on self-determination from the Covenants. However, it was evident to the Delegation that the "immediate and fiercely critical response" from the anti-colonials¹³¹ was a clear indication that the

Secretary General's recommendation would not be allowed to have a functional role in this process.

On the other hand, the reaction of the Delegation to the Secretary General's position was a 'favourable' one. They believed that "Draft Covenants without articles on self-determination would be a lesser evil than Draft Covenants with them."¹³² The Canadian position and attitude towards the idea of a Covenant on Human Rights had not changed since the ministerial decision of 1951. We are examining an exercise in which Canada was forced to engage because of international interests, although Canada did not approve of the aims of this exercise. Therefore, the Secretary General's recommendation, to draft a 'declaration' which would diffuse the situation and postpone the process to include Article 1 in the Covenants, was an appealing one.¹³³ The Delegation notified Ottawa that it intended to 'endorse' the Secretary General's proposal on the condition that "a sufficient number of anti-colonial and neutral Delegations can be persuaded to support it."¹³⁴

The Danish Proposal

In view of the anti-colonial insistence on keeping article 1 in the covenants, the strategy of the Western powers became one of procedural deferral of the discussion of this article. But since the Secretary General's recommendation which would have achieved this goal was rejected, Lannung of Denmark came up with another proposal which would achieve the identical goal.

It appears that, in preparation for the Tenth Session of the General Assembly, Ottawa had been enquiring as to the position which the Western powers were planning to take in the Third Committee.¹³⁵ They presented a consolidated front since there was agreement, in principle, on the matter. Canada saw a role for itself in directing process by seeking support for its position from the ranks of the opposition. However, Baroody of Saudi Arabia, was explicit in the anti-colonial rejection of any attempts to forge a compromise solution. He declared that "there was nothing clearer than Article 1 of the Draft Covenants, in which the right was proclaimed." And in response to the Secretary General's definition of the situation, Baroody claimed that he found "the text guileless, direct and unambiguous. It defined one of the fundamental human rights with almost biblical simplicity." Therefore, the discussion should begin with Article 1.¹³⁶

On the other hand, Lannung proposed that the Committee should not begin with Article 1...which was regarded in some quarters, as their most important provision." He thought that "the discussion was likely to lead to acute controversy." In light of this possibility, he therefore recommended that the Committee "should not begin its work with a discussion of that article," and argued that, it would be a pity if heated discussions on the subject were to disturb the atmosphere."¹³⁷ The Danish delegate did not conceal the fact that he was not interested in pursuing the substance of Article 1. Lannung advanced the idea that it "would be a good start" to begin with part III, because "the amendments and proposals relating to those articles were mainly technical and could hardly give rise to serious argument."¹³⁸

The Committee decided to adopt a joint proposal¹³⁹ by Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Greece, in a roll call vote.¹⁴⁰ The following procedure was recommended for the consideration of the Draft Covenants:

- (1) Discussion of the Preambles to both Covenants;
- (2) Discussion of those operative parts common to, and similar in, both drafts, beginning with Part I of the two Covenants, continuing with Part II, and so on;
- (3) Discussion of the remaining articles in their existing order in the two drafts, beginning with the draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.¹⁴¹

In explaining his vote for the proposal, Nosek of Czechoslovakia stated that, in the context of the General Assembly Resolution 833 (IX) directive, he saw "no reason to change an order which had been carefully established with due regard for the content and inter-relationship of the articles...the individual articles were logically interrelated; to depart from the existing sequence would be tantamount to tampering with the very substance of the draft Covenants."¹⁴²

In view of this fact, Nosek felt that the joint proposal adopted was in keeping with the conviction that

the right set fourth [sic] in Article 1 fundamentally affected all other human rights. That point clearly emerged from the United Nations Charter itself, and from the practical point of view any guarantee of the rights of individuals was an absurdity in a society in which the right of self-determination was denied. That consideration had guided the General Assembly in its decision that an article relating to the right of self-determination should be included in the Draft Covenants.¹⁴³

This opinion was shared by Tsaldaris, who headed the Greek Delegation. She strongly criticised the Danish proposal which she thought "would upset the order established after long careful study by various United Nations organs." In her

view, Article 1 "related to a fundamental human right, one which was essential both to the dignity of the human being and to friendly relations among nations."¹⁴⁴

Moreover, Tsaldaris went on to emphasise that "if the principles proclaimed in the Charter were to remain mere principles that would not be implemented, the United Nations could have rested content with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and need not have spent years preparing legal instruments."¹⁴⁵ Rodriguez Fabregat, the delegate from Uruguay, also saw the Draft Covenants as a vehicle by which 'essential principles' could be realised. In his opinion, the Draft Covenants

had been carefully prepared...each article, each sentence and each word had been carefully weighed. The work was thus the result of mature consideration. The preamble stated essential principles which would come, after centuries of struggle and sacrifice, to crown the hopes that had dawned ten years previously at the San Francisco Conference and would be the United Nations answer to man's search for progress and justice.¹⁴⁶

On the whole, he found the joint proposal 'logical' and in keeping with the format of the "logical order" of the Drafts themselves. In light of this, his Delegation found the Danish proposal 'unacceptable'.

On October 12, the Canadian Delegation reported to Ottawa that, at the meeting of Old Commonwealth and Western European Delegations that morning, "it was agreed that Norway and Venezuela should speak in support of the Danish proposal to begin with discussion of articles in part 3 of each Covenant."¹⁴⁷ The anti-colonial arguments in defence of normal procedure were ignored by the colonials. It was indicative of the importance of the topic, and of process, that "an all-day procedural discussion" and a resolution, were needed to

decide on the order in which the parts should be discussed. The Canadian Delegation had decided that it was necessary to support the Danish proposal and had registered Canada on the list to speak. However, after the joint Latin-American resolution was tabled, the Delegation realised that its statement "would not likely influence the final vote," and therefore supported a Haitian proposal to close the debate.¹⁴⁸ Canada voted against adoption of the joint proposal.¹⁴⁹ The joint Latin American resolution proposed that the Draft Covenants be discussed in the following order:

1. Preambles to both Covenants
2. Part I and II of both Covenants
3. Remaining parts of the two Covenants beginning with the Covenant on Economical, Social and Cultural rights.

Wall explained the Canadian Delegation's reason for voting against the joint proposal by showing that the Danish proposal was, in his opinion, "the best way for the Committee to undertake the detailed discussion of the draft covenants and to progress in its work...."¹⁵⁰ The Canadian position was clear on one major point; that is, by beginning the debates with part III of the Drafts, the Committee would omit any references to fundamental principles and, especially, not deal with Article 1 and self-determination. Wall stated that his Delegation thought that "the most reasonable course to follow, after the long procedural debate that had taken place, would be temporarily to postpone consideration of the preamble and Article 1 of the draft covenants and to return to them at a more opportune time."¹⁵¹ This was a stalling tactic. He said that the Canadian Government considered self-determination to be a "collective matter, which was

out of place in an international instrument dealing with individual human rights."¹⁵²

Coaton, the delegate from the Union of South Africa, found that "the fundamental differences between the positions of the various Delegations represented in the Committee were such as to rule out any possibility of unanimity on the matter for years to come."¹⁵³ And since his Delegation

had no intention either of calling in question what had already been done with regard to the drafting of the Covenants or of impeding the work which might still confront the Committee in that connection...it would refrain from active participation in any further discussion of the Draft Covenants...and would abstain on all articles as and when they come up for adoption.¹⁵⁴

Because of the polarisation of uncompromising positions, it was decided that the establishment of a Working Party could be instrumental in facilitating the Committee's consideration of Article 1.

A joint proposal by Cuba, Ecuador and El Salvador was presented to the Committee which "decide[d] to appoint a Working Party, composed of representatives of nine countries designated by the Chairman of the Committee, to consider Article 1...in light of the amendments proposed and of the comments and suggestions made, and to report the result of its work to the Committee as soon as possible...."¹⁵⁵ Three separate proposals outlining the frame of reference for the Working Party were adopted by roll call votes. The substance of these proposals and amendments were indicative of the intent of the antagonists.

In view of his experience whereby controversial proposals tended to be 'shelved' at the UN,¹⁵⁶ the delegate from Saudi Arabia submitted "an oral amendment in which the words 'as soon as possible' would be replaced by the

words 'not later than November 19, 1955.'" The delegate from Afghanistan also submitted a more substantive amendment to the joint proposal in two points:¹⁵⁷

1. Replace the words 'report the result of its work' by the words 'submit a text'.
2. Between the words 'discussion' and 'at', add the following phrase: 'and adopt, in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly, an article on the right of peoples and nations to self-determination in the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights.'

Both amendments were separately voted upon and were adopted as single amendments. In addition, they were accepted as integrated into the joint proposal,¹⁵⁸ which was adopted by a roll call vote.¹⁵⁹ Without any doubt, the voting results indicated that the majority of members was in favour of these new developments.

Canada Searches for a Policy

In light of this development, and because the Secretary General's recommendation had become a working part of Canada's framework of analysis, the Delegation wrote to Ottawa: "since the irresponsible element of the Third Committee now seems to have the bit firmly in its teeth, there is a possibility that...an all-out effort may be made by the Arab bloc and other anti-Colonial Powers to push through a decision to include self-determination articles in the Covenants without any serious attempt being made to clarify the concept of 'self-determination of peoples and nations'."¹⁶⁰ Baroody of Saudi Arabia tried to put

the process into perspective. He did not share the view of the Western powers, that there was a need for abstract undertakings, because colonial peoples

believed, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights entitled them to do, that like all other men, they had the right to live in freedom and dignity. The right to decide their own destiny was for them not only a means of putting an end to the subordinate status in which they had been kept, but also a prerequisite for the free development of the personality of each individual member of the population.¹⁶¹

This sort of interpretation prompted the Delegation to propose a change in strategy, to Ottawa. They recommended: "because of the uncertainty of the future trend of the debate it may not be wise for us to express our full support of the principle of self-determination before we are quite clear in our own minds what we mean by the terms 'self-determination' and 'peoples and nations'." Furthermore, the Delegation suggested that, "it might be desirable to re-examine" the position that was taken in the Instructions for the Delegation to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly.¹⁶² It is important to point out that the Delegation did not address the substantive claims of the Saudi delegate. Like the Swedish Delegation, the Canadian Delegation allowed the Saudi argument a functional role in policy-making only in so far as it affected Canada's tactical position.

The Canadian Delegation felt that it was incumbent upon them to "co-operate fully with other rationally-minded Delegations in the Third Committee to obtain a sensible and generally acceptable definition of the principle." The aim of the Canadian activity would continue to be an "acceptable text." Clearly, the dynamics of the operational context had an influence on the perception of the Delegation's need to take a more active involvement in the process. In a second

communication to Ottawa on October 14, the Delegation attempted to clarify the position they should take in the debate and also pointed to "certain weaknesses" in the position which Canada had taken so far.¹⁶³ The Delegation felt they were "being torn by conflicting requirements."

The definitive expression of a direct connection between this process to include Article 1 in the Draft Covenants and colonial matters in general, is evidence of the operational value of this process for colonial empires in Canada's perception. The Delegation conceded that, "on the one hand we wish to avoid embarrassment possibly to ourselves and certainly to our friends: if the 'right' of self-determination were to be proclaimed it is easy to foresee that the positions of France or of the United Kingdom, for instance, would be made even more difficult in UN debates on colonial matters."¹⁶⁴ On this basis, the Canadian position had to be an active one in helping to direct this process in terms of means and goals.

The Delegation acknowledged that, "on the other hand, we attach importance to our relations with the emerging countries in Asia and Africa, and, bearing in mind their strong convictions on the subject of self-determination, we are anxious to take such a position as will not identify Canada with the so-called 'Colonial Powers' but will express our understanding for the aspirations of dependent peoples." In this perception, Canada's own self-interest was a factor in the kinds of positions that Ottawa should choose to support. Nevertheless, the recommendation was not for tangible action, it was limited to an expression of 'understanding'. According to the Delegation, the factors outlined above were "to motivate" their actions.¹⁶⁵

How would Ottawa accommodate these "conflicting requirements?"

The Delegation explained that, up until about late 1955, "we have attempted to resolve the dilemma by opposing as best we could any attempt to incorporate a definition of the right of self-determination in the Draft Covenants on Human Rights while on every suitable occasion expressing support for the underlying idea."¹⁶⁶ This policy was also a reflection of Canada's incongruent goals in this process. Action was confined to a support of the colonial choices and the intangible factor of 'appearance' continued to be operational in not being associated with the colonials and in not totally alienating the anti-colonials. The Delegation observed: "we are more inclined to argue now that self-determination is a principle and therefore not perhaps, at least at this stage, a matter which lends itself to the precise formulation required for international legislation."

The Canadian position in this decision-making process had gone one step further than the colonial stalling tactic to define the concept before it could be effectively utilised. By suggesting that the fundamentals of the principle could not even be formulated, Canada was definitely setting itself up as the target of the anti-colonial fury. What was the motivation for such an 'inclination'? The past ambiguous position of supporting the idea but not the UN attempt at implementation could not have been overseen in the Committee. In spite of this obvious 'fence-sitting', the Delegation conceded, "we are, however, to maintain our line of covert support for the Notion itself which, as we pointed out, has been a vital element of our own national evolution."¹⁶⁷ If this was indeed the case, then Canada must have known which factors or characteristics were operative. And if

the principle did have a perceived functional role in Canada's own experience, why was it not appropriate to apply this same principle to a comparable category? The application of the principle of self-determination in a colonial situation, whether it was in Canada or Africa, basically allowed the inhabitants to 'determine' themselves. This was the essence of the anti-colonial position.

The Delegation was aware of this apparent discrepancy in its public policy and complained to Ottawa:

the difficulty on our position is that harsh and cynical representatives from a number of irresponsible countries are not likely to be deceived by such a line and it is unlikely to achieve its purpose. Furthermore, there is some inconsistency in proclaiming support for something which we hasten to add is not susceptible of definition or regulation.¹⁶⁸

Therefore, the Chairman of the Delegation recommended that the Department undertake to "re-examine closely both the problem itself" and Canada's position with the goal of achieving "greater consistency" in its public policy. He wanted to know, "are we right, for instance, in our view that self-determination is a principle? Do we mean a legal or a political or a moral principle?"¹⁶⁹ He observed: "to concede that self-determination is a principle or a right, represents in effect from the outset what seems to me an unnecessary strategic retreat."¹⁷⁰

What did Canada want to achieve in this process, especially as it attempted "to determine what exactly is involved in self-determination"? Was this whole process of definition simply a strategic exercise? The length and frequency of the correspondences to and from New York suggest that the matter was addressed with some importance. Hoare of the UK, argued in the Third Committee that even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not concern

itself with self-determination to this extent. He felt that the General Assembly in 1948, "had apparently not regarded self-determination as a fundamental human right, for that document, which was intended to be comprehensive, contained no mention of it."¹⁷¹

At the most, international respect for the principle of self-determination was desired as was respect for the principle of equal rights in the context of the Charter. Similarly, Beaufort of the Netherlands, protested that "certain states wished to go beyond the Charter and to proclaim as an absolute right what had been accepted as a fundamental principle. Those members were asking for much more than what had been agreed on by all members in 1945."¹⁷² This was the crux of the problem. On what basis were these Delegations insisting upon, "at most," the 1945 decision to confine self-determination to the status of a principle? And why the adamant refusal to consider self-determination as a right? Was it in their self-interest to retain the Charter stipulations at all cost? And, were the racial and cultural factors simply operative in helping to maintain a system of dominance which happened to be of a white-non-white category? The UK delegate made a recall to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in justifying his policy to obstruct the process to establish self-determination as a right in UN operations. The anti-colonials did exactly the same thing in rejecting this colonial position.

The Chairman pointed out to Ottawa that there was still "the problem of determining whether self-determination is achieved when self-government, autonomy or full internal and external sovereignty has been conceded."¹⁷³ This

was indeed a crucial and very relevant question which had to be answered as the decolonisation process got under way. In view of the ramifications of the exercise which were poignantly brought out by the Colonial Powers, the Chairman concluded: "the very notion, it seems to us, of who is entitled to self-determination and what it means exactly is completely elastic."¹⁷⁴ For this reason, we may be unwise to proclaim that it is a principle and that we are in favour of it." And because there was a pressing need to take a stand on this in the Third Committee, where the anti-colonials were referring to self-determination as a 'right', the Chairman proposed to Ottawa: "would we not better be advised to recognise that we do not know exactly what is involved and to suggest that the whole matter should be studied carefully so that we can determine what we can support and to what extent"?¹⁷⁵

The Delegation was fully aware that such a position would be difficult to maintain with any credibility in light of the operational pressures in this Committee and the UN. Therefore, the Chairman further recommended that, "in explaining our position which would not be one of opposition or of endorsement even as a principle, we could discuss the difficulties involved in the unreserved acceptance of self-determination either as a right or as a principle and suggest that these difficulties should be resolved before definite commitments can reasonably be made."¹⁷⁶ This position chose to ignore the fact that the anti-colonials were also sovereign states and they were not pushing for an 'unreserved' acceptance of self-determination. They had a very strict limitation of the application of self-determination; this was to be only in the context of colonial

empires. Chapters XI and XII of the Charter were under attack. The Chairman observed: "to accept self-determination as a principle or a right might involve commitments insofar as existing territorial arrangements are involved. Acquired rights under valid international treaties might also be affected. These important matters must be examined carefully and the implications of self-determination assessed before a decision can be reached."¹⁷⁷ This was a concise summary of how this matter was perceived to be relevant for Canada's self interest.

In the opinion of the Canadian Delegation, the notion of self-determination was generally not limited to a simple act of people wanting to 'determine' themselves in colonial empires. Moreover, they argued that, in Chapter XI, the Charter did "recognise that self-determination is not an absolute right and that, in their own interests, certain people need protection and support from other countries and that in such matters 'the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples' must be taken into account."¹⁷⁸ This ethnocentric interpretation insisted upon a pro-colonial perspective of the operational limits of self-determination. The Chairman observed that, "the provisions of Chapter XI imply that self-determination is not to be interpreted in such a way that it would be inconsistent with the obligations and rights of the Administering Countries." On the other hand, the anti-colonials rejected this viewpoint that Colonial Powers should have any prerogatives in the operational confines of self-determination.

In the anti-colonial interpretation, the assumption was that all colonial peoples were capable of deciding on their own future. Therefore, in recognition that this was "admittedly a contentious subject," the Chairman of the Delegation

suggested "that the whole problem and our relation thereto might be re-examined in the Department as a matter of some urgency." However, because of the time constraint, he wrote:

I venture to suggest also that we should consider abandoning the line that we favour self-determination as a principle. We should stress instead that we have an open mind on the whole subject, that we are prepared to study it carefully and to endorse any practical, concrete suggestions which will not involve contradictions with other Charter obligations and which will appear to us to be politically advisable in their flexibility and timing...and what we will consider to be the best interests of the peoples concerned and of the organisation.¹⁷⁹

Canada was consistent in maintaining that Western powers must have the right to have a say in what is 'best' for peoples who are thought incapable of doing so for themselves.

By mid-October, the Chairman of the Delegation was unable to state clearly what the Canadian position on self-determination was: it was not a principle and it was also not a right. However, he allowed that this Canadian "line would not embarrass our friends nor lead us to accept commitments of doubtful validity."¹⁸⁰ The incongruence between the 'colonial' perspective and the "anti-colonial" one, in regard to the goal of this process, was a large one. The delegate from Czechoslovakia did not share Canada's negative attitude on the significance of the 'commitments' which self-determination as a right, in the colonial context, would bring. He asserted that the right of self-determination "fundamentally affected all other human rights." In his interpretation, "that point clearly emerged" from the Charter. Moreover, he declared that "from the practical point of view any guarantee of the rights of individuals was an absurdity in a society in which the right of self-determination was denied."¹⁸¹

Tsaldaris of the Greek Delegation concurred with him on this point.¹⁸²

In addition, she repudiated the claim by the Western powers that this pursuit was inconsistent with the Charter. In her judgement, it was clear in the General Debate that "no attempt was made to broaden or distort the provisions of the Charter." She argued that, by becoming a signatory to the Charter, every member accepted the principle of self-determination and was, therefore "committed to respect the right which derived from it."¹⁸³ This definitive interpretation was diametrically opposed to that of the Canadian Delegation and the Colonial Powers and it imposed upon them the need to renounce it. Tsaldaris argued that, "Article 1, which acknowledged the right of self-determination of peoples and nations, constituted the cornerstone of the Draft Covenants; the right of self-determination of peoples and nations had already been recognised as a fundamental principle both in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."¹⁸⁴

Hsueh of the Chinese Delegation 'deplored' the perceived confusion in the Third Committee. In his estimation it was a "categorical statement" by the drafters of the Charter "that the principle of self-determination conformed to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations only in so far as it implied the right of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession."¹⁸⁵ This was indeed the premise of the anti-colonial argument. Nevertheless, the UK Delegation was most disturbed by the theoretical extrapolation on this principle which could have significant and functional implications for all. He explained that,

the first reference to a 'right' of peoples and nations to self-determination occurred in a General Assembly Resolution of 1950; yet

by 1952 it was spoken of as "a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights." Consequently, either the General Assembly had inadvertently omitted the very corner-stone of human rights from the declaration or...the various Delegations at subsequent sessions had been so carried away by their enthusiasm and their desire to affirm an important principle that they had failed to give due consideration to the legal and political effects of converting a principle into a universal right, which created a corresponding universal obligation upon states.¹⁸⁶

The fact was that the Draft Covenants "were legal texts, imposing definite obligations on states."¹⁸⁷ This was the primary concern of Canada's decision-makers. By mid-October, the Delegation hoped that the Canadian position "might convince the more moderate elements" in the Third Committee that, although the Canadian approach to this problem under consideration was 'guarded', Canada was "in sympathy with their objectives." Most importantly, "in the typically Canadian fashion," the Canadians were "patiently seeking practical solutions."¹⁸⁸

At the end of October, in the Third Committee, the Delegation "acknowledged perhaps by implication, that self-determination was a 'right' but one which was collective and should be dealt with separately, since it was out of place in Covenants on individual rights."¹⁸⁹ This was a categorical rejection of the anti-colonial ongoing pursuit to have self-determination established, as a human right, in the Covenant. How could Ottawa perceive this public position to be "in sympathy" with anti-colonial objectives? And what about the desire that Canada not be identified with the colonial side? In January 1951, the Department of External Affairs had decided that the 'innocuous' subject of human rights would not have a priority in Canada's list of objectives at the UN. This was, in principle,

the colonial position. The operative limits of Canada's role were limited to actively 'seeking' a way, either to postpone the initiative or to assist in designing a text that would suit Canada's perceived interests.

The anti-colonials were not necessarily interested in establishing human rights *per se*,¹⁹⁰ they were determined to achieve an operational consensus on the principle of self-determination in the colonial sphere. It is necessary to understand the matrix of rights that were perceived by the anti-colonials to be subsumed under the concept of self-determination. Had there been no colonial empires and had there been no foreign economic domination in these areas under alien rule, it is most probable that all encompassing concerns with human rights would not have existed. In this sense, the anti-colonial pursuit we are examining in this chapter, was driven by an ethnocentric and racial perception of the way things ought to be. And the Working Party's text was a reflection of this.

In the next section, we will show what Canada and the Western powers wanted as a "practical solution" to this pursuit. Their reaction to the Working Party's text was a clear indication of their intention to retain the Charter conception of self-determination as a principle. This was their preferred choice for "the standard of permissible action" in the colonial world. The Charter categorisation of peoples into different 'kinds,' which had an operative role in justifying an unequal 'entitlement' to one 'kind' of peoples, was no longer accepted by the anti-colonials as "the standard of permissible action" in the colonial world.

The Report of the Working Party

There were 26 meetings on self-determination in the Third Committee. The debates ended in mid-November 1955. In early December, the Working Party reported to the Third Committee that, "in the discharge of the task with which they were honoured, they endeavoured to reconcile, as far as possible, the different points of view."¹⁹¹ In spite of the threat that several Delegations would be unable to accede to the Covenants if Article 1 was retained in the Covenants, the Working Party decided that it would be included in the final draft. This text of Article 1 was submitted to the Third Committee for its consideration:

1. All peoples have the right to self-determination.¹⁹² By virtue of this right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the Covenant having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories shall promote the realisation of the right of self-determination in such Territories in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.¹⁹³

Although, in the General Debate, the Delegations recognised that this text was a "compromise solution," two radical amendments were submitted. Yugoslavia tabled the first one; the other was a joint effort by Lebanon and Pakistan. The subsequent sub-amendment submitted by Afghanistan was an attempt to remedy the 'damage' done by the joint amendment.¹⁹⁴ The Yugoslavian amendment intended to make the obligation to operationalise the

right of self-determination as universal as possible. It was a constricted imperative which became automatically relevant for marginal peoples like the native peoples in the USA and Canada. Minorities and other groups seeking secession were excluded because of the requirement to conform with the Charter.¹⁹⁵ On the other hand, the joint amendment was designed by moderate members who believed that some agreement on the part of the Colonial Powers was needed for a successful implementation of the resolutions.

The Yugoslav amendment concentrated solely on paragraph 3 of Article 1. It recommended that

All the States Parties to the Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories shall promote the realisation of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.¹⁹⁶

It is clear that paragraph 3 of the Working Party's text addressed only the Administering Powers. The Yugoslav amendment made this paragraph all inclusive: all members, not just Colonial Powers, were to "promote the realisation of the right of self-determination." In this sense, the amendment brought the Working Party's text within the guidelines of General Assembly Resolution 545 (VI).

The joint amendment to the Working Party's text was an attempt to accommodate the expressed wishes of the Western powers in two ways. First, by replacing paragraph 1 of the text to read: "1. The States Parties to the Covenant shall uphold the principle that all peoples and nations have the right of self-determination." In effect, this amendment went in the opposite direction of the

cumulative effort of the anti-colonials by replacing a recognised right with a nebulous principle. In addition, it released "The States Parties to the Covenant" from any obligations arising from the application of the right of self-determination; it merely urged them to 'uphold' a principle.

Secondly, this amendment recommended the deletion of paragraph 2 from the Working Party's text.¹⁹⁷ The recommendation to delete paragraph 2 was detrimental to the interests of the inhabitants of dependent territories because it would remove the international controls or safeguards proposed in the Working Party's text. By stipulating that any economic arrangement should be to the "mutual advantage" of both parties, paragraph 2 protected the interests of dependent peoples.

Denmark submitted a revised proposal which took the Working Party's text into consideration.¹⁹⁸ The Committee rejected this revised proposal in a draft resolution by a roll call vote of 28 against, 25 for, with 5 abstentions.¹⁹⁹ This resolution had two operative paragraphs: "1. The General Assembly decides not to proceed at the present session to a vote on a text of Article 1 of the Draft Covenants." The second operative paragraph was of a secondary nature recommending the preparation of another working paper. A comparison of the voting positions with the substantive parts of the debates brings out a very clear dichotomy and polarisation of policy on the Danish proposal. Clearly, this proposal was fully in keeping with the perceptions and voting behaviour of the pro-colonials.

The Working Party had attempted "to reconcile the widely divergent views" and after several years of debating and examination of proposals, it was felt that the text "represented the best possible compromise."²⁰⁰ Twenty-eight States voted to postpone the vote on Article 1 and thereby delay any action on this issue. In essence, the anti-colonial position on the Danish proposal was that, notwithstanding the fact that the General Assembly had dealt with this issue over several years, "the fundamental position of Delegations holding opposing views had not changed in that time."²⁰¹ Consequently, any new attempts to accommodate the divergent views would be 'fruitless'.

The Committee then proceeded to consider the text submitted by the Working Party and the three subsequent amendments. The Yugoslav amendment was adopted by a roll call vote of 32 to none with 36 abstentions.²⁰² Most importantly, the amendment made it incumbent upon Canada to consider its national interests because of the inclusive aspect of the phrase "[A]ll the States parties to the Covenants" and the specific operative part "to promote the realisation of the right" in conformity with the provisions of the Charter. Canada felt that this obligation was "extremely controversial" and that "widely different interpretations" left the situations with "national entities" and "minority groups" the ambiguous right to secede.²⁰³ In the debates, Hoare had agreed that self-determination "could not be whittled down to exclude minorities or groups wishing to secede," for in his opinion, "its great force lay precisely in the fact that it was all-embracing."²⁰⁴ According to Hoare, the universal application of the right of self-determination would present problems for sovereign States because,

many areas of the world where questions involving the issue of self-determination arose or could arise, whether States having no colonies were indeed prepared to face the consequences of assuming a legal obligation to promote the right of self-determination within their borders, and to consent to abide by the Committee's decision on any claims that might be made.²⁰⁵

The Working Party had addressed these objections of the Canadian and the British Delegations.

As a result, the primary operational confines of the phrase "in conformity with the Charter," had been recognised in both the text of the Working Party and in the Yugoslav amendment of paragraph 3. According to Lucis of Mexico, "the Mexican Constitution provided that sovereignty was vested essentially in the people and the people had the inalienable right to change the form of government." The Mexican delegate therefore considered that the right of self-determination "should be 'explicitly stated' in the Covenants."²⁰⁶ At the end of October, the UK delegate had insisted that members "should in all honesty face the implications of the insertion of an article creating a legal right to self-determination in the Draft Covenants."²⁰⁷

India had been a member of the Working Party and felt that its text was the best possible choice, for one important reason. The colonial situation was singled out as the "most pressing and urgent problem" because the Working Party felt that this was where fundamental human rights were denied or abused. Therefore, paragraph 3 of its text concentrated on the Administering Powers and their role in the achievement of independence in regard to the Non-Self-Governing-Territories and Trust Territories. However, in the General Debate, it was pointed out that by "omitting the references to 'All States'" the Working Party

did not strictly adhere to the operative frame of reference of General Assembly Resolution 545(VI). The Yugoslav amendment was therefore seen as an attempt to remedy this discrepancy. Five members of the Working Party voted "in favour" of the Yugoslav amendment, and four 'abstained'. By abstaining here, India found itself in the company of predominantly pro-colonials.²⁰⁸

The Delegations from Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan did not request a vote on their specific amendments to the text of the Working Party. The USA, under the Rules of Procedure: Rule 125, proposed to reintroduce the joint amendment by Lebanon and Pakistan as a USA amendment on the second part only. This called for a deletion of paragraph 2 of the text of the Working Party. It was put to a roll call vote and was not adopted: 25 against deletion, 18 to delete and 15 abstentions.²⁰⁹ In spite of the fact that the Working Party had taken into consideration all the criticisms of the Delegations of both the USA and the UK in presenting a new and moderate text, paragraph 2 was not acceptable to them. In late October, the USA Delegation had argued, in the Third Committee, that the right of nationalisation²¹⁰ could be inferred from the "permanent sovereignty" clause in Article 1 of the Drafts.²¹¹ The Working Party had deleted this clause to meet the objections of the USA Delegation which felt that this clause would "detrimentally affect the climate of investment."²¹²

Moreover, in order to "allay any fears regarding foreign investments" the Working Party grounded all economic relationships in international law. It was understood that economic co-operation would be "based upon the principle of mutual benefit." The pro-colonial objection remained notwithstanding these

'safeguards' of the text of the Working Party. At the time, Hoare had also argued that "sovereignty over national wealth and resources was inherent in the conception of national sovereignty." It was his conviction that this was a generally accepted concept which "had no relevance to the question of self-determination."²¹³ Canada voted with the USA and the UK Delegation to delete paragraph 2 from the text of the Working Party.

Lopez of the Colombian Delegation pointed out in the debates that "the right of peoples to sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources could in no case imply the right of nationalisation or expropriation without prior compensation."²¹⁴ She decided that the right of self-determination could be wrongly interpreted because paragraph 3 of the text was not "sufficiently clear on that point." In spite of the Working Party's revision of this paragraph, to accommodate this aspect of weakness, the Colombian Delegation abstained on the vote. Velando from Peru supported the aim of the Working Party in the redrafted paragraph which sought "to restore 'confidence' by stipulating guarantees for the foreign capital which under-developed countries so badly needed."²¹⁵ His Delegation voted against the USA amendment because paragraph 2 served to protect all parties.

In October, the USA delegate had already taken the position in the debates, that there were parts of the Drafts "the ramifications of which so materially affected...general relations among States that the USA felt it should take a substantive position with regard to them."²¹⁶ He was referring to the paragraph dealing with sovereignty over natural wealth and resources. Therefore,

the USA Delegation requested a separate vote on the words "for their own ends" of paragraph 2 of the text of the Working Party. This was adopted by a roll call vote of 21 to 17 against with 20 abstentions.²¹⁷ Canada voted with the pro-colonials against retention of this phrase in the Article.

According to Paul Martin of the Canadian Delegation, all signatories to the Charter "had repudiated the idea that any human being or group should be held in political subjection or be the object of exploitation and had dedicated themselves to mutual service and assistance."²¹⁸ Likewise, in the debates, Lord of the USA had expressed 'sympathy' with those desiring self-determination. She hoped it could be achieved "under circumstances which would enable the peoples concerned to assume and maintain equal station among the free nations of the world."²¹⁹ Indeed, paragraph 3 of Article 1, which was redrafted by the Working Party to appear as paragraph 2 of its text, was an attempt to regulate "the circumstances" which would protect peoples from being "objects of exploitation" and thus guarantee arrangements of "mutual benefit" for all concerned. The anti-colonials believed that only in those circumstances in which the interests of both sides were adequately safeguarded, could peoples "assume and maintain an equal station among the free nations of the world."

The Working Party was also aware of the fact that any international progress in the economic area depended upon the agreement of the Western nations. Therefore, it was imperative that they elicit their complete co-operation on paragraph 2 which had no stipulations of a colonial nature. In the debates, Hoare had pointed out "how regrettable it would be, in considering Article 1, if the

issues were to be regarded as merely colonial issues, such as had led to certain alignments of opinion in the past."²²⁰ Simply put, the substance of Article 1 was basically and indirectly of a colonial nature. However, because the Covenants were international instruments dealing with fundamental human rights, they contained aspects of a non-colonial nature such as those necessary for "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations." The two roll calls on phrases from paragraph 2, which were made at the request of the USA Delegation, resembled those "alignments of opinion" which closely resembled colonial issues.

The clause, "based upon the principle of mutual benefit," was voted upon separately as requested by the USA Delegation. It was adopted by 21 for, 14 against with 23 abstentions.²²¹ Canada voted with the pro-colonials against retention. Although the retention of these words in the article would, in effect, be a sort of legal guarantee that the interest of both parties would be safeguarded in transactions, the Western powers voted against the retention of this universally applicable, uncompromising clause. This clause sought to ensure a 'just' and 'fair' arrangement. In the perception of the anti-colonials, the fundamental principle of mutual benefit should be operative in a world as it ought to be. By refusing to support the retention of paragraph 2 in the article, the Western powers demonstrated that they were perfectly satisfied with the existing 'unfair' arrangements at the time.

The second roll call vote was on the words, "in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." It was adopted with 25 for, 8

against with 25 abstentions.²²² The significance of retaining these words in the Draft Covenants can be explained in two parts. First, the "means of subsistence" is the most fundamental of all basic human needs. Therefore, it ought not to be dependent upon the good intentions of other states or peoples. Secondly, that a people may not be deprived of its own means of existence is an unquestionable moral imperative, the implication of which can be seen in the rather unusually large group of pro-colonial states which choose to abstain on this vote. States like China, Turkey, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg and France, which had been consistent pro-colonial voters, abstained. Australia, New Zealand and Canada - all white-settler ex-colonies lined up with Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and the USA against the retention of these words in paragraph 2. Canada could have chosen to abstain, but did not. This paragraph had no specific colonial directives, although in its application, it would involve relationships between mostly Western industrial nations and newly independent ones and colonial peoples. Nevertheless, the basic operative principles that were separately voted upon in these three roll calls, were meant to have universal application.

Paragraph 2 as a whole was put to a vote. It was adopted with 26 for, 13 against with 19 abstentions.²²³ The Western powers which abstained on the second roll call reverted to their regular voting pattern with the hard core colonial group. Canada was with this hard core group against the inclusion of paragraph 2 in Article 1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 remained unchanged and were adopted in the form of the text submitted by the Working Party. However, the Yugoslav

amendment to paragraph 3 of the text of the Working Party was adopted. In concluding its consideration of Article 1, the Third Committee adopted the final text as amended for inclusion in the Draft Covenants on Human Rights by a roll call vote of 33 for, 12 against with 13 abstentions.²²⁴ In keeping with its position on self-determination and its policy on the objective of a Covenant on Human Rights, Canada voted against the adoption of Article 1 and its subsequent inclusion in the Draft Covenants.²²⁵

In the debates, Canada tried to appear as if it had been one of those members which had been working in the interest of disadvantaged peoples. Canada's voting behaviour, an act which would tangibly support methods to secure 'fair' arrangements, was diametrically opposed to these verbal declarations. Canada chose not to support these steps undertaken by the UN to secure instruments which, in the anti-colonial perspective, would protect all human beings against alien domination and against becoming "objects of exploitation" on a universal scale. The debates and votes show that there was a clear dichotomy in policy: some members displayed characteristics that were indicative of a negative orientation towards an operational consensus on self-determination, while other members utilised arguments for 'just' and 'fair' measures to pursue it. The three Draft Resolutions FI, FII and the USA 'alternative' before the Third Committee were specimens which were representative of this dichotomy. Logically, it follows that the fundamental philosophies and mind set, which divided the members on the principle of self-determination and on the efforts of FI and FII, would manifest themselves in the

process to accept or reject the USA draft resolution in the Third Committee. This is concern of the final section of this chapter.

The USA takes control of Process on Self-Determination

In mid-November 1956, Ottawa notified the Delegation in New York that the USA Embassy in Ottawa had requested Canadian support and co-sponsorship of the USA Draft Resolution, adopted in ECOSOC in 1955. Ottawa expressed "support for the aims and objectives" of this draft, but 'refused' the above request on the following grounds: the 'opposition' of the UK and Australia to the proposed amendments to the USA draft. Secondly, the need to retain Canada's "freedom of movement at the Assembly should the UK and the other so-called Colonial Powers remain adamant in their opposition to the USA Draft Resolution as amended."²²⁶ In Ottawa's perception, this freedom to manoeuvre was limited by the positions of the other 'relevant' Western powers. The Under Secretary told the Delegation: "I should be grateful if you would keep in close contact with your USA, UK, French, Australian and New Zealand colleagues on this matter and if you would advise on any significant developments which may affect our position in this matter."²²⁷ These were the points of interest which contributed to Ottawa's definition of the situation.

In mid-January 1957, the UK called a "private meeting" in New York to discuss a new USA draft. The invitation included a 'warning' that the USA was not invited and that 'only' Colonial Powers would attend. The Canadian

Delegation was "given the opportunity to decline" if they felt that "to be seen in such company would embarrass" them. The Canadian Delegation attended the meeting "in the capacity of observer."²²⁸ Hoare of the UK felt that the new USA draft did "depart significantly from earlier texts." It appeared that the USA was attempting to be a credible anti-colonial with its new draft of January 9th. Hoare pointed out that "the part concerning recommendations had been expanded in a way which his Delegation considered to be objectionable and dangerous. Not only was the concept of self-determination to be studied, but a bias was given in the new wording of paragraph 1, which was, in his view, undesirable." The Delegation told Ottawa that the "individual parts" of this paragraph were 'unobjectionable' in themselves but Hoare had apprehensions about possible amendments. He discovered a "considerable bias toward 'early implementation,' as opposed to a study of the concept of self-determination."²²⁹

As we have attempted to show in this study, there was a combined effort on the part of the Western powers to prevent the setting up of any commissions with terms of reference which could give the UN any operative role in the colonial world not foreseen by the Charter. Paragraph 3 of the new draft allowed for "recommendations concerning further steps which might be taken by the various organs of the UN and by the specialised agencies." It was obvious that the Colonial Powers were not pleased with this direction which the USA had taken. According to the Canadian Delegation:

it was difficult to imagine what further steps the proposed ad hoc commission could recommend, which would not go beyond the terms of reference and competence of existing organs of the UN. The Trusteeship Council, the Committee on Information and the Fourth

Committee were all, in the view of the Colonial Powers, pressing against the limits of their competence and any further expansion of their activities would be resisted by the Administering Powers.²³⁰

Paragraph 3 of the new USA draft seemed to give the anti-colonials the avenue by which they could follow through on the recommendation of FII to set up a Commission of inquiry.

The Canadian Delegation believed that it was "extremely unlikely" that such a commission would ever be 'dominated' by pro-colonial members. Therefore, it was understandable that the Colonial Powers 'feared' that this new USA "initiative, even if it succeeded in shelving temporarily" FI and FII, it "might serve only to delay" the establishment of the commission proposed in FII. The Delegation observed that the new draft "would in fact tend to assist its eventual adoption." Would this, in effect, not defeat the purpose of the USA alternative Draft Resolution of 1955? In the opinion of the French representative at the meeting, the revised draft of January 9th "was in fact a new draft, both in spirit and in terms." He perceived a potential danger to which this new draft had exposed the Colonial Powers; this could come in the form of amendments by anti-colonials to either paragraph 1 or 3 which could make them specifically applicable to Non-Self-Governing-Territories or Trust Territories.

The Colonial Powers were perplexed about the new USA draft. Hoare pointed out with great 'surprise' that the USA had "re-introduced part B of paragraph 2,²³¹ after having withdrawn a similar provision, under pressure from the UK and others, from their original text" as presented to ECOSOC in 1955. During this process at the time, the colonials showed complete solidarity for the

USA alternative to FI and FII. It was in their perceived interest to circumvent these two proposals and the irregular procedural move, to have ECOSOC adopt the USA proposal before transmission to the Third Committee, ensured that it would receive the same consideration as FI and FII. This new USA draft effectively served not only to undermine this measure it also opened up dangerous avenues for anti-colonial manipulation of process. They could make these general considerations operative in specific colonial territories. Up to this point in the process, the Colonial Powers were successful in hindering this move. In light of this, the UK representative 'thought' that the new USA decision on paragraph 2(b) "was merely a reflection of the current cold war."

The Canadian Delegation observed: "leaving aside current cold war connotations it might lead the Commission into an unhelpful investigation of the origins of the dependent status 'enjoyed' by some present-day colonies of the UK and others."²³² As we have shown in chapter IV, there was a solid colonial front against the anti-colonial assault on the Charter arrangements from the process to approve the Trusteeship Agreements to the establishment of procedure in Non-Self-Governing-Territories. Because of this solidarity of purpose, the Western powers were relatively successful in containing the erosion of their privileged status and authority, and limiting the damage to their over-all interests.

In the perception of the Canadian Delegation, the new USA draft laid all of this open to a renewed anti-colonial attack. For the seven representatives present at this private meeting, it was essential to discover the USA aim in

undertaking such an enterprise that was fraught with danger and inimical to colonial interests. The Delegation wrote to Ottawa:

there was some discussion of the interpretation to be given to the considerable amount of activity which the USA Delegation is engaging in these days in connection with this item, in spite of their statement to most of us that they are not intending to press for the discussion of this item if the majority of the Third Committee prefer to spend the remaining time discussing other matters.²³³

Here was evidence that, in the colonial ranks, there was a perceived break in the previous consolidated 'front' on this colonial issue in the UN.

According to the representative of New Zealand, "she had been told that the USA was seeking wide co-sponsorship from Delegations representing such areas as Scandinavia, Latin America, Asia and the Mid-East and possibly the New Western European members." If this was indeed the case, then the USA action would have significant consequences for the strategy of the Western powers in an altered operational environment. The UK representative "expressed the fear that the new material added to the USA draft was the result of a blackmailing operation on the part of the Afro-Asians in particular, which one could expect would go even further as the USA sought wider co-sponsorship."²³⁴

Did the USA weave itself into this vicious circle of its own free will? Or, did it not have a choice? According to the Canadian Delegation, the UK and others had 'pressured' the USA to alter its first draft. They were speculating that the Afro-Asians "in particular" had influenced the contents of the new draft. Can we imply, from this perceptual definition of the situation, that in the late 1950s the USA did not choose to direct the decolonisation process in an anti-colonial way but was compelled by the international situation to take this route in protecting its

own interests? This assessment necessarily attributed, in Canada's decision-making and policy, a functional role for the communist factor in influencing the process during this period.

In spite of new circumstances, Hoare conceded in the meeting that "the only hope of doing anything constructive in the field of the item of self-determination and the only hope of defeating" FI and FII was to take the path suggested in the first USA draft adopted in ECOSOC in 1955.²³⁵ In the UK interpretation, 'constructive' activity meant the setting up of a study on the meaning of self-determination. This would serve to circumvent the process which FI and FII would have initiated. To this end, and because the new USA draft "certainly did not meet the test," the Canadian Delegation reported to Ottawa that the UK delegate saw an immediate need "to dissuade" the USA from using the new draft.

Inside of forty-eight hours, Hoare told the Canadian Delegation that "attempts to persuade the USA Delegation to delete...objectionable parts" had not been successful. Furthermore, he "was not too helpful" about his appeal that they 'rephrase' these parts. This was due to the fact that the USA had already circulated the draft and Hoare "wondered whether" the USA, in doing so, "had not completely tied its own hands." Was this a voluntary and planned action on the part of the USA? If it was not the case, then, why did the USA circulate the new draft before it gave the Western powers "an opportunity to comment on it"? According to the Canadian Delegation, the UK and Australian Delegations "were so unhappy" about this fact. Moreover, they were aware of the possibility that,

even if the USA did decide to withdraw this new draft, "there would be nothing to prevent those Delegations who wished to do so from suggesting in Committee amendments in accordance with the USA draft of January 9."²³⁶

In the perception of the Western powers, the USA had wilfully turned this process on self-determination into a perilous journey for them. The Commission on Human Rights had spent six sessions from 1949 to 1954 preparing the Covenants and since then, ECOSOC and the Third Committee were occupied with adopting each article in a separate process. There was a congruence in the interests and goals of the Western powers up until the beginning of 1957 in this process. It was evident to the Canadian Delegation that the USA behaviour was a deviant one. Therefore, they informed Ottawa that during the meetings, they "made no comments...on any aspect of the draft." And after the meeting, Hoare asked them 'privately' whether they were approached by the USA to co-sponsor the new draft.

Actually, the USA was 'pressing' the Canadian Delegation for their 'views' on the new draft.²³⁷ In light of this new situation, the Delegation asked Ottawa for guidelines on the policy Canada should take. The Old Commonwealth continued to work as a team on this issue. The Canadian Delegation had a 'private' conversation with one of the Australian delegates who "wondered out loud whether the USA was not perhaps incorporating material in the draft of a nature sufficiently objectionable to the Colonial Powers to force them to denounce the resolution and thereby gain for the USA the advantage, in their view, of being associated directly with what would then be interpreted as an anti-

colonial move."²³⁸ This Australian was ascribing, to the USA, a devious plan to reap benefits for its own position at the cost of the other Colonial Powers.

According to the Canadian Delegation, this interpretation was reinforced by a "growing suspicion" among the Scandinavian and New Zealand Delegations that the USA Delegation "was prepared to go as far with their resolution as is necessary to defeat Resolution 1 which deals with permanent sovereignty over natural resources, even if it involves compromising themselves on the substance of Resolution 2." What were the perceived implications of such a policy? The Delegation continued: "our own impression from conversations with a member of the Swedish Delegation is that the Scandinavians, at present at least, are taking a fairly cautious attitude to the USA initiative."

It is evident that USA self-interest had a primary and operative role in its policy. Since FI had a specific functional role which directly affected USA economic interests, it was imperative that this resolution not be adopted. On the other hand, FII had a more general application in colonial empires. As such, it had operative implications for the other Colonial Powers and less relevance for the USA 'strategic' trusts. Therefore, this break in colonial ranks and process was due to the perceived priority of USA policy to hinder the adoption of FI; apparently at all costs. The New Zealand Delegation informed the Canadian Delegation that Wellington had instructed all its High Commissioners in the Commonwealth capitals to encourage "all old Commonwealth Governments" to utilise all avenues "to persuade" the USA to refrain from pursuing the new draft to

adoption. If it did pursue the matter, "the Colonial Powers would be compelled to vote against" it.

Unlike the blatant accusation of the Australian, the Canadian Delegation believed that the New Zealand Delegation was "inclined to attribute the unhappy situation to a miscalculation by the USA, rather than to be suspicious of their motives." On the other hand, the Canadian Delegation were themselves "unable so far to assess with confidence the motives and intentions of the USA Delegation." This did not prevent them from making this observation:

it would seem to us that if the USA approach is in fact predicated on a more 'pro' anti-colonial bias than usual, this might be a reflection of recent developments in the Mid-East. Those developments might also explain what may be undue suspicion on the part of the UK, and also the failure of the USA to consult with them sufficiently in advance to serve any useful purpose.²³⁹

Whether the Canadian Delegation agreed with the other Western powers as to the reason or motivation of USA policy, the net effect was the same. The fact is, the USA failed to consult with the other Colonial Powers before setting off in a new direction. Ottawa, however, found "it hard to understand the negative stand of the UK, France and other colonial countries" on the new USA draft.²⁴⁰ The Canadian decision-makers showed less interest in speculating as to the USA motivation for such a move and more concern with the limited choices available for action. Accordingly, the Delegation was told, "we feel that we can support this resolution for the same reasons we supported the previous one, and more particularly, when we consider the alternatives." FI and FII were 'unacceptable' to Ottawa.

Moreover, as Ottawa had pointed out to the Delegations, the principle of self-determination was "already incorporated" in the draft Covenants on Human Rights. This was the basis from which the decision-makers in Ottawa would assess the situation and policy choices. Therefore, they informed the Delegation at the UN: "the concept of 'study' contained in the present USA Draft Resolution seems weaker to us than the 'right' set forth in Article 1 of the Draft Covenants."²⁴¹ Ottawa expressed the sentiment that the UK "may be putting too much importance on nuances because of suspicions of the USA intentions and tactics, rather than taking a realistic view of the possible alternatives open to the Third Committee."

On the whole, Ottawa believed that the new USA draft had some merit insofar as operative paragraph 1 would set up an ad hoc commission of 5 persons "to conduct a thorough study of the concept of self-determination." Officials argued that this Commission "might find for example, that countries which are not self-sufficient are not ready for self-determination, which would be exactly what the Colonial Powers desire."²⁴² In other words, the new USA draft was seen to have an important functional role to play in view of the alternatives. On this conviction, and because Ottawa would "be most reluctant to see an open split among our old friends," the Delegation was instructed to do "its best to persuade the UK and France at least to abstain on the USA text with such modifications as would make this possible for them." In order to secure this goal, the Delegation was advised to 'exert' their "influence on the USA to this effect."

In addition, Ottawa recognised that in order to assure some possibility of adoption, the USA draft would have to also accommodate the idiosyncratic wishes of the opposition in the UN. To this end, the Delegation was told to "explore the possibility of the USA withdrawing specific words from the text."²⁴³ Unquestionably, Ottawa was working for the adoption of the new USA draft and the exclusion of FI and FII. In keeping with past practice, the Delegation was to explore the "possibility of the Committee postponing debate" on this item, for that session. Ottawa specifically instructed the Delegation to "encourage this way out of reopening a discussion which will give rise to bitter feeling whatever the result."²⁴⁴

A Reassessment of Canada's Policy

The developments on the question of self-determination in the UN led the Department of External Affairs in mid-1956 to not only reassess its "attitude on self-determination" but also to review Canada's "policy on colonial issues as a whole." In 'anticipation' of the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly, a "number of tentative conclusions" were brought to the attention of the Minister.²⁴⁵ The Department agreed that their "past difficulties" of policy on self-determination was "due in part" to their failure to make "a clear distinction between self-determination as a legal concept²⁴⁶ and self-determination as a political principle."²⁴⁷ This was the cause of their "reluctance to subscribe to" Article 1 of the Covenants.²⁴⁸ A recommendation was made for a new approach

in Canada's policy on the condition that the above "distinction commend itself to" the Minister.

This new approach would be put "to practical use" in the discussions on FI and FII and the USA alternative proposal at the coming session. The Minister concurred on the point that the proposed commission, in FI, would find it "difficult...to apply concepts which still require legal definition."²⁴⁹ On this rationale, Ottawa reinforced its position that the USA alternative was the only acceptable choice. In order to make this proposal more palatable to the opposition in the UN, Ottawa suggested that the Delegation could "informally explore with other Delegations the possibility that the study group...might also look into the practical applications rather than restrict itself to theory."²⁵⁰ This would accommodate what Ottawa saw as "a genuine conviction on the part of many Western countries that the problem has not been sufficiently explored," and refute the anti-colonial 'view' that the USA alternative was actually "a mere stalling device."

Here is evidence of a functional role of the UN operating context in the formulation of Canada's policy. In Ottawa's definition of the situation, it was incumbent upon the Western powers to demonstrate that they were not merely concerned with obstructionist tactics in this process over self-determination. Therefore, the Department suggested that, "by proposing that the group should relate theory and practice, we would show that we do not merely propose to delay the application of self-determination but that we are anxious to find out whether effective arrangements can be worked out on an acceptable theoretical

basis."²⁵¹ Ottawa's attitude to the whole exercise continued to be in conflict with that of the anti-colonials.

The Western powers did not disagree with the anti-colonials on the implications of this pursuit. They all agreed that the application of self-determination as a fundamental human right in colonial areas necessarily brought with it the end to alien political domination, economic and military control. With the adoption of the Working Party's text, the remaining considerations in FI and FII were crucial to the actualisation of the goals set out in Article 1 of the Covenants. Consequently, Ottawa's priorities remained unchanged and the emphasis continued to be on defining the legal basis and functional limits of self-determination. The application of a right was still out of the question.

Another New USA Draft Proposal

On July 2, 1957 the UK Delegation called a meeting to discuss a second, new USA draft dated June 13.²⁵² Samuel Hoare cautioned the representatives that the information was given "on a strictly confidential basis." The UK did "not wish the USA to know that they had discussed" the draft with Canada. He told the Canadian Delegation that the USA had intended to canvass support for this draft and he was "not sure" whether this USA new attempt was "designed as a tactical move to force a further postponement" of the item at the next session or whether it will be "a sincere effort." In Hoare's estimation, it was 'undesirable' to undertake any effort to secure support at such an early stage

because he believed that there was a "reasonable chance that the majority of the members of the UN would prefer not to undertake any study of the concept of self-determination or indeed to take any decision with respect to" FI and FII.²⁵³ The UK had recognised that there was a dramatic break in the process.

It is most likely that the USA had also come to the same conclusion because of the adoption of the Working Party's text. The basic goal of FI and FII had been achieved for the anti-colonials. From the outset, they rejected the need to discover the meaning of self-determination. Therefore, the proposed study in the USA alternative draft held no interest for them. This was a situation of conflicting attitudes which did not change throughout the whole process. The significant question at this point in the process was, why did the USA persist in its determination to hinder any further consideration of FI and FII in the General Assembly, in light of the UK's viewpoint? The successive new drafts by the USA are evidence that the USA goal remained unchanged. If, as the UK suspected, this was indeed a tactical move, was the USA not aware of the potential damage of its new draft to the interests of the other Colonial Powers?

Although the first new draft of June 9th went "some way to meet the UK and French objections to the January 9th draft," Hoare hoped "to persuade the USA Delegation not to take any precipitate action," by circulating the still secret draft and canvassing support for it. The Canadian Delegation informed Ottawa that both the UK and France would undertake to 'convince' the USA to amend certain sections of the draft.²⁵⁴ The substantive disagreements were over the reference to practical applications of the principle of self-determination, in

specific areas. If this draft was adopted, it would present innumerable problems for the other Colonial Powers. The fifth Preambular paragraph which 'notes' the practical application of the principle of self-determination, which have taken place under the supervision of the Trusteeship Council, was "completely unacceptable" to both the UK and France.

As we have shown in the last chapter, the Western powers strove to limit UN interference, in both the Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing-Territories to the Charter stipulations for sound reasons. The Colonial Office had previously decided to undertake a campaign to publicise UK achievements under the Trusteeship System in order to meet anti-colonial criticism. Why was this proposal to 'note' such progress not acceptable to the UK? However, it should have been obvious to the USA Delegation that the other Colonial Powers would definitely not support the retention of operative paragraph 2(B) by which the ad hoc Commission would be requested to examine "the applicability of the principle both to peoples deprived of their right to exercise it as well as to peoples who have not previously enjoyed the right to exercise it."

The Colonial Powers had always objected to any decisive steps that would alter the Charter conceptions and it was clear that they would object to any further operative steps pertaining to specific territories. According to the Canadian Delegation, the objections of France and the UK "relate principally to the use of the word 'right' and to the fact that it appears to prejudge the results of the study of the concept. They also fear that it might be interpreted to apply to colonies of long standing."²⁵⁵ Operative Paragraph 3 requested that the ad hoc

Commission submit its study and recommendations to the Trusteeship Council. The UK and France did "not agree" with this directive and intended to have the USA 'reword' it to have the Commission report to ECOSOC and the General Assembly.²⁵⁶

It is important to understand the functional value of this distinction for the decolonisation process. If the Commission had to report to the Trusteeship Council its frame of reference would be limited to the colonial world. In view of these objections, the UK and France hoped that they could convince the USA to amend its draft "to bring the language into conformity with the language used in the Charter." They also hoped that the USA would "stick to such a revised text without further amendments." These conditions had to be fulfilled by the USA in order to ensure British and French support of this draft. There was, of course, the possibility that it could be further amended when it was introduced in the General Assembly, making it unacceptable even to the USA. This was the risk that the USA was apparently willing to take in order to sabotage the normal process of FI and FII from the Third Committee through to the General Assembly.

By the end of August, Ottawa notified the Canadian Embassy in Washington that the State Department was "contemplating reviving its January 9 draft."²⁵⁷ This information was 'passed' on to the Embassy "in strict confidence." Therefore, the Canadian activity to seek a compromise solution was effectively limited. Moreover, it became obvious to Ottawa that, the draft of January 9 and its re-draft "which met with strong opposition among the group of Administering

Powers," could not be supported. These were the instructions to the Delegation:

Canada's

first preference would be for postponement. If that is not possible, we would wish to see a compromise resolution which would be acceptable to the UK and other friendly Administering Powers, as well as to a representative group of the more responsible anti-Colonial Powers. Our positions would, therefore, depend to some extent, on how far the Administering Powers can support what resolution the USA puts forward.²⁵⁸

It is evident that this was no longer an exercise to manipulate the process in regard to FI and FII. Ottawa had perceived an approaching rift in the colonial ranks because of the USA action and was forced to alter its strategy.

At the end of July 1958,²⁵⁹ the Canadian High Commissioner in London reported that a meeting at the Commonwealth Relations Office "was not particularly enlightening."²⁶⁰ This was due to the fact that the Colonial Office, Australia and New Zealand "approached this question with considerable trepidation," although they all agreed that "some sort of study - as objective as possible - should be made of the general concept of self-determination."²⁶¹ Consequently, the Foreign Office decided to work with the USA on this aim. The High Commissioner reported that "the UK, Australia and New Zealand would like to tidy up the USA draft as much as possible but would probably not oppose even the present one." The choice was limited, and because the Old Commonwealth continued to see the USA draft as the only defensive measure, in view of FI and FII, the High Commissioner speculated that "they would most likely abstain." On the other hand, he believed that "they might give it support if this was necessary

to secure its adoption and the rejection of the other more objectionable resolutions," FI and FII.

This being the case, the UK was now prepared to co-operate with the proposed the ad hoc Commission in the USA draft, "as fully as possible partly to ensure that it did not step beyond its terms of reference." However, in the estimation of the High Commissioner, the "greatest fear" of the Colonial Office was that this Commission could become an avenue of appeal from "dissident elements in Non-Self-Governing-Territories, whether they had the right to or not." In this way, "the Commission would thus be led to over-step its terms of reference." It was the same danger which FI and FII had presented in their recommendations to set up committees of inquiry. The UK was therefore "determined that the study should not be confined to colonial or overseas territories, and that the concept of self-determination should be studied" in regard to its universal application.²⁶² The anti-colonials did limit the application of the right of self-determination to colonial areas and the stipulations of the Charter.

The Canadian High Commissioner cautioned Ottawa: "we were asked not to divulge to USA officials that the UK was consulting us at this stage on this question." Since the USA had unilaterally taken over the process in order to circumvent FI and FII, the behind-the-scene colonial solidarity on the means by which to achieve this common goal had temporarily dissipated. In order to gain a wide support for its draft, the USA had designed one which would be "generally acceptable" and therefore had to have a colonial content.²⁶³ According to a New Zealand 'informant' of the Canadian High Commissioner in Wellington, the USA

had to oppose FI and FII because "the economic clauses would cloak drastic expropriation measures in a guise of international respectability." The 'sixth' draft dated August 27, 1958 is testimony to the earnestness with which the USA was pursuing its interests, at what was perceived by the other Colonial Powers to have been at their cost.

Although there were strong objections from some of the Colonial Powers, the New Zealand Department of External Affairs found this sixth draft 'reasonable', especially its fourth Preambular paragraph: "noting the practical applications of the principle of self-determination which have taken place in the past."²⁶⁴ In addition, the third operative paragraph proposed that ECOSOC was to report on this draft on some 'future' date. In practical terms, the content of the USA draft had served the purpose of postponing consideration of FI and FII; they were the initiative of, and alternative to, the USA draft. The High Commissioner was also 'informed' by the New Zealand Department of External Affairs that a resolution on self-determination "may for the first time, be endorsed by the General Assembly."²⁶⁵ Under these circumstances, the USA draft would have no appeal to the anti-colonials who were beginning, on the Soviet initiative, to move to a more extensive platform. They wanted to ensure the right of self-determination in the colonial world especially after the adoption of the Working Party's text.

Conclusion

It is obvious that this process would show that the Western nations preferred to retain the Charter conception of the colonial arrangements that were premised on the white man's burden and which operated to their advantage. The disputants recognised that the establishment of self-determination as a legal right would have been the most effective means by which to dismantle this system of unequal relationships. And to be able to do this, the anti-colonials had to argue that the natural order was premised on the belief that "all men are created equal." Therefore, their starting position seemed to follow the motto: "to treat equals equally is to guarantee fairness."²⁶⁶ The pro-colonials had a problem with this radical definition of the situation.

The process which we have discussed here, actually began with the anti-colonials seeking to establish the right to self-determination as a self-evident right. They disputed the authority of Colonial Powers to dispense the right of self-determination, on the basis of entitlement, to dependent peoples in colonial territories. Consequently, the position of the disputants provided a good example of racial cleavage.²⁶⁷ Canada did understand the impact of exploitative relationships, at home and in the colonial world. It is evident that Ottawa chose to ignore 'impact' in the choices that were made in this process we have just discussed. In the view of non-white ex-colonies, 'impact' was a motivating factor in their preferences and policy.

The atmosphere which accompanied this controversial process not only influenced policy but also reinforced the pre-dispositions of the disputants. The anti-colonials became more determined to change or circumvent the built-in controls of the Charter, in colonial areas. Their goal was a comprehensive restructuring of the political, economic and social system which was sanctioned by the Charter, and they saw the right of self-determination as the key to this exercise. The pro-colonials continued to insist upon the retention of self-determination as a principle. They argued that the Charter stipulation ought not to be tampered with. The diametrically opposed positions became more entrenched in the policy of members in this exercise which spanned over 5 years. In this sense, the pursuit operated as a reinforcement mechanism in the policy of the disputants and as a catalyst in the decolonisation of empires. According to Shepherd and Le Melle, "racism in international relations has meant that the originators of modern racism – the Europeans and Americans – are almost always distrusted in their dealings with the non-white world."²⁶⁸ And it is basically for this reason that the process to include self-determination as a right in the draft International Covenants became such a significant part of the process of decolonisation.

¹ The Preparatory Commission of the UN "recommended at San Francisco that ECOSOC should, at its first session, establish a commission on human rights as envisaged in Article 68 of the Charter. The Council established the Commission on Human Rights early in 1946."

-"The Commission decided, late in 1947, to apply the term 'International Bill of Human Rights' to a declaration of human rights, a convention on human rights, and measures of implementation: and to the convention - 'The Covenant of Human Rights.' That formula led to the adoption and proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 as the first of the projected instruments. Much later, in 1960, two Covenants on Human Rights were completed (instead of the one originally envisaged) - the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Each contains measures for international supervision of the rights which it sets out and for the settlement of complaints by States that another State is not giving effect to its provisions."

United Nations, The United Nations and Human Rights, "The Covenants had been drafted by the Commission on Human Rights during the period 1948-1954, following the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Assembly for consideration over the period 1955-1966, the Covenants were unanimously adopted on December 16, 1966.

"The Covenants are based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although the rights covered are not identical. The most important right regulated in both Covenants and not contained in the Declaration is the right of peoples to self-determination, including the right of peoples freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources."

United Nations, Basic Facts, p.83.

² John Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations. (N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1984). A Canadian and member of the Mc Gill Law faculty before moving to the UN, p.75.

³ Humphrey, p. 19."And if the Covenants had been completed earlier, some of the most highly controversial issues, such as the question of self-determination of peoples...might have been avoided."

⁴ Ibid., p.129.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., Mrs. Roosevelt was the USA Representative and Chairperson on the new Drafting Committee of Eight. She appointed the members of this Committee which had the mandate to draft the International Bill of Rights, p.37.

⁷ Humphrey, p.140. According to Humphrey, the Assembly had originally decided in 1950 that there should be one Covenant. However, a disagreement in the Third Committee "split the Assembly down the middle, this decision was reversed." The result were two Covenants- one on social, economic and cultural rights, the other on civil and political rights. The Canadian Delegation voted against the decision in the Assembly "to include economic and social rights in the Covenant." "I was shocked by the position some Delegations were taking on the question....It was hard to understand why the Western Democracies, including the United Kingdom and the United States, should be opposing their inclusion." p.123. In 1951 the American delegate was "ready to accept the inclusion of economic and social rights in the Covenant, adding that this would be innocuous." Chile, Egypt, Pakistan and Yugoslavia "moved that the decision taken in 1950 that the Covenant include economic and social rights be reaffirmed.," p.130.

⁸ RG 25, Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40, pt.1. From: M.K. Ewans, Office of High Commissioner for the UK, Ottawa To: Dave Stansfield, Commonwealth Division, Ottawa. No: 1074/166, November 18, 1960. Confidential. Expressed the importance of the "structure of co-operation between the UN and the UK on these matters which has been slowly and carefully built up over the past years." He complained that all this "would be jeopardised" by the Soviet attempt to have the UN adopt "a resolution...which made demands for immediate independence...." This was the 1960 Declaration on the granting of independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Jack Plano and Robert Riggs, p.366, citing Rupert Emerson, "Colonialism, Political Development, and the UN," International Organisation, Vol: 19, (Summer, 1965), p.486. "Within the United Nations the original Charter assumption that each colonial power should at its own discretion and in an unhurried way lead its dependent peoples to well-being and self-government 'has given way to the proposition that colonialism is an intolerable and illegitimate abuse to be done away with as speedily as possible by the international community.' This revolutionary change in ideology has been accompanied by an organisational assault upon the whole structure of colonialism." Part of this assault was the process to draft the Covenants on Human Rights.

⁹ John Humphrey, p.167.

¹⁰ See: Stewart Easton, The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism (N.Y. F.A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), p. 367. British "promise to Indians in 1929 that Dominion status would ultimately be granted changed the whole course of colonial history. It was then conceded that a valuable colony could leave an empire by permission of its masters."

¹¹ Humphrey, see: p. 17 for a detailed explanation of membership.

¹² Ralph Bunche, A World View of Race (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press Inc., 1968), p.2. A reissue of Copyright 1936 by Associates in Negro Folk Education.

¹³ John Humphrey, p. 74. "Apart from a few discordant notes, some of which were, I regret to say, sounded in Canada, the adoption of the Declaration was hailed, both inside and outside the

United Nations, as a great achievement." Preamble in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Member States "shall strive...to promote respect for these rights and freedoms...both among the peoples of the Member States themselves and among the peoples of the territories under their jurisdiction"; towards "a common standard of achievement."

Article 2 of this Declaration left little doubt as to the "basic principle of equality and non-discrimination as regards to enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms." It stipulated the absolute universality of its frame of reference:

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of political jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs whether it be independent, trust, non-self governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

¹⁴ UN Charter, Chapter I, Article 1(2). The Purposes of the United Nations are:

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

¹⁵ From: Ministry of External Affairs, Wellington To: New Zealand, Permanent Mission to the UN, New York. No: 274, October 27, 1960. Confidential. Transmitted From: Canadian High Commissioner to New Zealand To: USSEA, Ottawa as Letter No: 629, November 4, 1960. Chapters XI and XII of the Charter were relevant for these areas.

¹⁶ John Humphrey, p.46.

¹⁷ Minister of Labor in the Polish government in exile and "a socialist of the old school." Second in command to Henri Laugier, the Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations in charge of social affairs.

¹⁸ John Humphrey, p.2.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.13. Churches, trade unions, ethnic groups, peace movements "aided by Delegations of some of the smaller countries," were active in this lobby. Altogether 42- private organisations were involved. They were invited by the USA Government.

²⁰ Ibid., p.12.

²¹ Ibid., p.13. See: Victoria Berry and Allan McChesney, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy-Making," in Matthews and Pratt, p. 7. They wrote that "chapters 2,6 and 7 confirm our findings that until the 1970s human rights were unimportant at the national and international levels." As a matter of fact, the post-war period to the late 1950s occupied a great deal of the UN time not only in the drafting but also in the process to adopt each and every single article in the Covenants. It was not unimportant to the majority of the new nations and they made it the pressing business of the international community during this period of time. Berry and McChesney claim that "Canada became a party to the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights and Civil and Political rights..." "This chapter explains Canada's non-support of the UN process to draft and adopt them. The General Assembly adopted these International Covenants in December 1966. Canada only ratified them in March 1976, shortly before they were to come in force.

²² Ibid., Cuba, Mexico and Panama were the Latin American members.

²³ Ibid., this was to accommodate the Latin American pressure. The Commission on Human Rights is a full functional Commission of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and reports directly to it. Mrs. Roosevelt (USA delegate) appointed the Drafting Committee Australia, Chile, France, USA, UK, Lebanon, the Soviet Union and China on March 24, 1947. "The Council discussed points of procedure, fine points of drafting and administrative matters at great length, but important questions of principle were raced over with a few generalities," p.122.

²⁴ From: Escott Reid To: Deputy Minister of Justice, Ottawa, August 15, 1946.

²⁵ Chapter X of the UN Charter Article 62(2): "It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all". Article 62(3): "It may prepare draft conventions for the submission of the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence."

-Members are elected by the General Assembly; 18 members.

-The total membership- 54 members.

-A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.

²⁶ From: Canadian Delegation, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, December 2, 1946

²⁷ Hereafter called the Declaration.

²⁸ Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, June 14, 1948. p.164.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Escott Reid, Memorandum For Legal Advisor, October 9, 1948. c.d. Mr. Pickersgill and Mr. Ignatieff.

³¹ From: Hume Wrong To: Department of External Affairs, Secret, November 24, 1948.

³² From: Canadian Delegation, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Telegram No: 461, November 25, 1948.

³³ Ibid., Under reference Ottawa's telegram No: 294 November 25, 1948, not traceable.

³⁴ From: Canadian Delegation Paris, To: SSEA, Ottawa No. 325, December 2, 1948.

³⁵ Humphrey claims that because the Third Committee "was supposed to be nonpolitical... it was thought to be less important. Delegations...were less inhibited and said what they really thought." On the other hand, in the First and ad hoc Political Committee, "the issues were more often than not drawn on Cold War lines, a delegate had to stand up and be counted in the knowledge that the position he took might later be used against his country." Humphrey, pp. 129-130.

³⁶ No. 525, December 2, 1948.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ 29 votes in favour, none against, 7 abstentions.

³⁹ From: Canadian Delegation, Paris To: SSEA Ottawa, Secret, No: 577, December 8, 1948 South Africa planned to be absent. Under Reference was Ottawa Telegram No: 355 December 7, 1948, which was not traceable.

⁴⁰ Ibid., The American Bar Association had recommended deferring the consideration of the Draft Declaration until April 1949. The USSR introduced a resolution to this effect, but only the 6 Slav States voted for it. In this instance, Canada was not in this group.

⁴¹ No: 577, December 8, 1948. Pearson's statement made clear Canada's support for the general principles contained in the Draft declaration.

⁴² St. Laurent Papers, Letter, Kingston, Ontario. December 11, 1948.

⁴³ Ibid., emphasis added. He felt that Federal/Provincial rights controversy "which, I am convinced, statesmen of courage would soon settle if they appealed to Canadian patriotism against Canadian provincialism. Except in Quebec and possibly the Maritimes, "provincial rights is more of a goblin than a giant." According to J. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, p.281, Arthur Lower (historian) "had been a close friend of Jack Pickersgill's." (Prime Minister's Office). Arthur Lower, 'Adam Shortt, Founder, Historic Kingston, No: 17 (January, 1969), 9, cited in Granatstein, Ibid., "Civil Servants of the higher ranks are interested in what they are doing, and many of them, perhaps most, in power." Memorandum. W.R.Martin to Pearson, December 21, 1948 asking on policy position for Prime Minister's Office to take on Lower's letter.

Memorandum for W.R.Martin, Prime Minister's Office reply to above Memorandum. In addition to clarifying the stand taken in the UN, Pearson pointed out that the Draft Declaration "is often worded in vague, ambiguous language, which, it was thought, will be the source of future trouble and misunderstanding." Draft Letter December 23, 1948 to Lower from Prime Minister's Office. At the back of the draft, St. Laurent wrote in pencil "add another paragraph." "None more that I would like to see this controversy of Provincial rights settled but I think it must be settled in the light that the provinces have certain rights and the Federal Government has certain rights guaranteed by our constitution. We must respect those rights. Only as they are respected will we attain true national unity. The solution to the present controversy, it seems to me, lies in the minds of men."

⁴⁴ Prime Ministers Letter to Lower, December 24, 1948. The actual letter which was sent to Lower dated December 24, 1948 did not include the paragraph which St. Laurent instructed to be added to the letter he saw. In addition, this letter was not the substance of the draft letter which was sent to St. Laurent for his perusal. MG 26L, Vol.42, File: D-12-D; Department of External Affairs-General 1948-49.

⁴⁵ See: Ronald Manzer, "Human Rights in Domestic Politics and Policy," Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. R.O. Matthews and C. Pratt (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University

Press, 1988), p.29. Emphasis added. In writing about the pre-1970 period, Roland Manzer asserted that "human rights are generally accorded low salience and little influence in making Canadian foreign policy." Since his source materials were wholly of a secondary nature, we question the validity of this opinion. However, his summary of political platforms and public agendas is useful as an indicator of public awareness and political response on this one issue during these specific time periods: "after 1945 there was a marked increase in recognition of individual (and collective) rights as principles of political commitment and as justification for government action in national party platforms....85 percent of the 134 references to individual and collective rights in national party platforms from 1867 to 1968 occurred after 1945. Left-wing parties, the CCF and the Labour Progressives, were responsible for two-thirds of the references to rights 1945-53....Governing parties (Liberals, 1945-57; Conservatives 1957-63) seem less inclined than those in opposition to refer to rights in their platforms."

⁴⁶ Humphrey, p.168. The motion was adopted by a vote of 11 to 3 with 4 abstentions.

⁴⁷ Humphrey, p.72.

⁴⁸ Ibid., Humphrey had neither a footnote nor a bibliography in his book. Emphasis added.

⁴⁹ Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights", British Yearbook of International Law, No. 25, (1948), p.354.

⁵⁰ See: Humphrey, p.76. Writing in 1984, Humphrey claimed, "I am satisfied in my own mind that the Declaration is now binding on all states. But whatever its juridical force may be, its great political and moral force, which it owes to the fact that it was adopted by the United Nations...cannot be denied." This perspective was certainly coloured by the speeches of the representatives and was more relevant for the Canadian Delegation, at the time. Decision-makers must take the international operational context of their policy into consideration, since a purely legal interpretation could be irrelevant for certain members, on specific issues at the UN.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada (5th ed.; University of Toronto Press, 1970), p.64.

⁵³ Kenneth Lysyk, "The Unique Constitutional Position of the Canadian Indian," Canadian Bar Review, December 1967, p.551, cited in Dawson. p.64.

⁵⁴ ECOSOC. UN Doc. A/608 and A/610.

⁵⁵ From: Under-Secretary To: Deputy Minister of Finance Ottawa. February 19, 1949. The Canadian Delegation on the Social Commission recommended meeting the cost "through funds available to the Division of Social Activities".

⁵⁶ From: R.B. Bryce To: USSEA Ottawa, March 8, 1949. Emphasis added. The choice of the words underlined above reveals some involvement of emotional influences which is atypical in the private correspondences examined.

⁵⁷ Sent as Memorandum to SSEA, RG 25, Vol 3458, No: 6-1949/1, E-5.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., there are no documents in the files which show that Canada was working behind the scenes to defeat this proposal. The matter of Human Rights was too important to the Latin Americans for Canada to attempt any initiative in this direction.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., there were no correspondences in files between the USA and Canada on this matter and, therefore, we are not sure of Canada's claim to speak for the USA on this matter.

⁶³ St. Laurent Papers, MG 26 L, Vol.43, File: D-12-D. Letter March 8, 1949. Committee for a Bill of Rights, Toronto, Ontario signed B.K. Sandwell. March 14, 1949, St. Laurent's reply to above letter acknowledged the contents. (with copies of Sandwell's letter to Minister of Justice; SSEA, and Secretary to the Cabinet).

⁶⁴ St. Laurent Papers, From: Committee For a Bill of Rights To: L. St. Laurent, March 28, 1949, Toronto. Signed by 10 persons, including a Rabbi and a Reverend.

⁶⁵ Letter, March 28, 1949.

⁶⁶ St. Laurent's reply of March 29, (not signed) intended to refer their letter "to the attention of his colleagues." Copy sent to Mr. N. Robertson and SSEA on April 5.

⁶⁷ Article transmitted by: Jules Leger, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, June 17, 1949.

⁶⁸ Humphrey. "The feeling against the Colonial Powers was running so high...." p.129.

⁶⁹ J.H. Cleveland, Note for Mr. Holmes, August 29, 1950.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Humphrey, p.131. He took Jean Lesage, the Canadian representative in the Third Committee to lunch to see if he could influence him in any way. Lesage told Humphrey that C.D. Howe "the leader of the conservative element in the Canadian cabinet...was so chary about human rights." See Appendix VII for a detailed explanation of my attempt to look at C.D. Howe's fonds No:MG 27,III B20 in 1991, which may have resulted in the entire fonds being closed and subject to be reviewed in 2000.

⁷² Ibid., p.133. Writing of the post-war period.

⁷³ John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p.333, emphasis added.

⁷⁴ John T. Rourke, "Taking Sides," International Politics on the World Stage (3rd ed.; Gilford,Conn.: Dushkin Pub. Group Inc.,1991), p.231.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.xvi.

⁷⁶ Pierre E. Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society," Towards a Just Society, ed. Thomas S. Axworthy and Pierre E. Trudeau (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1992), p.402.

⁷⁷ John Humphrey, p.8.

⁷⁸ Humphrey, p.41.

⁷⁹ See: Kim R. Nossal, "Cabin'd, Cribb'd, Confin'd ?: Canada's Interest in Human Rights," in Matthews and Pratt, p.46. "surveys the governments own public perceptions of the impediments to, and the opportunities for, an active human rights policy." This survey is based on statements or speeches which aimed at assessing "the degree to which other external objectives, strategic, diplomatic, and economic- constrain Canadian activism in human rights," since the 1970s. He concluded: "there appears [to be] a great deal of desire for active involvement in human rights: the government casts itself as genuinely committed to human rights objectives, broadly construed." Emphasis added. He also claimed that "human rights achieved greater prominence on foreign policy agendas in the 1970s...." p.46. And on p.51, that "human rights were propelled into sharper relief in the 1970s."

⁸⁰ UN Division, Department of External Affairs, Commission on Human Rights. November 18, 1949.

⁸¹ From: Holmes To: Heeney, New York, May 20, 1950, p.3. He also referred to the Social Commission which "had one substantial job in drafting a future program for the Children's Fund, a job of which it made a thorough mess, under the leadership of members like the French Republic, who was more interested in declaring the rights of babies than in making certain that the program for helping babies was based on solid foundations." Canada was a member of the Social Commission and abstained on the Declaration of the Rights of the Child on the grounds that it was not appropriate to declare the right of every child to free education and free medical services unless we were prepared to implement such a declaration."

⁸² Ibid., "if...we are to beat our way through all the other draft conventions that have been proposed, then not only will an enormous amount of time and money be wasted, but we shall not be able to grapple with things like Technical Assistance, the future of refugees...and the many other economic, social and political matters which will have some substantial effect on women and children and other human beings [Men?]." p.5.

⁸³ Ibid., the French and Americans "have a hankering after noble proclamations like written constitutions and the citizens of the United States love them....The only other Delegation which seems to view this trend with dismay is the United Kingdom – although the Australians are moving much more in this direction since the departure of Dr. Evatt," p.6.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ From: L.D.Wilgress, Ottawa To: High Commissioner for Canada, London, October 6, 1950. Letter No:2397 transmitting "Canada Policy in the U.N."

⁸⁶ Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Canadian Government made no effort to implement by 1950.

⁸⁷ From: Holmes To: Heeney, May 20, 1950.

⁸⁸ From: Wilgress To: High Commissioner, London, October 6, 1950.

⁸⁹ From: Canadian Delegation, Geneva To: USSEA No:203, October 25, 1950.

⁹⁰ McInnes, U.N. Division, Memorandum for Mr. Reid. Secret. May 11, 1951.

⁹¹ Memorandum for Mr. Reid, McInnes, UN Division. May 11, 1951, Secret. Section IV: E. Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A re-examination of Canadian policy in the United Nations.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ RG 25, Acc. 86-87/ 160, Vol: 77, File: 5475-FA-40, pt.2. Holmes, UN Division: Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, paragraph 5475-2-40. Sub: y, Chron:Y, p.37.

⁹⁴ Memorandum, From: Escott Reid To: LePan, Ritchie, Mackay, Pick, McInnes and Robinson, May 12, 1952.

⁹⁵ Holmes, UN Division. Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

⁹⁶ UNGAOR, Seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 382nd meeting, October 17, 1952, pp.84-85. General Debate. See: Sydney D. Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice (N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1964), p. 36 discusses changes in relative strength of regions and groups. "As the membership of the United Nations has increased, so the relative strength of the regions has changed. Western European membership has declined from 18 per cent in 1945 to 16 per cent on 1 January 1964, Eastern Europe from 12 per cent to 9 per cent. The most substantial change, however, has been that Latin America's proportion of seats has more than halved, while the Afro-Asian area's has more than doubled. There has been a small increase in the proportion of Commonwealth members."

Table 7

Changes in relative strength of regions and groups in the Assembly, 1945 and 1964

	1945		1. January 1964	
	no.of members	%of seats	no.of members	%of seats
Latin America	20	39	20	18
Asia and Africa (incl.China and South Africa)	12	24	59	52
Eastern Europe	6	12	10	9
Western Europe	9	18	18	16
Commonwealth	6	12	18	16

⁹⁷ Memorandum for Mr. Holmes, K. Goldschlag, United Nations Divisions, January 18, 1951. Confidential.

⁹⁸ Ibid., in Ottawa's perception, this Latin American attitude and policy were instrumental in the way the USA was able to utilise the human rights issue in the UN to serve its own interests in appearing as an "anti-colonial." This will be clearly brought out in Ottawa's decision-making process and we will see how the Colonial Powers were forced into a reactive and embarrassing position because of the USA behaviour. Humphrey, p. 37. Mr. Hernan Santa Cruz represented Chile. "No one has been more continuously, or for a longer period of time, associated with the human rights program. Politically left of centre, he had considerable influence with Delegations representing the economically developing countries, whose cases, he sometimes argued with great energy – a practice which often brought him into conflict with the Western industrial powers....I remember how annoyed Mrs. Roosevelt was with him for the part he played in the drafting of the second paragraph of Article 1 of the two Covenants on Human Rights dealing with the economic self-determination of peoples, which she thought compromised the future of the instruments."

⁹⁹ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1, pt.1. Intro: 2(a)4. Confidential.

¹⁰⁰ Resolution FI recommended that the General Assembly establish a commission to conduct a full survey of the status of the right of peoples to self-determination including "permanent sovereignty over the natural wealth and resources" and to make recommendations, if necessary, for the strengthening of that right. Draft resolution FII was concerned with the denial or the "inadequate realisation of self-determination." To serve notice on the resoluteness of this matter, the resolution proposed the establishment of a commission of good offices to investigate any situation which was brought to its attention by at least ten members of the UN in respect of the denial or inadequate realisation of the right of self-determination. The commission would be operative in the 'rectification' of any such situations and would have to report to the General Assembly if no measures were undertaken to correct the situation within 6 months.

Resolution FI: Preamble: The Economic and Social Council Having Considered General Assembly Resolution 837(IX) in which the Assembly requested the Commission on Human Rights to complete its recommendations concerning international respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination....Article 1: The General Assembly, "Noting that the right of peoples and nations to self-determination as affirmed in two draft covenants completed by the Commission on Human Rights includes permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources."

¹⁰¹ A roll call on the resolution as a whole: 41 for, (including USA); 11 against (Western European and Commonwealth) and 3 abstentions (Canada, Chile and Mexico)

¹⁰² The 6 Western powers on the Commission on Human Rights voted against this move, but 11 members supported the decision. Greece was the only abstention. The Commission added the words: "Having due regard to the rights and duties of states under international law," to FI. This was the only change that was made to the original texts of FI and FII that were first sent to ECOSOC.

¹⁰³ RG 25, Vol: 7572, File: 5475-DW-39-40 pt.2.1. Confidential. Item 29: "Recommendations concerning International respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination," p.3.

¹⁰⁴ RG 25, Vol:7572, File: 5475-DW-39-40 pt.2.1. p.5.

¹⁰⁵ This was approved by 12 votes to 6 (Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Pakistan, USSR, Yugoslavia).

¹⁰⁶ The objections were on procedural matters and a question of competence. First, India, the USSR, Yugoslavia and Ecuador submitted that the USA proposal was no less than "an amendment" to FI and FII. Secondly, that ECOSOC had no power to address the substantive parts of these draft resolutions without first placing the matter on its agenda. This would have shown its intent to extend the scope of the item dealt with in FI and FII. And thirdly, ECOSOC was not empowered to overstep the instructions of General Assembly Resolution 837 (IX). Egypt protested that ECOSOC was not competent to decide on the USA proposal, it should have transmitted its debate on the matter together with FI and FII to the General Assembly. Ottawa saw all the above as attempts "to side-track the United States resolution."

¹⁰⁷ RG 25, Vol: 7572, File 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.2.1.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., Ecuador made this accusation in ECOSOC.

¹⁰⁹ RG 25, Vol: 3463, File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. Intro: 2(a),4. John Humphrey, p.165. French diplomat George-Picot told Humphrey in 1952 that the Soviet Union "was using the United Nations to stir up resentment in the economically developing world against the Western powers."

¹¹⁰ RG 25, Vol: 7572, File: 5475-DW-39-A-40. pt.2.1.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, Agenda Item 28, 24 (A/C.3/SR.642)

¹¹⁴ From: Assembly Delegation New York To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 102 October 11,1955. Telegram No: 98, October 10 from New York under reference, not traceable. It had explained to Ottawa the Delegation's definition of the situation re: the 'impasse'. The anti-colonials generally believed that the Secretary General was 'influenced' by the Colonial Powers to propose such an alternative to what the majority of the members had been working towards. This was dismissed by the Delegation as not being "the case." The Delegation reported that a meeting of the Western and Commonwealth Delegations was planned for the next day "to consider whether to support the Secretary General's proposals and also the question of what articles of the Draft Covenants should be discussed first." The Delegation planned to attend "but not to declare our position one way or the other at this stage."

¹¹⁵ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, 5 (A/C.3/SR.633) October 11, 1955.

¹¹⁶ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee 20 (A/C.3./SR.641) Sweden.

Tenth Session, Third Committee 21 (A/C.3./SR.641) UK.

Tenth Session, Third Committee 28 (A/C.3./SR.641) Netherlands.

Tenth Session, Third Committee 3 (A/C.3./SR.642) China.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 10 and 11 (A/C.3/SR.633) October 11, 1955.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 22 (A/C.3/SR.633).

¹¹⁹ Ibid., Tenth Session. A.I. 28, 18(A/C.3/SR.641) and Tenth Session. A.I. 28, 4(A/C.3/SR.642) China

¹²⁰ Ibid., Tenth Session. A.I. 28, 18(A/C.3/SR.641)

¹²¹ Ibid., Tenth Session. A.I. 28, 8(A/C.3/SR.641)

¹²² Ibid., Tenth Session. A.I. 28, 7(A/C.3/SR.641)

¹²³ UNGAOR. Annexes, Tenth Session, Third Committee, General Debate, 40 (Doc A/3077), October 8, 1955. And, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21, paragraph 3.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public services in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government.

¹²⁴ UNGAOR. Tenth Session. A.I. 28, 39(A/C.3/SR.633) October 11, 1955.

¹²⁵ Costa Rica, Saudi Arabia and Egypt concurred on this point.

¹²⁶ "The Preamble of each Covenant recalls the obligation of States under the United Nations Charter to promote human rights, reminds the individual of his responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of those rights, and recognises that 'in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights.'"

¹²⁷ UNGAOR. Tenth Session, 40-44(A/C.3/SR.633) October 11. 1955.

¹²⁸ Ibid. Tenth Session, 7(A/C.3/SR.633).

¹²⁹ Ibid. Tenth Session, 10(A/C.3/SR.642) October 24, 1955.

¹³⁰ Ibid. Tenth Session, 25(A/C.3/SR.641) October 21, 1955.

¹³¹ No: 102. October 11, 1955.

¹³² No: 102, October 11, 1955. Emphasis in the Original.

¹³³ MG 31, E46 Vol: 6 File: 10:201.2. Introduction to the Commentary Prepared for the Use of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the UN, New York, October 9, 1946. Secret. p.7. paragraph 22. "There is always a tendency in international bodies to avoid decisions on controversial problems by establishing new committees or commissions for the purpose of study and report to a later session. This practice is often useful and indeed essential...."

¹³⁴ From: Assembly Delegation New York To: SSEA, Ottawa. No: 76 October 5, 1955. The Delegation had already notified Ottawa, in early October, that there was "little likelihood that a 2/3 majority could be mustered against the anti-colonial group" if it was a subject matter on which they feel strongly about.

¹³⁵ RG 25, Vol: 7572. File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.2.1. The UK Delegation "was under instruction to abstain" in ECOSOC on the USA 'alternative' resolution. However, "in the last resort" he voted for adoption. Ottawa was made to "understand it is the intention" of the UK to vote for the resolution again in the General Assembly. Despatch No: 307, September 8, 1955. From: Canadian Ambassador, Oslo, Norway To: SSEA, Ottawa, Tenth Session, General Assembly. Provisional Agenda Items. p.2.(g) Human Rights-Question of Self-Determination. "Norway will actively oppose the two draft resolutions presented by the Human Rights Commission but will support the United States proposal to establish an ad hoc Committee to study the principle of self-determination if they feel that the American proposal can detract from those put forward by the Commission." The Despatch gives detailed information on Norway's position after the Ambassador (signed C.H.Ronning) had a discussion with "the competent offices in the Foreign Ministry here." Under Ref: Ottawa's Letter No: V-293, August 12, 1955, which was sent out to all relevant Embassies, but not traceable.

¹³⁶ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, 22(A/C.3/SR 633) October 11, 1955.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 30(A/C.3/SR.633).

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ UNGAOR. Annexes, Tenth Session, A.I. 28 (A/C.3/L.470/Rev. 1).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 32(A/C.3/SR.636). In favour: India, USSR. Against: Australia, Canada, China New Zealand, UK, USA.

¹⁴¹ UNGAOR. Annexes. Tenth Session, Report of the Third Committee. A.I. 28, 15(Doc A/3077) December 8, 1955. Meetings held from October 11 to November 11.

¹⁴² UNGAOR. Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 1 (A/C.3/SR.635).

¹⁴³ Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 2 (A/C.3/SR.635).

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 3 (A/C.3/SR.635).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 4 (A/C.3/SR.636).

¹⁴⁷ From: Assembly Delegation, New York To: SSEA, Ottawa, Cypher No: 110, October 12, 1955. Danish proposal UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, (A/C.3/L.469) October 11, 1955.

¹⁴⁸ From: Assembly Delegation New York To: External Affairs, Ottawa, Confidential, Telegram No: 124, October 14, 1955.

¹⁴⁹ The joint Latin American Resolution (Doc. A/C.3/L.470 Rev. 1). 36 in favour – Soviet and Arab blocs, a majority of Asian and Latin American Countries. 18 against - Western European, Scandinavian, old Commonwealth and some Latin American Countries. 3 abstentions- South Africa, Burma and Cuba.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 43 (A/C.3/SR.636).

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 1 (A/C.3/SR.645) October 27, 1955.

¹⁵³ UNGAOR. Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 36(A/C.3/SR.636) October 13, 1955.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 37(A/C.3/SR.636).

¹⁵⁵ UNGAOR, Annexes, Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 53 (doc.A/3077).

¹⁵⁶ UNGAOR. Tenth Session, Third Committee, 21 (A/C.3/SR.633) October 11, 1955. "...the question of the right of peoples to self-determination would be consigned to a fate similar to that of the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information. After the Draft Convention had given rise to lengthy debates since 1947, the study of it had been entrusted to a committee of 15 members (General Assembly Resolution 426 (V)), and then to a special Rapporteur (Economic and Social Council Resolution 442C (XIV), and many efforts would probably still be needed before, under the pressure of circumstances, it finally came into being....he knew from the person concerned that the Special Rapporteur had always been the victim of manoeuvres aimed at shelving the question of the Convention. The right of peoples to self-determination must not suffer the same delay, for it was of importance to all Governments and all peoples." Mr. Baroudy: Saudi Arabia.

¹⁵⁷ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, (A/C.3/L.478).

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., (A/C.3/L.477) Rev. 1.

¹⁵⁹ Adopted 35 to 13 with 10 abstentions. Canada voted against adoption with all Western powers except the USA which abstained with a mixture of African, Arab, Latin American countries, Iceland and Israel.

¹⁶⁰ No: 124, October 14, 1955. John Humphrey, p.160. He wrote that, in 1951, the Commission on Human Rights "had done nothing, notwithstanding the instructions the Assembly had given it 1950," on the self-determination of peoples. "The Arab Delegations in particular were crying up the issue again and it seemed pretty obvious that, at this session, the Assembly would decide that there should be an article in the Covenant stating that self-determination is a human right."

¹⁶¹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, 30 (A/C.3/SR.641).

¹⁶² No: 124, October 14, 1955.

¹⁶³ From: Canadian Delegation, New York To: USSEA, Ottawa, No: Letter 29, October 14, 1955. Confidential. The chairman of the Delegation: "In considering this subject I am reminded of the story about a man who was advised by the optician to buy glasses. A week later, he returned to the optician who was anxious to know whether the man's vision had improved. It had. He could, he said, now see much more clearly the black spots that had been bothering him."

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., emphasis in the original.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ No: Letter: 29, emphasis in the original, underlined by hand in the typed document

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., on the left-hand column of the document, the USSEA wrote in hand-writing, "I agree completely" next to the line "...not likely to be deceived by such a line...."

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., "I doubt whether this can be established either in doctrine or in practice. This is a point which it seems to me, the experts in political science or international law might well establish. If I

suspect, they were to suggest and that self-determination is not a principle, we would still be left with the problem of determining what exactly is involved but at least we would not be wedded to a notion, which implies far-reaching and basic consequences in any field."

¹⁷⁰ Parallel lines drawn by hand on the left-hand column of the page next to the sentence starting "to concede..."

¹⁷¹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, 13 (A/C.3/SR.642). See: Vernon Van Dyke, "Self-Determination and Minority Rights," International Studies Quarterly, Vol: 13, No: 3 (September, 1969), p.224. "The General Assembly decided to include an article on the subject in the International Covenants on Human Rights...in this official sense, then, self-determination became a human right."

¹⁷² Ibid., 24(A/C.3/SR.642).

¹⁷³ Letter No: 29.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., "the notion within the context of sovereign borders implies first agreement as to who is to enjoy self-determination: whether racial, religious, geographical units are to be invited to determine their fate and, if so, what tests are to be applied to ascertain whether such a unit is seeking expression of an articulate desire in this respect." Parallel lines for emphasis were written in hand on the left-side column of the document next to the word 'agreement'.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., emphasis in the original. The entire left-hand column has parallel lines drawn by hand for emphasis by the Under Secretary.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., this aspect was addressed in the last chapter.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, 2(A/C.3/SR.635).

¹⁸² Ibid., 3(A/C.3/SR.635).

¹⁸³ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, 28 (A/C.3/SR.638).

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, 7(A/C.3/SR.642).

¹⁸⁶ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, 14 (A/C.3/SR.642, October 24, 1955. General Assembly Resolution 421 (V), Section D and 637 A/VII). UNGAOR, Thirteen Session, Third Committee, 15 (A/C.3/SR.889) November 21, 1958, AI 33. Mr. Elmandjra (Morocco): The Charter "spoke of the principle of self-determination of peoples; it seemed obvious, however, that that basic text must not be regarded as static, and what had been true in 1945 was not necessarily so in 1958."

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Letter No: 29, October 14, 1955.

¹⁸⁹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Third Committee, 1 (A/C.3/SR.645), October 27, 1955.

¹⁹⁰ John Humphrey, p.129. "When the real test came - the creation of effective machinery for its international implementation - they would back away."

¹⁹¹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, A.I. 28, Report of the Third Committee, 57 fn. 17(Doc.A/3077) December 8, 1955.

¹⁹² The Third Committee, at its 668th Meeting, amended the phrase "right to self-determination" in the English text to read "right of self-determination."

¹⁹³ UNGAOR, (A/C.3/L.489 and Corr. 1 and 2.) Tenth Session, A.I. 28.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., (A/C.3/L.499).

¹⁹⁵ John Humphrey, p.139. Apparently it was important for members to establish an acceptable image for themselves in the UN. "Peru remained an Indian country, and that, unlike what has happened in Mexico, the process of integration had hardly begun. But yet in the United Nations, the almost purely Spanish Peruvian delegates were arguing that there were no minorities in South America. The Peruvian Indians may be technically a majority but they were certainly the kind of nondominant group contemplated by the definition of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities."

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., (A/C.3/L.495/Rev.2). Emphasis in the original. A.I. 28.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., (A/C.3/L.498/Corr. 2).

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., (A/C.3/L.479/Rev.1) and Annexes, A.I. 28-I, 67 and 69 (DOC A/3077)

Danish revised proposal, operative paragraph 2: "Requests the Secretary General to circulate to Governments of States members and non-members of the United Nations the record of the discussion of this question in the Third Committee during the present session, to invite them to submit before 30 June 1956 any observations, amendments or proposals which they may wish to make, and to prepare a working paper incorporating these observations, amendments and proposals for consideration by the General Assembly at its eleventh session."

¹⁹⁹ Danish draft Resolution (A/C.3/L.479/Rev.1) 67 and 70 (A/3077). UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Annexes, Report of Third Committee. A.I. 28-I. In favour: Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, UK, USA.

²⁰⁰ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Annexes, A.I. 28-I, 67 (Doc. A/3077), Report of the Third Committee, December 8, 1955.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Annexes, 66 (Doc. A/3077). Yugoslavia amendment, paragraph 3: of Working Party text. Abstaining: Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand and UK.

²⁰³ Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations, Ottawa, 1957, p.44.

²⁰⁴ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 15(A/C.3/SR.642) October 24, 1955.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 25(A/C.3/SR.646) October 27, 1955.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 20(A/C.3/SR.642).

²⁰⁸ Ibid., A.I. 28, 15 (A/C.3/SR.642). See: John Humphrey, p.212. In mid-October 1955, he had a private conversation with Menon of India who, "suggested that the debate on self-determination be postponed....He wasn't concerned with saving the Covenants but only with strengthening the right to self-determination, and he agreed that this could be done better outside than in the Covenants; but he was not sure that he could carry the Arabs with him...judging from the ensuing debate they were not impressed."

²⁰⁹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Annexes, Report of the Third Committee, 73(Doc. A/3077). USA amendment calling for the deletion of paragraph 2: of Working Party's text. In favour: Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, UK, USA.

²¹⁰ UNGAOR, Seventh Session, Annexes, S.I. 25, (A/C.2/L.165) and Corr. 1 and 2 and (A/C.2/L.165/Rev.1.)

²¹¹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 34(A/C.3/SR.646) October 27, 1955.

²¹² Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 35 (A/C.3/SR.646) October 27, 1955.

²¹³ Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 18(A/C.3/SR.642) October 24, 1955.

²¹⁴ Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 36(A/C.3/SR.639) October 19, 1955.

²¹⁵ Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, December 8, 1955.

²¹⁶ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 30 (A/C.3/SR.646) October 27, 1955.

²¹⁷ Paragraph 2: The words "for their own ends" Working Party's text: Against: Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, UK, USA.

²¹⁸ Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 1(A/C.3/SR.645) October 27, 1955.

²¹⁹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 33(A/C.3/SR.646).

²²⁰ Ibid., Tenth Session, A.I. 28, 35(A/C.3/SR.644), October 26, 1955.

²²¹ UNGAOR, Annexes, Tenth Session, Report of the Third Committee, 75 (A/3077), December 8, 1955. Paragraph 2 Working Party text: the words "based upon the principle of mutual benefit." Against: Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, UK, USA.

²²² UNGAOR, Annexes, Tenth Session, Report of Third Committee 75(A/3077), December 8, 1955. Paragraph 2: Working Party text: "in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." Against: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, USA.

²²³ UNGAOR, Annexes, Tenth Session, Report of the Third Committee, 75(A/3077) December 8, 1955. Paragraph 2: as a whole put to a vote. Against: Australia, Canada, France, UK, USA.

²²⁴ Article 1 as a whole, as amended, was adopted by roll call. Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, New Zealand, UK, USA.

²²⁵ After the Third Committee adopted Article 1 (Part I), it decided not to vote on the remaining articles of Part II, in which states undertake to guarantee certain rights enumerated in the Covenants, until it had adopted the texts of the substantive articles in Part III of each of the two

Covenants. At succeeding sessions Article 6 to 16 Part III of the Draft Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights and Articles 6 to 14 Part III of the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In 1959, 3 articles were adopted and in 1960, the Third Committee continued to study Part III Article 15 of the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

²²⁶ From: USSEA, Ottawa To: Canadian Delegation, New York, No: V-10. Confidential. November 20, 1956. A copy of USA-Canada and Canada-USA correspondences on this matter under reference were not traceable in the files or elsewhere.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ From: CANDEL, New York To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 287. Confidential. January 22, 1957. Under Reference: CANDEL letter of January 11, not traceable. Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand representatives attended the meeting.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Part B of paragraph 2: "2. The General Assembly considers that the term of reference of this commission should include examination of: (b) The essential attributes and applicability of the principle of equal rights and of self-determination, including the rights and duties of states under international law."

²³² No: 287, January 22 1957.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid., this delegate spoke "in his private capacity and not for his Delegation."

²³⁹ Ibid., see: A. Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), on the Suez Incident and the UK-USA relationship thereafter. He quoted J. Dulles Press Conference, October 2, 1956. "...any areas encroaching in some form or manner on the problem of so-called colonialism, [will] find the United States playing a somewhat independent role," p. 556. Eden was the British Prime Minister at the time of the Suez crisis. He explained that, "the dispute over Nasser's seizure of the canal had, of course, nothing to do with colonialism, but was concerned with international rights. If the United States had to defend her treaty rights in the Panama Canal, she would not regard such action as colonialism; neither would I. Yet her rights in Panama are those of one nation, not of many, as at Suez," p. 557. He suggested that: "It is worth while to probe deeper into the causes for the frequent divergences on colonialism, which have presented a continuing problem in Anglo-American relations and still do so, despite official denials." For further explanation on this see: pp. 558-559.

²⁴⁰ From: SSEA, Ottawa To: CANDEL, New York, Confidential. No: V-43, January 23, 1957. Under Ref: Telegram No: 287 of January 22.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid., "we feel that the words in operative paragraph 1: 'and advance rather than retard close cooperation among nations in a growingly interdependent world,' may well irritate the Afro-Asian and anti-colonial groups and cause them to vote against the paragraph." Ottawa had already decided that it was in its own interests to maintain a working relationship with them.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ RG 25, Acc: 86-87/336, Vol: 127, File: 5475-W-13-40-pt.2. Jules Leger, Memorandum For the Minister, Confidential, October 12, 1956.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., the Department felt that this concept "has not yet been satisfactorily defined."

²⁴⁷ Ibid., the Department 'subscribe' to this position but it "must be related to other Charter principles, e.g. domestic jurisdiction, respect for valid international obligations, etc."

²⁴⁸ Ibid., "Canadian policy statements have accepted the principle but we have not always been clear in our minds as to what exactly the concept involved legally...."

²⁴⁹ Ibid., on the left hand column of this point Pearson wrote 'yes'.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., the Department believed that the study group should not be "turned into a raving commission or be given the task of making proposals relating to specific issues." This was a great worry of the French and the British.

²⁵¹ Ibid., "an added advantage in setting up the proposed study group would be to remove the issue from the heated atmosphere of the Assembly for at least a short while."

²⁵² From: Canadian Delegation, Geneva, To: External Affairs, Ottawa. No: 394, July 3, 1957, Confidential. Present at the meeting UK Canada, Australia, Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Letter No: 91, February 27, 1957, under Ref. from the Delegation not traceable. Apparently the Colonial Office intended to contact the Canadian High Commission in London on this matter.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ From: External Affairs, Ottawa To: Washington, No: V-562, Priority and Confidential, August 28, 1957. Under Ref. Tel.999, October 24, 1956 and 1799 of August 20, 1957, not traceable. They were the correspondence between the Canadian Embassy in Washington, the Delegation at the UN and Ottawa on this matter.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., the Department wanted "to see an USA text as soon as possible" in order "to make recommendations to the Minister." This was an indication of the importance of the matter to Canada.

²⁵⁹ We have been unable to find any documents in the Department of External Affairs Files or private papers Files from August 1957 to July 1958. For example, Letter No: V-278 February 27, 1958 from Ottawa to the Canadian High Commissioner in London was not traceable. It contains Canada's view on this controversy between the USA, UK and France which, according to the High Commissioner, "were well received" by Bourdillon of the Colonial Office.

²⁶⁰ From: Canadian High Commissioner London To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 3223, Confidential. Under Ref. Ottawa's Telegram V-302 of July 9 not traceable.

²⁶¹ Ibid., "even the South African representative came some way to acknowledging this position." We have already pointed out that South Africa had washed its hands of this matter in the early phase of this process.

²⁶² Ibid., the High Commissioner observed that this development "does not help the South Africans very much," but made no comments as to how it could affect Canada's native peoples.

²⁶³ From: PERMIS New York To: External Affairs, Ottawa. No: 904. Confidential. March 22, 1957. "The increase in the number of Afro-Asian members has made it more difficult to suppress colonial issues."

²⁶⁴ From Canadian High Commissioner, Wellington To: USSEA, Ottawa, No: 503. September 11, 1958. Confidential.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., Wellington had indicated its willingness to support the USA text "as it stands." It was considered to be "the least objectionable of the resolutions."

²⁶⁶ See: Gerald Runke, Ethics: An Examination of Contemporary Moral Problems. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston) p.6 for a discussion of "to treat equals equally is to guarantee fairness."

²⁶⁷ James Rosenau, "Race in International Politics: A Dialogue in Five Parts," Race Among Nations: A Conceptual Approach, ed. G. Shepherd and T. Le Melle, (1970), p.46. "For a variety of reasons, race-pervaded situations which seem likely to evoke verbal stances on the part of many more societies and of basic human rights are so central to racial issues...external developments that are pervaded with racial relevance are not likely to seem so remote as those that are sustained by other types of values."

²⁶⁸ George Shepherd and Tilden Le Melle, p.xiv.

Chapter VI: British Togoland – Termination of the First Trusteeship Agreement

Introduction

An important element in any process is the aim or goal which is being sought by the principal actors. Unfortunately, expressed aims are not always in keeping with private goals, and the difficulty lies in trying to keep this fundamental distinction in mind while searching for the motives of policy. It is unquestionable that the aims of the Administering Authorities had defined the strategy in both case studies, and it should have been a simple matter of analysis had the process to terminate the two Trusteeship Agreements been in keeping with democratic principles and practice. At the end of this two-year process, Soward of the Canadian Delegation spoke of "the historic nature of the decision which the UN General Assembly was being called to take," in terminating the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland.¹ And, Menon of the Indian Delegation described this decolonisation process as "a development which is unique in the annals of the United Nations." He felt that this process in British Togoland brought "an end to that chapter begun by Western incursion into West Africa."²

The process to terminate the first UN Trusteeship Agreement encountered all the 'firsts' in regard to the legal and functional roles of the UN and the Administering Authorities. The Trusteeship Agreements seemed to represent progressive thinking in the colonial system, and it is not without

significance that the UK Memorandum asking the UN Secretary-General to prepare the steps in order to terminate the first Trusteeship Agreement appeared to be a voluntary act.³ The constitutional progress in the nearby colony of the Gold Coast, with which the Trust Territory of British Togoland was integrated as an Administrative Union, seemed to represent developments which were in keeping with a democratic process.⁴ As a consequence, the case study should have been a straight-forward assessment of the role of Canada in the process to terminate this Trusteeship Agreement. This process should also have been guided by a general application of the right of self-determination in the Trust Territory. According to Sears of the USA Delegation, this was "the only sound foundation of self-government."⁵

It is our contention that the decolonisation process to terminate the first Trusteeship Agreement was a series of calculated steps which were designed to circumvent the application of the right of self-determination in British Togoland; that the inhabitants of this Trust Territory were successfully denied the right of self-determination was due, in no small measure, to the status which India had achieved by 1954 as the unquestionable leader of the anti-colonial offensive in the UN. This denial was orchestrated through a successive series of deceptive moves in which India and Canada played instrumental roles. In this analysis, we take as our starting point the position that the process in regard to British Togoland had nothing to do with decolonisation as such.

This is a radical interpretation. We argue that the process was simply one of substituting a white colonial power for a non-white 'colonial' power. We will

show that in the behind the scenes manouvering in which India and Canada were involved, the major concerns were with the interests of the UK and Nkrumah of the Gold Coast and not necessarily with that of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. Our revisionist definition of the situation is premised on the fact that the inhabitants of the Trust Territory did not rise up in revolt against British colonial rule and, as a consequence, it is less correct to speak of the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland as a process of decolonisation.

The expressed desire by the Ewe people in the late 1940s for reunification, as a people and as a nation with its own territorial identification, was an anti-colonial movement in the classical sense. This was also understood as such in the UN in the late 1940s. However, in 1954 the UK initiated the process in the UN in order to terminate its Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland; it was a request for the UN to terminate its obligation in this Trust Territory. This would in turn facilitate the independence of the British colony of the Gold Coast. Both the UK and the Gold Coast government had hoped to retain the UN-sanctioned Administrative Union of British Togoland with the Gold Coast. It is this process with which we are concerned here and which is generally referred to as a process of decolonisation.

The inhabitants of British Togoland rejected the attempt by the UK and the Gold Coast to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. The southern part of the Trust Territory requested a continuation of the Trusteeship Agreement under the UN. We suggest that it was the obligation of the UN, in a process to terminate its responsibility in a Trust Territory, to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. If

they clearly expressed a wish to continue their Trust Territory status, for a temporary period of time, then it should have been the duty of the UN to facilitate this democratic alternative. For an eventual union of the two Togolands could only take place if British Togoland did not become integrated into an independent Gold Coast.

The UN Visiting Mission to West Africa, in 1952, had concluded that "there exists a general desire for unification among the inhabitants of the two Togolands." At the time, the Canadian Delegation to the UN General Assembly noted that this conclusion "was of particular interest."⁶ One month later, the Delegation reported to Ottawa that the petitioners from the two Togolands to the UN had two complaints.⁷ The main complaint about the administration of British Togoland was that "the territory was being too closely integrated with the Gold Coast." In addition, "their chief fire was concentrated on the French, whom they charged with intimidation and repression of political activity in French Togoland." Moreover, the Delegation pointed out that "the petitioners proposed that the two Togolands should be unified under a United Nations High Commissioner and that they be given their independence after a period of five years." There was a UN precedent for a planned and deferred independence in the case of Italian Somaliland. Why was this not applied in the case of the two Togolands?⁸

This is one of the concerns of our two case studies. Our effort is to discover with what the 'bulk' of Canada's diplomacy was concerned in the process to decide the future of both Trust Territories. We will show how this process was controlled and directed by a small group of members who had

collaborated in their own self-interest, at the UN. Because of the Administrative Union, Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP) effectively became the colonial power in this highly unequal relationship. And, in view of this situation, the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement should have been seen in the context of the inhabitants wanting freedom from the Gold Coast, rather than from UK control.

It is this special case of Administrative Integration rather than Administrative Union, which was stipulated in the Trusteeship Agreement that set the stage for this first case of termination. It served to complicate the matter by introducing into the scenario a patchwork of tribal and ethnic loyalties in an East to West manifestation. Although this Administrative Integration reunited those tribes which were divided before 1919, it also separated those which were united before 1919. Because the Trust Territory had a unique history of conflicting colonial needs; a chequered ethnic composition and a complex array of public and private demands as to its future status, the process to terminate this Trusteeship Agreement was wrought with seemingly insurmountable difficulties.

Menon of India chose to discuss the "Togoland Unification Problem" in the context of territorial nationalism. He talked of India's appreciation of the significance of nationalist movements.⁹ His definition of the situation in which nationalism was functional in a classic anti-colonial context, is a misleading one for British Togoland. The petitioners had all argued, vehemently, for the recognition of tribal affiliations and they insisted upon significance of these for any future settlement. Herein lies the problem of the application of the right of

self-determination in this Trust Territory. The dynamics had less to do with nationalism and more to do with ethnic and tribal loyalties, across three international borders - the Gold Coast, British Togoland and French Togoland. We suggest that because these ethnic and tribal considerations were relegated to a low level of priority and irrelevance by the principal actors in this process, the inhabitants of Southern British Togoland were denied the right of self-determination in a planned and systematic way.

The half-hearted attempt by the UN to set up a Joint Council was based on an implicit recognition of the historic rights of an Ewe people; these transcended the arbitrary territorial borders which were created by the British and French division of German Togoland in 1919. Had the Joint Council not been sabotaged by a combined effort of the British and the French, the process to terminate colonial rule in the two Togolands might most probably have resulted in a 'just' solution. It would have provided for the reunification of a pre-existing cultural and political entity: a nation called Togoland, its people were predominantly Ewes. Most petitioners at the UN had pleaded for such a solution. But the case was not such a simple one.

In the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement, the UN took as its starting point the administrative integration of the Trust Territory; not the Trust Territory itself, as an entity or separate unit, but as part of an integrated whole. This was the problem. It was also in the interest of France to hinder reunification of British and French Togoland; France wanted French Togoland in some sort of arrangement within the French Union. Historic rights of these

dependent peoples were irrelevant. Since France intended to have French Togoland 'determine' itself as a permanent part of the French Union, freedom of choice was a constricted one.

The anti-colonials in the UN, minus India, attempted to ensure that the questions that were to be asked in the plebiscite, in which the inhabitants of British Togoland could "re-determine" themselves, also continued to recognise the historic rights of an Ewe nation. Had the British succeeded in its desire to place just the one question on the ballot, the plebiscite would have effectively failed to recognise the legitimate rights of the divided Ewe people. The second question on the ballot allowed for this possibility despite the colonial effort, plus India, to delete it. The Gold Coast government had the power to obstruct the democratic process in which the Ewe of British Togoland were to "re-determine" themselves. This it did with the full knowledge of the UN.

The Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories recommended that the Trust Territory be sub-divided to enable the inhabitants of the Trust Territory to fairly and democratically 'determine' themselves. This recommendation was based on a UN recognition of a historical claim. The results of the plebiscite showed that there was enough reasonable doubt that the integration of the Trust Territory with the British colony of the Gold Coast ought to be the only course to follow. Integration would be a permanent arrangement. The UK's decision to interpret the very narrow margin in the plebiscite as being in favour of integration with the Gold Coast served to prevent any further steps by the UN to ensure that this interpretation for integration was, in fact, representative of the true wishes of

British Togoland. India and Canada were active in this deceptive interpretation. The operative value of the second question on the plebiscite was effectively nullified by this distortion of the true meaning of the plebiscite results. The end effect was that the Ewe people of both British and French Togoland were denied the later possibility of ever re-unifying as they were in a pre-colonial context.

This leaves us with the cardinal question: since the Ewes of British Togoland were effectively incorporated into the Gold Coast, what was the need for a UN supervised plebiscite in French Togoland? Since the pre-colonial Ewe 'nation' could no longer be re-established, was it necessary to have a portion of a nation 'determine' itself? And, what was the principal goal of the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over French Togoland? Surely, it was not self-determination in the classic sense? A new situation had arisen for the Ewes in French Togoland. The French made it a point of their policy to ensure that the Ewes of French Togoland were not involved in the UN process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement in British Togoland. Had this not been the case, the UN would have had to define the situation with regard to British Togoland differently. Was the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over the Trust Territory of French Togoland more of a negative aim, by the anti-colonials, to prevent a permanent integration of the Trust Territory in the French union, rather than a positive goal of having a new, permanently divided people, 'determine' itself? Was the left-over portion of an historic nation an acceptable option for the Ewes of French Togoland?

It is obvious that the decisions which were conspicuously taken by the principal actors with regard to British Togoland effectively served to limit the options which French Togoland would have. The decision to push for the integration of British Togoland with the Gold Coast was a violation of the historic rights of the Ewe peoples. How does this decision accord with the Charter and the respect for sovereign borders? Or, do colonial peoples not have the same prior rights which colonial powers claim for themselves? Could we interpret the UN decision on British Togoland as an international 'legitimation' of the division of peoples and their territories as spoils of war? If anti-colonials like India reject any claims by the colonial powers to have rights over their conquered lands, would it not have been consistent and logical to reject also the arbitrary 1919 division of German Togoland? We are not talking here of a conglomerate of small tribal or ethnic groupings. We are referring to a specific case where all the criteria for national sovereignty had existed and more importantly, the possibility to rectify the damage of colonial conquest was a real and attainable one.

The Gold Coast, the UK and France were the antagonists in this process. The 'self' had already existed, but was forcibly separated in Canada's perception. What were the relevant factors which were operational in its choices that served to violate the right of the Ewe people to re-determine themselves? What does this process tell us about India's betrayal and Canada's apparent double-standard? Should the claim by the Ewes for the reunification of their nation not have given India a worthy cause, and a reason based on principles, to rally for the eradication of all traces of colonialism in Togoland? By working for

the reunification of British and French Togoland, especially in view of India's own tragic partition, would India not have taken a tangible step in the rejection of the concept of the white man's burden, and also the claim by Colonial Powers to an inherent right to determine the destiny of colonial peoples? Is this an idealist aspiration?

The Trust Territory of Togoland under French administration became the second Trust Territory to achieve independence under the auspices of the UN. Canada had recognised, by 1950, that there was a "strong ideological prejudice" which existed in the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee "against placing the Trust Territories on the same level as the colonies."¹⁰ For all practical purposes, this was what happened to Trust Territories that were, in effect, 'incorporated' into Administrative Unions. The arrangements for individual Trusteeship Agreements were sanctioned by the Charter. And, although the Trusteeship Agreement for British Togoland had authorised the Administrative Union with the Gold Coast, it is this status which became one of the central issues in the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland. According to Easton, the French "have seldom gained any credit for the fact that by administering their territories separately, they really did accord them a status different from that accorded to territories by Britain and Belgium."¹¹ This meant that, for the Trust Territories, the French "legislated for them separately, in contrast with her usual practice of giving uniform concessions to all the land she administered."¹²

This fact had enormous significance for the UN process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over French Togoland. As Easton has pointed out, "it was this separate legislation that was scrutinised by the United Nations, not the uniform laws of the French Union."¹³ The process was a compact and focused one; it differed in substance from the process over British Togoland which had become side-tracked with the issue of the simultaneous coming to independence of the Gold Coast. The ulterior motives of both the Administering Authority and the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast had served to complicate the process and confuse the UN members as to the actual aim of the UK Memorandum to the Secretary General asking to be relieved of its responsibilities in British Togoland.

The process in French Togoland concentrated on the kinds of political development which had taken place in the Trust Territory and whether these had fulfilled the sufficient condition of self-government. For the anti-colonials, the central issue to be resolved was whether self-government or independence would be acceptable as the necessary condition for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. And they were determined to utilise the UN's supervisory authority in the resolution of this issue. Pignon of France had already taken note, in March 1954, of the 'dissatisfaction' expressed by the Indian Delegation "with the possibilities open to Togoland of withdrawal from the French Union,"¹⁴ and India's concern with the conditions under which the electoral lists were 'compiled.'¹⁵

An important consideration for us, is, whether the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland had any effect or influence on

the proposals which were made or the decisions that would be taken in regard to procedure and aims in French Togoland. Although the French Delegation had taken the position that British Togoland had no relevance for French Togoland,¹⁶ Menon of India proposed that "if one part of Togoland could achieve independence, there was no reason why the other should not be capable of doing the same."¹⁷ Moreover, a hint of intent is discernible in his warning that "it should also be borne in mind that, once one part of Togoland became independent, France would have great difficulty in refusing to grant the same status to the other part."¹⁸ The Canadian Delegation, speaking after Menon, did not want "to prejudge the issue."¹⁹ According to the Indian Delegation, its role in the process which sought to speed up the termination of the first Trusteeship Agreement was based on the belief that dependent territories should be emancipated as soon as possible. Would this same logic be applied to the Trust Territory of French Togoland? Escott Reid had written in 1954, that the "Indians, including the Prime Minister, were prepared to concede that colonialism in the old sense is on the wane in Asia though it seems to be practised with undiminished rigour in Africa."²⁰

We begin with a brief assessment of the UN effort to set up the Joint Council because the short process clearly demonstrates the extent to which the British and the French were prepared to direct UN activity in their own interests. Most instructive for the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreements over British and French Togoland are the positioning of the key players in this UN effort to set up the Joint Council. The pre-dispositions and expectations of these

key players, in regard to means and goals of the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreements in British and French Togoland, are already laid out here.

The Joint Council

The original demand of the Ewe people in the UN in 1947 called for a unification of all Ewes residing in the Gold Coast and in the Trust Territories of British Togoland and French Togoland. This gradually changed into a plea for unification of the two Trust Territories. In light of the reports of the Visiting Missions to West Africa in 1949 and 1952 and the arguments of petitioners, the General Assembly instructed the Trusteeship Council in Resolution 750 (VIII) to "reconsider the problem bearing in mind...."

- A. The re-establishment of a Joint Council in which the direct elected representatives of both Togolands could discuss how to overcome the obstacles brought about by their artificial separation and, if they so desired, plan their joint approach to self-government or independence in co-operation with the Administering Authorities;
- B. The need for a revision of the electoral qualifications in force in Togoland both under French and British administration; and
- C. The constant developments in the Gold Coast as they affect Togoland under British and French administration.

The Trusteeship Council was further instructed "to submit a special report on the above to the 9th Session of the General Assembly." Pursuant to these instructions, the UK held "a wide series of consultations."

Thereafter, Alan Burns of the UK Delegation reported to the Trusteeship Council that, in the southern section, administrative and technical

problems seemed to stand in the way of accommodating the principle of a Joint Council. Moreover, Burns explained that in the northern section, "all authoritative opinion tended to the conclusion that the creation of the Joint Council...would not meet any clearly identified need."²¹ Part (A) of the resolution recommended that the members of the new Joint Council should be "directly elected by universal adult suffrage and secret ballot." But because Part (B) called upon the Administering Authorities "to revise the electoral systems in force," the UK Delegation felt that this "preliminary task...would, of necessity, delay the actual re-establishment of the Joint Council."²² In addition, Burns suggested that because the UK was "engaged in final negotiations with the Gold Coast on the revision of the existing constitution," which must follow with general elections, "he was unable at this juncture to adopt a final position on the re-establishment of the Joint Council." Clearly, the UK's definition of the situation gave priority to the developments in the Gold Coast over any action that was to be undertaken in British Togoland. It is evident that this attitude and position was not necessarily in the best interest of the Trust Territories.²³

In explaining the French position on the re-establishment of the Joint Council, Pignon felt it "noteworthy that all of the Togoland representatives elected to the French Parliament, twenty-two out of thirty members of the Territorial Assembly, almost all of the conseils de circonscription and thirteen out of the fifteen former members of the Joint Council had vehemently declared themselves opposed to its re-establishment."²⁴ Pignon reported that the majority parties "were opposed to any method of electing members to the Joint Council which

would create rivalry or conflict between the Joint Council and the Territorial Assembly, which was the main elected body in the Territory and should remain so." He added that, "in their eyes the Territory's advancement towards the purposes of Article 76 of the Charter should be based on the gradual extension of the Territorial Assembly's powers." On the whole, they all believed that "the time had passed when the Joint Council could serve any useful purpose in solving problems common to the two Trust Territories."²⁵

On the other hand, the Syrian Delegation believed that "the first step towards...satisfying the evident desire of the population for unification was to re-establish the Joint Council on the basis of a democratic election."²⁶ Although Menon of India agreed that this was the aim of General Assembly Resolution 750A(VIII), he was critical that it "made no reference to the propositions of the representation of the two Territories." In his opinion, proportional representation would result in an advantage for the French Territory on the Joint Council. He made only a passing reference to the fact that both reports from the Administering Authorities "indicated that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to set up the Joint Council."

In addition, Menon pointed to the general arguments of the petitioners regarding "the limitations under which the Council would have to operate."²⁷ The Indian Delegation was obviously not making a case for the re-establishment of the Joint Council. And it was evident that Menon had already incorporated the integration of the Trust Territory with the Gold Coast in his definition of the situation. He allowed that "a Joint Council might well be practicable even if

Togoland under British administration joined the Gold Coast."²⁸ Indeed, India's positioning in early 1954 seemed to be supporting the arguments of the Administering Authorities, instead of giving priority to the desire of the inhabitants as expressed in the Visiting Mission Reports and by the petitioners.

The UK had recommended that the Trusteeship Council "postpone until its next session its examination of the problem." This would allow time for the elections in the Gold Coast. By agreeing to a postponement, the Trusteeship Council became a willing partner in effectively side-stepping the problem of the Joint Council. After the elections had taken place, the UK notified the Trusteeship Council that the new Constitution was "in force"; that it did not 'alter' the administrative status of the Trust Territory and that "the new constitutional arrangements represented the last stage before the Gold Coast assumed full responsibility for its own affairs." On June 21, a UK Memorandum proposed to the Secretary General that the question of "the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under UK Trusteeship" should be placed on the agenda of the ninth Session of the General Assembly. The proposal included the recommendation that the Trust Territory should remain integrated with the Gold Coast. Because the Memorandum dealt specifically with General Assembly Resolution 750 (VIII) Part (C), the UK suggested that it also be submitted to the President of the Trusteeship Council for consideration at the fourteenth session.

This specific procedure gave Asha of Syria cause to question the motives of India and the USA. He observed: "in view of the fact that the United Kingdom Memorandum had originally been addressed to the General Assembly

and not to the Trusteeship Council, he had been rather surprised by the Indian draft resolution and the United States draft resolution, which proposed that the Council should take action on it."²⁹ In anticipation of the General Assembly's discussion of the item, Burns of the UK suggested that the results of the recent elections were in favour of integration and that the UK regarded the results "as an indication of public opinion regarding the future status of Togoland under British administration."³⁰ He continued: "in that connection, the UK felt that there would be no point in continuing discussion on the re-establishment of the Joint Council for Togoland Affairs until the United Kingdom Memorandum, which was transmitted to the Council, had been debated by the forthcoming General Assembly."³¹ This recommended procedure not to discuss is in principle, an extension of the previous UK tactic to postpone an examination of the problem because of the elections which were to be held in the Gold Coast.

In effect, the UK had utilised the pending elections and the result of these elections to evade the problem of re-establishing the Joint Council and, therefore, the unification issue. In addition, the UK began to show a preference to the alternative of integration of the Trust Territory with the Gold Coast. Pignon of the French Delegation spoke directly after Alan Burns of the UK. He promptly agreed with Burns that "the results of the recent elections in Togoland under British administration indicated that the question of reconstituting the Joint Council was no longer pertinent or topical."³² It is unmistakable that, at the time, both the British and the French were beginning to set the parameters of UN action in regard to both Trust Territories. Referring to his report on French

Togoland, Pignon maintained that as a result of the "consultations...the great majority had expressed itself against reconstitution of the Joint Council." He concluded that "the French Government, respecting the freely expressed will of the population, considered it impossible to reconstitute the Joint Council merely to satisfy two minority groups in the two Trust Territories."³³ This was an incorrect estimation of the scope of the problem and Pignon knew that.

The 1949 Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa had been petitioned by the tribes which inhabited the northern section of British Togoland. The Dagombas Petition recommended a solution which would have satisfied the northern tribes by eliminating one boundary. In addition, it would have provided the basis for a possible unification of British and French Togoland, thereby eliminating the southern boundary problem. The petitioners to the 1952 Visiting Mission and to the Trusteeship Council in 1954, reinforced these previous claims of the northern tribes. Their argument for the retention of links with the northern part of the Gold Coast would have been a sufficient cause for the UN to seriously consider a north-south division of British Togoland in light of the long and continuous Ewe claim. Southern British Togoland would have continued the temporary Trusteeship Agreement pending the developments in French Togoland.

However, France was adamant that French Togoland was not a constituent part of the problem. Pignon insisted that political leaders in French Togoland believed that the matter was one "of primary interest to the Togoland of the British Territory." He reiterated that this was 'clearly' brought

out in the consultations in French-administered Togoland.³⁴ In late 1947, the Canadian Ambassador to Paris wrote to Ottawa: "France would appear to be fundamentally incapable of permitting any of the Overseas Territories voicing for the world's ears, opinions which might differ from its own."³⁵

As we will see in the discussions, Canadian officials were aware of the tactic by France to define the situation in such a way as to limit the concern for unification to British Togoland. This position was diametrically opposed to that of Asha of Syria. He pointed out that Resolution 750 (VIII) consisted of three parts "each dealing with a particular aspect of essentially the same problem, namely, the future of the two parts of Togoland."³⁶ In his opinion, "as far as implementation of Part A was concerned the Council could only pass on the information on what had and had not been done, as communicated by the Administering Authorities and by the people in their petitions." However, he protested that Part C had "raised considerable difficulties" because at the Thirteenth Session, the Council "had insisted on examining the political situation separately in each of the Togolands, as if there were no possible connection between them." Consequently, he "was bitterly disappointed...that a properly representative Joint Council for the two Togolands had not been established."³⁷

This was a forewarning of things to come later on. Asha's definition of the situation had significant consequences for process. It also had a functional role in Canada's decision to take a public 'colonial' position in an attempt to direct process. The Syrian delegate believed that "the Togoland problem had become so important that the General Assembly, as party to the Trusteeship Agreement,

would undoubtedly wish to assume direct responsibility for determining the true wishes of the population of both territories by a special mission, a plebiscite or any other suitable means, the Joint Council having unfortunately fallen by the way."³⁸

Pignon's attempt to categorise the re-establishment of the Joint Council, as a future project, was in the interest of an intact French Union. He concluded that "the main operative part of Assembly Resolution 750 (VIII)A had been rendered inapplicable...." Approximately one week later, the Canadian Delegation reported to Ottawa that "the Togoland Unification problem was virtually eclipsed by the discussion of the Future of British Togoland."³⁹ The first major hurdle had been overcome with the indirect assistance of the Indian Delegation. What we know for sure is that, by not actively working for the re-establishment of the Joint Council and conversely, by working against its re-establishment, the Colonial Powers and their 'friends' in the Trusteeship Council effectively subverted the UN first attempt to set up democratic institutions in preparation for the termination of trusteeship.

As a matter of fact, sixteen months later Lall of India utilised this failure to set up a Joint Council as evidence in his argument for the integration of the British Trust Territory with its neighbouring colony. He felt that it should be the basis for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. Here is what he said:

The experiment of setting up...a Joint Council for Togoland Affairs by the administering authorities, had been a failure and the effort to promote common policies and programmes for the two Territories of Togoland and for increasing their collaboration in various fields had had to be abandoned. Hence, a serious attempt at unification had

already failed, and the reasons for that failure applied as much today as they had two years previously.⁴⁰

We will now begin an examination of the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland. It occupied the UN for approximately two years, during which France and the UK continued to work with their friends behind the scenes for the goal of integration.⁴¹ In other words, their goal was the retention of the Administrative Union which was sanctioned by the UN Trusteeship Agreement.

The Administering Authority Starting Position: Instructions for the Visiting Missions, July 1955.

General Assembly Resolution 860 (IV) instructed the Trusteeship Council to appoint a special Visiting Mission to visit both British and French Togoland in August to consult the inhabitants regarding the future of British Togoland. The UK, in consultation with the Gold Coast and the French Government as to "what advice they should tender to the Mission before it leaves...agreed that a direct plebiscite should be recommended, and that the questions to be put to the inhabitants of British administrated Togoland should be in the following form: "(a) Do you wish the territory to be united with the Gold Coast? (b) Do you wish the territory to be separated from the Gold Coast"?

A plebiscite is not just a technical process. The questions to be asked can represent all kinds of preferences and they can serve to consolidate specific choices. In addition, the conflicting desires of the contending parties may be

eliminated by simply choosing to ignore these desires as possible alternatives in designing the questions. Although the mechanical act, a 'yes' or 'no', is part of the democratic process, the questions to be put to the electorate and the results could effectively serve to reinforce undemocratic intentions on the part of principal actors.

According to the UK Delegation, the logic behind this very simple formulation of the questions was that the inhabitants should have to address "the one fundamental question at issue, i.e. whether or not they are willing to participate in an independent Gold Coast." The means whereby the Trust Territory could exercise the right of self-determination were tentatively pre-selected in a behind-the-scenes negotiation among three self-interested parties. The UK explained that, "if the questions are formulated as proposed, it will be made clear to them that a decision against inclusion will involve separation from the Gold Coast" with no other alternatives on the ballot.⁴²

The UK was careful to point to the attention of the Visiting Mission before they left New York that because the Trust Territory was administered as an integral part, "...any decision to discontinue this association would signify the rupture of the close administrative, economic, social and political ties, which have linked the two territories for 45 years." It was therefore imperative that the Visiting Mission understood that "the primary decision"⁴³ had to be placed in context of this association. And because the UK Government had "already expressed their views as to the impracticability of independence,"⁴⁴ the nature of the question or questions which should be put to the people were of critical importance. It is

evident that the UK in its private correspondence, was consistently pushing the single possibility of integration. The argument was that "so small and undeveloped a territory would suffer from the outset from its limited administrative, social and economic resources and their severance from the much greater resources of the Gold Coast."⁴⁵

Logically, this was clearly exclusive of a future possibility of British Togoland unifying with a self-governing French Togoland; it was in keeping with the interest of France which wanted a self-governing French Togoland within the French Union, and with Nkrumah who wanted the continued integration of British Togoland with the Gold Coast. Consequently, the UK's arguments to support integration had to simultaneously dispel any hope of some form of continued trusteeship as a separate territory. And this meant that "it would be impracticable for them to continue administration of the Trust Territory as a distinct political entity after the Gold Coast became independent."⁴⁶ Therefore, for all the above reasons the UK suggested that only one question – in two parts - should be put to Togoland. It felt that "until they have expressed their wishes on these questions it is impossible...to give even preliminary considerations to the practicability of such theoretical alternatives." In addition, the UK did not want to include any of these theoretical alternatives because they would "merely serve to confuse the issue" in the minds of inhabitants.⁴⁷

It is most probably with the intent to warn those who sought to complicate this matter with several alternatives, that the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs cautioned the Fourth Committee on December 2, 1954:

if the offer of participation in an independent Gold Coast is rejected, a new situation will have arisen which will have to be considered afresh by the UK Government and by the United Nations in light of the expressed wishes of the people and of the various alternative solutions available.

By so doing, he attempted to set the tone and the parameters within which the UN could operate. The choice was limited, the alternatives were either impracticable or hypothetical and the means that were to be utilized towards this limited goal, were very simple.

At the end of its instructions to the Visiting Mission, the UK explained that a plebiscite "is of course well established as a means of resolving any doubt as to the wishes of a population and of arriving at a settlement which is stable and lasting." However, the UK observed that it is a "practicable method only when the number and nature of the questions to be answered permits of a short, unambiguous answer in the form of 'Yes' or 'No' or 'A' or 'B'." The members of the Visiting Mission were warned that "theoretical alternatives" would confuse the issue. In light of the above, the UK concluded that a plebiscite would "in this case be most effective as well as the most direct means of ensuring that the people's wishes are expressed in a manifest and incontrovertible way."⁴⁸

It is difficult to say whether the General Assembly or the Trusteeship Council were aware of the fact that the Visiting Mission had received observations which were "offered in the hope that they may assist the Visiting Mission to Togoland in carrying out the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly Resolution 860(IX) and Trusteeship Council Resolution 1084 (XV)."⁴⁹ Because this was the first instance in which the UN was addressing the specific

task of terminating a Trusteeship Agreement, there were no established procedures or normal practice. We do not know whether the 'observations' given to the Visiting Mission were part of an attempt by UK, France and the Gold Coast to influence the Visiting Mission report.

The UN has a supervisory function in regard to the administration of a Trust Territory. We cannot be sure whether the Secretary General of the UN was notified that a copy of the Guidance Document was handed to the Indian Chairman of the Visiting Mission on or about July 15. A copy was transmitted to Canada two days before this. The UK's starting position as to aims and means regarding the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement, could be readily identified in this Document. It is obvious that although the UK's preferences as to the process were outlined, they nevertheless cloaked the real reasons for such a position because the Visiting Mission included non-administering members. One of these was a militant anti-colonial.

We know that Canada was notified in early October, that there would be a Minority Report from the Visiting Mission. The USA and India were members of the Visiting Mission. Therefore, the UK must have also been informed of this. On November 18, the Secretary or State for Commonwealth Relations sent an 'Immediate' Circular to the UK High Commission in Ottawa, Colombo, Salisbury and UK Delegation, outlining the UK's response to the submitted Visiting Mission Report and instructing High Commissioners to inform Commonwealth Governments urgently of the UK's position. The UK Delegation in New York

would be "simultaneously consulting Commonwealth Delegations in view of time factor."⁵⁰

The information was for "their confidence" especially Paragraph 4 which set out specific instructions regarding the Gold Coast Government's wishes.⁵¹ In the instruction addressed to "New Delhi only," the UK High Commissioner was advised to convey "that we have been very impressed by the way in which Indian Chairman and members of Visiting Mission have tackled this difficult and arduous task". In this document, the UK had set out in a little more detail but still somewhat reserved in relation to No. 90 of November 18, its reasoning and logic for its preferred aims, means and expectations in this process.

At the invitation of the UK, the "simultaneous meeting" taking place on Nov. 8 in New York comprised Canada, all their colleagues of the Old Commonwealth, United States, Belgium, France, and Netherlands "to consider such tactics as might be adopted for a prompt and satisfactory disposition of the Togoland question" and more specifically, "as it relates to the arrangements for a plebiscite...." According to the Canadian Delegation, "the meeting afforded those present a frank exposition by each of the parties most concerned of their views on that matter."⁵² It is most interesting to note that although the UK had assigned a pivotal role to the Indian Delegation in guiding the direction of the process, the UK chose not to invite the Indian Delegation to this meeting. Why? Could it be that the Indian Delegation would be informed of the real intent of UK policy but

not of its motives? Would this have made a difference in Indian attitude? Was India aware of such negotiations "behind its back"?

The Special Report of the Visiting Mission: A Dissenting Opinion

In its observations to the Visiting Mission before it left New York, the UK explained in an exhaustive way, the reasons why the election of a representative body would "not necessarily reflect with any great accuracy the major trends of opinion in the territory."⁵³ The UK therefore opted for the plebiscite as the means to be recommended. In spite of this, Mr. Tarazi of Syria gave notice of his intention to file a Minority Report which would require that

the establishment in Togoland under British administration of a legislative body whose members would be elected by universal suffrage, should be made a condition precedent of the holding of a plebiscite in the territory regarding the question of integration with the neighbouring Gold Coast or otherwise.⁵⁴

Tarazi was one of the non-administering members of the Visiting Mission and, in keeping with the expected attitude of the majority of anti- colonials,⁵⁵ he sought to keep the unification question in the framework of analysis of possible solutions.⁵⁶

It is also important to note that an effort had been made in this Minority Report to separate the Gold Coast from the Trust Territory by referring to it as "the neighbouring Gold Coast." This is different from the customary way in which pro-colonials had been referring to the Administrative Union. Several of the petitioners against integration had undertaken to convince the UN that the Gold Coast should be kept out of the process which concerned British Togoland alone;

that the Gold Coast was for all intents and purposes "a foreign country."⁵⁷ Actually, this Minority Report is a sort of mirror which reflected the dichotomy of positions in the Trusteeship Council and Fourth Committee.

Bargues of France "agreed with the Syrian representative that some forty years of Administrative Union between Togoland and the Gold Coast had undoubtedly created among the people of the Trust Territory a state of mind favourable to integration."⁵⁸ Apparently, this state of mind was not confined to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory alone. The Indian Delegation talked of integration as "the logical result" and "a natural course of events."⁵⁹ By so doing, was India inadvertently or consciously trying to help create such a state of mind among the non-administrating members of the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee?

Bargues contended that in the Trust Territory "their views might perhaps have been different if Togoland had been administered as a separate entity."⁶⁰ He was expressing a fundamental point which had been made by anti-integrationists during the two year process. He recognised that the proposal in the Minority Report was "obviously designed to establish an atmosphere of complete objectivity." Nevertheless, the French Delegation, in recognition of the time pressure which had been effectively utilised by the UK to hurry the process to terminate, reverted back to a pro-colonial argument. He recommended that "in view of time which would be needed to set up institutions to counter balance the influence of forty years' union with the Gold Coast, the only result of the proposal could be to postpone the date of the popular consultation unduly."⁶¹

The hurry to terminate and therefore the process to ascertain the wishes of British Togoland was "a direct and necessary consequence of the imminence of the Gold Coast independence."⁶² It is this fact which had been allowed to set the tone and pace of the process. The acceptance of these conditions effectually gave the Gold Coast's desire for immediate independence precedence over the due process which the application of the right of self determination would require in British Togoland. The UK and France were working for this goal; the USA, the Old Commonwealth and India knew this.

These principal actors all seemed to have the same priority on how this issue should be resolved. They worked in a combined effort to support a process for integration. The Minority Report of Syria was an attempt to resist the pro-colonial and pro-Gold Coast effort to contain the Ewe and Togoland unification movement. And as such it represented the last major endeavour in the battle between these two 'fronts' of interest in this process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement.

An expression in favour of a plebiscite to determine the future of the Trust Territory would be an implicit rejection of the Minority Report which recommended that a separate legislative assembly should first be set up in the Trust Territory before the plebiscite. This procedure would have restored to the Trust Territory a separate political identity as required by the Trusteeship Agreement and the Charter. After this step, the UN could have ascertained the wishes of the people in a process which would be separate from any political connections with the Gold Coast.

Response to Visiting Mission Report: UK Introduction

The purpose of this part is to assess to what extent the result of private correspondences and meetings specific to the Visiting Mission differ in substance to the publicly expressed position which comprised the basis of future UK action. Although in the secret meetings Canada was briefed as to the real motives of British action and public policy, Ottawa had chosen to act in keeping with certain public postures of the UK. By looking at the discrepancies between the UK's public and private view points and the strategies which were planned to accommodate either of the two, we would be able to assess to what degree Canada's public stance was in keeping with certain principles or self interest.

The UK delegate did not address the Minority Report in his speech to the Trusteeship Council under Agenda Item 2.⁶³ This was part of the strategy not to come out directly with its own preferences but rather to work in an indirect way and behind the scenes to achieve the goal of integration. Canada and India assisted in this process. Before beginning with his position in regard to the Majority Report, Hopkinson took the opportunity to reiterate the UK's sentiment that the process was an unusual one to solve both 'complex' and 'delicate' issues. He agreed that "in the normal course, the Council would have had a full and detailed discussion of Mission's views on the many and important issues which arose." And as if he intended to emphasise the fact that it was not going to be a normal course of discussion, he informed the Trusteeship Council that his Government "had not been able to circulate written observations" on this special

report of the Visiting Mission. This was part of the strategy to give the anti-colonials no basis from which to launch an attack on the UK's written observations and to create a certain climate of opinion in the Trusteeship Council that would be favourable to the UK's preferred outcome.

We suggest that there were two additional factors which were indicative of conscious planning on the UK's part towards this goal. First, Hopkinson stressed the time factor which must be adhered to if the Trusteeship Council's report is to reach the General Assembly at the current session. At the same time, he asserted that "the stage reached in the affairs of Togoland under British administration gave unusual prominence to the part to be played by the General Assembly itself." In other words, taking both of the above together, it would be in the interest of process if the matter could be expedited through the Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly.

According to the Charter, the General Assembly should play an instrumental role in the process to finalise the transition from a trust to self-government or independence. Since the Trusteeship Council is only endowed with powers to recommend, it can effectual determine the operational limits within which the Assembly can make a decision in the kinds of recommendations that it makes. And, although the General Assembly is empowered to accept or reject these recommendations, Bargues of France felt that under these circumstances, the General Assembly "might not wish to go on record as contradicting the recommendation of the council."⁶⁴ We suggest that this assumption was to underlie the entire process in the Trusteeship Council. In this council, the UK

sought to set the operational limits of the General Assembly in its consideration of the Visiting Mission Report.

Secondly, by building his case on time limit factor and competence of the General Assembly at this stage, Hopkinson " suggested that it would be for the general convenience of all concerned and would not, he hoped, be regarded as a dereliction of duty on the part of the Trusteeship Council if it did not embark on the usual exhaustive discussion."⁶⁵ This was sufficient to underline his observation that the process would not be a 'normal' one. But to avoid giving the impression that the UK wanted to curtail discussion in order to stifle controversy, Hopkinson added that he did not "mean to suggest that the Council need do no more than forward the Mission's report to the General Assembly without expressing any views on the recommendations."

However, this short-circuiting of the process was absolutely necessary if the UK were to be able to influence the kinds of recommendations which would be transmitted with the Visiting Mission Report to the General Assembly. And since it is the Assembly that would take the final decision on the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, it was crucial to work towards creating a specific climate of opinion. Hopkinson therefore resolved to "concentrate on certain essentials, and for the time being reserved his comments on a number of other important aspects of the matter."⁶⁶ The perception of the Canadian Delegation in regard to the UK's posture at the strategy meeting is enlightening:

It seemed apparent to us in view of the time factor involved...as well as the objectives to be gained, that the United Kingdom (with the other Administering Powers acquiescing) would endeavour to steer the Council (its non-administering members) away from a full and

detailed discussion of the General Assembly's resolution 860 (IX) of September 14, 1954. This would not, we take it, preclude a review by the Council of the recommendations listed in paragraph 2 of this letter....⁶⁷

The speech of the UK Delegation in the Trusteeship Council on November 21 did verify the Canadian estimation of the "certain essentials" on which Hopkinson had proposed to concentrate. According to the Canadian Delegation, Gidden expressed the "hope it might be possible to avoid discussion in the Trusteeship Council on the substance of the Visiting Mission's recommendation with respect to the overall question of the plebiscite." He added that, "as a matter of tactics, it seemed advisable for the Council in transmitting these to the Assembly to confine its remarks to a broad commendation for the Visiting Mission's work in formulating arrangements for an effective handling of the plebiscite."⁶⁸

We propose to examine Hopkinson's speech in light of the above parameters in order to discover if, and to what extent, there is any discrepancy between UK policy position with its implied or expressed intentions and the corresponding democratic principles to which this process to terminate the TA would appeal. And in the following sub-section, what this would mean for Canada's decision-making process. In light of the UK's instructions to the Visiting Mission before it left for the Trust-Territories, why did Hopkinson feel the need to clarify his government's position to the Trusteeship Council - that it found no difficulty whatever with the Visiting Mission's recommendation to ascertain the wishes of British Togoland by means of a plebiscite? It was, in fact, exactly what the UK itself had recommended. Is it possible that the Trusteeship Council was

not aware of this Guidance Document? Hopkinson also felt the need to affirm a "widely accepted" fact that a plebiscite was "the fairest form of consultation in a case like the present." The UK was taking a public stance in an attempt to demonstrate its concern for the well-being of the peoples of British Togoland when, in fact, the private meetings and tactical planning were working towards the sole goal of integration.

The Visiting Mission was informed that the decision to ascertain the wishes of British Togoland "is a direct and necessary consequence of the imminence of Gold Coast independence," and that any attempt at disruption of this established union with the Gold Coast would have only massive, negative consequences for the territory.⁶⁹ By implication, it is obvious that, for the UK, "no other method would be feasible."⁷⁰ A plebiscite was its recommended choice and after the Visiting Mission reported to the Trusteeship Council, it became the only 'feasible' method for the UK. Consequently, the recommendation and the condition set forth in the Minority Report by Syria was, again by implication in this speech, rejected by the UK. Nothing else would be said in regard to this matter. In a very long and detailed speech, Hopkinson criticised the 'important' recommendations of the Visiting Mission Report.

Response to Visiting Mission Report: UK

A. Proposal for Subdivision

The Visiting Mission proposed that "for the purpose of taking the count" in the plebiscite, the territory should be divided and the central area further subdivided. The UK explained to its allies that this method was intended "to take account of the strength of opinion in the north and south for integration and continued Trusteeship respectively."⁷¹ But basically, "the manner in which the plebiscite was to be held...raised important problems" for the UK; both the proposal to subdivide the territory into areas and the questions to be put in the plebiscite were unacceptable. According to Hopkinson, "it could be argued that the whole recommendation, based as it was on an assessment of the present state of public opinion in the north and south respectively, to some extent prejudice the result of the plebiscite itself."⁷² The recommendation had the sole purpose of discovering exactly what the inhabitants of the territory desired. Why should the UK Delegation now reject such an important part of this democratic process? The petitioners, the attempt to set up a Joint Council and the Visiting Mission report of 1952 all indicated that there was a substantial desire in the southern part of British Togoland to separate from the Gold Coast. Therefore, the recommendation to subdivide the territory for the purpose of ascertaining the results of the plebiscite was in keeping not only with the present state of public opinion but also with the democratic process which the UN had undertaken to ascertain the wishes of the territory.

It was in the UK's opinion that "clearly mounted petitions" and the "lightly expressed conclusions" of the Visiting Mission Report of 1952⁷³ were significant factors which helped to create a climate of opinion that was sympathetic to the Ewes and the unification movement in the UN. The Charter had recognised that Petitions and the Visiting Mission were two crucial avenues whereby the international community could adequately supervise the Trust Territories. With this information at its disposal, the Visiting Mission took the unusual step to propose a subdivision of the territory. If the petitions and the Visiting Mission were not representative of the desire of this divided population, then a subdivision into distinct areas would be able to dispel any fears that any one significant part of the population was not able to exercise the right of self-determination in the UN supervised plebiscite.

However, according to Hopkinson, "it could further be contended that the very concept of a subdivision into areas was contrary to the essential purpose of a general test of public opinion such as was now proposed." We suggest that this viewpoint not only ignored the fact that the territory was not administered as a unit but was divided for administrative purposes in a North-South dichotomy and most importantly, it also disregarded the special circumstances of the historical colonial truncation of tribal and ethnic peoples. In light of the petitioner's assertions that the CPP had undertaken illegal steps in the territory such as infiltration and the redrawing of electoral boundaries so that the Gold Coast would achieve a majority in the election results, the UK should have accepted the

recommendation for subdivision in order to allow for a 'fair' consultation in a case like the present.⁷⁴

As a consequence, we must question the motives behind the UK Delegations speech to the Trusteeship Council and his arguments against the recommendation to subdivide the Territory, in name of democratic principles. Again, Hopkinson observed,

it might be asked whether the very object of a plebiscite was not to discover the wishes of the people; whether the wishes of the people, in accordance with free democratic practice, should not be interpreted to mean the wishes of the majority of the people; and whether it was not therefore right that the will of the majority should govern the whole result....⁷⁵

The democratic method, if applied to this special circumstance of an Administrative Union with its highly unequal distribution of power and undemocratic practices on the part of the Gold Coast, would necessarily result in a majority decision for integration which is favourable to the Gold Coast. This was the aim of both the UK and the Gold Coast.

The strategy to achieve this goal was a very simple one. The UK chose to disregard all the relevant internal factors of the territory which should have been the concern of any initiatives of policy. Hopkinson observed that "in any territory there was bound to be at least one minority opinion on fundamental questions affecting the future of the territory as a whole." But the UN was not entrusted with the resolution of the future status of just any territory, it was concerned specifically with British Togoland, which was not like any other territory. Any 'democratic' solution had to take this factor into consideration.

The UK appeal to democratic principles - 'fair' consultations, an emphasis on the will of the majority and on what is 'right' – was embedded in a working assumption that the situation in this territory should be assessed on the basis of criteria that are applicable to any territory. This is a fundamental component of the strategy to create a specific climate of opinion in the Trusteeship Council. Hopkinson drew attention to the serious practical consequences which would ensue if such a precedent (subdivision for electoral purposes) were to be generally adopted.⁷⁶ Again, the move from a specific case to a general application of method and principle served to deflect from the fact that the Visiting Mission Report was specifically designed to accommodate an amalgamation of unusual circumstances and conflicting needs. The unending request to the UN for oral hearings of petitioners and the Visiting Missions had attested to the existence of such.

The final UK judgement against the recommendation to subdivide into areas dismissed as irrelevant the fact that the territory was not a coherent political and economical unit. Hopkinson hypothesised:

if there was to be a process of fragmentation whenever there was a test of public opinion under the United Nations similar to that now proposed for Togoland under British administration, the prospect was indeed disturbing. The result, as the Visiting Mission must fully have realised, could be none other than the break-up of the viable political and economic units and the frustration of true constitutional progress.⁷⁷

In this framework of analysis of the situation, the UK eliminated what should have been the most basic operational factor: the wishes of the inhabitants of British

Togoland. The Administrative Union of British Togoland with the Gold Coast was a viable political and economic unit after 45 years.

But the Trusteeship Agreement did not sanction assimilation or automatic integration. And since it did not provide for any other status when the colony which shared this administration union became independent, the UN was obligated under the Charter to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of this territory and this territory alone, as to its future status. Besides, the constitutional activity which the UK and Nkrumah had undertaken in the Gold Coast should not have involved British Togoland at all. In referring to the separation of the Trust Territory from its neighbouring colony as 'fragmentation', Hopkinson was being consistent with his analogical portray of British Togoland as an intrinsic and permanent part of the Gold Coast. Such a formulation would automatically disregard any premise that British Togoland was a separate unit which had rights of its own.

Response to Visiting Mission Report: UK

B. Questions to be asked

The UK Delegation took exception to the Visiting Mission recommendation that two question should be asked on the plebiscite, and proceeded to qualify this by adding that a 'difficulty' would exist "if the Visiting Mission recommendation was adopted." The questions to be asked were:

- (1) Do you want integration of British Togoland with an independent Gold Coast?

- (2) Do you want separation of British Togoland from the Gold Coast and its continuance under the Trusteeship pending ultimate determination of its political future?

In keeping with its secret strategy "to obtain a reversal" of the Visiting Mission's recommendation on the choices to be put before the peoples of Togoland,⁷⁸ Hopkinson was suggesting, indirectly, that the Trusteeship Council was not really obliged to accept the Visiting Mission recommendations exactly as presented.

In his protestation as to why his government had 'difficulty' with the two questions, we find more of the same assertions and assumptions that were made in his speech against the Visiting Mission recommendation to subdivide the territory into 3 sections in order to assess the plebiscite results. The UK tactic to create a certain climate of opinion in the Trusteeship Council which would be favourable to integration was to continue to paint a picture of chaos and upheaval in the Trust Territory if any one section "might elect against integration with the Gold Coast." This would result in "new arrangements" having to be made, which Hopkinson speculated could "involve a dislocation possibly serious in the life of the inhabitants" who were seeking separation.

However, he added that no further details regarding this matter would be forthcoming because "much closer thought would have to be given to the problem."⁷⁹ This speech was fully in keeping with the private strategy in New York to "avoid discussion in the Trusteeship Council on the substance" of the recommendations. The speech was also consonant with Hopkinson's statement in the Trusteeship Council that "for the time being" the UK government wanted to "reserve...comments on a number of other important aspects of the matter." We

suggest that the UK government did not have to do any more thinking on the questions to be asked. Here is a summary of the UK's objectives, and the strategy which was designed to achieve them.

In spite of the fact that its Guidance Document to the Visiting Mission argued for a single question to be put on the plebiscite, the UK was faced with the recommendation to put two questions on the plebiscite. And it is the second question which presented the UK "with considerable difficulties," because it offered the inhabitants of British Togoland "its continuance under trusteeship pending ultimate determination of its political future." The UK had consistently taken the position that after the Gold Coast became independent, it would be 'impossible' to continue the Administrative Union 'exactly' as at present. It was to be expected that the whole administrative rearrangement would cause problems with the Gold Coast.

And it was for this reason that Circular W. No. 319 recommended to the UK Delegation that the queries as to who should be the Administering Authority for any part of the territory which choose to continue the Trusteeship Agreement, "should only be tackled if and when it is clear from results of plebiscite that inhabitants of Togoland or a part of it are opposed to immediate integration with the Gold Coast." This was the expressed 'preference' of the Gold Coast government,⁸⁰ and the UK felt that it was a "relevant factor" which must be taken into account when discussing strategy. The Gold Coast was recognised as an important behind-the-scenes interested actor by the UK and France.

The UK took the position that in order "to secure General Assembly's authority" to hold the plebiscite in the territory in the early part of 1956, and in light of the time factor, they had "no choice but to agree" to the recommendation of the Visiting Mission for the 2 questions.⁸¹ Yet in the New York strategy meeting which was held on the same day the Circular was dispatched, the UK had decided that its 'aim' in the General Assembly "should be to have it recommend the rejection of the second choice" on the plebiscite.⁸² Would not asking just the one question on the plebiscite have also served to prejudge the results? And if this was in fact the intention behind the push for a single question, how is this in keeping with democratic practice? Is it for this reason that Hopkinson did not express the UK's sentiment for the single question in his speech in the Trusteeship Council? Could we therefore assume that the UK's Guidance Document was given to the Visiting Mission in confidence and that the rest of the members of the Trusteeship Council were not aware of the UK's preferences? Or could it be that the Trusteeship Council knew of this document but because the speech in the Trusteeship Council is published, the UK Delegation said nothing in this regard fearing it would lead to controversial discussions in the Fourth Committee or in Plenary?

In the strategy meeting, the UK observed that, "if this question remained as a positive alternative, it would certainly affect the vote and, likely as not, nullify the efforts carried on by them in recent years, both in the Assembly and the territory, in favour of the acceptance of the idea of the integration...."⁸³ This factor must be taken in conjunction with the unequivocal position assumed

by Gold Coast Government to the alternative represented by the second question to be put on the plebiscite. Nkrumah claimed that he would "never agree to a continuation"⁸⁴ of Trusteeship once self-government or independence had been achieved. This behind-the-scene determining factor on UK decision making and policy position was known to only a selected few, among them was Canada. Was India aware of this significant Gold Coast's pressure on the UK? On November 18, the UK decided to work for a 'reversal' of the recommendation to put the second question on the plebiscite.

According to Gidden, "the worst possible tactic for the UK would accordingly be to come out in the Trusteeship Council with a statement that the second of the questions proposed was unacceptable either to them or to the Gold Coast."⁸⁵ It would have been a factual representation of the situation. However, in the strategy meeting it was decided that for the sake of appearance, this UN effort to ascertain the wishes of British Togoland ought not to be seen as being influenced by the wishes of either the neighbouring Gold Coast or of the Administering Authority. Therefore, what the strategy required was "to throw enough doubt in Delegations' minds as to its value for it to be discarded as a likely source of confusion."

India was recommended as a probable candidate to "table a resolution intended to implement the Visiting Mission's recommendations". The next step of this strategy would be to "have someone else introduce an amendment, the purpose of which would be to delete the second question."⁸⁶ At this stage the UK "was prepared in principle" to accept the Visiting Mission's recommendations for

the subdivision of the territory for purposes of the plebiscite.⁸⁷ But this policy was again "subject to unforeseen changes in the situation in the Gold Coast." The process was influenced to a great deal by decisions and happenings in the Gold Coast, many of which were kept hidden from the "public context" in which the UN had to work.

India's draft Resolution: Fourth Committee

At the beginning of December 1954, the Venezuelan Delegation complained about the inextricable nature of the problem of unification of the two Togolands. Although Members "had succeeded in achieving the virtually unanimous adoption of amendments and draft resolutions by the General Assembly," it was clear to this Delegation "that those parliamentary successes had had no tangible results."⁸⁸ What could be the contributing factors that such a situation was obtained? We suggest that in spite of the fact that the hearing of petitioners "had brought to light the multiplicity of viewpoints,"⁸⁹ the UK working with Nkrumah and France had decided what sort of information should be considered as being relevant to the resolution of the problem. It is our contention that India assisted this group by attempting to limit the frame of reference of the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of British and French Togoland. This Visiting Mission would set in motion the process by which the UN would terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland.

We propose in this section, to show what India attempted to do in this process by discussing India's draft resolution in light of the general trend in the debate.⁹⁰ In virtually ignoring the input from the many pro-unification petitioners and in selectively addressing those who petitioned for continued association with the Gold Coast, India sought to orchestrate which factors would be operational thereby influencing the dynamics of the process.

It was already apparent to the anti-colonials in early 1954, that India's intentions and actions were not necessarily in keeping with the content of its Delegation's speeches. The Indian draft resolution (A/C.4/L. 370) was a tangible case in point. The Canadian Delegation at the UN felt however, that "India's attitude on several items before the Fourth Committee had been prompted more because of a change of representatives than of basic policy."⁹¹ And the Delegation suggested that because "this was not always entirely understood by other members of the anti-colonial bloc who had come to regard India as their leader," this apparent contradiction in policy on the part of the Indian Delegation resulted in the "hesitation as to the course which they [anti-colonials] should adopt, especially with regard to the questions of South West Africa and Togoland."⁹²

For example, it is logical to assume that a Member's position in regard to Administrative Unions would directly relate to the kinds of preferences it would show in the resolution of the future status of British Togoland. However, the argument put forward by Mrs. L. Menon of India on November 17 prompting her to question "whether the time had not come to refer the question of

Administrative Unions involving political integration to the International Court for an advisory opinion,"⁹³ is in direct contradiction to the views put forward by Mr. Menon in the Fourth Committee on the December 7 in introducing his draft resolution for the Visiting Mission. His recommendations were based on the Administrative Union as a permanent factor.

Briefly, the Canadian Delegation reported that Mrs. Menon and the Yugoslavian Delegation both expressed their apprehension towards "a growing tendency" on the part of Administrative Authorities for the Charter-sanctioned Administrative Unions of the Trust Territories with their neighbouring Non-Self-Governing-Territories, to perceive these "as being politically integrated therein." The elections to set up a new legislative assembly in the Gold Coast under the constitutional reforms of June 1954 which included the inhabitants of the Trust Territory of British Togoland, specifically intended to do this. According to the Canadian Delegation, both speakers argued that "in conditions of such close association, the people's choice of their future status could hardly be free in fact."⁹⁴

Under these circumstances, it is obvious to expect Menon to reject any proposals which would take such a politically integrated union as the basis of recommendations for a solution to the future of the Trust Territory. But this is not what Menon did in his speech on December 7. He ignored the following considerations which Mrs. Menon had put forward. She rejected the step which the UK had taken in British Togoland in preparing the way for the UN acceptance

of integration. Mrs. Menon had observed that any alternative to integration would yield disastrous results because the Trust Territories,

by cutting themselves off from the Non-Self-Governing-Territory, they might well be faced with a total lack of any organised system of administration or legislation, any stable basis for separate economic existence, or any facilities for higher education. The inhabitants of the Trust Territories would therefore be forced to agree to a situation which they had no part in creating or to accept a separate existence with poor prospects. Such a choice would obviously not be in accordance with the basic objectives of the Trusteeship System.

In Mortimer's viewpoint, "the British hoped to preserve the integrity of the union which they had created out of the Gold Coast and British Togoland together," and in light of this desire, "they were therefore opposed to the reunification of former German Togo, and (were) fully prepared to co-operate with the French in playing down the Ewe problem."⁹⁵ This would mean which out of the "multiplicity of viewpoints" presented by the petitioners in the UN, only those that would work for the colonial position would be allowed an operational function in the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. Obviously, these countries would not publicly declare their intention and although the UK, France and Canada were logically placed in the colonial interest category, it was India's actions that would serve their purpose best. However, India's behaviour would not go unnoticed by anti-colonials such as Venezuela, Liberia, Haiti, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, just to name a few.

But as we have suggested, "the people's choice" and the application of the right of self determination were not operational factors in the UK's, France's, Canada's and India's framework of analysis of the situation. Consequently, no alternatives to integration would be considered by this group of

states. On December 7, in introducing his draft resolution, Menon asserted that "historically no country called Togoland had ever existed."⁹⁶ By a process of systematic deduction, he sought to eliminate all the obstacles which might impede the conduct of this exercise. This method was transparent to the anti-colonials.

The question of Togoland unification was disposed of because one could not unify what previously never did exist. The alternative of continuing the Trusteeship Agreement until the future of the Trust Territory could be decided at a later date was clearly not tenable because, "the country was too small, had no access to the sea and was viable neither from the administrative nor from the economic point of view."⁹⁷ The proposition of having the Gold Coast "assume the role of an Administrative Authority" was turned down because Menon felt that the Gold Coast "was too well versed in the subject" to undertake such a task voluntarily. He concluded that the "remaining possibility was independence, which did not mean isolation."

And, in light of the fact that the Trust Territory had already actively participated in parliamentary methods through the legislative assembly in the Gold Coast, Menon asserted that British Togoland "was therefore capable of governing itself on democratic lines." So "integration would mean fusion, with independence" because "the Indian Delegation could see no other solution."⁹⁸ This framework purposely ignored the fact that the UN did not recognise the validity of the elections which set up the legislative assembly in the Gold Coast and which sought to incorporate, politically, the Trust Territory into the Gold

Coast institutions. The framework also assumed an alleged independence whereby the Trust Territory would "govern itself;" this would not be obtained under integration. The intent here was to effectively force the inhabitants to agree to a situation which they had no part in creating. Menon was interpreting the Administrative Union in the way which Mrs. Menon had envisaged, with great perturbation, a few days before.

We suggest that Menon's strategy to give some credence to his discriminative portrayal of the situation was a resort to the report of the UN Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in West Africa in 1952. He declared that because it had only "vaguely referred to unification but had made no specific proposals on the subject, the Assembly need not take a decision immediately, but it should express its opinion." And he asserted: "for that reason" the Indian draft resolution "proposed...that the question should be referred to the Trusteeship Council." This recommendation would serve to transfer the matter out of the hands of a predominantly anti-colonial Fourth Committee into a 'balanced' context. In so doing, Menon could effectively alter the dynamics of the process whereby the framework for the solution would emphasise the administrative convenience of integration, at the expense of the right of self determination of the inhabitants of the territory.

However, the anti-colonials would have none of Menon's manipulation of the content and process in such a pro-colonial way. In the following exchange we are able to show how Menon intentionally sought to manipulate the process by systematically trying to create a climate of opinion favourable to integration.

But because Menon tried to hold on to India's anti-colonial image at the same time, several Members were able to point out the discrepancies between what he said that he wanted to achieve, and the his framework for UN action in the process to terminate this Trusteeship Agreement.

It was obvious to the Members that Menon's concept of self-government by the Trust Territory was to find a fit solely within the context of integration of British Togoland with the Gold Coast. This notion of integration was clarified in great detail by Menon himself, not another member of the Indian Delegation, in the Trusteeship Council on March 3, 1954. He declared that if British Togoland would decide to accept the alternative of integration, then "it must do so for good and all." Menon acknowledged that generally "most constitutions including the Indian, provided no right of secession," because "the permanence of accession was a necessity of national survival."⁹⁹

The anti-colonial trend in the debate laid stress on finding a method whereby the inhabitants of the Trust Territory would be able to exercise the right of self-determination, and this necessarily entailed a choice between unification and integration. Rivas of Venezuela spoke directly after Menon. In his judgement, "the economic dependence to which the territory's situation appeared to condemn it" gave cause for "particular concern." This reflected Mrs. Menon's misgiving about "such close association" of these Administrative Unions. Rivas, in choosing to use the word 'incorporation' instead of 'integration', recognised that it "would not only increase those difficulties but would make the unification of the two parts of Togoland even more complicated."¹⁰⁰

This position was a rejection of Menon's contention that a Togoland never existed. He reminded the Members that the UN process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement must take unification into consideration. Rivas "was glad to note that under the Indian draft resolution, the Trusteeship Council was to take into account the views expressed by the members of the Committee."¹⁰¹ It is interesting to note how the anti-colonial members sought ways of letting the Indian Delegation know that it was abdicating its leadership role in this specific process, while acknowledging the intangible efforts of the Indian Delegation which appeared to be working for the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. However, if the process to terminate this Trusteeship Agreement is to be in keeping with General Assembly resolution 637 (VII) regarding the UN role and the right of self-determination, then Rivas "felt that the next Visiting Mission should examine the question in connection with that of Togoland unification."¹⁰²

The Soviet representative speaking directly after Rivas also ignored India's attempt to give integration under Item 52 a tactical position of priority. He pointed out that "the two items , 35 and 52, Future and Unification, had been introduced for diametrically opposed reasons." He argued that the Togoland unification had been before the UN Trusteeship Council since April 2, 1947, asking for "an end to the division of the Ewe peoples." And in order to stress the importance which this issue had been given by the UN, Grubyakow of the Soviet Union reminded the Committee that,

since its inclusion in the agenda of sessions of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council, the Togoland unification problem had been the subject of many resolutions, reports by Visiting Missions and innumerable petitions from organisations and inhabitants of the

Territories, which continue to call for restoration of a unified Togoland.¹⁰³

Therefore, India's attempt to minimise the importance of Item 35 was rejected by anti-colonials. It was clear that, in the resolution of this issue, India was certainly concerned with a limited number of specific objectives.

In an obvious attempt to dissociate French Togoland from British Togoland's future context, Cardin of Canada asserted that this problem which the UN had been "trying to solve" during the last seven years "appeared to exist only at the regional level."¹⁰⁴ In other words, from the Canadian perspective, there were no basis for unification. Canada took part in the combined pro-colonial effort to create a climate of opinion that would be favourable to the integration idea in the UN. The Delegation pointed out that during the same seven years "political developments of a most important nature had been taking place in Togoland under British administration." Canada sought to portray British Togoland as a separate unit in an attempt to show that the process which was enabling this separate unit a possibility of integration was a democratic one.

Cardin began his speech by trying to dismiss the unification issue as a factor in the UN framework of analysis. He asserted that "the idea, held until recently, that views in Togoland were generally in favour of a particular form of unification was far from correct." He arrived at this conclusion after listening to the views expressed by "other political groups" at the UN. This is one indicator that Canada had chosen to take a public stand for integration. Other groups had petitioned the UN for a continued association with the Gold Coast. The second indicator is his interpretation of the efforts to re-establish the Joint Council; this

was combined with the new source of information from the other political groups. Cardin observed: "at most, the petitioners' statements which the Committee had just heard served to explain the results of the consultation which the Administering Authority had held regarding the re-establishment of the Joint Council for Togoland affairs."¹⁰⁵ In other words, the pro-integration petitioners would be Canada's selective source of information, in addition to that supplied by the UK and France. They claimed that the majority of the inhabitants of both territories were against the re-establishment of the Joint Council.¹⁰⁶

It was in Cardin's opinion that the Trust Territory under British administration "had progressed at the same rate" as the Gold Coast towards self-government because it was "for administrative purposes an integral part of the Gold Coast." Therefore, taking all of the above into consideration and the new situation in which the General Assembly was to ascertain, in pursuance of Article 76 of the Charter, the views of the inhabitants regarding their future he declared that,

to place any further insistence on the particular question of the unification of Togoland would therefore be to prejudge the issue. For similar reasons, his Delegation felt, that it ought not for the present to express any definite views on the political and administrative re-organisation of Togoland under French administration.¹⁰⁷

As a consequence, the unification issue which involved French Togoland would no longer find a fit in Canada's framework of analysis regarding the future of British Togoland. The Canadian Delegation "would support" the Indian draft resolution "which ought to give effect" to the UK proposal that "the population

should be allowed to decide its own future...in whatever manner might be deemed best suited for the purpose."¹⁰⁸

In principle, this explanation would seem to be in keeping with the requirements of a democratic process and upholding the democratic principle of freedom of choice. However, Canada chose to endorse the proposal "since, as the Administering Authority had suggested, it provided for the Assembly to request the Trusteeship Council to consider and formulate arrangements for consulting the inhabitants of that part of Togoland in 1956."¹⁰⁹ Therefore, seeking to eliminate the possibility of unification and consequently the freedom of choice for British Togoland, Canada, the UK and the Indian draft resolution were working together in an operation to effectively deny the application of the right of self determination to these inhabitants. This exercise in deception did not escape the attention of the anti-colonials in the UN.

Cardin's careful proposal that "within the limits of its term of reference, the Committee should take steps as might hasten the progress of the Trust Territories towards self-government and independence," rang hollow. The anti-colonial members were aware that the Canadian viewpoint favoured an absorption of British Togoland into the Gold Coast. "It would be a matter of regret" observed Cardin "if in its desire to do so the Committee did not take the fullest account of the legitimate aspirations of the people."¹¹⁰ Canada's speech pushing for integration and the Indian draft resolution sought to circumvent this democratic process. Both positions effectively ignored the directives of General Assembly Resolution 750 (VIII) which attempted to facilitate the process for a

probable future unification of the two Togolands and, as such, had a lot to do with the "legitimate aspirations" regarding the future of the people of British Togoland.

If Canada's policy was to work for a democratic and fair process which would actualise the recommendations of General Assembly Resolution 637 (VII), then the directives of General Assembly Resolution 750B(VIII) should have continued to have an operational function in Canada's framework for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. But both Canada and India had a priority on how this issue should be resolved; both decided at a relatively early stage to help to smooth the way for integration,"¹¹¹ thereby eliminating all other alternatives in their conceptual framework for British Togoland.

The Liberian Delegation, speaking directly after Cardin, did not respond to Cardin's speech. It was typical of a pro-colonial position which for all intents and purposes, sought to portray a concern for the rights of the inhabitants. However, Miss Brooks directed her attention to the Indian Delegation. Like Rivas of Venezuela, Brooks of Liberia "was glad to see that, while advocating integration of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration with the Gold Coast, India conceded the point that the will of the inhabitants must prevail."¹¹² The anti-colonials seemed to be more concerned with the policy position of the Indian Delegation than any other and they did not display any hesitation in bringing the Indian Delegation to task for the gaping discrepancies between its speeches and its preferred actions.

In addition, the Liberian Delegation acknowledged the concession of the Indian Delegation "that the Togoland Territories were Trust and not Colonial

Territories and the Administering Authorities could not, therefore, be considering the possibility of annexing them to adjoining Territories."¹¹³ In effect, the Indian Delegation was being served a notice that the anti-colonials were fully aware of its strategy of deception. Brooks also placed Nkrumah, on notice, by informing him that her Delegation did not accept the argument that integration of the Trust Territory of British Togoland and Gold Coast was an established fact. Brooks stated that "she was particularly appreciative of the desire revealed by the Gold Coast to see a territory bordering on its own become independent."¹¹⁴

This statement clearly indicated that the territory was separate and it was not part of the Gold Coast, and that the Gold Coast was not in any way to decide the future of this territory. Brooks "hoped, however, that the Gold Coast would not confine its gesture to colonial or Trust Territories bordering its territory but to all dependent Territories in Africa and elsewhere which had not attained their independence."¹¹⁵ In other words, Brooks recognised no special rights or interests of the Gold Coast in the neighbouring Trust Territory of British Togoland. She felt that, for the Gold Coast, this territory should be like any other territory.

In light of Liberia's definition of the situation, Brooks "did not understand why there should be a fear of presenting to the people the question of a choice between unification or integration." But the interests working for integration would not publicly explain the background of this 'fear'. Although Mrs. Menon had warned of the possibility, Brooks

...had received proof that when two Territories were administered together and one was subordinate to another in preference to

considering the future of both as independent entities, the inhabitants of the territory which was subordinated became doubtful as to the possibility of successfully leading an independent existence if separation of the two were envisaged.¹¹⁶

However, her Delegation refused to consider such pro-colonial misgivings against the temporary continuation of the Trusteeship Agreement which would facilitate the possibility of a later desire for the unification of both Togolands. She affirmed that the agenda "had called for a study" of the Togoland unification problem and because the interests of the inhabitants of both territories were paramount, she 'hoped' that the Indian draft resolution would enable the inhabitants a choice between integration and unification. Although she observed that if the draft resolution "was intended to cover both the Togoland unification problem and the future inhabitants of the Trust Territory of Togoland under UK Trusteeship, it had not been so stated in the text."¹¹⁷ Again, she reminded the Indian Delegation that such; an omission was not overseen and would not be accepted as such, hence the amendments to the draft resolution.

On December 10, Antor of the opposition party, the Togoland Congress, confessed to the Fourth Committee that "the patience of his people had been sorely tried and that feelings were strong in the Trust Territory."¹¹⁸ He petitioned the Committee to facilitate the process to grant the desired unification and independence, and the request for a plebiscite in both Trust Territories. Moreover, he sought to inform the Committee, from his party's point of view, of the situation in the Trust Territory:

Three United Nations resolutions had been ignored by the Administering Authority¹¹⁹ the conditions which had made that possible still prevailed, namely, violation of civil rights, the elimination

of freedom of speech and assembly, the rigging of electoral districts and the intimidation of the people.¹²⁰ It was impossible to depend on the United Kingdom and French authorities to ensure that the will of the people was freely ascertained. It was essential, therefore, that the General Assembly should establish appropriate machinery to overcome all those violations, eliminate the gerrymandered electoral districts and establish proper ones.¹²¹

It had been already established that such electoral districts were designed on an East-West basis to ensure a majority vote for integration.

Antor categorically rejected Menon's premise that because Togoland had no historical claim to an entity that the unificationists also had no basis for such a claim. He countered: "that same argument could be applied to almost all countries in Africa including the Gold Coast and to many European countries."¹²² Nevertheless, he reserved his strongest criticism for the Administering Authorities who "had done nothing to establish legislative institutions to teach the people self-rule on Western lines."¹²³ This was in violation of the Trusteeship Agreement. According to the Charter, the territory was supposed to retain its own political identity as a separate unit in the Administrative Union.

In a long speech, Singh of India acknowledged the "many references" which "had been made" to Assembly Resolutions 652 (VII) and 750(VIII). Both resolutions recognised that "unification was the manifest aspiration of the majority of the population." And although he 'agreed' with the Polish representative "that the frontier between the two Togolands was artificial," he nevertheless insisted that "so was the frontier which had separated German Togoland from the Gold Coast." He claimed that in both cases, various tribes had been dismembered."¹²⁴ Under these circumstances, it would have been logical to

expect Singh to argue the case for both unification and integration, for in a democratic process, these alternatives ought to have been available as choices. He conceded that the complicating factors of "ethnic links" with the Gold Coast and French Togoland "considerations of freedom and independence" or maybe "the price of cocoa" made it difficult for anyone in New York to make a decision on the future of these people.

Therefore, he concluded that "only the people concerned could decide what was best for them and they had a right to decide their own destiny."¹²⁵ This position, like Canada's, is in keeping with basic democratic principles and procedures. But then, Singh sought to set aside the General Assembly's previous decisions that unification was the manifest aspiration of the majority of the people. In a rather similar vein, Cardin of Canada attempted to rectify the situation which was caused by the views on unification and which he referred to as "far from correct," although they were held until recently in the UN. In Singh's judgement, these previous decisions which were based on "outside evidence of various reports and petitions" should not take too much precedence over the "new factor;" the UK government had now announced that it was in agreement that a plebiscite be held.¹²⁶

In other words, like Canada, India felt that all the old evidence which documented the desire for unification - a seven year process in the United Nations activities of receiving Petitions and sending Visiting Mission etc. - should all be set aside and should not be allowed to "prejudge the issue." The Indian Delegation suggested that,

the Committee should take advantage of that new factor. The wishes of the people could be ascertained far better by a plebiscite based on universal adult suffrage and the secret ballot and held under United Nations supervision than by any number of studies and Visiting Missions.¹²⁷

Again, like Canada's position, this proposition appealed to democratic principles and procedures while at the same time purposefully repudiating the cumulative authority of previous General Assembly's decisions and recommendations. It also discarded the information provided by the petitioners. They had warned the UN that any plebiscite would be subject to infiltration, gerrymandering and other undemocratic action, in order to achieve a result in favour of integration.

The strategy of the Indian Delegation was a transparent and very simple one. First, the previously operational factors which contributed to make British Togoland a complicated and difficult case were to be ignored and new ones were to be set in their place. Secondly, a new definition of the situation had to be established. Singh protested that the term 'integration' was apparently being 'misused'. In his Delegation's opinion, "there was no question of integration or annexation, since the decision would be taken voluntarily and freely by the independent people of Togoland under British administration and not by the Gold Coast."¹²⁸ He not only chose to ignore the well-known 'subject' conditions that were obtained in British Togoland as a result of its integrated administration with the Gold Coast, but he also decided to accredit the Trust Territory an independent status which was free from the influence of the Gold Coast.

Cardin of Canada had also attempted to portray the Trust Territory as a unit unconnected in any way with the Gold Coast, but he did not misrepresent

the facts of the situation to the degree that Singh did. The inhabitants of British Togoland could not be considered by any standards to be 'independent' of the Gold Coast. The UN, after studying the situation for seven years, knew this to be the case. Why did the Indian Delegation take such a stance that was evidently in conflict with the established facts of case? In its attempt to defend the position taken in its draft resolution, Singh sought to explain why his Delegation had "differed from those Delegations advocating unification." Although

it felt that the people of Togoland under British administration wanted integration, it did not seek to impose that solution on them. The advocates of unification, however, implied that the General Assembly had decided that the people wanted unification and that that decision should be enforced.¹²⁹

Despite the arduous process to create a climate of opinion in favour of integration in the UN, the Indian Delegation declared in the final analysis that "the question of unification versus integration was unimportant in itself."

The decision of Singh to renounce the information from all previously established methods of the UN - the hearing of petitioners and the Visiting Missions - is a dramatic one in the service of India's own self interest. Although Singh terminated his speech by granting that "the important thing was to ascertain what the people wanted and then give it to them," his Delegation was surely aware of the fact that the Indian draft resolution was not designed to address a wide array of desires or interests.

Winiewicz of Poland answered the charge of the Indian Delegation that the anti-colonials¹³⁰ "intended to impose unification" on the two Trust Territories. Since one of the basic arguments against the unification issue was

that it would delay the process of independence of British Togoland because French Togoland was not yet ready "to be ascertained," the push for integration with the Gold Coast which would soon achieve independence had assumed a sort of "rush to independence" mentality. The Delegation of Poland warned the Committee that it "should not prejudge the issue of ascertaining whether the people of both Trust Territories wished for unification by over-hasty action on Togoland under British administration and its relationship with the Gold Coast." He protested that if any one group was attempting "to impose" a solution on the inhabitants then it was the integrationists who were acting in this regard. The Indian draft resolution was a crucial part in this process to achieve this aim.

At this stage in the process, the dichotomy between unificationists and integrationists paralleled the same division on policy which was found between colonials and anti-colonials. Singh's speech was taken by Delegations such as Haiti and Poland, as an attack on the anti-colonial position. It is in recognition of this selective intent of the draft resolution that Winiewicz expressed his dissatisfaction to the Committee. He pointed out that "the only major objection to the India draft resolution was that it brushed aside the question of unification, which had been on the agenda of the United Nations for so many years."¹³¹ But this action of the Indian Delegation was in keeping with its attitude in regard to the process to terminate the Trust Agreement over British Togoland. There was a change in this attitude, from a pro-unificationist to a pro-integrationist, and despite the successive changes in Delegations, there remained a consistent pro-integrationist policy.

Like the Delegations of Liberia, Haiti, and Syria, the Delegation of Poland reminded the Indian Delegation that "on many other occasions, the Indian Delegation had been in favour of ascertaining the wishes of the people of the Trust Territories with regard to unification."¹³² And therefore the attempt of the anti-colonials to remind the Indian Delegation that the UN should continue to retain unification as an alternative in the process to ascertain the wishes of people, should not be 'interpreted' as a 'decision' to enforce it as a sole possibility. In addition, he suggested that those Delegations which have expressed reservations on the Indian draft resolution should not be considered by the Indian Delegation to be automatically imposing unification.

According to Ottawa, France, India, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, supported the UK view that "integration could be regarded as awarding a full measure of self-government to the inhabitants..." while at the same time "achieving the aims of the Trusteeship provisions of the Charter." However, Ottawa thought that the USSR, Poland, the Philippines, Yugoslavia and other anti-colonial Members "had doubts as to the extent of self-government that would accrue to British Togoland through unification with the Gold Coast."¹³³ There were many references in the secret correspondence of the colonial group where India was accorded a pro-colonial status on this one issue of termination. And in terms of its policy position, India was behaving like a pro-colonial in the eyes of the anti-colonials.

It was in the opinion of the Canadian Delegation that the anti-colonial Members "suspected that the UK wished to remove British Togoland from United

Nation's influence" through the avenue of integration with the Gold Coast and at the same time leave the French government in a position to unite French Togoland to Dahomey.¹³⁴ The pro-colonial Members knew that the anti-colonial group harboured suspicions about UK–French collusion to bring British Togoland to a rapid decolonisation through integration. This would leave the way free for France to determine the destiny of French Togoland in the absence of the possibility of the unification of French and British Togoland. Officials in Ottawa believed that because of these suspicions, the Indian draft resolution introduced by Menon "was substantially amended in its progress through the committee."¹³⁵

In its original form, this resolution would have in a limited context, instructed the Visiting Mission to make a special study of the Togoland problem without specifically enumerating all the possibilities that would find a fit in a democratic process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. This was unacceptable to the anti-colonials and they worked to make it an all inclusive one. The amended draft resolution 'embodied' the Assembly's decision that

steps be taken in light of the peculiar circumstances of the territory, to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants as to their future, without prejudice to the eventual solution they may choose whether it be independence, unification of an independent Togoland under British administration with an independent Togoland under French administration, unification with an independent Gold Coast or some other self-government or independent status.¹³⁶

The anti-colonial states had categorically rejected the proposed direction which the UN should follow in the Indian draft resolution.

In the next step in the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement, it was the Trusteeship Council's responsibility to decide on what

arrangements had to be undertaken in light of the recommendations and instructions of General Assembly Resolution 860 (IX). It instructed the Trusteeship Council to dispatch a special mission to the West African Trust Territories in order to undertake a study of how the UN could best ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. In addition the Council was to submit a report on this Mission's work to the 10th General Assembly. We presume that because the Fourth Committee did not support the effort of the Indian Delegation, Menon sought to produce a combined effort with two anti-colonial states. Their main concern were the decisions taken by the Trusteeship Council to set up the machinery in order to implement General Assembly Resolution 860(IX).

On March 11, 1955 Menon spoke in the Trusteeship Council regarding the final stages of planning before the Special Visiting Mission was to leave for the territories: the Trusteeship Council approval of the persons that were nominated for the Mission, the itinerary and the Mission's "functions as a periodic Visiting Mission." He emphasised, again, that "whatever solution was adopted must be governed by two factors: the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and, even more important, the wishes of the inhabitants." His Fourth Committee's speech at the ninth session had set new parameters for the UN resolution of the problem on British Togoland's future. And he knew that the anti-colonial members - Haiti, Syria, El Salvador and the USSR - sitting in the Trusteeship Council were aware of this public position.

This cautious speech in the Trusteeship Council seemed to reflect an attempt to tone down his aggressive push for integration. Menon observed that,

the members of the Council might have their own views as to which solution would be the best, and indeed the Indian Delegation had stated its predilections at the ninth session of the General Assembly, but such views could, and must, be only tentative pending ascertainment of the people's wishes. The aspirations of the inhabitants of the inhabitants must be taken into account.¹³⁷

Could it be that Menon had realised, after "substantial amendments to its draft resolution" and after speeches of Delegations like Haiti and Poland in the Fourth Committee at the ninth session, that the Indian Delegation had finally and effectively lost its credibility as an anti- colonial? Why then in one short speech - by the Indian standard for speeches in the UN - would Menon now concede, twice, that the 'aspirations' and 'wishes' of inhabitants should have an operative function in this process to terminate?

The anti-colonials in both the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council no longer sought the leadership of the Indian Delegation in this case before the UN. It was so obvious to them that the Indian Delegation was not working in the interests of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory in this process. This could also be gleaned from the confidential correspondences between the Canadian and UK Delegations from New York, and from officials in London and Ottawa. Nevertheless, Menon felt it necessary, in this speech in the Trusteeship Council, to alert the Visiting Mission to the dangers involved in addressing itself to the aspirations of the inhabitants. He felt it was an "important consideration in Africa" and in light of the circumstances in the Trust Territory, the Visiting Mission should "not seek to introduce or perpetuate elements of discord."¹³⁸ In other words, Menon was still being consistent with his previous position that not too

many alternatives should be proposed in the effort to ascertain the wishes of the people. This is what he seemed to want to reinforce in an indirect way.

Bargues of France assisted in reducing the alternatives for the Visiting Mission by refusing access to a Special Visiting Mission to French Togoland. The French Government would be 'unable' to receive such a mission because,

not only would the arrival of such a mission have adverse repercussions locally, but its very appointment ran counter to a provision of the Charter, the Trusteeship Agreement and the Council's rules of procedure. It was clear from Article 87(c) of the Charter, Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Trusteeship Agreement and rule 94 of the Council's rules of procedure that the only missions the Council could send to Trust Territories were the periodic regular Visiting Mission.¹³⁹

It is evident that this position of the French government had a legal basis even though it served both French and British interests in the Trust Territories. In choosing to utilise this legal argument, the French Delegation took the opportunity again to disassociate its part of Togoland from the developments in British Togoland. This was in spite of the parallel development in French Togoland which would lead the French Government to seek a termination of its Trusteeship Agreement within a short space of time.

The Charter called for periodic Visiting Missions to the Trust Territories every 3 years and because the next mission was due to visit the Trust Territories in West Africa in 1955, the French Government could not prevent it from entering French Togoland. Bargues explained that,

it could not, however, agree to the appointment of a special mission to make a special study of the specific questions covered by General Assembly Resolution 860 (IX). The only solution acceptable to the French Government would be to ask the regular Visiting Mission to undertake the special study as part of its normal functions.¹⁴⁰

France felt it necessary to submit its own amendment (T/L 553) to paragraph 2 of the joint draft Resolution (T/L 551) to this effect. This exercise undertaken by the French Delegation to affect what seemed to be a simple procedural change was, in reality, an important step in the process dealing with the future of British Togoland. Actually, this effort to disassociate French Togoland from developments in British Togoland was, in principle, a replica of the actions undertaken by the French Government to sabotage the re-establishment of the Joint Council.

Both the special Visiting Mission and the Joint Council were machinery to facilitate the process to ascertain the true wishes of the inhabitants of both Trust Territories, especially in regard to their desire for unification. Moreover, the decision of the French government to refuse to receive the special Visiting Mission in French Togoland was an acknowledgement of the value that is attached to the presence and the work of the Visiting Mission in the Trust Territories for the UN's role of supervision.¹⁴¹ Easton wrote: "on the whole, knowledge that a mission from the UN may visit a territory has served to keep the colonial administration more alert than it otherwise would have been; and this fact cannot fail to have been of benefit to the territories."¹⁴²

The Visiting Mission's frame of reference for a special investigation was limited to the context of British Togoland. Even though Agenda Item 14 was concerned with the future of the UK Trust Territory of Togoland, the French Delegation was aware of the fact that a democratic process to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of British Togoland necessarily involved the

ascertainment of the wishes of French Togoland at the same time. This was a necessary condition of any future possibility at unification. The decision of the French Government to refuse the special mission was a major step towards circumventing this possibility for unification at a later date. Consequently, the draft resolution submitted jointly by the Delegations of El Salvador, India and Syria in the Trusteeship Council accounted for two distinct sets of functions for the special Visiting Mission. In British Togoland, its frame of reference derived from General Assembly resolution 860(IX). In French Togoland, it would be guided by the conditions set down in the Trusteeship Agreement and therefore it could not undertake any special investigation of the Trust Territory as it was instructed to do in British Togoland.

Visiting Mission Report: Trusteeship Council - India's Response

In its report to Ottawa on the strategy meeting in New York regarding the Visiting Mission's report, the Canadian Delegation 'believed' that India "may be relied upon to assist the United Kingdom in achieving its objectives in the Trusteeship Council."¹⁴³ Basically, the UK had wanted "to avoid discussions in the Trusteeship Council on the substance of the Visiting-Mission's recommendations." The French Delegate spoke directly after the UK Delegate's response to the Special Report of the Visiting Mission at the 648th meeting. Bargues of France was the last speaker at this meeting and Lall of India was the first speaker at the next meeting in the Trusteeship Council; he was followed by

Gerig of the USA. This effort at consolidation was essential to the strategy of creating a specific climate of opinion at the outset of the discussions on the Visiting Mission Report.

Like Hopkinson of the UK, Lall did not address the Minority Report in his long speech which he announced would be of a "preliminary character" because he wanted to await the views of the other members of the UN and of the petitioners who would come before the Fourth Committee. It seemed as though he wanted to create the impression that his government had not yet decided on a final policy position in regard to the important decisions which the UN had still to make; these were the terms of process and the goal sought in the resolution of this issue. His Delegation favoured a plebiscite as "the best method of ascertaining the wishes...in the existing circumstances."

Questions to be asked

Lall's position was consistent, in principle, with the position Menon had taken in the General Assembly on the preparations for the Visiting Mission trip to the Trust Territories and on the Indian draft resolution which was "substantially amended" by the anti-colonial Members. Lall felt that the questions "should first of all be capable of immediate implementation otherwise the plebiscite would have little practical value and might lead to confusion." This proposition, in principle, necessarily and immediately excluded the alternative of continuing the Trusteeship Agreement. Lall assumed that "there could be no doubt that the first

question...was a practical one that could be implemented at once."¹⁴⁴ At the outset, he had opted in a definitive way for the question which could prejudice the result of the plebiscite in favour of integration and in this sense he was working with the colonials to create a climate of 'doubt' in regard to the second question. The UK felt that this question "should be discarded as a likely source of confusion."¹⁴⁵

The Indian Delegation asserted that the second question was "obviously based on the presumption that a continuation of the Trusteeship Agreement was possible after the Gold Coast became independent." If the Administrative Union was in keeping with Trusteeship Agreement, then the Trust Territory would have been administered as a separate political unit with its separate identity; for all intents and purposes, a continuation would have been possible. Lall further asserted that because the objectives of the Trusteeship System had "already been substantially attained, he could not see why a part of the territory should be separated and continued" under the Trusteeship System. Seven years of UN investigation of the situation had confirmed that the southern part of Togoland not only rejected any form of integration with the Gold Coast, but it also insisted on some form of unification with French Togoland in the future. Therefore, Lall knew that if this alternative was placed in the plebiscite, the UK would surely be confronted with the need to continue some form of Trusteeship Agreement for the southern part of Togoland. And, it is because of this specific reason that the colonial strategy required that the UN discard this alternative from the plebiscite.

The UN had sanctioned the Trusteeship Agreement which allowed for an Administrative Union of British Togoland "as an integral part" of the Gold Coast. When the Gold Coast became independent, it was obvious that the Administering Authority could not continue to administer the Trust Territory as an integral part of the Gold Coast. This was clearly stated in the UK Memorandum to the Secretary General to request termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. Consequently, Lall complained that "it was not clear what the alternative was" if part of Togoland chose not to be permanently integrated in the Gold Coast. But more importantly, it was also not 'clear' to him "why continued tutelage should be necessary."¹⁴⁶ These are the kinds of words an "anti-colonial" India would use and which would have some credibility with the anti-colonial members if the context was a genuine desire to decolonise subject peoples through the realisation of the right of self determination. But the Indian Delegation proposed alternative to this "continued tutelage" would effectively deny the realisation of this right to British Togoland.

Lall based his argument on the fact that the Trust Territory was administered "as a part of" the Gold Coast and declared that,

the logical result of that fact would be the development of the Trust Territory towards independence as part and parcel of the Gold Coast. Any attempt at the present stage to change the natural course of events might well have serious consequences not only for the Trust Territory but also for the Gold Coast.¹⁴⁷

It is evident that this view point ignored the fundamental and crucial part of the work which the UN had undertaken for seven years - the receipt of written and oral petitions, the conclusion of the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in

1952 that the unification of both Togolands "is the manifest aspiration of the majority" of the two territories, and two General Assembly resolutions which recognised this fact.

It is without any doubt that the 1952 report of the Visiting Mission had served to strengthen the case for the petitioners seeking unification. Nevertheless, was it not an important part of a democratic process to ascertain the wishes of the peoples in regard to their future status? And in light of the fiasco in the Fourth Committee and again the above repudiation by the Indian Delegation of the UN's previous work, and the authority of the General Assembly resolutions, how much weight can we put on Lall's expressed claim at the beginning of his speech, to be interested in the views of "the other members of the UN and of the various petitioners who would be appearing before the Forth Committee"? Was this also not a part of the UK's strategy to avoid discussions on the substance of the Visiting Mission Report? By postponing the discussion in the Trusteeship Council was Menon not doing the same thing?

The UK was clearly interested in the consequences of the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement on its colony, the Gold Coast. The anti-colonial interest, in the first instance, was centred on the right of self determination of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. Evidently, India's interest as portrayed in its policy did not find a fit in this group. According to Lall,

in the opinion of the Indian Delegation the people of Togoland under British administration should at the present stage be asked only one question, i.e., the question concerning integration with the Gold Coast. If integration were rejected a new situation would arise which would have to be considered afresh, but for the present it was not necessary to anticipate that.¹⁴⁸

In principle, this proposition was more or less identical with that of the pro-colonials "negative majority" and the "implied alternative." Both propositions seem to imply that the second question had no significance or positive value for the process to determine the wishes of the inhabitants and for this reason it was not necessary to place it on the plebiscite in the first place.

The Indian Delegation's interpretation of the alternative to continue the Trusteeship Agreement in the second question again laid emphasis on the effect it would have on the Gold Coast, while at the same time ignoring the fact that if this alternative is disposed of, the inhabitants of the territory would be denied the right of self-determination. Lall's framework for continuation of the Trusteeship Agreement rested on the integral part formula which would necessarily "amount to limitation of that country's [Gold Coast] sovereignty." And if the Trusteeship Agreement was to be continued outside the Administrative Union concept, Lall "regarded the independent and isolated existence of Togoland under British administration as precarious, both politically and economically." In light of the above, "he could not therefore see any practical advantage in putting the second question to the people." Was this position a part of the combined effort to create a climate of doubt?

The Indian Delegation then proceeded to explicate on the "many practical difficulties" that the unification of the two Togolands would bring on both parts. The 30-year development of the "different legal and administrative systems and with different cultural backgrounds" would be the source of difficulties and for these reasons, Lall advised that such a "union...should not...be given serious

consideration at the present stage unless there was clear evidence that a very large majority of the people in both Territories were in favour of unification. Such evidence was lacking." This speech was given in the context of agenda item 2 of the Trusteeship Council which dealt with General Assembly Resolution 860 (IX): the Togoland unification problem and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration. The resolution instructed the Trusteeship Council to send out a Visiting Mission as part of the process to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the above Trust Territory. The Visiting Mission Report recommended that two questions should be put on the plebiscite in light of the special circumstances of the Trust Territory and the expressed desire of the inhabitants. If the plebiscite were to put both questions to the inhabitants, then the evidence for or against a union of the two territories would be available from one of the Trust Territories.

However, the Indian Delegation chose not to follow the recommendations of the Visiting Mission and proposed instead, the integration of the Trust Territory with the Gold Coast as the first step. Lall argued that "in any event, such a union in the future was not precluded by the integration" of the Trust Territory with the Gold Coast. Could this Indian conception of a later unification have been thrown in as an escape clause from the pro-colonial web which the Indian Delegation had woven around India's position? Ignoring the fact that, "at the present stage" the Indian Delegation was attempting to deny the right of self determination to British Togoland, in specifically proposing its integration the with Gold Coast, Lall asserted that "it would undoubtedly be open to

Togoland under French administration to decide at a later date to join its neighbours within the larger framework of some form of West African Federation."¹⁴⁹ It was still obvious that in such a framework, integration was to be the first and immediate step; it took priority over all other possible, future solutions.

Moreover, it was Lall's viewpoint that the 'failure' of the experiment and effort to set up a Joint Council for Togoland affairs was evidence enough to show that "a serious attempt at unification had already failed," and most importantly, that "the reasons for that failure applied as much today as they had two years previously."¹⁵⁰ As we have tried to show, the Indian Delegation did not actively work in this exercise to set up a Joint Council but concerned itself mostly, at that time, with all the negative aspects and difficulties that such an experiment would entail. It is, therefore, in keeping with its pro-integration policy that Lall would utilise the failure of this operation, as evidence, to discard the second question which related to the unification of the two Togolands.

The last part of this exercise involved a two-pronged strategy. The first attempted to minimise the importance and value of the ethnic and tribal factor for the solution of problem of the future of British Togoland. The second worked not only in assisting the effort by the French Government to dissociate French Togoland from the context of available solutions to the problem, but also in support of its own position that integration with the Gold Coast provided the most efficient means in the Indian Delegation's definition of the situation.

We suggest that the Indian Delegation sought to assign a relatively low value, in its hierarchy of priorities, to the tribal and ethnic factor. Although Lall felt that the Ewe movement had seemed to assume "a larger political aspect" in its push for the unification of the two Togolands, he insisted that the problem "basically was still an Ewe problem."¹⁵¹ And that being the case, these tribal aspirations could best be accommodated in the integration option. However, this aspect was to be considered as a residual factor in his framework. It was in the opinion of the Indian Delegation, that "political union based on tribal and ethnic considerations was undesirable and unwise and perhaps even contrary to the basic objectives of the Trusteeship System."¹⁵² This premise suggests to us that the Indian Delegation did not feel that it had to take the anti-colonial pressures to respect the UN's previous resolutions into consideration.

The Soviet Delegation had already admonished the Indian Delegation in the previous session of the Fourth Committee for ignoring the numerous attempts of the UN, since April 2, 1947, to accommodate the wishes of the Ewe people; first, in the context of an Ewe State and, later, in a unification of the two Togolands. Ignoring this fact, the Indian Delegation continued to question the legality of such a demand in the context of the Charter. This would not have been the case if the Indian Delegation had accepted the UN role and authority in this process and had not attempted to direct the process in a preferred way. Like the anti-colonials in both the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council, the Venezuelan Delegation did not feel that an "amalgam of tribes" were an obstacle to political union.

However, in keeping within its strategy to push for integration but at the same time not to seem too pro-colonial, Lall allowed that, "in any case, tribal aspirations would not be jeopardised"¹⁵³ by integration. At the same time, he elected to point to the 'danger' of conceding the "Ewe demand for unification." He believed that the consequence of such a decision "might well raise similar problems concerning other tribes" which could be found in the Gold Coast and both Trust Territories in an East-West distribution. By a resort to a "numbers game" and in an appeal to the democratic principle the Indian Delegation tried to show how minimal the strength was for an ethnic solution.

In other words, the Ewe demand was too proportionally insignificant to be given an operational role in determining the future of British Togoland as a whole. Lall observed that,

in the southern part of Togoland under British administration Ewes constituted about sixty percent of the population and in the whole territory about one third of the total population. The question was whether one third of the people should be placed in a position where they exercised a disproportionate influence on the future of the territory as a whole. In Togoland under French administration the Ewes constituted one third of the population in the southern part and one sixth of the total population of the territory.¹⁵⁴

We suggest that, in principle, this question put forward by Lall is a democratically acceptable one.

However, he chose to underestimate the fact that the most significant aspect of the problem to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement was of an ethnic and tribal nature from the perspective of the inhabitants of the territory; this was the fundamental concern of the anti-colonial members. Why was the Indian Delegation so concerned to avoid setting a precedent at the cost of

accommodating the expressed desires of the inhabitants? Was the Indian Delegation more concerned with the process to achieve integration than with the right of self-determination for these peoples? After covering all the grounds that he could muster in favour of dispensing with the second question, Lall addressed the last factor which could have been utilised to sustain the unification possibility as a specific choice in the plebiscite.

Unification had to be portrayed, at best, as an uncertain and unreliable alternative to integration because of the French factor. Lall recognised that the Visiting Mission,

recommended a plebiscite in Togoland under French administration after certain political advances had been made, but it was not known when that would be. Nor was it clear what questions would be put to the people of Togoland under French administration; how and when the plebiscite would be held there and whether there would be a subdivision of that territory also for purposes of the plebiscite. Until those questions could be answered it would be extremely unwise to place before the people of Togoland under British administration the alternative of separating any part of the territory from the Gold Coast to be placed under an unknown Trusteeship administration in the vague hope of an eventual union with part or all of Togoland under French administration, when the whole or combined territory would have to determine its future. Such hypothesis seemed much too distant to be put before the people in the plebiscite in 1956.¹⁵⁵

The Indian Delegation seemed to have aimed at leaving no doubt in the minds of the members in the Trusteeship Council that only the first question should be put on the plebiscite and, therefore, the second should be discarded.

Visiting Mission Proposal for Subdivision: India

The Indian Delegation's 'doubts' were similar to Canada's 'difficulty' with the Visiting Mission recommendations to subdivide the Trust Territory for the purpose of the plebiscite. The principle underlying this recommendation was to allow for some rectification of the divisions that were created by the British and French mandates. The anti-colonials neither questioned the 'wisdom' of this recommendation nor attempted to set it aside because it was, in their opinion, a necessary step in the process to facilitate the right of self-determination of the inhabitants of British Togoland. Lall felt that "the idea was obviously based on the assumption" that part of the territory "might wish to continue" under the Trusteeship System. Actually, it was to be expected in light of the UN action to accommodate the petitions of the Ewes and the Visiting Mission in 1952, that if the second question was to be placed on the plebiscite a majority in Southern Togoland would opt for this alternative.

Nevertheless, the Indian Delegation declared that "such a course should not be necessary" thereby choosing to repudiate the fact of the special circumstances of the Trust Territory. Like the pro-colonial position, the Indian Delegation asserted that such a course "in any case appeared to prejudice the results of the plebiscite."¹⁵⁶ Was the argument of this Delegation for the one question to be put on the plebiscite not the same thing in principle? It appeared that from the speeches, both the anti-colonial and the colonial proposals would serve to prejudice the results of the plebiscite. Again, the argument of the Indian

Delegation that "a plebiscite was seldom held in parts"¹⁵⁷ was based on the assumption that this Trust Territory was an established and unified whole. This argument was consistent with that of the UK and French Delegation.

Lall warned the Trusteeship Council that "a divided plebiscite in a Togoland that was already divided and unable to exist independently would weaken it still further."¹⁵⁸ This conception had obviously not taken into consideration the fact that the division would be a temporary first step towards an eventual unification of the two Togolands which would be able to exist as an independent State. But the above observation was in keeping with the strategy to create a climate of doubt as to the value of this alternative for the resolution of the problem. This recommendation for subdivision, like the second question, had to be overturned. In the opinion of Lall, "if the idea were to be extended to other areas, there might be a general disintegration of stable political units."¹⁵⁹ It seemed as if the Indian Delegation wanted to avoid setting precedents just as much as it seemed to be working for the goal of integration. Both of these factors appeared to be operational in the decision-making process of the Indian Delegation; they seemed to influence India's policy position on the means that should be utilised to facilitate the exercise of the right of self-determination in British Togoland.

Visiting Mission Report: Trusteeship Council – the USA Balancing Act

The USA had indicated its support for the UK's position in the Memorandum to the Secretary General on British Togoland.¹⁶⁰ The USA Delegation also worked in the UN with the rest of the pro-colonials on this issue;¹⁶¹ USA representatives had attended the strategy meeting in New York and they were therefore fully informed of the UK's objectives.¹⁶² In addition, London had informed the UK Delegation in New York that the continuation of the United Kingdom responsibility "as a purely interim measure pending plebiscite in French Togoland would be very much preferable to any other proposal likely to be forth coming e.g. for a United Nations trusteeship." The USA was informed of this position.¹⁶³

The general position taken by the pro-colonial group in the Trusteeship Council was that the United Kingdom was unable to continue to administer the Trust Territory "as an integral part after the Gold Coast achieves independence." However, as part of the strategy, the UK did not "propose to make any direct statement about United Kingdom willingness to continue Trusteeship."¹⁶⁴ But in light of the fact that it also did not want any other authority replacing UK's Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland, a way had to be found in which the UN would offer to the UK the possibility of continuing the Trusteeship for a temporary period of time. And because of "the fact that a referendum on French Togoland concerning the future of its inhabitants now appear probable in the near future,"¹⁶⁵ the UK knew that the continuation would be for a limited time only.

Gerig of the USA Delegation spoke directly after the Indian Delegation in the Trusteeship Council. He undertook to pave the way for this possibility. His Delegation "had always considered that the whole-hearted co-operation of the Administering Authority was essential in carrying out any plan affecting the future of Togoland under British administration." And it was "encouraged to believe" that the UN would also co-operate in this effort "in view of the earnestness" of the UK's conduct in this UN process.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, in Gerig's estimation, the 'differences' that had come up between the UK's position and the recommendations of the Visiting Mission were "not...insurmountable," and he sought to explicate where the difficulties rested. He shared the view of Canada and India that the questions in a plebiscite "should always be simple and easily understood," and that a "negative majority" of a single question would serve the same purpose as a two-part question.

However, the main concern of his very short speech was to the possibility of a need for continuing administration. In his opinion: "the essential difference...seemed to be the express reference to continuing some kind of trusteeship for any district that would not opt immediately for integration with the Gold Coast." And because a negative majority could necessarily create such a situation,

it was difficult to believe that the Administering Authority would find it impossible to continue temporarily to retain some kind of administrative responsibility in areas where there might be substantial majorities that were not ready to make up their own minds as to their future.¹⁶⁷

This was a radically different position from the one taken by the Indian Delegation which left no such open alternatives for the resolution of the problem.

The USA Delegation was aware of the fact that, in order for the UK to retain administration of a continuing Trusteeship Agreement in the UN context of operation, at least one pro-colonial must include in its definition of the situation, the possibility that any part or parts of the Trust Territory might require a continuation of the Trusteeship Agreement. He "understood why" the Administering Authority "would not wish" to continue administering after the Gold Coast achieved independence. Nevertheless, "he had hoped" that the Administering Authority "might find it possible to accept such a temporary situation if it arose and, in co-operation with the United Nations, might continue to assist in the final stages."¹⁶⁸ Through its pre-planned conciliatory attitude and almost anti-colonial tone, Gerig implied that the UN has the responsibility to make the decision. He also sought to remind both the UK and the UN that the Administering Authority should remain with its trust until it had achieved the objectives of the Charter. After this speech, it became difficult for the UN to seek any other Administering Authority for continuing the Trusteeship Agreement and this is what the UK had hoped for.

Fourth Committee "General Debate": The USA Lays the Groundwork

Bell of the USA told the Fourth Committee that Trusteeship Council Resolution 1367 (S-5) "considered that the report constituted in general a useful

basis for determining the plebiscite arrangements." In view of this development, the USA Delegation concentrated their efforts on attempting to create a climate of which would be favourable to the Majority Report in the General Assembly. In order to do this, they had to discredit the Minority Report. Bell therefore asked the Chairman of the Committee "to call upon" Robbins who was the USA delegate on the Visiting Mission, to explain "the complexity of the problems dealt with in a very short space in the report." Bell believed that Robbins was "in a position to help clarify some aspects of the report."¹⁶⁹

We will highlight the salient points of the USA positions on the Minority Report in order to establish a context for Canada's position.¹⁷⁰ In addition, the USA speech was the reference point for Canada's public position. Speaking three days later, Martin of the Canadian Delegation said that Robbins had "clearly set out" why the Minority Report was not an acceptable alternative.¹⁷¹ In an extraordinary long speech,¹⁷² Robbins began by associating the Minority Report with the views of the Togoland Congress, the opposition party in British Togoland. More specifically, this party "felt that before a plebiscite was held, Togoland under British administration should be clearly separated from the Gold Coast and the Trust Territory should be given a separate legislative body."

Robbins explained that three of the members of the Visiting Mission believed that "the establishment of a purely temporary legislative body" in the Trust Territory was, at that point in time, "unnecessary and would delay the holding of the plebiscite." This position was reinforced by their viewpoint that such a step would not receive support from "an overwhelming majority of the

population of the Territory." Robbins utilised this belief to build his argument against the recommendation of the Minority Report. He explicated further: "Moreover, the establishment of such a legislative body and of separate institutions would hardly be feasible in the absence of wide-spread popular demand for that step, which would reverse the evolution of the two Territories over the past forty years."

This argument ignored the evidence collected over the many years in the UN, which indicated the need for such a democratic solution. It also rejected the premise of the Syrian position that it was the responsibility of the UN to set up a representative institution in the Trust Territory before it decided how it should terminate its authority in the Trust Territory. This was a normal democratic process; it was also in keeping with the Charter stipulation that the Trust Territory should retain its political identity. These points seemed to be irrelevant to the colonial framework of analysis and solutions. Robbins asserted that,

although the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly had often discussed the extent of the Administrative Union between the Gold Coast and the Trust Territory under British administration, neither of those two organs had seen fit to institute any such far-reaching changes as the establishment of separate institutions for the Trust Territory.¹⁷³

This position was a manifest rejection of the claims made by petitioners that the existing arrangements were in contravention of the Trusteeship Agreement and the Charter and should therefore be terminated.

Robbins argued that "the measure" proposed in the Minority Report "would be extremely costly and would completely disrupt the organisation of life in the Territory." In other words, his Delegation did not perceive a need to alter

the state of affairs in view of the extenuating circumstances. The two most important aspects were: "first, that neither Trust Territory was an ethnic or cultural unit; secondly, that owing to forty years' association with their respective administering authorities their economic, social, educational, political and juridical institutions fell into two divergent patterns." This was a plea for the status quo.

Since there were no viable alternatives to this status quo, any process which had the aim of allowing the inhabitants to 'determine' themselves would be inconsequential. Robbins ventured to explain that "popular conceptions held by the people in the two Territories" were evidence of this because:

In Togoland under British administration there was no objection to union with the neighbouring Territory under French administration provided that the whole Territory was joined with the Gold Coast. In Togoland under French administration, which was about two and a half times the size of Togoland under British administration both in area and population, there was no objection to the union of the two Togolands provided that such a unified Togoland remained in the French Union.¹⁷⁴

Therefore, he concluded that these conceptions "were not likely to be changed by any political arguments put forward by the Fourth Committee."

Concerns with prior rights and historical roots of an Ewe people were out of place in such a definition of the situation. Robbins was implying that the people of these two Trust Territories had already 'determined' themselves. Nevertheless, he was careful to reassure the Fourth Committee

that the Visiting Mission had been guided by three basic considerations in making the recommendations in its special report: the wishes of the people of the two Territories, the principles of democracy, and the desire to deal fairly with the whole problem and in particular with the Ewe question and to bring about an early settlement of a matter which had been before the General Assembly annually for many years.

We know that from behind the scene strategy meetings, the wishes of the people were not a working part of the definition of the situation. A significant question for us here is how did the principles of democracy function in these decisions that were reached by the Visiting Mission? And which principles were they? Finally, was the decision not to implement the recommendation of the Minority Report a 'fair' deal for the Trust Territories? The only conspicuous goal that would be achieved at the end of this process of deception was an early settlement to this matter.

Visiting Mission Report: Canada's Response

One of the most crucial aspect of analysis is to be able to identify the attempts by decision-makers to portray one position, publicly, while privately intending to obtain a totally different result. Interpretation can vary depending upon the context and emphasis that is placed on specific factors. The Visiting Mission Report is a classic case in point. Because the Visiting Mission had an equal number of non-administering members who were at the same time anti-colonials, the mission was not allowed to ignore the continuing possibility of a territorial unification between British Togoland and French Togoland. This required certain pre-requisites: the most important one was to resist a permanent integration of British Togoland into an independent Gold Coast.

There were many ways one could approach this goal, intentionally and unintentionally. And it is this aspect of the Visiting Mission Report that occupied

the Canadian Delegation at the UN. Shortly after it was submitted, Holmes complained to Ottawa:

we are not too sure that the Visiting Mission, by describing the result of its findings in each of the Trust Territories under the same headings rather than in separate parts of its report, may not have the effect of perpetuating in the mind of the majority of non-administering members the idea that unification is what the Assembly should seek rather than direct its first attention to the effect which the attainment of self-government by the Gold Coast will have on that portion of Togoland integrated with it.¹⁷⁵

The non-administering members were not particularly interested in what was happening in the Gold Coast as such because they felt that those developments should not be allowed to influence or pressure British Togoland into integrating with the Gold Coast. They argued that integration would automatically exclude any future chance of British Togoland unifying with French Togoland when it became self-governing or independent.

However, the UK and Nkrumah were pushing for integration at the cost of self-determination for British Togoland. Integration would be in the UK's and Canada's own economic interests. Ottawa informed its Delegation that,

because Canadian Aluminium concerns are interested in the Volta River Hydro-Electric development scheme, Canada also has an economic stake in the union of British Togoland within the Gold Coast, for complete success the scheme should not depend upon the goodwill of a disinterested Togoland. Although Canadian economic interest must not overthrow Canadian principles, it does in fact march with them....¹⁷⁶

Integration would also serve the long term interests of France because it would eliminate the ever-present problem of the unification of the two Togolands and it would also facilitate the retention of French Togoland within the French union.

Bargues asserted that France was "the other party most interested in the Visiting Mission Report."¹⁷⁷

It was obvious to all that to be able to achieve their goal of integration, the UK and its allies must retain control of the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement in both the Trusteeship Council and in the Fourth Committee. Canada and India were both aware of this fact.¹⁷⁸ In this section we will attempt to identify what role Canada sought to play in this process. Canada had an economic interest in integration; but ought we to assume that economic interest is a sufficient condition of Canadian action for the goal of integration? Did Ottawa not caution its Delegation that Canadian economic interests must not overthrow Canadian principles? What kind of discrepancies do we find between the Delegation's speeches and what Ottawa actually intended to accomplish as goals?

Canada was briefed by the UK on the overall tactics of all the Colonial Powers and Old Commonwealth in regard to the Visiting Mission Report and on the lines of policy which Canada was expected to follow. In addition to all of the above information we have presented in the UK's position on the Visiting Mission Report, we will examine Canada's speech¹⁷⁹ - a relatively long one in the Fourth Committee, and the correspondence between the Assembly Delegation in New York and officials in Ottawa in an attempt to discover to what extent Canadian principles were allowed to 'march' with Canadian economic interests. In addition, we will attempt to identify the operational factors in Canada's decision-making process.

Although Canada was aware that the UK's 'initiative' to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland was directly "related to constitutional developments in the Gold Coast,"¹⁸⁰ Martin's speech began with the assertion that, "as a result of forty years of enlightened and progressive administration, Togoland under British administration was on the threshold of independence a development which involved the fulfilment of the ends of the Trusteeship System. We suggest that by not referring to the Gold Coast or the Administrative Union, Canada was trying to demonstrate that the core concern of its policy was fixated on the Trust Territory and not necessarily on what was happening in the Gold Coast. Martin claimed that it was the result of Togoland's progress that the General Assembly "was now called to take early action in that respect."¹⁸¹

Martin sought to set the parameters of UN action as Canada saw it, "in view of that situation" which he had outlined above. It is in this context that he proceeded to assess the Visiting Mission recommendations. His Delegation 'agreed' with the choice of a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the population and that a United Nations plebiscite commission should be appointed to supervise the carrying out of the plebiscite with the help of observers from the Secretariat. However, in view of the time frame suggested by the Visiting Mission he supported the idea that this appointment should take place "without delay." This reference to the importance of the time factor for the process was in keeping with the priority of the UK and France to rush the Gold Coast to independence.

Both the UK and France decided that it was necessary to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement before the Gold Coast attained independence.

The Minority Report: Canada's Response

Canada was informed by the Secretariat, in confidence, that Syria intended to file a Minority Report. The UK briefed the Canadian Delegation in New York on the possible controversial situation what could arise from this report in the Fourth Committee among the non-administrative members and which could "possibly jeopardise the whole question of the future of Togoland under British administration."¹⁸² Ottawa's response to Syria's call for the establishment of a legislative body before the holding of the plebiscite reflected a recall to the Trusteeship Agreement which Pearson felt should be the basis of action regarding termination of the agreement. He wrote: "It is my understanding that the Trusteeship Agreement does not specify that any specific political organs shall be set up in British administered Togoland before the agreement shall expire."¹⁸³

The situation as set out in the Trusteeship Agreement in regard to the Administrative Union was about to change because the UK contended that when the Gold Coast "becomes self- governing, it will be impossible" for the UK to continue the Trusteeship. Therefore, Pearson felt it was for the UN to "decide what is to be done."¹⁸⁴ He proposed that there were only two possibilities in regard to the UN interpreting the situation. First, he felt that if Togoland were to

"continue hand-in-hand" with the Gold Coast, the conditions of self-government would be obtained, "although not independence." And in this case, the terms of the agreement "will have been met." The Trusteeship Agreement referred to self-government or independence as the goal of the Trusteeship. Secondly, if Togoland chose to leave the union with the Gold Coast, Pearson felt that the terms of the Agreement "will not have been met and the United Nations will have to make arrangements to meet the situation."¹⁸⁵

The most important reason for rejecting the Minority Report was Ottawa's interpretation of the terms of reference of the Visiting Mission. It had extended its limits in light of both Resolutions: General Assembly 860(IX) and Trusteeship Council 1084 (XV) which instructed the Visiting Mission to concern itself "with the arrangements that must be made to carry out the Council's decision to ascertain the will of the inhabitants." According to Ottawa, the Mission "was not concerned with the alternatives faced by British Togoland."¹⁸⁶ This interpretation differed from that expressed earlier by the High Commissioner for the UK in Ottawa. He felt that both resolutions instructed the Visiting Mission to "study the wishes of the inhabitants of British Togoland about their future."¹⁸⁷

Such broad instructions necessarily included both substantive and technical concerns for the Visiting Mission. However, the anti-colonials refused to accept the results and to recognise the significance of the elections in the Gold Coast for the future of British Togoland because they were neither authorised nor supervised by the UN. Canada had taken the position that they were to be accepted as part of the process to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of

British Togoland in regard to their future. This pro-colonial interpretation was based on the fact that the Trust Territory was an integrated part of the Gold Coast. Therefore, they felt that any process to alter this status, at this late stage, must be resisted. By suggesting that the legislative body be made a "condition precedent" to the plebiscite, the Syrian Delegation on the Visiting Mission was attempting to introduce substantive matter in the process which should have been confined to the technical aspects of procedure.

In spite of the detailed explanation by the UK to the Visiting Mission, as to why the means of ascertaining the wishes through the election of a representative body, "would not necessarily reflect with any great accuracy the major trends of opinion in the territory," Pearson felt that,¹⁸⁸ in principle, "it was possible that the setting up of a Legislative Council might in some way assist in ascertaining the wishes of the people." However, under the circumstances in the territory, he was aware of a possibility of another boycott of the elections by the Togoland Congress. And because of this factor, he advised that as "a bit of machinery" the representative body was "not entirely reliable for the purpose, which can best be achieved by a plebiscite of the simplest nature as recommended by the United Kingdom."¹⁸⁹

In his speech, Martin "subscribed whole-heartedly to the majority view of the Visiting Mission with regard to the setting up, prior to the plebiscite, of separate deliberative institutions,"¹⁹⁰ thereby indirectly rejecting the Minority Report. Robbins of the USA was a member of the Visiting Mission and Martin

thought that in his 'arguments,' Robbins had "clearly set out" why the proposal of the Minority Report was not feasible.¹⁹¹

Response to Visiting Mission Report: Canada

A. Proposal for Subdivision

In the New York strategy meeting on November 18, Canada was informed that the UK "was prepared, at this stage, to accept...in principle" the subdivision of the Trust Territory.¹⁹² The French representative felt that "such an arrangement would rather prejudge the final result and might even influence it." Not unlike the British position,¹⁹³ France also resorted to a comparison of British Togoland with any other 'national' situation as if the Trust Territory was already a sovereign state, to support the French stance against the proposed subdivision. The French Delegation asserted that plebiscites "on national issues whenever held took into consideration the views of the country as a whole and not those of specific areas."¹⁹⁴ For both the British and the French starting positions the Trust Territory of British Togoland was an established entity, although the UN was occupied with a process whereby the temporary status of British Togoland as an integral part of an Administrative Union, could be altered according to the desire of the inhabitants.

On November 21, Canada was additionally notified that the UK was "ready to accept" the Visiting Mission's proposal to subdivide the Trust Territory "in view of important ethnic differences, between Northern and Southern parts of

the territory." The clarification which accompanied this position was that the territory was "not a viable political or economic unit."¹⁹⁵ Therefore, all the public pro-colonial arguments against 'fragmentation' did not apply, in fact, to the British Togoland situation. However, this information did not hinder Canada from adhering to the same position which the UK had taken in its response to the Visiting Mission Report in the Fourth Committee and Trusteeship Council. Martin declared in the Fourth Committee that his Delegation "felt some difficulty...in particular, to the proposal for the division of the territory for the purpose of assessing the result of the plebiscite."¹⁹⁶ He submitted that because the territory was such a small one with a correspondingly small population, "it would have been possible to follow the majority principle."

This push for the usual democratic process would facilitate the whole pre-electoral effort of Nkrumah and the CPP - to ensure that the vote would result in a majority in favour of integration. The CPP infiltration and overlapping of electoral boundaries among other tactics were public knowledge in the UN and hence the Visiting Mission's recommendations to subdivide in order to accommodate, in a democratic way, the varied desires of a divided people. Why did Canada take this seemingly irrelevant stand in its appeal for the majority principle? In any normal and national situation this argument would be the right one. But under the specific circumstances in the Trust Territory with its multiple problems and complex situation, Canada knew that an application of the majority principle would not necessarily rightfully restore the kinds of unity that were being sought after. Therefore, in this attempt to shift the process in favour of a decision

for integration, Canada was not necessarily working in the interests of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory.

According to Martin, the proposal to subdivide "showed undue concern for popular feeling in the different areas listed."¹⁹⁷ However, as we have seen in an earlier section, any attempt to satisfy one group's ethnic needs would at the same time serve to antagonise another; this is what the Canadian Delegate seemed to want to avoid. He felt that if subdivision "was considerate of the views expressed by certain groups or districts, it might well be regarded as discriminating by others." The unfortunate situation in this Trust Territory was that there were no single tribal or ethnic majority except the Ewes, that could constitute a solid national base. And "popular feeling" was localised to a variety of small tribal and territorial groupings. Martin observed that because of the above circumstances subdivision could, in effect, "prejudge the result of the plebiscite" and ultimately "would result in a fragmentation" of many levels of political organisations.

This observation leads us to very important questions. First, was there an anticipated result of the plebiscite which would be in jeopardy if there were to be a method which genuinely applied the right of self-determination to the inhabitants of British Togoland? Secondly, if a plebiscite is held in a land which has been fragmented by colonial conquest and if the varied divided tribes of this already non-viable territory - by exercising the right to self-determination - seek alternative arrangements to the temporary Administrative Union, what 'democratic' arguments could be utilised against this choice? Thirdly, what is the

purpose of petitions to the UN when the members ignore practical solutions proposed by the petitioners themselves? The petition of the Dagombas to the 1949 UN Visiting Mission recommended a reorganisation of the colonial boundary between the Gold Coast and the Trust Territory which would have served to reunite all the Northern tribes and would have also freed the Southern section to unite later with French Togoland.

However, this reorganisation would have resulted in a diminution of the territory that had been administratively integrated with the Gold Coast and it would have set the stage for a later unification of part of British Togoland and French Togoland; neither the British nor the French wanted that then, or now. What was the motive behind Canada's show of public concern for possible discriminatory actions against one set of tribes if these same actions served the needs of other tribes? Did the Administering Authorities, both UK and France, not choose to maintain the division of the Togoland and to continue the separation of ethnic peoples?

The Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories was part of the process of the UN to promote the realisation of the right of self-determination in British Togoland. If the recommendations of the Visiting Mission have "showed undue concern for popular feeling in the different areas listed" as pointed out by the Canadian Delegation, then this factor must be permitted an operational role in facilitating the exercise of this right in this Trust Territory. The Visiting Mission discovered that the subdivision of the Trust Territory was a necessary condition of process if the "freely expressed wishes" of the peoples concerned were to

have any tangible value. But both the UK and Canada argued that such a method would "prejudge the result of the plebiscite." How does such a statement have relevance in a process to ascertain the wishes of the people unless a predetermined outcome was expected?

Because Martin "did not wish to belittle the considerations which had prompted the Visiting Mission to make that recommendation" and because the UK had already come to terms with this requirement and "in the light of the particular circumstances of the territory," the Canadian Delegation decided to 'accept' the Visiting Mission recommendations for the subdivision of the territory.¹⁹⁸ However, Martin found it necessary to qualify this position taken as being specific to "conditions particular to the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration;" it was not to be interpreted as a precedent. The Visiting Mission had recognised that the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement must acknowledge the political individuality of this Trust Territory. In so doing, it rejected any prior claims to ownership of this Trust Territory by the Gold Coast. And in this sense, the recommendation to subdivide the territory for the plebiscite had pressed the pro-colonials to concede this point, at least verbally.

Response to Visiting Mission Report: Canada

B. Questions to be asked

International supervision was the responsibility of the United Nations towards the Trust Territory and part of this task was to frame the questions to be

asked in a plebiscite which would be held in the Trust Territory of British Togoland. Ottawa was aware of the fact that "in a plebiscite the wording to be chosen is of vital importance"; and therefore instructed its Delegation to 'consult' with the UK Delegation "in this regard as the United Kingdom views seem to fit the need and the situation."¹⁹⁹ The UK had also recognised how crucial the wording of a plebiscite was for the outcome. Consequently, Gidden had emphasised to his colleagues at the strategy meeting of November 18, that "the prime object" of their effort in both the Trusteeship Council and the Assembly should be, "to obtain a reversal of the Visiting Mission's recommendation on the choices to be put...in the plebiscite."²⁰⁰ The 'need' was to work for a guaranteed vote for integration and the situation called for a strategy of deception.

It was obvious that what the UK was planning to do would definitely prejudice the result of the plebiscite in favour of integration. This was the UK's expressed intent and Canada did not seem to have a problem in working for the goal of integration. Ottawa noted that, "so far as our information goes, the obvious desire of the United Kingdom to link permanently British Togoland to the Gold Coast meets entirely ethnic needs for the people of the North...."²⁰¹ This argument chose to ignore several aspects of the situation the Canadian Delegation had reported to Ottawa in June 22, 1954 that in the elections for the legislative assembly in the Gold Coast under the new constitution, the CPP "had a poor showing in the Northern region, where the influence of the traditional chiefs remain strong."²⁰² And even if integration would satisfy Northern Togoland, how did Ottawa propose to accommodate the wishes of Southern Togoland for

unification with French Togoland? Southern Togoland had rejected integration in this same election. Did the petitioners and the Visiting Missions not have an impact on this assessment?

The Delegation in New York had also informed Ottawa in June 23, 1954, that "Togoland...put the unification of Togoland before any closer association with an independent Gold Coast."²⁰³ Despite that expressed desire, Ottawa declared that the failure of the Joint Council idea taken together with "the expressed attitude of the Ewes in French Togoland," support its stance that integration would unite the Ewe tribe "to the greatest extent possible at the present time."²⁰⁴ But, why the rush to independence? And was it the attitude of the Ewes of French Togoland or that of the French Government which wanted to keep French Togoland in the French Union? Which was the primary operational factor here? According to Ottawa, "some of the Togolese" of French Togoland "made clear their wish to maintain the links uniting them to the French Union to the exclusion of all other associates."²⁰⁵ It would therefore seem that the desire of French Togoland and the French Government were functional factors in Canada's assessment of the possibilities in its definition of the situation. These apparently took precedence over the expressed wishes of the inhabitants of British Togoland.

The UK's request to work for a reversal of the Visiting Mission recommendation on the choices to be put on the plebiscite was not going to be a simple task; it entailed two separate directives. First of all, Gidden proposed that the peoples "should be faced with a simple and clear question to be answered by

'Yes' or by 'No'."²⁰⁶ Incidentally, the first question which was recommended by the Visiting Mission came very close to that proposed in the UK's instructions for the Visiting Mission before it left New York. It is therefore not surprising that the first of the two questions recommended by the Visiting Mission would serve to fulfil the UK's requirements of a 'Yes' or 'No' answer. The second part of the operation to obtain the desired 'reversal' entailed a deletion of the second question proposed by the Visiting Mission. How could the UK achieve its aim in bringing the General Assembly "to recommend the rejection" of the second choice proposed by the Visiting Mission?²⁰⁷

All Commonwealth Governments were "urgently informed"²⁰⁸ of the above and they understood that the UK could not publicly propose such a scheme. Therefore, the strategy would be for all the allies to work for this predetermined choice by helping to create a climate of 'doubt' in the Fourth Committee, in two ways. The second question should be shown to have no significant positive 'value' for the process to ascertain the wishes and, in addition, it should be "discarded as a likely source of confusion."²⁰⁹ It must have been perfectly clear to Canada that the rejection of the second question which was recommended by the Visiting Mission would effectively serve to deny the inhabitants of British Togoland the right of self-determination. Both questions would have given them a choice in determining their own future. General Assembly Resolution 637(VII) had instructed the members to "promote the realisation of the right of Self-Determination of the peoples of Trust Territories" and "to facilitate the exercise of this right."

How consonant is the UK strategy to obtain a reversal of the recommendations with this resolution? And how compatible is Canada's appeal to democratic principles as a guide for action with the above resolution in light of the following policy position? In addressing the problem of the questions to be put at the plebiscite, the Canadian Delegation "urged that the issue be put to the peoples in simple and clear terms. That being so, it would have thought it possible to place only the first of the two questions proposed which was simple, straightforward and practical."²¹⁰

Put simply, Canada had chosen to utilise the UK strategy to work for the goal of integration. Martin gave the Fourth Committee two precise reasons why only the first question should be on the ballot. His hypothesis was that, "in itself the question implied its alternative, and a negative majority reply would certainly provide a clear indication that the majority of the inhabitants...would elect to terminate their association with the Gold Coast." This was the explanation for the 'simple' and 'straightforward' approach with the obvious emphasis again on the majority principle. The Visiting Mission had already rejected the majority principle in favour of concentrating on 'areas' and subdivision of the territory.

The Canadian Delegation, in its endeavour to help in the creation of a climate of doubt cautioned that:

the addition of the second question, addressed to peoples who had only recently been introduced to the intricacies of democracy, would invite difficulties, create doubts and uncertainties in their minds and generally bring about the same kind of situation which his Delegation feared when considering the Visiting Mission's proposal as to the assessment of the results of the plebiscite.²¹¹

In Canada's estimation, these backward peoples who are only recently versed in the intricacies of the democratic process, would be able to evaluate the assumptions that accompany the single question for the plebiscite; especially the 'implied' alternative and the tangible value of a "negative majority." We suggest that it is the single question and the consequent elimination of the alternative of unification - for which the Southern Togoland petitioned the UN for so many years - that would serve to create the above described atmosphere of difficulties, doubts and uncertainties. On the other hand, for the backward peoples of Northern Togoland who had petitioned for the retention of the Administrative Unit with the Gold Coast, the single question would have served their purpose.

The UK had suggested in the Trusteeship Council on November 21, that if certain parts of the Trust Territory decided to "elect against integration" the UN would have to make "new arrangements that would...involve dislocation, possibly serious, in the life of the inhabitants" of those parts.²¹² This statement was part of the strategy to bring members to question "the value" of the second question in the plebiscite. And, as planned, the UK's allies in deception were to assist in reinforcing this probable uncertainty. On December 9, the Canadian Delegation

noted its genuine concern regarding the serious dislocation in any part of Togoland under British administration which might as the result of the putting of a second question, elect against integration with the Gold Coast. Hence it would be more appropriate to agree to pronounce themselves on only one issue....²¹³

Both the UK and Canadian Delegation knew that this kind of apprehension had no basis in fact. The other members had also recognised this;

for by November 1955, the UN had been fully informed of the varied and conflicting desires of the peoples of British Togoland and that of the ruling party in the Gold Coast. Northern Togoland invariably wanted to stay with the Gold Coast and Southern Togoland did not want to be integrated with the Gold Coast. This demand or expressed wish presented a problem for the Gold Coast, the UK, Canada and France, because

in the area which the Ewes occupy intensive farming is carried on. Copra and tapioca are also prepared for export...several trades and crafts are practised in the towns and villages. The most heavily populated area of that part of Africa, it is also the most advanced economically and one of the longest known to Europeans who have established there in time trading stations, missions and schools.²¹⁴

Obviously, the second question to be put to the people was designed to accommodate the expressed wishes of the Southern Togoland. And Gidden had already acknowledged that "if this question remained as a positive alternative, it would certainly affect the vote."²¹⁵ Did Canada resort to the "implied alternative" in the hope that it would serve to confuse the inhabitants into failing to recognise that there was indeed an alternative choice implied in the one question on integration?

Because of the complicated factors involved in the termination of this Trusteeship Agreement, Canada was aware of the fact that the questions on the plebiscite had a lot to do with the outcome. If Southern Togoland would choose the second alternative were it to be placed on the plebiscite, the consequences could be far-reaching and difficult. As Ottawa observed,

the pro-Ewe character of the United Nations resolutions naturally raised the question of the effect which the creation of an autonomous 'Eweland' might have on the economy and future political

development of the remaining and less developed parts of the Togolands.²¹⁶

Besides, Ottawa conceded that "on the Volta River development depends the further economic development of Togoland."²¹⁷ Therefore, a north-south division and separation of the territory was not an acceptable solution for the UK or Canada.

Although the "Commentary for the Delegation to the Tenth Session" was prepared by the Department of External Affairs in advance of the session, Ottawa was aware of the potential problems which the issue of unification would pose for the UN that fall. And it is in this connection that Ottawa reminded the Delegation of the attitude taken by the Philippines and Yugoslavia Delegations at the ninth session towards the failure of the Administrative Authorities to implement, fully, General Assembly Resolution 750 (VIII). Both Delegations had warned that "the possibility of unifying the two Togolands should not be ignored without rendering meaningless the Assembly's previous consideration of the Togoland problem."²¹⁸ But at that same session, the UK had decided to defer the question of unification at the UN.²¹⁹ The UK claimed that integration of British Togoland with a self governing Gold Coast "could be regarded as awarding a full measure of self-government" to the peoples of the Trust Territory who would be at the same time "achieving the aims of the Trusteeship provisions of the Charter."²²⁰

In Ottawa's estimation, the above "considerations were backed by such factors as the existing racial divisions, the economic benefit of integration with the Gold Coast, and the indications given by the last elections which

indicated that public opinion might be in favour." The Canadian sentiment was that the policy followed by the United Kingdom in the Gold Coast "is enlightened and, if anything, in advance of the principles of Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter." This correlation seemed to form the basis of Ottawa's "Policy Guidance" to its Assembly Delegation:

should integration with the Gold Coast be feasible, it is considered that the peoples of British Togoland will have achieved a full measure of 'self-government' in terms of Chapter XIII and that it is not necessary in terms of that Chapter for 'independence' to accompany 'self-government.'

In Canada's judgement, the Charter principles had laid down the goals of a Trusteeship Agreement. But who, in the final analysis, was to decide which route should be taken to arrive at this goal? If the UN is left to decide "in the best interest of the inhabitants themselves" as Canada had suggested, and if the whole process to terminate was planned and navigated by the principal actors to achieve a specific goal, how operational were the information from petitioners and the Visiting Missions' Reports as decision-making factors for Canada? Ottawa's Policy Guidance directed that, beyond what was discussed above, the following factors "should be borne in mind":

1. As a method of consultation a plebiscite has advantages over elections and should be chosen if possible.
2. India has pursued an enlightened policy in the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council. Although it would not be desirable to act deliberately to augment the prestige of India in Africa, the Delegation may find it wise and suitable and perhaps rewarding to consult fully with the Indian Delegation concerning the problem of Togoland.²²¹

In its speech, the Canadian Delegation sought to set the tone of its position by appealing to democratic principles and for "usual democratic processes." In regard to the Visiting Mission recommendations for subdivision and the questions to be put, Martin expressed concern over the effect of 'discriminatory' practice and displayed misgivings about utilising a method which might prejudice the result of the plebiscite against the colonial preferred goal of integration.

Response to Visiting Mission Report: Petitioners

Antor of the Togoland Congress presented a convincing case of collusion between the Administering Authority and the Gold Coast Government in preparing for the coming plebiscite. He observed that it was 'inconceivable' that a plebiscite were to be held under conditions whereby the people "themselves were not represented in the organs which would arrange the plebiscite."²²² In addition, he complained of the 'unchecked' infiltration from the Gold Coast to the Trust Territory which was in full knowledge of the Administering Authority. However, a most telling fact was brought out in the Visiting Mission Report: the two main integration parties "had headquarters outside the Trust Territory and only individual members inside it."²²³ Because the Chairman of the Visiting Mission was an Indian, this information was not new to Jaipal. He did not respond to the accusations by Antor, who claimed that the CPP - the Government Party of the Gold Coast - was campaigning in the Trust Territory for integration, and "had

given orders to its public servants in the Trust Territory to work against the aspiration of Togoland nationalists."²²⁴

This is difficult to substantiate. Although the United Nations "had not yet decided" on a plebiscite as a means to ascertain the wishes of the people of the Trust Territory, Antor declared that "official plans had already been made for a campaign" in the Trust Territory. For Antor, it was "obvious that with such a degree of officially supported infiltration" from Nkrumah's Party, a plebiscite "would not interpret the true opinion" of the people of the Trust Territory.²²⁵ Speaking after the Pakistan Delegation, Jaipal of India admonished the anti-colonial states for placing too much "emphasis...on the extent of public opinion against integration" with the Gold Coast, in the southern section of the Trust Territory.²²⁶ And in spite of the findings of the Visiting Mission, Jaipal enquired of Kumah (CPP) as to his "own estimates of the number of voters in the south in favour of integration." Was this an attempt to shift the examination towards a more balanced perspective?

According to Kumah, "over 60 percent" of the voters were at present in favour" of integration. He explained that this increase was a direct result of the Visiting Mission Report being released in the Trust Territory. This new information served to show to what extent integration was directly related to the Administrative Union.²²⁷ He conceded that "many colonial farmers in the south had realised that by voting against integration they would risk losing their cocoa farms which were located in the Buem-Krachi area." And in his opinion, "they therefore decided in favour of integration."²²⁸

In a dialogue with the CPP representatives, Jaipal obtained their agreement that 'integration' was seen as "being synonymous with independence"; that United Nations "supervision would help to ensure that there was no infiltration," and "that any delay in the plebiscite would mean the continuance of a tutelage which was no longer necessary." In light of "the present circumstances," Jaipal wanted to know whether Olympio of the All-Ewe Conference, still felt it "desirable to set up an Ewe State on a tribal basis." And he was also "interested in the motives of Ewe unification movement" because in his viewpoint, "it would seem rather undemocratic for one of the most advanced peoples in West Africa to seek unity on a purely tribal basis."²²⁹

Olympio asserted that the Ewe tribe had "instituted a system of democratically elected chiefs who were deposed if they ceased to watch over the welfare of their people." Because the Ewe tribe is estimated to be "roughly one million" in both Trust Territories and the south-eastern part of the Gold Coast, he felt that they could have been "united under one administration." Disputing Jaipal's claim that integration "would, to a large extent, achieve that unity," Olympio reported that the Gold Coast Ewes had already 'decided' that integration "would not be in the best interests of the Ewe people as a whole." And to the Indian Delegation's proposal for integration first and then for some sort of 'joining' with the French Togoland after its independence, Olympio observed that 'once' integration took place and Togoland under French administration became part of the French Republic, it would be "impossible for the Ewes ever to be united."

However, the Indian Delegation utilised the examination of the petitioners to show not only the benefit of integration, but also the "certain practical problems involved" in the unification of the two Togolands, despite "the possible economic advantages that would accrue from this unification." While setting all the arguments for unification aside, Jaipal affirmed that the territory was 'ready' for independence "together with an independent Gold Coast." He pointed out that it was equally 'clear' that French Togoland "had not yet reached that point." He came to the logical conclusion that under these circumstances, "unification would mean a delay" in the independence of British Togoland.²³⁰ But the Indian Delegation had consistently chosen to ignore the fact that British Togoland did not necessarily demonstrate the desire for a rush to independence. Moreover, an element of delay in British Togoland's independence was a necessary condition for its desired unification with French Togoland. This was obvious to those seeking unification and, consequently, a temporary continuation of the Trusteeship Agreement.

Jaipal observed that without any doubt, the most important "practical difficulty" would arise when both Togolands would unify and the "two very different systems" would have to be combined into one administration. He also insisted that both Northern British Togoland and French Togoland were against unification; this fact was equally important. And because of all of the above, he enquired of Olympio "whether apart from Ewe unity, there was any good reason" for the movement for unification. Besides, he argued, many people felt that the 'destiny' of Togoland under British administration "lay with" an independent Gold

Coast. Was the rush to independence in the policy position of the Indian Delegation an ultimate goal in itself for British Togoland? And if this was so, then, what factors would help to explain why the Indian Delegation did not seem to pay much public attention to the previous input from the pro-unification and Ewe petitioners and the Visiting Mission Reports of 1949 and 1952?

For how else could Jaipal ask the following question? He hypothesised: since French Togoland "could be independent on its own" and with integration, British Togoland would also become independent, in "both cases the Territories would be independent, so why was it so important to secure unification?"²³¹ The UK's Memorandum seeking a termination of the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland did not initiate from a specific desire of the Trust Territory for independence. The Ewe movement for a tribal unification and then, later, for a territorial unification of both Togolands had to do, in the first instance, with unification and not a pressing independence from the UK. The desired separation of British Togoland from the Gold Coast was a necessary step in order to facilitate the unification of the two Trust Territories.

Olympio reiterated that the movement to stop British Togoland integration with the Gold Coast was based on the "chief argument" that "once Togoland had become part of the Gold Coast the two Togolands could never be united."²³² And he asserted that although the Indian Delegation 'assumed' that British Togoland wanted integration, it was his conviction that the plebiscite "would prove it one way or another." The Ewe leader sought to alleviate the pressure that was exerted by the pro-integration faction in the UN on the other

Members to discard the alternative of a future unification of the two Togolands. He reminded them that the Visiting Mission had "recognised that there was a strong movement for unification based on ethnic ties and on economic and other considerations." And he concluded the interrogation by the Indian Delegation with the suggestion that "proper steps should be taken to find out what the majority view really was." He also cautioned the Fourth Committee that "the question should not be prejudged in the plebiscite."²³³

It was in the opinion of the Indian Delegation that "whatever the arguments in favour of unification had once been, they had changed with the change in the political situation." Although he did not explain what he meant by this 'change,' Jaipal was very specific in disassociating once more, French Togoland from the resolution of the problem involving the future status of Togoland under British administration. He declared that he "could not...agree with the attempt to use the Ewes in Togoland under French administration in order to decide the fate of the Ewes in Togoland under British administration and the Gold Coast."²³⁴ In his conception, the Ewes of the Trust Territory of British Togoland and its neighbouring colony were already grouped together as one and therefore the Ewes in the other half of Togoland would not be allowed to have any functional relevance under this agenda item.

Fleku, the CPP petitioner for the Ho district, had supported the colonial opposition to the subdivision of the territory for the purpose of a plebiscite with the allegation that "it would create a new frontier." Rivas of Venezuela wanted to know whether this frontier would be a 'temporary' one or one that would "arise

out of the results of the plebiscite."²³⁵ Fleku explained that if the recommendation of the Visiting Mission to subdivide the territory "were accepted," he wanted to alert the UN to the possibility "that people in a particular region would vote differently from those in other regions within Togoland."²³⁶ The CPP was working closely with the UK for the goal of integration and according to Olympio, this party had its headquarters in the Gold Coast, but some of its members were living in the Trust Territory. And because the Administrative Union had served to reunite several tribes, Fleku estimated that a compartmental plebiscite could result in the creation of a new frontier which would separate the north from the south. He protested that, in addition to this new problem, the "intolerable frontier separating Eastern and Western Togoland, the two Trust Territories, was still unresolved."²³⁷

From this viewpoint then, the UN should put just the one question on integration to a vote since integration of the whole Trust Territory with the Gold Coast would effectually serve to contain the fissiparous regional tendencies for the greater good of the Trust Territory. But this single question would deny to certain parts of this dismembered territory the right of self-determination. On the other hand, the Visiting Mission recommendation to sub-divide the territory for the purpose of the plebiscite would not only serve to create new tribal and ethnic separation, it would also not help in repairing the previous East-West division. However, if the right of the peoples to self-determination is to be applied in such an intractable situation then the peoples of the Trust Territory must be made aware of the probable consequences of such an action for the territory, as a whole.

In the context of the 1952 Visiting Mission Report the United States Department of State observed, that "in considering steps to meet the wishes of certain groups" in the two Togolands, the UN must also "consider the effect of such action on the remaining inhabitants of the Territories." But since the dichotomy of tribal and ethnic interests were more or less geographically contained in a north-south position, the State Department had suggested that "the interests of the inhabitants of the Northern parts of the two territories...must certainly be given proper consideration along with the interests of the predominantly Ewe-inhabited Southern parts of the Territories."²³⁸ In light of the above information we will attempt in the next section to examine the various criticisms and support of the Indian draft resolution. It proposed certain basic recommendations for the General Assembly to authorise the next procedural step in the attempt to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. In this analysis, we will show how India chose to manipulate the UN instruments of supervision in order to achieve the specific goal of termination with integration.

Indian Draft resolution: " A far cry"

The Canadian Delegation communicated to Ottawa that, on December 6 the Indian Delegation had circulated a draft resolution in the Fourth Committee. It was intended to initiate the next steps in the process which began with the submission of the UK Memorandum in June, 1954. "The main purpose" of this draft was "to ensure" that the inhabitants of the Trust Territory "would be

consulted at the earliest possible date," as to their wishes for their future status and "to this end to recommend the ways and means by which these views might be ascertained."²³⁹ Giddeen of the UK suggested at the strategy meeting of November 18, in New York, that India should be asked to table a resolution "intended to implement the Visiting Mission recommendations and subsequently have someone else introduce an amendment the purpose of which would be to delete the second question."²⁴⁰ An important part of the strategy was to concentrate on the arrangements to be made for the plebiscite rather than on the substantive part of the plebiscite. This Indian draft resolution did exactly this.

According to the Canadian Delegation, "while it deals at some length with the organisation, conduct and supervision of the plebiscite,"²⁴¹ section A of this draft "does not in any way touch upon" the question or questions to be put to the people of the territory or on the proposal for subdivision of the territory for the purpose of the plebiscite.²⁴² In other words, a draft resolution was prepared by the Indian Delegation in which the substantive recommendations of the Visiting Mission were omitted in toto. It was in the opinion of the Canadian Delegation that, "undoubtedly, India's hope in so doing was to remove from the resolution any possible areas of contention." The Delegation felt that these were "very real" in light of the context of debate in the Fourth Committee, the examination of the petitioners, and the conflicting opinions in the Visiting Mission Report.²⁴³ How effective would India's effort be in "smoothing the way" for an early termination of the Trusteeship Agreement?

Because of all the above reasons, the Canadian Delegation submitted that the draft "as it now stands is a for cry" from the resolution which will be adopted on this subject by the Assembly. On the other hand, this Delegation recognised that the draft "as it stands...is acceptable both to the Adminstrating Authority and to the representatives of the Gold Coast who form part of the United Kingdom Delegation."²⁴⁴ However, the Delegation seemed to think that Section B of the draft resolution was "a concession to the views expressed by the majority of non-administering states in the Assembly last year."²⁴⁵ The Indian Delegation had already experienced the wrath of this group during the process last year in which the Indian draft resolution was "substantially amended." The result was Resolution 860 (IX) which provided the terms of reference for the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of British and French Togoland. The Canadian Delegation observed that section B of the draft in circulation "may be said to flow directly from the terms" of Resolution 860 (IX).

Because of section A, the Canadian Delegation expected a similar situation to arise in the Fourth Committee when the Indian draft resolution was introduced. It is without any doubt that the Indian Delegation was prepared for the expected onslaught from the anti-colonials. On December 8, Menon introduced his draft resolution (A/C.4/L.428) in the Fourth Committee. In his judgement, the United Nations "could not withhold independence" from Togoland under British administration "on the ground that" Togoland under French administration "was not ready" for independence.²⁴⁶ Again, he made reference to the failure of the Joint Council which was set up in 1951 but allowed that it should not be taken to

"mean that the two Togolands could not become a single entity." However, he considered that to be "a long-term problem"²⁴⁷ which obviously would not be addressed in his draft resolution. After briefly disposing of the unification issue Menon also rejected the Visiting Mission recommendation to sub-divide the territory for the plebiscite because "he personally felt that the United Nations should keep to the terms of the Charter and conduct the plebiscite in accordance with the provisions of Article 76 b."

His decision to ignore this recommendation was based on his conviction that the Trusteeship Agreement "had been established for the territory as a whole, not for its separate parts."²⁴⁸ He announced that, "in drafting its proposal," the Indian Delegation "had borne in mind all the views expressed to the Visiting Mission and the agreements for and against put forward by petitioners before the Fourth Committee."²⁴⁹ And he conceded that "there was nothing" in his draft resolution that "conflicted with the views of the Adminstrating Authority." This was obviously clear to the anti-colonials in the Fourth Committee, 21 amendments were submitted to this draft, which Menon felt had "merely reflected the general desire that the dependent Territories should be emancipated as soon as possible." The amendments were an indicator that the anti-colonials had disapproved of not only the suggested arrangements to be made but also of the substantive parts of the Indian draft resolution.

We propose to examine the position of the Indian Delegation in regard to the amendments that were addressed to the substantive issues. The Liberian Delegation had simply submitted 21 amendments. Amendment 5 called for the

draft to recognise the Visiting Mission recommendation that the inhabitants of Togoland under French administration "should similarly be ascertained in the plebiscite." Menon asserted that the amendment was inadmissible because it "would have the effect of holding up the progress of the British-administered territory." Amendment 6 and 7 were logically derived from Amendment 5. All three were concerned with retaining the possibility of a future unification of the two Trust Territories in the process of British Togoland deciding on its future status. Menon "could not accept" amendments 6 and 7 which requested the insertion in Operative Paragraph 2 of words "or its continuance under Trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of its political future." He felt that "that would conflict with the general view that the time had come to put an end"²⁵⁰ to the Trusteeship System in the territory. Menon's rejection of the three amendments was in keeping with a consistent position of the Indian Delegation who were working for integration and a dissociation of the French Togoland factor from the context of the future of British Togoland.

In working towards the goal of helping to create an international consensus against colonialism in general, Menon asserted that the "continuance under trusteeship would be a retrograde step which would create an unfortunate impression in Togoland under French administration, the Cameroons, and other African Territories."²⁵¹ We suggest that in order to achieve this goal, India felt it was not necessary to terminate colonial role solely through the application of the right of self-determination especially when an application would serve to delay the process. Again, the "integral part" concept of the Administrative Union was

utilised by the Indian Delegation to provide the basis of its argument for a permanent retention of the arrangement. Menon argued that this had been 'accepted' by the General Assembly. And because the future possibility of unification of the two Togolands had been eliminated from India's definition of the situation, Menon could effectively claim that "in view of its geographical situation and small area, the territory could not be administered or subsist in isolation."²⁵²

In Amendment 8, the Liberian Delegation proposed that Paragraph 3 of the operative part of the draft should request a plebiscite Commission instead of a plebiscite Commissioner to organise for the elections.²⁵³ Since this process involved the termination of the first Trust Territory, some Members were concerned about setting unfavourable precedents as to procedure and aims of the UN. The Venezuelan Delegation complained that the conflicting solutions combined to present a "state of confusion" in the Fourth Committee. Jaipal of India "did not agree" with this point of view because he felt that the Visiting Mission recommendation to subdivide the territory could lead to "serious repercussions" if followed.²⁵⁴ He pointed out that the ethnic-sketch map provided in the Annex "showed the immense diversity of tribes in the two Trust Territories." And he suggested that the Committee should pay "closest attention" to the implications of subdivision for "the question was whether each tribe was to be given the right of self-determination" especially in light of the fact that "one tribe had already sent in a petition asking for the right of local option." He warned that the Committee "was in danger of establishing a precedent which might have incalculable results on other Trust Territories and perhaps elsewhere."²⁵⁵

This resort to the tactic of promising chaos and doom was not a new phenomenon for the Indian Delegation. It was an established part of its strategy to ignore the specific circumstances of this one Trust Territory and to universalize the consequences of any action that the UN would take in this process. We see an application of this strategy by the Indian Delegation in a more specific way as Menon explained to the Fourth Committee why the Visiting Mission Minority Report should be rejected. He believed that

the trend was towards the establishment of larger units. The Syrian representative's suggestion, which sought to promote the unification of the two Togoland's or of the Ewes, might seem more democratic but would in fact inevitably tend to keep not only Togoland but all Territories in the area under Trusteeship.²⁵⁶

Did the Indian Delegation really intend to pursue the goal of the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement at all costs? Did Menon aim at initiating a process that could be applied to all the Territories in the area under Trusteeship?

Japial admonished the Visiting Mission for taking a "somewhat oversimplified" position in its recommendation for a 'broad' division of the Trust Territory into Ewe and non-Ewe areas. Ignoring the petitioners' assertion of infiltration and the gerrymandering of electoral districts by the Gold Coast Government's party, he complained that he "could not see why" these "recognised districts" were not being used in the plebiscite. He argued that if under this arrangement the result "should suggest some special treatment for part of the Trust Territory,"²⁵⁷ then the Committee could deal with it at the next session. However, Members were aware of the fact that the 'overlapping' of electoral districts would not permit of such democratic results.

It is for this reason Rivas of Venezuela requested that the conclusions of the Visiting Mission - that opinion in the south was divided and that in the north there was an overwhelming majority in favour of integration - "should be verified by means of separate elections."²⁵⁸ He even felt that "it would be contrary" to the provisions of the Charter if the Committee decided against holding a plebiscite by sections. And he protested that the Indian Delegation "did not wish to view the situation of the people of the territory in light of the Visiting Mission Report."²⁵⁹ In rejecting Menon's previous argument against any other alternatives because the UN had accepted the "integral part" in the Trusteeship Agreement, Rivas thought that the Report "stated clearly" that Togoland under British administration "had never been administered as an entity." Sections of the Trust Territory were administered with sections of the Gold Coast. And even though this was in contravention to the Charter stipulations on Trust Territories, he insisted that that fact "was a peculiarity of the territory which could not easily be disregarded."²⁶⁰

An even more extreme viewpoint was put forward by Brooks of Liberia in her reply to Jaipal's statement. She admitted that she had 'accepted' the Visiting Mission recommendation for a second question in the plebiscite only because she wanted to be 'co-operative'. In reality, she would have preferred that the plebiscite would present to the people "a choice of any of the various solutions: independence, integration with an independent Gold Coast, and union with Togoland under French administration."²⁶¹ These alternatives were necessary as a basis for a democratic process and to facilitate the application of the right of self-determination in British Togoland. Although the Liberian

Delegation "was not opposed to integration," she felt that the people 'concerned' must 'decide' that integration is what they preferred to the other alternatives.²⁶²

On December 9, Martin presented Canada's position²⁶³ on the next step in the process. By planning²⁶⁴ to concentrate only on the 'future' of the Trust Territory, the Delegation's framework²⁶⁵ would automatically ignore half of the subject matter of Agenda Item 35: "Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust Territory Togoland under British Administration."²⁶⁶ And it is the portion that is not addressed in Canada's framework which occupied the anti-colonial speeches and arguments. Therefore, in terms of the context of the General Debate, Canada's proposal regarding the process would not find a fit in the anti-colonial trend. Was the Canadian decision to disregard the unification possibility for the future status of British Togoland working "in the best interests of the inhabitants themselves?" According to Martin, this is the "sole concern" of his Delegation in regard to the UN's actions on Agenda Item 35.²⁶⁷

The Canadian Delegation pointed out to Ottawa that Section A of the draft resolution "strives to achieve the very aims we have had in mind all along."²⁶⁸ This interpretation necessarily placed Canada together with India and the other pro-colonials in an isolated position relative to the context of the General Debate. In spite of the fact that the Committee had been dealing with the various amendments to the Indian draft resolution, Martin proposed that "so far as it goes, in our view, it should commend itself generally to the members of this Committee." This is an obvious indicator that the Canadian Delegation did not feel that it had to take these anti-colonial pressures into consideration in its policy

position. And this is supported by the acknowledgement of the Canadian Delegation that this draft was "a far cry" from what the Assembly expected to accomplish in the decisions that would be taken as a result of the Visiting Mission Report.²⁶⁹

Martin decided that he would not 'record' his view, at that stage, on the amendments to the draft. However, he conceded that he could not "but express regret that they should have been introduced at this late hour." The draft resolution was 'circulated' on the afternoon of December 6. The amendments were submitted to the Fourth Committee between December 6 and December 8 when the Indian Delegation formally introduced this draft. Therefore, this procedure could not have taken place in a shorter space of time. What did the Canadian Delegation intend to achieve by utilising such a transparent tactic to apply a time pressure on the process?

Martin hypothesised "surely their sponsor would not wish to be a party to any action which, no matter how well intended, might have the result of delaying for some time the exercise of their right to independence." The pro-colonials had sought, throughout the whole process, to consolidate a position which was based on the need to hurry the process along the way. The most important factor in these consolidations was the pending independence of the Gold Coast. And it was accorded a high priority in the resolution of the problems under Agenda Item 35. But why the rush to independence for the Trust Territory? The anti-colonials repudiated any prior claims by the pro-colonials to define the

situation solely within the context of the Administrative Union with the Gold Coast.

Nevertheless, the Canadian position was founded on such a prior claim and Martin did not hesitate to caution the Fourth Committee that, "if these amendments were adopted in the final analysis, the United Nations would not be keeping faith with the peoples concerned." But who were the "peoples concerned" in Canada's definition of the situation? Were they the peoples of the territory, "who have been repeatedly told that the granting of independence to the Gold Coast...will be helped by an early expression of their views as to their future status?"²⁷⁰ Or was it Nkrumah of the Gold Coast, who not only wanted early independence but also insisted that the Trust Territory be retained in the Administrative Unit at independence?

The Canadian Delegation had recognised that "the adoption of these amendments would mean a delay in the holding of the plebiscite in the Trust Territory."²⁷¹ Should we therefore take this interpretation to mean that a rejection of the proposed amendments on the part of Canada and India had more to do with hurrying the process to terminate than with the concern to facilitate the application of the right of self-determination for the peoples of the Trust Territory? Could we also assume that the rush to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement was the primary means by which an uncomplicated independent status could be accorded to the Gold Coast?

The Visiting Mission had recommended the appointment of a plebiscite Commissioner to organise matters of procedure for the plebiscite in the

Trust Territory. Liberian Amendment 8 proposed a plebiscite Commission instead of the Commissioner. Martin announced that his Delegation could not "see any advantage to be gained in following such a course."²⁷² Besides, as the Delegation wrote to Ottawa the day before, "the character of the office...has nothing to do with policy making."²⁷³ But the most important consideration in its argument against this amendment was "that the appointment of a Commission could lead to the submission of a Minority Report." In view of the controversy that was stirred up with the Minority Report of the Visiting Mission, the Canadian Delegation recognised that a Commission could "involve the likelihood of delays which all are anxious to avoid."²⁷⁴

Both the Canadian and Indian Delegation shared the opinion that "the size and the population"²⁷⁵ of the Trust Territory did not 'justify'²⁷⁶ the appointment of a Commission. And because the Visiting Mission had expressed the desire that "if approved, the plebiscite should be carried out forthwith," Martin submitted that Amendment 8 would serve to delay the implementation of the results of the plebiscite. The Canadian Delegation had already decided in its draft speech which was sent to Ottawa the day before that, "for its part," the Delegation "would not associate itself with any action which would...result" in not "keeping faith with the people concerned."²⁷⁷ Therefore this action to amend the Indian draft resolution would not be supported. The Delegation "proposed to vote against the 21 amendments in whole or in part."²⁷⁸ In renouncing the anti-colonial definition of the situation and its accompanying processes, the Canadian Delegation categorically placed itself on the side of the colonials.

Rivas of Venezuela announced that he had abstained on section A and on the Indian draft resolution as a whole "because Liberian Amendment 7 had been rejected" by Menon.²⁷⁹ The Venezuelan Delegation "was convinced that in order to give the peoples of both Territories freedom of choice," this process could not ignore the recommendations of the Visiting Mission. He added that the 'solution' which was suggested in this draft resolution "was not in conformity with" these recommendations of the Visiting Mission. At issue in this process was the question of the freedom of choice of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. As we have seen, the pro-colonials had essentially eliminated the question of unification of the two Togolands from their framework of analysis of the problem since 1954. As a result, the anti-colonial insistence that this question must remain as an operational factor in the process served to solidify the dichotomy of interests in the UN.

The Venezuelan Delegation protested that, "by providing for a plebiscite in only one of the two Territories" and in addition, by advocating that the plebiscite should put the "single question of union with the Gold Coast," the Indian draft resolution "would prove an obstacle"²⁸⁰ to the unification of the two Territories. This was precisely the intent of India's draft resolution and it was in keeping with the interest of Canada, the UK, the Gold Coast and France. We suggest that limiting the choices was a sufficient condition for obtaining the goal of integration. However, the colonials also wanted to eliminate the possibility of British Togoland being able to reverse the steps that were undertaken. This was a necessary condition of the process especially for the Gold Coast and France.

The single question for integration would serve to ensure this. As Rivas pointed out,

there could be no doubt that the majority of the population would vote for union with the Gold Coast rather than continuance under Trusteeship, as they would gain a greater measure of self-government, but unification with Togoland under French administration would then be more difficult as the present territory of Togoland under British administration would have to secede from the Gold Coast in order to unite with Togoland under French Administration.²⁸¹

An examination of a few additional anti-colonial criticisms of the draft resolution would show to what extent India had chosen to stray from its anti-colonial path in the process to terminate the first Trusteeship Agreement. Saab of Lebanon advised the Members that they should recognise the value of the input of "an African state" which sought through the amendments, to help in resolving the "problems in another African state."²⁸² Apunte of Ecuador announced that he had initially "intended to abstain" on section A of the draft resolution, but the adoption of the Liberian amendments had "enabled him" to vote for it.²⁸³ On the other hand, the Afghanistan Delegation was not satisfied in spite of the amendments. He was convinced that for the plebiscite "to be valid," there should be "no interference from a foreign power." It was obvious that he was referring to the Gold Coast pressures for integration. In addition, he asserted that the plebiscite "must not exclude any alternative" if the process was to follow democratic principles. Since the draft resolution "excluded the possibility" of independence, Aziz of Afghanistan chose to abstain on the resolution.²⁸⁴ Cortina of Argentina claimed that his Delegation "had consistently advocated the unification of the two Togolands." But to his perturbation, the debate at this

session "had centred not on unification, but on the practical possibility of conducting a plebiscite."²⁸⁵

The UK had planned a strategy to achieve exactly this aim in the process. India and Canada were active participants in this strategy. Section A of the Indian draft resolution merely ignored the substantive recommendations of the Visiting Mission. This was a major contribution to the colonial effort to achieve the goal of integration. Since "the efforts to unify" the two Togolands had 'apparently' failed, Cortina gave his support for a plebiscite because the recommendation of the Minority Report of the Visiting Mission for an alternative route was swept aside. However, with the Indian rejection of the Liberian Amendments 5 and 6, Cortina chose to abstain from voting on Operative Paragraph 3 of the draft. In so doing he registered his opposition to the elimination in the draft resolution of the possibility of continuing the Trusteeship Agreement.

What is most revealing for an assessment of Canada's and India's role in the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement is the way in which the pro-colonial faction perceived India's almost generous willingness to assist the pro-colonial cause in this case. The UK was "more doubtful...that it would be able to influence in any way the attitude of Haiti and Syria." These two non-administering members in the Trusteeship Council were the standard bearers of the anti-colonial cause, not India. Inasmuch as the Gold Coast had not yet attained independence, the Delegation from Haiti had thought that "it would be better first to unify the two Togolands, which would then be free to decide upon

their future course of action."²⁸⁶ This position came closest to what was required for the actualisation of the right of self-determination in British Togoland. It took as its starting point the desire of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory, irrespective of what the colony of the Gold Coast wanted. Haiti "was keenly aware of its obligation to Togoland, whose future was still uncertain."²⁸⁷ Theoretically and ideally, this attitude was what had been required of an anti-colonial seeking to terminate a colonial relationship. And according to the Trusteeship Agreement, this relationship was a primary one between the UK and the inhabitants of British Togoland. It is this link and the corresponding obligations that were to be addressed, in the first instance, under the Charter principles of Trusteeship.

Because of the desire of some of the inhabitants of this Trust Territory for some sort of unification with French Togoland, and because "the trend of the discussion" in regard to the future of British Togoland had "relegated the question of unification to the background," Seraphin of Haiti abstained from voting on the Indian draft resolution. He had "supported some of the amendments" that were consistent with his own views, but the principal aim of the draft resolution was in conflict with what he felt as an 'obligation' which the UN had to its Trust Territories. Menon seemed to have felt the need to defend the position taken in the draft resolution and which was the subject of attack from the majority of non-administering states in the Fourth Committee.

Choosing to ignore the official strength to influence the results in the plebiscite in both the Trust Territory and the Gold Coast, he announced that he had no "apprehension with regard to the future" of the Trust Territory since in his

estimation, "the results of a properly organised plebiscite could be only in favour of independence."²⁸⁸ In this conception, the integration of Togoland with the Gold Coast was to be the same as an independent Togoland. In defence of Section A, which rejected the Visiting Mission recommendations, Menon warned against "further division of the African Territories" which were "already much divided by Western conquest." He asserted that his draft resolution "aimed at consolidation."²⁸⁹ The unification of the two Togolands would have also been an exercise in consolidation of a previously divided entity; this Menon chose to ignore.

The constant barrage of attack by the anti-colonials on the Indian Delegation's position seemed to have influenced Menon to declare that "it had been a mistake to link the future of the Trust Territories with the question of unification."²⁹⁰ How is such an allegation possible, in light of the 10 year process during which the UN sought to resolve the Ewe pressure, on the UN, to rectify the division of their people? The unification question was an on-going exercise for the UN and it was a very crucial and essential part of the whole question of the future of the Trust Territory. Nevertheless, since early 1954, the Indian Delegation was consistently attempting to eliminate the question of unification in favour of integration.

According to Menon, the Committee "was dealing with two different problems under one item" and he complained to the Committee that this confusion served to "obscure the fact that it was really considering the report of the Trusteeship Council and the end of the UK Trusteeship in Togoland."²⁹¹

Again, Menon deliberately chose to ignore the fact that General Assembly Resolution 860 (IX)²⁹² instructed the Trusteeship Council to send a Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory with the specific objective to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants "without prejudice to the eventual solution they may choose." And therefore the unification issue would necessarily be a component of the Visiting Mission Report.

The draft resolution introduced by the Indian Delegation on December 8 was, in the words of the Canadian Delegation, "a far cry" from what the Assembly would eventually adopt. On December 15, the UK Delegation declared in the General Assembly that the amended Indian resolution was what he "might call a balanced synthesis of the views of all the members of the United Nations." And he confessed that, "because the resolution...succeeds, as far as is humanly possible, in achieving that result," he voted for the resolution despite the fact that, "it is not...in all respects in accordance with the preferences" of the British Government. The extremely short speech ended with the UK Delegation expressing its "sincere conviction that the people of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration can justifiably look forward to a future freely chosen by themselves...."²⁹³ The members were aware of the fact that the highly unequal distribution of power in this Administrative Union allowed a very small chance of taking place.

According to Menon, his government had regarded "this Togoland problem as one of the major issues before the General Assembly." He pointed out that the original draft of the resolution was submitted by the Indian

Delegation. And he claimed that it contributed to the process which "have now laid the foundations for accelerating the process of self-government and independence in all the West African Territories."²⁹⁴ We submit that this was a primary aim of India's efforts in the process to terminate this Trusteeship Agreement. Menon finally acknowledged that the ultimate goal in this process was the independence of the Gold Coast: "as a result of the action which the Assembly has just taken, the minor impediments in the way of attainment of independence of the Gold Coast have now been removed."²⁹⁵

The process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement was undertaken in order to facilitate the achievement of independence of the Gold Coast. However, for the Indian Delegation, the important functional factor in this process was that "the example will be followed elsewhere, so that other dependent peoples in Africa will emerge to independence more quickly." In one short speech Menon made two references to the effect that this process to end the first Trusteeship Agreement will have in all of Africa. In India's perception, the termination of the first Trusteeship Agreement was an important first step in the process of building an international consensus against colonial empires. This was a goal in India's own interest. Menon accredited to the Gold Coast government "a great deal of understanding" on its part in this process. In Menon's judgement, Nkrumah had "not tried to influence results in advance."

According to the Charter, the neighbouring colony of the Gold Coast should not have had any functional role in the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland. But as we have seen so far, the Gold Coast

was an active behind-the-scenes actor. Menon's comment was again consistent with the position that the Indian Delegation had taken in its selective definition of the situation. By choosing to ignore the input of anti-integration petitioners, the Indian Delegation could free the Gold Coast Government from anti-colonial accusations of harbouring imperialistic motives in the Trust Territory.

The next section will deal with the final instrumental step in the process to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. We will show to what extent the Gold Coast Government sought "to influence" the results of the plebiscite with the tacit assistance of the Administering Authority. The resolution authorised the Trusteeship Council in conjunction with the Administering Authority, to hold a plebiscite in the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration "without delay": the inhabitants should be asked to express their views on the two questions which were proposed by the UN Visiting Mission.

In addition, the resolution decided that a UN plebiscite Commissioner should be appointed, assisted by observers, to carry out the supervisory functions envisaged by the Visiting Mission Report. The Commissioner had to report to the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly on the results of the plebiscite. These would be assessed by the General Assembly and the Administering Authority. Together, they would determine the next step which the UN should undertake in this process. The Visiting Mission recommendation to subdivide the territory for the purpose of the plebiscite was rejected by the resolution. However, the UK Delegation felt that the General Assembly could

"take into consideration the strength of opinion in the various parts of the territory, in assessing the result of the plebiscite."²⁹⁶ He thought that this method would effectively obtain a similar interpretation of the results which was intended by the proposal for a subdivision of the territory.

The Plebiscite

The Canadian Delegation informed Ottawa that Mexico had "come under much suspicion because of the support" it had given to the Netherlands and the UK in the Fourth Committee.²⁹⁷ Despite this conduct Espinosa Prieto (Mexico) was appointed by the General Assembly to be the UN Plebiscite Commissioner. In the opinion of the UK Delegation, Espinosa Prieto "had earned general respect for his moderate and constructive attitude on colonial problems in general." Therefore the UK felt that he could be "relied upon to take a sensible line."²⁹⁸ What should we interpret this to mean in light of the display of his pro-colonial behaviour?

Weishhoff, the Principal Secretary to the Commissioner, who was appointed by the Assembly to supervise the plebiscite confided to the Canadian Delegation that "it is open to question whether the Assembly might have been better to appoint a Commission...rather than a Commissioner." According to the Delegation, "it would appear" that Espinosa had "already ran afoul of the Togoland Congress in his desire to obtain a cut and dried decision on the plebiscite." Weishhoff reported that Espinosa not only "dealt high-handedly" with

the problems of the Togoland Congress but he also sought "to ingratiate himself" with the CPP.²⁹⁹

Consistent with its earlier complaints of infiltration and fraudulent practices of the CPP, the Togoland Congress requested that the Plebiscite Commissioner keep the ballot boxes and the ballot papers in "UN custody." According to Weishhoff, the problem with this arrangement, was that, if the Togoland Congress could prove that the ballot boxes were 'stuffed' with 'rigged' ballots, then the UN could be placed "in an invidious, if not untenable position."³⁰⁰ But this is exactly what UN supervision of the process to prepare for the plebiscite was supposed to prevent and Espinoza did not seem to display the impartiality expected of a UN representative. Both the Canadian Delegation and Ottawa were informed by Weishhoff that the Plebiscite Commissioner also seemed to be working to obtain the goal of integration.

Situation in the Trust Territory

"No one could deny," according to Weishhoff, "that the decision of the United Kingdom...to leave the Gold Coast...was dictated by purely political reasons and had little to do with realities." As a member of the UN, he had accompanied the 1949 Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory and had also returned from the area in February. He claimed that "it would be folly to hold....that they were qualified for self-government...."³⁰¹ Anthony Eden who was the British Prime Minister at the time, later wrote that he "was doubtful of a truly

democratic development there."³⁰² In spite of this, the UK decided to deny the peoples of its Trust Territory of Togoland the right of self-determination in order to ensure its integration with the Gold Coast. In regard to the "UN Official Comments on Conditions in Togoland," the Commonwealth and Middle East Division of External Affairs in Ottawa wrote that the Togoland Congress "is on sound ground in accusing the British of partiality in the registration of votes for the plebiscite."³⁰³

The Canadian Delegation observed that the Ewes "especially...understood much better than their fellow country men of the north, just what the plebiscite intended to do."³⁰⁴ As pointed out earlier, the Ewes located mostly in the southern part of the territory had contacts with Western missionaries, traders etc. and they could therefore relate more effectively to the electoral process that was being undertaken to decide their future. The Delegation reported that in Weishhoff's "estimation...the populations of north British Togoland would be almost entirely subject to the influence of the Chiefs." He felt that these peoples of the north which "civilisation had barely brushed, if at all," understood little of this process.

In light of this, he reported with great disquiet that a Gold Coast Government agent had been "informing the chiefs" and the people of the north "there will be two ballot boxes in the voting period....The white box will stand for Gold Coast and British rule, while the black box will stand for unification and French rule."³⁰⁵ The Delegation reported that, according to Weishhoff, "incidents such as these are by no means exaggerated." Weishhoff claimed that a British

official in the Mamprusi District suggested to Espinoza "the need for a simplification" of the question on the plebiscite. He proposed a simple question such as "Do you wish to remain with the British or do you wish to go with the French?" Under the circumstances, the Delegation considered that "these remarks speak most eloquently as to the results which one may expect of the plebiscite." Therefore, if a great percentage of the north vote in favour of integration it is "because the Chiefs wish it to be so."³⁰⁶

Because the Togoland Congress had been asking for a temporary continuation of the Trusteeship Agreement with the hope of possible unification with French Togoland, Weishhoff suggested that "the developments now afoot in French Togoland might not be without having some effect" on the plebiscite. The French Delegation had notified the Trusteeship Council on March 1, that elections would be held very shortly in the French Trust Territory and this was published in the United Nations Press release (TR/1110). This information would strengthen the position of the Togoland Congress with regarding to maintaining the status quo of the territory. The Delegation believed that it could also serve to encourage its supporters to "reject integration with the Gold Coast and take a long term view of the situation."³⁰⁷

Weishhoff was of the opinion that because of the political developments in the French Trust Territory, the Togoland Congress expected in the up-coming elections that the French Trust Territory would "definitely pronounce themselves in favour of independence." This new direction in developments offered potential problems for the UK and the Gold Coast in

keeping the lid on British Togoland. According to the Canadian Delegation, the French government was "not unaware" of this new explosive situation in the area. The Delegation believed that "precisely because of their wish to see the portion of Togoland which they administer remain within the French Union," the French Government would most probably urge that their own plebiscite be held "at the earliest moment."³⁰⁸

In its January 6 Telegram the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) had asked its High Commissioners to inform Commonwealth Governments that if the future of the Trust Territory "is not determined in advance of, or concurrently with, the achievement of self-government by the Gold Coast, it would seriously complicate arrangements for the transfer of power in the Gold Coast."³⁰⁹ It is this factor which assisted the UK Government in obtaining the support of the Latin American and other Governments which were not so enthusiastic about supporting the Indian resolution to authorise the plebiscite in British Togoland.³¹⁰ Up to that point in the process, the UK had set the pace of developments and had been successful in utilising this self-imposed time restraint to move events along to a conclusion which the UK and the Gold Coast desired.

We will show in the next chapter how France had also attempted to follow this same strategy in its attempt to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement for French Togoland. However, it is precisely because of this situation in the French part that complications did arise in the British part of Togoland. These had the potential to either halt the process altogether or to change the direction of the developments if the Togoland Congress was successful in its aim to maintain

the status quo. On May 24, the UK High Commissioner transmitted to Ottawa³¹¹ the results of the UN plebiscite of May 9 which was held in the Trust Territory of British Togoland. These are the official voting figures: in the northern section for union with the Gold Coast 48,739 and, for separation from the Gold Coast 12,619. In the southern section, for union 43,976 and, for separation 54,785. The totals for the territory for union 92,769 and, for separation 67,404.

Plebiscite Results and Interpretation

The CRO informed Commonwealth Governments³¹² on June 14 that "in spite of differing" plebiscite results in the northern and southern sections of British administered Togoland, "it has now been decided that the United Kingdom should take line in Trusteeship Council that the plebiscite revealed a clear majority vote (58%) in favour of integration" with the Gold Coast when it becomes independent. Besides, the CRO added, the opposition registered were "mainly concentrated in two small districts," Ho and Kpandu in the southern part of the territory. The time had arrived for the last strong offensive by the UK to maintain the momentum which was working for the goal of integration. And there were only a few key players on which the UK could effectively rely to carry this case through the UN. The French and British had already decided on the strategy to solidify the position in the Trusteeship Council where, with the help of India, the colonials could carry the day because of the equal number of administering and non-administering members. And after obtaining its desired goal in the

Trusteeship Council, the UK could then have the Trusteeship Council recommend the next step which the General Assembly ought to take in the process.

Of course both France and the UK were aware of the fact that the General Assembly could decide to take other steps than those recommended by the Trusteeship Council. But, Bargues of France had already concluded in November that the General Assembly "might not wish to go on record as contradicting the recommendation of the Council."³¹³ The colonials had agreed that the strategy was worth a try and up to that point in the process, it had been a successful one. This success was due in part to the relatively inactive role of USSR Delegation but mainly to the "leading part" which the Indian Delegation had taken in "the proceedings" and its overall 'invaluable' support in the process.³¹⁴ As to the other "anti-colonials," the USA worked behind the scene as a colonial and supported the UK's position in cloaked language and indirect recommendations, in its short speeches.

With the plebiscite results in, the CRO believed that "if our line is pursued sufficiently firmly" in the Trusteeship Council, the "other Administering Powers and India will support us." And although in the UK's estimation the USSR, Haiti and Syria would certainly be in the opposition, there was still "a good chance that the Trusteeship Council will recommend accordingly."³¹⁵ This was a continuation of the strategy worked out in the N.Y. meeting. The UK government was still not prepared to take the risk of allowing open discussions on the interpretation of the plebiscite results. The colonials were aware of the fact that

the General Assembly was 'committed' by its resolution of December 1955 to assess the results of the plebiscite "as a whole." And they also anticipated that with "such close voting some attempt would naturally be made in the Assembly if not in the Trusteeship Council to have the results of the balloting considered on an area basis."³¹⁶ This possibility was implicitly allowed in the resolution and the UK understood this. Had the anti-colonials chosen to take this route of assessment and interpretation of the results, they would have been able to give those parts of the territory a final chance to actualise their dream of unification because the numbers were adequate for this purpose.

The Last Step: Consolidation - Strategy and Support

Because any alternative to integration was out of the question in British Strategy, the CRO began in June to lay the ground work for the upcoming discussions on the results of the elections in the Fourth Committee in November. The CRO anticipated that the UK Delegation would be able "to obtain" a Fourth Committee decision for integration³¹⁷ 'assuming' that the Trusteeship Council recommendation to the General Assembly would be "favourable to our view," that the results revealed a clear majority for integration. However, this would entail extensive work for the UK not only in the Trusteeship Council but more so in the Fourth Committee. The plan was a comprehensive one. The CRO announced to all the High Commissioners:

we are of course most anxious that Australia, New Zealand and (especially) India in the Trusteeship Council, and all other

Commonwealth Countries in the General Assembly, should support us in line we propose to take. From our point of view ideal arrangements would be for Indians to sponsor a resolution in the Trusteeship Council which would lead to union of the Trust Territory with Gold Coast when the latter becomes independent.³¹⁸

In addition to specifying the anticipated role which India was supposed to play, the CRO attempted to cover all the fronts in order to limit the unexpected problems. The UK High Commissioners were instructed to 'inform' all the Commonwealth Governments "in confidence of the line we propose to take in the Trusteeship Council and ultimately in the Fourth Committee." Although the UK did not intend to alter its position in regard to the direction which the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement should take, the CRO further instructed the High Commissioners that they should not only "invite the opinion of the...governments on the proposed UK line but also attempt to elicit from those governments their own probable attitude."³¹⁹

In spite of the fact that the Colonial Secretary had already informed the CRO that, on June 8, Menon had "strongly agreed" with the British "proposed line," the High Commissioner in New Delhi was instructed on June 14 to "take advantage of any suitable opening to suggest that Indians might sponsor Trusteeship Council resolution" on lines discussed above. Because general elections were to be held in the Gold Coast on July 12 and 17, the time factor was an important one. And because of the instrumental role that India was being asked to undertake, the CRO directed the UK High Commissioner in New Delhi "to report Indian reactions as soon as possible" so that the "detailed tactics can then be discussed between the two Delegations in New York." The Trusteeship

Council session was already in progress and it was expected to address itself to this item on or around July 20. Therefore, the CRO pointed out how 'urgent' it was that he report from New Delhi because the CRO felt that the Indian Delegation was "no doubt expecting to be approached."³²⁰

In addition to the UK High Commissioners in all Commonwealth countries, the UK Delegations in New York and Washington were briefed on this strategy. The CRO proposed that,

if you are asked what will happen if:
 a) Nkrumah loses Gold Coast election; or
 b) Vote in Gold Coast Legislature does not result in 'reasonable' majority for independence within Commonwealth;
 You should say that clearly a new situation would exist, but that you have not slightest reason to doubt that United Kingdom government would remain as anxious as before to see their aims for the Gold Coast realised.³²¹

However, we submit that the UK knew that its representatives would encounter difficulties in any attempt to put forward, in any credible way, the following point of view as additionally instructed from London:

it may also be suggested to you that Togoland should have a choice in deciding shape of Gold Coast constitution if British Togoland is to be united with independent Gold Coast (it still being open question what form of constitution, and in particular what degree of regional autonomy, an independent Gold Coast should have). You should reply that Togoland will have full opportunity to vote in forthcoming general elections in the Gold Coast which will be fought mainly on the constitutional issue.³²²

The elections which had taken place in June 1954, in both the Gold Coast and the Trust Territory of British Togoland were also intended to revise the existing constitution in the Gold Coast.

The British government now had ample grounds to anticipate such questions and concerns because of the results of these elections in 1954. At the time, this is how the June 17 issue of the New York Times had interpreted the results: "as was expected, the Convention Peoples Party made a poor showing in the Northern region, where the influence of the traditional Chiefs remain strong. But the Party's most significant defeat occurred in British Togoland, a Trust Territory administered as part of the Gold Coast." It continued: "Candidates in the Transvolta region who had campaigned strenuously in behalf of permanent integration of Togoland and the Gold Coast were opposed by the Togoland Congress, backed by the Ewe Tribe, which is striving to promote unification of French and British Togoland."³²³

In a letter of June 23, the Canadian Delegation had disagreed with the interpretation of the New York Times and the Economist of June 19, 1954, that the CPP had "significantly failed" or that the Togoland unification Party had won a 'victory.' However, the Delegation warned Ottawa that "the result of the elections are a factor which cannot be ignored." They felt that the situation was "not any clearer" as a result of the elections and shared the view of the Economist that it "could in effect lead to a strengthening of the demand for an eventual independent Togoland."³²⁴ On July 13, 1954, Asha of Syria expressed his Delegation's viewpoint in the Trusteeship Council, on the elections. He declared that "the integrationists had suffered a severe setback in Southern Togoland, the only part of the Trust Territory where any real public opinion was evident."³²⁵ This was in spite of the fact that "there had never...been a clear-cut issue of

integration versus unification." Quoting from the pre-election issue of May 1, 1954, of the periodical West Africa, the Syrian Delegation pointed out that the CPP had 'promised' in its campaign programme "to work for unification" of the two Togolands. Therefore, any vote for the CPP could have "in fact, been a vote in favour of unification," because "both the CPP and the Togoland Congress had supported unification as key point in the election campaign."³²⁶

If we combine the fraudulent tactics of the CPP with the fact that in the northern part of British Togoland, "the people there voted as their chiefs wanted and their chiefs mostly came from the Gold Coast and favoured integration," then we must conclude with the Syrian Delegation that the election results of 1954 left the United Nations "still unaware of the real wishes" of the people of the two Togolands. Asha had advised that "no significance" should be attached to the 1954 results of the northern part of the Trust Territory. It is therefore without any doubt that the interpretation by the British Government of the May 1956 elections would be grounds for contention in the Fourth Committee in November. And this time it was an Indian resolution which would attempt to give effect to this interpretation. The Canadian Delegation co-sponsored the resolution. Let us now look at the reasoning behind the Canadian decision to take a public stand at this stage in the process.

The Canadian Policy Position

The Commonwealth and Middle East Division in Ottawa had an instrumental role in the decision-making process. On June 26, 1956, P.G.R. Campbell of this Division informed the United Nations Division that its "interest in this problem is directed mainly toward the effect which the decision on the future of the Trust Territory will have on the newly-independent Gold Coast." Under reference in this communication was the UK telegram Y No.106 of June 14. And it is interesting to note that the interpretation of the May 9 plebiscite results by this Division was consonant with that of the UK Government. Campbell felt that the 'majority' in favour of integration was "in no small measure a triumph" for the CPP. It would seem that Nkrumah's interest was paramount in this assessment which chose to interpret such a close margin as a 'majority' in view of the specific circumstances of the Trust Territory. Campbell warned that,

it would be a considerable blow to his prestige as the leader of the successful movement toward independence for his country if the preference reflected by the plebiscite were ignored, thus further delaying independence for those Togolese whose affairs have been administered from Accra.

In this conception, the whole process to terminate the Trust Territory had, in the first instance, to do with the granting of independence to the Gold Coast with the Trust Territory as a sanctioned part of this unit. In addition, this Division considered that under such an arrangement British Togoland would have achieved independence on termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. However, Campbell cautioned that "in view of the strong tendencies to insist upon regional

autonomy which are now being exploited by the National Liberation Movement, the Nkrumah government is likely to need all the support it can muster to bring the state to independence intact."³²⁷

At this stage in the UN process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement, the concern, the emphasis and the strategy of the Commonwealth and Middle East Division in Ottawa centred on the wishes of its principal interest, the Gold Coast. Did Cardin's speech urging the UN in 1954 to "take the fullest account of the legitimate aspirations of the people" find a fit in this conception?³²⁸ What was the purpose of the two year process in the UN to determine the future of the peoples of the Trust Territory of British Togoland when the UK and its supporters were working for Nkrumah's goal of integration, from the outset? It is evident that all means and methods were undertaken by the colonials to ensure that this would be obtained as the result of a 'democratic' process. And because Nkrumah was so certain of this result, his constitutional proposals for Gold Coast independence made "specific provision for the inclusion of British Togoland"³²⁹ in the new state of Ghana, well in advance of the General Assembly's assessment of the plebiscite results. It was for this specific reason that the UK, working with its supporters had to establish from the outset that the plebiscite results could only be interpreted as a 'majority' in favour of integration.

According to Campbell, "it would be both administratively convenient and politically desirable from the view point of the Gold Coast Government"³³⁰ if the Trust Territory could be maintained intact "as an integral part" after independence is obtained. Two sets of proposals which could work in favour of

this goal were put forward by this Division to the Canadian UN Division. The first one reiterated the logic of the UK interpretation of the 58% for integration, taking the territory "as a whole." The second was based on the assumption that the UN was 'committed' to consider the results of the plebiscite for the territory "as a whole, and not by regions."³³¹ This interpretation is in consonance with the interpretation of the first proposal but in conflict with that of the CRO which allowed that General Assembly Resolution 944(X) paragraph 5 "did leave the way open" for the General Assembly to interpret and assess the results based on areas.³³²

The Commonwealth Division in Ottawa chose to selectively interpret what decision the UN ought to take in this last step in the process. And because of this, the Division was able to take the viewpoint that Nkrumah "with some justification would consider any decision other than one providing for integration...as being unfair and unwarranted."³³³ On the other hand, could an anti-colonial argument not claim that to interpret the results for integration would be unfair and unwarranted to the peoples of the Trust Territory of British Togoland? This Division agreed that the 'line' which the UK decided to pursue in the UN provided "the only feasible solution" regarding the future of the Trust Territory in light of fact that the Gold Coast would obtain independence and the Trusteeship Agreement could no longer be continued as an Administrative Union.

On July 4, the Canadian United Nations Division advised the Under Secretary of the position that Canada should take and enumerated the factors which had influenced this decision.³³⁴ This Division agreed with the UK

interpretation and Campbell's argument that the plebiscite "favoured integration...by 58%" and that "the margin in favour of integration is quite sufficient to justify the continuation of the political and Administrative Union" of British Togoland with the Gold Coast. The Division acknowledged the UK 'line' as the "best approach to a solution of this issue" and reported that both the UN Division and the Commonwealth Division found it "difficult to envisage any effective alternative."

Here are the five 'considerations' which the Canadian UN Division listed as of "particular interest." First, integration would serve to "enhance the prestige" of Nkrumah. On the other hand, a decision against integration would not only "strengthen the hands" of regional interests but might also be "prejudicial to the achievement of independence at this time." Secondly, the 'majorities' that were achieved in the Newfoundland (52.34%) and Rhodesia (62.95%) plebiscites could serve as evidence to be utilised in defence of the UK 'line' on the 58% in British Togoland. Both Divisions argued for the interpretation of the results "as a whole" in support of this 'line.' In addition, the results of the election of 1954 could also be a token of proof: the Togoland Congress Party which opposed integration in its election platform returned only 2 members, whereas the CPP was able to send 6 members from the Trust Territory, to the Legislature.

The third set of considerations centred around the situation in the territory. "Deep-seated differences" were accredited to the one million Ewes inhabiting the two Trust Territories and the Gold Coast. The Memorandum had concluded that they would "rule out for many years to come at least, any

prospect of independence for a unified Togoland." The Trust Territory was not only too small but it was also economically not viable. Because of this, "its best future" would lie in integration especially since it was 'linked' economically and politically already with the Gold Coast for the last 35 years. The Administrative Union was to form a basis of the Trusteeship Agreement and this union would also be utilised as the rationale for the termination of the agreement.

Fourthly, the Division chose to take the position that because the UK "was bound by its previous pronouncement to relinquish administration" of this Trust Territory, a rejection of integration would raise the question as to the potential Administering Authority. This could not have been a serious 'consideration' in terms of the decision-making process. We know that at the strategy meeting in New York on November 18, 1955, the UK had set out in great detail the strategy which would permit the UK to continue the Trusteeship Agreement. Actually, the UK had insisted that under no circumstances would it agree to allow any other power to replace the UK as the Administering Authority in any part or the whole of this territory. And we also know that the report of this meeting was referred two days later to the UN Division in Ottawa.

"Direct Canadian interests" were the fifth 'consideration' for policy making. According to this Division,

it would be of advantage to the success of the Volta River Hydro Electric development scheme, in which Canadian aluminium firms have a stake, if this project commanded the support of an independent Ghana which would include Togoland and would be part of the Gold Coast.³³⁵

In light of the five sets of 'considerations' listed above, both Divisions had concluded that "the case for integration...is so strong" and the Divisions therefore proposed to the Under Secretary that if he 'agreed' the UK High Commissioner in Ottawa should be informed of Canada's "general agreement with the UK position."³³⁶ He agreed.

The Indian Draft Resolution to Terminate the Trusteeship Agreement

Dehli agreed to the secret strategy proposed by the UK in June. On July 25, 1956, Lall of India introduced a draft resolution in the Trusteeship Council. In his opinion "it was clear" from paragraphs 541, 542 and 543 of the report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner "that the wishes of the people had been freely expressed" in accordance with Article 76 b of the Charter, "and they were in favour of union with an independent Gold Coast." He announced that "the next stage" in the process was the final step which the Council would have to take: it should report to the General Assembly that the plebiscite "had been fairly conducted." And in light of this, the final step for the General Assembly "now remained to terminate the Trust Agreement." According to Lall, it was the 'purpose' of his draft resolution to authorise this final stage in the process and in his Delegation's viewpoint, "it was the only course the Council could properly follow."³³⁷

In order to impress upon the Council that the process was indeed approaching its end, he emphasised the fact that the draft resolution "itself was

largely procedural" at least for the Council's work, because paragraph 5 of General Assembly Resolution 944(X) "had reserved" to the Assembly "the decision on future action." The Indian Delegation had taken the significant step of interpreting the plebiscite results as the UK had desired and in so doing set the tone for the Council's recommendation to the General Assembly. On the August 22, the CRO informed all Commonwealth High Commissioners and the UK Delegations in New York and Washington that the Indian Delegation "were most co-operative throughout the Trusteeship Council proceedings and their Representative was very successful in his efforts to secure largest possible vote in favour of the resolution."³³⁸

The Petitioners Appear Again

On the November 28, the CPP and the Togoland Congress touched upon the crucial factors in a dialogue with the Indian Delegation. According to Kumah of the CPP, the UN should not accredit the desire for Ewe unification to the voting results in Southern Togoland. He asserted that the Togoland Congress Party, although representing itself as being against integration, was "not against union with the Gold Coast in principle." And he felt that "the main reason" why the southern part of the territory voted the way it did was because it "wanted a federal form of government."³³⁹ Singh of the Indian Delegation explained to the Fourth Committee that the Constitutional Adviser had "advised against" a federal

form of government because it "would slow down development and introduce an intolerable handicap" to the administration of the new nation.³⁴⁰

Asare of the CPP added that instead of a federal form, the Adviser had "recommended regional assemblies with wide regional devolution of powers so as to safeguard the interests of the various regions."³⁴¹ However, the Indian Delegation was most helpful in utilising the results of the general elections of the July 12 and 17 in the Gold Coast to show that "a large majority favoured a unitary scheme." In his estimation, this was the basis of the decision "to grant limited regional autonomy," instead of the "wide regional devolution" recommended by the Constitutional Adviser.³⁴² The CPP petitioner supported Singh's assertion: he claimed that "about two-thirds" of the Gold Coast preferred a unitary form of government. In a resort to the numbers game, Asare pointed out that 52-60% of the southern section of British Togoland also voted for a unitary form.

Antor of the Togoland Congress rebuffed the Indian and the CPP attempt to interpret the results of this general election in the same pro- integration framework they had utilised for the past two years. He attempted to show that in this election the Northern Territories, Ashanti and the southern section had voted for a federal system because of their desire to protect their internal autonomy. But most importantly, he rejected the CPP 52.6% 'proof' of support for the general scheme in Southern Togoland; the fact is that the Togoland Congress had won three seats. He explained that the fourth seat was "an overlapping constituency in which the population on the Togoland side was outnumbered by that on the Gold Coast side."³⁴³ In an earlier petition, the Togoland Congress had

warned the UN of the potential consequences of the redrawing of electoral districts by the CPP, to obtain this 'overlapping'.

The Indian Delegation's selective questioning seemed to be directed towards the goal of convincing the Fourth Committee that integration provided the best alternative in the interests of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. Ignoring the Togoland Congress' insinuation of the Gold Coast's fraudulent tactics, Singh wanted to know whether both Northern and Southern Togoland were in fact administered "as part" of the Gold Coast and therefore "would benefit equally by whatever form of regional autonomy was finally decided upon."³⁴⁴ The CPP petitioner allowed that this was so.

Nevertheless, Antor insisted on putting forward his case and again he attempted to explain to the Committee that the northern section of Togoland under British administration "did not exist representatively as such." He asserted that because the territory "had been carved up in such a way that out of several electoral districts five overlapped with the Gold Coast northern Territories," the peoples of the Northern part of the Trust Territory ended up in such a 'minority' position that, "in fact, they had no representation at all except in two districts where they could elect members from Togoland."³⁴⁵ The persistence on the part of the Togoland Congress forced the Indian Delegation to address this issue. Singh finally enquired whether the CPP petitioner "would comment" on the above accusations. This is instructive for our analysis of India's role in this process because it helped to demonstrate that India was not the anti-colonial 'vanguard'

which should have been working actively to secure the rights of self determination of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory.

Kumah of the CPP admitted that "it was true" that in the northern section of Togoland, "some of the constituencies overlapped."³⁴⁶ But at the same time he protested that the Togoland Congress "was apparently trying to give the impression that the overlapping was with a foreign country" which, in his opinion, "was not the case."³⁴⁷ This CPP interpretation of the relationship between the Trust Territory and the colony of the Gold Coast was clearly in contravention of the Charter stipulation in regard to Trust Territories. Under the Trusteeship Agreement, the Gold Coast was in fact a foreign country with which the Trust Territory of British Togoland was 'administered'. The anti-colonials had the occasion to admonish the Indian Delegation for choosing to ignore that fact.³⁴⁸ And at the 547th meeting, the Afghanistan Delegation had cautioned against the "interference from a foreign power" in the Trust Territory; he felt that this would alter the results of the plebiscite.³⁴⁹

The principal accusation by the Togoland Congress against the tactics of the Government of the Gold Coast to influence the result of the plebiscite should have been sufficient cause for alarm in the Fourth Committee, as it prepared to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. The decision was based on the results of the plebiscite. Antor declared that "the original intention of the planners had been so to draw the boundaries of electoral districts in both Northern and Southern Togoland as to give voters within the Gold Coast a majority in each district."³⁵⁰ Under those circumstances and in any representation

based on population, the Togolanders automatically found themselves in a minority.

The CPP petitioner was correct in claiming that "this minority referred to by the opposition party was a political and not an ethnic minority."³⁵¹ However, the fact remained that this political minority was primarily from the Trust Territory of Togoland. Therefore, the contention of the Indian Delegation that "the supreme legislative authority would be a freely elected parliament of representatives of the people in which the people of Togoland under British administration would be represented on the same basis as those of the Gold Coast,"³⁵² was totally irrelevant in this situation where the people of Togoland was the minority.

It is evident that the Indian Delegation did not feel compelled, in light of the above, to take the concerns and complaints of the indigenous petitioners from the Trust Territory of British Togoland into consideration. Instead this Delegation gave priority to the claims and wishes of the petitioners from the Gold Coast Government. This policy decision by India was a critical and operational factor in the dynamics of the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement.

The Anti-Colonial Vanguard

On the November 29, the Canadian Delegation informed Ottawa that they had 'agreed' on this day "to co-sponsor" an Indian resolution which would be introduced in the Fourth Committee by Menon.³⁵³ Because the other co-sponsors were African Members, the Delegation declared that the resolution was

"expected to be received favourably by a large majority" in the Committee. For both the Canadian and Indian Delegations, the process was at its end and the resolution was only a formality for the UN. However, on November 30, Rivas of Venezuela made his speech. He pointed out that "the problem was very complex" and he reminded the Committee that the pending decision was a "very important" one.

For the Delegation of Venezuela, the process was not at its end. He proposed that,

it must be clearly determined whether the results not only the numerical results but the political results of the plebiscite, were such as to justify the United Nations in finally abdicating its function as supervisor over the territory for which it was still directly responsible.³⁵⁴

In arriving at this conclusion, he had consulted the report of the plebiscite Commissioner, the documents and speeches of the Administering Authority, and the dialogue between the petitioners and the Fourth Committee members.³⁵⁵ The shift in 'emphasis' of the discussion in this process did not escape his attention. And he reminded the Committee that during the seventh, eight and ninth sessions of the General Assembly, "a majority had been trying to remedy the division of the territory."³⁵⁶ To his disquiet, he had realised that "the trend now" seemed to be towards integration.

Rivas called the Committee's attention to the seventh session and the warning of the Delegation of Haiti that the Administrative Union "was hampering the progress" of the territory to independence.³⁵⁷ At that time, it was becoming acceptable to interpret 'independence' for this territory as being only within the

context of integration. And in recognition of this, Resolution 649(VII) had 'affirmed' what was already established in the Trusteeship Agreement: "that measures of custom, fiscal or Administrative Union must not in any way hamper the free evolution of each Trust Territory towards self government or independence."

However, this parliamentary step had no tangible effect on the administrative assimilation of the Trust Territory by the Gold Coast. The report of the plebiscite Commissioner made note of the fact that the territory "was not a separate unit."³⁵⁸ Because of this status, the Venezuelan Delegation concluded that "it was clearly impossible to avoid the consequences of the former administrative and political unions." But instead of asking the UN to sanction this wilful assimilation of the Trust Territory into the neighbouring colony of the Gold Coast as the Indian draft resolution was proposing to do, Rivas insisted that this union "must be taken into account when assessing the results of the plebiscite."³⁵⁹

It was obvious to the Committee that this Delegation was not prepared to accept the interpretation in the Indian draft resolution of July 25 in the Trusteeship Council. Rivas advocated that an additional step be taken in assessing the plebiscite before any consideration to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement was entertained. This proposal was based on his assertion that "integration, was against the wishes of the inhabitants of one part of Togoland and that it was not in keeping with the spirit of Resolution 649 (VII), and still less with Article 76 b of the Charter."³⁶⁰ It is for this specific reason that the General

Assembly was called upon to fulfil its obligation to the people of the Trust Territory.

Rivas contended that the General Assembly had decided against the Visiting Mission recommendation to subdivide the territory for the purpose of the plebiscite and instead, by its resolution 944 (X), "clearly indicated that it would decide at the eleventh session on the most appropriate system for assessing the results of the plebiscite." The Eleventh Session had convened and he discovered that "the majority" had seemed to have taken a stand against this concept of subdivision which was being "advocated by the opposition parties."³⁶¹ Had the strategy of the UK to create a specific climate of opinion in the UN become so successful after all? How did India cope with this evident recognition by the anti-colonials that its Delegation did, in fact, play an instrumental pro-colonial role in this process? Let us examine the speech of the Canadian Delegation whose goal was to undertake the final attempt at consolidating the position for integration.

Canada's Speech

On December 3, Soward of Canada announced in the Fourth Committee that his Delegation "had been one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution."³⁶² He acknowledged with satisfaction, that the people of Togoland were able "to decide their own political future" through a plebiscite.³⁶³ Like the Indian Delegation, Soward felt that it was necessary to point out that the integration which the UN was about to officially sanction, had been obtained

through democratic means. He declared "that in expressing their opinion on the constitutional regime for the new nation, five of the nine constituents situated wholly or mainly in the Trust Territory had voted during the general election of July 1956 for the party which advocated a unitary form of government." Evidently, it was also most important for Soward to remind the Committee that at independence of the new State of Ghana, the people of Togoland "would enjoy equal rights with and have the same obligations as the people of the Gold Coast." In the Legislative Assembly, 70 Votes to 25 had approved the constitutional proposals.

Moreover, Soward felt that the petitioners arguing against the unitary system "had failed to make a valid case on ethnic, linguistic, geographical or other grounds."³⁶⁴ Soward selectively addressed all of the above factors and he chose to ignore all of the information which had revealed the fraudulent tactics and undemocratic processes which had taken place in the territory. Under these circumstances, the Canadian Delegation "felt that it was the duty of the Fourth Committee to facilitate the implementation of the final measures needed in order to allow the wishes of the majority of the people of the Trust Territory for independence with the Gold Coast to be fulfilled."³⁶⁵

It was agreed that the margin achieved in the voting results was sufficient to express it as representing "a majority" of the people of the Trust Territory. In the final and indirect argument against the proposal of the Delegation of Venezuela, that the General Assembly should assess the results, Soward 'agreed' with the Indian Delegation that, "at a historic moment when the first Trust

Territory was to accede to full independence with all satisfactory democratic guarantees, the UN must be careful not to delay the fulfilment of the aspirations of the people concerned."³⁶⁶

On November 30, Menon had already associated a "moral effect" and a "moral defeat" with any Assembly undertaking that would serve to delay the final step in this process. The USSR, Poland, Yugoslavia, Syria, Liberia and the Philippines all "had doubts as to the extent of self-government that would accrue to British Togoland through integration with the Gold Coast." It is without any question that these members were, in essence, the anti-colonial movement. They collectively rejected the claim that the Gold Coast had any prior ownership to British Togoland simply because the Trusteeship Agreement had sanctioned the Administrative Union. This was the premise of the colonial argument.

¹ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meeting, 619th meeting, December 13, 1956. p. 677. paragraph 4.

² UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meeting, 619th meeting. December 13, 1956. p. 682. paragraph 69.

³ The UK's decision to ask for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement over Togoland could be categorised as one of the "initiatives...which point to a metropole with a clear sense of how to explore new coalitions capable of underpinning its international influence." The Trusteeship Agreement for Togoland was more or less in the tradition of the 'amalgamationist' tendencies of British colonial policies in "East and Central Africa for much of the century"; and which was designed to serve British administrative needs. Holland identified a "changing approach" in British colonial policy; after 1950, which emphasised "the construction of national states." This new direction was clearly taken not for altruistic purposes but rather out of necessity for "only such modernised politics could play the role of economic partner which the UK's trade strategy required."

See, R. F. Holland, "British Strategies...." p. 174.

⁴ RG 25, Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: High Commissioner for Canada, London To: SSEA, Ottawa. Message No: 666, June 16, 1954. Confidential. "We have learned from an official in the Colonial Office that the UK has decided to request the Secretary General of the UN to include an item entitled 'The future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under UK Trusteeship,' in the provisional agenda of the next session of the General Assembly. The UK authorities wish now to prepare for the termination of the agreement, and to set in train the arrangements necessary to determine the future status of the territory." Two months later, several Divisions in Ottawa became involved in preparing a briefing paper on Togoland for the Delegation to the UN. See: From C.G.D. Roquet, UN Division To: Commonwealth Division, August 3, 1954. Confidential.

⁵ UNTCOR, Fourteenth Session, 558 Meeting, July 13, 1954. p. 227. paragraph 43.

⁶ RG 25, Vol: 8331, File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa. No: 36, November 14, 1952.

⁷ RG 25, Vol: 6405, File: 5475-N-40 pt.7.1. From: Candel, N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa. Message No: 504. December 11, 1952.

⁸ RG 25 84-85/019 Vol: 331 File: 9764-40 pt.1. From: High Commissioner for Canada, London To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 832, April 13, 1950. Confidential. "With the placing of Italian Somaliland under Italian trusteeship a new pattern of trusteeship has developed. [A Committee appointed by the Trusteeship Council drafted the Trusteeship Agreement] An Advisory Council has been set up to assist the Administering Authority and a definite term of [ten] years has been set for the trusteeship. For their part, Colonial Office officials are very glad that the United Kingdom does not have to undertake the administration of any Trust Territory under this new pattern. They are, however, rather uneasy about the effect that conclusion of the period of trusteeship in Italian Somaliland will have. Whatever the substance of real independence Italian Somaliland obtains at that time, there may well be uncomfortable repercussions of the British colonies in East Africa, where African opinion will be encouraged by the facade in independence to demand too-rapid development of self-government." According to the Despatch, this information should be seen "as representing present Colonial Office thinking" on the problem of trusteeship.

RG 25 Acc. 86-87/360 Vol:85, File: 9764-40 pt.3. From: Office of High Commissioner to London To: USSEA, Ottawa No: 224, February 5, 1959. Confidential. In early 1959 the Colonial Secretary planned to announce, during his visit to British Somalia "that when Somalia (i.e. the present Italian UN. Trust Territory) becomes independent in 1960 the inhabitants of 'British Somalia, should they wish it, will be permitted a majority in the nominated Legislative Council and to take the first step towards complete internal self-government. Mr. Lennox-Boyd may also state that, if the British Somalis together wish it, the U.K. is prepared to use its good offices to bring the Italian Somalis and the British Somalis together with the eventual prospect of a union."

⁹ UNTCOR, Fourth Session, 507th Meeting, March 3, 1954, p. 197. paragraph 26.

¹⁰ RG 25 84-85/019 Vol: 331 File: 9764-40 pt.1. From: High Commissioner for Canada, London To: SSEA, Ottawa. Dispatch No: 832, April 13, 1950. p. 2. paragraph 6. "(Those who hold his view would say 'lowering' them to the same level)." "The provision in the Trusteeship Agreement specifically authorised them to make such joint administrative arrangements...which are mandatory from a legal point of view."

¹¹ Easton Twilight, p. 407

¹² Ibid., p. 408. "The French did not even institute a customs union between the Trust Territories and their two African Federations."

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Dispatch No: 527 August 4, 1947. From: Canadian Embassy, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa. RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40. Dispatch No: 810, December 16, 1947. "The concept of L'Union Francaise developed during, and largely as a result of, the recent war...this realignment of colonial thinking was patently designed to win to the side of Free France and the provisional Government those colonies which had been confused by the capitulation. It would be wrong to suggest, however, that there was any thought of repudiating, once the war was won, promises made under the pressure of extraordinary circumstances." "An examination of the texts of the Constitution (both first and second) reveals an astonishing inability to reconcile the unitary and federative concepts of union." "One need only recall the extremely limited powers accorded to the Governors of New France, to realise that centralisation is part of the French tradition."

¹⁵ UNTCOR, Fourteenth Session, 505 Meeting, March 1, 1954, p. 185. paragraph 35.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 460th meeting, December 7, 1954, p. 412, paragraph 15.

¹⁸ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 460 meeting, December 7, 1954, p. 412, paragraph 15.

¹⁹ UNGAOR, Ninth Session. Fourth Committee, 461st meeting, December 8, 1954, p. 421, paragraph 48.

²⁰ MG 26 N1 Vol: 12. From: High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 1318, November 18, 1954.

²¹ UNTCOR, Twelfth Session, 505th meeting, March 1954. "Views on the methods and machinery for electing representatives had differed," they wanted "parity of representation...despite the greater population and area" of French Togoland.

²² Ibid.

²³ See: Michael Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule (Evenston: Northwest University Press, 1968). p. 407. "After the Second World War, in British Africa, the political scene was dominated by true nationalists that actually demanded that the political process be handed over in its entirety to Africans." In view of the UK financial situation which we have already discussed in chapter III, the opinion of von Albertini is relevant. See: Decolonisation: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919-1960. (N.Y.: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1971) p. 223. "The 1948 riots [in Accra, Gold Coast] were a shock, particularly to the Labour government which had wrongly assumed that one could confine reforms to the local area at first and need not hand over any power at the centre." p. 222. "Challenged by the riots in Accra, London did not stop at repressive measures but accepted 'national' emancipation and took the final step to responsible government with an African majority." See also: John D. Hargreaves, The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa. (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1979). p. 21. "For the French, a turning-point came in the Ivory Coast in 1949; the brief but bloody confrontation between a reactionary administration and the followers of Houphouët-Boigny (then an open fellow-traveller of the French Communist Party) made both parties change course, recognising that their essential interests might after all be reconciled through negotiated collaborations." And see: R.F. Holland, "The Imperial Factor...." pp. 168-169. "In fact, the UK economy had moved into a phase of acute disequilibrium by late 1946, when the slow recovery of domestic production began to tail off as excess demand destroyed any national distribution of physical resources. Finding adequate internal adjustments politically unacceptable, Attlee moved to relieve those marginal pressures associated with external commitments: in February 1947 it was announced that British troops would evacuate from Greece where they had been fighting Communists; in mid-July the Indian Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, announced that India would now receive her independence as early as August 15; and in September the imminent abandonment of the Palestine Mandate was made public by the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin....The Attlee administration locked into a metropolitan crisis concerned with balancing the demands of social reform and economic stabilisation, can be discerned cutting adrift from dependencies which were net liabilities, and maintaining a grip on those (largely African) possessions which remained bankable assets."

²⁴ UNTCOR, Twelfth Session, 505th Meeting, March 1, 1954, and (doc.T/1096). See: Crowder, p. 407. "after the Second World War...in French West Africa, the political leaders were still pro to nationalists since they did not demand independence from France, but an increasing share in government." See also: Hargreaves, The End of Colonial Rule in Africa. p. 5. "...when the future of France's African colonies was debated in the Second Constituent Assembly in September 1946, African Deputies* concentrated their demands, not on independence, but on broader extensions of African political rights within the projected French Union."

* for example Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Fily-Dabo Sissoko and Lamine Guèye.

²⁵ UNTCOR, Twelfth Session, 505th Meeting, March 1, 1954. Pignon claimed that, "the Union des chefs et des populations du Nord-Togoland and the Jeunesse du Nord had categorically stated their opposition to any idea of the unification of the two Togolands and to any organisation common to the two Trust Territories."

"The Committee de L'Unité togolaise and the Juvento on the other hand were in favour of the re-establishment of the Joint Council...which they saw as the embryonic government of a future united, self-governing and independent Togoland."

²⁶ UNTCOR, Thirteenth Session, 507th Meeting, March 3, 1954.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ UNTCOR, Fourteenth Session, 558th Meeting, July 13, 1954. USA draft (T/L.480), Indian draft (T/L.490). Emphasis added.

³⁰ Ibid. P. 22. paragraph 27. [In dispatch No.: 625 p. 3. "In this connection Sir Alan gave the following results of the recent elections as an indication (no more) of public opinion", Emphasis in the original]

³¹ UNTCOR, Fourteenth Session, 558th Meeting, July 12, 1954. UK Memorandum Doc. (A/2660) transmitted as Doc. T/1130.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid. And (T/1096). 'Consultations' were conducted in 1953 in the French Trust Territory with a view to the reconstitution of the Joint Council on Togoland Affairs.

³⁴ UNTCOR, Fourteenth Session, 558th Meeting, July 13, 1954.

³⁵ RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40. Interim Access 45. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 810, December 16, 1947. INFO LDN THE HAGUE BRUSSELS PRETORIA. Easton, Twilight. pp.410-411. "The parties which desired unification with either the Ewes and their lands in the Gold Coast or British Togoland...had...little chance of obtaining a working majority in the French Togoland Assembly. The French did not favour the parties that looked for unification. They naturally preferred to work with these parties, especially Parti Togolaise du Progrès and the Union des Chefs des Populations du Nord, who were in favour of internal self-government but continued association with France afterwards."

³⁶ UNTCOR, Fourteenth Session, 558th Meeting, July 13, 1954.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/I pt.1. IV (a).

⁴⁰ UNTCOR, Seventeenth Session, 649th Meeting, November 22, 1955.

⁴¹ Hargreaves, pp. 8-9. "Britain and France did have intentions, sometimes even plans, to make the retention of formal empire unnecessary; Africans did organise to challenge the measures prescribed for them, and to seize the initiative. What determined the relative strength of the two forces the timing of events, the eventual conditions of political withdrawal, was not only social and political conditions within the different colonies (perhaps these determined the sequence of accession to independence) but the international context."

From the available files in Ottawa, we found the first indication of Canada's knowledge of any such rational decision making, in Whitehall, in early 1959. We have already pointed out, in chapter I the path chosen by Paris in 1958. RG 25 Acc: 86-87/360. Vol: 85, File: 9764-40-pt.3. From Office of the High Commissioner for Canada To: USSEA, Ottawa, No: 224, February 5, 1959. Confidential.

"Foreign Office preliminary thinking at the official level is that the UK must face facts, cut its losses, accelerate its programme towards independence, and arrange to get out as quickly and gracefully as possible (and with much good will) later making a re-entry as a member, and by no means a negligible member, of a general Western move towards trade and aid for the newly emerging under-developed countries of black Africa." On the other hand, "The Colonial Office believes that the British having retreated so far so fast should now announce firmly and publicly their intention of staying where they are, with only limited constitutional concessions, in Aden, British Somaliland, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia...[this] might involve some initial 'police action' and would not exclude the possibility of bloodshed, it would be as well to grasp this nettle now. If this is not done...the position will deteriorate so sharply before a wave of engulfing African nationalism that within the next two to five years little or nothing would be left of the British strategic and economic investment in East Africa....The policy of 'stay put'...could only be carried out if the United Kingdom could persuade the Americans and the Western world of its soundness....The Colonial Office is thinking in terms of a time scale for independence of about 1975. While the Foreign Office view, in which the C.R.O. concurs, is that events are moving too fast both in Africa and in the international sphere for the United Kingdom to announce its determination to stay put until about 1975...the Colonial Office view has powerful advocates partly because of the strategic implications for the Persian Gulf of the new military and air bases in Kenya and Aden." The High Commissioner felt that the Foreign Office - C.R.O. view "might seem to a Canadian more reasonable," and added, "we foresee a severe tussel in Whitehall [especially in an election year] and would not venture to predict which side gain the day."

⁴² RG 25 Vol: 8331 File:10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: Ross, Office of High Commissioner for the UK, Ottawa To: Read, DEA, Ottawa. Despatch No: 647/121, July13, 1955, p.1. Confidential.

⁴³ RG 25 Vol 8331 File 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: J.B. Hunt, UK High Commissioner to Ottawa To: H.W. Read, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. July 26, 1955. Confidential. Transmitting: The Future of Togoland Under British Administration. A guidance document handed by UK Delegation to Visiting Mission. Hereafter referred to as Guidance Document.

⁴⁴ Ibid., UK Memorandum T/1130:-thin strip of territory, small population, poor except for a small area in the centre, landlocked and with economic, social and cultural affiliations, stretching not up and down its length but to the West, and to a lesser extent to the East, can never be a viable, independent political unit."

⁴⁵ Guidance Document, July 26, 1955 p.2.

⁴⁶ "...attempts made to obviate these [other alternatives already discarded] by a continuation of the arrangements for administration, as an integral part of the Gold Coast, would involve an unacceptable limitation of sovereignty of that territory."

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ The item would be on the Trusteeship Council agenda November 21, 1955, that is three days later.

⁵¹ RG 25 Vol:8331 File:10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: Hunt To: McInnes, Circular W.No: 319, November 21, 1955. Immediate Cypher. Confidential. Repeated Colombo, Salisbury, UKDEL. Under reference: UK Telegram Circular W No: 125. Saving. "Another relevant factor is natural tendency of Gold Coast Ministers to prefer it questioned who should be the authority responsible for administering any part of Togoland opting for continued trusteeship, should only be tackled if and when it is clear from result of plebiscite that inhabitants of Togoland or a part of it are opposed to immediate integration with Gold Coast." See: A.N. Porter and A.J. Stockwell, British Imperial Policy and Decolonization 1938-1964, Vol: 2: 1951-1964 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1989), p. 286. Document 37. -A copy was sent to Canada. "The urgent problem arises from the rapid growth of nationalism and the consequent pace of political development in the territories listed in group (a).* It is this which will test the flexibility of the Commonwealth connection and will present an immediate challenge to Commonwealth statesmanship."

*Gold Coast, Nigeria, Central African Federation, A Malayan Federation, A West Indian Federation.

⁵² RG 25, Vol:8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: Canadian Delegation N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa, No: 90, November 18, 1955. Canada's identification of the "parties most concerned" UK and France. The Government of the Gold Coast is a behind-the-scene but important factor in decision making: re-choices and means see No: W. No. 319 November 18, 1955.p.3 and 4. Preference of Gold Coast. Important factor of tactic.

⁵³ Guidance Document p.3. paragraph 9.

⁵⁴ RG 25 Vol: 7573 File 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.3.1 From: R.A. MacKay, N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 90. October 7, 1955. Confidential. This information was given to MacKay "in confidence by the Secretariat." If the USA and India were members of the Visiting Mission, were they not aware of Syria's Minority Report before October?

⁵⁵ MacKay to Pearson, Despatch No: 90. "...the United Kingdom are rather fearful lest the views of Mr. Tarazi should be seized upon by the non-administering members in the Fourth Committee to precipitate once more a debate on Togoland such as the one of last year and possibly jeopardise the whole question of the future Togoland under British administration."

⁵⁶ Ibid., paragraph 3, "the question of unification died hard among the non-administering members." See also: "Final Report"

⁵⁷ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 558th meeting, November 28, 1956 p.37 paragraph 38 Mr. Kumah, CPP rejected this implication, this "was not the case." UNTCOR, 507th meeting, March 3, 1954, p.97. Menon rejected the implication that the Gold Coast is "an African State motivated by imperialism."

⁵⁸ UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, 648th meeting, November 21, 1955. p.5.paragraph 16. "present administration of territory as integral part of Gold Coast has not prejudiced issue in

favour of integration as may be seen from existence of large and vocal section in southern part who oppose such a course."

Circular W. No: 319, November 18, 1955 p.5. paragraph 9 "Mr. Tazari's Recommendation" exactly the contra-argument was given by France in explanation for the logic behind the minority position. Part of strategy between France and UK? This inward telegram was sent to the UK High Commissioner in Ottawa and repeated to Colombo, Salisbury and UK Delegation, in time for the strategy meeting in N.Y. See No: 90, November 1955 for detailed information. Secondly, the UK's statement that the recommendation was 'impracticable' and would involve long period of unnecessary delay" was utilised as the second argument by France to support the majority Report instead

⁵⁹ UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, 649th meeting, November 22, 1955 Lall, p.7. paragraph 4."Any attempt at the present stage to change the natural course of events might well have serious consequences not only for the Trust Territories but also for the Gold Coast."

⁶⁰ Ibid., France.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Guidance Document, p.1. paragraph 3.

⁶³ RG 25 Vol: 7573 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.3.1. From: MacKay To: Pearson, No: 90. October 7, 1955. According to MacKay, the UK felt that Syria's position "is yet another indication of how pre-judged and blinded less responsible members of the Council can become as a result of cleverly mounted petitions from the Trust Territories."

⁶⁴ RG 25, Vol: 8331, File 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: Assembly Delegation N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa, No: 90, November 18, 1955. p.3. paragraph 9. Mr. Bargues (France)

⁶⁵ UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, 648th meeting, November 21, 1955. p.3. paragraph 5.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ No: 90. November 18, 1955 p.4. paragraph 12. p.1.paragraph 2:3 points of the Visiting Mission Special Report which gave the UK "special cause for concern":- [Mr. Gidden, UK representative in Fourth Committee]

- a) the questions recommended to be put at the plebiscite (paragraph 105);
- b) the nature of the United Nations Commissioner to supervise the plebiscite.(paragraph 131);
- c) the division of the territory into three parts or purposes of the plebiscite.(paragraph 108).

⁶⁸ Despatch No: 90. November 18, 1955. p.3. paragraph 7.

⁶⁹ Guidance Document, p.1

⁷⁰ UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, 648th meeting, November 21, 1955.p.3. paragraph.6 UK.

⁷¹ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File 29283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London. To: High Commissioner for the UK Ottawa, Cypher, Circular W.No: 319, November 18, 1955. Repeated Colombo, Salisbury, UKDEL.

⁷² UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, 649th meeting, November 21, 1955, p.3. paragraph 7.

⁷³ Despatch No: 90, October 7, 1955, paragraph 3.

⁷⁴ UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, 649th meeting, November 21, 1955 p.3. paragraph 8.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, 648th meeting, November 21, 1955. p.4. paragraph 9.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Despatch No: 90 p.3. paragraph 6.

⁷⁹ UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, 648th meeting, November 21, 1955, p.4. paragraph 10.

⁸⁰ Circular W. No: 319, November 18, 1955 p.3. paragraph 4.

⁸¹ Ibid. Transmitted to Ottawa on November 21.

⁸² Ibid. p.3. paragraph 6.

⁸³ Despatch No: 90, November 18, 1955 p.3. paragraph 6.

⁸⁴ Ibid. Emphasis in original.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid. [Emphasis added]

⁸⁷ Ibid. p.2. paragraph 5.

⁸⁸ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 460th meeting, December 7, 1954, paragraph 24. Rivas (Venezuela)

⁸⁹ Ibid. paragraph 25.

⁹⁰ Indian draft Resolution A/C.4/L. 370 "which provided for the General Assembly to request the Trusteeship Council to consider and formulate arrangements or consulting the inhabitants of that part of Togoland in 1956."

⁹¹ RG 25, Vol: 3463, File: 6-1955/1. pt.1. CH. IV (2) p.3. See also: Pearson Papers, Vol: 12 File: Reid, Escott. From: Pearson To: Reid, Ottawa, December 27, 1952. Secret and Personal. Complains of "the lack of friendly co-operation between the two senior people of the Indian Delegation....It is hoped that in the future the Indians will put their senior delegate in charge of the most important subject under discussion, or that they will ensure that the top two delegates are more in each other's confidence...."

From: Reid To: Pearson No: 42, January 14, 1954. Reported that there was "a struggle for power among the various people who advise Mr.Nehru on foreign policy."

⁹² RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1, pt.1. Chapter IV (9). Confidential.

⁹³ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, November 17, 1954. Mrs. Menon

⁹⁴ RG 25 Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1, quoting Mrs. Menon. General Assembly Resolution 649 (VII): "measures of customs, fiscal or Administrative Union must not in any way hamper the free evolution of each Trust Territory towards self-government or independence."

⁹⁵ Edward Mortimer, France and the Africans 1944-1960 (New York: Walker and Co., 1969),pp.44-115. "If the British government had really been behind the pan-Ewe movement, the latter might well have secured a favourable hearing at the UN, and the French would have been gravely embarrassed. But in reality the British were scarcely if at all less hostile than the French to the idea of a pan-Ewe state, for such a state would have included not only the 139000 Ewe of British Togoland but, much more important, the 376000 Ewe of the Gold Coast. i.e. It involved not merely a reversal of the partition of 1919, but the loss of a sizeable slice of an old-established British colony. Temporary British trusteeship over an Ewe state would not compensate for the fragmentation of the Gold Coast."

⁹⁶ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 460th meeting, December 7, 1954, p.412. No: 16

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 460th meeting, December 7, 1954. p.412. paragraph 17.

⁹⁹ UNTCOR, Thirteenth Session, 507th meeting, March 3, 1954. p.198, paragraph 35

¹⁰⁰ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 460 meeting, December 7, 1954. p.413. paragraph 26.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 460th meeting, December 7, 1954. p.413. paragraph 30.

¹⁰⁴ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.5. From: Canadian Delegation Geneva To: Acting USSEA, Ottawa, March 23, 1950. "The representatives of the Ewe people have...for some time been urging that the Ewes in the two Togolands and Gold Coast should be united under one political and economic administration. The suggestion now made to the Council is that the British and French Administering Authorities should draw up a plan for the harmonising of their two administrations, accelerate the participation of Africans in the administration, and introduce measures with a view to self-government of the territory at the expiration of a period of 5 years." Item5: Togoland Relations. This context did take Togoland to be an entity and recognised that the Ewe problem was not only a 'regional' one.

RG 25, Vol: 6405 File 5475-N-40. pt. 6.2. From: Perm. Delegation, N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa, Letter No: 610 May 20, 1952. Confidential. Unification of the Cameroons: "Consideration of British and French reports of their administration of the Cameroons may be complicated by a petition of some tribes in the two Territories who wish to be united under a single administration. The British and French Colonial Offices are afraid this petition may be inflated into another "Ewe Problem" which, as you know, has caused the Administering Authorities considerable trouble ever since it was first raised in the Trusteeship Council. The UK and French Delegations hope to be able to confine discussion of this petition to the Council's Committee on Petitions and, for the time being at least, to prevent it from being aired in the Trusteeship Council proper."

¹⁰⁵ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 461st meeting, December 8, 1954.

¹⁰⁶ See: Section on Joint Council at the beginning of this chapter.

¹⁰⁷ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 461st meeting, December 8, 1954. p.421. paragraph 49.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. P.422. paragraph 50.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ RG 25, Acc. 84-85/019. Vol/Box 360, File 10283-40-pt.1. August 5, 1954 p.6. Mr. H.T. Bourdillon (Under Secretary, Colonial Office) in meeting with Canadian Department of External Affairs, July 29, 1954. "The U.K. hoped Canada would lend its active support in the United Nations to the United Kingdom position in Togoland". He added that "India had already indicated its support," which "would be of the greatest assistance."

¹¹² UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 460th meeting, December 8, 1954. p.422. paragraph 57.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., Despatch No:58.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. Despatch No: 59.

¹¹⁸ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 464 meeting, December 10, 1954. p.442. paragraph 7.

¹¹⁹ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa, Message No: 493, November 14, 1953. Restricted. Subject: Togoland Unification-Fourth Committee. p.1. paragraph 2. Mr. Antor and Mr. Olympio "both suggested that nothing had been done in Togoland to implement last year's resolution."

¹²⁰ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: High Commissioner for Canada in London To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 3254, September 15, 1952. Secret. Subject: The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem. Paragraph 1: "Gold Coast Ewes crossed into French Togoland at Lome/Aflao frontier to greet the Visiting Mission; according to Press reports, 'serious disturbances took place in French Togoland during the stay of the Trusteeship Council Visiting Mission' there." Paragraph 2: "There has been no official UK comment on the press reports referred to in paragraph one above but unofficially the Colonial Office has expressed concern at the repercussions which they may produce in the Assembly. In particular it is feared that the proponents of Ewe unification will again claim their right to be heard by the Fourth Committee and that the results will be a repetition of the prolonged and acrimonious debates to which their appearances gave rise in Paris last winter."

¹²¹ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 464th meeting, December 10, 1954.

¹²² UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 464th meeting, December 10, 1954. p.442, paragraph 9.

¹²³ Ibid. See also: correspondence between Candel N.Y. and Ottawa regarding this aspect of Administrating Unions. From: Candel, N.Y. To: Acting USSEA, Ottawa, No: Letter 78, December 8, 1952 p.1. paragraph 3. "A resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union (doc. A/C. 4/L 247) proposing the establishment of separate legislative and executive organs in Trust Territories which are part of Administrative Unions was rejected by a vote of 5 for, 21 against and 24 abstentions. The number of abstentions is noteworthy since it reflects the wishes of many countries that the Soviet proposal should eventually be implemented although this step is not practicable at the present time."

¹²⁴ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 464th meeting, December 10, 1954, No: 19. p.443.

¹²⁵ Ibid. No: 21

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid. paragraph 22. And on March 11, 1955, (Menon) "The Administering Authority was to be heartily commended on the way it had maintained the Trust Territory's status as a separate entity despite the fact that it enjoyed certain common services with the Gold Coast."

¹²⁹ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 46th Meeting, December 10, 1954.

¹³⁰ the dichotomy between unificationists and integrationists was so clear that it paralleled the division of policy found between the colonial and anti-colonials. Singh's speech was taken by Delegations such as Haiti and Poland as an attack on the anti-colonial position.

¹³¹ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 464th meeting, December 1954.p.443 paragraph

24.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ RG 25, Vol: 3463 File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. CH IV(9) p.3. paragraph 10.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ File 6-1955/1 p.1. CH.IV (9).

¹³⁶ UNTCOR, 597 Meeting, March 11, 1955. Menon p. 257, paragraph 4. "In Resolution 860 (IX) paragraph 1, the General Assembly...opened the door to various possibilities instead of insisting as it had done previously, that there was only one solution." In spite of this, the Indian Delegation attempted through the draft resolution to push just the one solution of integration as the basis of a frame of reference for the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., and, p.258 paragraph 13, Ryckmans, (Belgium). "The Council might, in agreement with the Administering Authority, conduct special investigations or inquiries when it considered that conditions in a Trust Territory made such action desirable."

¹⁴¹ UNTCOR, 597th Meeting, March 11, 1955, p.258, paragraph 14. Mr. Forsyth (Australia) advised that the terms of reference of the Visiting Mission should be stated 'precisely.'

¹⁴² Easton, Twilight, p. 223.

¹⁴³ Despatch No: 90, November 18, 1955.

¹⁴⁴ UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, 649th Meeting, November 22, 1955 p.7. paragraph 3.

¹⁴⁵ Despatch No: 90 November 18, 1955. p.3. paragraph 6

¹⁴⁶ UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, November 2, 1955 p.7 paragraph 4 In 1946, the Indian Delegation had taken an altogether different stand on the incorporation of a Trust Territory into a colony. See: UNGAOR, Second Part of First Session, Fourth Committee, Seventh Meeting November 23, 1946. Menon. "...incorporation was not consistent either with the Samoan desire for self-government or with the terms of the Charter. The draft agreement for New Guinea in which the wording used was 'as if it were an integral part' with which wording...he was not in agreement," p.44. France (Mr. Naggiar) New Zealand's article on Samoa "...not contrary to the Charter." Australia (Mr. Bailey) "The entire history of this concept eliminated the suggestion that "as an integral part" conveyed or intended to convey the power of annexation." UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 538th Meeting, December 8, 1955, p.403, paragraph 23. (Menon) "Togoland under British administration was administered as an integral part of the Gold Coast. That arrangement had been accepted by the General Assembly when it had approved the Trusteeship Agreement...."[This was to form the basis of the 'trust' but it was not intended to be the solution and the basis on which to terminate the trust.]

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. p.7. paragraph 5. [Emphasis added]

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. p.7. paragraph 6.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. p.8. paragraph 6.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p 8. paragraph 7. Canada also came to this conclusion in its guidance policy to the Canadian Delegation although it was not to be expressed in the speech.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ RG 25 Vol: 8331. File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: Permanent Canadian Delegation N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa, Letter No: 558, June 23, 1954. Confidential. Under reference, Ottawa's Telegram No: V-396 of June 18, not traceable.

¹⁶¹ Vol: 3463, File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. Chapter: IV(9) p.3. paragraph 10.

¹⁶² RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40. Pt.1.1. From: Canadian Delegation To: USSEA, Ottawa, Letter No: 90, November 18, 1955.

¹⁶³ Cypher: Circular W No: 319. November 18, 1955, pp. 3 and 4.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., this position was qualified by 3 exceptions: "...except in reply to direct questions from other Delegations or if there is any danger that either less acceptable proposals will be made or that failure to make such a statement will prejudice chances of obtaining [a] plebiscite at all. If we are forced to make [a] statement we shall go no further than appears essential to avoid these two dangers."

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p.3. paragraph 5.

¹⁶⁶ UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, 649 meeting, November 22, 1955. p.8. paragraph 11.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p.8. paragraph 13.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 536th Meeting, December 6, 1955.

According to Bell, Robbins "had travelled widely in the two Togolands discussing the problems with the people and observing conditions on the spot. He had participated in all the deliberations on the Visiting Mission and in the drafting of the report before the Fourth Committee...."

¹⁷⁰ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 542nd Meeting, December 9, 1955,

Martin did not elaborate on this in his speech.

¹⁷¹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 542nd Meeting, December 9, 1955.

¹⁷² UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 536th Meeting, December 6, 1955.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 391. paragraph 1.

¹⁷⁵ RG 25, Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: J.W. Holmes To: USSEA, Ottawa, Letter 58, November 1, 1955. Confidential. p.1. paragraph 3.

¹⁷⁶ RG 25, Vol: 3463, File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. Chapter IV (9) p.5. paragraph 15.

¹⁷⁷ Despatch No: 90, November 18, 1955, p.3. paragraph 8.

¹⁷⁸ Despatch No: 810.

¹⁷⁹ RG 25 -Vol: 8331 File: 10383-F-40 pt.1.2. Draft Statement transmitted N.Y. To: Ottawa, December 8, 1955 No: 407. From: Assembly Delegation N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs No: 406 December 8 1955 asking for comments on the Draft Statement of the Canadian Delegation to be delivered as a speech in the Fourth Committee, December 9 or December 10. From: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa To: Assembly Delegation N.Y. No: V 208 December 9, 1955. "Your Draft Statement...is admirable and we feel that everything possible should be done to ensure that other Delegations appreciate the significance we attach to it. For this reason we hope that Mr. Martin might be able to deliver it himself in the Fourth Committee and shall be grateful if you would submit this suggestion to him for his consideration."

¹⁸⁰ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: High Commissioner, London To: SSEA, Ottawa No: 666, June 16, 1954. Confidential.

¹⁸¹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 542nd Meeting, December 9, 1955, p.428, paragraph 9. [Emphasis added]

¹⁸² RG 25 Vol: 7573 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40. Pt.3.1. From: Assembly Delegation, N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 90. October 7, 1955. Confidential.

¹⁸³ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: SSEA, Ottawa To: Assembly Delegation, N.Y. Despatch No: V-58, October 12 1955, p.1. Confidential.

¹⁸⁴ Despatch No: V-58; and No:90 "...as the Trusteeship Agreement makes no express provision for the administration of British Togoland after that time...."

¹⁸⁵ Despatch No: V-58. paragraph 1.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. [Emphasis added]

¹⁸⁷ Despatch No: 647/121, July 13, 1955

¹⁸⁸ Despatch No: V-58, October 12, 1955 p.2. paragraph 3.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

- ¹⁹⁰ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 542nd Meeting, December 9, 1955 p.428. paragraph 12.
- ¹⁹¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁹² Despatch No: 90, November 18, 1955. p.2. paragraph 5.
- ¹⁹³ See: Response to Visiting Mission: UK A Proposal for Subdivision.
- ¹⁹⁴ Despatch No: 90, November 18, 1955.
- ¹⁹⁵ Circular W. No: 319. From: Hunt To: McInnes, November 21, 1955. p.4. paragraph 7.
- ¹⁹⁶ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 542nd Meeting, December 9, 1955. p.428.
- ¹⁹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹⁹ File 6-1955/1 pt.1. Chapter IV(a) p.6. point 2.
- ²⁰⁰ Despatch No: 90, November 18, 1955. p.3. paragraph 6.
- ²⁰¹ File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. Chapter IV(9) p.4. paragraph 14. "Policy Guidance"
- ²⁰² RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: Permanent Delegation N:Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa, June 22, 1954. p.2. Confidential.
- ²⁰³ Ibid.
- ²⁰⁴ File: 6-1955/1. pt.1. Chapter IV(a) p.5. paragraph 14.
- ²⁰⁵ Ibid. P.2. paragraph 4.
- ²⁰⁶ No: 90, November 18, 1955. p.3. paragraph 6.
- ²⁰⁷ No: 90, November 18, 1955. p.2. paragraph 3.
- ²⁰⁸ Circular W. No: 319 p.5. paragraph 10.
- ²⁰⁹ No: 90, November 18, 1955. p.3. paragraph 6.
- ²¹⁰ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 542nd Meeting, December 9, 1955. p.428. paragraph 15.
- ²¹¹ Ibid.
- ²¹² UNTCOR, Fifth Special Session, 648th Meeting, November 21, 1955, p.4. paragraph 10.
- ²¹³ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 542nd Meeting, December 9, 1955.
- ²¹⁴ File: 6-1955/1. pt.1. Chapter IV(a). p.1. paragraph 1.
- ²¹⁵ Despatch No: 90. November 18, 1955. p.3. paragraph 6.
- ²¹⁶ File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. Chapter IV(a). p.1. paragraph 3.
- ²¹⁷ Ibid., p.5. paragraph 15. This could be the major reason why the UK and Nkrumah chose to ignore the alternative of allowing the Northern Section of the Trust Territory to remain integrated with the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast and permit the Southern Togolanders to democratically and fairly determine their future status - which was a possible later unification with French Togoland. The result of unification would have been a viable political and economical unit and the independent Gold Coast would have had to settle for the less developed and poor section of Togoland.
- ²¹⁸ File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. Chapter IV(a) p.3. paragraph 8.
- ²¹⁹ Despatch No: 625, July 21, 1954. p.5.
- ²²⁰ File: 6-1955/1 pt.1. Chapter IV(9).
- ²²¹ File: 6-1955/1. pt.1. Chapter IV(a). p.6.
- ²²² UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 535th Meeting, December 5, 1955. p.387. paragraph 79.
- ²²³ Ibid., No: 81. Emphasis added.
- ²²⁴ Ibid.
- ²²⁵ Ibid. No:81.
- ²²⁶ Ibid. No: 84.
- ²²⁷ Ibid. P.388. paragraph 98. Antor Togoland Congress "Ewe figures for Gold Coast had been inflated by the large number of Ewes from British Togoland...who had been forced by the policy of integrated administration to seek employment in the Gold Coast."
- ²²⁸ Ibid., paragraph 85.
- ²²⁹ Ibid., paragraph 96
- ²³⁰ Ibid., paragraph 99.
- ²³¹ Ibid., paragraph 99.
- ²³² Ibid., paragraph 100.

²³³ Ibid., paragraph 100.

²³⁴ Ibid., paragraph 101.

²³⁵ Ibid., paragraph 102.

²³⁶ Ibid., paragraph 193.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ RG 25 Vol:6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.6.2. Aide Memoire October 22, 1952 p.6. The Northern inhabitants are the "numerical majorities" in both Trust Territories and have "thus far been generally opposed to unification."

²³⁹ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Assembly Delegation N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. No: 393, December 7, 1955. p.1. Important-Confidential.

²⁴⁰ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: Assembly Delegation N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. No:90. November 18, 1955. Confidential. p.3, paragraph 6.

²⁴¹ Ibid. No: 7 and UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 539th meeting, December 7, 1955, p.413. paragraph 85. Iraq, Yemen and Syria wanted a "plebiscite by areas."

²⁴² Despatch No: 393 of December 7.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ UNGAOR. Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 538th Meeting, December 8, 1955, p.402, paragraph 14.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ UNGAOR, Tenth Session. Fourth Committee, 539th Meeting. Mr. Chamandi (Yemen) p.413, paragraph 77. "The supervision of the plebiscite should be entrusted...to a commission composed of at least five members who had had previous experience of such matters."

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., paragraph 83.

²⁵⁶ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 538th Meeting, December 8, 1955, p.404, paragraph 33. Menon.

²⁵⁷ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 539th Meeting, December 8, 1955. p.413, paragraph 83.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., paragraph 85. Emphasis added.

²⁵⁹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 540th Meeting, December 8, 1955, p.420, paragraph 55. Rivas found it "surprising that Delegations which had been represented in the Visiting Mission were opposed to its conclusions." No: 57: Jaipal of India explained that "the Indian member of the Visiting Mission had acted not as the representative of his country but as a United Nation's official."

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ UNGAOR, Fourth Committee, 540th Meeting, December 8, 1955, p. 420, paragraph 56.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: SSEA, Ottawa To: Assembly Delegation N.Y. Outgoing Message No: V 208, December 9, 1955. Confidential. "Your draft statement on Togoland is admirable and we feel that everything possible should be done to ensure that other Delegations appreciate the significance we attach to it. For this reason we hope that Mr. Martin might be able to deliver it himself in the Fourth Committee and shall be grateful if you would submit this suggestion to him for his consideration."

²⁶⁴ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Assembly Delegation N.Y. To: Ottawa, No: 406, December 8, 1955. Asking for comments on Draft Statement of Canadian Delegation to be delivered as a speech in the Fourth Committee on December 9 or 10.

²⁶⁵ Despatch No: 393, December 7. "The Canadian Assembly Delegation statement will be devoted entirely to the question of the future of Togoland under British administration. It will be

based on the instructions contained in the Commentary and will, of course, bear due regard to the views expressed so far by the United Kingdom in the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee as well as in its telegram to its representative in Ottawa, the text of which you sent us under cover of your transmittal slip of November 23." This text is Circular W. No: 319. dated November 18, was transmitted on November 21. From: J. Hunt To: General Council. McInnes transmittal slip.

²⁶⁶ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From : Assembly Delegation N.Y. To: Ottawa. No: 407. December 8 1955. Subject: Draft Statement on the Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration.

²⁶⁷ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 542nd Meeting, December 9, 1955, p.428, paragraph 17.

²⁶⁸ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Assembly Delegation N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa. No: 407. December 8, 1955, p. 7, paragraph 3.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Assembly Delegation N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa. No: 414. December 8, 1955. Important and Confidential. Under reference: DEL Telegram No: 393, December 7.

²⁷¹ Ibid., "we were...especially gratified to see that Menon shares our views."

²⁷² UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 542nd Meeting, December 9, 1955, p.429.

²⁷³ Despatch No: 414, December 8, 1955, p.2, paragraph 3.

²⁷⁴ UNGAOR Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 542nd Meeting, December 9, 1955, p.429.

²⁷⁵ Despatch No: 407, December 8 1955, p.2.

²⁷⁶ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 538th Meeting, December 8, 1955, p.403, paragraph 24. Menon.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., Despatch No: 407.

²⁷⁸ Despatch No: 414, p.2, paragraph 4. And, RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Assembly Delegation N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa. No: 424, December 9, 1955. Giving a summary of the "developments as we foresee them" with names and positions taken by other Delegations. However, p.2 of this document is missing from the file which must have been removed by the Department of External Affairs before being sent to the Archives.

²⁷⁹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 547th Meeting, December 12, 1955, p.464, paragraph 30. Rivas.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ India and Canada knew that union with Gold Coast would be "permanent" with no question of secession possible.

²⁸² UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 547th Meeting, December 12, 1955, p.464, paragraph 32.

²⁸³ Ibid., paragraph No: 33.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., paragraph No: 34.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., paragraph No: 40.

²⁸⁶ UNGAOR Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 547th Meeting, December 12, 1955, p.464, paragraph 42 and 43. Emphasis added. Mr. Seraphin (Haiti)

²⁸⁷ UNGAOR Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 547th Meeting, December 12, 1955, p.464, paragraph 42 and 43. [Emphasis added]. Mr. Seraphin (Haiti)

RG 25, Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt. 6.2. From: High Commissioner for Canada, London To: USSEA, Ottawa, Letter No: 3697, October 23, 1952. Transmitting CRO's informal note on the Anglo-American discussions in Washington. P.5. paragraph 2. "The State Department inclined to the view that the ultimate solution might be for both Togolands to unite and then to join the Gold Coast. The United Kingdom Delegation...thought the unification of British Togoland with the Gold Coast was a natural development, but they could not entertain the idea of a French territory being absorbed into a British Colony."

UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 539th Meeting, December 8, 1955. Mr. Chamandi (Yemen) p.413. paragraph 80. "His Delegation believed in the immediate reunification and independence of the two Togolands and the formation of one independent nation, which eventually might include the Gold Coast...."

²⁸⁸ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 547th Meeting, December 12, 1955. p.464. paragraph 35.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 547th meeting, December 12, 1955, p.464, paragraph 38. First Menon insisted on linking 'unification' with 'future' together when, in fact, the Trusteeship Council/ Fourth Committee did not decide on that procedure date?

December 12, 1955, 547th meeting, p.464, paragraph 38. Menon: Now claims that it was a "mistake to link" unification with the future.

²⁹¹ Ibid., Syrian Delegation claim that "they are 2 parts of the same question."

²⁹² Indian draft resolution "substantially amended."

²⁹³ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Plenary meeting, 556th Meeting. December 15, 1955, p.456, paragraph 164.

²⁹⁴ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Plenary meeting, 556th Meeting. December 15, 1955, p.456, paragraph 172.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Hunt To: McInnes, Transmittal Slip W.No:9. January 17, 1956. Confidential. And, From: Ottawa To: Holmes, Transmitting CRO Telegram of January 6, 1956.

²⁹⁷ On the Question of Surinam and Netherlands Antilles; and coming out in favour of a plebiscite for British Togoland. RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Permanent Mission, N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 456, December 15, 1955. See also: From: Permanent Mission, N.Y. To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 992, December 19, 1955.

²⁹⁸ Transmittal Slip: W. No: 9. January 6, 1956, p.2, paragraph 3. See also: Weekly Divisional Note: "1956 Plebiscite in British Togoland." Commonwealth Division, Ottawa, January 5, 1956. "The UK Government as the Administering Authority strongly favours integration with an independent Gold Coast."

²⁹⁹ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Permanent Mission, N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 170, March 12, 1956, p.3, paragraph 7. Confidential. Liberia, Egypt, Indonesia and Yugoslavia had all put the case for a Commission to avoid these same potential abuses.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p.3, paragraph 7.

³⁰¹ Despatch No: 170, March 12, 1956, p.2, paragraph 4.

³⁰² Anthony Eden, Full Circle (1960) p.426. He wrote that "Nigeria showed better promise of stability and tolerance." Foreign Secretary 1951-55; Prime Minister: 1955-57.

³⁰³ Weekly Divisional Note, January 5, 1956. See also Doc. T/ Com. 6/L 61, February 20, 1956. "Listing alleged irregularities in the registration procedure adopted for the Togoland Plebiscite." cited in Despatch No: 170, p.2, paragraph 5.

³⁰⁴ Despatch No: 170, March 12, 1956, p.2, paragraph 5.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., paragraph 8.

³⁰⁷ Despatch No: 170, March 12, 1956, p.4, paragraph 11.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., p.4 paragraph 12 and p.5, paragraph 13. The cost of UN supervision of the elections in French Togoland would cost approx. \$300,000. "It is a measure of the haste of France to dispose of the question of French Togoland's future status in its favour that the French Delegation has already indicated to the Secretariat, albeit quite informally, that it might be prepared to meet the whole of these costs if need be," p.2, paragraph 5: The UK High Commissioner were to inform the Commonwealth authorities "keeping them in close touch with further developments" and were also instructed to "report any views which may be expressed" to them in conversation.

³⁰⁹ Transmittal Slip W. No.9, January 6, 1956 p.1, paragraph 1.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Ross To: McInnes, May 24, 1956. Transmitting UK Telegram W. No. 212 of May 23.

³¹² RG 25 Vol: 6922 File: 5475-N-40 pt.12.2. From: Ross To: Cadieux, June 21, 1956 transmitting CRO Telegram to UK High Commissioner in Ottawa. Cypher Y. No: 106 Confidential. of June 14, 1956. "Comparable majority in Newfoundland and Rhodesia plebiscites

amounted to 52-34% and 62-95% respectively." On the right hand side column of this sentence are 2 large question marks next to each other that were pencilled in.

³¹³ Despatch No: 90, November 18, 1955, p.3, paragraph 9.

³¹⁴ Transmittal Slip: W. No: 9. January 6, 1956, p.2, paragraph 4.

³¹⁵ CRO Telegram Y: No: 106. June 14, 1956.

³¹⁶ Despatch No: 170: March 12, 1956, p.4, paragraph 9.

³¹⁷ CRO Telegram Y: No: 106, June 14, 1956, p.1, paragraph 2.

³¹⁸ Ibid., paragraph 3.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Ibid., paragraph 7.

³²³ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.1. From: Permanent Mission, N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa, June 22, 1954. Confidential.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ UNTCOR, Fourteenth Session, Fourth Committee, 558th Meeting, July 13, 1954, p.226, paragraph 39.

³²⁶ Ibid., paragraph 41.

³²⁷ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Campbell To: Cadieux, June 26, 1956, p.1, paragraph 2. Confidential.

³²⁸ UNGAOR, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 461st Meeting, December 8, 1954, p.422, paragraph 50.

³²⁹ From: Campbell To: Cadieux, June 26, 1956. p.1. paragraph 2.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ From: Campbell To: Cadieux, June 26, 1956. p.2. paragraph 3.

³³² RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Hunt To: McInnes, January 17, 1956. W. No: 9. of January 6, 1956. p2, paragraph 2. We are going on the assumption that Campbell's Division had received all communications.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ RG 25 Vol: 6922 File: 5475-N-40 pt.12.2. From: United Nations Division To: USSEA, Ottawa, Memorandum July 4, 1956 under reference Y. No: 106 and Campbell to Cadieux, June 26, 1956.

³³⁵ Department of External Affairs Memorandum From: United Nations Division To: USSEA, Ottawa, July 4, 1956, p.2, paragraph (e)

³³⁶ RG 25 Vol: 6922 File: 5475-N-40 pt.12.2. Memorandum July 4, 1956. Confidential. On the left hand column in hand writing 'agreed' with the initials J.L. (Jules Leger) Under reference: From: Cadieux To: Ross, June 21 and Memorandum From: Commonwealth and Middle East Division To: United Nations Division of June 26.

³³⁷ UNTCOR, Eighteenth Session, 734th Meeting, July 25, 1956, p.281, paragraph 2.

³³⁸ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. Commonwealth Relation Office, Outward Telegram, Y. No. 121 Saving Confidential. August 22, 1956.

³³⁹ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 558th Meeting, November 28, 1956, p.36, paragraph 13.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., paragraph 26.

³⁴¹ Ibid., paragraph 27.

³⁴² Ibid., paragraph 28. Emphasis added.

³⁴³ Ibid., paragraph 30.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., paragraph 32.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., paragraph 34, p.37.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., paragraph 38.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., paragraph 38, p.37.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ UNGAOR, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, December 12, 1955, p. 464, paragraph 34.

³⁵⁰ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 558th Meeting, November 28, 1956, p.37, paragraph 40.

³⁵¹ Ibid., paragraph 25.

³⁵² Ibid., paragraph 24.

³⁵³ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Candel, N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, No: 1500, November 29, 1956. Confidential. Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia and probably Thailand were co-sponsors.

³⁵⁴ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 561st Meeting, November 30, 1956, p.53, paragraph 17.

³⁵⁵ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 561st Meeting, November 30, 1956, p 53, paragraph 18.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., paragraph 19.

³⁵⁷ UNGAOR, Seventh Session, Fourth Committee, 292nd Meeting.

³⁵⁸ Paragraph 160 of the Report:- Northern Togoland was administered as part of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast and Southern Togoland as part of the Trans-Volta/Togoland region.

³⁵⁹ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 561st Meeting, November 30, 1956.

³⁶⁰ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 561st Meeting, November 30, 1956, p.53, paragraph 21.

³⁶¹ Ibid., paragraph 22. Haiti, one of the more active anti-colonials in both the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee was now a co-sponsor of the Indian Draft Resolution.

³⁶² RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: CANDEL N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Despatch No: 1514, November 30, 1956. Restricted. INFO LDN WASHDC EMBASSYPARIS TT DELHI FM OTT. "Mr. Krishna Menon introduced joint resolution (of which Canada is one of several co-sponsors) to approve of union of Trust Territory of British Togoland with Gold Coast when latter becomes independent and to terminate Trusteeship status then. (New State to be called Ghana is expected to attain independence within Commonwealth on March 6, 1957)." Paragraph 2: "Mr. Menon made a strong speech in favour of the cause recommended by the Administering Power (Great Britain) and already agreed upon by Trusteeship Council. He praised British administrators for their part in guiding Gold Coast and Togoland towards independence....It seemed obvious that Mr. Menon was glad to seize this occasion to give a shot in the arm to UK and Commonwealth following Suez crisis." Paragraph 3: "Prospects for adoption of resolution in Fourth Committee are very good as joint sponsors include countries from all areas except communist bloc. USSR, however, has indicated approval of the resolution."

³⁶³ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 562nd. Meeting, December 3, 1956, p.59, paragraph 24.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., paragraph 25.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

Chapter VII: French Togoland – The Pilot Project for the French Union

It is generally believed that the French efforts toward political progress in French Togoland was a consequence of the developments in British Togoland.¹ On March 1, 1954, Pignon notified the Trusteeship Council that that the majority parties in French Togoland felt that "the territory's advancement" towards the purposes of article 76 of the Charter "should be based on the gradual extension of the Territorial Assembly's powers."² The majority parties which were pro-French were able, in an alliance, to defeat the nationalist party in the elections of 1951 and 1952; thereby taking over the important positions in the National Assembly and the Territorial Assembly.

However, if the French Government had chosen to accept this "gradual extension" as its policy position, it should not have been in a hurry to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. On what basis would it justify such a step? The Togo Statute of April 16, 1955 introduced a Government Council of ten members, five of which were elected by the Territorial Assembly. But this Assembly was itself elected on a restricted, elite voters list on February 6, 1952. Both organs had no operative functions as such. However, on July 4, 1955, the Territorial Assembly adopted a resolution asking the French Government to request the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. The September 1955 Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in West Africa reported that the Trusteeship Agreement could not be terminated before a plebiscite was held

under UN auspices. According to the Canadian Delegation, at the time, the French Government had accepted this "in principle."³

By March 1956, the UN had realised that, in French Togoland, the French authorities were "speeding plans to hold a plebiscite." According to the Commonwealth Division "they hope that the political partners which they sponsor will be able to persuade the voters to favour continued adherence to the French Union."⁴ As we have seen, in British Togoland, the plebiscite had served the purpose of sanctioning the wishes of the UK and the Government of the Gold Coast. And it seemed as though the French Government had decided to utilise the plebiscite to achieve the same goal. Part of the plan was to first extend the scope of internal autonomy, and it is for this purpose that the French National Assembly adopted, on June 23, 1956 the Loi Cadre.

Paris explained that it was "a framework of reform" which embodied the main principles that the Government "intended to follow." The Canadian Ambassador felt that it 'foreshadowed' a series of future 'decrees' that were to be promulgated.⁵ Part 2 Article 8 was devoted entirely to Togoland. The process which this article proposed seemed to be in keeping with democratic principles but the assumptions and the substantive parts presented problems for the French Government in the UN. Article 8 'authorised' the French Government "to define by decree" after consultation with the Territorial Assembly, a new Statute for French Togoland. The new Statute was intended "to lay down the division of competence" between the Government and the territory.

It is important to point out here that the representatives of the elite voters were charged with this operation. The Loi Cadre had introduced universal suffrage so that the inhabitants of the Trust Territory could choose between the new Statute and a continuation of the Trusteeship Agreement. Essentially, they had no part in determining the substance of the new Statute and in this sense, it was a product of undemocratic intentions. The Government was to arrange by decree, a referendum to facilitate this exercise of choice for October. The implementation of the Statute was made contingent upon the referendum results.

Trusteeship Council and the Referendum: India the Vanguard

The French Government had informed the Trusteeship Council that it had planned to hold a referendum and requested the presence of UN 'observers' in the territory. The Indian Delegation had "welcomed the political reforms within the framework of the Trusteeship Agreement," but made it clear to the French Delegation that "it would oppose any unilateral attempt" by the Administering Authority to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement.⁶ This decision was based on the conviction of this Delegation that, before any considerations of termination should be entertained, the Administering Authority and the General Assembly "together would assess the situation" in light of Article 76b of the Charter "and decide whether the Trusteeship Agreement might be terminated and, if so, how and when." Jaipal of India reminded the Trusteeship Council that "that was the procedure followed in the case of British Togoland."⁷

The Indian Delegation had raised a fundamental question regarding the necessity of "prior consultation" with the UN before any action can be taken that could alter the status of the Trusteeship Agreement. Jaipal observed that "it should be left to the General Assembly to appraise [the reforms] and decide whether the Trusteeship objectives were near fulfilment." This was an important step in the process and he did not fail to point out that "as in the case of Togoland under British Administration," the Assembly after its appraisal, would "formulate the questions to be put to the people...and appoint UN supervisory machinery for the referendum."⁸ This was the accepted procedure in the British case and the Indian Delegation seemed not prepared to compromise on it.

The issue of prior consultation was not an important factor for some members of the Trusteeship Council. However, Jaipal admonished those who interpreted France's action as "merely requesting observers, without prejudice to the terms of the referendum." Moreover, his Delegation "failed to see how" the UN "as a party to the Trusteeship Agreement, could send observers to the referendum before deciding that the terms of the referendum were a proper basis" for the termination of the Trusteeship. In light of our analysis of India's position with regard to its aims and its preferred choices in the British Togoland case, we can assume that the Indian Delegation was fully aware of the implications of the French Government's intentions in ignoring a prior consultation with the UN.

In secret Anglo-American talks on colonial and trusteeship questions UN held in Washington, July 1950, USA and UK officials agreed that "there was

no obligation on the Administering Authorities to consult the Trusteeship Council before taking any proposed action in a Trust Territory."⁹ However, the UK officials disagreed with the American view that "in important matters of policy...the Administering Authorities might welcome the advice of the Trusteeship Council before taking steps to implement such a policy."¹⁰ In view of this position, would the attempt of the French Government to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement not be considered an important matter of policy? And how are we to define the limits of accountability of the Administering Authorities to the UN for their administration in the Trust Territories, if prior consultation was such a fluid concept?

The USA submitted three amendments to the French draft resolution; it requested the Trusteeship Council to authorise observers to the referendum which the French Government had intended to hold in French Togoland. And because this referendum proposed to ask the people of the territory whether they accepted the new Statute or preferred a continuation of the Trusteeship, Jaipal asserted that the USA amendment was 'incorrect'.¹¹ It selectively portrayed the referendum as a consultation "on the question of a Statute for the territory" disregarding the crucial question of the continuation of Trusteeship.

The second USA amendment attempted to utilise Article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement to support the right of the French Government to hold this referendum. Jaipal argued that the second amendment was "not on [sic] conformity with" the terms of that article. According to Jaipal, Article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement allowed for consultation "to assess popular opinion on

the political regime and certainly not on the termination of Trusteeship." Article 12 of the Trusteeship Agreement referred to the "relevant provisions" of the Charter in the case of termination. Jaipal insisted that a 'consultation' undertaken for this purpose, must be "in pursuance of Article 76(b)...and should have prior approval of the General Assembly under Article 85 of the Charter as in the case of Togoland under British administration."¹² The effort of the French Government to seek a termination of its Trusteeship Agreement over Togoland, in a total disregard of the authority of the General Assembly in the process, was clearly in contravention of Article 12 of the Trusteeship Agreement.

The Indian Delegation concluded that "as the Trusteeship Council could not associate itself in any way with the referendum without, by implication, endorsing its terms, it was somewhat meaningless to state that the UN could send observers to the referendum without prejudicing its position or that of the General Assembly."¹³ In this speech, the Indian representative referred, three times, to the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland. In the Indian conception, any framework to terminate a Trusteeship Agreement must take note of the precedents that were established in this prior process for British Togoland. In this perspective, that process had acknowledged the authority of both the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council which was laid down in the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement. This authority must be recognised in the process to terminate a Trusteeship Agreement.

As a consequence of this conclusion, Jaipal found it necessary to point out that "the questions to be put at the referendum were such that the results

might lead to the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement to which the General Assembly was a party," even though it was, in fact, not consulted in this instance. In addition, he recognised that the Trusteeship Council "by sending observers to the referendum, would in effect be accepting the validity of the entire operation." In other words, any involvement in this procedure would amount to "aiding and abetting" the French attempt to terminate its Trusteeship Agreement over Togoland "without any authority from the General Assembly."¹⁴

It is important to recognise that UN adherence to procedure, as stipulated in the Charter and in the Trusteeship Agreement, did not necessarily secure for the inhabitants of British Togoland their right of self-determination. The procedure to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement in British Togoland had observed the Charter stipulations in terms of rights and responsibilities of the UN and the Administering Authority. As we have tried to show in our analysis, in spite of the correct procedure the UN chose to ignore the special circumstances of this Trust Territory. Consequently, the peoples of British Togoland were effectively denied the right of self-determination. The Indian Delegation had undertaken to play an active role in influencing the process which worked specifically, work toward this goal.

However, it would seem that in this second case, the Indian Delegation had decided to work for the application of the right of self-determination for the peoples of French Togoland. This Delegation expressed concern that the questions in the referendum could possibly work in favour of termination. Because of this, Jaipal insisted that the Administering Authority pay

attention to the correct procedure in this first attempted step in the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over French Togoland. He believed that the referendum "was obviously intended" by the Administering Authority "to be a stage" in the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. And Jaipal had decided that his Delegation could not concede this viewpoint, "nor could it accept" that the decision to terminate a Trusteeship Agreement could be taken by the Administering Authority.

The Indian Delegation submitted that, for a procedure to be a valid one, the Administering Authority must adhere to due process. The Charter was clear on this. Jaipal was adamant in his rejection of the request of the French Government in the Trusteeship Council for observers, because Article 85 of the Charter specifies that "the functions of the UN with regard to Trusteeship Agreements were exercisable only by the General Assembly". If the Trusteeship Council would grant the request of the French Government, in the opinion of the Indian Delegation, it would not only be 'contravening' Article 85 but it would also be "exceeding its own authority."¹⁵

Therefore, his Delegation voted against the amended French draft resolution which, in its opinion, "intended to convert a unilateral act to end Trusteeship into a bilateral act." A vote was taken. There were 7 in favour and 7 against. Rule 38 of the Trusteeship Council Rules of Procedure require a brief recess in tied voting. The second voting resulted again in a tie. Consequently, the resolution was not adopted. The Trusteeship Council had decided that it would not send UN observers to the referendum to be held in French Togoland. The first

effort to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over French Togoland had been frustrated by the anti-colonials in the Trusteeship Council.

Process: Behind The Scenes - UK

Bourdillon of the British Colonial Office expressed the viewpoint that the French notification of the Trusteeship Council of its pending plebiscite and its request of the Trusteeship Council to send observers was more or less what the UK "had to do" for the British Togoland plebiscite. In principle, the actions were of a similar nature. Therefore, the UK 'regretted' that the Trusteeship Council "had been unable to agree" to the French request. Unlike the position of the Indian Delegation, Bourdillon observed that this request "would have entailed no commitment on the Council's part."¹⁶

It is evident that the definition of the situation by the UK was radically different from that of the Indian Delegation. Therefore, the UK interpretation of obligations and responsibilities of both the UN and the Administering Authority would result in obverse expectations. According to Bourdillon, the French "had on their side a resolution of the French Togoland Assembly demanding autonomy within the French Union." In the UK's opinion, that was "a genuine demand." This position ignored a factor which seemed to be a significant one for the Indian Delegation, that an elite or restricted voters list could not possibly produce a representative Assembly. Therefore, to claim that this organ is able to speak for the people as a whole and to regard this claim as "a genuine demand," Bourdillon

was sanctioning a process which unmistakably worked towards denying the right of self-determination of the people of French Togoland.

He considered that 71% of "the total possible" voters was "a very strong affirmative" vote for autonomy within the French Union, as demanded by the French Togoland Assembly. And he expected that the French Government would ask the General Assembly of the UN to recognise the validity of this claim. Bourdillon acknowledged, however, that because complete independence was not an 'alternative' on the plebiscite the French "might well meet with difficulties" in the UN. Apparently, considerations of due process, prior consultations and Charter stipulations were not operational factors in this definition of the situation.

We know that the UK did not agree with the USA on the desirability of prior consultation. But in its procedure to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland, the UK did pay the utmost attention to the Charter stipulations regarding Trusteeship Council and General Assembly responsibilities in this process. In the meeting of November 1, the UK seemed to forget that it was the responsibility of the General Assembly to assess the situation in a Trust Territory in order to determine whether a change should be made in the Trusteeship Agreement. This was an indication that the Indian position of August 13 in the Trusteeship Council was irrelevant to the UK definition of the situation. Jaipal made an effort to establish the procedure for British Togoland as a precedent for all future processes to terminate any Trusteeship Agreement.

In rejecting this concept, Bourdillon felt that the French "had a strong case." He believed that irrespective of the referendum, France "would have been

committed to continue political advance in the territory" under the Trusteeship Agreement. Moreover, he suggested that France "would also claim that Togoland was not yet ready for full independence" and therefore could not put it as an alternative on the plebiscite; besides, the Togoland Assembly "itself had said this." He assumed that had there been any great dissatisfaction with the choices, the plebiscite would have returned "more abstentions."

Decision Making in Ottawa

The Canadian Embassy in Paris notified Ottawa that the French intended "to press ahead" with the implementation of the new Statute. The French Government's decree would be acknowledged by the colonials in spite of the refusal of the Trusteeship Council's co-operation in the process and as stipulated in the decree, the implementation would be the next step after the referendum. In light of this unilateral action in what seemed like a process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement, the Embassy observed that "it will only remain to be decided whether and to what extent the French Government will continue to acknowledge the authority of the UN in respect of French Togoland."¹⁷

Ottawa was confronted with a similar situation of intransigence in 1949, when South Africa refused to place South-West Africa under the Trusteeship System. Utilising plebiscite results, the South African Government

had sought to demonstrate support for its intention to incorporate this territory into South Africa. At the time, the Canadian Delegation took the position that,

apart from the merits of the particular case...it would be extremely unwise to establish the precedent that the Assembly should accept as established fact the results of soundings of opinion or plebiscites taken solely under the auspices of interested parties (in this case, the South African Government).¹⁸

Taken in the context of the time, this conviction was in keeping with "the general sympathy" of the Canadian Government "with the principle of trusteeship and accountability in colonial administration."¹⁹ And a major part of accountability is the Administering Authority's recognition of its responsibilities and the UN's authority in Trust Territories. Like the Indian Delegation, the Canadian Delegation resorted to UK practice in British Togoland in order to establish Canada's policy position in regard to French Togoland. In December 1955, the Canadian Delegation had already decided that the Administering Authority "is the one party to decide on the introduction of the constitutional reforms as well as on the timing of these."²⁰ This opinion was also shared by the Indian Delegation. In its telegram, the Canadian Delegation pointed out that this fact was "well recognised in UN practice with regard to the territories."

However, the UN Division in Ottawa complained to the European and Commonwealth Divisions that they "continued to have some reservations concerning the course followed by the French Government regarding the holding of a plebiscite."²¹ This course was obviously not in keeping with past practice in the UN to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement in British Togoland. "Nevertheless", the UN Division felt that "even though" the plebiscite did not

include the alternative of an "outright independence" and despite the rejection of the French request by the Trusteeship Council, "the fact remains that no less than 77%"...voted to join the French Union and end trusteeship status."²²

This interpretation was clearly in consonance with that expressed by Bourdillon at the Commonwealth Relation Office meeting in early November. And it would logically influence Canada's policy position in this process. Taken in conjunction with Canada's "General Policy of refraining from action which might further weaken the position of...Commonwealth friends and NATO allies," this Memorandum "particularly underlined" that: "While we find it difficult to agree unreservedly with the tactics adopted by France on this issue we cannot but endorse her proposal, on legal grounds."²³

In this conception, the plebiscite and the results would be accredited to the process of ascertainment of the wishes of the peoples of French Togoland as to their future. And as such the French proposal that the UN alter the Trusteeship Agreement in favour of autonomy within the French Union was a valid one based on "legal grounds," that is, a 77% expression of the peoples concerned. The Indian Delegation had rejected the validity of this procedure as part of the process of ascertainment of the wishes of the peoples of French Togoland as to their future although this Delegation recognised the procedure as a perfectly normal one in the process of institutionalising legislative systems in the Trust Territories. The Administering Authority was obligated under Article 76b and the Trusteeship Agreement to develop the political institutions in the Trust Territories in preparation for eventual self-government or independence.

According to the Commonwealth Division, the Loi Cadre "marks the first time that French Colonial policy had placed serious emphasis on the political, as well as the social, educational and economic development of its colonial possessions." However, the Division conceded that the decision of the French Government to introduce such a comprehensive plan for change was not taken for altruistic purposes. In the Division's estimation, "the importance of the Loi Cadre lies in the realisation by France that its main hope of retaining the still very substantial areas left of its former overseas colonial possessions rests in associating local peoples more fully than in the past with their own government."²⁴

Strategy Meeting in New York

On December 22, the French arranged a "private meeting" in New York with "some of their friends"- USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium and Canada - to assess the situation. Bargues of France observed that the UN operational context allowed France limited possibilities "to follow" the new colonial policy on which it had decided. Bargues conceded that the Delegation had "come to realise more and more how difficult it would be to muster a two third majority" for a resolution seeking to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. "Speaking frankly," he admitted that this goal was "in conformity" with the new colonial policy and could be seen as "a trial scheme which, if successful, would be applied in other overseas territories."²⁵ Because Paris had decided to categorise its goals in French Togoland as a "project-pilote," Bargues warned

those in the meeting that the French Government "had decided to adopt an unshakeable attitude" and he "felt that it would not be easy to obtain a change of approach in Paris and Lome." The Togolese Government had insisted that it was interested in nothing less than a termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, in light of the plebiscite results.²⁶

Nevertheless, in Bargue's estimation, the situation required some sort of a "compromise solution" and this is what he 'recommended' to Paris: "the French would give up completely their demand for termination of the Trusteeship and try to get a resolution whereby the General Assembly would do three things:

1. Accept the new constitutional set up in Togoland;
2. Recognise the efforts of the Administering Power in developing politically the Togoland;ers;
3. Invite the Administering Power to report on the functioning of the new political institutions.²⁷

Could this compromise solution have been a result of the long speech setting the operational parameters by the Indian Delegation in August? And was the French Delegation's decision to recognise the authority of the General Assembly in the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement also not an affirmation of India's position with regard to procedure?

Bargues acknowledge that the compromise solution "amounted to important concessions." And this was necessary because "in the present circumstances" he saw no realistic chances of obtaining "anything better." The Canadian Delegation attributed this difficult "psychological climate" to the Suez debate and assured Ottawa that it "was bound to be better" because "it could not be worse." The Delegation reported that Ben Gerig of the USA "expressed

enthusiasm" over the desire of the French to compromise and suggested that this attitude would encourage 'support' for the French in the UN.²⁸

On the other hand, Smoldersen of Belgium had a totally different interpretation of the direction in which the compromise solution could take the Colonial Powers, in general. In his judgement, "it was a dangerous course to follow since the General Assembly would be given an authorisation which it did not have on Trusteeship matters." He felt that, if the French Government no longer sought an end to the Trusteeship Agreement, then it was not necessary to get the Assembly's approval or interference in points (1) or (3) of the compromise solution. Smoldersen warned that the Assembly "might well come back and say that the results of the plebiscite were unacceptable because there had been no international supervision." And once the General Assembly was invited to get involved, so to speak, in the developments in the Trust Territory, Smoldersen hypothesised, "there might well follow an Assembly request for a second plebiscite."²⁹

In light of Smoldersen's apprehension that the compromise solution "would be tantamount to giving the Assembly carte blanche at every stage of the steps towards self-government or independence of Togoland," Bargues searched for alternative solutions to replace the request for termination. He did not want to give additional authority and rights which were not stipulated in the Charter to the General Assembly. And because "the danger was real" that the General Assembly would utilise the opportunity to interfere in the Trust Territory unnecessarily, Bargues decided that the French would "confine themselves to

informing" the General Assembly that a referendum had been undertaken. Secondly, France would not "ask the Assembly to draw any conclusions from the results" of the plebiscite.³⁰

The Canadian Delegation believed that Ottawa would agree with them that the French "concessions, if they materialise, would be very extensive." In terms of process, the compromise solution did not include any substantive alteration of the situation in the Trust Territory. This solution was, in effect, seeking the General Assembly's affirmation of a procedure that was "clearly within the authority of an Administering power."³¹ And in this sense, it is difficult to understand why the Canadian Delegation would interpret the compromise solution as proposing 'concessions' or that they would be 'extensive'. Actually, it was the decision of the French Government to take the matter to the UN. Under normal circumstances, political progress in a Trust Territory would be included in the Administering Authority's Annual Report to the Trusteeship Council. But the Administering Authority did not necessarily require the UN's consent to introduce such legislative reforms that had taken place in French Togoland.

The Canadian Delegation also agreed with Gerig of the USA, that the compromise solution would entice "considerable support" from the anti-colonials and that it had an "excellent chance" of Assembly's approval. It had "become quite evident" to the colonials that the anti-colonials "would not agree" to termination of the Trusteeship Agreement under all circumstances. The Canadian Delegation felt it was an important factor that the compromise would come from the French who wanted to retain control of the process. According to the

Canadian Delegation, its approach to the Indian Delegation to work with them for a compromise solution "if a deadlock were to be avoided" was spurned by a "not constructive" attitude of Jaipal. His exact words were: "there are so many deadlocks in the UN, that one more would not make much difference."³²

In spite of the instrumental role of the Indian Delegation in the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland, the Canadian Delegation complained that the anti-colonials "do not yet realise that their intransigence may boomerang on them and some of the dependent peoples."³³ The Indian Delegation did not seem to want to adopt the same pro-colonial role in the second case to terminate a Trusteeship Agreement. In all of the behind-the-scenes negotiations and correspondences for the British Togoland case, the Indians were considered to be part of the pro-colonial group in terms of directing the process to achieve a specific goal. In the French case India was being grouped with the 'intransigent' anti-colonials, and this attitude would become an important factor in the pro-colonials perception of the possible choices of action.

The 'determination' of the new Togolese Government in Lome to push for a termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, and the French insistence that its pilot project in Togoland "would have to go through before further progress could be made elsewhere,"³⁴ were two important factors in the Canadian perception and definition of the situation. Following the private meeting, Bargues had 'intimated' to the Canadian Delegation that Canada would be the most appropriate candidate to co-sponsor a resolution on the compromise solution. The Delegation reminded Ottawa that they had co-sponsored the resolution on

British Togoland.³⁵ But that was almost at the end of the process. The Indian Delegation had already successfully accomplished the task of carrying the British case to a desired end.

Bargues had also 'intimated' to the Canadian Delegation that "as long as no progress was made in emancipating Togoland" the French had decided that, on its part, "little effort will be made to push constitutional development in other overseas areas."³⁶ Since the UN has even less competence in Non-Self-Governing-Territories, the French threat to stall the progress in this area had to be taken as a serious one. Did colonials decide that it was in their interest or wanted, for other reasons, to see progress made in the colonial world?³⁷ The Delegation sought Ottawa's guidance on whether it should take an active part in the process: "you may therefore wish to consider whether it might not be appropriate for us" to co-sponsor a resolution on French Togoland, "should this be formally requested of us."³⁸

The French Embassy in Ottawa had also undertaken to directly inform External Affairs that both the Quai "at the official level" and Defferre 'personally' had agreed in principle to the compromise solution. This decision was taken in light of the "unfavourable atmosphere" in the UN which resulted from the French demand for termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.³⁹ The speech of the Indian Delegation in August was responsible, in no small measure, for creating this atmosphere. Before the next phase in the strategy could be pursued, this agreement "in principle" was subject to the approval of the French Cabinet and the 'concurrence' of the new Togolese Government.⁴⁰

According to the Canadian Embassy in Paris, the French "appreciated the advantages of obtaining a favourable resolution, even if this fell short of what they would wish." This was a clear indication of the willingness of the French Government for compromise in order to obtain a more accommodating working environment in the UN. In addition, the Embassy reported that France "also saw the advantages" in being able to retain "the initiative" in this process.⁴¹ Consequently, the French official position as to the tactics that should be followed in New York would be, as the first step, to submit the compromise resolution. It was "to give credit" to France for the political accomplishments in the Trust Territory and indirectly take the termination question out of the operational context in the UN.

In deciding to retain for itself the initiative in this process, the French Government wanted to set the operational limits of the UN from the outset. It therefore stipulated that it would "not agree" to any attempts by Members to set up a UN investigation committee to the Trust Territory since, in France's opinion, "this would call in question the conduct of the plebiscite." Other than that, the 'details' of the tactics were to be "worked out" in New York.⁴² In Ottawa, the UN Division together with the Commonwealth Division and the Canadian Delegation suggested that because they had originally 'intended' to vote for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, it seemed 'logical' to them that Canada should support "the lesser measure." They proposed that in so doing, they would have "the opportunity to support the French" in what they felt was "a difficult session" in the General Assembly.⁴³

The UN Context: The Formative Stage

During the first week of January 1957, the UN was occupied with the French Togoland Item. Singh of India took a leading part in questioning the petitioners. He also interrogated Defferre on the rate of Africanisation of the administrative personnel and the establishment of representative political institutions in the Trust Territory. He feared the possibility that Articles 23 and 25 of the Statute could, in effect, create another 'Algeria' because of the influence of a relatively large white resident population from France.⁴⁴ During this period, the French Minister had called two private caucuses "for a number of friendly countries with a view to working out a compromise solution acceptable to the majority of the Committee Delegates."⁴⁵ The concern was to make the resolution as palatable as possible to the largest number of Members.

In assessing the new compromise solution which was arrived at in New York and with this operational imperative in mind, the Canadian Delegation felt that the French Minister had, in fact, made "considerable concessions" by agreeing to:

- A) Giving up the French Togolese demand for termination of the Trusteeship Agreement;
- B) Persuading the Togolese Government to extend an invitation to the UN to send an investigating committee of five to Togoland to examine the practical operation of the Government institutions established by the Statute of August 24, 1956 and the conditions under which the Statute is applied.

Although the French officials in Paris had decided to take a stand against a UN Investigative Committee to the Trust Territory, the new strategy meetings in New

York included the Investigative Committee as an essential part of the appeasement tactic. These two new conditions would amount to considerably greater concessions than the French Government was originally prepared to allow.

On Friday January 4, the Togolese Finance Minister extended the invitation to the UN Investigating Committee to the Trust Territory. Defferre had intended to announce his Government's 'renunciation' of the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement on Monday January 7 in the Fourth Committee. And on the next day, have someone introduce the draft resolution⁴⁶ incorporating the two points listed above. The Canadian Delegation felt reasonably sure that the draft resolution stood "a very good chance of being carried by a fair majority." The Delegation had ample grounds to be "very happy" in light of Canada's efforts to obtain these results; especially since the concessions turned out to be "right along the lines" Canada had proposed to the French "in several informal advances" since early December. The Delegation believed that "high level pressure" from the USA was also a factor in the process.⁴⁷

Even though Ottawa had instructed the Delegation to support the French in their demand for termination the Delegation was of the opinion that it was a "rather premature" move and as such they "felt uneasy about trying to talk the Delegations into supporting it."⁴⁸ The functional role which Canada had chosen for itself was based on a realistic appraisal of the operational limits of the UN in regard to the question of French Togoland. It would seem that the Delegation's assessment of the situation not only considered the chances of

success of a policy, it also involved a considerable amount of conviction on the part of the Delegation that it was the right and proper thing to do. The Delegation wrote to Ottawa:

It seemed to be too much to ask the UN at this point to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement when it had had no opportunity to exercise effective supervision of what has happened in French Togoland since 1955. Furthermore, we are not sure that [the] Autonomy Statute was quite liberal enough and left the way open for future changes.⁴⁹

The Indian Delegation decided to push for integration of British Togoland with the Gold Coast in the knowledge that this decision was against the wishes of the people of the southern part of the territory and that it would be a permanent arrangement. The Canadian Delegation seemed to want to ensure, for the French Togolese, a possibility to alter this dependent status within the French Union in the future. In this sense, the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over French Togoland would give ample considerations to the application of the right of self-determination as opposed to the process in terminating British Togoland's Trusteeship Agreement.

The decision to drop the demand for the termination not only accommodated the desire of the distrustful elements in the UN it also allayed the fears of the opposition parties in the Trust Territory. Apparently, Defferre and the Togolese Government were able to convince the Opposition that they should "accept the Statute as a worthwhile step towards greater self-government." This position was of course contingent upon the retention of trusteeship status. And consistent with Canada's choice of a gradual approach to the decolonisation process, the Delegation declared that they were 'satisfied' that the Statute would

be "adequate for the time being."⁵⁰ As a result, the Canadian Delegation indicated to the French that they were prepared to 'join' in sponsoring the resolution in the context of the new compromise solution.

Draft Resolutions: India and Canada

The result of Canada's active and instrumental role in the behind the scenes process was a resolution that would:

- a) Take note of the approval of the Statute by a "substantial majority" of the Togolese population through the referendum of October 28, 1956;
- b) Express the Assembly's satisfaction at the reforms introduced under the new Statute by the Administering Authority;
- c) Congratulate the Togolese population for the progress it has achieved in various field;
- d) Resolve to dispatch a Committee of five from the General Assembly to Togoland to examine the operation of the Statute and report to the Trusteeship Council.

Looking at this resolution in light of the fact that the UN was faced with a demand by the French Government and the Togolese Government for a termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, it would be logical to conclude that it accommodated a broad spectrum of conflicting desires.

It was an indication that Canada did take these into consideration in drawing up the final product. Therefore, it was obvious that "several Delegations" would be 'surprised' at the Indian draft resolution which was circulated on January 4, in the Fourth Committee. The draft would "simply refer the whole matter back to the Trusteeship Council for appropriate action on the ground that the reforms under the new Statute require careful study."⁵¹

Under normal circumstances, this was a classic pro-colonial tactic to remove a controversial matter from the agenda of the Fourth Committee thereby curtailing any further discussion of the subject matter pending a report from the Trusteeship Council. And because of the composition of the Trusteeship Council, the matter would have the opportunity of a more favourable chance of being settled to the Colonial Power's liking. Since Menon had undertaken 'personally' to 'request' Canada's support for his resolution,⁵² we are tempted to conclude that the Indian Delegation was seeking to take the initiative to direct the process in favour of a pro-colonial disposition.

According to the Canadian Delegation, the Indian Delegation had "been kept informed of the evolution of the French position by the USA representative." However, for whatever motives, he neglected to inform the Indians about "their projected move" to renounce the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and to submit a compromise resolution.⁵³ Had the Indian Delegation been aware of this plan, it is most likely that they would not have submitted a resolution of their own; they were not a party to the behind the scenes negotiations and it is questionable to what extent they were actually briefed by the USA representative.

But the Indian Delegation had voted in the Special Session of the Trusteeship Council in December, to "refer the whole matter" to the General Assembly and from the Canadian viewpoint, "this precluded the holding of a debate in the Council."⁵⁴ It was therefore difficult to comprehend this new action proposed by the Indian resolution. The Canadian Delegation felt that, "in the

circumstances," the Indian resolution not only represented "a step backwards" but also served to "raise unnecessary suspicions against the Administering Authority."⁵⁵ The Indian move was an unwelcome one. The Canadian Delegation observed:

It would seem ill advised to introduce further delay in the provisional settlement of the problem when the Assembly, though the Fourth Committee, is now in a position to reach a solution which it appears will be acceptable to all parties involved, including Togolese opposition groups represented by petitioners.⁵⁶

The circumstances in the UN seemed to be favourable to the interests of the French Government and the Togolese Government. Evidently, Menon did not perceive this to be the case. For the Canadian Delegation, the Indian resolution was "a stalling device." The question is, why did the Indian Delegation unilaterally undertake such action? The Canadian Delegation took the position that the Indian resolution "was inspired by considerations foreign to the merits of the case" as it stood at the time. And because of this belief, they "resolved to refrain from giving it any encouragement." They would continue to work for the 'other' resolution.⁵⁷

Therefore as planned, the 'other' resolution was introduced in the Fourth Committee on January 8. But in the Canadian Delegation's estimation, due to "heavy pressure at high level from the Indians"⁵⁸ the Yugoslav Delegate was "unable to fulfil his desire" to sponsor the resolution. In addition, the Tunisian Delegate also "failed to come up as a co-sponsor." Because of these withdrawals, Canada introduced the resolution which was co-sponsored by Denmark, Dominican Republic, Thailand and the USA. It is interesting to note

that India was either unable or did not attempt to influence Thailand to withdraw from the co-sponsorship of the resolution.

The Indian resolution, by its mere presence, had a crucial and functional role in this process. Although this draft was only being circulated in the Fourth Committee and had not yet been formally introduced, it induced France and its 'friends' to put further work into its resolution in order "to overcome a certain distrust among anti-Colonial Powers." As a result it had "been toned down appreciably" and the Canadian Delegation was convinced that it would "have a good edge over the Indian resolution."⁵⁹

It was important for the Administering Authority at this stage in the process that the Indian resolution not be adopted. Therefore, in introducing the 'other' resolution, Soward of Canada made a specific effort to cover not only the "salient points" of the resolution but also the varied elements that had been combined to produce that resolution. Stress was laid on the opinions and acquiescence of the petitioners from the opposition parties. In addition, a majority of the voters had approved the reforms.

We suggest that the most important and instrumental role which the Canadian Delegation played in the process was its interpretation of the situation. Soward asserted that "the differences of opinion among the various parties appeared to concern not so much the Statute itself as the advisability of terminating the Trusteeship Agreement forthwith."⁶⁰ And because the resolution ignored the fact that a demand was ever made for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, Members were no longer able to address that question.

Moreover, the Statute was not really a point of issue in Soward's conception. And just in case there would be doubts among Members as to the value of the reforms, he explained that the resolution asked for a UN Commission whose terms of reference "did not prejudge the issue." This Commission would 'appraise' the working of the Statute in the territory's "progress towards self-determination."⁶¹ This recommendation for a UN commission of inquiry was sufficient to dispel any fears and ease any suspicions that the anti-colonials might harbour against the Administering Authority's intentions in the Trust Territory.

Soward utilised the qualities in his resolution as the basis for his criticism of the Indian draft resolution. He proposed that it was "inadequate in that it did not provide for a commission to study the situation on the spot." The Canadian resolution also appealed to the pro-colonial states in that it "took note of the significant advances" that were made in the territory "in the past year." A fact which the Indian draft resolution had "failed to take note of."⁶² Again in addressing the anti-colonials, Soward suggested that "even those who might question the extent of the territory's progress towards self-government" should not dwell on what has happened in the past; but should rather view the Statute as 'offering' the Togoloese "the opportunity" to "begin to participate in the law-making process."⁶³

In addressing a major criticism against the French unilateral behaviour on the referendum, Soward agreed that it was "unfortunately true that the referendum had not been held under the auspices of the UN." Nevertheless, in his defence of France it was obvious that he had chosen to interpret the

supervisory responsibility of the UN in very limited terms as opposed to that expressed by the Indian Delegation on August 13. Soward claimed that the Administering Authority, in its Memorandum of July 30 "had invited the UN to send observers...thus indicating the seriousness with which it regarded its obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement."⁶⁴

In other words, the phrase "under the auspices of the UN" could only mean for the Canadian Delegation the sole function of sending observers to the territory. At the time, the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement was a question to be put in the referendum; therefore, the Administering Authority should have followed a very different procedure prior to announcing to the UN its decision to hold a referendum. It is in this sense that the 'seriousness' of the Administering Authority with regard to its obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement and the Charter and the also in regard to its recognition of the UN responsibility in the Trust Territories, should be called to question. But these factors did not seem to have any significance for Canada's position in regard to its resolution and the chances for adoption against the Indian draft resolution.

Soward ended his speech in expressing a 'hope' that this joint resolution would be adopted because he felt it "would meet in a practical manner the wishes of all the parties concerned."⁶⁵ In its report to Ottawa, the Canadian Delegation wrote,

we urged other Delegation to support the joint resolution which embodies acceptance of the French-Togolese invitation so as to ensure that the UN interest in the Trust Territory will continue to receive due recognition and that its responsibilities will be properly discharged.⁶⁶

India Introduces its Draft Resolution

In his speech of January 9, Menon reiterated the substantive points he had put forward in his August 13 speech. Since then, the referendum had taken place in French Togoland on October 28 and he observed that it was "no different from that of any elections held in various Trust Territories." And although the context of debate as set out by France no longer referred to the termination question, Menon nevertheless pronounced that the Statute had introduced "mere reform" which in his opinion, "was no adequate reason for requesting the termination of Trusteeship."⁶⁷ He took the position that nothing really of significance in regard to process had taken place in the territory which would require any action on the part of the UN.

Menon declared that he could not vote for the joint draft resolution because "the sponsors were committing themselves too far."⁶⁸ To begin with, the joint resolution was "to take note of the approval of the Statute by a substantial majority." He agreed that "a large majority" of the Togoland people had approved the new Statute. But he felt that he should bring to the attention of the Committee the fact that the Territorial Assembly - which negotiated the contents of the Statute with the French Government was - "elected by restricted suffrage" and as such was not democratically representative of the people. He also wanted to 'emphasise' that even after the referendum, this Assembly still "had not yet been elected by universal suffrage."⁶⁹

Secondly, the joint resolution had proposed to express the Assembly's satisfaction at the reforms introduced. However, in view of the procedure so far, he expressed regret that the Trusteeship Council did not find it necessary to 'examine' the text of the Statute before it simply transferred the matter to the General Assembly. In addition, the error was compounded by the fact that the General Assembly "likewise made no detailed study of it." In view of this, he cautioned the Committee that "by adopting" the joint draft resolution which was introduced by Canada on January 8, the General Assembly "would prejudge the conclusions of the proposed Commission of Inquiry, since in Operative Paragraph 1 it expressed its satisfaction at the reforms introduced in Togoland."⁷⁰

As to the proposal of the joint resolution to "congratulate the Togolese for the progress it had achieved in various fields," Menon had decided to undertake an article by article analysis of the Statute to show that substantively speaking, there was no progress. In order to discover what, in the opinion of the Indian Delegation, were the 'merits' of the case, we would concentrate briefly only on those articles that were relevant to the context of the debate as it related to the two draft resolutions under discussion.

Menon asserted that "unless proclaimed by the Togoland people themselves," the claim by article 1 of the Statute that Togoland "was an Autonomous Republic did not tally with the facts and was meaningless." As simple as this label may appear, it would nevertheless be the source of controversy in a later part of the process because it implied a certain political condition which was not obtained in the territory. Moreover, in his opinion, Article

2, "was tantamount to the declaration of a French protectorate."⁷¹ The word 'progress' could be interpreted to mean a positive movement of accumulation towards a specific goal. However, with great misgivings, Menon observed that Article 2 and 3 "amounted to the integration of Togoland in the French Republic, as one of the overseas territories referred to in Articles 76 to 81 of the French Constitution." He therefore warned the Committee that if the General Assembly "approved the measure" that was proposed in the joint resolution, "it would merely be surrendering a territory to a colonial empire."⁷²

Finally, he explained how the sub-paragraphs of Article 26 and the areas in which the French retain "reserved powers," and Article 30 which "vested considerable powers" in the High Commissioner - who was appointed by the Council of Ministers of France, even in internal security matters - all contributed to the conclusion that, "whatever its merits, the Statute did not confer autonomy on the territory." Since Menon considered the Statute "only...an interim measure," we suspect that he was trying to forestall any later attempt by the French to request a termination of the Trusteeship Agreement on the basis of the Statute.

And it may have been for this reason that with respect to the 'resolve' of the joint draft resolution to dispatch a commission from the General Assembly, he preferred to have the members of this commission "elected by the Assembly rather than appointed by the President of the Assembly." Besides, in terms of correct procedure, he "felt that it was for the Trusteeship Council to do so," not the General Assembly.⁷³ Since the Indian Delegation was not a principal participant in the behind-the scenes strategy, it may be that the voluntary

withdrawal of the French demand for termination of the Trusteeship Agreement was seen by Menon as a temporary.

It was most probably for this reason why the joint draft resolution recommended seemingly anti-colonial proposals. For its adoption by the General Assembly would, in fact, serve to lay the basis for a later claim for at least, self-government. Therefore, in view of all of the above, Menon "hoped that the Indian draft resolution would be adopted, since it was the only decision the UN could take if it wished to observe the provisions of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement."⁷⁴

Canada Amends the Indian Draft

On January 10, Soward announced in the Fourth Committee that his Delegation shared the opinion of other Delegations that the joint draft resolution and the Indian draft resolution "were not far apart." It was therefore worth the attempt to 'harmonise' them into a "joint text," so the Canadian Delegation presented the combined amendments which were proposed by Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Liberia, Peru, Thailand and the USA. There were only two proposed amendments that had any substantive significance for the process. First, Soward argued that,

Whatever views might be held concerning the nature of the referendum or the auspices under which it had been held, it remained a fact that the population of Togoland under French administration had expressed itself by a substantial majority in favour of the reforms and the proposed amendment merely took note of that.⁷⁵

The Canadian Delegation effectively disregarded the most fundamental elements of the Indian criticism of French policy, and showed even less interest in what might have been the motive of the French Government in pursuing a referendum.

The second significant amendment which Canada submitted was mostly concerned with setting a limited frame of reference for the proposed investigative commission to the territory. According to Soward, the amendment, "seemed desirable since it was with the application of the reforms that the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee were primarily concerned and it was upon that point that the proposed commission would presumably concentrate its attention." The Indian Delegation had concentrated on the reforms themselves because the joint draft resolution was seeking to establish the Assembly's "satisfaction at the reforms introduced," in its operative paragraph. By limiting the frame of reference, the Canadian Delegation sought to remove the reforms from the arena of contention; that is, whether or not they represented progress in preparing the territory for self-government or independence.

The other amendments proposed "new wording" in order to make the Indian draft resolution "more courteous" for it had failed to take 'note' of the presence of the representatives of the Togoland Government in the debate. Soward complained to the Committee that the Indian draft was not courteous because it "omitted to mention that the invitation had been initiated by the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Togoland."⁷⁶ Despite the detailed arguments presented by the Indian Delegation that the Statute did not allow for

sufficient powers of the Trust Territory to be accorded the status of autonomy, the Canadian Delegation continued to insist upon referring to it as an autonomous republic.

Soward also pointed out that the sponsors of the amendments "thought it reasonable that satisfaction should be recorded;" that everyone 'agreed' that there had been "substantial reforms" and that they all wanted to register the fact that the Statute was indeed "a step forward." In addition, the sponsors stressed the importance of having the members of the investigative commission "appointed by the president" and not elected by the Assembly as proposed in the Indian draft, since they felt that "the choice of the members of the Commission would be an important step."⁷⁷

These were, in essence, the amendments to the Indian draft resolution. After its speech, the Delegation informed Ottawa of the developments in the Fourth Committee and suggested that the Indians "had already come closer" to the joint draft resolution "by introducing in theirs a provision for the Despatch of a UN Commissioner to Togoland."⁷⁸ Actually, the 'purpose' of the effort was, according to the telegram, "to give some recognition to the reforms;" "to acknowledge the presence and views" of the representatives of the Togolese Government and most important, their 'initiative' in inviting the Commission to the Trust Territories. The Delegation was convinced that the Indian draft resolution had ignored these aspects in its draft, "because of the narrow, unrealistic and distrustful position behind which the Indians and other anti-Colonial Powers tend to entrench themselves. This in spite of many important concessions made by

the French." This is a totally different Canadian conception of the attitude and position of the Indian Delegation as opposed to that reported by this same Delegation to Ottawa during the UN process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland.

India: The Anti-Colonial 'Problem' for France

We can utilise this perception of the Canadian Delegation as sufficient indication that the Indian Delegation was, indeed, behaving as a typical anti-colonial in this process regarding French Togoland. We have already tried to show how, in its August 13 position, the Indian Delegation may have been instrumental in having the Trusteeship Council reject the French request for observers to the referendum. If we look at the arguments of the Indian Delegation, we could conclude that the Indian Delegation was able to significantly alter the direction and concerns from the outset of the process in which the French sought the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. The effort of the Canadians joint resolution was mainly to offset some of the trouble instigated by the Indians.

The Canadian Delegation reported that in its speeches and in its "canvassing of other Delegations," the Delegation "urged anti-Colonial Powers to take a realistic and positive view of the situation" in light of the reforms that were introduced through the Statute. And they were pleased to discover that "even among the anti-colonials," the speakers conceded that the Statute was "a step

forward in the history of Togoland." Noteworthy, is the interpretation of the Canadian Delegation of Menon's speech which also made a concession along those lines.⁷⁹

Although the Indian Delegation was working for the British position in the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement in British Togoland, the Delegation tried to maintain the appearance of an anti-colonial. In the process pertaining to French Togoland, the open criticism of the USA and Canada by the Indian Delegation was not an attempt at covering up ulterior motives on the part of the Indian Delegation. The Canadian Delegation characterised as "loose talk," Menon's 'amazement' that the "anti-Colonial Powers" - Canada and the USA - had neglected to effectively police the actual reforms which the Statute had purported to bring, before "expressing satisfaction" with it.⁸⁰ Whereupon, the Canadian Delegation "took issue" with Menon's characterisation of Canada as "anti-colonialist." The Delegation made it clear to Menon that they "were perfectly satisfied to be neither an anti-colonialist nor a Colonial Power but just a fully independent state."⁸¹ We know that in its internal correspondences, the Canadian Delegation did utilise similar categories and had consistently placed Canada in the 'colonial' category.

The behind-the-scenes effort by the USA to convince the Indian Delegation that it should support the colonial position in the French Togoland question is again an important indication of the perception of the colonial group of the further potential damage that the Indian Delegation could cause to the French position in the UN. In view of India's behaviour on this question, the Canadian

Delegation notified Ottawa of the USA consideration of ways in which it could influence the Indian attitude.⁸² Apparently, the USA Delegation considered 'advising' the State Department to instruct the USA Embassy in New Delhi "to make an approach to Mr. Nehru in support of the USA position." However, the Indian Delegation knew that the USA position was, in fact, the French position; that this was a consolidated colonial effort. It seemed that the USA Delegation had finally settled on making 'direct' approaches to Menon in New York.

The Amended Indian Resolution: Canada's Role

On January 14, discussions in the Fourth Committee on the future of French Togoland came to an end. Most of the amendments to the revised Indian resolution were "carried intact." They originated from the joint draft resolution introduced by Canada. The Canadian Delegation reported that, "at the last moment" Guatemala, "in an effort to overcome the reservations of some Latin American and Afro-Asian countries regarding the autonomous status of French Togoland," suggested some additions before the final roll call vote on the amended Indian resolution "as a whole."⁸³

It would seem that the position which the Indian Delegation had taken with regard to the so-called autonomous status of the Trust Territory on January 9, was a factor in the policy position of some members; thus forcing the sponsors of the amended draft to accommodate this 'reservation' in order to have the resolution adopted. The insistence of the Indian Delegation upon a UN

supervisory role in determining when a Trust Territory could change its status had an instrumental function in the application of the right of self-determination of the inhabitants of French Togoland. It meant that the Administering Authority could not unilaterally integrate the Trust Territory into the French Union by simply proposing that limited reforms could be the basis of an autonomous status.

According to the Canadian Delegation, the Guatemalan amendment which was adopted,

Represented a setback for the French, the Togoland Government and the sponsoring powers in that it ensured the retention of the sixth paragraph of the Indian preamble which makes the reforms introduced by the autonomy Statute subject to further study by the Trusteeship Council.⁸⁴

The Canadians had taken the position that "the application of the reforms and not the reforms themselves should be examined."⁸⁵ Under the circumstances, this would have served to consolidate the French claim that through the reforms, the Trust Territory had obtained an autonomous status. The 'setback' would work in the favour of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory.

The Canadian Delegation was pleased to report that "the ground lost" through the Guatemalan amendment was 'recovered' through a Canadian amendment on the first operative paragraph of the Indian resolution.⁸⁶ As adopted, it served to limit the 'tasks' of the Visiting Mission whose purpose was to examine the situation in the territory "resulting from the practical application of the new Statute, and not the reforms themselves. Therefore, Canada won in this battle between the Indian insistence on examining the substance of the reforms

and the Canadian goal of limiting any UN assessment to the application of the reforms.

It would seem that the general anti-colonial concern about the autonomous status of the Trust Territory presented a problem for the Canadian Delegation's definition of the situation. It had utilised the designation "Autonomous Republic of Togoland" wherever possible and, in the Canadian perspective, it did represent a new legal status for the Trust Territory. A Liberian amendment to remove from Canada's amendments that designation, "met with qualified success,"⁸⁷ in that it was discarded from one position and allowed in another. This is an indication of the illogical and emotionally determined starting positions of the Delegations, especially Canada and India, in this process regarding French Togoland.

The Philippines amendment which proposed that the elections to the Legislative Assembly in French Togoland be conducted on the basis of universal suffrage was most likely influenced by Menon's constant harping on the fact that that crucial organ was elected on the basis of a restricted franchise. Although universal suffrage was introduced in the Statute, the Legislative Assembly was able to retain its composition, untouched. Was this an oversight on the part of the French Government? This amendment was carried "despite the opposition" from the sponsors of the draft resolution.

The joint amendment by the Philippines and Nepal proposed a deletion of the recognition of 'satisfaction' of the General Assembly of the "significant step" which was taken in the referendum. The rejection of this

amendment was a meaningful victory for the Canadian Delegation. In its report to Ottawa, the Delegation acknowledged the instrumental role which the Indian Delegation had played in the procedural and substantive areas and to what degree some of its goals were frustrated because of the persevering efforts of Canada in this process, to this stage. The Canadian Delegation wrote:

On the whole the amendments adopted have modified appreciably the Indian resolution in that they carried recognition of the good start the Administering Authority and the Togolese Government and people have already made on the road towards full self-government for Togoland, an acknowledgement as well as a courteous gesture which the Indians would not have written down in their resolution because of procedural resentment and general suspicion against the Administering Power.⁸⁸

Assessment of Phase I

The persistence with which the Indian Delegation pursued its role as a vanguard for the subject people of French Togoland led, in the opinion of the Canadian Delegation, to "a severe defeat for the Indians." In the final analysis, "they themselves had to vote against what was originally their own resolution with no alternative left."⁸⁹ On the other hand, in view of the Quai's preference for a "favourable resolution, even if this felt short of what they would wish,"⁹⁰ recognition must be given to the determined effort of Canada to obtain such a resolution. The outstanding performance of the Indian Delegation was to result in the many anti-colonial amendments. However they were insufficient to produce the kind of resolution that would have appealed to the Indians.

In terms of the dynamics of the UN operational context, this process had dramatic consequences. According to the Canadian Delegation, "the Bandung bloc was pretty well shattered."⁹¹ In addition, they saw "little likelihood" that the resolution would be defeated in Plenary, since "the Indians would have extreme difficulty in gathering the necessary two-thirds."⁹² As for the consequences for India's self interest and international prestige the USA Delegation felt that "a fundamental issue behind the scene was a further bid by India - after the leading part she played in the question of British Togoland last month - to substitute her influence for that of the West in West Africa."⁹³

In the judgement of the Canadian Delegation, this view of the USA Delegation might not be "fully warranted." However, they were 'certain' that India's attitude on the question of French Togoland to that point in the process, "did not seem, generally speaking, to be dictated by completely disinterested motives." The Canadian Delegation attributed a functional role to India's self interest in this process and concluded that "her whole behaviour - and particularly that of Menon," had worked towards the detriment of "her prestige and authority" in New York.⁹⁴

If the anti-colonial role of the Indian Delegation in this process had such adverse consequences for the Indians, what does that tell us in regard to the operational context - the needs and expectations of the members - and the UN's role in the decolonisation process? We have analysed the proposals in the Indian draft resolution as opposed to those in the joint draft resolution which was introduced by Canada. It is evident that the Indian Delegation had attempted to

direct the process in such a way that the authority of the UN would be recognised and its instrumental role in altering the status in the Trust Territory would not be overlooked by the French. In so doing, the Indian Delegation would have inadvertently or intentionally secured a procedure whereby the application of the right of self-determination in French Togoland would be guaranteed.

In his capacity as Rapporteur in the Fourth Committee, Soward of Canada presented the report of the Committee in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on January 23.⁹⁵ As opposed to its public position in British Togoland, the Canadian Delegation acknowledged the "able participation" of several petitioners in the comprehensive debate which benefited from the "full participation" of the French Delegation. Soward paid tribute to France and for its decision to postpone termination and to invite the General Assembly to send a commission to the Trust Territory.

In an attempt to prepare the General Assembly for the upcoming vote on the draft resolution, Soward described this agenda item as "a delicate and comprehensive issue," which could be considered "as coming under the heading of controversial colonial problems." In spite of this, he asserted that the draft resolution was able to pass from the Committee stage to the General Assembly "with a substantial majority" behind it. Nevertheless, he admitted that the numbers were an indication that "no Delegation was fully satisfied with all aspects of it." And because the draft was the result of "reasonable and constructive compromise" among the Delegations, he 'hoped' that it would be received with sympathetic consideration by the General Assembly.⁹⁶

On that same day, the draft resolution was adopted in Plenary.⁹⁷ In its report to Ottawa, the Delegation declared that, "the result of the vote was a defeat for India which was left pretty much isolated at the end of much haggling and shifting." But much more significant was the 'devastating' effect which this controversial process had on Afro-Asia solidarity.⁹⁸ This was fully reflected in the voting positions of the Delegations. On the other hand, the Canadian Delegation observed that this same voting result "was a great source of satisfaction to the USA Delegation which played a major role throughout in promoting backstage negotiations and public speech making."⁹⁹

In addition, the Canadian Delegation were "naturally very much pleased with the outcome," in view of the fact that they "assisted actively in trying to reconcile differences." It was most 'gratifying' for them to discover that they were able to contribute to the success of this operation.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, "viewed in relation to the other accomplishment in regard to British Togoland," the Canadian Delegation considered that the vote on French Togoland added "a substantial item...to the credit side of the balance sheet" of the Eleventh Session "in the field of trusteeship."¹⁰¹ In the British Togoland case, India and Canada had worked alongside each other for the same goal. But in the French Togoland case, it was a "hard fought battle all the way;"¹⁰² India and Canada worked in direct confrontation for conflicting goals. The French pilot project had successfully completed the first phase.

Phase II: Strategy in Paris and London

Before the UN Commission to French Togoland had submitted its report to the Trusteeship Council, and in preparation for the General Assembly session, the French Government began consulting with its allies on probable strategy. On September 4, Jaquet, the Minister of France D'Outre-Mer, briefed Davis of the Canadian Embassy, in Paris, on the position which it intended to take on French Togoland at the UN. As we have seen in the last section, the French thought it imperative that the terms of reference of this Commission be a rather limited one. Yet, Jaquet "expressed disappointment that the Commission had not come out in favour of a termination of the Trusteeship." Davis pointed out to Jaquet, that the Commission could not make any reference to the question without overstepping its terms of reference. Nevertheless, the French Minister continued to dwell on the fact that the Commission "had not taken an initiative on this point."¹⁰³

Davis warned Ottawa that the French intended to 'press' for termination of the Trusteeship Agreement at the upcoming General Assembly. The main basis for this demand was that Togoland had achieved "a large measure" of autonomy with the introduction of the Loi Cadre. In addition, the French intended to pursue further measures which would put the Togolese in "complete control" of the three organs of government; these were considered as steps to develop the existing state of autonomy. Jaquet expressed the French Government's position in very explicit terms: "any further developments would

exceed autonomy and amount to independence a condition which neither the Togolese nor the French desire." He asserted that since autonomy was accepted as a basis for termination, the French proposed that the Trusteeship Agreement be terminated.¹⁰⁴

The Ministry therefore intended to consult with France's 'supporters' - USA, UK and Canada - "in an effort to assure a favourable decision" for termination. Jaquet reminded Davis that this phase in the pilot project must be successful in Togoland for two specific reasons. First, Jaquet felt that if the UN rejected the second attempt to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over French Togoland, it could be interpreted as "implied judgement on the inadequacy" of the Loi Cadre. Secondly, he cautioned that that would "have a serious effect on the smooth application" of the Statute on France's other territories in Africa.¹⁰⁵

A point of issue for Jaquet, was the UN requirement for general elections based on universal suffrage and how that aspect would be 'related' to the actual termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. According to Davis, he implied that the Togolese Government was 'unwilling' to consider any termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. This position was based on the assumption of both the French and the Togolese Government that any UN participation in the elections "would be inconsistent with Togolese independence." Because both Governments asserted that French Togoland had already attained an autonomous status, Jaquet submitted that general elections in the territory was a "strictly internal" political matter for which the Togolese 'alone' were responsible.¹⁰⁶

Jaquet solicited Canada's support for the French position but Davis could not commit Canada's support for immediate termination of the Trusteeship Agreement without instructions from Ottawa. However, he indicated Canada's willingness to "work with the French in order to achieve the best possible results."¹⁰⁷ On September 10, Marnham of the Colonial Office mentioned to the Canadian Embassy in London that apparently the UK views were 'misunderstood' in Paris. Because of this belief, Jebb from the UK Embassy in Paris was asked to 'clarify' the UK views in a meeting with the French Ministry. His most important mission, however, was to "endeavour to dissuade" the French from pursuing the goal of terminating the Trusteeship Agreement for two reasons. First, in light of the 'objective' report of the UN Commission, the UK felt that there was "no chance of success." And secondly, the French had failed in the attempt to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement "as recently as last year," and it would be tactically inadvisable to do so again in such a short space of time.¹⁰⁸

In the UK definition of the situation and its assessment of the operational limits in the UN, Marnham observed that if Ghana would 'have' to take a position on the question of termination, it would "undoubtedly be against the French." This, in the UK view, would create an 'undesirable' situation for the UK for several reasons. Even though the UK felt that the "additional concessions" which the French proposed to extend to Togoland would "go a long way to satisfy the legitimate aspirations" of these people; Marnham acknowledged that they would still "fall very far short of real self-government." Moreover, this was more apparent to him in light of the status of Ghana.¹⁰⁹

According to Marnham, the UK was anxious "to avoid a split" between the UK and France "on this issue" in the General Assembly. And it was his 'personal' view that the UK "would, in the last analysis, support the French even in the face of what they consider to be certain defeat." Consequently, if the termination question was brought up again, an Assembly rejection would apply to the two major Administering Authorities.¹¹⁰

According to Marnham, the UK would explore the avenue of a 'compromise' tactic whereby the French could take action on certain reservations that had been brought up. More specifically, a new Legislative Assembly should be elected "under UN supervision." The UK expected the French and 'perhaps' the Togolese to be averse to such a suggestion¹¹¹ because of their efforts in the last General Assembly session to obtain validation of the election that had taken place in the Trust Territory. This recommendation to reconstitute the Legislative Assembly through universal suffrage was made by Menon in the last session. And the UK was most probably conscious of the fact that Menon would not permit the French to ignore this aspect. On its effort to secure a more acceptable proposal, the UK would recommend to the French that the question of termination should be 'deferred' again until the new Legislative Assembly was in place.¹¹² This would depend on the progress of the meeting between Jebb and the French Ministry in Paris. For only then would the UK be able to assess to what degree they may be able to influence the French in taking a new direction in the UN.

On September 11, Davis was briefed by Jebb, in Paris, on the salient points of discussion he had with Jaquet of the French Ministry. Although the French was adamant on pursuing the question of immediate termination, Jebb felt that he was able to influence Jaquet into considering a more practical and purposeful tactic which they could follow.¹¹³ Davis enquired of Jebb whether he was able to verify the French assertion that it was the Togolese Government which had been insisting on making new elections 'conditional' upon the UN agreement to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. The French 'insisted' that that was indeed the case. According to Davis, in his discussion with Jebb over the necessity to settle the question of terminating the Trusteeship Agreement, Jaquet did not bring up the ramification of the pilot project, for other territories, as he did in his meeting with Davis.¹¹⁴

Strategy in New York

In its report to the Foreign Office,¹¹⁵ the UK Delegation made a summary of its talks with the French, USA, Canadian Delegations in New York; the French Embassy in Washington, and with Mr. Spinal, the French High Commissioner in French Togoland. Up until September 14, there were no attempts to consolidate the positions of the various Delegations. However, the USA and Canada had indicated their support of a 'compromise' to the French insistence on immediate termination. According to the UK Delegation, they

agreed to make termination by the UN 'dependent' upon the results of a new elected Legislative Assembly.

In the estimation of both the USA and Canadian Delegation, the French would not be able to secure a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly for a termination of the Trusteeship Agreement without these elections. The UK Delegation also expressed doubt as to the willingness of the Government of Togoland to this procedure although Apedo Amah of the Government of Togoland indicated to the Trusteeship Council on September 12, that a 'renewal' of the Legislative Assembly was already 'formally' anticipated by his Government.

We submit that because the UK was convinced that its Delegation at the UN must support the French position in the final analysis, the UK endeavoured to not only influence the direction in which it preferred the French to take but also to work with its allies to prepare a compromise solution. This naturally entailed an accommodation of the wishes of the Togolese Government which, according to the French, were the principal decision makers as to the developments in the process to determine the future of French Togoland.

Cohen of the UK Delegation felt that the wishes of two-thirds of the General Assembly would be "a good deal more difficult" to accommodate, in the resolution, than those of the French or Togolese Governments.¹¹⁶ Therefore, it was important to accurately define the situation and the context in which the resolution would be acceptable. Having this target audience in mind, the UK Delegation in consultation with Washington and Ottawa concluded that the UN observers would have to 'observe' but not 'supervise' the elections in French

Togoland. And it was in the opinion of the French that the Togolese Government "could be persuaded" that this was a necessary condition for Assembly acquiescence.¹¹⁷

Cohen recognised that the next step in the process would present a problem for them because they had to decide "whether the matter would have to come back again to the UN after elections had taken place and before trusteeship was formally terminated." In Spinal's estimation, the Togolese "would strongly object to having to argue the whole case in the UN again after elections." However, an important factor for the UK Delegation was the acknowledgement by the French, of the fact that termination of the Trusteeship Agreement was dependent upon 'formal' UN action. And, in this context, the matter would definitely have to be referred to the UN after the elections.¹¹⁸

The UK Delegation therefore concluded that, at that phase in the process, the "hub of the problem" for the interested parties was to 'devise' a resolution which would serve to accomplish several goals. It would 'commit' the Assembly "in principle" to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement; this would have to be conditional upon the election of a new Legislative Assembly by universal suffrage. The colonials expected a "reasonable" majority of the Legislative Assembly to express itself in favour of termination. On these terms, Cohen argued that those Delegations resisting termination would find it "difficult" to propose any retrograde steps for retention of the Trusteeship Agreement.¹¹⁹

Consequently, the UK Delegation felt that it was incumbent upon the French Government and its allies to give "careful thought" to the words and

conditions of the resolution. Cohen conceded that despite the above proposal, the General Assembly could still refuse to consider termination. Therefore, he proposed that in designing the resolution, they allow for "maximum flexibility." If the French agreed with the suggestion to link termination of the Trusteeship Agreement with successful elections, then Cohen would recommend that the "details of proposed resolutions should be worked out among the relevant Delegations in New York before being brought to the attention of Paris and London." This strategy was based on the recognition that the Permanent Delegations in New York were in a position to better appraise the operational limits of the General Assembly.¹²⁰

UN Context: India's Response to Commission Report

On September 16, Lall of India gave credit to France for the "highly developed political consciousness" of the people of French Togoland. This was established by the Commission¹²¹ which reported that, although the people enjoyed a large measure of internal autonomy, they ought to have greater powers before the question of termination could be entertained.¹²² According to Lall, the Commission also proposed that the people would have to express their wish to have the Trusteeship Agreement terminated under "conditions agreed upon by the General Assembly," thereby affirming the authority of the General Assembly and the procedure which should be followed.

The Indian Delegation reiterated the fact that the Togoland Legislative Assembly represented a restricted, elite electorate. In addition, he acknowledged France's intention to extend further powers to the Trust Territory but he rejected France's request to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement "in the meantime." In Lall's opinion, the Trusteeship Agreement "did not allow of any residuary trust being left with the Administering Authority."¹²³

On September 18, speaking directly after the French Delegation, Jaipal found it necessary to point out "certain basic differences" between the French and Indian points of view which became apparent after that speech. Jaipal enumerated the three basic factors which comprised his definition of the situation. First of all, the Trusteeship Agreement could be terminated only on the basis of self-determination or independence. Secondly, elections on the basis of universal suffrage still 'had' to take place and, finally, France could not escape its obligation to bestow more extensive powers to the government of Togoland.¹²⁴

In what seemed as an attempt to set up the operational limits in regard to procedure, Jaipal declared that the second or third factors, above, "could not be made conditional on the termination of Trusteeship." Moreover, the amendments to the Statute by the Decree of March 22, did not, in his opinion, "substantially alter" the Statute itself.¹²⁵ In light of this interpretation, the Indian Delegation took the position that this new step which France had undertaken would not be sufficient reason for the General Assembly to 'reconsider' its rejection, at its last session, of the request by France for termination.¹²⁶

This did not mean that the Indian Delegation would not give recognition to the value of the Statute in the political development of the Trust Territory. Taking as the basis the French claim that the Statute "represented a significant step in the achievement of the objectives of Article 76 of the Charter," Lall hypothesised that this would 'imply' that in spite of the steps already taken, "the goal had not yet been achieved."¹²⁷ Four days later, Jaipal would extend this reasoning to declare that "the holding of elections... was a requirement of the Loi-Cadre itself." The Indian Delegation had granted the Statute a functional role in its frame of reference for French Togoland's development towards Self-government or independence by concluding that "the law required the elections to be held on the basis of universal suffrage."¹²⁸

In her speech of November 15, Sinha of India expressed to the Fourth Committee her "deep concern" over the lack of political freedom in the territory. This was pointed out in the report of the Commission and also by the petitioners; it seemed to be a central issue in the perception of the Indian Delegation. Sinha suggested that this condition in the territory was due to the fact that general elections based on universal suffrage "had not yet been held."¹²⁹ Although she admitted that the Administering Authority "deserved credit for its liberal interpretation of the Statute," she nonetheless felt that

the true merit of the new Statute could be assessed only when a democratically elected Legislative Assembly had come into being. Political progress required that general elections should be held at the earliest possible date with adequate guarantees of freedom of speech, press and assembly, in accordance with Article 10 of the Trusteeship Agreement.¹³⁰

Additional causes for concern were the "inadequate participation" of the Togolanders in the 'higher' levels of administrative services and in the main sectors of economic development.¹³¹

It is readily evident that the operational context of concerns of the Indian Delegation in French Togoland were radically different from those in British Togoland. Because of the Administrative Union of British Togoland with the Gold Coast, the administrative services and the economic powers were concentrated in the hands of the Gold Coast elite and Government. The problem of Africanisation of these services had arisen only because, in French Togoland, these services were in the hands of white French citizens.¹³² But in principle, both Trust Territories had no Legislative Assemblies of their own that were truly representative. In British Togoland that fact was not to become a central issue for the Indian Delegation.

Consequently, the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement in British Togoland did not address the crucial issues of freedom of speech etc. On the other hand, in the case of French Togoland, they would become key issues at stake for the Indian Delegation,¹³³ and had a functional significance for the process itself. Taking a cue from the Indian speeches, the Delegations from the Soviet bloc became very active in emphasising exactly those factors and proposing similar procedural steps which the Administering Authority would have to undertake before termination could be considered.

The petitioners from British Togoland had complained incessantly about repression from the Gold Coast Government which sought to secure its

preponderant power in the Trust Territory. This was evidently not an operative factor in the Indian perception of how the process, should be guided through to termination. In the French Togoland process, the anti-colonials had consolidated their attack on all these undemocratic aspects of colonial rule; they took the lead from the Indian Delegation in directing the procedural steps.

And in this sense, we submit that the Indian Delegation was effectively fulfilling a 'vanguard' role by seeking to ensure that the right of self-determination of the peoples of French Togoland would not be denied, in the rush to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. Sinha declared that "any other course of action," except self-government or independence, would be considered contrary to the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement.¹³⁴ Grinberg of Bulgaria spoke directly after Sinha. In his interpretation,

Article 76 of the Charter indicated that the trusteeship regime should be terminated when the process of progressive development towards self-government had been completed rather than at some stage along the way....[it] laid down another extremely important condition for the termination, namely, the freely expressed wishes of the people themselves. That condition had no yet been fulfilled and until it had been there could be no question of terminating the Trusteeship Agreement.¹³⁵

These are the speeches which coalesced into an uncompromising operational context for the French Togoland item at the UN.¹³⁶

Colonial Consolidation for Self-Government within the French Union

Although the question of whether a Trusteeship Agreement could be terminated on the attainment of self-government or independence did not arise in

the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland, the viability of the Trust Territory was a central issue. The integrationists had successfully utilised this factor to justify the integration of British Togoland with the Gold Coast. Without really seeking to make an issue of the viability factor, the 'supporters' of France gave it a functional role in their definition of the situation in French Togoland. According to Smolderen of Belgium, the Government of Togoland

was relying on the economic, financial and technical assistance of the French Government to carry out its new plans for the economic and social development of the territory, which proved that at the present stage, and no doubt for some time to come, Togoland's independence would present more disadvantages than advantages.¹³⁷

In other words, the Belgian Delegation was suggesting that the UN exercise caution in its over-zealous crusade to sever the strings that tied the Trust Territory in a subordinate relationship to France. He was implying that this relationship was a necessary condition for the future development of French Togoland.

Two days later, Kosciusko-Morizet of France attempted to create a favourable climate of opinion by expounding on the virtues of independence. This was, of course, in addition to his argument in the 590th Meeting in the Fourth Committee that the Africans had desired to retain their status as members of the French Community for their own benefit. However, for the specific context of French Togoland, the Delegation appealed to Article 76(c) of the Charter. Kosciusko-Morizet reminded the Trusteeship Council that one of the 'essential' goals of the Trusteeship System was "to encourage recognition of the

interdependence of the peoples of the world."¹³⁸ In his opinion, the concept underlying the French Community was one of interdependence. Kosciusko-Morizet asserted that, "it was 'Black' Africa's good fortune to be able to omit the intermediate stages and join the community of nations without passing through the convulsions which had shaken other parts of the word."¹³⁹ It was, therefore, in the interest of all to pursue a path in this process which would facilitate the retention of French Togoland in the French Community.

By September 20, Davis wrote from Paris that the French have finally concluded that it was 'unlikely' that they would be able to muster a two-third majority in the General Assembly for immediate termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.¹⁴⁰ In light of this new context and in terms of the French perspective of the possibilities, the French Ministry was prepared to work with "sympathetic friendly Governments" in order to obtain "the best compromise."¹⁴¹ However, the uncertainty of the Togolese Government's willingness to hold an election with UN observers was an important factor which influenced the degree to which the French could compromise on its initial demand for immediate termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.¹⁴²

According to Davis, the French Ministry was appreciative of Canada's "sympathetic attitude" in regard to "this item." Pontillon pointed out how much they valued "the continuation of close consultations" in New York and Paris, and he showed great interest in working closely with Canada on "tactics as well as on substance."¹⁴³ He also intimated that they were "reasonably satisfied" with the approach and interest of the UK Government but "somewhat less so about that of

the USA." Because of this, the French Ministry was not sure as to what position the USA would take on this item. Davis assured Ottawa that if the USA could be relied upon to support the compromise, the French case would be strengthened with the Togolese Government.¹⁴⁴

In a meeting on November 6, in New York with the USA, UK and French Delegations, the Canadian Delegation was asked to sponsor the draft resolution on Togoland.¹⁴⁵ It would outline the necessary steps to be undertaken towards the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. Basically, the Secretary-General of the UN was asked to dispatch observers to the election in the territory. The French Government would then transfer all powers except external relations, external defence and currency of Togoland, to the Government of Togoland; this would be followed by a request of the new Legislative Assembly, elected by universal suffrage, for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. The Canadian Delegation suggested that Ghana may express reservations against the UN terminating the Trusteeship Agreement "on a lesser degree of independence" than it had achieved for itself.¹⁴⁶

The four Delegations agreed that, strategically, it would be "the best solution" to have the same six members of the Commission co-sponsor the resolution. However, it was anticipated that India may pressure Guatemala and Yugoslavia to refrain from taking any active part in this process. The Canadian Delegation suggested that even if these two Delegations "would not play ball" there still remained Canada, Liberia and Denmark to co-sponsor the

resolution.¹⁴⁷ The Canadian Delegation was convinced that the Indian Delegation could be co-opted if it was given an instrumental role in the early stages of strategic planning. And, in order to forestall another independent Indian initiative, the Canadian Delegation proposed that the Indian Delegation be included in 'consultations'. The Canadian Delegation wrote to Ottawa: "if India's neutrality could be obtained there is little doubt a number of Afro-Asian countries would follow their lead."¹⁴⁸

Therefore, in spite of the dramatic and negative consequences of the independent Indian initiative, in January, the Canadian Delegation continued to perceive a possible operational role for India in the process. However, there is no indication that the French Delegation was prepared to include the Indian Delegation in the formative stage of this phase in the process. Another informal meeting of the four Delegations was held on November 8, and the French was "most anxious" that Canada co-sponsor the resolution.¹⁴⁹

The Canadian Delegation had unilaterally undertaken "preliminary negotiations" with the other Delegations to secure several co-sponsors for the resolution. The French themselves had lined up Liberia, Ecuador, Denmark and the Dominican Republic as 'willing' co-sponsors.¹⁵⁰ In seeking instructions from Ottawa on Canada's sponsorship, the Delegation pointed out that because of Canada's membership on the Commission on Togoland, it was 'logical' that Canada should undertake this responsibility." In view of Ottawa's past concern that there should be a broad support for Canada's action, the Delegation reported

that it was "impossible to foresee" a guaranteed two-thirds majority. However, it expected that "a good majority would be available."¹⁵¹

The Indian Delegation and the Petitioners

Can we assume that the petitioners had a functional role in convincing the Indian Delegation to work for independence? Or was the position of the Indian Delegation influenced by the French decision to omit India from its consultations and strategic planning? The policy which the Indian Delegation followed, in British Togoland, showed a clear disregard for the expressed wishes of the opposition parties. However, it is important to point out that the complaints of the petitioners from French Togoland were of a qualitatively different genre from the complaints of the petitioners from British Togoland.

Perhaps the existence of a white, elite administration in French Togoland was the fundamental reason for the Indian policy of working for the goal of independence for French Togoland. The conditions obtained in this territory were similar to those in colonial India although they were not of the same scope. The petitioners from the opposition: All-Ewe Conference, Mouvement Populaire Togolais and Juvento all described similar conditions of subjugation of the people of French Togoland, in a dialogue with Sinha of India.

Olympio of the All-Ewe Conference, reiterated that "only upon the achievement of political independence would Togoland be able to draw up economic plans that would serve its own interests and not the interests of an

overseas power."¹⁵² Santos of Juvento, complained that "if public funds were not squandered on official salaries in order to bolster French authority, and if the economy were planned to the advantage of the country by means of favourable trade agreements and judicious development, Togoland could become self-supporting."¹⁵³

Akakpo of the Mouvement Populaire Togolais pointed out the extent and nature of persecution: "brutality, summoning arrests and imprisonment under inhumane conditions." He had 'hoped' that with the reforms under the new Statute these would no longer be permitted. However, he added that nothing had changed. Ohin, a member of Akakpo's party referred to the 'absence' of political freedom and claimed that "the most elementary civil rights were disregarded." He also accused the French of a divide and rule policy; it was a "policy of fostering the notion that the Southerners hoped to rule the country and exploit the Northerners after the French had gone."¹⁵⁴

According to Santos, the Administrating Officials permitted the Chiefs to practice slavery in the agricultural branch although it was officially abolished. And Olympio suggested that the Chiefs received "large allocations" from the Administration as bribery for their loyalty. It was therefore understandable that these same Chiefs "should be opposed to elections based on universal suffrage...and political freedoms."¹⁵⁵ It was in their interests, like that of the pro-Government political parties, to lend their support for this artificially created situation.

Sinha expressed great interest in the rate and quality of the Africanisation of the civil service since her Delegation "attached the greatest importance to that aspect of preparation for independence." She believed that "unless a country had its own trained civil service it could not be self-governing." Olympio observed that a "well-thought-out plan" for the training of indigenous administrators was essential to the future of Togoland, but it seemed as though the French were content to retain for themselves all higher administrative posts.

At the next meeting of the Committee, Jaipal asked Kosciuszko-Morizet for his estimation as to when the Togolandese "would be in a position to assume full responsibility for administration." He also wanted "to know exactly how much France contributed in subsidies" to the budget of the territory, "what use was made of those funds, and for how long those subsidies would continue to be necessary."¹⁵⁶ But the most important question at this stage in the political development of the territory was "exactly what powers" France had intended to reserve for itself. The Indian Delegation wanted to know what France had meant by "constitutional revision." This Delegation was aware of the fact that Colonial Powers were not, as a rule, inclined to transfer their entrenched authority without great resistance; these were the concerns of the Indian Delegation as reflected in the dialogue with the petitioners.

Canada Introduces the Draft Resolution

On November 14, the French Ambassador expressed his appreciation to Ottawa for the Canadian Delegation's "organising support" for the resolution in New York. He also found it necessary to ask Ottawa to notify the Canadian Delegation of a special request from Paris. The Delegation was told that because paragraph 8 of the resolution "had been carefully worked out," the French thought that it was absolutely essential that they all "stand firm" on this paragraph. It was crucial that the Delegation understood that France "could not accept any change in it."¹⁵⁷

It was unusual that the French would take this route through Ottawa, to inform the Canadian Delegation in New York of an important aspect of the resolution when the Delegation was, in fact, a major player in the formative stages of this process. Finally on the evening of November 15, the Canadian Delegation reported to Ottawa that "a mutually acceptable text" for the resolution had been agreed upon.¹⁵⁸ As planned, Canada would co-sponsor the resolution with Columbia, Denmark, and Liberia. The Delegation also mentioned that Argentina, Ecuador, Ceylon and India had made their co-sponsorship contingent upon certain 'concessions' from France. This presented a problem for the Canadian Delegation because the resolution was scheduled to be presented in the Fourth Committee on November 16; on November 15, the France was not prepared to make any concessions at all.¹⁵⁹

On November 15, Ottawa requested from the Canadian Delegation "an indication, in particular, of the probable Assembly support for the resolution."¹⁶⁰ In view of its perceived operational context of the UN, Ottawa was concerned that without a broad anti-colonial support the resolution did not stand a chance of being adopted. Consequently, the French would have to adopt a more flexible attitude.

On November 16, the Romanian Delegation spoke directly before White of Canada expressing an anti-colonial view of the situation. He declared that the Statute was "characterised primarily by the denial to Togoland of a large degree of internal and external sovereignty." He agreed with the view expressed in the general debate that a target date should be set by the Administering Authority. He felt that this was a necessary condition of process because the Administering Authority would be obliged to take certain steps within a specific time limit to 'enable' the Trust Territory to end its subject status.¹⁶¹

For the Canadian delegate, the Statute "represented a decisive step in the development of the autonomy of Togoland."¹⁶² White was careful, however, to point out that it was only an "advance towards" the goal of self-government. In keeping with the operational limits set out by France, White observed that this advance which was 'initiated,' was part of a process which "could not be reversed but rather was bound to gain momentum with the passage of time."¹⁶³ This position was a clear rejection of the anti-colonial push for a target date and the need for consequential steps to be undertaken by the Administering Authority

within this time limit. White also implied that the far-reaching goal of self-government and not independence was the aim of the process.

Evidently, the Canadian Delegation was working to create a favourable climate of opinion for the French position in his speech. Referring to the Commission's report, White concentrated on refuting the conclusion that "there were still important restrictions to a state of full autonomy." He brought to the attention of the Fourth Committee the "two new and important developments" which had occurred since the report and in his opinion, they "further confirmed what seemed to be the inevitable unfolding of political progress noted by the Commission".¹⁶⁴

The 'decision' by France to transfer further powers to the Togoland Government and the "declared intention" of the Togoland Government to renew the Legislative Assembly on the basis of universal suffrage, were the important developments. White seemed impelled to point out that these elections were being held "some two years earlier" than stipulated by the Statute.¹⁶⁵ And he declared that after the elections were held, the people of Togoland

would be in a position to show their attitude towards the type of association now envisaged by France which, if accepted, would safeguard for them the valuable structure with which Togoland had been provided by France in a variety of economic, social and cultural fields.¹⁶⁶

White was evidently attempting to reinforce the position which was taken by Smolderen of Belgium on September 16, and Kosciusko-Morizet on September 18, in the Trusteeship Council. The goal of France was to retain Togoland within the French Union.

And in order to facilitate the French efforts in this direction, the Canadian Delegate recalled Canada's own historical experience to demonstrate the positive benefits which a continued association in the French Union would hold for Togoland:

In representing a country which had once benefited from a period of self-government in close co-operation with the parent country, the Canadian Delegation could not be averse to Togoland being given the opportunity freely to work out a constitutional relationship which, while giving it full nationhood, would allow it to retain the guidance of the older and more experienced nation.¹⁶⁷

The next "public step" which the Canadian Delegation took in smoothing the way for France was its co-sponsorship of the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.508) "in order that the United Nations, as a party to the Trusteeship Agreement, might facilitate and follow up" the developments in the Trust Territory.¹⁶⁸ White was also careful in his speech to portray the French Government and the Togoland Government as parties willing to 'compromise'. He praised them for their "admirable spirit of conciliation" which he saw in their decision to "restrain their desire" for immediate termination; thus "enabling the United Nations to be an active party to the attainment of full nationhood by Togoland."¹⁶⁹

The Canadian conception of "full nationhood" with regard to French Togoland was self-government within the French Union. According to White, after the people of Togoland had followed the steps anticipated in the draft resolution, they were then expected to inform the UN and the Administering Authority "of their acceptance of the new powers they wished France to retain and of their desire to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement." He suggested that, at that stage,

the UN "could surely not refuse to accede to those wishes." And because the draft resolution was, in his opinion, "designed to foster the best interests of the Togoland people," White expected the Fourth Committee to examine the plan it proposed, with this in mind.¹⁷⁰

By November 18, no formal amendments to the draft resolution had been tabled, and the Canadian Delegation felt that the reactions to it were "on the whole...satisfactory." However, most of the Delegations seemed to have 'awaited' the speech of the French Minister, Jaquet, before deciding on what position they would take. In the Delegation's estimation they were "acting cautiously" in the meantime.¹⁷¹ More significant was the Delegation's complaint to Ottawa that their "effort to obtain Indian co-sponsorship" was not fruitful.

In view of the performance of the Indian Delegation in the last session, the Canadian Delegation reported that in private meetings, "this year again on this question the Indians have been shifting ground...in a disconcerting way."¹⁷² The French had finally decided to make some concessions conditional upon Indian co-sponsorship, "to meet the Indian point of view." According to the Canadian Delegation, the Indians insisted on having the Commission to observe the elections 'elected' by the General Assembly after nomination by the President of the Assembly. Actually, this did not represent any substantive alteration to the draft resolution in terms of process. The Indian Delegation was more interested in "the scope of the observations" that would be outlined in the UN Commissioner's frame of reference.¹⁷³ However, the Delegation reminded Ottawa that "the main point of discord" still centred around paragraph 8 which the French adamantly

refused to alter. In spite of this, Ghana had proposed a new wording of this paragraph 'privately'; if the French would accept it, the Delegation felt that "a certain" two-thirds majority would be forthcoming.¹⁷⁴

The French Apply Pressure on Canada

For the Canadian Delegation, the Telegram of November 18 from the Canadian Embassy in Paris represented a break-point in its behind-the-scene efforts for the French case in Togoland. In a conversation with Wolfram, Head of UN Division, Ministry for Overseas France, Davis was told that the French Delegation in New York had reported to Paris that "the Canadian position was not as helpful to the French as it had been last year." The French Delegation therefore requested that it was 'necessary' for Wolfram in Paris, to inform the French Embassy in Ottawa, which in turn would have "to raise the matter" with Canadian officials in Ottawa.¹⁷⁵

Evidently, the French Embassy in Ottawa had discussed the matter with Holmes, at Department of External Affairs. Lacoste from the French Embassy in Ottawa indicated to Paris that he was "hopeful that Canada's attitude would now be forthcoming." Davis expressed 'surprise' at the French behaviour because he was "sure that Canada would be working for the most satisfactory solution obtainable." Since the Canadian Embassy in Paris was a crucial information source, Davis was kept fully informed of the French perception of the Canadian role in this process. He pointed out to Wolfram that the Canadian

Delegation, due to its efforts, "was in a position to co-sponsor the resolution in terms satisfactory to the French Delegation."¹⁷⁶ According to Davis, Wolfram "did not seem to be aware of this" and Wolfram claimed that the French Delegation in New York protested that Canada "was not taking such an active part in supporting the French position," relative to that taken last year.¹⁷⁷

As we have seen so far, the Canadian effort in this process was geared to working for an 'obtainable' goal in view of its perception of the operational limits in the UN. This was not necessarily what the French wanted to pursue in spite of the immense odds against them. It was therefore not surprising that the Canadian Delegation would be "completely at a loss to understand" the French reproach that Canada's attitude was 'unforthcoming'. In defence of its position, the Delegation argued that the French knew that no negotiations could be undertaken before "the French position was finally made clear." In addition, the Delegation had begun "preliminary discussions" and had also sought Ottawa's guidance on Canada's co-sponsorship of the resolution as soon as the French had established a basis from which to work.¹⁷⁸

It would seem that the Canadian Delegation was well informed as to the limits of possible colonial action in the UN. The Delegation's perception of what the UN would accept and what it was sure to reject was an important factor in the dynamics of Canada's role playing. Therefore with some disquiet, the Delegation pointed out to Ottawa that the French 'must' also have been "aware that to sponsor the resolution alone would have made it highly suspicious," in

view of Canada's membership in the Commission and more importantly, the fact that the Commission's report was a unanimous one.¹⁷⁹

Because of this, the Delegation explained that it was "more than active in promoting" the resolution which necessarily involved compromise and negotiation so that the resolution would be "acceptable to the so called opposition." In the Delegation's opinion, it was a better strategy to co-opt the opposition through behind the scenes contacts than on the floor in the Fourth Committee, Trusteeship Council or General Assembly, where prestige and role playing were important operational factors. And it was for this reason that the Delegation had 'urged' France on November 6, to include India in its confidence. Apparently the French did not think it necessary to consult India in the previous planning phases. Nevertheless, the Canadian Delegation suggested to Ottawa "if India, Ghana, Yugoslavia etc. can be won over to our side the value of their support will be immense."¹⁸⁰

On November 19, Holmes reported from Ottawa that in his talk with the French Ambassador he pointed out that Canada could play "a more effective role...if we appeared to the Assembly as an objective member of the Commission and not a special apologist for France." Although the Ambassador did not comment on this point of view, Holmes reminded the Delegation that "from past experience, on colonial issues," the French Delegations often displayed the tendency "to mistrust the flexibility of those who are trying to help them." However, as the Canadian Embassy in Paris communicated on November 20, the French would have nothing to do with this Canadian 'flexibility' in the pursuit

of compromise solutions. Instead, the French officials "wanted to encourage Canada to take a stronger line in promoting the absolute French case."¹⁸¹ This position limited the choices which were effectively available to Canada, on this issue.

According to Davis, French Officials - Wolfram and Max - "felt that the French had already compromised as much as they can."¹⁸² On December 27, 1956 the French Delegation "was prepared to work for a compromise resolution even if it would be less than what they had hoped for."¹⁸³ Apparently the French officials were not satisfied with the developments which such a strategy had brought, and Davis reported that they were "not really happy about the judgement that it is better to obtain a majority on compromise wording rather than to face the risk of an unfavourable vote."¹⁸⁴ This new position of the French had significant consequences for the Canadian functional role in this process to have a draft resolution adopted, in view of the proposed amendment to paragraph 8 and the French 'insisting' that it was not to be altered in any way. What made the situation more difficult for Canada was the "misinterpretation, perhaps deliberate" by the Quai, that the Canadian Delegation had attempted "to persuade the French to accept the Ghanaian amendment" to paragraph 8, in its overzealous pursuit of a compromise solution.¹⁸⁵

Because the Quai had instructed its Embassy in Ottawa to ensure that Ottawa inform the Canadian Delegation as to "its position on paragraph 8," the UN Division in Ottawa kept in close contact with the Delegation as to the developments on the resolution. Osborne of the Canadian Delegation "thought

that the French intransigence on this point was mainly the result of Togolese stubbornness" and she suggested that French agreement to the amendment would "enable the resolution to obtain a two-third majority."¹⁸⁶ In Osborne's estimation, the direct contact between the French Embassy in Ottawa and Canadian officials "might have been born of a French suspicion" that the Canadian Delegation would either accept the Ghanaian amendment, or end up voting for the resolution as a whole even if 'unacceptable' amendments were embodied in it. She therefore asked Ottawa to inform Lacoste that the Canadian Delegation "would not accept any amendments to the resolution not agreeable to the French."¹⁸⁷

This should have been a clear indication to the French that the Canadian Delegation was working solely for the French position. And in the event that any unacceptable amendments were adopted, Osborne said that she would seek guidance from Ottawa in regard to an abstention. Accordingly, Holmes was asked to notify Lacoste of Canada's position, and to report to Lacoste that "the Delegations are working together for an acceptable solution."¹⁸⁸ In other words, Ottawa had decided that "it would not limit its action to promoting the absolute French case in the negotiation stage, before the vote." Written in hand at the bottom of page 2 of the Memorandum and initialled by Holmes, was a report of his conversation with the French ambassador. He explained to Holmes that the French was 'suggesting' that Canada "should not only not support the Ghanaians amendment, but should try to dissuade them from putting it in." Whereupon Holmes assured him that the Canadian Delegation "would consider this part of

the exercise." However, Holmes "avoided promising to intervene" with the Ghanaians once more because he thought that "they would be more annoyed than they were the first time." It would seem that the French had decided that the Canadian Delegation should seek to obtain concessions from the 'opposition'; that the anti-colonials should design their policies so that they would find a fit in the French frame of reference and not vice versa.

The French Position

According to Davis, the French Minister had decided to personally head the French Delegation in New York in what was perceived to be "the final stages of this item"¹⁸⁹ at the UN. On November 18, Jaquet made an extremely long speech in which he specifically addressed the questions that were put forward by the Delegation of India.¹⁹⁰ This Delegation had decided, as opposed to its position on British Togoland, to make the following issues central to any progress in the process over French Togoland. The first concerned the anticipated time in which the Togoization of the civil service would be completed. Jaquet estimated that "all posts would be occupied by Togoland within a few years." In reply to the Indian query as to how long would annual subsidies to French Togoland be 'necessary' Jaquet made it absolutely clear that such subsidies were conditional; that is, "as long as Togoland wished to form part of the community of sentiment and interests which it had voluntarily chosen."¹⁹¹

Jaquet was careful to point out that France did not obtain any profit out of its connection with the Trust Territory and, "had no need of Togoland's modest resources." In addition, he claimed that since there were no commercial or economic links with the territory, France's "disinterested help" was rewarded by the 'friendship' of the people. As to the question of the transfer of further powers to the territory, Jaquet declared that "the intentions of the French Government were clear and precise. It intended to complete the autonomy of Togoland, i.e., to hand over all internal powers without exception, reserving to the French Government only those concerning external affairs, defence, currency and foreign exchange." The UN was thus officially notified that independence was not going to be the basis for the request for termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. France intended to 'reserve' powers to itself.

According to Jaquet, France's "principal aim had never been the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement." He explained that because his Government had been 'implementing' the policy which was recommended in Trusteeship Council and General Assembly resolutions and in keeping with the wishes of the population of Togoland, the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement become an "unavoidable obligation" between the General Assembly and the Administering Authority. In addition, he felt that the Togolandians wanted termination because "it was intolerable for them to remain under trusteeship when their brothers in Togoland under British administration had been emancipated."¹⁹² Nevertheless, he cautioned the Fourth Committee "to avoid comparing situations which were not comparable" and therefore the British

Togoland case could not be utilised as a precedent in terms of process. He claimed that the most important factor of distinction between the two Trust Territories was the fact that British Togoland had been administered "as an integral part of the Gold Coast and had possessed no institutions of its own."¹⁹³ Although this was contrary to the stipulations of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement, it had not been a central issue in that process.

On the other hand, Jaquet asserted that French Togoland "had always constituted a separate entity and possessed its own institutions," which have progressed to assure the status "proper to a State." In order to complete the process of developing these institutions, he felt that the elections and UN observers would serve to 'ensure' that the opposition parties enter the democratic process. Jaquet reminded the Indian Delegation that these parties had "systematically refused" to enter candidates for the elections because with the implementation of universal suffrage, they had been unable to retain a majority status.¹⁹⁴ Since it was important for the French Government to retain the initiative in the process, Jaquet proposed that "simultaneous with the preparations of the elections and without delay," his Government intended to effect the transfer of powers according to the Statute.

In an attempt to set the UN limits of operation in the rest of the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement, Jaquet estimated that both of the above operations would have been concluded before the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. In view of this, he concluded that the General Assembly "would thus be able without further debate" to terminate the Trusteeship

Agreement.¹⁹⁵ In his brief reference to the draft resolution, Jaquet suggested that "despite the unnecessary caution with which it was worded," it was an "acceptable basis" for the completion of the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. He warned the Fourth Committee that, after the completion of this last stage in the process, the UN could not refuse to recognise the expression of the will of the people.¹⁹⁶ It was in fact the "unnecessary caution" of the Canadian Delegation which facilitated the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement in French Togoland.

India's Response to Draft Resolution

It is significant that, from the tabling of the draft resolution to the voting in the Fourth Committee, the Indian Delegation made only a few, extremely short and atypical speeches. On November 18, the only comment of substance was in regard to operative paragraphs 7 and 8, which established that the Legislative Assembly was to express 'wishes' in regard to termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. Jaipal claimed that they were 'inconsistent' with operative paragraph 3 which 'entrusted' the Legislative Assembly with "special responsibilities." And he interpreted that to mean "the formulation of proposals,"¹⁹⁷ without further explanations or suggestions as to how this inconsistency could be resolved. However, on November 21, Jaipal had a short and substantive comment to make in acknowledgement of the "important point" which was brought to the UN's

attention by the Yugoslav Delegation. This was in regard to the "scope and extent" of United Nations supervision of the elections.

It is possible that the exercise, in British Togoland, could have had an operative role in influencing the Indian Delegation to stress the following factors. He cautioned that "there was a serious danger that the United Nations might receive large numbers of complaints or petitions if supervision were excluded from any particular stage of elections." He also saw an additional 'danger' to which this exclusion could lead, and the same point was raised by Jaquet in his speech on November 18; that the opposition parties "would continue to boycott the elections on the grounds that there were insufficient guarantees."

It was therefore in the interest of the UN and the Administering Authority "to ensure free and fair" elections, and in order to accomplish this goal, Jaipal thought that UN supervision had to be a comprehensive one. To this end, he sought the 'assurance' of the Togoland Government that the UN supervision "would cover all stages of the elections, including revision of the electoral register."¹⁹⁸ The Indian Delegation had virtually ignored the evidence given by the petitioners from British Togoland that the Gold Coast Government had tampered with the electoral boundaries to effect a pro-integration majority vote. It is most probably with this in mind that Jaipal pleaded for the creation of a "proper atmosphere of confidence" which in turn would serve to "facilitate the task" of the General Assembly at the next session.¹⁹⁹ This was possible only if after the elections, the rush of dissatisfied petitioners to the UN could be stemmed. It was not only the need to expedite the process but also a concern with the rights of the

inhabitants that led Jaipal to place emphasis on the conditions under which the elections would be held.

Jaipal 'regretted' that the sponsors declined the amendment to paragraph 8. He felt that this paragraph was not explicit enough about which alternatives – self-government or independence – the UN was being asked to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. And this could 'create' the wrong 'impression' that the Trusteeship Agreement could be terminated before either one of the objectives was obtained. Therefore, his Delegation would be 'obliged' to vote against the draft resolution as a whole" if this matter was not specifically addressed in the resolution.²⁰⁰ Suffice it to say that in light of Article 76 of the Charter, no Trusteeship Agreement could be terminated without the attainment of self-government or independence. And in this sense, Jaipal's insistence on this matter being repeated operative paragraph 8 was of a superfluous value for substance and the process.

All that was being suggested in this paragraph of the resolution was that the General Assembly, after the expression of the wishes of the newly elected Legislative Assembly and the Togolese Government, should come to a decision at the next session as to the future status of this Trust Territory. It was a very important instruction for the General Assembly and in that sense, Gerig of the USA Delegation felt that paragraph 8 was "the key paragraph of the whole resolution."²⁰¹

Therefore, in order to accommodate the Indian point, Gerig recommended that the words "in accordance with Article 78(b) of the Charter of

the United Nations" should be added to paragraph 8. Any decision to be taken by the General Assembly would then be guided by these words. The Danish Delegation claimed that it was 'inconceivable' that the General Assembly would make any decision that would be 'contrary' to the conditions set out in Article 76(b) and therefore it was not necessary to amend paragraph 8.²⁰² Whereupon, Jaipal protested that Article 12 of the Trusteeship Agreement which set out the limits and conditions under which the Trusteeship Agreement could be altered or terminated, "made no reference" to Article 76(b) of the Charter and he insisted that the recommendation of the USA Delegation "pointed the way to a satisfactory settlement." He explained that if this would be accepted as an amendment to paragraph 8, it would "help to alley the anxiety of his Delegation on that score." Jaquet therefore decided to accept the text proposed by Gerig "as a compromise solution."²⁰³

Again, we suggest that because the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland had effectively succeeded in denying the right of self-determination to the people of the Trust Territory even though the General Assembly did operate, so to speak, within the terms of the Charter, the Indian Delegation sought to secure adequate safeguards in the process over French Togoland so that the people of this Trust Territory would have a better chance of realising that right.

The Fourth Committee Votes on the Draft Resolution

On November 23, the Delegation reported to Ottawa that the vote on the draft resolution which was "introduced and piloted by Canada...were gratifying and better than generally expected."²⁰⁴ The Delegation found it 'noteworthy' that not a single vote was cast against the resolution "as a whole." In assessing Canada's role in the process from the drafting, introduction and piloting, we find that it had accommodated and correctly perceived the conflicting concerns of the Delegations. This was necessary to obtain adoption of the resolution. However, the 26 abstentions indicated to what extent the draft resolution was indeed a compromise solution for both the colonials and the anti-colonials.

More importantly, the abstentions were indicative of the willingness of the Delegations to compromise their positions in order to obtain some progress in this process. This was evident in the abstentions of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia and the extremist Arab countries. On the other hand, the Canadian Delegation reported that the abstention of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan, "was dictated more by a desire to safeguard their anti-colonial prestige than by a genuine dislike of the resolution." According to the Delegation, both the Indian and the Afghanistan representatives 'intimated' this 'privately' to them after the voting.²⁰⁵

Evidently, the short atypical speeches of the Indian Delegation in phase II of this process were a reflection of its behind-the scenes effort to aid the Canadian Delegation in its search for a compromise solution, in spite of the

French pressure against this method.²⁰⁶ The Canadian Delegation felt that the Indian representative in the Fourth Committee "deserves a tribute for facilitating greatly the adoption of the contentions final paragraph of the resolution." Actually, it was a compromise 'deal' between the Indian and USA Delegations which made the USA sub-amendment possible and acceptable to both the French and Togolese Government, in what the Canadian Delegation described as "a somewhat confused procedural wrangle."²⁰⁷ The Canadian Delegation was generous in its praise of the efforts of the Indian Delegation in this part of the process. In a comparison of this behaviour of the Indian Delegation with that of its behaviour of November 18,²⁰⁸ the Canadian Delegation thought that the "Indian co-operation deserves full recognition here." In its estimation, the Indian Delegation "was glad to seize upon this occasion to repair the damage done to their reputation by their previous attitude which had drawn unfavourable comment privately from leading Western Delegations."²⁰⁹

Similarly, Ghana's position was an important factor in the dynamics of the process. And, it required a combined and strenuous effort of the French, British and Canadian Delegations to 'reassure' Ghana that the French did not intend to 'incorporate' Togoland into the French Republic when the Trusteeship Agreement is terminated. And, in the final analysis, this effort was successful in converting Ghana's "rather hostile attitude" and 'offensive' speech into an abstention on the resolution. The representative of the Togolese Government who appeared as a member of the French Delegation accused Ghana of "imperialistic and annexationist designs" on French Togoland. Because Delisle of

Canada was a member of the Commission to the Trust Territory, he was able to confirm to Chapman of Ghana that the French 'assurances' which were given both "publicly and privately" were genuine. According to the Canadian Delegation, this went a long way in helping to obtain Ghana's acquiescence in the adoption of the resolution and its abstention "was a welcome development."²¹⁰

In Canada's perception, two considerations were instrumental in determining the operational limits of its role in this process. First of all, "throughout the discussion," the Canadian Delegation was obliged "to keep in touch with India and other countries which as a rule assume a defensive and often suspicious attitude in matters of dependent territories." And secondly, the French was not only 'sceptical' of the success and value of the Canadian strategy, but was also in "fear of capitulation" on the part of the Canadian Delegation under the anti-colonial pressure.²¹¹ The Canadian Delegation was aware of the fact that if their policy was to be successful, "it had to satisfy the desire of the three target groups: the French as the Administering Authority, the Togolese Government which was "mindful of its new gained internal autonomy," and the most difficult of all, the anti-colonials. The Delegation was therefore,

guided by the desirability of endeavouring to persuade anti-Colonial Powers and particularly India that the co-sponsors of the resolution had nothing to hide and wanted to do their utmost to arrive at a solution which offered all necessary safeguards from the standpoint of UN responsibilities.²¹²

As we have shown in the case study on British Togoland, the Indian Delegation was working behind the scenes as part of the colonial group with the

full knowledge that the UK was hiding its real intentions in British Togoland from the UN. The Canadian Delegation knew this and also realised that because the French had systematically refused to include the Indian Delegation in its strategy plans, the Indian Delegation had ample grounds for believing that the 'public' French policy was not necessarily congruent with the 'private' French intentions with regard to French Togoland. The most important questions which we must address are these: would the Indian Delegation have been prepared to work again, in the French Togoland case, as part of the colonial group had the French been more willing to include the Indians as part of its inner circle on strategy? And if the Indians were included, as was recommended by the Canadians from the outset, would the process to terminate this Trusteeship Agreement have taken a different path to the one we are now examining?

According to the Canadian Delegation, the two significant changes which were made to the substantive part of the draft resolution were a 'result' of their "continuous consultation with members of the other group particularly India and Yugoslavia."²¹³ As an active member of the anti-colonial group, India was instrumental in altering the frame of reference for the UN Commissioner - from 'observing' the election process to 'supervising' the procedure. And instead of the President of the General Assembly 'appointing' this Commissioner, the General Assembly would 'elect' him. Again, as shown in the British Togoland case, the UN plebiscite Commissioner had a decisive role in influencing the election process in the Trust Territory to work in favour of a pro-integration result. The Indian Delegation was aware of this at the time and was, therefore, adamant that

a more neutral figure should obtain the post through election by the General Assembly, to secure that this would not be repeated in French Togoland. As a result of both changes in the draft resolution, the Indian Delegation in conjunction with the Canadian Delegation served to facilitate the unobstructed application of the right of self-determination in French Togoland.

The Latin American Group had also made a substantive contribution to amending the draft resolution in such a way that the UN authority in this process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement would be recognised. The Canadian Delegation thought that this group was 'hesitant'²¹⁴ to support the resolution as a whole until an Ecuadoran-Venezuelan amendment added a reference to "circumstances then prevailing" in the Trust Territory to the resolution. The amendment was specific to the proposal that the General Assembly reach a decision at the next session on the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. This amendment committed the General Assembly to examine the situation in the Trust Territory before deciding whether the Trusteeship Agreement should be terminated, irregardless of what the French or Togolese Government felt to be the case.

Since neither of the French nor the Togolese Government were prepared to allow UN interference in the Trust Territory after the elections, this amendment had a significant and functional role in securing the right of self-determination of the people of French Togoland. And according to the Canadian Delegation, "this change" and the decision to 'elect' the UN Commissioner, "shook the Afro-Asian bloc." Both amendments combined, provided "the basis"

for the moderate anti-colonials "to desert" this bloc and to vote in favour of the resolution as a whole.²¹⁵

In view of the significance and repercussions of the Minority Report of the Visiting Mission to British Togoland and because two 'extreme' anti-colonials, Guatemala and Yugoslavia, were members of the UN Commission for French Togoland, the Canadian Delegation expressed some 'fear' that the Delegations of either Guatemala or Yugoslavia could utilise their speech-making as representatives of their countries "to tear apart" the unanimous conclusion of the report. This was still possible although the report was already "commended by all sides" in both the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee.²¹⁶

In its report to Ottawa, the Canadian Delegation took pains to demonstrate the success of its effort to obtain a successful compromise solution. The lack of dissension in the debate among the six members of the UN Commission for French Togoland was 'comforting'. But the Canadian Delegation was more appreciative of the fact that of the six, four voted in favour of the resolution; even if "in the case of the Liberian representative [who had] at times to be supplied with statements written by a Canadian hand."²¹⁷ This is an indication of the lengths to which the Canadian Delegation was prepared to go in order to fulfil the functional role it had undertaken, in this process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement.

According to the Canadian Delegation, the gratitude of the French Minister and his aides was a 'recognition' that the Canadian "practical approach to negotiations throughout the debate had been the right one." Nevertheless, the

Delegation did not fail to point out that the French Delegation which consisted of two Togolese, was "slow in agreeing to suggestions toward a more liberal attitude and toward establishing a text which did not cast any doubt on their intentions."²¹⁸ It is evident that, in the perception of the Canadian Delegation, its own efforts were instrumental towards obtaining progress in the process. However, the Delegation also felt that the French and Togolese "must be given credit" for the two major decisions which they had taken. First of all, they had no choice but to postpone, twice, the pursuit of their goal of termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. Secondly, as shown in an earlier section they were against further elections in the Trust Territory. Nevertheless, in this resolution they were forced to agree to "a fully democratic and UN-supervised procedure for the final attainment of self-government by Togoland."²¹⁹

And in the estimation of the Canadian Delegation, these "were substantial and effective concessions." Petitioners from the opposition parties attested to this conclusion 'privately' to the Delegation. In spite of this consensus, the Delegation continued to harbour the fear that "such restless representatives as those of Yugoslavia and Guatemala" might endeavour to influence the General Assembly to "dilute further"²²⁰ the specific recommendation of paragraphs 7 and 8 that the General Assembly "devote its attention to the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement" at its next session. Because this was "not at all unlikely" the Delegation was forced to devote all its attention to carrying the resolution through the General Assembly,²²¹ although the "prospects" for

adoption by the Plenary were "encouraging" in view of the fact that any amendments would require a two-third majority.²²²

The General Assembly and the Resolution

On November 27, France, the UK, the USA and the co-sponsors of the resolution held a strategy meeting to prepare for the General Assembly Plenary which would consider the Report of the Fourth Committee on November 29. In the anticipation that anti-colonials would make an attempt to amend paragraph 8 of the resolution, they decided at the meeting to have King of Liberia:

recall the care and consideration given by the Fourth Committee to each phase of the resolution and warn the Assembly that rejection of the paragraph might mean that the resolution no longer be acceptable and thus leave the Assembly faced with a somewhat hopeless situation in regard to Togoland.²²³

If, in spite of the threat, this paragraph was amended, the Delegation cautioned Ottawa that France and the UK "may expect us to vote against the resolution as a whole." Although, the Delegation doubted whether colonials could obtain a blocking two-third majority, the Delegation recommended to Ottawa that it "would be more appropriate" for Canada to abstain. In view of these circumstances, the Delegation requested "urgent instructions" as to what position Canada should take.

A situation was developing which would place Ottawa in a similar situation in which India had to abstain on its own resolution on January 14. At the time, the Canadian Delegation had perceived this as "a severe defeat for the

Indians."²²⁴ France decided that the co-sponsors, the UK and the USA "should keep to the background," and leave the Latin Americans - who were 'pressing' for a specific candidate for the post of UN Commissioner - a free hand in the developments.²²⁵ On November 28, Ottawa sent instructions to its Delegation:

we agree that an abstention would seem appropriate but are unable to assess from here the relative advantages of an abstention or negative vote or to judge whether defeat of the resolution would be in any way helpful in leaving the way open for future solutions and must leave the matter to your discretion.²²⁶

In fact on November 29, the colonial group discovered at the last minute²²⁷ that the 'opposition' had planned to seek a "division of the vote on paragraph 8." This new development was complicated by the withdrawal of the Liberian Delegation from the pre-planned strategy, of November 27, to set the stage in case this paragraph became the subject of attack. According to the Canadian Delegation, King of Liberia was 'advised' by his Delegation "not to intervene." Therefore, in a new strategy meeting, Eskelund of Denmark decided that he would move that this new proposal for paragraph 8 be put to a vote and Ireland would second the Danish motion.

The Syrian Delegation had assumed the vanguard anti-colonial role throughout the British Togoland process and had attempted to undertake a crucial exercise with regard to French Togoland, at this late stage in the process. The basis for this intervention, according to this Delegation, was a radio interview in Paris in which Jaquet expressed his determination to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. Consequently, Syria proposed a deletion of the operative parts of paragraphs 7 and 8 dealing specifically with termination. Despite the "earnest

and conciliatory statement" of the representative of France, the Ghanaian Delegate "spoke emphatically" in support of Syria's proposal and declared that if this proposal was not accepted, Ghana would vote against the resolution. On the other hand, this proposal would effectively nullify all that the colonials had achieved in the resolution and it was therefore unacceptable to the co-sponsors. According to the Canadian Delegation, Jaipal "was extremely disturbed by the turn of events since he was obliged to vote for the Syrian proposal."²²⁸

On the other hand, the Scandinavian bloc had decided that it would vote against the resolution if the Syrian proposal was accepted. In terms of dynamics, an 'against' vote would have included members from both colonial and anti-colonial groups, and Jaipal recommended that the colonials seek an adjournment which would enable them to work for another compromise solution during the weekend.²²⁹ Without any further information as to any behind-the-scene manoeuvring, the Canadian Delegation reported to Ottawa that the Syrian proposal was defeated by a roll-call vote and the resolution as a whole was adopted with similar voting percentages previously obtained in the Fourth Committee. An exception was the solitary negative vote cast by Ghana. The Canadian Delegation did not think that Ghana would "have gained any merit by this vote." The Delegation observed that Ghana's behaviour was "certainly causing great distress to the United Kingdom."²³⁰

Dynamics of the Last Phase

With the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1182 (XII), the UN was authorised to set up a UN commission to supervise the elections in French Togoland. However, in this last and important phase in the process, the Canadian Delegation and Ottawa decided to refuse any functional role in another UN commission. According to Reece of the UN Division in Ottawa, Canada had taken "a particular interest and responsibility in this matter," because Delisle of Canada had served on the Six-Member UN Commission to French Togoland.²³¹ Ottawa was of the opinion that this perceived responsibility had entailed an active role in the process. Therefore, the Canadian Delegation not only co-sponsored and introduced the resolution, but was also "very active in the strenuous negotiations" which were necessary to obtain a "wide acceptance" of the resolution after the amendments. And in light of this, it was with great disquiet that Reece reported to the Under Secretary: "during the course of the negotiations...the French Ambassador here...gave us the impression that the French had some doubts as to whether the Delegation was doing everything possible to assist the French."²³²

On December 9, the Canadian Delegation notified Ottawa that Boland of Ireland showed personal interest in the post as UN Commissioner to supervise the elections. However, Boland was "not sure of his Government's consent," although the Canadian Delegation thought that he would be "an admirable choice and acceptable to all." In view of this, and because Canada had already served

on the last UN Commission to French Togoland, the Delegation "would hesitate to encourage a Canadian candidate."²³³ On the same day, the Under Secretary agreed that Ottawa "should discourage a Canadian candidate" for the reasons outlined by the Delegation. The Under-Secretary expressed his "reluctance to have a Canadian involved in yet another ticklish operation of this kind which provides more scope for making enemies than friends."²³⁴

As already pointed out, the UK Government had set great value on the outcome of this process on French Togoland because it felt that a UN reprimand of French policy would inevitably reflect on the UK as the other primary Administering Power.²³⁵ It was therefore with great satisfaction that the UK High Commissioner in Ottawa communicated to the Department of External Affairs a letter from Sir Andrew Cohen, the UK Delegation at the UN. It contained "most appreciative references to the splendid efforts made by the Canadian Delegation in dealing with the French Togoland resolution at the UN."²³⁶

The UK Government was aware that, in this phase, the UN authority and responsibility would not be limited to the technicality of supervising the elections in the Trust Territory. According to the Commonwealth Relations Office, any progress in this process depended on two things. First, the French would have "to satisfy a two-third majority of its [UN] members that the electorate and the new Assembly in French Togoland have genuinely pronounced themselves in favour of the end of trusteeship."²³⁷ The UK Government knew that without the help of the Indian Delegation, the interpretation of the elections results for integration and termination of the Trusteeship Agreement in British Togoland

would not have been possible in light of the protestations against this decision. Therefore, in the French Togoland process, the UK Government knew what issues the Indian Delegation would be addressing in its anti-colonial role. Second, the UN would also have to be "satisfied with the powers" which the French had intended to transfer to the Trust Territory. Both of these factors would play an instrumental role in whether the French would be able to follow through with its plans to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement.

UK and India

In the UK perception, the Indian position would play a critical role in the dynamics of this last phase in the process. The Commonwealth Relations Office telegram warned that

present indications are that the Indians intend to oppose termination of trusteeship on any other basis than complete independence....India's attitude on this question is extremely influential, both in the Trusteeship Council and in the General Assembly; and if she is indeed committed to the view described by Menon it may be impossible to secure a two-third majority for termination on basis proposed, even if conditions which we regard as essential are fulfilled.²³⁸

The Indian Delegation had abstained on the resolution; this was in keeping with its policy of seeking independence as the alternative to self-government at termination of this Trusteeship Agreement. We assume that this was not just a 'public' policy, the Indian Delegation was prepared to work for this goal in French Togoland. The colonials were very much aware of this aim. The Commonwealth Relations Office informed the High Commissioners of Ottawa, Canberra,

Wellington, Delhi and Accra that the UK was "therefore most anxious that the Indians should not pre-judge this important issue or formulate any final view without objective consideration of the full facts."²³⁹

This was the first indication that the UK resorted to its Commonwealth links for assistance in obtaining a consolidated position on French Togoland. This became a necessary step because the UK had seen its "role in this as one of honest broker" and the CRO asserted that the UK's past "efforts in that direction undoubtedly contributed greatly to the satisfactory results achieved at the Twelfth Session". The UK was convinced that without this intervention, the whole process "might otherwise...have ended in deadlock." And in view of this, the UK Government was "most anxious" that this be brought to the attention of the Government of India.²⁴⁰

This position necessarily assumed that the Indian Government would be willing to accommodate colonial needs as it had done in regard to British Togoland. But as we have already suggested in the British Togoland case, it was most probably in India's own interest to work for a rapid termination of colonial rule. Under the heading "Delhi only", paragraph 8 of the Commonwealth Relations Office telegram instructed the UK High Commissioner to

please therefore discuss this question urgently with the Indian authorities at a suitably high level making it clear that we wish to have a full and frank exchange of views with them....You should try to convince them that the solution for which we are working is the most helpful and practicable in the circumstances, and that their support for it in the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly would be in the true interests of the people of French Togoland themselves.²⁴¹

A line was drawn across this paragraph with the phrase "Not at this time" in handwriting. Because it was not initialled, it is difficult to say whether this was added by the UK High Commissioner in Ottawa before the telegram was transmitted to Canadian officials or if this was a Canadian opinion. However, under the heading "Ottawa, Canberra and Wellington only" paragraph 8 of the telegram instructed the UK High Commissioners, at their 'discretion', to "pass the material in paragraphs 1 to 6 above to Commonwealth authorities." On the other hand, under the heading "Accra only," the UK High Commissioner was informed that the telegram was for his "own information only." Did this mean that Nkrumah of Ghana was not to be informed of its contents?

The Election Results

On April 27, the elections took place in French Togoland and the UN Commissioner - Dorsinville of Haiti - reported on the organisation, conduct and results of this election to the Trusteeship Council. The Government of Togoland had lost the elections. On April 30, Crean of the Canadian Embassy, Paris, informed Ottawa that in Pignon's opinion, "the elections have been a disappointment and a surprise to him." The Embassy suggested that the results had "undoubtedly been influenced by the Accra Conference which criticised French policy in Togoland."²⁴² It was generally believed to be in Ghana's interest to ensure that Togoland did not become part of the French Union in view of the fact that Nkrumah had 'imperialistic' intentions towards this territory.

According to Jaipal, "the significance of the elections lay primarily in the fact that the people of the territory were now truly represented in the Chamber of Deputies and thus had been able to make clear their desire for independence." He acknowledged the French acceptance of this democratic expression of will and its intention "to give effect to it." In light of the transfer of powers and information which France would supply in regard to the "substance of those modifications," he suggested that the Council recognise the Assembly's authority in "determining the next step to be taken toward the attainment of independence." Jaipal not only preferred that the General Assembly take charge of the next step in the process, he also proposed that the Assembly should be guided by the conditions that were set out in General Assembly Resolution 742 (VIII), in its examination of the situation in the territory and also "before deciding that the time had come to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement." Undoubtedly, these rigorously elaborated limits were intended to prohibit the UN from terminating the Trusteeship Agreement before the Trust Territory had actually achieved the status of full independence, not just self-government.²⁴³

Had the Indian Delegation insisted upon similar operational conditions for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland, the UN would have had to pay closer attention to the desire of the people of British Togoland as expressed in the elections. However, the Indian Delegation seemed to have chosen another role for itself in the process over French Togoland and for this reason it abstained on the vote on General Assembly Resolution 1182(XII). According to Jaipal, this resolution did not include independence as

the 'basis' of termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.²⁴⁴ On the other hand, the six-power draft resolution of the Trusteeship Council did "take note" of this aspect and therefore ensured the co-sponsorship of the Indian Delegation.²⁴⁵ It was adopted unanimously. This resolution not only made recall to General Assembly Resolution 1182 (XII) on which India abstained, it also "took note of Togoland's choice of independence upon expiration of trusteeship," in operative paragraph 4. But most important for the process of decolonisation with regard to Trust Territories, this resolution in the Trusteeship Council 'agreed' that the procedure which was 'initiated' in regard to British Togoland "would be continued" in the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over French Togoland in operative paragraph 5(b).

Despite the protestation of several Delegations, at the time, that the procedure which was undertaken to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland should not be seen as establishing a precedent; it did in effect become a precedent for French Togoland in Trusteeship Council Resolution 1921 (5-8).²⁴⁶ And in spite of the fact that the Indian Delegation had abstained on General Assembly Resolution 1182(XII), Trusteeship Council Resolution 1921 recommended in operative paragraph 6, that the General Assembly "as envisaged in its Resolution 1182(XII) take a decision...to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement." This resolution was adopted because of the "very active" part of the Canadian Delegation in the "strenuous negotiations" to obtain a compromise solution. By common consent of both the Trusteeship Council and, of course, the General Assembly, this resolution outlined the steps which the UN

would have to follow in this last phase to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over French Togoland. The results of the elections which favoured independence enabled the Indian Delegation to accept and support the implementation of this resolution.

On November 3, the Canadian Delegation informed Ottawa of a strategy meeting called by the French in New York. The Delegations of Canada, Ireland, Yugoslavia, Tunisia, India, Brazil and Argentina, in addition to the co-sponsors of the Trusteeship Council Resolution 1921 were invited to attend. Canada and India worked together in a behind-the-scene attempt "to discuss the best tactics to be followed" and to put together a draft resolution which the French expected Canada to co-sponsor.²⁴⁷ On November 6, Ottawa agreed that the Canadian Delegation "join with other Delegations in working for broad support for this resolution, and join in co-sponsoring a resolution satisfactory to the French and likely to be widely supported."²⁴⁸ In other words, the Canadian Delegation would continue its own method of compromising and negotiating with the entire UN membership, if necessary, in order to obtain a resolution which stood a good chance of being adopted. On November 6, the Under Secretary was reminded²⁴⁹ that it was only after the French defeat in the General Assembly at the 11th and 12th Sessions, that Canada's "considerable assistance" and its "large hand in negotiating the compromise solution" was able to make any progress in the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement.

On November 7, the Canadian Delegation notified Ottawa that they "were active in securing the acceptance of draft resolution A/C.4/L.544/Rev.1

ending the Trusteeship Agreement over French Togoland."²⁵⁰ But it was not until November 12 that the Delegation decided to inform Ottawa of the details of the exercise. The major complaint centred around "the rigid position" of the French in regard to the strategic discussion on possible amendments to the draft resolution and tactics. As in the past instances, the French had submitted a basic "draft text" which was acceptable to both the French and Togolese Governments to the group which was entrusted with the task of designing a draft resolution out of this text.²⁵¹ The Canadian Delegation protested to Ottawa that "not only did they [the French] not make any positive proposals or suggestions to assist in securing its approval by the widest possible majority, but they turned down the most innocuous redrafts or suggestions with affronted dignity."²⁵² Moreover, "the French "refused to negotiate except through the small group" of Mexico, Ireland and Tunisia, which they put together at the meeting of November 3. In view of the French intransigence, why did the Canadian Delegation persevere in this difficult enterprise?

The Delegation reminded Ottawa that the Canadians "bore the brunt of responsibility for securing the much more difficult adoption of Resolution 1182(XII)." The Delegation also pointed out, that, in spite of all this, the French Embassy in Ottawa "did not seem entirely satisfied with the sincerity or vigour" of the Canadian effort "on their behalf at that time."²⁵³ But precisely one year had gone by and despite this French pressure, the Canadian Delegation was successful in pursuing the French goal with Canadian methods. The Delegation wrote to Ottawa: "without being hypersensitive, it occurred to us that the rather

obvious omission of Canada from the negotiating group might indicate that the French still had doubts regarding our attitude."²⁵⁴ Why would the French entrust its interests in such a critical stage in the process, to the Mexican, Irish and Tunisian Delegations? Had the French not realised that without Canada's efforts at compromise the procedure could have been a long and drawn-out affair? India's anti-colonial leadership seemed to have emboldened the Russian bloc to take a radical and extreme anti-colonial stand.

The attention which the Indian Delegation gave to the petitioners had only served to reinforce the conviction of the anti-colonials that France wanted to integrate French Togoland into the French Union. Under these circumstances, it should have been clear to the French and Togolese Governments that the UN would not agree to any termination of the Trusteeship Agreement without the achievement of certain required conditions. Is it possible that the Canadian and UK Governments were apprehensive that the French would seek to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement, unilaterally? Although the French had chosen to keep the Canadian Delegation out of this last-phase inner circle, "in the end" the Canadians were "drawn into the negotiations actively since it was impossible for Ireland to negotiate single handedly with the whole membership of the Fourth Committee." In addition, Tunisia was forced to withdraw from France's side because of the confrontation of French-Tunisian forces on the Tunisian-Algerian border.²⁵⁵ Therefore, it was out of sheer necessity that France would resort to the services of the Canadian Delegation.

In British Togoland, the Canadian economic interest was one of the important factors in its policy position. But in French Togoland, there were no direct Canadian interests at stake. Why did the Canadian Delegation become involved in the process to such an extent, in light of the French attitude? The Delegation gave a poignant description of this attitude in its report to Ottawa. It felt that it was

unfortunate that this stubbornness on the part of the French is sometimes related to what appears to be an almost arrogant assumption that all of France's friends should carry out her behests, not as parties in a common enterprise, but obediently, blindly and uncomplainingly. As a consequence despite their cordial personal relations, it is sometimes difficult for France's friends to act as effectively as they might wish on her behalf.²⁵⁶

In its final report on Agenda Item 40 - "The Future of Togoland under French Administration," - the Delegation wrote that "by and large, the tone of the general debate was of mutual understanding and satisfaction at a job well done."²⁵⁷ But we suggest that that would not have been possible had the French not followed the advice of the Canadian Delegation to co-opt the adversary in a behind-the - scene effort for a compromise solution. As a result, the strategy meeting of November 3 included Yugoslavia and Mexico who were "among last year's most violent opponents of resolution 1182(XII)," several middle-of-the-road Latin American states, Tunisia and India.

However, the Delegation observed that the inner circle of Ireland, Mexico and Tunisia, which France had appointed on November 3, to "co-ordinate back-stage negotiations," was a 'representative' group.²⁵⁸ In their dealings with the French, these three Delegations faced "the same regrettable rigidity and

inflexibility encountered last year" by the Canadian Delegation. The Canadian Delegation had continued to work for the adoption of the resolution that would authorise the General Assembly to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. And because the Delegation gave great weight to the operational context and limits of the General Assembly, it decided to withdraw from associating with the introduction of the resolution.²⁵⁹ In the Canadian perception, this was a critical decision for the process. Because they had worked in "constant and close contact" with the Togolese Government during their mediatory efforts, the Delegation believed that the Committee would 'associate' them with support for that regime which had lost the elections.²⁶⁰

This logic was also applied to the involvement of the five co-sponsors of the last resolution on French Togoland. It was thus decided that Ambassador Espinosa of Mexico should introduce the resolution with Ghana, "a fellow African and neighbouring country." The resolution noted, in its four operative paragraphs, that the French and new Togolese Government had agreed that Togoland should attain independence in 1960. It is without any doubt that the constant and active support and direct interest of the UK Government was an instrumental factor in the functional role which Canada had undertaken in this enterprise. The UK, the USA and the other Colonial Powers could not have assumed the role which Canada had successfully played throughout this process, because of its apparent lack of self-interest in colonial empires.

¹ RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40. Commonwealth Division, Weekly Divisional Note, November 23, 1956. Confidential. Loi Cadre. "In view of the failure of its policy in North Africa it appears that France has decided to take this step none too soon." However, the February 1952 Electoral Law

in French Togoland brought the first single-college Territorial Assembly in Black Africa. (except Senegal, of course)

See:-Steward Easton, The Twilight of European Colonialism. And also:-L.P. Singh. United Nations and the Birth of States (New Delhi: Gitanjali Publishing House, 1986).

² UNTCOR, Thirteenth Session, 505th Meeting, March 1, 1954, p. 185 No: 35. Although not a member of the Trusteeship Council, Canada was fully informed of the proceedings in the Trusteeship Council

³ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Assembly Delegation To: Ottawa, December 7, 1955.

⁴ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. Commonwealth and Middle East Division, March 21, 1956 "UN official comments on conditions in Togoland." Stamped: G.C. McInnes.

⁵ RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 859, July 30, 1956. Confidential. Under reference Despatch No: 744, June 29, 1956.

⁶ UNTCOR, Eighteenth Session, 742 Meeting

⁷ UNTCOR, Eighteenth Session, 744 meeting, 13 August 1956, p.341, paragraph 49.

⁸ Ibid. paragraph 50.

⁹ RG 25 Vol: 6405 File: 5475-N-40 pt.5. From: Shannon, Office of the High Commissioner for the UK., Ottawa To: Heeney, USSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 1074/154, 21st August 1950.

¹⁰ Ibid., Emphasis added.

¹¹ UNTCOR, Eighteenth Session, 744th meeting, 13 August 1956, p.341, paragraph 53.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ UNTCOR, Eighteenth Session, 744th Meeting, 13 August 1956, p.341, paragraph 57.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/160 Vol: 79 File: 5475-GH-40-pt.1. Commonwealth Relations Office, Note of a Meeting, 1. November 1956. "Colonial questions at the eleventh Session of the UN." Present were Bourdillon and Marnhan (Colonial Office), Miss Meagher (Canada), Mr. Doig (Australia) p.6 paragraph 14.

¹⁷ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1. From: Canadian Embassy Paris To: USSEA No: 1179 October 31, 1956, p.1.

¹⁸ RG 25, Vol. 3458, File 6-1-1949/1, T/2 P.7

¹⁹ Ibid. P.8.

²⁰ RG 25 Vol: 8331 File: 10283-F-40 pt.1.2. From: Assembly Delegation N.Y. To: Ottawa No: 408. December 8, 1955. Important and Confidential. Under reference New York Telegram No: 394 of December 7, 1955. This was "a fact borne out by the way in which the question of the future...of British Togoland was introduced before the United Nations..."

²¹ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. Memorandum From: United Nations Division, To: European Division and Commonwealth Division, November 21, 1956. Confidential. CANDEL Telegram No: 1261, November 15, 1956 under reference drew "attention to the impact of the Middle East Crisis upon attitude likely to be taken by anti-colonial countries on such matters as French Togoland and other African territories" was not in file and not traceable.

²² Memorandum. November 21, 1956 paragraph 2.

²³ Ibid., paragraph 3. Instructions in Commentary for Delegations to UN. In paragraph 4, the Division asked for comments. Written on the lower left side in hand-writing "I do not think we would wish to change our instructions to the Delegation: 77% is a pretty impressive figure - even to the African Group".

²⁴ RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40. Commonwealth Division, Weekly Divisional Note, November 23, 1956. Confidential.

²⁵ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1 From CANDEL N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Despatch No: 1845, December 22, 1956. Confidential.

²⁶ Ibid., the Canadian Delegation was preparing Ottawa for its role in this process. See: RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: Embassy Paris, To: External Affairs Ottawa No: 950, December 21, 1956. Confidential. Subj: French Togoland UN discussion "De Menthon, the acting

head of the UN Division, has asked us to convey to you the French hope that Canada will be able to support them in the Fourth Committee debate on French Togoland...."

²⁷ Ibid., p.2.

²⁸ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 4.

²⁹ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 4.

³⁰ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 4, p.3. The French Plebiscite Administrator Perier de Feral suggested that the Assembly "could simply note the results and request the Administering Power to keep it informed of political developments in Togoland".

³¹ Ibid., p.3, paragraph 5.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., p.4, paragraph 5, "one of our Commonwealth friends was talking the other day of the 'UN colonialism'."

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., p.4, paragraph 6.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ See: Henri Grimal, Decolonisation: The British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires 1919-1963, trans. Stephan De Vos (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978).

³⁸ Telegram No: 1845, December 22, 1956

³⁹ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: Embassy Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa No: 959, December 27, 1956. Important and Confidential. Under reference CANDEL TEL 1845 of December 22.

⁴⁰ Telegram No: 959, December 27, 1956.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., Mr. Deferre (Minister of Overseas territories) accompanied by his Chef du Cabinet who was the earlier French Representative of the Trusteeship Council- both went to N.Y. to plan tactics for the January Session of the Fourth Committee.

⁴³ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: D. Osborne, UN Division To: USSEA, Ottawa, December 28, 1956. Confidential. cc. Commonwealth Division.

⁴⁴ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, 587th Meeting, 4 January 57, Petitioners present were Mr. Santos (Mouvement de la jeunesse togolaise(Juvento)), Mr. Atakparry (Parti togolaise du progrès), Mr. Olympio (All-Ewe Conference).

⁴⁵ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: CANDEL, N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, Telegram No: 41, January 5, 1957. Confidential. Under reference: Ottawa Telegram V V 53, January 2. Not traceable. Info: LDN, Embassy Paris, WASHDC, BAG DELHI FM OTT.

⁴⁶ Ibid., most "probably" Yugoslavia would introduce the resolution, with co-sponsors: Canada, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Thailand, Tunisia and the USA.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 2, paragraph 4, the Delegation was informed of the USA activities, but we don't know by whom.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 4. Telegram No: 41, January 5, 1957.

⁵⁰ Telegram No:41, p.2, paragraph 4, January 5, 1957.

⁵¹ Telegram No:41, p.3, paragraph 5. January 5, 1957.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Telegram No:41, p.3, paragraph 5.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Telegram No:41, p.3, paragraph 5. January 5, 1957.

⁵⁷ Telegram No:41.

⁵⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: CANDEL, N.Y. To: External Affairs, Telegram No: 84, January 8, 1957. Confidential. Info: LDN, Embassy Paris, WASHDC, TT DELHI FM OTT. Under reference: CANDEL TEL. 41, January 5, 1957. "It was hoped that Yugoslavia would sponsor and introduce the resolution." After withdrawal, the Yugoslavian delegate promised his support of the resolution.

⁵⁹ Telegram No: 84. From: N.Y. January 8, 1957, p.1.

⁶⁰ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 591st Meeting, 8 January 57, p.207, paragraph 2.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., paragraph 3.

⁶³ Ibid., He pointed out that this was the expressed wish of the Visiting Mission Report of 1955 paragraph 39.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 591st meeting, 8 January 57, p.207, paragraph 4.

⁶⁶ Telegram No: 84, From: N.Y. January 8, 1957, p.2, paragraph 3.

⁶⁷ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 592nd meeting 9 Jan 1957 p.2/5 No: 19.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p.215. No: 19.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid., paragraph 25.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., p.216.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee 595 meeting 10 January, 1957, p.229. No: 37. (emphasis added)

⁷⁶ Ibid., paragraph 40.

⁷⁷ Ibid., paragraph 43.

⁷⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: CANDEL, N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa No: 118, January 10, 1957. Confidential. Info: LDN, Embassy Paris, WASHDC, BAG DELHI FM OTT. Under reference: CANDEL TEL 84, January 8.

⁷⁹ Telegram No: 118, January 10, 1957, p.2. paragraph 2. The Delegation felt that the one and a half hours speech by Menon could have been "shorter, less impassioned and more constructive."

⁸⁰ Telegram No: 118, January 10, 1957, p.2.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Telegram No: 118, January 10, 1957, p.2, paragraph 3.

⁸³ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: CANDEL, N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa. Telegram No: 171, January 14, 1957. Confidential. Info: LDN, Embassy Paris, WASHDC, BAG DELHI FM OTT. Under reference: CANDEL TEL 118, January 10.

⁸⁴ Telegram No: 171, January 14, 1957, p.1, paragraph 2.

⁸⁵ Ibid., Emphasis added

⁸⁶ Telegram No: 171, January 14, 1957, p.1, paragraph 2.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 2, paragraph 3. Emphasis added.

⁸⁸ Telegram No: 171, January 14, 1957, p.2, paragraph 5. On the left side of this above quote are several parallel lines drawn, in pencil for emphasis.

⁸⁹ Telegram No: 171, January 14, 1957, p.2, paragraph 6. - vote on amended resolution, 52 in favour, 10 against, 14 abstentions. For: India, Indonesia and the Mid-East. Against: Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Soviet bloc. Abstaining: most Latin Americans

⁹⁰ Telegram No: 959, From: Embassy Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, December 27, 1956.

⁹¹ Telegram No: 171, p.2 paragraph 6. Again the above quote was underlined by hand and marked off with parallel lines on the side for emphasis by the reader at External Affairs in the original.

⁹² Ibid., p.3, paragraph 6. This perception and fact contradicts the popular assumption of most secondary sources that, with the entry in 1955 of the many new nations, the anti-colonials could run the show.

⁹³ Ibid., p.3, paragraph 7 and selected Document B, January 22, 1957 paragraph 1. -"Some observers deem this to be the first blow to India's behind the scenes attempts to replace the influence of the United Kingdom in West Africa."

⁹⁴ Telegram No: 171, January 14, 1957, p.3, paragraph 7. Again parallel lines in hand writing on the side of the comment on India's role in British Togoland and the lower quote blocked off on the

left-hand side. At the bottom of the page, "split in Bandung" and "Rebuff to India" emphasised in the document.

⁹⁵ UNGAOR, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 643rd Meeting January 23, 1957, p.61. No: 23.

⁹⁶ Ibid., paragraph 27.

⁹⁷ Vote of 53 to 16 with 17 abstentions, on resolution "as a whole." Opposed - Soviet bloc, Arab Countries of the Mid-East. Abstained: - Lebanon, India, Burma, Indonesia, Morocco. Supported:- Cambodia, Laos, Ceylon, China, Ethiopia, Japan, Liberia, Pakistan, Thailand, Tunisia.

⁹⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: CANDEL N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 330, January 23, 1957. Confidential. INFO EMBASSY PARIS LDN INFO TT DELHI FM OTT. Under reference CANDEL TEL 171, January 14.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 4. Although the USA was assured of a seat on the 5 member Commission to the Trust-territory, "it is expected to turn it down. In this event, it is anticipated that Canada will be asked" to send a member. RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. Selected Document B. January 22, 1957. Confidential.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 2, paragraph 5.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 803, September 4, 1957. Priority and Confidential. INFO PERMISNY LDN WASHDC.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p.2. No:4.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 7.

¹⁰⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: Canadian High Commissioner, London To: External Affairs, Ottawa No: 2329, September 10, 1957. Immediate and Confidential. INFO PERMISNY WASHDC EMBASSY PARIS. Under reference: External Affairs Telegram V 594 of September 6, not traceable.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p.1, paragraph 2.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 3.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: Embassy Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 838 September 11, 1957.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: U.K. Delegation N.Y. To: Foreign Office, Telegram No: 1440. September 14, 1957. Priority and Confidential. Transmittal slip From: Crombie, UK High Commissioner to Canada, Ottawa To: Hicks, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, on September 24, 1957

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p.1, paragraph 3.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p.1, paragraph 3 (emphasis added)

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 4.

¹²¹ UNTCOR, Seventh Special Session, 843rd Meeting, September 16, 1957, p.9. And Ibid., Smolderen of Belgium found it "regrettable that no Administering Authority had taken part in" the Commission, p. 10.

¹²² Kenneth Robinson, "Colonialism French Style, 1945-55: A Backward Glance," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol: XII, No: 2, January 1984, p.29." There were in the rest of French West Africa [except Senegal]...separate electorates [for citoyens de statut francais] for elections to the territorial Assemblies, in which they were accorded representation quite disproportionate to the number of such citizens in the territory. Since the senators of the Council of the Republic were elected by the territorial assemblies (together with the deputies), separate representation was also provided in that body. Such separate electorates also returned deputies of the National Assembly from Equatorial Africa, Cameroon and Madagascar."

¹²³ Ibid., p.10.

¹²⁴ UNTCOR, Seventh Special Session, 845th Meeting September 18, 1957, p. 21.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ UNTCOR, Seventh Special Session 845th Meeting, September 18, 1957, p.21.

¹²⁷ UNTCOR, Seventh Special Session, 843rd Meeting, September 16, 1957, p.9.

¹²⁸ UNTCOR, Seventh Special Session, 847th Meeting, September 20, 1957, p.27.

¹²⁹ UNGAOR, Twelfth Session, Fourth Committee, 703rd Meeting, November 15, 1957, p.281.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid., Kenneth Robinson: pp.26-27 wrote of the period 1945-55 in French West Africa: "The uniformity of the administrative structure from the Governor-General to territorial governors, commandant de cercle, chef de subdivision, chef de canton, to chef de village broken only by the occasional recourse to grouping several cantons under a chef de province, all except the village, artificial units of French administrative design, concealed very few concessions to African society, in contrast to the extraordinary patchwork of 'native authority' units to be found in British West Africa."

¹³² Kenneth Robinson p.29. "...there was a sizeable number of metropolitan French in French West Africa....There were nearly three times as many Europeans in French, as in British West Africa though the African population was little more than half that of the British territories....Large posts in British West Africa were usually filled by Africans." ("clerks in banks and in government offices primarily school teachers, shop assistants, and many others in relatively humble work requiring not very elaborate skills").

¹³³ See also UNGAOR, Twelfth Session, Fourth Committee, 587th Meeting, January 4, 1957. No: 21, p.188. Mr. Defferre (France) talks of the "pace of Africanisation" of administrative personnel as being accelerated by allowing at least 50% of Africans to enter school in the territories themselves! See also: UNGAOR, Twelfth Session Fourth Committee, 707th Meeting, p. 307. France's excuse for not having more Togolese in Government jobs.

¹³⁴ UNGAOR, Twelfth Session No:703rd Meeting, November 15, 1957, p.281.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p.282.

¹³⁶ UNGAOR, Twelfth Session 702nd Meeting, November 14, 1957. The USSR representative had suggested that the UN set an "early target date" for the attainment of independence of French Togoland.

¹³⁷ UNTCOR, Seventh Special Session, 843rd Meeting, September 16, 1957, p.10.

¹³⁸ UNTCOR, Seventh Special Session, 845th Meeting, September 18, 1957.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ RG 25 Vol: 7260 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.1. From: Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 872, September 20, 1957. Priority and Confidential. INFO: LDN WASHDC PERMISNY. Davis told Ottawa that the French were not "prepared to acknowledge this publicly."

¹⁴¹ Ibid. Under reference: EXTERNAL TEL D626, September 19. Not traceable. From: External Affairs, Ottawa To: Embassy, Paris. Ottawa made a recommendation as to the "type of resolution which the French could submit to the General Assembly." Davis replied that it was 'acceptable' to the French. Apparently Ottawa suggested that Jaquet convince the Togolese Government to hold elections under UN auspices, but Pontillon, Jaquet's chef de Cabinet "stressed again that they could not take full responsibility since holding of elections was for the decision of the Togolese Government." The Telegram under reference was not traceable and we, therefore, do not know the details of Ottawa's recommendation.

¹⁴² Ibid., paragraph 2. Pontillon told Davis in confidence "that the biggest difficulty" he encountered was Mr. Robert Avajon, President of the Legislative Assembly and a native Southerner, who believed that because the Legislative Assembly did not have a solid base there, and the people were "against new elections" in the South, would not support this demand for new elections. Pontillon had set his hopes on the President of the Legislative Assembly to convince the Legislative Assembly of the necessity of such, on the basis of Ottawa's recommendation for a solution.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 4. Pontillon suggested that Ottawa's recommendation "should come out as the French compromise."

¹⁴⁴ Telegram No: 872, September 20, 1957 p.2. See also: RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. From: Embassy Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa No: 883, September 24, 1957. Confidential. Davis reported that, in a conversation with Jaquet he got the impression that there was "an obvious relationship between the development of autonomy in Togoland and the course of events in Black Africa and Algeria." p.3.

¹⁴⁵ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: CANDEL, N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2411, November 6, 1957. Priority and Confidential.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p.2.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: CANDEL, N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2443. November 8, 1957. Immediate and Confidential. Under reference: CANDEL TEL 2411, November 6.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., John W. Foster, "The UN Commission on Human Rights," Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. R.O. Matthews and C. Pratt (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), p. 97. Theo van Boven on a lengthy list of co-sponsorship of resolutions: They have "effectively turned the business of co-sponsoring into nonsense. It simply adds to the inefficiency and complexity of the proceedings." In a telephone interview with Matthews; van Boven is an ex-director of the Human Rights Commission-ECOSOC.

¹⁵¹ Telegram No: 2443, November 8 1957.

¹⁵² UNGAOR, Twelfth Session, Fourth Committee, 698th Meeting, November 11, 1957.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 70% of the expenditure went for 'officials' salaries. Professionals earned up to 300.000 Francs whereas 95 % of the population – farmers - received annual incomes of 6.000 Francs. (CFA)

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ UNGAOR, Twelfth Session, Fourth Committee, 699 Meeting, November 11, 1957, p.26.

¹⁵⁷ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. Memorandum, From: Holmes To: UN Division, November 14, 1957. Holmes mistakenly wrote paragraph "9" in this communication. Actually it was paragraph "8" which the French insisted on retaining unchanged. See: Memorandum, November 20, 1957.

¹⁵⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: CANDEL N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2515, November 15, 1957. Confidential.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: External Affairs, Ottawa To: CANDEL. N.Y. No: V-715, November 15, 1957. Confidential.

¹⁶¹ UNGAOR, Twelfth Session, Fourth Committee, 705 Meeting, November 16, 1957, p.293.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Dispatch No: 313 March 26, 1957 Deferre had expressed France's preference for "a gradual approach."

¹⁶⁴ UNGAOR, Twelfth Session, Fourth Committee, 705 Meeting, November 16, 1957, p.293.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p.294.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: CANDEL N.Y To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2534, November 18, 1957. Priority and Confidential. INFO LDN WASHDC EMBASSY PARIS.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ UNGAOR, Twelfth Session, Fourth Committee 707th Meeting, November 18, 1957. p.307 (Jaipal) Although Espinosa Prieto of Mexico was the Plebiscite Commissioner for British Togoland and had very unfavourable press with the petitioners, the Indian Delegation had praised his work at the time. He was up again as a tentative candidate for the post in French Togoland. Benjamin Cohen was the other possibility. He held the post of Under Secretary for Trusteeship.

¹⁷⁴ Telegram No: 2534, November 18, 1957.

¹⁷⁵ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: Embassy Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1071, November 18, 1957. Confidential. INFO LDN WASHDC CANDELNY NATOPARIS BAG ACCRA DELHI FM LDN. Under reference: External Telegram V 715, November 15. Wolfram, Head of UN Division, Ministry for Overseas France.

¹⁷⁶ No: 1071, November 18 1957. (emphasis added)

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., (emphasis added)

¹⁷⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: CANDEL N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2531, November 18, 1957. Priority and Confidential. INFO EMBASSYPARIS LDN WASHDC.

¹⁷⁹ Telegram No: 2531, November 18, 1957

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., Nesbitt to Holmes: "We must say it would be more helpful were the French to provide asbestos gloves to help pull their hot chestnuts out of the fire rather than to knock the tongs out of the hands of their friends."

¹⁸¹ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: External Affairs, Ottawa To: CANDEL, N.Y. No: G 268, November 20, 1957. Confidential. French officials: Wolfram and Max. (emphasis added)

¹⁸² Telegram No: 1087, November 20, 1957.

¹⁸³ Telegram No: 959, December 27, 1956.

¹⁸⁴ Telegram No: 1087, November 20, 1957.

¹⁸⁵ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. Memorandum To: Holmes, UN Division, Ottawa, November 20, 1957. Confidential. "We did not tell Miss Osborne that the French Embassy in Ottawa had been instructed by the Quai to approach us on the subject, or that the Canadian Embassy in Paris had discussed the matter with the Quai." (emphasis in the original) A telephone call from Ottawa on the morning of November 20 to the Canadian Delegation, N.Y.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p.2.

¹⁸⁷ Memorandum to Mr. Holmes, November 20, 1957 P.2 paragraph 2. The whole communication process between the Quai, Ottawa and N.Y. "seem to substantiate our Embassy's impression that the Quai is being less flexible than the French representatives in New York."

¹⁸⁸ Memorandum to Mr. Holmes, November 20, 1957.

¹⁸⁹ Telegram No: 1071, November 18, 1957.

¹⁹⁰ UNGAOR, Twelfth Session, Fourth Committee, 707th Meeting, November 18, 1957.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p.308.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p.309.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., according to Jaquet, it was this same intransigence of the opposition parties that was responsible for the demise of the Joint Council.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ UNGAOR, Twelfth Session, Fourth Committee, 707th Meeting, November 18, 1957, p.307.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From CANDEL, N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2586, November 23, 1957. Priority and Confidential. INFO EMBASSYPARIS LDN WASHDC BAG ACCRA DELHI FM LDN. Under reference: CANDEL TEL 2576, November 22. Not traceable.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p.1, paragraph 1.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 4.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p.1, paragraph 2.

²⁰⁸ Telegram No: 2534 of November 18, 1957.

²⁰⁹ Telegram No: 2586 of November 23, 1957, p.2, paragraph 2.

²¹⁰ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 3.

²¹¹ Ibid., p.2, paragraph 4.

²¹² Ibid., p.2, paragraph 4.

²¹³ Ibid., p.3, paragraph 4.

²¹⁴ Ibid., p.3, paragraph 5.

²¹⁵ Telegram No: 2586, p.3, paragraph 5. Ceylon, Ethiopia, Iran, Malaya, the Philippines and Tunisia were the 'moderate' anti-colonials.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Telegram No: 2586 p.3, paragraph 6. Canada, Denmark, Liberia and the Philippines - in favour; Yugoslavia and Guatemala - abstained.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p.4, paragraph 7.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid., p.4, paragraph 8.

²²¹ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: External Affairs, Ottawa OUTGOING MESSAGE No: V-726, November 27, 1957. Restricted. INFO EMBASSYPARIS LDN WASHDC BY BAG FM LDN TO ACCRA AND NEW DELHI. "Result of vote...is indeed gratifying...and the Embassy here has told us of their pleasure at the result and of French appreciation for your effective work towards attaining it."

²²² Telegram No: 2586, p.4, paragraph 8.

²²³ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From CANDEL N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2618, November 28, 1957. Immediate and Confidential. INFO EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS WASHDC LDN.

²²⁴ Telegram No: 171, January 14, 1957 see this Chapter: Assessment of Phase I.

²²⁵ Telegram No: 2618, November 28, 1957. "The French are anxious not to offend any Latin Americans during the debate on Algeria." This was in keeping with the Latin Americans' very anti-colonial active role in the UN during this early period, especially in the Third Committee.

²²⁶ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa To: CANDEL N.Y. Despatch No: V-730, November 28, 1957. Confidential.

²²⁷ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: CANDEL N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2639, December 2, 1957. Confidential. INFO WASHDC LDN EMBASSYPARIS.

²²⁸ Telegram No: 2639, p.2, paragraph 3.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Telegram No: 2639, p.2, paragraph 3. Vote on Syria's motion: 39 against (Canada); 30 in favour with 11 abstentions (India)

Vote on Resolution as a whole: 50 in favour; 1 against (Ghana) 29 abstentions (India). Incidentally, "Gunewardene of Ceylon voted with us despite his advisers' obvious disapproval and if an appropriate occasion arises you might like to thank the Ceylonese for their support."

²³¹ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: UN Division To: USSEA Memorandum, December 4, 1957.

²³² RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. Memorandum. From: D.C. Reece, UN Division To: J. Leger, USSEA, December 4, 1957. Confidential.

²³³ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: CANDEL N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2736 December 9, 1957. Confidential.

²³⁴ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: Jules Léger To: D.C. Reece, December 9, 1957. See also John Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, Vol. II. P.326, for the same reason why Canada did not want a seat on the Trusteeship Council.

²³⁵ Telegram No: 2329, September 10, 1957.

²³⁶ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: G.E. Crombie To: J. Holmes, Telegram No: 1074/66, December 17, 1957. Confidential.

²³⁷ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. Commonwealth Relations Office, Outward Telegram. Y. No: 6 Saving. February 14, 1958. Confidential. Emphasis added.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: Embassy Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 477, April 30, 1958. Confidential. Pignon- Political Director of Ministry of Overseas France.

²⁴³ UNTCOR, Eighth Special Session, 938th Meeting October 17, 1958. Emphasis added.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid. Burma, India, Guatemala, Italy, New Zealand and USA- co-sponsors. Trusteeship Council Resolution 1921 (S-8) October 17, 1958

²⁴⁶ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Perm. Mission N.Y. To: USSEA Ottawa No: 687 October 24, 1958, transmitted the text of this resolution to Ottawa.

²⁴⁷ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: CANDEL N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1802, November 3, 1958. Confidential.

²⁴⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: External Affairs, Ottawa, To: CANDEL N.Y. No: V-520, November 6, 1958. Confidential. Under reference No: 1816 and No: 1817 with details of draft Resolution A/ C. 4/ 382 and Resolution 1182(XII). Ottawa wanted to ensure that developments were consistent with past policy position taken on this issue.

²⁴⁹ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. European Division, Memorandum to USSEA, November 6, 1958. Confidential.

²⁵⁰ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: CANDEL N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1846 November 7, 1958. Confidential.

²⁵¹ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.1.2. From: CANDEL N.Y. To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1881, November 12, 1958. Priority and Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS WASHDC. A small negotiating group consisted of Ireland, Mexico and Tunisia.

²⁵² Telegram No:1881, November 12, 1958.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ RG 25, Vol 7146 File 5475-DW-58-C-40 pt.5.1 Thirteenth Session: Fourth Committee, Final Report Chapter VIII-2, December 1, 1958. Confidential.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

Chapter VIII: Assessment and Policy as Displayed in Votes.

Assessment

By the late 1950s, the formative phase of the UN involvement in the colonial world was over. We have shown how Canadian officials were influenced by the dynamics of the international context, in their decision making on the colonial issue from the mid-1940s. We have examined, in detail, the process to terminate the first two Trusteeship Agreements. Our concern in the first part of this chapter is to ascertain whether, and to what extent, the international situation and the decolonisation process had any instrumental role in affecting change in Canadian policy on colonial issues. What kind of challenges did the colonial world present to the West in the late 1950s? Which aspects of the international situation were perceived to be functional constraints on Canadian policy? How did the process over this period of time affect colonial planning and policy, in Ottawa's perception? Did Colonial Powers continue to see some value in the retention of colonies? Did the new African members like Ghana or Guinea make their presence felt in the rest of the colonial world or did they attempt to influence process in the UN? Most importantly, did Canadian officials feel that the process whereby Ghana and Guinea achieved their independence played a role in their behaviour and attitude toward the Colonial Powers and the colonial world, in general?

In the second part of this chapter, we will examine and explain Canada's voting position on all roll call resolutions on colonial issues from the outset to about the mid-1960s, against those of the relevant principal disputants in the UN: the UK, France, the USA; USSR and India.¹ Together, both parts of this chapter will show whether Canada's policy on colonial issues did evolve or continue to evolve in a consistent manner, despite the new and extenuating circumstances in the UN and in the colonial world.

The International Situation

In late 1957, members of the House of Commons were distressed about the 'abortive' attempts at disarmament;² they agreed that there was a "desperate and dangerous" arms race between the USA and USSR. They suggested that, in view of this situation, they should all "decide whether or not Canada's role should be entirely different from that...pursued in the past." More specifically, the concern was with the "most useful" role which Canada might undertake to relieve the "extremely dangerous" world tension.³ Moscow seemed to be following a path of peaceful penetration in Asia and Africa. The French Foreign Ministry expressed concern over the attention given Black African Delegates at the Moscow Youth Festival. According to the Canadian Ambassador, Pignon believed that it had "substantially enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union and he found this very worrying for the future."⁴ The Chinese were making incursions into Africa.

In early 1958, the DEA became apprehensive about the deteriorating American political situation which seemed to have been influenced by the discovery that the Soviets had made 'rapid' technological and scientific headway.⁵ An additional concern for officials in Ottawa, was the effect which American military aid to Pakistan was having on India's foreign exchange reserves. Because of India's need to direct funds from industrial and agricultural sphere to finance its 'mounting' defence expenditures, Ottawa was 'doubtful' that the developments undertaken in the Second Five Year Plan (1956-61) could be sustained.⁶ In view of this situation and because Nehru preferred assistance "with no strings attached," the aid offered to India by the Soviet Union was troubling to the West.⁷ This economic and financial crisis had significance for the future political configuration in Asia, because officials in Ottawa believed that the Asian countries were "watching critically and comparing India's development, under democratic methods, with that of China, under Communist control."⁸

The USA, the UK and France met in Washington to discuss the situation in Africa, in early 1959.⁹ Their main concern was the Soviet threat to the area and "special attention" was given to Guinea because of the Soviet bloc arms deliveries "which had provided Guinea with military equipment far beyond its capacity for absorption."¹⁰ The concern was possible transfer of these arms to the French Cameroons. The UK asserted that the combination of African nationalism and Communist influence in such tangible manifestations¹¹ "were forcing colonial areas too quickly along the road to independence." The Canadian Ambassador wrote to Ottawa:

At the meeting it had to be recognised, however, that the West could not possibly provide all the economic assistance the Africans wanted; inevitably there would be opportunities for Soviet action and the injection of Soviet bloc economic aid. This circumstance would have to be accepted and there was nothing which Western Powers could do to prevent it.¹²

Foreign Secretaries Selwyn Lloyd and Dulles agreed, at the end of 1958, that "it would be helpful if they could take a combined look at Africa as a whole." The result of the initiative was a UK Paper "Africa, the Next Ten Years" which became the basis of UK-USA and UK-Old Commonwealth talks at the end of 1959. The UK hoped in this process to generate "a general understanding as to the priorities which the West must envisage if it is to get the best out of Africa during the next ten years."¹³

Officials in Ottawa were animated to make suggestions for modification. However, Allen - Head of the Ghana Department at CRO "made it clear that this did not, of course, carry with it a Canadian responsibility for endorsing UK policy in Africa."¹⁴ The multi-racial situation in the settler colonies was among the concerns of the Paper. In the opinion of the High Commissioner; "if massive and intelligently directed economic assistance were combined with an accelerated timetable there is hope yet for the West."¹⁵ It is evident that the Colonial Powers were not necessarily working for a consolidated front, even at this point in time, and this situation is clearly reflected in the relationship between the colonies of the British and the French, for example.¹⁶ The UK's inner circle continued to exclude the non-white ex-colonies of the Commonwealth. Was this a tactical error? Would it not have been easier to co-opt the recalcitrant ones in a

behind the scene situation rather than in the UN? And why did the West not perceive a need to show some interest in independent Africa?

In early 1960, the Canadian High Commissioner complained about this and he warned Ottawa about the degree of the Soviet bloc interest and involvement in all of independent Africa. From Dakar, Watson also warned the Foreign Office that in French Cameroons "the insurgents, though a genuine local movement...were receiving arms and encouragement from outside: particularly (it is said) from Guinea and Ghana."¹⁷ One week later British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited Ghana. The Canadian High Commissioner wrote:

The two Prime Ministers devoted considerable time to nationalism in Africa. Mr. Macmillan tried to impress on Dr. Nkrumah that the problem in Central and East Africa is different in character from West Africa. In West Africa there is and was no minority of permanent white settlers. The very homogeneity of West Africa therefore eased the situation.¹⁸

Was Macmillan's trip an attempt to enlist support for the intractable problems of race in colonial Central and East Africa? However, there were many aspects other than race which served to make the colonial issue such a complex one.

NATO and Europe

In early 1958, officials in Ottawa agreed that some "continued involvement" of the United Kingdom in European continental strategy was "an essential element in the political and military stability" of NATO. However their assessment of the situation gave them many reasons for concern. The most important was the comprehensive British forces 'reductions' due to the UK

Treasury "pressure for financial relief."¹⁹ In addition to this state of affairs, additional reductions were 'contemplated' in the projections for 1959-60 and 1960-61. This drive for financial contraction was also partially responsible for the 'deterioration' in Anglo-German relations. The disagreement arose over the payment of the costs incurred in Germany by UK forces stationed there and apparently the Foreign Office was perturbed over this development.²⁰

The second reason for concern was the Franco-German Entente which was "viewed with suspicion" by the Dutch and Belgians. They had expressed some 'fear' that de Gaulle's plan for an independent French nuclear force and his 'resentment' of the USA predominant role in NATO, could result in a France-German 'domination' of a "New Europe." In view of this perspective, it was understandable that they would "look to Britain to act as a protector and a counter-weight" to this duo. The Department concluded with dismay that the movement towards some economic and political unification in Europe which has been fortified by a "spectacular West European recovery, has resulted in a growing shift in the balance of power within the North Atlantic Alliance away from the United States towards Western Europe."²¹ What were the perceived implications of this development for Ottawa's policy concerns? And why should this be relevant for our concerns in this study? Officials saw a "possible risk that a European third force, operating more or less independently between the United States and the Soviet Union, might develop." They expected this to "drastically weaken" the North Atlantic Alliance.²²

Situation in the French Colonial World

As of 1957, the process of decolonisation which led to the sovereign nation of Ghana has been used as a standard of measurement in terms of pace and goal for the rest of the colonial world. In late 1957, Defferre, the architect of the Loi-Cadre for the French Overseas Territories, was of the opinion that the "gradual process of evolution towards greater autonomy was preferable to the more abrupt policy "of the UK in regard to Ghana. At the time, Pignon of the Foreign Ministry thought that Ghana's independence had a "very slight" impact on the French Black African territories,²³ and Devernois of the Political Section in the Ministry of Overseas France concurred with him on this point in early 1958. At the time, Devernois agreed with the Canadian Ambassador that political events "were moving rapidly" in French Black Africa and he acknowledged that this was the incentive to seek some sort of "mutually advantageous" new relationship with the political leaders there.

However, Devernois conceded that any progress in that area was contingent upon whether the French Parliament "could be enjoined to act quickly and imaginatively enough to take into account the practical implications of growing African political consciousness."²⁴ It is important to point out here that this political consciousness was of an altogether different genre than that of Western civilisation. This fact is instrumental in helping us to understand the dynamics of the development in French Black Africa during this period and the narrow range of alternatives which were available to officials in Ottawa.

The Canadian Ambassador in Paris wrote in mid-1958: "The speed with which political events are moving in French Black Africa is admittedly disquieting to many of the more responsible African political leaders who seem unable to hold in check the competitive tendency to outbid the last accepted stand to prove oneself anti-colonialist." As a matter of fact, R.D.A. leader M. Houphouët-Boigny told him that "he hoped French Black Africa would be able to skip over the step of national independence and pass directly to that of interdependence, freely consented."²⁵ What were the mitigating circumstances which influenced African political leaders to take such a position? A Senator from the P.R.A. elite also "admitted privately" that the French African territories "were just not ready for independence." He was 'dismayed' by the way the conference at Cotonou had been swayed by the "young hot heads" who were obviously carried away by "the myth of independence...undoubtedly influenced by the example of Ghana and did not give nearly enough thought to economic and social factors."²⁶

Are we to understand that some French African political leaders had permitted a cost-benefit analysis to dampen their political spirit? The Canadian Ambassador observed: "Given the scarcity of political and administrative knowledge in the African territories and the low stage of economic development, most objective observers would agree that a further period of tutelage and of large-scale economic assistance is desirable if chaos is to be avoided in the area." But African political leaders were not "objective observers," they were supposed to be political activists. Surely they must have understood that these

circumstances were the end product, if not the result, of a past period of tutelage. On what sort of logic was the Ambassador's conclusion based? Was a further period of tutelage the right solution in such a situation? And would France be willing to continue in this relationship?

The Ambassador acknowledged that: "The links carry distinct economic advantage for France in the form of guaranteed access to important raw materials and guaranteed, and protected, outlets for French manufacturers. Nevertheless, they also involve a substantial budgetary charge."²⁷ Under these circumstances, it is evident that de Gaulle's "all or nothing" deal in regard to his new Constitution which was put to the people on September 28, 1958, was more or less in keeping with the temper of the times. Sekou Touré, leader of the left wing of the R.D.A. and the dominant political figure in French Guinea, took exception to this offer and opted out for immediate and complete independence. He was obviously not convinced that it was in the best interest of Guinea to continue in what appeared to be a further period of tutelage, despite the fact that de Gaulle was explicit in his intent to terminate all assistance to any territory which voted 'no' in the referendum.²⁸

Situation in French Territories

Article 78 of the French Constitution gave a large measure of autonomy possible and each territory "could consider membership in the Community as a step toward a comparatively early independence."²⁹ In early

1959, the French Ambassador to Ghana confided in Williams, the Canadian Ambassador, that Paris expected "a repetition of the difficulties" which they had experienced with Guinea in their relationship with the other African territories.³⁰ The new Community was inaugurated in February. The Canadian Ambassador felt that this occasion was of "historical significance."³¹ It is obvious that a conflict situation was inherent in the concept of Community. The UK Consul General was informed that the 'difficulties' were not over independence but "the nature of the 'contracts' to be worked out for the Federation of Mali. Apparently de Gaulle "did not trust some of the Mali Leaders" and as a consequence, he refused to grant independence before the contracts were negotiated. According to the French principal adviser to the High Commissioner-General, the difficulties were "almost entirely over defence and degree of freedom in foreign affairs."³² In principle, de Gaulle was insisting on a tight relationship. It is believed that he was exploring ways in which he could consolidate the Community.³³

By late 1959, De Gaulle described the Community as an organisation which provided "effective independence and guaranteed co-operation" for its members. Leopold Senghor, the President of the Federal Assembly of Mali referred to the arrangement as "constitutional independence" in a "contractual Community." What did these terminologies actually mean? Africans wanted an independent status which would qualify them for membership in the UN; de Gaulle preferred to call it "international sovereignty." According to the Canadian Ambassador, de Gaulle explained this to be "a desire, attitude or intention rather than a state of affairs for, in the modern world, no country can really be said to be

totally dependent." In de Gaulle's opinion, international sovereignty "carries with it important significance, that of complete responsibility for one's own actions, internal and external."³⁴ He was "ready and willing" to give aid to Mali. However, this was consistent with his initial position and the Canadian Ambassador pointed out the "interesting contrast" in de Gaulle's attitude to Mali and that toward Guinea in late 1958. As a matter of fact, the Ambassador recognised that taken together:

The experience of Guinea and recent and prospective developments in non-French Black Africa may have been educative if only to the extent that they indicated that the evolutionary process in that continent demands a speedier tempo than he had evidently regarded as appropriate and feasible eighteen months ago.³⁵

An additional factor was the 'assurance' from the Federation leaders that they saw their future in "a great Franco-African Ensemble."

On the other hand, the leaders of the Entente were proponents of "a tight knit Community closely bound to France." These parallel developments in the French colonial world would have significant implications for France's future status. Whereas Guinea's departure did not have appeal to the African leaders, the path taken by the Federation of Mali could exemplify the future direction for the leaders of the Entente. The Ambassador suggested that if those African leaders realise that the closer arrangement with France do not bring them "serious economic and financial advantage...local pressure will certainly be on the leaders" to change their course. In his estimation France was not in a financial position to follow through on massive aid.³⁶ The Canadian High Commissioner to London reported to Ottawa that de Gaulle's speech in Dakar

announcing "the acceptance of Mali's existence as an independent state" and his 'promise' to Senghor to sponsor Mali at the next UN Session meant that "enough powers would be transferred to ensure the Assembly's acceptance."³⁷ It is apparent that this is not necessarily what de Gaulle had anticipated in his decision to have a referendum in late 1958. The Community had evolved to the point of no return with his reluctant agreement on Mali's future.

Nevertheless, Watson wrote on December 17, 1959, that "the popular acclaim [for de Gaulle in Dakar] showed that the public once promised independence is anxious to remain closely associated with France."³⁸ Four days later, he informed the Foreign Office that the French High Commission General for the territories of former French West Africa "will be liquidated" by the end of the year. In Watson's opinion, this act "symbolizes the formal end of the Federation." He saw the next step as "a general move towards independence." High Commissioner General Messmer expected all the Republics to "move fairly rapidly in the wake of Mali towards independence."³⁹ This situation naturally presented Houphouet-Boigny with a difficult problem of credibility. According to Watson, he "had said so often and so firmly how undesirable independence was, and how much he preferred membership of a larger French Union." In view of this, Watson suspected "that it might be difficult for him to eat all his words in time," for admission to the UN together with Mali and Madagascar. At the time, Watson felt that the future of the Entente Republics was 'problematic' and that of the four Equatorial states, was also 'uncertain'.

In early 1959, the American Ambassador to Paris had made it clear in a report that an enormous task lay ahead in French Black Africa. There was a "relative poverty" of natural resources but the most daunting difficulty was seen to be in "the lack" of educational facilities:

In some areas there were no schooling facilities for 90% of the native population and even in the most developed areas, 30 to 40% of the population went without schooling, despite a valiant if belated French effort to overcome the deficiency. The result of past failings in this field was a great scarcity of individuals with sufficient educational background to assume the responsibilities inherent in local autonomy, whether at the political or at the administrative level. This situation was to result in a 'most pressing need...for straight budgetary assistance from France to pay for the day-to-day costs of administration in the territories, plus such social investment and economic infra-structure as schools, roads and railways.'⁴⁰

In other words, these territories were by no means 'ready' for independence and under these circumstances it is obvious that the Canadian Ambassador's recognition in 1958, that a further period of tutelage was 'desirable', would continue to have some force in the formulation of Canada's policy.⁴¹

In late 1959, an officer from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, made a tour of the French Community. He reported that "the prospects" for internal stability in the French Cameroons were "obviously not good."⁴² This was due to apparent support from Guinea and Communist manipulation of tribal differences.⁴³ Moreover, he estimated that "a substantial effort will be required...the road will be long and difficult" towards economic development.⁴⁴ The officer's visit also revealed that French Togo, due to become independent in late 1960, was "one of the least capable of eventually sustaining independence....After independence, Togo will require substantial external

financial assistance to finance its investment programme."⁴⁵ In his opinion, Togo will 'undoubtedly' seek UN aid "to a greater extent than many other African states will for some time" and he even cautioned officials that Olympio "is counting on the West including Canada to assist if possible in the difficult days ahead."⁴⁶

By early 1960, the Foreign Office was informed that, as a result of "the atmosphere of mutual confidence" pervading de Gaulle's talks with the Entente Leaders in Paris, "a change of climate" in the French-African relationship was detected.⁴⁷ This information must have been comforting to officials in Ottawa especially in view of the speech by Houphouet-Boigny at the closing meeting of the Entente Leaders two weeks later. He announced that:

For the first time, Africa is open to the Communist world. The Russians are in Guinea and, with them the Chinese....The presence of the Chinese on our flanks causes us serious anxiety, for it is a matter of survival for us....Paris must recognise that there is no more time to loose: cheaper goods must be provided for Africa in order to raise the standard of living. Africa must be an extension of Europe and not of Asia.⁴⁸

In September 1960, seventeen new African nations achieved independence and admission to the UN; fourteen were from the French Empire.⁴⁹ This is an indication of how fast the process of decolonisation had swept through French Black Africa.

Situation in British Africa

On a study tour in the summer of 1958, McInnes of the Department of External Affairs was confronted with African nationalism 'throughout' British East Africa, the Federation and the Union of South Africa. He wrote:

It is beyond doubt one of the greatest political movements of our time. It seemed to us irresistible, the British being caught in the familiar dilemma that if they concede any form of representative institutions, the overwhelming preponderance of African numbers, even if under-represented, will inevitably involve the transfer of effective power to Africans.⁵⁰

Why should the grant of representative institutions to Africans have been a dilemma for the British? What was the cause and the premise of such a position? It is obvious that this dilemma had relevance only for white-settler colonies in Africa. The privileged position of the white minority settlers was an important factor in British policy in these colonies.

Nkrumah of Ghana had advised Tom M'Boya, the leader of the Nairobi Peoples Union to organise a political base in order to increase his bargaining power with the British. M'Boya told McInnes: "We are under-represented in terms of our population. All we seek is a more equitable representation in a society in which Europeans must not expect to retain a position of privilege solely because of their skins." In his report, McInnes confessed that in spite of M'Boya's democratic pursuit, "it struck us as one of the many anomalies of the British position that the Chief of Police in Kenya should be using agents provocateurs in M'Boya's own organisation to frustrate his efforts to form an effective political party...while at the same time the Colonial Office is committed to the encouragement of a responsible political sense among Africans...." This contradictory situation is best explained in the British decision to develop Kenya as a "forward strategic base to protect its interests" in the Persian Gulf and Aden. The African leaders believed that the British could use this military reinforcement to "thwart legitimate African nationalist aspirations."⁵¹

McInnes was concerned that under the circumstances in Kenya, the "perfectly straight forward African nationalist" movement epitomised in M'Boya's work "could quite easily" be exploited by the Soviets. He felt that in the power and privileges of the white race in Kenya was exemplified by "an impressive standard of material wealth, in grotesque contrast to the surrounding poverty" of the native African.⁵² In addition to these "harsh realities," McInnes wrote: "What we saw was essentially a police state." In spite of this situation, he argued that because the British were attempting to find a compromise between the disputants and were undertaking "practical measures" to develop the country and educate the Africans, Kenya should be "left undisturbed by external events." However, he saw a threat to this process because M'Boya was "too much in a hurry," his aim to independence was "within five years or so."⁵³ McInnes knew that the settlers had built their wealth and lifestyle on an "unlimited low paid African labour" and he realised that the process of accommodation would be a difficult one. Moreover, he felt that "even working at top speed," no adequate local administrative apparatus of Black Africans could be obtained "for at least fifteen years," in Kenya.

Although the Trust Territory of Tanganyika had no comparative racial problems, McInnes reported that "the most immediate need is basic education and technical training and the erection of an administrative machine staffed by Africans."⁵⁴ Uganda had no European settlement. McInnes understood that British policy was "based on an undertaking to grant eventual independence." He felt, however, that the 'militant' African nationalism from 'throughout' the white

settler colonial areas could influence the pace of developments in Uganda. He recommended that "the outside world" should not interfere in this process. However, Uganda was in great need of development funds. In other words, it would be in Canada's interest to support British policy in order to contain the situation.

McInnes wrote of "the formidable problem of the multi-racial society" in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.⁵⁵ In his opinion, the decision to undertake a journey for 'partnership' and to 'reject' apartheid was "a response to world public opinion."⁵⁶ He had no illusions about the success of this arrangement because he recognised that there was still "a fairly strong social barrier against African advancement." Racial discrimination was in full force and McInnes realised that it still had deep roots in this part of Africa. The effect of world opinion was perceived to be superficial because "very low wages" and welfare schemes for the Black Africans were "justified on the basis that 'the African just isn't worth any more'." Although Federation Prime Minister Roy Welensky understood that economic inequalities were responsible for the "color bar" and even though he expressed the need to alter the situation, McInnes realised that if the settlers continued to believe that the Africans were 'incapable' of 'acquiring' European skills, then Welensky's policy to "attack economic inequalities...gradually" could not be taken seriously.

Nigeria was described as "a great cumbersome aggregation of differing tribes and regions." This situation was the cause of the 'complexities' of its federal problems which had to be addressed because of "the non-party

demand" for independence by April 2, 1960.⁵⁷ Governor General Sir James Robertson told McInnes "in confidence that he was recommending strongly to the Colonial Office that it accede" to this demand because Nigerian political leaders were clearly prepared to unite in a "natural spirit" in order to pursue the goal of independence. A Constitutional Conference was planned for the end of September 1958, and Robertson expected that a "definite date" for independence would be set. McInnes wrote: "I should be surprised if Sir James Robertson's recommendations were not accepted and if independence did not come on or about April 2, 1960."⁵⁸

Any considerations of independence for Nigeria necessarily involved the future of the Trust Territory of British Cameroons which was administered "as an integral part" of Nigeria. In this sense, the UN process to terminate the first Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland could be utilised as a precedent for the British Cameroons. Was this the case for officials in Ottawa? Did members actively attempt to avoid the pitfalls which they had encountered in the first process? What were British goals in this process and how did the operational context affect the realisation of these goals? A brief analysis of the first phase of the UN process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement over British Cameroons is helpful in our assessment of Canada's policy and perception of how the decolonisation process ought to proceed.

Control Case Study: The Termination of the Trust Territories of British and French Cameroons

The Fourth Committee started the General Debate on the future of the British and French Cameroons around mid-November 1958. At this time, the Delegation reported that the UK announced the pending independence of Nigeria (October 1, 1960) which made UN action 'imperative' with regard to British Cameroons. The UK felt that, due to the administrative arrangements, the future of the Trust Territory was "necessarily intimately concerned with Nigeria's independence."⁵⁹ The Delegation reminded Ottawa that the "unforeseen and early" independence of the French Cameroons "may be a complicating factor" in the British plans.⁶⁰ According to the Delegation, the UK was "particularly concerned" that both sections of the territory should freely decide their future "in complete understanding of the consequences" of the choices available. To this end, the UK envisaged a "plebiscite under UN supervision."

French effort to by-pass the UN authority in Togoland was an obvious lesson for the British or so it seemed at the time. The questions in the plebiscite were simple and straightforward.⁶¹ Unlike the case in British Togoland, the UK evidently found the alternative of continuing the Trusteeship Agreement for a part of the territory, in order to facilitate a later unification of the British Southern Cameroons with French Cameroons, a perfectly normal and acceptable one. Was the difficult process in British Togoland responsible for this voluntary and

generous attitude of the British towards Cameroons? What were the motives behind this strategy? Were Canadian officials briefed on this?

According to the Delegation, a pending election in January, 1959, envisaged "much greater autonomy" for Southern Cameroons and could result in victory for the opposition or 'secession' party. Under these circumstances, this part of the Trust Territory could legitimately request reunification with the French Cameroons. Therefore, it was necessary to keep the North and the South as two separate entities. Nigeria was scheduled to gain independence in less than twelve months: this limited the amount of time available to the Trust Territory to make a decision on its future. The British were repeating the pressure tactic which was rather successful in the process over Togoland and the Delegation observed that the timetable "has been considered in detail" by the British.

The terms of reference for the Visiting Mission to both British and French Cameroons in November, 1958, specified that the Mission "advise on the method of consultation of the inhabitants...." However, the Trusteeship Council could not possibly consider the Report of the Visiting Mission before February, 1959. Due process required a Trusteeship Council Report to the General Assembly and the British 'hoped' that the Visiting Mission would "confirm the desirability of a plebiscite." This would enable the General Assembly to authorise the consultation which the British hoped that they could organise 'rapidly' and carry through by December, 1959.

Since the termination or modification of the Trusteeship Agreement had to be undertaken before the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, to

meet the British timetable for Nigeria, the UK 'reluctantly' agreed that there might be a 'need' for a Special Session. Shortly thereafter, Ahidjo, Prime Minister of the French Cameroons recommended "simultaneous consultations" of both British and French Cameroons which would pave the way for them to "become united" on January 1, 1960. This presented a problem for officials in Ottawa. First of all, under these new circumstances, the UK would refuse to support any calls for a Special Session, because the Northern Cameroons could possibly be encouraged in such a situation to opt out of integration with Nigeria and join Southern Cameroons for independence with French Cameroons.

Secondly, the UK was made to understand in early September that the French would oppose a joint plebiscite.⁶² Faced with this new situation, the Delegation wrote: "the UK feel strongly that it would be unjust and unfair to the people under their tutelage to accelerate in any way these successive steps and will vigorously resist any such move."⁶³ Were the British no longer "particularly concerned" about the inhabitants being able to freely decide their future? Canadian officials knew that this was just a public position, but in view of the French change of plans and the new British argument against simultaneous consultations, how credible was the UK professed concern about a democratic process, and what alternatives did the Canadian Delegation have?

In reply to the "repeated allegations regarding the bias" of the Governments in both French and British Cameroons and the possible request by some members for UN supervised simultaneous elections, the British intimated that they would "oppose this adamantly." The UK argued that "it is invidious to

ask a duly constituted Government to hold elections under outside [UN] supervision when in fact that Government and country are supposed to have reached an advanced stage in their political maturity which enables them to undertake the complete control of their affairs, domestic and foreign, i.e. self-government or independence." Ahidjo told the Canadian Delegation that he would not consider new separate elections in French Cameroons, "even as a remote possibility." His goal was to aim for simultaneous elections. The petitioners to the UN reported that a great proportion of the population of French Cameroons had retreated to the woods and would not participate in elections without UN supervision.

Under these circumstances, the Delegation expected "an acrimonious debate" and the obvious kinds of draft resolutions in the Committee. A French 'Memo' requested the General Assembly to instruct the Trusteeship Council to undertake "all appropriate steps" to enable the General Assembly to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement "simultaneously with the attainment of independence" by the Cameroons on January 1, 1960.⁶⁴ It is evident that the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement for British and for French Togoland were perceived to have no relevance for the plans of the British and French in the Cameroons. Both Administering Authorities were attempting to terminate these Trusteeship Agreements in keeping with their own needs and in accordance with their own plans. How did this influence Canada's policy?⁶⁵

The Canadian Delegation made a brief statement in the Committee "approving in general the program set out by the British." The French position

was in obvious conflict with British aims and the Canadian Delegation had chosen to support the British position.⁶⁶ Because France "was unable to accept a consolidated text," two draft resolutions were tabled instead of the original one draft.⁶⁷ These drafts were a reflection of the antagonistic positions of the UK and France. The Delegation expected the UK, the USA and France to oppose the idea of a Special Session suggested in the first draft, for different reasons.⁶⁸ The Delegation reported to Ottawa: "We propose to oppose the draft resolution calling for a Special Session if the UK and French, after consulting their governments, continue in their negative view...." Since a vote on the other draft resolution depended on the outcome of the first draft, the Delegation proposed "to ascertain the views of the various groups" before reporting further.⁶⁹ At the end of December, Thorpe of New Zealand briefed the Canadian Delegation privately on the 'findings' of the Visiting Mission shortly after its return to New York.⁷⁰

The Visiting Mission was able to confirm the "democratic character" of the Government in French Cameroon, its desire for independence and unification with British Cameroons. Thorpe said that the Visiting Mission had realised that the accounts of suppression and terrorism in French Cameroons "seem to have been enormously exaggerated by the Petitioners" at the previous session. The Visiting Mission also confirmed that there was "no evidence" of a desire on the part of Northern Cameroons to alter its status as an integral part of Nigeria and, therefore, would recommend that there was no need for a plebiscite there. The Visiting Mission found the situation in Southern Cameroons "more complicated" because of the pending elections in January. Thorpe 'feared' that an opposition

victory would be "considered as a victory for 'unification.' " His fear was based on the realisation that "only a very small but vocal minority" in Southern Cameroons wanted unification. In view of this, the Visiting Mission decided that it was in "the best interest" of the territory to remain integrated with Nigeria.⁷¹

According to the Canadian Delegation, the Visiting Mission was aware of its pro-colonial 'findings' and Jaipal of India was concerned that he could "convince his Delegation to go along with him." The UK was satisfied that the Visiting Mission did "bear out the reasonableness of the original UK 'slow' timetable for the British Cameroons." However, due to his active part in the compromise effort to obtain a Resumed Session of the Assembly, Andrew Cohen was "somewhat at a loss as to what attitude to advise the Colonial Office to take with regard to the timing of a plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons." On the other hand, the Delegation observed: "The French of course could not care less and will feel fully vindicated by the Mission's conclusions." The Delegation believed that, in view of the above, the Resumed Session in February "will be more thorny" than they had 'originally' anticipated.

UN Members were convinced of the need to have plebiscites in both British and French Cameroons and that unification "should be an issue." This was the operational context in which the Delegation perceived that Canada "may therefore have a useful role to play in helping to resuscitate the middle group of countries which seemed to die stillborn at the 13th session but which should be able to counterbalance in some degree the more emotional anti-colonial powers at the Resumed Session." The goal pursued in this proposed role for the

Canadian Delegation was to "make sure" that the General Assembly does not adopt resolutions which would "call for unnecessary consultations under UN supervision before the Trusteeship Agreements for the Cameroons are abrogated."⁷² In other words, the Delegation did not perceive a need to consult the inhabitants of the Trust Territories as to their future status.

At the end of January, 1959, the UN Division in Ottawa consulted the Minister on the position the Delegation should take in the UN. He was made aware of the "strong views on the question of what action the Assembly should appropriately take...." The Division wrote:

As far as Canada is concerned the question of the future of the Cameroons does not, of course, concern us directly but it will be necessary for us to take one position or another on the question and we may be asked, as we have in the past, to assist in working towards generally acceptable conditions. We will wish to ascertain the reactions of the French or United Kingdom Governments to whatever recommendations are made by the Trusteeship Council.⁷³

On February 9, 1959, the Delegation warned Ottawa of a potential for open conflict in the Trusteeship Council. India and the UK were in favour of a simple "procedural motion" on the discussions of the two Visiting Mission Reports in the Trusteeship Council. The "general feeling" in the Trusteeship Council was to leave any action to the General Assembly, and Kosciuszko-Morizet of France was expected to "press for a more substantive resolution" in the Trusteeship Council.⁷⁴ The French position was influenced by the fact that the Visiting Mission had admirably contained not only the suppression of the opposition in French Togoland but also the reality that existing Legislative Assembly was not a 'democratic' one.⁷⁵

The Delegation was of the opinion that, although the Communist bloc "will insist" on a plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons and the anti-colonials believed that a plebiscite should be a condition of abrogation of a Trusteeship Agreement, it was 'likely' that the Visiting Mission Report would be accepted. In mid-February, the UN Division sought the approval of the Minister for the Instructions to the Delegation. Ottawa reminded the Delegation that the Visiting Mission "has been given to understand that the Government is prepared to hold by-elections in Sanaga-Maritime and to invoke broad amnesty measures which should count considerably in its favour." By accommodating the opposition faction as part of the process, the UN Division believed that the UN would accept the recommendations of the Visiting Mission on French Cameroons and advised that: "since this course of action is acceptable to both the Administering Authority, France and to the Government of the French Cameroons, the Canadian Delegation may support it and support any resolution embodying it...."⁷⁶

It is evident that, although officials in Ottawa were visibly constrained by the starting position of the UK and France and, necessarily, the UN context, they continued to prefer a democratic solution to the problems in British Cameroons. They wrote:

The Delegation will wish to keep in mind the importance of ensuring that the people of the territory has ample opportunity to consider the advantages or disadvantages of the alternatives of integration with Nigeria and unification with the French Cameroons. It is not possible to give any specific guidance on the position Canada may wish to take on the question. The Delegation will wish to keep the Department informed of developments and in their light, of the most desirable course of action which might be recommended by the Assembly.

Nevertheless, the specifics of the Policy Guidance to the Delegation pointed to an unequivocal support of the initial positions of France and the UK.⁷⁷ On February 18, Ottawa was informed by the UK High Commissioner that the Secessionist Party, Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) had won the elections in Southern Cameroons with more than 50% of the votes cast. The KNDP was advocating secession from the Federation of Nigeria and a continuation of a 'modified' form of the Trusteeship Agreement pending exploration of the "possibilities of reunification with any section of British and French Cameroons."⁷⁸

On February 19, Ottawa was notified by the UK High Commissioner that the Trusteeship Council had accepted the Visiting Mission recommendation that the Trusteeship Agreement for French Cameroons be terminated on independence, January 1, 1960. Since the UK Mission in New York saw no possibility of a 2/3 majority for "fresh elections" before independence, the UK Delegation was instructed to support the move "unless new factors arise."⁷⁹ One week later, Mc Cordick of the UN Division informed the Under Secretary that the Canadian Delegation was asked to co-sponsor the draft resolution, on French Cameroons, which was not made public in the Fourth Committee. In his opinion, two conditions had to be fulfilled before Canadian co-sponsorship was considered.

First, there had to be a "wide group" of co-sponsors. Secondly, it was imperative that no 'new' members of the Commonwealth be among the co-sponsors of an Afro-Asian resolution 'demanding' new elections for French

Cameroons before the abrogation of the Trusteeship Agreement. Mc Cordick wanted to avoid any Canadian action that might contribute to 'conflict' between the new and old members of the Commonwealth. If the above conditions were obtained he saw "no objection" to Canada co-sponsoring. He wrote: "the terms of the draft are in full accords with what we believe the decision of the Assembly should be with respect to the abrogation of the Trusteeship Agreement for French Cameroons."⁸⁰ The next day, the Delegation was informed of the terms of Canadian co-sponsorship. Ottawa enquired as to the possibility of India joining them on this, and reiterated the necessity of withholding Canada's support if 'other' members of the Commonwealth were co-sponsors of another draft resolution containing "opposing views."⁸¹

On February 27, the Delegation reported on a meeting called by New Zealand and USA, the night before, with the aim of making the draft resolution "more generally acceptable." The tactic was to make cosmetic changes without altering the operative part, that is, the recommendation to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement on January 1, 1960.⁸² Jacquinot also announced that, on independence, France would sponsor the admission of the Cameroons to the UN. Ahidjo had undertaken 'private' consultations with African Delegations and was thought to be "making good progress." The USA was working on Liberia to co-sponsor; Burma, Ceylon and India indicated support of the draft resolution. The Delegation believed that "India's determination not to back down" from its endorsement of the Visiting Mission Report and Ahidjo's 'persuasiveness' were

responsible for a diminishing opposition to termination of the Trusteeship Agreement in French Cameroons, without prior elections.⁸³

The UK Delegation called a meeting of Old Commonwealth and Western European Delegations to brief them on the UK position and plans for British Cameroons. Cohen did not want the UN to turn its attention to this Trust Territory in view of the new situation after the elections in Southern Cameroons. The Canadian Delegation wrote: "It is our impression that our British friends find some interest in seeing this situation [French Cameroons] prolonged at least for a few more days. This may also be a further reason why no draft resolution on either of the British Cameroons has yet been proposed for private discussion among Commonwealth members." However, one week later, the UK submitted its own draft resolution which accepted the anti-colonial demand for a plebiscite in both the British Northern and Southern Cameroons. This was exactly what the British wanted to accomplish in the UN after the failure of the first elections. Since this automatically eliminated "all possible points of friction," the Canadian Delegation decided to agree to consider co-sponsorship. The Delegation explained to Ottawa: "We believed that we were able to be so forthcoming in view of the uncontentious nature of the resolution and our general instructions to assist the UK if we could."⁸⁴

It is evident that the officials in Ottawa were not prepared to take an active role in an open process of accommodation in the UN. On March 9, the General Debate was concluded in the Fourth Committee and the Communist bloc, the Africans and some Arabs were "still pressing" for elections to be held

before January 1, 1960.⁸⁵ The Canadian Representative in Accra suggested that "it was to Ghana's advantage to have a pre-independence election if there is a chance that the UPC might form the Government or elect sufficient members to give them a spring board for future success."⁸⁶ The Resumed Session ended on March 16 and the colonials agreed that there was no longer international support for re-opening the French Cameroons question in the UN. The USA Central Intelligence Agency believed that this was the reason why the UPC, "the extreme nationalist movement," turned to terrorism and labour disturbances "to discredit the moderate Government by disrupting the territory's economy in order to show the world that the pro-French Government is incompetent and that new elections are needed before independence."⁸⁷

This is the final report of the UN Division on the first phase of the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreements over the British and French Cameroons:

Canada had no direct interests of its own at stake in the debates, beyond the broad aims shared by most other Western states....It was our hope that these decisions would be arrived at without jeopardising some of the basic political and other Western interests in Central Africa, and while maintaining the Western unity of policy and ensuring that ours, and our Allies', relations with the new members of the Commonwealth and also the other Afro-Asian countries would not be adversely affected as a result of the Assembly's debates and decisions....For these reasons, our Delegation, while avoiding to take the lead in the proceedings, maintained regular and close contacts with the other Commonwealth and NATO Delegations, as well as with several other Asian Delegations....⁸⁸

The UN Division reported that the Delegation did comply with its final instructions on both Trust Territories and was helpful in the British case.⁸⁹

On the other hand, the Division explained to the Department that "while supporting" the main draft on the French Cameroons, the Delegation,

refrained from co-sponsoring this text even when it became apparent that it was widely supported, since another member of the Commonwealth (Ghana) was among the co-sponsors of another draft resolution containing opposing views. Ceylon, India, Malaya and New Zealand - all countries presumably (!) having closer affinities with France – did not share these qualms, as they agreed, for their part, to co-sponsor the main resolution on the French Cameroons.⁹⁰

As we have seen in the British Togoland case study, Ghana had 'colonial' aspirations in the Trust Territory.⁹¹ This was admirably accommodated because of the Administrative Union. At the time the Togoland Congress had pleaded with the UN to first "clearly separate" the Trust Territory of British Togoland from the Gold Coast. The Togoland Congress had also suggest that the Trust Territory should be given a separate legislative body before the plebiscite was held. The USA Delegate had taken the colonial position that such a step was "unnecessary and would delay the holding of the plebiscite." He had found such a procedure "hardly feasible in the absence of wide-spread demand for that step." As we have shown in the case study on British Togoland, the Colonial Powers chose to ignore the wishes of the inhabitants, of this Trust Territory, as to their future status. The Trust Territory of British Cameroons was faced with a similar arrangement. However additional difficulties in finding a solution were due to the administrative division of this Trust Territory into northern and southern units.⁹² The documents are less explicit about Nigeria's 'colonial' intentions as they were about such intentions of the Gold Coast.

The administrative arrangement for the British Cameroons effectively led to a functional two-tier system which had characteristics akin to a white settler colony administration. Plimsoll of the Australian Delegation wrote to his Minister of Foreign affairs:

On the whole I got the impression that the South Cameroons is far from being the most successful example of British colonial policy. Lack of adequate roads is noteworthy. The territory has probably suffered from being administrated as part of Nigeria, which has worked to its disadvantage in the allocation of finance and in the training of the inhabitants for administration. Most of the senior positions in the public service are filled by Nigerians. After visiting the Northern and Southern Cameroons, I can understand better some of the feeling in the United nations against Administrative Unions.⁹³

This definition of the situation was an instrumental factor in Australia's preference in the available choices. Plimsoll argued that the people in Southern Cameroons "are not ready for self-government" and, therefore, "what happens there is of importance to more than its neighbours" in view of the international situation. Canada had similar concerns.

In Plimsoll's opinion, French Cameroons "is unsettled and could even come under Communist control," whereas Nigeria showed "promise of developing into a fairly stable and responsible state." He, therefore, recommended: "In the wider international context, it would be best if the people of Southern Cameroons choose freely to join themselves to Nigeria."⁹⁴ It is obvious that the French solution⁹⁵ for its part of the Trust Territory and the possibility of Communist intervention were the basis from which the Western powers would decide on the future of the British sections. How democratic was this decision-making process in the West? The continuing 'anarchy' and the wave

of terrorism in French Cameroons exemplified the mistakes that were made in terminating UN supervision of the Trust Territory, without the consent of all of its inhabitants.⁹⁶

Could this have been avoided if elections were held before independence with a guarantee of the full participation of the outlawed opposition parties?⁹⁷ And was the situation of unrest after independence not an invitation to the Communists?⁹⁸ Surely, if the Communist factor was such an important one in policy formulation, should the West not have expended more effort in setting up a democratic Government in French Cameroons? On the other hand, both the UK and the French were guided by the same principles in terminating the Trusteeship Agreements over the Togolands and they did not have to face such catastrophic consequences. As we have shown in chapter III, the international operational context was very different and the constraints were limited in the mid-1950s. In late 1961, the Canadian Ambassador was told that Olympio was 'irritated' by the fact that the UN had decided to hold separate plebiscites in Northern and Southern Cameroons.⁹⁹ We know that this was in accordance with a specific UK plan.

It is questionable whether the UN would have been successful in authorising the separate plebiscites without the acquiescence of the UK. What may have appeared to be a UK wish for a democratic process was, in reality, a procedure which would enable Northern Cameroons to continue with the Northern Region of Nigeria.¹⁰⁰ In face of the possible rejection by Southern Cameroons of continuing administration under Nigeria, this was the only

alternative method.¹⁰¹ The fact that the British were able to successfully pursue a second plebiscite in Northern Cameroons, after the first plebiscite returned a negative vote for a continuation of the administrative arrangement, is evidence of the extent to which the Colonial Powers were able to obtain their goals with the aid of shifting coalitions in the UN.

The Desk Officer in Paris told the Canadian Ambassador that Olympio continued to maintain the conviction that, because there was a single plebiscite and not separate ones in the Trust Territories of British and French Togoland and in the colony of Ghana, the Ewes "were forced into Ghana against their expressed desire."¹⁰² Similarly, in the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreements over the second British and French Trust Territories, the French outlawed the opposition parties and was thus able to take the Trust Territory to independence under the Government of its preference. This was in spite of international criticism of the adamant refusal by France to have elections in the Trust Territory before granting independence.

As we have shown in the case studies, the British and the French were both able to successfully achieve their aims in the UN process to terminate the first two Trusteeship Agreements. The purpose of this control case study on the first phase of the process to terminate the Trusteeship Agreements of the British and French Cameroons is to reinforce our contention that, despite an antagonistic operational context of Communist and extremist anti-colonial opposition in the UN to the French and British plans, the Administering Authorities were still able to pursue their perceived interests. Canadian officials

had believed that, as of 1955, they were faced with a narrow range of options on the colonial issue because of the preponderance of the Afro-Asian and the Soviet bloc in UN business.

However, it is obvious that Ottawa's preferences were perceived to be within this range of available options which resulted from a consolidated colonial 'front' and successful behind the scenes negotiations with 'moderate' members. We have shown throughout this study, how much effort was expended in policy formulation; the perceived need by officials in Ottawa to have a detailed description and assessment of the varied interests in the UN operational contexts and those of the colonial and Western powers. Decisions were taken with these conflicting pressures in mind. It is instructive to note that, in view of the results, the endless reassessments of Canadian policy had contributed to a position which was indeed helpful in attaining Western goals in the UN decolonisation of empires.

The UN Context and Process

The assessment of the Canadian Delegation of this phase over the second set of Trust Territories concluded that the "most important phenomenon" during the Resumed Thirteenth Session was the major break between the Africans and Asians over what the Delegation described as 'essentially' a colonial question. This 'split' was due to several factors; the most apparent was the extremist behaviour of Guinea and Ghana. The Delegation felt that although

Ghana was in "the forefront of the battle," its speeches were not so frequent and were "more moderate"¹⁰³ than those of the Guinean Delegation whose "refusal to accept any form of compromise or accommodation antagonised the Asians."¹⁰⁴

Why were the Asians so willing to work for a compromise?

The Delegation suggested that these Delegations were "perhaps somewhat sobered by the difficulties" of development and internal instability after achieving independence whereas the Africans were "still flushed with the excitement of their battle for freedom." In addition, the Delegation recognised that the Asian countries were beginning to realise "the dangers of Communism and subversion," especially from the Chinese, in Asia. An equally important, if not more significant, factor which helps to explain this divergence in attitude and behaviour was the 'competition' between the Asians and Africans for the limited foreign aid available from the West. The Delegation speculated that the Asians were concerned that aid would be 'diverted' to the new African nations.¹⁰⁵ In view of the above circumstances, the Delegation saw a possible role for itself in affecting the UN operational context.

The consensus from New York was that the Asians might be willing "to take a somewhat more niancé approach" to colonial questions "if they could be convinced of the good intentions of the Colonial Powers or Administering Authority in question."¹⁰⁶ The Delegation observed: "with the battle of colonialism won in principle and well on the way to being won in fact," the above goal seemed to be an attainable one.¹⁰⁷ It is evident that the Asians would continue to be the target group for Canadian advances. In view of the information received in

Ottawa, officials knew that any approaches to the new African nations for their support on colonial issues in the UN would be unsuccessful.¹⁰⁸ The Africans also saw the Asians as their target group with which they could trade support for their specific interests.¹⁰⁹ This naturally complicated the task envisioned by Ottawa. Was the "battle of colonialism" really "won in principle" by early 1959? And if officials in Ottawa did concur with the Delegation in New York on this point, was it perceived to be necessary to ensure that the battle of colonialism was not going to be "won in fact"?

Canada's View of the Colonial Situation and UN Context

In early March 1960 the Department of External Affairs completed an extensive survey of the colonial situation. The survey was "designed to make the point that new circumstances will exist in Africa during the next few years." The situation was a recent one; in 1958 the "outside world awoke" to a powerful African nationalist force. Officials in Ottawa realised that, in 1960, "the world – Africa included – had still not fully awakened to an even more startling fact: in most of the continent, African nationalism's struggle against European colonialism had been crowned with victory...."¹¹⁰ The survey concluded: "It is perhaps self-evident that these circumstances will call for new responses." Did officials perceive a need to alter Canada's policy in any way? This is how the Department described this 'victory':

The fact is that the major Colonial Powers in Africa are withdrawing. France stands ready to concede full independence at once to any or

all of the former territories of French West and French Equatorial Africa. This was unthinkable two years ago. In the Congo, Belgium is virtually abdicating. Except in a few years...the United Kingdom expects to have relinquished its vast colonial responsibilities in Africa in five years or less.¹¹¹

What were the implications of this situation for the UN operational context of the colonial issue? The Department believed that "while the anti-colonial rhetoric will probably go on being heard for years to come, however, it will have a good deal less substance than heretofore." More important for Canada's policy makers was the perception that the UK, France and Belgium "will no longer be open to criticism for their colonial policies in Black Africa – or not significantly so."¹¹² What did this mean in substantive terms? The Department argued that:

While the grounds for African nationalist belligerency have been greatly reduced, the targets for that belligerency are far less defensible than they used to be. Canada, for example, could not and did not condone intemperate attacks on responsible British and French colonial policies; there may, however, be less Canadian inclination to come to the defence of the South Africans, Rhodesians and Portuguese.¹¹³

In recognition of this significant distinction in types of colonial rule, did officials in Ottawa perceptibly alter their pro-colonial preferences in the process to decolonise empires? The Soviet bloc sought to impress upon the UN members that the colonial situation continued to be grounds for belligerency. Premier Khrushchev's speech on colonialism in the General Assembly was supposed to accomplish this goal by setting the constraints and limiting the choice of action by the West in the UN.¹¹⁴ The Canadian Delegation informed Ottawa that, in response to Khrushchev's speech, Ormsby-Gore of the UK "made a few brief

remarks concerning the irrevocable policy of the UK to promote independence of colonial countries and peoples with all speed...." In addition, Ormsby-Gore proceeded to argue that

precisely because the question of the transition of colonial countries and peoples to the state of sovereign independence was one of the most important political developments of our time and because the UK would welcome a serious discussion of the subject, the UK supported the inscription of the Item and advocated that it be allocated to the First Committee for consideration.¹¹⁵

This was an attempt to forestall the Soviet move to have the matter discussed in the Plenary rather than in a Committee of the General Assembly, thereby affecting its status as an 'important' matter.

It is obvious from the report of the Delegation that the Soviet initial position had an instrumental role in forcing the Colonial Powers to take a public stand on colonialism, at the time. They were also aware of the fact that colonial rule was far less 'defensible' than it used to be. The position of the Afro-Asian bloc was also perceived to have a crucial role in limiting the range of alternatives open to the West. The Delegation wrote to Ottawa:

It had become clear, both from the debate and from conversation in the corridors, that all the African and Asian countries were going to vote in favour of taking the item up in Plenary. As a result, the UK and others who had indicated that they would vote against the Soviet proposal would have found themselves in an isolated position of opposition to the wishes of the African states...."¹¹⁶

The Colonial Powers and the West had to concede, by late 1960, that colonial rule was no longer legitimate nor acceptable.

Officials in Ottawa attributed this development to two significant factors. The most important was perceived to be Soviet behaviour which directly

influenced the attitude of the Afro-Asian bloc. In its Instructions for the Delegation to the Fifteenth Session, Ottawa had anticipated active Soviet involvement in colonial affairs:

The Soviet bloc can be expected to work hard to demonstrate that they share fully the interests of the less-developed states...and to establish an alignment with them...they will continue to try to exploit differences among the NATO allies and to split them away from the other groups; they will seek to increase the influence of the Soviet Union as a powerful leader of opinion and policy at the United Nations; and at the same time to create the impression that the United States power and influence is declining rapidly...."¹¹⁷

Unquestionably, Canadian policy had to seek a position of consolidation with its NATO allies in view of this perception of Soviet intention. Ottawa's task in the decision-making process was made considerably lighter because the major antagonistic, anti-colonial member had seized upon the Soviet initiative to demonstrate to the world that its extremist days were over.

In the opinion of the Canadian Delegation, Guinea's Sekou Touré was instrumental in creating an atmosphere of accommodation between the Colonial Powers and the Afro-Asian bloc on this item, because he was the first African Delegate to speak directly after Khrushchev.¹¹⁸ As a consequence, the "determined effort" of Zorin of the USSR to have the Plenary discuss the Soviet item as a "matter of urgency" contrasted with the "lack of support from the African countries." In view of these developments, the Delegation told Ottawa: "it is not our intention to play an active part in the discussion of this procedural issue in the General Committee, but we could be grateful to have your instruction on the question of timing." The pending USA elections and the question of disarmament were perceived to have a significant effect on the atmosphere and operational

context of this issue. The Delegation added that the UK decided "to leave the running in the discussions to the African countries in the hope that they will be successful in introducing sufficient moderation in the proposed Declaration to make it acceptable to most Colonial Powers."¹¹⁹

Officials in Ottawa knew that there were basic aspects of the colonial issue which Africans had to address. Africans were concerned that without UN participation in the colonial world, the UN could not effectively gauge whether progress was indeed taking place in these areas. Canadian officials knew from several sources that these areas were generally backward and some sort of action was necessary.¹²⁰ The Colonial Powers also had to concentrate on accelerating the training of local inhabitants for administrative responsibilities. The Delegation reminded Ottawa that this was "an aim we have fully supported" in the debate. The third concern of the Africans was the refusal of the Colonial Powers to transmit political information from Non-Self-Governing-Territories. Without this information, progress could not be ascertained. In recognition of the difficulty in achieving a two-third blocking majority on this point, the Delegation was prepared to support efforts toward achieving these goals in an African resolution on the Soviet Item.¹²¹

On the other hand, it was obvious that Canada would join the Colonial Powers in rejecting any demand to fix target dates for independence in view of their recognition of the need for a further period of tutelage and the desirability of maintaining internal stability. The Delegation informed Ottawa that the UK, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa "all spoke in sympathetic terms but

made it plain that the question of target dates would raise exceptional difficulties for Administering Powers."¹²² Although the whole Commonwealth was of the opinion that "countries like Portugal needed to feel the full weight of Assembly disapproval," and that the Soviet Union should not be allowed to "get off scott free in the debate," the Commonwealth felt that it would be 'regrettable' if the USA insisted on using this issue to turn the debate "into a cold war exercise."¹²³ The whole Commonwealth seemed to be in agreement on the contentious aspects of this issue, in view of the possibilities that the ex-French colonies could interject unexpected demands. About one week after the Commonwealth meeting, the Delegation transmitted to Ottawa the text of a Guinea Draft which was seen "as an indication of African-Asian thinking."

Of significance, is the degree to which this Draft had reproduced the substantive considerations embodied in Article 1 of the International Draft Covenants on Human Rights which we have discussed in chapter V. Paragraph 5 of the Guinean text stated: "that only when all peoples and nations achieve complete sovereignty, will the establishment of peace and international security become a reality." This premise had functional significance in view of the international situation, at the time. The draft continued: "The United Nations General Assembly hereby solemnly proclaims:

1. The unconditional end of the Colonial System in all its forms;
2. The necessity to grant immediate independence to all dependent countries to allow them to enjoy full and total sovereignty;
3. Appeals to the Administering Members to make arrangements with a view to the final liberation of the dependent peoples, according to the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

There was no signature next to the pencilled comments on the copy of this document which was sent to Ottawa; 'sovereignty' was underlined and written next to the word was the comment "no connection." A line was drawn from the reference to the Charter of the United Nations with the phrase "but the UN says nothing about sovereignty."¹²⁴

Whereas the anti-colonials had moved beyond the Charter stipulations in Chapters XI and XII for the colonial world and had taken the principles agreed upon in the International Draft Covenants on Human Rights as their working premise for UN action, officials in Ottawa continued to insist upon the stipulations of Chapters XI and XII as their basis of policy. They neglected to acknowledge the operative force of the incremental steps in the process of decolonisation. In chapter V, we have shown how the word 'sovereignty' had achieved much more significance for anti-colonials than ambiguous terms such as self-government or independence within the French Union. We have also explained how 'independence' was perceived to have no tangible value for the colonial world if its inhabitants did not have sovereignty over their natural resources.

These developments created a new categorical imperative for UN action in colonial matters. This is the context in which the anti-colonial pressure, for target dates, has to be seen. The imperative of these concepts - sovereignty and independence - made the need for further tutelage irrelevant; they also rejected all the pretensions of the "white man's burden." In this light, the implications of any further tutelage was a continuing state of political, economic

and social dependence. This necessarily meant that colonial peoples could not take their place in the international community of nations.

Some African leaders were convinced that, without some conscious effort to pursue the goal of this sovereignty and independence, entrenched colonial rule could not be dislodged. As we have seen in chapter V, non-white ex-colonies described colonial rule as a comprehensive system of dominance. Therefore, they were compelled to take tangible action which went at the root of this dominance, because of Khrushchev's initiative. In our study, we have shown how Canada perceived the value of the colonial world for the well-being and security of the West, in terms of markets, resources and military fortifications. The Soviets were also aware of this fact and Khrushchev had finally decided that a Declaration was the only effective weapon against colonial rule. The time for endless resolutions on the colonial issue was over.

By November 7, the Delegation was greatly perturbed at the developments in the UN and wrote to Ottawa: "We thought the intention was to have a resolution as distinct from a Declaration, but after seeing the Guinean draft, we are not so sure." Most distressing to the Delegation was the fact that the Afro-Asians were 'confident' of a two-third majority in the General Assembly; they "were controlling the operation." The Delegation complained that Afro-Asians knew they "did not need to seek advice, assistance or reassurance toward resolutions" in order to have them universally accepted. Ottawa was warned: "it may turn out to be another case where we will have to make the choice of refraining from voting against ideas we dislike or finding ourselves in a voting line

up not so much to our taste."¹²⁵ Which ideas, at work in this process, would not gain the acceptance of the Canadian Delegation? In view of the fact that the Delegation knew the anti-colonials regarded this operation as "a statement of faith rather than a plan of practical action," and keeping in mind the conviction in Ottawa that colonial rule was at an end, why did the Delegation express reservations about this process? Was it because the anti-colonials were insisting that political independence ought not to be made contingent upon economic and social development?¹²⁶

In a realistic fashion, anti-colonials were entertaining the possibility of including the word 'speedy' rather than 'immediate' independence in the Declaration. Diggines of the UK thought that the British could support an 'acceleration' of independence. Scott of the Canadian Delegation wrote to the Commonwealth Division in Ottawa:

I have myself been troubled how far Canada could support a resolution calling upon Colonial Powers to accelerate the programme of independence. For us to request the British to emancipate, for example, Kenya or Southern Rhodesia ahead of the present schedule for these places might enable them, in Commonwealth context, to point out that we had accepted a degree of responsibility for the development of colonies toward independence, and that we should therefore accept some responsibility for the results....If, however, the UK is itself willing to vote for resolutions of the General Assembly advocating accelerated independence, then I suppose they cannot complain if we do....¹²⁷

In setting out the guidelines for Canada's position on the Declaration on Colonial Independence, officials outlined their perception of the constraints of the international operational context which actually limited Canada's options:

The consequent strengthening of the Afro-Asian voting power appears to be facing us with a new situation....The resolutions...tend to be

idealistic and unrealistic, couched in terms which sound as if their object was to remake the world in ways which are quite beyond the competence of the Assembly....The ideals behind the resolutions have generally been ones with which we sympathised fully. There have in most such resolutions been passages which represented a positive contribution to consideration of the subject matter. Perhaps most important, there has been no evidence that the Communist bloc has been able to make much use of the Afro-Asian bloc for its own ends; rather it would appear that many Afro-Asians are deeply suspicious of Sino-Soviet intention.¹²⁸

But Khrushchev did successfully utilise the Afro-Asians for his own ends. By expounding on the idea of a Declaration in his speech at the General Assembly, he not only indicated his determination to achieve substantive changes in the colonial world but he also demonstrated, to the Afro-Asians, that they were negligent in their perceived duty towards still dependent peoples. This psychological tactic was so successful in forcing the Africans to take over the enterprise that they publicly refused Soviet interference in the actual drafting of the Declaration; it had to be a non-white product without a Cold War imprint.

It is evident that a narrow range of alternatives was available to officials, in view of this context. They explained to the Delegation:

It is clear that there are elements in this situation which we would wish to encourage, particularly the independence from Sino-Soviet influence. We would wish to encourage the moderates, and also to avoid adopting what might appear to be a disapproving or superior attitude towards the over-enthusiastic and over-idealistic newcomers. There is a tendency on the part of most Afro-Asians to divide the rest of the world into those who are with them and those who are against them on colonial questions.¹²⁹

Under these circumstances, Canada's voting position on any roll calls had to be carefully orchestrated. The Delegation was reminded that:

In UN votes, Afro-Asians regard an abstention and a negative vote as virtually the same thing. If we are to demonstrate sympathy with those countries with whom we do in fact sympathise, and to give encouragement to those elements we wish to encourage, we can certainly do so best from a position of seeming alignment with them – that is; after having supported in principle the resolutions they have sponsored....In any case, and in particular if we have been forced to vote negatively or abstain, we should be at pains to make clear our essential sympathy with the objectives of the sponsors.¹³⁰

After the Declaration on Colonial Peoples

In the opinion of officials in Ottawa what was the value of the Declaration for process and policy? The General Assembly Plenary Meetings of 1961 were concerned with the 'implementation' of this Declaration and this is what Brooks of the Canadian Delegation had to say in the General Assembly:

That resolution was a landmark in the political development of the United Nations. It was in accord with the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and was based on fundamental principles of the Charter....[It] gained added significance from the fact that it was not opposed by any Member State....¹³¹

He emphasised that Canada was not only "most pleased" to be among the supporters of the resolution but also thought it "natural and proper" to consider ways of implementing the Declaration. According to Brooks, the Canadian attitude was 'based' on several considerations: "Foremost is our concern that fundamental human rights and freedoms, including the national right of self-determination and the freedom of the individual from discrimination on grounds of colour and creed, should be fully respected throughout the world."¹³²

As we have shown in detail in chapter V, Canada did not support the process in which self-determination became a right in UN proceedings and international practice. We have also explained Canada's negative attitude and policy in the UN process on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Did Ottawa intend to work toward the implementation of the Resolution 1514 (XVI)? And if so, on what would action depend? During the 1960 Session, the UN Division was aware that the Delegation was not "adequately prepared" for the emphasis on colonial matters in the UN. This emphasis was perceived to be the result of the entry of 17 new African members and the Division felt that there was a "need for a precise directive on what the Canadian attitude should be toward colonial items generally," if the Delegation were to follow "a line which is fully consistent."¹³³

To this end, the African and Middle Eastern Division wrote to the Under Secretary:

The Canadian Delegation and this Department found that our pattern of voting on African and other colonial items was often ragged, based on no firm policy, and marked by only too visible inconsistencies. The result has been that Canada has failed, in many cases, to make a positive contribution to the debates and decisions of the Assembly and, at the same time, it is highly questionable that Canada's standing and influence has been greatly enhanced with either old or new friends in the course of discussion of African items. Canadian decisions on individual items have generally been based on a rather precarious balance between the substantive and legal merits of the case and an assessment of the tactical line-up of votes. The result has often not been such as to be clearly explicable to the Assembly, to individual delegations, or to Parliament and the Canadian public.¹³⁴

Moreover, this Division believed that "the NATO Delegation could use some guidance...along the general lines of policy which Canada might recommend that Western countries ought to pursue in Africa."

The goal was an ambitious one and the Division did not have "much confidence" in its own "range of ideas." Therefore, it "suggested that a Departmental Panel on Africa should be established immediately," with the "short-term task" of establishing guidelines for the Canadian position on aspects of African and colonial issues which were likely to come up at the 16th General Assembly.¹³⁵ Three days later, the Under Secretary was notified of a meeting "to chart the course of the Panel's activities."¹³⁶ On June 6, the Panel agreed that, by establishing "a set of basic attitudes and sticking firmly to them" Canada,

might hope to exert a measure of useful influence in the United Nations, by organising a respectable group of more or less like-minded medium-sized and smaller powers. We would, of course, hope that such a group might lead to majority support in the General Assembly for positions which we adopted; but the essential consideration would be that we should be prepared to stand up and be counted, if necessary on the losing side but in respectable company, on issues we considered it right to oppose....¹³⁷

On the whole, the Panel intended to retain the initiative in defining the situation; the goal was to win support for Canada's position.

The associates would continue to be "like-minded" and 'respectable' members; these were definitely not from the Soviet bloc but there were a few from the Afro-Asian bloc. A pro-colonial predisposition had continued to prevail in Canada's choice in the 'kind' of relationships officials wanted to cultivate and the particular operational conditions they hoped to create. This necessarily required a new tactic; the old one of "constantly trying to accommodate opposing points of

view" should be discarded. In the opinion of Wilson of the Economic Division, "the basic principles underlying Canadian foreign policy in fact were already laid down and recognised, several of them (such as the right of self-determination, respect for individual liberty, etc.) in the UN Charter." He felt that the task of the panel would be "to enunciate these long-standing principles in a form which would be useful in meeting day to day problems." In other words, tactics had been revamped but the substantive basis of policy remained unchanged.

But is this not what officials had been doing since Canada's membership in the UN? This was precisely the modus operandi of Canadian officials, whether they were deciding if Canada had 'dependent' peoples of its own, or whether the principle of self-determination should become an automatic right of self-determination for colonial peoples, or whether all peoples should have sovereignty over their natural resources, especially when Canada's sovereignty over its own natural resources was a self-evident one. Which implicit rules were being followed in this process and what kinds of ideas were ascendant in such specific behaviour? And, how do we explain these choices? Were they the result of conviction? How much of a role did 'appearance' have to play in decision making?

Miss Ireland of the Commonwealth Division pointed out that "a fundamental element" of the Canadian approach to African problems was Canada's "desire that the African nations should be enabled to achieve the same political, economic and social benefits," which Canadians enjoyed. This position is very similar to that of Professor Lower on the subject of human rights we have

discussed in chapter V. However, Ireland was careful to remind the Panel that because of the tremendously accelerated process of decolonisation, "the necessary progress" which would enable the Africans to enjoy Western benefits "had to be telescoped into a very short period." The practical implications of the situation, thus obtained, presented problems for Canada's decision makers. Simply put, Africans were just not yet ready for independence.

The financial factor also had a significant role in the formulation of policy. Miss Osborne of the African and Middle Eastern Division wondered whether Canada "could necessarily accept without qualification the pace of change demanded by the Africans." Consistent with the Department's guidelines for Canada's speech making in the UN during the debate on Franco's Spain, Osborne questioned "how far" was Canada "prepared to back up" its desire to assist African aspirations "with concrete assistance in achieving them." There was an ongoing concern in Ottawa that Canada's policy should appear to be a credible one. This consideration was essential to setting goals for policy. For example, how practical was the aim to set target dates for independence, if members were not willing to contribute to the establishment of a solid basis for independence? Brown of Defense Liaison warned the Panel that any Cabinet approval necessitated an assessment of the "political realities" involved in proposed policy. Whereupon, Wilson reminded them that "there seemed to be little prospect in the next few years for any increase in funds available for Canadian assistance to African states."

What were the "political realities" of the situation? And what was Canada's perception of its responsibilities on colonial matters in the UN?¹³⁸ In the opinion of the European Division, if Canada decided to take the position that there was "no alternative to self-determination" then, that stand had to be qualified by two major points: "To make clear that Canada is unwilling to give in blindly into all sorts of anti-colonialism propaganda or into Black African extreme nationalism and that it believes that the whites and in certain instances the Colonial Powers have rights in colonial territories."¹³⁹ This position was congruous with Canada's past policy, for over a period of fifteen years, on the various aspects of colonial rule. This we have discussed, in detail, in this study.

The argument showed a pro-colonial predisposition to emphasise the rights of the Colonial Powers and the white settlers, it also entailed a preference for undemocratic means with which to secure these rights. The European Division insisted on "the right for the Governing Powers to protect their nationals in colonial territories and the latter's property." This Division recommended that "in certain cases this right should indeed extend for a certain period after independence." Surely, the European Division had not expected that this restricted conception of 'independence' would be acceptable to the new African nations? Under these circumstances, it was clear that any consideration of 'sovereignty' would be qualified by a potential right of the Colonial Power to intervene in an independent African state to protect white settlers.

On what basis should Colonial Powers continue to have such a right? Was self-government the goal to which officials in Ottawa had, in fact, aspired in

the decolonisation process? It is evident that, in this conception, the well-being of the inhabitants of colonial territories continued to be a subsidiary consideration, which was essentially similar to Ottawa's interpretation of the Charter conception we have discussed in chapter IV. This estimation is supported by the summary of the second group of rights set forth by the European Division: "The rights for white settlers – who often settled in colonial territories generations ago – to remain there, to retain their nationality of origin should they so wish and to be protected against racial, social and economic discrimination." The Department had finally begun to address the matter of discrimination in its consideration of colonial matters.

Except for brief references to 'white' privileges in the settler colonies, Canadian officials did not show much concern for the racial, social and economic discrimination against the local inhabitants in colonial arrangements and administration, in their correspondences. In chapter IV, we have pointed out how discussions on 'rights', in the colonial context, were in connection with situations involving the right of aliens in colonial territories. Jean Fournier of the European Division observed that "the tempo at which 'de-colonisation' processes poses very serious problems not only for the Black Africans themselves but also for the minorities of white settlers scattered all over Africa." He recommended that "when necessary adequate protection should be given to settlers against possible abuses." In such cases, the usual democratic solution of majority rule were not seen to be acceptable without "specially devised guarantees for the minorities."

A perusal of official documents show a startling paucity of concerns about abuses against Black Africans, yet on the verge of independence such words as 'discrimination' and 'rights' and 'abuse' were beginning to crop up in the process of formulating policy. Why did officials anticipate "possible abuses" of the white settlers by Black Africans? Was it because white settlers had themselves been responsible for racial, social and economic discrimination and abuses of Black Africans? We knew that Canadian officials were aware of this situation. Why did they not address this matter or pursue policies which could have helped to alleviate the situation? Or were racial problems and abuses of local inhabitants under colonial rule, in general, not really relevant to Canada's definition of the situation over a period of fifteen-years? Could this be the reason for the conclusion of the Panel that it was "virtually impossible" to find any African state which was predisposed "to adopt an openly pro-Western position on any international issue"? Is this the colonial legacy in Africa?

Policy as Reflected in Roll Call Votes

In this section, we will examine a universal sample of all General Assembly resolutions that were brought to roll call votes from 1949 to 1968 on the competence of the General Assembly to make specific authoritative decisions on the disposition of colonies. The first selection of samples isolated those resolutions that were worded "Bearing in mind the competence of the General Assembly to...." The second step in this sorting process was to identify those

resolutions in which the General Assembly perceived a direct responsibility to assist actively in the progressive decolonisation of empires up to the eventual achievement of full independence of colonial peoples. At the end of this selection process, the study found that resolutions of this kind fell into three separate categories: the UN authority to discharge the responsibility of the Administering Authority in the mandate territories of Palestine and South West Africa; the UN authority and competence to dictate decolonising policies to obdurate Colonial Powers and to request specific assistance of members (non-administering) in this regard, and finally, the UN authority and competence to supervise or control the military activities (installations and forces) of Colonial Powers in their colonial territories. The General Assembly appealed to the specialised agencies, the Security Council of the UN and to all members to assist in the discharge of this responsibility.

An examination of the 45 roll call votes show that Canada did not support the General Assembly in this perceived task. Canada voted for the adoption in 14; against adoption in 18, and abstained on 13 on the roll call votes. In effect, Canada did not support 31 out of the 45 initiatives of the General Assembly regarding its competence and authority in these areas. The following content analysis will show in which specific areas Canada chose not to support the General Assembly's attempt to assert its competence and authority to actively decolonise empires. It will also show whether Canada's policy choices remained consistent in this respect or changed over time. The resolutions are listed in a chronological order to facilitate reference in the File Pocket attached to

the thesis. However, the integration of these resolutions in the content analysis is based on a topical requirement rather than on a chronological necessity.

Canada was a member of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine which was set up by the General Assembly in 1947, to visit Palestine and report on the situation to the General Assembly. This report was presented in the divided form of two separate proposals. Canada endorsed the proposal of the partition of Palestine into an Arab State and a Jewish State and the city of Jerusalem as an international zone. The other proposal in the report envisaged a federal arrangement between a Jewish section and an Arab section, each having internal autonomy. The UK had terminated its mandate officially on May 14, 1948, and on that same day the Jewish National Council gave notice that a Jewish State called Israel was unilaterally created. Since the early 1920s, the Arab sought independence from the UK government but the granting of democratic institutions to the Arabs was apparently not envisaged in British rule in Palestine.

Although General Assembly Resolution 303(IV) of December 9, 1948 proposed the internationalisation of the City of Jerusalem as was envisaged in the proposal that was endorsed by Canada, all 8 roll calls on the resolution to this effect, were not supported for adoption. The separate roll calls on the first operative paragraph, point (1) of this resolution which proposed that the UN itself be the Administering Authority, received an 'against' vote from Canada. So did the operative point (2) which proposed the Trusteeship Council as "discharging the responsibilities of the Administering Authority"; the proposal for an

international regime to protect and guarantee the various and mixed religious interests in the Holy Places; support for the operative function of the Trusteeship Council in preparing a Statute for Jerusalem; an effort to secure the authority of the Trusteeship Council in implementing the Statute; and finally, the attempt by the UN to have all interested parties co-operate in operationalising the eight proposals of this resolution. Operative Point (2) was rejected by Canada, the USA and the UK. In effect, all three States rejected the UN as an Administering Authority in an area where, on the termination of the British mandate, the UK had neglected to "ensure that the rights and position of other sections of the population were not prejudiced" in establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine. With the unilateral creation of the state of Israel, it was imperative that the UN set up an international regime to protect the varied interests in Jerusalem. To this end, India, France and the USSR supported the 8 roll calls for adoption.

The UN involvement in the 'colonial' situation of South West Africa was complicated by the geographical factor and the truculent behaviour of its mandate power in its refusal to place South West Africa under the UN Trusteeship System. South Africa wanted to end its mandate by incorporating South West Africa into South Africa, in light of the voluntary nature of the wording of Articles 77 and 80(2) of the Charter. General Assembly Resolution 338(IV) of December 6, 1949, requested legal counsel as to the disposition of the mandate of South West Africa and needed to supply the International Court of Justice with all relevant documentation to aid the Court in its decision-making. Canada voted against this move, but had accepted the decision of the International Court of

Justice that the UN had the competence to decide, with the mandatory power, on the disposition of the mandate of South West Africa in Resolution 449(V)A of December 13, 1950. The International Court of Justice ruling was supported by 45 members; 6 against; 5 abstained and 4 absent.

On the other hand, General Assembly Resolution 449(V)B held that the procedure to modify the international status of South West Africa under Article 77 and 80(2) would be the 'normal' way. Canada, with the UK, Australia and South Africa voted against adoption, and the USA, USSR along with 28 members voted for adoption. France abstained. The question for us here is this: why did Canada take such a definitive colonial stand when the USA voted for adoption and France abstained? Was it because Canada felt strongly about its position? We can exclude the Communist threat variable here with the USA voting alongside the USSR. Canada could have abstained like France did. On the other hand, Canada voted with the USA and France for the adoption of Resolution 570(VI)A of January 19, 1952, which stated that South Africa's unilateral action outside the context of the Charter would not be 'recognised' by the UN. The UK voted against adoption. This was merely a procedural statement in which the General Assembly did not seek to expand or assert its competence and authority outside the confines of the Charter.

Canada abstained on a separate roll call on Resolution 570(VI)B. There were no 'against' votes; the 22 abstentions were primarily Western Powers or pro-colonials. By this resolution the General Assembly seemed to be trying to alter the voluntary nature of Articles 77 and 80(2) of the Charter. The General

Assembly recognised that Chapter XII did not impose a legal obligation on South Africa. However, the International Court of Justice ruled that South Africa could not act alone on South West Africa. In this context, Chapter XII was in fact applicable to South West Africa. Where the Charter did not establish an obligation on the part of Colonial Powers, the General Assembly obtained a legal ruling which recognised that it had a shared competence and that the Colonial Power had to recognise this fact. This development was a result of the General Assembly's conviction that "acceptance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice resolutions [449(V)A and B]] is essential to the rule of law and reason in international affairs thus strengthening the cause of the UN." Was this not one of Canada's goals?

By Resolution 579(VI) A and B, the General Assembly secured competence in an area where none was recognised by the Charter. This resolution therefore represented a crucial step in the decolonisation process. The majority of the pro-colonials sought to prevent this development by voting against the adoption of Resolution 338(IV) and abstaining on Resolution 570(VI) A and B. In this resolution, concern for "the cause of the UN" and "the rule of law and reason" became interwoven in the decolonisation matrix. Canada also abstained on the roll call on the operative part of Resolution 1245(XIII) of October, 1958 which recognised the General Assembly's competence and authority to comment on the 'situation' in South West Africa.¹⁴⁰ However, the resolutions which stayed within the confines of the principles and purposes of the Charter, in their directives on South West Africa, found support from Canada. For example,

Resolution 749(VIII)A, all three roll calls and General Assembly Resolution 1593(XV). General Assembly Resolution 2145(XXI) of October 27, 1966, placed the problem of South West Africa within the operational context of Resolution 1514(XV). This changed the voluntary nature of the Charter context regarding mandate territories to one which placed specific obligations on the mandate powers.

General Assembly Resolution 2145(XXI) declared that because South Africa neglected its obligations under the mandate regarding South West Africa, and in light of General Assembly Resolution 449(V) A and B, the UN must assume a direct responsibility in South West Africa. To this end, this resolution established an ad hoc Committee on South West Africa "to recommend practical means" which would lead this territory to independence. It also instructed South Africa to observe the UN authority over South West Africa; notified the Security Council on this decision and requested the assistance of all members in the implementation of this resolution. In 1966, most of the colonial areas had only small pockets of intransigent Colonial Powers holding on to their territories. South Africa was one of those Powers. In light of this, Canada supported all three roll calls on this resolution. As stated in the Preamble of this resolution, the General Assembly was asserting its competence to act as a supervisory body over South West Africa, within the operational confines of the mandate, the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

However, the General Assembly initiatives in Resolution 2248 (S-V) of May 19, 1967 did not find support from the Canadian Delegation. Based on the

direct responsibility it had assumed in Resolution 2145 (XXI) for South West Africa, the UN sought to fulfil its obligations by taking "practical steps to transfer power to the people of South West Africa." The ad hoc Committee which was set up by Resolution 2145 (XXI) was to have a purely advisory function. Canada had supported this move. But by Resolution 2248(S-V), the General Assembly decided to establish a UN Council for South West Africa to actively administer South West Africa until independence was achieved and, most importantly, this Council was to be based in South West Africa. Its "immediate task" was to take "all necessary measures" through democratic process to set up a responsible government in South West Africa and a target for independence was – set for June 1968. To facilitate these steps, the General Assembly proposed specific functions for the specialised agencies and the Security Council. All members were expected to actively participate in the implementation of this resolution.

Although officials had ample evidence of the South African Government's intention to continue its repressive rule and they understood the implications of its inflexible stand against accepting the principle of equality of persons, Canada abstained on this resolution. In other words, Ottawa chose not to support the General Assembly, in its authority as the Administering Authority, to utilise the UN channels in a direct decolonisation of South West Africa. This was in May 1967. In its capacity as Administering Authority for South West Africa the General Assembly, in two further Resolutions 2325(XXII) of December 1967 and 2372 (XXII) of May 1968, attempted to initiate the decolonisation process in South West Africa. In Resolution 2325(XXII), the General Assembly 'appealed'

directly to members which had economic and financial interests in South Africa and South West Africa, to assist in practical measures to force South Africa to withdraw from South West Africa. This resolution was concerned not only with the situation in the colonial territory of South West Africa but also with activities between sovereign states: members and South Africa. This resolution also saw direct action and a responsibility for the Security Council.

General Assembly Resolution 2372 (XXII) went several radical steps further than all the resolutions so far on South West Africa. The General Assembly not only 'condemned' members which continued to have political, military and economic contacts with South Africa, but also declared that the actions of the members "have encouraged the Government of South Africa to defy the authority of the UN." It is obvious that South Africa was not the only member that was being censured by the General Assembly. All members did have an obligation to actively assist the UN in its perceived responsibility on the decolonisation of empires. By abstaining on these two resolutions, Canada did not support the UN's practical measures in the colonial situation in South West Africa. Canada also rejected UN authority to compel members to comply with General Assembly directives to act inside the borders of sovereign states.

The obduracy of the Government of South Africa in its determination to hold on to South West Africa was matched by the Government of Portugal in its non-compliance with Chapter XI of the Charter and relevant resolutions. In Resolution 1699 (XVI) of December 1961, Canada supported the General Assembly's condemnation of the non-compliance of Portugal. But by Resolution

2107 (XX) of December 1965, in which the General Assembly specifically requested Portugal's allies in the military alliance of NATO to take specific measure regarding the sale of military equipment etc., Canada and the UK voted against adoption and France abstained. Again by Resolution 2184 (XXI) of December 1966, the General Assembly in its assessment of the situation in the territories under Portuguese administration 'requested' all members, in particular NATO members, to desist in their financial and economic activities and those of their nationals which exploit human and material resources of the territories. In other words, NATO should curtail military assistance which enabled the Portuguese Government to continue its repression of its colonial peoples.

Members were also asked to supply moral and material assistance to the peoples of the territories. Canada held the conviction that colonial territories were, in fact, within the sovereign borders of the Colonial Powers. Therefore, this directive was not acceptable because of Article 2(7). Operative paragraph 7 of this resolution was the third directive which sought active involvement of all members in the decolonisation of the Portuguese empire. A role for the Security Council was envisaged in carrying out obligatory measures; this automatically included all members. Again, Canada, the USA and the UK voted against adoption and France abstained. The final resolution in this section on the situation in the territories under Portuguese administration is General Assembly Resolution 2270 (XXII) of November 1967. This resolution was almost identical in substance to General Assembly Resolution 2184 (XXI) and the one before that, General Assembly Resolution 2107 (XX). The unyielding Government of Portugal

continued to refuse to comply with the provisions of the above resolutions. Some members refused to take action, separately or collectively, as directed in the above resolutions. Canada finally joined France in abstaining on General Assembly Resolution 2270 (XXII), but the USA and the UK continued to vote against adoption.

This section will deal with a mixture of resolutions by which the General Assembly sought to establish its competence and authority in all aspects of colonial administration. In a separate roll call on General Assembly Resolution 849 (IX) of November 1954, on the competence of the General Assembly "to decide whether a Non-Self-Governing-Territory has or has not attained a full measure of self-government" - in the context of Chapter XI of the Charter Canada, the USA, the UK and France all voted against the adoption. Similarly, General Assembly Resolution 945 (X) of December 1955, with the exact wording of the roll call Preamble of Resolution 849 (IX) above, again sought to establish General Assembly competence by consensus in this area. Canada, France, the UK and the USA voted against adoption. The pro-colonial perspective in regard to the General Assembly's competence and authority in colonial territories seemed to be circumscribed by the kind of action that the General Assembly was to undertake. The pro-colonials supported all resolutions in which the General Assembly approved of decisions already taken by the Administering Authorities on colonial aspects. However, those resolutions in which the General Assembly asserted its authority and competence to make decisions regarding the same substantive questions were consistently rejected by the pro-colonials. For

example, Resolution 849 (IX) and 945 (X) were rejected by this group, Canada included.

On the other hand, the next three roll calls on Resolution 2064 (XX) of December 1965, in which the General Assembly had only to put its stamp of approval on decisions that were already taken by the Administering Authorities, were fully supported by Canada. On a separate roll call, this resolution as a whole reaffirmed the responsibility of the General Assembly, as derived from Resolution 1514 (XV), to 'assist' the people of the Cook Islands to proceed from the status of self-government to independence, if they so wished. The Administering Authority had already brought this territory to self-government. The General Assembly was therefore not attempting to assert its authority or competence to make a decision on its own initiative without the voluntary co-operation of the Administering Authority.

Here are resolutions in which the General Assembly, on its own perceived competence, sought to issue directives to Administering Authorities in regard to "the situation" in their territories. Resolution 1580 (XV) of December 1960, attempted to influence the autocratic policy of Belgium in Ruanda. Canada, the USA, the UK and France voted against adoption. Similarly, Resolution 2227 (XXI) of December 1966 operative paragraph 5, which assessed the military activities of Australia in its territory of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea to be "incompatible with the Charter," was voted against adoption by the USA, the UK and Canada. France abstained. Administering Authorities which saw their obligations under Article 76(a) "to further international peace and

security," rejected General Assembly contention that their military activities in their territories were incompatible with the Charter. The military assessment that was made by the Western Powers, to secure their economic and security needs in colonial areas, depended upon the authority and freedom they enjoyed under Chapters XI and XII of the Charter.

In contrast, the anti-colonials or new nations looked to the UN to protect their natural and human resources from exploitation by the Western Powers and their interests. It was, therefore, obvious that the removal of the military means of repression or exploitation would have to be achieved in concerted action through the UN. Resolution 2238 (XXI) of December 1966 was a case in point. By this resolution the General Assembly held the UK responsible for the critical situation arising out of its policies in Oman. Canada, the USA and the UK did not recognise the competence of the General Assembly to pronounce on the internal policies of the Government of the UK, in Oman. However, the General Assembly saw a direct connection between the military troops, bases and depots in the territory and the repression of the people. The General Assembly was of the opinion that "immediate removal" of military installations was essential to the well-being of the people of Oman. In operative paragraph 2 of this resolution the General Assembly had perceived its responsibilities in this context as arising out of the 'legitimacy' of the struggle of the people of Oman, "to achieve the rights laid down in the Charter of the UN, and the Universal Declaration of Independence to Colonial Peoples."

Consequently, the General Assembly decided that any action on the part of the Colonial Powers to prevent the realisation of these legitimate rights in the colonial territories was incompatible with the Charter. The General Assembly had the competence to pronounce on the UK's policies in Oman. Paragraph 7(b) of this resolution called upon the UK to withdraw British troops and sought in paragraph 7(d), the elimination of British domination in any form. Canada, the USA and UK voted against adoption. Canada chose to abstain on Resolution 2357 (XXII) of December 1967 in which the General Assembly's competence was limited to pronouncing on the incompatibility of the military bases and installations on colonial territories with the Charter. This resolution had a non-operational purpose in which it simply deplored the non-co-operative attitude of some Administering Authorities in regard to UN Visiting Missions etc.

Finally, General Assembly Resolution 2311(XXII) of December 1967, was of a totally different substantive nature from the rest of resolutions which we have analysed so far. In the Preamble, this resolution stipulated that the UN's immediate task was to provide "urgent assistance in various social fields, particularly education, health and nutrition" in response to a plea from the national liberation movements. It also limited the functional role of UN activities to the "oppressed peoples of Southern Rhodesia" and also the "territories under Portuguese domination." In this purely humanitarian undertaking, the General Assembly requested the assistance of not only the members but also the specialised agencies of the UN. Under the Charter, the 'agreements' between the UN and specialised agencies serve to co-ordinate the policies and activities of

those agencies in their assistance of the UN "in achieving the objectives of General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV)." The General Assembly therefore requested these agencies and the international institutions, "not to grant any assistance to South Africa and Portugal until they renounce their policy of racial discrimination and colonial domination," in operative paragraph 4. In operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly Resolution 2311(XXII), the General Assembly turned to the members for their assistance in the implementation of all the relevant resolutions. Canada voted against the adoption of all three roll calls on this resolution thereby refusing to support the General Assembly's perceived operational role in the social aspects of the issue.

In addition, the non-controversial and non-military resolutions like General Assembly Resolution 2311(XXII) and 1245(XIII) of October 1958, in which the General Assembly's perceived authority to express "its deep concern regarding the social, economic and political situation..." in the territory of South West Africa, did not receive any support from Canada. As we have seen so far, Canada had chosen, over time, to vote against or to abstain even on resolutions concerned with the condition obtained in colonial situations of racial discrimination and the denial of fundamental human rights and freedoms. This policy position was not supportive of these UN initiatives in its attempt to dismantle colonial empires. It is instructive to note that, even in the cases where France abstained on three separate resolutions, Canada consistently voted against adoption. We have found that most cases in which Canada chose to abstain were invariably those where there were no 'against' votes. Under these

circumstances, the only practical alternative for Canada to register its objection without being the only 'against' vote, was to abstain. And, in such cases, we can consider the abstentions as functional negative votes rather than intentional positions.

In this section, we will concentrate on the attempts to implement the Declaration in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 12, 1960. The General Assembly began to perceive its expanding authority and competence in the decolonisation of empires as arising out of the cumulative effect of its adopted resolutions. And, in light of these resolutions, the General Assembly sought to reinterpret the Charter directives on the administration and future of colonial peoples in a more specific and emphatic way. General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) of December 14, 1960, generally called the Declaration, was the zenith in the pursuit of the anti-colonial members to erode the ensconced authority of the Colonial Powers in the colonial world. It set the pace and tone for the UN membership to fulfil its responsibility in operationalising and universalising the Charter principles in the whole colonial world. In this resolution, the General Assembly did not lose sight of the UN's "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." The General Assembly was "mindful of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the UN...to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." These were proclaimed by the Charter Signatories at San Francisco on June 26, 1945. What this resolution did, in fact, was to utilise

the above avowed Charter objectives as the basis from which to assess the policies and actions of the Colonial Powers in their colonial territories. This resolution was the result of an anti-colonial conviction that colonial policies in the territories were incompatible with the above stated principles and purposes of the Charter, for over fifteen years.

Because of this conviction, and "convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory," this resolution decided to "solemnly proclaim the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations." These manifestations were perceived to be in the social, political, economic and military spheres. This proclamation altered the UN operational context of Chapters XI and XII of the Charter in three very fundamental ways. First, it erased any significant distinctions in the previous categorisation of colonial peoples. Since the Charter left the Non-Self-Governing Territories to the discretion of the Colonial Powers, the General Assembly had, in effect, little supervisory capacity. The Charter gave the Colonial Powers wide authority and a lot of discretion in Article 76(b) with the clause "as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory" to determine the "progressive development towards self-government or independence," of the Trust Territories. In operative paragraph 5, this resolution made it very explicit that all dependent peoples, regardless of distinctions, were to be granted the means by which they could enjoy "complete independence and freedom."

Secondly, the Charter had also left in control of the Colonial Powers the right to decide when, and under what conditions, their territories would progressively develop. Operative paragraph 3 radically altered this aspect of qualification by declaring that "inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." In addition, operative paragraph 4 attempted to secure this free development of dependent peoples by directing that "all armed actions or repressive measure of all kinds," which readily permitted domination and exploitation of dependent peoples, "shall cease."

The third, and probably the most important radical and fundamental step of this resolution was its new operative imperative for the decolonisation of empires. The Colonial Powers no longer had the sole prerogative to dispense freedom to their dependent peoples as they saw fit. This resolution 'declared' that "immediate steps" should be taken "to transfer all powers to the peoples." It meant that piecemeal political concessions were no longer an acceptable premise of administrative policy. By setting out the manifest and precise instructions regarding pace, the resolution superseded the Charter basis of 'development' as stepping stones to eventual self-government or independence in the distant future. No time limits had been conceived in the Charter conception of 'development' and 'advancement':

This section will show how the General Assembly, under the sway of non-white ex-colonies which were very experienced in the ills and failings of colonial administration, translated the basics of Resolution 1514 (XV) into specific

functional mechanisms. These were to provide the means by which the General Assembly could supervise the compliance of the Colonial Powers with General Assembly directives. These became operative in a universal spirit of liquidating "alien subjugation, domination and exploitation" in their social, economic and military manifestations. On the whole, the resolution sought to ensure and, at the same time, extend the General Assembly's direct involvement in actuating the operative functions of Charter principles and objectives in the colonial world. Article 11(3) of the Charter allowed that "the General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security." Inadvertently, this article provided a mechanism by which the General Assembly could bring intransigent Colonial Powers to task and to make them aware of the obligations they had assumed under the Charter.

In operative paragraph 1, this resolution characterised "alien subjection" in terms of a threat to international peace which was the concern of the Security Council. According to Article 49 of the Charter, "the members of the UN shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council." By defining the colonial situation of calcitrant Colonial Powers in peace and security terms, this resolution sought to enlist the entire membership in a call to duty in the decolonisation of empires. However, what our survey shows in this section, is that successive resolutions which chose to define any critical situations in the colonial world as endangering international peace were invariably rejected by pro-colonial members. They did not

necessarily appreciate Security Council involvement in colonial matters and, as a consequence, they did not support attempts that specifically categorised situations as such.

A survey of all roll calls by the General Assembly shows that four separate resolutions on "The situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," were brought to a roll call for adoption by the General Assembly from 1960 to the end of this study. General Assembly Resolution 1810(XVII) of December 17, 1962 was the first since the adoption of Resolution 1514(XV). In it, the General Assembly registered its deep concern with the "negative attitude" and "deliberate refusal of certain Administering Powers to co-operate with the Special Committee." On the authority it derived from Resolution 1514, the General Assembly called upon the Colonial Powers "to cease forthwith all armed action and repressive measures." It also gave encouragement and legitimacy to the aspirations of dependent peoples by characterising political activists in the territories as "rightful leaders of the people" in operative paragraph 5 of Resolution 1810 (XVII). In the functional area, the General Assembly decided to enlarge its Special Committee by seven members and entrusted it with the objective of a "speedy and total application of the Declaration" to all colonial situations. It also sought the "fullest co-operation" of all members with this functional arm of the General Assembly regarding colonial territories. Canada and the USA supported the adoption of Resolution 1810(XVII). This step was taken as an indication of their willingness to support the General Assembly in its

perceived responsibility to bring colonialism to a "speedy end." The UK and France were among the four abstentions. No 'against' votes.

The second resolution which was brought to a roll call on "the Situation..." was General Assembly Resolution 1956(XVIII) of December 11, 1963. In light of the three Resolutions on this subject - 1514(XV); 1654(XVI) of November 27, 1961 and 1810(XVII) - the General Assembly regretted that no action had been taken toward any application of the Declaration. In addition, the General Assembly censured certain members for providing assistance which enabled Colonial Powers to refuse to take action on the Declaration in their territories. This resolution therefore requested that all members become aware of their actions in their relationship with Colonial Powers so that they do not inadvertently aid them in their non-compliance with General Assembly directives regarding implementation of the Declaration. This meant that the activities and actions of all members in regard to their association with Colonial Powers could become subject to General Assembly scrutiny and inquiry. It was a new development that could make non-administering members responsible for their indirect contribution to the deplorable colonial situations in the territories. And finally, the General Assembly specifically requested Colonial Powers to actually "facilitate the task of Sub-Committees and visiting groups" investigating the situation in their territories. Canada voted for the adoption of this resolution and the precedent-setting step which held all members, not just the Colonial Powers, responsible for their actions in deciding the destiny of colonial peoples. The USA, the UK and France abstained.

The third resolution brought to a roll call on "the Situation..." was General Assembly Resolution 2105(XX) of December 20, 1965. By utilising the four adopted resolutions as a basis for action, the General Assembly castigated all the Colonial Powers and especially the recalcitrant ones, Portugal¹⁴¹ and South Africa, for refusing to recognise the right of colonial peoples to independence. In operative paragraph 10, the General Assembly recognised the "legitimacy of the struggle" for freedom by colonial peoples and sought to implement the Declaration in three specific ways. Its first resource was the direct contribution of members in two ways. The General Assembly invited all members to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in the colonial territories. By providing this support, the members could help to undermine the repressive colonial regimes. The second part of the contribution of members was the General Assembly request that, in conjunction with the specialised agencies of the UN and international institutions, they "withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa until they renounce their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination." The implication of this request was that all members were to be held responsible for their actions that could directly hinder the pace and degree of decolonisation. On the other hand, the General Assembly provided all members with an avenue in which they could actively help in accelerating the decolonisation process.

In a Cold War operational context, the second source of attack by the General Assembly were the military arrangements of the intransigent Colonial Powers in their colonies. This found less favour with the pro-colonial members. In

operative paragraph 12 the General Assembly 'requested,' for more it was not empowered to do, the Colonial Powers "to dismantle the military bases installed in the colonial territories," and that they should "refrain from establishing new ones." But such a request presented a dilemma for members such as Canada, due to its membership obligations to Portugal in the military alliance of NATO. Canada as a member of NATO could neither "withhold assistance" to Portugal under all circumstances, nor could it vote for the adoption of a resolution that requested a NATO member to "dismantle military bases" which the NATO members may deem necessary for their own military chain of defences, in a cold war atmosphere.

Aware of this radical and unrealistic step, the General Assembly turned to the Security Council for assistance in bringing the Colonial Powers into line with the UN consensus, on the termination of colonial rule. In operative paragraph 13 of this resolution, the General Assembly requested "the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any territory examined by it which may threaten international peace and security." Two important functional steps must be recognised as new and as effective in the decolonisation process.

First of all, in Resolution 1956(XVIII), the General Assembly had specifically requested the Colonial Powers "to facilitate the task of sub-committees and visiting groups" sent into their territories to investigate their administration. These groups were then to report on the situation in these territories. In Resolution 2105(XX), the General Assembly directed the Special

Committee to utilise this information which was collected by the investigation mission, "to make suggestions which might assist the Security Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the UN." This step was taken in anticipation of the non-compliance of the Colonial Powers and their supporters with any General Assembly directives which sought to undermine and subsequently remove colonial presence from the territories. Canada and France chose to abstain with 25 others on this resolution. The USA and UK voted with four others against adoption.

A realistic appraisal of the easy co-existence between the national interest and obligation of Colonial Powers show that the pursuit of security and economic interests was an acceptable and obvious fact under the Charter. However, fifteen years later, the UN membership had expanded with mainly ex-colonies and the old standards of internationally acceptable behaviour of the Colonial Powers were radically modified. In Resolution 1514(XV) the General Assembly had decided that those policies and activities of the Colonial Powers which continued to hinder the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants of their territories were incompatible with the principles and purposes of the Charter. This resolution was to form the basis of an anti-colonial interpretation which discarded the whole Charter concept and structure, as it pertained to colonial rule.

The fourth and final resolution in this voting survey and content analysis of resolutions dealing with "the Situation..." was Resolution 2189/XXI of December 13, 1966. The General Assembly "noting with deep regret" that six years after the adoption of the Declaration which had called for a "speedy end to

colonialism in all its forms and manifestations" "many territories are still under colonial domination...." This resolution defined the situation in more comprehensive terms than the previous three resolutions. It attributed the continued "colonial domination" specifically to the 'negative' and 'intransigent' attitude of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa in their refusal to recognise the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence.

In general terms, this resolution utilised a new "definition of the situation" as the mainstay of its directives. It identified "racism and apartheid" as manifestations of colonialism and reaffirmed "its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle" of colonial peoples "to exercise their right to self-determination and independence." Because of all of the above, the General Assembly again urged "all States" to support the national liberation movements in colonial territories with "material and moral assistance." Most importantly, by declaring that the 'continuation' of colonial rule was a threat to "international peace and security," the General Assembly brought the Security Council into play and appealed mainly to those members that had persisted in subsuming the well-being of their colonial peoples under the priority of their own national interests.

The General Assembly defined the colonial situation this way in an attempt to include the entire UN membership in a concerted effort to terminate colonial domination. Because, in the final analysis, a threat to international peace and security automatically became a relevant issue for all members. In addition, it was an obvious categorical imperative, that every member ought not to set aside its responsibility in helping to prevent situations that "endanger world peace and

security." Therefore, in this resolution the General Assembly requested the Colonial Powers to do three things in their territories. First, in operative paragraph II, they were "to dismantle military bases and installations. Secondly, they were "to refrain from establishing new ones," and thirdly, their military forces should not be utilised in the suppression of the liberation movements.

A separate roll call on this paragraph was supported by a small majority with a great portion of the members either 'abstaining' or 'against.' Canada, the USA, the UK and France voted against adoption. The General Assembly had decided, in operative paragraph 12, that the predominant use of force in the territories by the Colonial Powers was not only incompatible with the Charter and the Declaration, but that it also served to facilitate the exploitation of the colonial peoples by foreign financial and economic interests. In other words, the General Assembly had concluded that the key to terminating colonial domination lay basically in removing the military presence from colonial territories.

However, since the General Assembly also decided that the foreign financial and economic interests in colonial territories not only exploited the human and natural resources of these territories but also supported colonial régimes, and thus constituted a serious obstacle to the implementation of the Declaration, it turned to the most direct means of control. In operative paragraph 12, the General Assembly called upon the Governments "of those members concerned to take the necessary measures to put an end to those activities." For the Western industrialised states, this was a direct thrust of responsibility which

they had to assume in their domestic environment in order to affect change in the international arena and in the colonial world, where they had no authoritative jurisdiction. Most importantly, they were being asked to take action that could be detrimental to their own economic interests. Therefore, this General Assembly directive could neither be supported nor encouraged by Western industrialised states.

In operative paragraph 20 of this resolution, the General Assembly served notice that it intended to include in the provisional agenda of the next session, an Item on the "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration...in all Territories under colonial domination." The General Assembly was convinced that this domination was reinforced by a network of foreign interests which had perceived their own survival in the continued military and political fact of power, in colonial territories. In a consistent policy, Canada refused to support UN intervention in the military and economic policies of the Colonial Powers in their colonial sphere. Therefore, in a roll call on the resolution as a whole, Canada abstained with France. The USA and the UK voted against a much greater majority than that in operative paragraph II.

Resolutions in the category of such restrictive directives for economic and financial interests of members or foreign firms, generally elicited an abstention from some moderate pro-colonial members. However, the military-content resolutions almost always, up until 1968, were categorically rejected by all pro-colonial members in either abstentions or 'against' votes. These

resolutions naturally received the full and unconditional support of most ex-colonies and the Communist bloc. In other words, the effort of the majority to chisel out a program of effective and comprehensive UN responsibility to terminate colonial domination, in all its forms and manifestations as envisaged in Resolution 1514(XV), was not supported by Canada.

This section will concentrate on a content analysis of the resolutions in which the General Assembly attempted to actively implement the policy directives set out in Resolution 1514(XV). These resolutions must be examined in light of the changed operational environment of the decolonisation process which was brought about by Resolution 1514(XV). General Assembly Resolution 1603(XV) of April 20, 1961 asked Portugal to take "immediate steps to transfer power to the people" of Angola. The situation in this territory had been described as wrought with "disturbances and conflict and...the loss of life of the inhabitants." Canada voted for adoption of the resolution which was of a commentary nature. However, Canada did not support, for inclusion, the second part of the resolution which was of a directive nature and which entailed an exact operative impact for Portugal. A specific roll call on paragraph 1 of the Preamble defined the situation in Angola in terms of a danger to international peace and security. Canada chose to abstain in spite of its overriding concern with international stability and the means by which it could be secured.

By Resolution 1979(XVIII) of December 17, 1963, the General Assembly defined the situation in South West Africa as "seriously disturbing international peace and security" and therefore requested the Security Council to

consider this "critical situation." It also condemned the Government of the Republic of South Africa for its intransigent behaviour regarding the implementation of the Declaration. Canada and the USA voted with the overwhelming majority for the adoption, the UK and France were the only two abstentions. General Assembly Resolution 2065(XX) of December 16, 1965, took as its basis for action the recommendations of the Special Committee; the Charter objectives regarding colonial peoples; General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) and the interests of the population. It invited the Governments of Argentina and the UK to negotiate a settlement of the dispute over the sovereignty of the Falklands (Malvinas). Canada, the USA, the UK and France refused to support this initiative by abstaining.

General Assembly Resolution 2072(XX) of December 16, 1965, on the "Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara" also dealt with the problem of contested sovereignty. This resolution requested in operative paragraph 2 that Spain undertake to 'liberate' the territories. A glance at the numbers show that Canada voted with the vast majority for its adoption. The USA; the UK and France were the three out of only four abstentions. A separate roll call was made on the second part of operative paragraph 2 which requested the parties to solve the problem through "negotiations." Canada abstained along with the USA, the UK and France. However, on the roll call on the resolution "as a whole," Canada voted again with the overwhelming majority for adoption; the USA, the UK and France abstained.

On the "Question of Gibraltar," two resolutions urged negotiations between Spain and the UK. There were no 'against' votes on both resolutions. The first one was Resolution 2070(XX) of December 16, 1965 which was content to utilise the Special Committee's directive on the "Situation with Regard to the Implementation...." Canada, the USA and the UK voted with the majority for adoption. France abstained. However, the second one, Resolution 2231(XXI) of December 20, 1966, not only noted the non-compliance of the UK with the guidelines of the Declaration regarding Gibraltar, it also called upon the UK "to expedite" the decolonisation of this territory. Canada, the USA and the UK voted for the adoption, France abstained.

It had been an almost consistent policy of Canada not to support those resolutions which referred to Resolution 1514(XV) as operational guidelines for action which the General Assembly generally required of the Colonial Powers. For example, the later Resolutions, 2065(XX) and 2288(XXII) were not supported by Canada for adoption. And although Resolution 2077(XX); 2070(XX) and 2231(XXI) all requested that specific action be undertaken by the Colonial Powers towards decolonisation of their territories, Canada voted for the adoption of all three. All three resolutions involved Spanish territories or Spanish claims to 'ownership' of a territory administered by the UK.

General Assembly Resolution 2288(XXII) of December 7, 1967 belongs to that category of controversial resolutions dealing with the General Assembly's attempt to regulate and supervise all activities which were classified as impediments to the implementation of the Declaration. This resolution had

addressed itself to the "activities of foreign economic and other interests...." These activities were assessed in light of the advancement and progressive development of the colonies and the right of peoples to dispose of their natural resources as they see fit. Article 1 of the Covenant on human rights had been actualised in the operative aspects of this resolution. As shown in Chapter V Canada did not support this process. This policy was therefore consistent with its pro-colonial predisposition to not support this resolution. The General Assembly declared that the exploitation of the human and natural resources and the institutionalisation of racial discrimination, in the territories, constituted a violation of the Charter obligations of the Colonial Powers. This resolution urged "all States concerned" to act; that included those members whose nationals had financial and economic dealings in colonial territories to assist in the rapid and effective implementation of Resolution 1514(XV). By abstaining, Canada refused to support this effort.

General Assembly Resolution 2324(XXII) of December 16, 1967 reaffirmed the General Assembly's responsibility in administering the territory of South West Africa since the General Assembly unilaterally terminated the Mandate by Resolution 2145(XXI) of October 27, 1966. Because of illegal arrests, deportation and the general condition of repression of the people in this territory by the Government of South Africa, the General Assembly sought to involve the Security Council, the UN Council for South West Africa, the Secretary-General and the Special Committee, in fulfilling its responsibility in

implementing the Declaration in this territory. Canada, the USA, the UK and France voted with an overwhelming majority for the adoption of this resolution.

By 1967, the Question of Gibraltar was still not resolved. General Assembly Resolution 2353(XXII) of December 19, 1967 took decisive steps to compel the Governments of the UK and Spain to negotiate in light of Resolutions 2070(XX) and 2231(XXI). The General Assembly was adamant in rejecting the attempt by the UK to unilaterally decolonise Gibraltar by means of a referendum for the mostly British subjects, without taking the territorial integrity of Spain into consideration. Most importantly, in recognising the crucial role of British strategic and military interests in the colony, the resolution made a recall to paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514(XV) as an operational guideline for future negotiations between the two governments. Canada and the UK voted against adoption. The USA and France abstained. A relatively large percent of the members refused to support this step. Forty-six members fell into this category as opposed to 73 for adoption.

Resolution 2356(XXII) of December 19, 1967, specifically discerned an obligation on the part of France to fulfil the wishes of the people, as determined through the means of a referendum, in French Somaliland. Canada abstained with the USA and the UK, France did not participate. The aim of resolution was to accelerate the process of decolonisation by setting up a time frame for the attainment of independence by the territory. Canada had consistently refused to support the imposition of such structural limits on the administration of colonies. Of the 19 roll calls in this section, Canada voted for the adoption of 10; against the adoption of 2 and abstained on 7. On the whole,

Canada supported approximately half of the initiatives that were brought to a roll call in the implementation of Resolution 1514(XV).

This section is a content analysis and voting survey of all General Assembly resolutions which were brought to a roll call on the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination and independence. We examine the efforts of the UN to decolonise empires towards the realisation of this right for all colonial peoples. The resolutions in this section were selected from a universal sample on one simple basis: they were all adopted after the categorical Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of December 14, 1960. In addition, each and every single resolution had been cited as the basis for any proposed action by the General Assembly regarding the inalienable right of peoples to complete freedom. Each of these resolutions either 'recognised' or 'reaffirmed' this right.

In our opinion, the substantive and operative parts of these resolutions are indicators of the kinds of policies Canada was prepared to support towards the realisation of this right for colonial peoples. In the preceding sections we have already examined the policy position of Canada on the applicability of the principle of self-determination in the colonial context. We have also analysed the substantive content of resolutions which sought to involve direct action of members in the implementation of this principle in colonial territories, over time. We will utilise the operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of Resolution 1514(XV) of December 14, 1960, as the guiding principles and an organising framework in which to analyse the 22 resolutions and the 25 roll calls on these resolutions.

In the Preamble of Resolution 1514(XV), the General Assembly was "convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory." However, the Charter did not speak of an inalienable right although in the Preamble, it spoke of "equal rights of men and women." In Article 1(2), the Charter dealt with "the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." Article 55(c) requested all members to have "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Above all, the Charter sought in Article 56 to secure compliance of the members with Article 55. These were expressions of general principles in the Charter and the signatories interpreted them as such. However, under Article 55(c), members did have obligations within their sovereign borders although the Articles which dealt with colonial peoples entailed, in the first instance, no obligations for them.

Under Article 56, all members had a duty and obligation "to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." In effect, they were to take active measures to promote the right of self-determination since it had been recognised as a human right in General Assembly Resolution 545(VI) of February 5, 1952. General Assembly Resolution 637(VII) of December 16, 1952 also categorised self-determination as "a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights." This meant, in the context of Article 56, that all members were not to support measures that would obstruct or hinder the realisation of the right of

self-determination. And in the final analysis, any support for action or any action by members which violated this right, would, in effect, be incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

Paragraph 1 of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) explicitly declared on this interpretation that, "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to world peace and co-operation." But as we have shown in chapter V, Canada rejected the contention that self-determination is a human right and felt it had no obligation, in spite of Articles 55(c) and 56, to co-operate with the UN in the realisation of this right for all peoples. This was made explicit in Canada's negative votes on the two roll calls on the operative parts of Resolution 637(VII)

Of the 25 roll calls selected for this section, Canada voted for the adoption of 7; against adoption of 9; and abstained on 12. Therefore, out of the 25 roll calls, Canada did not support 18 of them for adoption. These numbers indicate that Canada refused to give its support for UN initiatives which sought to facilitate the realisation of the inalienable right of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence. It is generally believed that by 1960, all members had realised that colonial rule could not be sustained, indefinitely. However, the numbers here show that Canada did not support 75 % of the UN initiatives to bring colonial rule to a "speedy end." In the analysis of these resolutions the initial consideration was to group them under those that Canada

chose to support, voted against adoption or abstained. In terms of a content analysis this examination found that, on an overall basis, Canada did not vote consistently on the substance of the resolutions. A pattern emerged in which Canada's voting behaviour after 1960 varied where specific Colonial Powers were addressed. In other words, Canada did vote consistently for or against Colonial Powers, rather than colonial policies.

Resolution 1568(XX) of December 1965 noted that South Africa's administration of South West Africa was "conducted contrary to the Mandate, the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," etc. Canada chose not to support by abstaining with the USA, the UK and France on this resolution in spite of the relatively large majority voting for adoption and no 'against' votes. Because there were no separate roll calls on the Preamble and the operative parts, it is difficult to say whether Canada disagreed with the notation above or the operative part which requested the Committee on South West Africa "to investigate the situation" and to make proposals to the General Assembly, "which would enable the indigenous inhabitants to achieve a wide measure of internal self-government." This was in 1965 and the resolution did not advocate radical measures even in view of the intransigent attitude of South Africa.

Again, Resolutions 2111 and 2112(XX) of December 1965 and 2226(XXI) of December 9, 1966, show that Canada, the USA, the UK and France were not prepared to support the UN initiative "to fix the earliest possible date" for the independence of Nauru nor were they willing to assist the UN in its attempt to rectify the damage done to the island, as a result of colonial economic policy. The

majority of the members felt that Australia should take "immediate steps...towards restoring the island of Nauru for habitation by the Nauru people." In the first two resolutions, no 'against' votes were registered whereas in the third resolution, only two negative votes were registered.

On the other hand, Resolution 2229(XXI) of December 1966, on Spanish Ifni and Spanish Sahara and Resolution 2230(XXI) of December 1966, on Spanish Equatorial Guinea were similar in substantive terms to those on Australia's Nauru. Nevertheless, Canada and the UK voted with an almost absolute majority for the adoption of Resolution 2229(XI), the USA abstained with France. Canada voted again with the majority on Resolution 2230(XI) whereas the USA, the UK and France abstained. Surely, Canada was not against the UN directive that Colonial Powers "take immediate steps to accelerate the decolonisation of..."; or against fixing an "earliest possible date"; or against "effective measures" that would lead to the "rapid economic development of the territories," in principle. Otherwise, the Delegation would not have registered a roll call vote for the adoption of such resolutions in the case of Spanish territories. Why, then, did Canada not support the UN directive for the almost identical measures to be applied to Australia's territory? Canada chose not to support these measures by abstaining.

Similarly, Canada abstained on the roll calls on the next three Resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, 1760(XVII) of October 31, 1962; 2138(XXI) of October 22, 1966 and 2262(XXII) of November 3, 1967. The Delegation also chose to vote against the adoption of 2022(XX) of November 5, 1965. In

Resolution 1760(XVII), the General Assembly requested the Government of the UK to fulfil its obligation in its colony and establish political institutions which upheld a status of equality among all inhabitants of the territory of Southern Rhodesia. It was, in addition to the other three resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, consonant with operative paragraph 1 of Resolution 1514(XV) which Canada had supported for adoption. They were also in keeping within the operational confines of the Charter.

General Assembly Resolution 2138(XXI) of October 1966 condemned the actions of the UK, which were in contravention not only of Article 1(2) but also of operative paragraphs 1 and 4 of Resolution 1514(XV). Six years after the Declaration, the UK had not fulfilled its Charter obligation to the peoples of Southern Rhodesia. Again Canada chose not to support the UN attempts to rectify its delinquency on the part of the UK. An examination of the text of General Assembly Resolution 2262(XXII) will give some indication of the seriousness of the situation, in this territory, and the kinds of drastic measures that were proposed to bring the UK to act. The UK was condemned for allowing the situation in the territory to deteriorate. In addition, the members that had indirectly contributed to this denial of the inalienable right of the peoples of this territory, were also condemned. This is ordinarily the genre of resolutions which Canada invariably registered an 'against' vote. But, with the majority of the members voting for the adoption of this resolution and the fact that the only two members that had voted against adoption were the two intransigent Colonial

Powers, South Africa and Portugal, Canada chose to abstain instead. Although the net effect was the same as an 'against' vote.

This section will provide an overview of the selected resolutions which dealt specifically with UN measures to secure the condition, in colonial territories, so that the inalienable right of peoples to complete freedom could be realised. The organising principle for this first category stem from operative paragraph 1 of Resolution 1514(XV) in which the General Assembly declared that the effect of colonial domination could no longer be measured solely in term of a denial of intangible rights; the new standard of measurement was its operational effects on the international environment: "world peace and co-operation."

The General Assembly's appeal to the Colonial Powers to abide by the guiding principles of the Charter in the administration of their colonial territories was the only effective means to secure their co-operation in the achievement of conditions in which colonial peoples could exercise their right to complete freedom. The struggle of colonial peoples to achieve economic, social and political independence continued to be met with "armed action" and "repressive measures" by colonial administrations, well into the 1960s. As a result of the escalating armed action and repressive measures in face of the struggle for freedom and the demands of liberation movements in the colonial territories, the situation in most parts of the colonial world presented a threat to international peace and security.

General Assembly resolutions directed members to fulfil the obligations of the UN, "to take effective collective measures for the prevention

and removal of threats to peace." The General Assembly also appealed to members to lend moral and material assistance to the liberation movements in their struggle against Colonial Powers. In light of the 'critical' and "explosive internal situation" arising from repressive colonial policies the following resolutions aimed at securing the compliance of specific Colonial Powers with General Assembly directives of past resolutions. Although the Delegation did vote against the adoption of Resolution 545(VI), Canada automatically had an obligation as a member of the UN to take active measures to promote the right of self-determination when the denial of this right resulted in situations which threatened international peace and security.

At the same time, members also had an obligation under Article 56 of the Charter to support all of the General Assembly's efforts to lead to the termination of repressive colonial administration in the following resolutions. These defined specific situations as threats to international peace and security. They were, Resolutions 1568(XV); 1573(XV); 1596(XV); 1760(XVII); 1807(XVII); 1819(XVII); 1899(XVIII); 2022(XX); 2023(XX); 2262(XXII). However, out of these ten resolutions, only two resolutions were supported by Canada for adoption. The first one, Resolution 1573(XV) was a closed case, that is, "the two parties concerned had accepted the right of self-determination as the basis for the solution of the Algerian problem." By supporting this resolution for adoption, Canada found itself in the company of the USSR. France chose to absent itself from the proceedings. The USA and the UK abstained. Another sort of pattern that was discerned in Canada's behaviour was its not so consistent display of

solidarity with France as it did with the UK, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

A glance at the number of the total membership voting will show that Resolution 1597(XV) which Canada and the USA supported for adoption, received overwhelming support, and there were no 'against' votes. In this category of resolutions which represented the new majority's interpretation of the subjection of colonial peoples and the concomitant UN directives for action, Canada did not find that they were always the kind of policies that it could support. The second category was selected on the basis of operative paragraph 2 Resolution 1514 (XV), by which the General Assembly declared that "all peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue of their right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." This was the authoritative basis from which the General Assembly sought to influence the policies and administration of the Colonial Powers in their territories by recommending that they should first ascertain the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants, then they should take practical steps that were consonant with those wishes.

We see that the disposition of colonial territories were no longer to be left solely to the discretion of the Colonial Powers; the wishes of the colonial peoples themselves would now play a constructive role in their future development. In the following resolutions, the General Assembly sought to initiate democratic processes and insisted on its own functional involvement in the territories to ensure that the Colonial Powers were in fact acting with the consent

of these peoples. The primary means by which the desires of the inhabitants could be ascertained was through elections "based on universal adult suffrage."

To this end, General Assembly Resolutions 2067(XX); 2111(XX) and 2112(XX) of December 1965, and 2138(XXI) of October 1966; 2226(XXI), 2228(XXI), 2229(XXI) and 2230(XXI) of December 1966 were adopted. Most of these resolutions required a UN presence and a functional role in the supervision of the elections in the colonial territories. On the successful execution of these democratic steps, the General Assembly then directed the Colonial Powers to take specific actions that would facilitate the realisation of the inalienable right of colonial peoples to complete freedom. Of the 8 resolutions in this category, Canada chose to abstain on the 4 roll calls that were specific to the territories of Australia and the UK but voted in favour of adoption of the 4 roll calls on the territories of Spain. We also found that the nature of the resolutions played a significant role in the voting positions which Canada took. Canada invariably voted to support what we categorise here as "closed cases" on all the territories. These resolutions were neither operative nor controversial in substance or tone. They more or less "took note" of the situation in the territories in light of some recommendations of the Colonial Powers. For example, Resolution 1573(XV); 1596(XV); 2007(XX) and 2071(XX) were representative of "closed cases" in this section.

General Assembly Resolution 2228(XXI) of December 1966 on the question of French Somaliland is a special case in point. There were two separate roll calls on this resolution. Whereas the bulk of the resolutions may be

considered closed cases in which there were agreement between the conflicting parties on the major part of the problems, there may have been one operative part which was totally unacceptable to some members and it was generally subject to a separate roll call. Canada had voted for the adoption of the resolution as a whole but chose to abstain on the roll call on operative paragraph 4 which requested the colonial power to arrange for a UN presence, before and during the holding of the referendum in the territory. This was a consistent position in Canada's policy of non-interference by the UN in the colonial territories. On the whole, Canada supported mostly those resolutions which served to simply approve the actions of the Colonial Powers over those that attempted to direct their actions in regard to the pace and progress of administration.

David Kay attributed to the new nations a "successful forging between 1960 and 1964 of an international moral consensus against the continuation of Western colonialism."¹⁴² The voting position of Canada indicate its refusal to support the specific kinds of UN initiatives to end Western colonialism. According to Kay, it was "no longer respectable or politic to vote against such measures, and the only prudent means of registering opposition in the Assembly," were 'abstentions'.¹⁴³ This is the path which Canada chose to follow. We have seen in this section that, although Canada continued to take the bold initiative of voting against the adoption of 6 out of 25 roll calls, 12 votes in this sample were abstentions. In other words, Canada did not support 18 out of 25 initiatives in this General Assembly attempt. On the whole, Canada still continued to register a

relatively high percentage of opposing votes in this period. It was a consistently pro-colonial profile despite the 'impropriety' of this position at the UN.

¹ This sample, found in the pocket of this study, necessarily eliminates those resolutions which we have already discussed in chapters V, VI and VII. In the Appendix is a chart which we have designed to accommodate all the roll call voting positions of Canada as discussed in this study. We have assessed Canada's position in relation to those taken by the five major players in the six categories of topics addressed under the colonial issue.

² Canada, House of Commons, November 26, 1957. See also: Michael J. Tucker "Canada and the Test-Ban Negotiations 1955-71," An Acceptance of Paradox, ed. Kim R. Nossal (Toronto: The Bryant Press Ltd., 1982), pp. 118-120. "During the Cold War Canadians...came to see the disarmament discussions as a form of 'gamesmanship' or a 'minuet', in which opposing powers, in rotation and as a matter of form, would present proposals in the full knowledge of their unacceptability. Disarmament negotiations were a "side effect" of propaganda advantage."

"At the 1957 United Nations Disarmament Conference in London (March 18-September 6) – the Western powers...included all first-stage measures in an indivisible package proposal requiring controls so broad as to be unacceptable to Moscow." "....in their public post-mortems on the conference, Canada's political leaders and diplomats placed full blame for its failure on the Soviet Union....In supporting the West's indivisible package proposal, and in casting the blame in the fashion they did, Canadian spokesmen were indulging with their allies in this gamesmanship." See also: MG 31 E 40 Vol: 5 File#8. II 1946-55. DEA Memorandum. Secret. November 27, 1958. From: European Division To: Members of the Summit Conference. Working Group.

³ MG 30, E 163 Vol: 17, 1958. Norman Robertson Papers. From: Escott Reid, Canadian Embassy, Bonn To: Norman Robertson, Under Secretary of State for European Affairs, Ottawa. November 17, 1958. Secret and Personal. Content of a private talk with Diefenbaker during his visit to Bonn. "Indeed, he gave me the impression that he considers it unrealistic to believe that we can have useful negotiations with the Russians."

⁴ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa No: 892, October 10, 1957. Confidential.

⁵ MG 31 E 6 Vol: 5 File: 57. DEA, Summary Reports: United States Political Scene, February 5, 1958. Confidential. "The Administration faces a fundamental difficulty in the form of a Congress that is controlled by the Democrats and accordingly generally hostile to the President...the present Republican Congressional leaders are out of sympathy with the President on many issues....Many domestic factors are also working against the Administration. The economic recession with its rising unemployment, the farm surpluses, the Administration's handling of the segregation issue, have all played their part, but undoubtedly the major issue is that of national security. The Administration has been in the dock while trying to defend its defence policies and reassure the public that it had not allowed the United States to fall so far behind the Soviet Union as to endanger national security, a task that has not been made easy in the face of Sputnik I and II and the failures of the Vanguard rocket. The Administration can, however, draw some comfort now from the recent successful placing of an American satellite in orbit with a Jupiter-C rocket. This project has provided a popular antidote to the alarmists and created a better psychological climate on defence matters for the President."

⁶ MG 31 E 6 Vol: 5 File: 57. DEA, Summary Reports: India's Economic and Financial Crisis, February 25, 1958. Confidential.

⁷ Ibid., the USA was the "largest contributor" of foreign assistance. A \$225 million USA loan was arranged for India to buy "badly needed grain, capital equipment and raw materials." Through the Colombo Plan. Canada was among the donor countries. France and Germany also gave "loan grants or debt deferments." Since 1955, the Soviet Union has given aid for industrial expansion "to about \$270 million." "All this aid has alleviated but not resolved" India's foreign exchange problem and food shortages.

⁸ Ibid., see also: Montreal Gazette articles distributed by the USSEA, world wide and filed in the DEA. MG 30 E 163, Vol: 17. From: B. Keith, European Division To: USSEA, Ottawa, December

3, 1958. Article by W. Lippman, November 12, 1958. "...to make an effective reply to the expansion of Communism in Asia and Africa, it would be necessary to make a demonstration in a large country – preferably India – that there is a way, other than Communism, to overcome mass poverty and national weakness." November 13, 1958: "Reds May Advance in Asia – But are Insecure in Europe: The Communist Revolution will, I think, expand in Asia unless the West makes an heroic effort of statesmanship to demonstrate that there is an alternative to it." RG 25 Vol: 3446 File: 1-1960/3 pt.2. "An important feature of the Far Eastern situation recently has been the deterioration of relations between Communist China and most of the countries of Asia."

⁹ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Washington D.C. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1003 OPIMMEDIATE, April 24, 1959. Secret. Subj.: Africa – Tripartite Discussions USA – Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, UK and French Ambassadors. USA, UK and French – Military Representatives. Canadian Ambassador briefed on April 23 by Dale, Deputy Director, British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs; and Brown (French Desk Officer) both of the USA.

¹⁰ Ibid., in order to "reverse the present rapid deterioration there" it was agreed that "further consultations on Guinea on the expert level" should take place. They decided that they had a "Guinea Problem."

¹¹ The Soviet Rep. was also verbally active in the UN. See: RG 25 Vol: 5361 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.2. From: PERMISNY To: EXTERNAL, Ottawa No: 707 Priority, June 1, 1960. "In his statement Soviet Rep. (Sobolev) said that the birth of the new state was evidence that a new blow had been dealt to the last vestiges of colonialism. Togo's independence, he said, had been made possible first and foremost by the 'persistent and prolonged struggle of the patriotic forces of Togo' headed by the present Prime Minister, Sylvanus Olympio."

RG 25 Vol: 5362 File: 10283-L-40 pt.2. From: Johnson, Yaounde To: Foreign Office No: 29 Saving, September 27, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. Cameroun was admitted to the United Nations on September 21. M. Okala, the Foreign Minister "stated that Cameroun in common with the other states of Africa which had freed themselves from colonialism refused to submit to ideological colonisation. They wanted to keep the cold or the hot war out of Africa and he appealed for pacific co-existence between the two blocs";

From: Small, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner, Hong Kong To: USSEA, Ottawa, 1-R-20-3 Letter No: 305, November 23, 1960. Subj.: Communist China, Cameroons and Revolution. "The death of Felix Moumie, President of the UPC, in Geneva on November 3, touched off a blatant and prolonged outburst by the Communist Chinese...as a means of advancing their thesis regarding the dangers inherent in 'imperialism' in its death throes and pointing out the need for waging a persistent and resolute revolutionary struggle against the 'imperialists' led by the United States." See also: From: McInnes, Canadian High Commissioner, London To: USSEA, Ottawa, Transmittal Slip, November 8, 1960 on comments from The Guardian on the effect of Moumie's death on the future of the Cameroons: "It is not a show piece of British Colonialism...the Cameroons needs to make up for lost time."

¹² RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Washington To: Ottawa No: 1003 OPIMMEDIATE April 24, 1959; RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1856, November 30, 1959. "An innocuous USA resolution (A/C.4/L611) inviting the Secretary General to consider sympathetically requests for economic assistance from territories emerging from a trust status, was adopted unanimously. The USA Delegation explained privately that they had a political motive in view in that the passing of this resolution would provide the means for creating a UN presence in newly independent Trust Territories if this were necessary." RG 25 Vol: 5541 File: 12529-40 pt.2. From: High Commissioner for Canada, London, To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa Despatch No: 3496, November 17, 1960. "Soviet Arms to Morocco" "Howard Smith, Assistant Head for Africa Department, told us today that he was neither surprised nor overly concerned about Moroccan acceptance of Soviet military aid including Jet aircraft." On File: The Times, London Editorial. Morocco and Algeria hope that "the more evidently the Communists become involved in North Africa the more France's allies, and particularly America, will be drawn in to redress the balance." See From: Seaborn To: Secretary of State, Ottawa, November 30, 1960. Despatch No:1267. Confidential. Subj.: "Soviet – Moroccan Relations." See From: High Commissioner, London To:

Under Secretary of State, Ottawa. Despatch No: 841, May 25, 1961. "...the criterion used in respect of both trade and aid by emergent African nations was the simple one of whether it was to their own economic advantage....[they]would accept Soviet aid without considering the ideological implications involved."

¹³ RG 25 Vol: 7792 file: 12530-40 pt.2. From: Canadian High Commissioner, London To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa Despatch No: 4030 November 6, 1959. Secret: Canadian Eyes Only. Subj.: UK Planning on the Future of Africa: proposed Meeting in Ottawa. The Paper "represents a consensus of official views, it carried Ministerial approval to the extent that it is regarded as a fair statement of UK's first approach to the problem of immediate future of Africa. After discussing the Paper with the Americans and ourselves, the CRO proposes to discuss it with the Australians and the New Zealanders....After the preliminary exercise the Foreign Office may have talks with the French and the Belgians and possibly, although this is less likely, with the Portuguese....The Paper strikes us as an able historical summary but is disappointingly inadequate in proposing action for the future...." A UK team – Hunt, Assistant Under Secretary CRO; Eastwood of the CO and Ross, Under Secretary of the African Department-Foreign Office want a meeting in Ottawa after meeting with USA officials in Washington on November 17th.

¹⁴ Ibid., the Paper was not on file or traceable and the High Commissioner was given the document on "a see-and-return basis." Under reference were the High Commissioners Letters 926 of May 11, and 1115 of June 11, not traceable, in which this Paper was discussed and in which "the general thinking of the Whitehall African Committee has been outlined." We, therefore, do not know of the contents of this Paper.

¹⁵ Ibid., the only point of substance on policy in the Despatch was this: "Clearly UK regard as the key to the success of any Western policy in Africa the effective progress of a multi-racial society in Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The work of the Advisory Commission of 26 and the Constitutional Review of 1960 thus have for them a deep significance." The rising violence in the Congo and the fragmentation of the French Union were apparent only after this Paper was prepared.

¹⁶ See: RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.3. From: S. Morley Scott, Memorandum To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, March 3, 1960. Confidential. Subj.: "Visit to neighbouring French territories by Canadian High Commissioner to Accra, Williams." "We believe that anything that can be done to bring about a better understanding between French speaking and English speaking African states should certainly be encouraged." From: Pearson, Dakar To: Foreign Office No: 36 Saving March 14, 1960. Restricted: Canadian Eyes Only. "M. Houphouet-Boigny...mentioned briefly the economic difficulties caused by commercial competition from English-speaking African nations and also Guinea." From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch 237, March 15, 1960. Confidential. "Within the [French] Community there is generally a complete lack of interest and comprehension concerning non-French speaking Africa....The existence of this separation is noteworthy and it will not be a negligible factor for the future." On the other hand, they "...display a fair interest in Togo and Cameroons, both retain their membership in the Franc Zone and are linked to the Community members through other economic arrangements still in force...."

¹⁷ RG 25 Vol 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.2. From: Dakar To: Foreign Office, No: 3. Saving. January 14, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "...it is clear that the 'Cameroons problem' remains to a large degree international. In these circumstances it is important for both, President Ahidjo, and the French to secure support in West Africa for the new Cameroons Government." But this was going to be a difficult enterprise. See: From: Dakar To: Foreign Office. No: 4. Saving. January 14, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "It seems to me that we must be prepared for the problem of the independent Cameroons to come up in the United Nations before long. The country was a UN ward. The armed dissidence is unlikely to stop. There must be many powers who will look for good fishing in such troubled waters....President Ahidjo could argue that French armed forces were there at the invitation of his Government. Both Guinea and Ghana much dislike President Ahidjo and the French...."

¹⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Williams, Accra To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 24, January 18, 1960.

¹⁹ MG 31 E 6 Vol: 5 File 57. DEA, Summary Reports: Reduction of United Kingdom Forces in Germany, March 2, 1958. Secret – Canadian Eyes Only.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ RG 25 Vol: 3445 File: 1-1958/6. DEA, Background Papers: Brief for the Canadian Delegation to Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, September 15-26, 1958.

²² Ibid.

²³ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, No: 892, October 10, 1957. Confidential. RG 25 Vol: 3283 File: 6938-B-40 From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa Despatch 365, April 17, 1959. Confidential. Mr. Armory, American Ambassador to Paris toured French Black Africa and the two Trust Territories of Togo and Cameroons. Witman, the First Secretary at the Embassy accompanied Armory and briefed the Canadian Ambassador on the trip. "It is...surprising that...there should be comparatively little interest in development in other parts of Africa. Virtually no interest was expressed in developments in British Africa, not even in the recent attainment of independence by Ghana; and apart from the immediately neighbouring territories, not much interest was expressed in the path to immediate independence which had been taken by Guinea...."

²⁴ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.1. From: Davis, Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch 291, April 2, 1958. Devernois allowed that Parliament "would not, however, react well if it felt that it was being dictated to by an African pressure group."

²⁵ RG 25 Vol: 3283 file: 6938-B-40. From: Canadian Embassy, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch 660, August 7, 1958. Confidential.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., "the French budget for 1958 devotes 331 billion francs to the overseas territories, half of the USA figure for foreign aid and inevitably cast the odium of imperialism upon France...." See: Jacques Marseille, "The Phases of French Colonial Imperialism: Towards a New Periodization" The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol: XIII, No.3. May 1985, pp. 127-141. "One can reckon that about 500,000 French people resident in France (300,000 of whom are in industry) draw their income directly or more or less directly from commerce between the metropole and the overseas territories: thus, in France itself, one household in 28 is dependent for its basic support on the imperial connection (it is estimated that there are about 14 million households). The importance of this mutual trade is thus considerable. Each of the partners, France on the one hand, the overseas territories on the other owes an important part of its livelihood to the control of the other partner."

²⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12329-40 pt.1.1. From: Canadian Embassy, Paris To: USSEA, Ottawa, Despatch: 787, September 19, 1958, under reference: Despatch 719 of August 29, 1958, not traceable. Enclosure: French Guinea Report by Mr. Bailey, Commercial Secretary of Canadian Embassy, Paris in conversation with Mr. Eichenberger, President of Aluminium Ltd. In French Guinea. "A Canadian company with an investment of approx. \$125 million can quite easily withdraw as...they have not actually commenced the construction. The Fria group of companies (a consortium of French, Swiss and American firms) are not in such an advantageous position. Their investment programme has passed the 'point of no return'. Eichenberger feels that this choice [by Touré] may have very grave consequences...."

²⁹ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Ambassador, Paris To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1046, September 24, 1958. Confidential.

³⁰ RG 25 Vol: 4432 File: 12530-40 pt.1. From: Williams, Canadian High Commissioner, Accra To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 15, January 29, 1959. Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12530-40 pt.2. And from: Sir H. Caccia, Washington D.C. To: Foreign Office, No: 2488, November 28, 1959. Subj.: De Gaulle's negotiation with Senegal and Soudan re: Federation of Mali. USA Embassy in Paris wanted clarification on info Ross received from Sebillear: De Gaulle, Senghor and Keita "reached no conclusion on the relative timing of full independence and the agreement on the association with France. The French wanted the two steps to be simultaneous, while the Africans wanted independence first...."

³¹ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Dupuy, Embassy, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa Despatch: 120. February 5, 1959. Subj.: Executive Council of French Community "held its first meeting February 3-4, "instituting the new French Community which replaces (in part) the old French Union under the Chairmanship of General de Gaulle. The council considered principally such organisational matters as will set the pattern for the future operation of this 'cabinet' of the

Community....Evidently from press statements by African Leaders every attempt is being made to portray the beginning of the Community in the most favourable light." See also:

RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12530-40 pt.2. From: Embassy, Paris To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 897. Priority September 14, 1959. Confidential. Subj.: the Community Executive Council met...matters of common defence discussed....African leaders endorse French possession of the Bomb....In principle goal of independence is retained. De Gaulle underlined evolutionary character of Community...evolution was dependent upon the progress in development of the structure of states themselves....[He]considered ways and means of channelling French aid to Republics through a comprehensive plan....[He]seemed ready to recognise that they do not want independence solely for its own sake and in complete disregard for the future prosperity of their own countries."

³² RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12530-40 pt.2. From: Watson, Dakar To: Foreign Office, Telegram No: 104, December 1, 1959. "De Gaulle considered Mali should accept a French base and bind herself not to give defence facilities to Powers hostile to France. Similarly he wanted to ensure that this, nor future Governments of Mali would vote in the UN against the declared policy of the Community over matters like the atomic bomb or Algeria....Though his declaration of general principles are doubtless sincere, he is apparently not at present prepared in practice to treat Mali as independent and equal. Furthermore, there is no question of France binding herself not to oppose a policy publicly proclaimed by Mali...." And From: Sir G. Jebb, Paris To: Foreign Office No: 353, December 1, 1959. Algerian leaders on talks with de Gaulle "wanted to discover the nature of future association that Mali wants with France....The General was not [publicly] opposed in principle to Mali's becoming independent within the Community."

³³ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12530-40 pt.2. From: G. Jebb, Paris To: Foreign Office, Telegram No: 354, December 1, 1959. "While he [de Gaulle] is not opposed to the evolution of the Community towards a sort of French version of the British Commonwealth, he believes that if it is too rapid there is a danger of complete disintegration." And, RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Dupuy, Embassy Paris To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 154, February 9, 1960. "...whether the French Community could develop along CRO lines. There is no doubt that France is looking at the Commonwealth System." Also From: Cunningham, London To: Doherty, Ottawa, No: 1152/47 March 1, 1960. Confidential. For record of a meeting held in CRO, attended by representatives of Commonwealth Houses in London on December 3, on subject of French Community. CRO and CO officers were also there. P.L. Trotter from Canada House attended.

³⁴ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12530-40 pt.2. From: Embassy, Paris To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1314. Priority, Restricted. Subj.: The Community – The Executive Council Meeting at Saint-Louis du Senegal, on December 11 and 12; See: Telegram No: 104, From: Watson, Dakar To: Foreign Office for more on this.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., at issue are the "reserved powers" of France. Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger were not against an arrangement like Mali's, but Houphouet-Boigny was the powerful force behind the Entente. Mauretania and Madagascar found Mali's choice appealing. On the French political scene: "Liberals view the prospects of evolution to independence as inevitable but the centre-left in the form of the radicals has expressed its uneasiness over the rapid pace of evolution of the structure of the Community in what could be regarded by some as controversial constitutional circumstances. The socialists indicate whole hearted approach, regarding this development as the logical continuation of their own policies when in power after [the]war."

³⁷ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12530-40 pt.2. From: Canadian High Commissioner, London To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 4574, December 17, 1959. Confidential. Watson reported to the Foreign Office that Soustelle (Leader of the ex-Gaullists) and Debre wanted "to preserve the organs of the Community – the Executive Council, the Senate and the Court – Mali could agree to consultative machinery only. Keita went on to explain that they must be intransigent on this since otherwise 'they would not be independent enough either to gain admission to UN or to satisfy public opinion'."

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12530-40 pt.2. From: Watson, Dakar To: Foreign Office. No: 34 Saving. December 21, 1959. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only.

⁴⁰ Despatch No: 365 April 17, 1959. RG 25 Vol: 5362 File: 10283-L-40 pt.2. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch 238, March 17, 1960. Confidential. "The African Ministers seemed under no illusions about the difficulties of independence." See also: RG 25 Vol: 5541 File: 12529-40 pt.2. From: Canadian Commissioner Wood, Leopoldville To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 226. Conference of Heads of French Speaking African States, Brazzaville, December 19-19. All except Guinea, Mali and Togo present. Subj.: Economic co-operation. "Little time seems to have been spent on economic questions beyond a decision to set up a study committee which would meet on January 30 in Dakar to examine possibility of an organisation for African economic co-operations."

⁴¹ Despatch No: 660, August 7, 1958.

⁴² RG 25 Vol: 5362 File: 10283-L-40 pt.2. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 28, March 17, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only.

⁴³ This is the colonial argument in the UN. On the other hand, the following article is consonant with the anti-colonial position on the reason for the chaos. RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1.

DEA File: New York Times, October 16, 1959. Cameroons City Combats Terror: Douala, in French Zone, Set for Independence in 1960, Target of Guerillas. "The specific point at issue is that the UPC demands general elections under United Nations supervision, prior to independence, so that a new Government can be formed before the state is on its own....The disorder has aroused unofficial but bitter international recriminations as well."

⁴⁴ RG 25 Vol: 5362 File: 10283-L-40 pt.2. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch No: 28, March 17, 1960. See also: RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1. From: McPhail Canadian Embassy, Paris To: USSEA, Ottawa. No: Letter 916, November 10, 1959. "Enclosed are two copies of a pamphlet issued recently by the French Government on the Cameroons - 'Ten Years of Investment and Progress under the Aegis of France.' The booklet is a factual summary of the situation in the Cameroons as seen from France, which may prove useful to the Department and to the Department of Trade and Commerce."

⁴⁵ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1. From: NATO, Paris To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1960, October 14, 1959. Confidential. Subj.: Togo and French Cameroons. "In reply to a Danish question, the French Rep. said he was unable to say whether any relationship between Togo and the Cameroons and French Community was contemplated[after they have achieved independence]."

⁴⁶ RG 25 Acc. 90-91/001, Vol: 229 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.2. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch 239, March 17, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only.

⁴⁷ RG 25 vol 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. From: Pearson, Dakar To: Foreign Office. Saving Telegram No: 25, February 25, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only.

⁴⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.3. From: Pearson, Dakar To: Foreign Office. No: 36 Saving. March 14, 1960. Restricted, Canadian Eyes Only.

RG 25 Vol: 5362 File: 10283-L-40 pt.2. From: Hugh-Jones, Conakry To: Foreign Office. No: 32 Saving Telegram, April 18, 1960. Confidential. "The Chinese seem to have done their best to swamp the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Conakry last week....President Sekou Touré [Guinea] has received...invitation to pay an official visit to China."

From: Johnston, Yaounde To: Foreign Office No: 45 Saving, June 4, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. Subj.: Situation in Cameroon. "The Prime Minister...believes the revolutionary movement has passed from local to international phase. He has evidence of terrorist trained in East Germany, of further supplies of automatic weapons from Communist sources and of large transfer of funds from Guinea."

From: Johnston, Yaounde To: Foreign Office, No: 28 Saving, September 14, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "The Government is...becoming more and more alarmed about the Communist threat elsewhere in Africa. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Okala, told me yesterday that he was sure now that the Soudan Republic would fall into the Guinean orbit...."

From: Johnston, Yaounde To: Foreign Office, No: 29 Saving, September 27, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "We have heard rumours to the effect that some 60 terrorists trained in China and the Soviet Union are attempting to infiltrate back and it appears that 5 of them, in possession of Guinean passports, have been arrested in Southern Cameroon."

From: Johnston, Yaounde To: Foreign Office, No: 30 Saving. October 12, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "President Ahidjo [Cameroon] defended association with the European economic Community both as a market for exports and as a source of public investment."

⁴⁹ All Africa north of the equator were independent except Algeria* (and the Sahara), French Somaliland (which had a fixed trusteeship time-limit set by the UN) and several relatively small UK, Portuguese and Spanish possessions. South of the equator: South Africa, Madagascar and the Belgian Congo were independent. Portugal claimed that Angola and Mozambique were Portuguese 'provinces'; South West Africa was still a South African mandate and the UK was working towards some sort of accommodation with its white settler colonies in East and Central Africa.

*Algeria:

Jacques Marseille, "The Phases of French Colonial Imperialism: Towards a New Periodization," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol: XIII, No.3, May 1985. "the favoured fields of expansion, the areas of high profit, the preferential markets, were Indochina and Algeria." RG 25 Vol: 6977 File: 5475-FA-78-40 pt.1. From: Williams, Accra To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 115 July 13, 1959. Confidential. Subj.: Ghana's Recognition of Provisional Government of Algeria. "Ghana accorded recognition knowing that M. Debre had announced that in future France would break off diplomatic relations with any state that recognised the Provisional Government of Algeria....Ghana is a valuable listening post for France. Ghana is also an important market for surrounding French territories and provides employment for itinerant workers from them."

⁵⁰ RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. G. McInnes, Notes on a Study Tour of Commonwealth Members and United Kingdom Dependent Territories in Africa South of the Sahara, September 25, 1958. Personal and Confidential. The Imperial Defence College pursue study tours of areas whose problems are discussed at headquarters. The party was overwhelmingly staffed by Defence Service Officers and members of the Board of Trade of the UK. McInnes of the Department of External Affairs was the Canadian Representative; 1-Australian (RAAF); 1-New Zealand (RNZAF); 1-USA (State Department). "The Party was almost completely 'contained' by United Kingdom representatives throughout the tour. But where Canadian (or Australian) representatives were on the ground, as in Cape Town and Accra...we had access to other points of view." The IDC however, enabled "frank off-the-record interviews, discussion and question periods at the highest levels except in the Union."

⁵¹ Ibid., "this has resulted in the enlargement of the East Africa Command and a substantial increase in RAF facilities and personnel in the area."

⁵² Ibid., "the Colonial Office, aware of this disparity, has made one of its most constructive efforts in a land-reform scheme in the Aberdares and the lower slopes of Mount Kenya....The [Kikuyu] tribe is gradually being raised above the level of subsistence."

⁵³ Ibid., "M'Boya and his colleagues are trying to build up a political party on a basis similar to that of the CPP in Ghana. M'Boya is convinced that the chances for a colony's early independence are enhanced if its leaders can persuade the British that well trained, responsible political and administrative cadres exist to whom power can be handed."

⁵⁴ Ibid., Tanganyika was not on the itinerary but the subject was discussed with officials in Kenya and Uganda. Dr. Nyerere head of the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) estimated independence in 1975, 'Informants' in Kenya felt about the year 2000 and the UN Visiting Mission of 1955 speculated "within the present generation." Tanganyika got independence in 1961.

⁵⁵ Ibid., "The Federation is a crucial laboratory for testing the theory of a plural society on the British model. Its progress will be watched closely in the Congo, in French Africa and in Asia." In 1963: Sarawak and British North Borneo were joined to Malaya to form Malaysia. Singapore was also included in this federation for two years, 1963-1965.

⁵⁶ Ibid., the decision "was not forced on the British or the liberal Rhodesians by the emergence of Ghana or by the prospect of an independent Nigeria."

⁵⁷ Ibid., "The Northern Region comprises three quarters of the area and half the population of Nigeria and is strongly Muslim; hence the pagan Eastern and Western Regions fear domination by the North. The North is very backward by Western standards. Political strength has been concentrated, through the United Kingdom principle of indirect rule, in the hands of the powerful

Emirs...trained administrators and technicians are few and far between and the North has to rely on the bright Ibo clerk from the south (the babu of Nigeria) whom he dislikes, and on the English Administrators....The Emirs really rule."

⁵⁸ Study Tour.

⁵⁹ RG 25 Vol: 4426 File: 12290-40 pt.1. From: Candel, New York, To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1962. Priority November 19, 1958. Confidential. Info: London, Embassy, Paris, Washington, D.C. Accra. "The Northern Cameroons is administered as a part of the Northern Region of Nigeria and participates in the legislature of that region and it is expected that it will wish to retain this status. The Nigerian Authorities have offered very favourable terms to the Southern Cameroons, full regional status for a proportionately much smaller population, if the Southern Cameroons also decide on integration with Nigeria.

⁶⁰ From: Candel N.Y. To: Ottawa, Telegram No: 1776 of October 30, 1958.

⁶¹ Despatch: 1962 of November 19, 1958.

Do you wish to integrate with Nigeria?

Do you wish unification with the French Cameroons or

Do you wish to continue under a modified Trusteeship Agreement pending settlement of your future status?

⁶² RG 25 Vol: 4426 File: 12290-40 pt.1. Department of External Affairs Memorandum: From: UN Division To: Commonwealth Division, November 26, 1958. Confidential. Subj.: "Discussions in UN on the future of the Cameroons." "The UK, France and the USA will probably oppose the holding of a Special Session. The UK and France, presumably because a Special Session would increase the likelihood of simultaneous consultations being held in both territories, which would greatly favour the unification movement. Sir Andrew Cohen, when he was in Ottawa last September, indicated that both the UK and France would oppose demands for a joint plebiscite. 'Both the British and French administrations were opposed to integration. The British, because it would necessarily be made on French Cameroon terms in view of the overwhelming majority of French speaking Cameroonians; the French, because of the threat that a British educated element would pose to continuation of their influence after independence has been achieved'. (Extract from Departmental Memos re: 'Pre-Assembly talks in Ottawa' on September 12, a copy of which was sent to you." Signed: Grondin.

⁶³ Despatch No: 1962, November 19, 1958.

⁶⁴ Ibid., French Memo (A/C.4/388). RG 25 Vol: 4426 File: 12290-40 pt.1. From: Candel, N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, November 20, 1958. Confidential. "Haiti and Mexico raised objections to 'no consultation of the peoples of British Cameroons before December, 1959' and that the French Cameroons should also hold elections at the same time thus affording equal 'considerations' of the 2 territories by the UN." Paragraph 3: "The usual group of 'anti-administration' countries – Ceylon, India, Ghana, Mexico, Yugoslavia etc. are meeting to discuss terms of a possible draft resolution."

⁶⁵ RG 25 Vol: 4426 File 12290-40 pt.1. From: United Nations Division, Ottawa To: Commonwealth Division, Ottawa, November 24, 1958. Confidential. "Under reference: Candel, N.Y. No: 1981, November 20, 1958, not in File and not traceable. Apparently the Delegation had asked for instructions for Canada's vote "on the desirability of holding UN supervised elections in both British and French Cameroons and concurrently with the elections, a plebiscite on the unification issue." The UN Division described the future of the Cameroons as a "very complicated problem" and unification as a "vexing issue." The Delegation had also informed Ottawa of the anti-colonial position on the above matters. See also: RG 25 Vol: 4426 File: 12290-40 pt.1. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa, Despatch 311, April 15, 1958. Restricted. Subj.: Political Situation in the French Cameroons. "...the tangled skein of Cameroun policy, a subject particularly complex because of the divisive forces of the country. The political parties tend to divide along regional and to some extent ethnic lines and, with one exception, cannot be fitted easily into the usual political spectrum of left or right."

⁶⁶ Was this situation a factor in Canada's decision-making process? RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12529-40 pt.1.2. Study Tour. "The importance of Kano as an international airport and as a military airfield on the staging route to East Africa and the Gulf has increased greatly during the past five years. The IDC party had a dramatic example of its value to the UK during the Iraq-Jordan-

Lebanon crisis. With El Adem full to capacity for ferrying troops to Jordan and with the Foreign Office dubious as to whether such a party should overfly the Sudan, we were diverted at short notice via Idress to Kano. Such emergency decisions, of which this is a very minor example, may increase in the future."

⁶⁷ From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Despatch No: 2006, November 24, 1958. Confidential. Info: Washington D.C., London, Embassy, Paris. "The consolidated text was the result of three days' negotiations between the Administering Authorities and representatives of all other groups in the Committee."

⁶⁸ Ibid. The French view: "In the French view the General Assembly would be able to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement for the French Cameroons at its fourteenth session since the French government and the government of the Cameroons under French administration are in complete agreement on the date of independence for that territory, they do not feel that it is necessary to hold a plebiscite to consult the people on their desires regarding independence."

The UK view: "The UK would oppose the resolution because they would greatly prefer to adhere to the timetable proposed by Sir Andrew Cohen in his statement to the Committee (OURTEL 1962) and, if a Special Session is necessary, to hold one in the summer of 1960 to authorise a plebiscite in the British Cameroons."

The USA view: "The USA has become greatly concerned at the possibility that the question of Chinese representation and Hungarian credentials would be raised at the opening of a Special Session. There is, of course, an equally embarrassing possibility that, if a resumed session were held to consider the future of the Cameroons, other equally embarrassing items might be carried over from the current session."

⁶⁹ Ibid., Draft Resolution L557 – called for a Special Session, can be adopted by a simple majority. Draft Resolution L 558 – dealt with the substance of the Trusteeship Agreement and, therefore, needed a 2/3 majority.

⁷⁰ From: Permis N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Despatch: 2228. Priority. December 31, 1958. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. Members of Visiting Mission: India, New Zealand, Haiti, USA. Information from Thorpe: "Strictly Confidential: for Canadian Eyes Only."

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/336, Vol: 155 File: 5475-DW-58-E-40. From: UN Division, Memorandum for the Minister To: USSEA, Ottawa, January 29, 1959. Confidential. Stamped: "Seen by the Minister."

⁷⁴ From: Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa. No Letter: 123, February 9, 1959. Confidential.

⁷⁵ "This fact seemed to be an acceptable one, to the Canadian Delegation, in the context of the recommendation of the Visiting Mission which observed: " There are certainly insufficient grounds, in the mission's view, for holding a new general election. It must be remembered that it was the present Legislative Assembly and Government which demanded and obtained from France the commitment to grant independence. It would be ironic if their representative character were to be called in question. Nevertheless, the Mission came to the conclusion, which it placed before the Cameoon authorities, that it would be desirable to rectify as soon as possible the situation in the Sanaga-Maritime by means of elections both to fill the two vacant seats there, and also if need be, to confirm or alter the representation of the other two." Ibid.

⁷⁶ D. Osborne, Brief for the Canadian Delegation to the Resumed Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly. February 17, 1959. Confidential. Prepared by the UN Division and sent to the Under Secretary who referred it to N.A. Robertson, Secretary of State: "You may wish the Minister to see." Whereupon the Secretary of State sent a Memorandum for the Minister, February 17, 1959. Confidential for his approval.

RG 25 Vol: 5362 File: 10283-L-40 pt.2. From: Johnston, Yaounde To: Foreign Office, No:6 Saving, March 14, 1960. Confidential Canadian Eyes Only. "The immediate reason" for the revocation of the French decree of July 1955 outlawing the UPC and the Allied Union Democratique des Femmes Camerounaises (U. DE.FE.C.) and Jeunesses Democratique Comerounaise (J.D.C.) "is clear....Ahidjo has no support in the South, even in departments controlled by his own Ministers....The recognition of the UPC is also an attempt to divide the

opposition...and to strengthen the moderate faction led by Mayo Matip at the expense of the Communist wing led by Moumie...."

RG 25 Vol: 5362 File: 10283-L-40 pt.2. From: Johnston, Yaounde To: Foreign Office No:7 Saving Telegram, March 15, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "Ahidjo has gone so far as to remove residence restrictions on twenty individuals....The political situation as the parties prepare for elections on April 10, is still very confused....The maintenance of French troops is of course a charge on the French exchequer."

From: Embassy, Paris To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 371, April 8, 1960. "Moumie has instructed his UPC adherents to abstain [in the election]." From Johnston, Yaounde To: Foreign Office No: 10 Saving, April 13, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "....terrorist activity has been so indiscriminate that it has alienated all public support and failed in its objective of keeping people away from the polls....Moumie having called for a boycott of the elections his followers intensified terrorist activity on the eve of the polls."

⁷⁷ RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/336 Vol: 155 File: 5475-DW-58-E-40. From: Osborne, United Nations Division, Brief for the Canadian Delegation to the Resumed Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly. February 17, 1959. Confidential. Policy Guidance: The Delegation may support the following proposals if they are made:

1. That further consultation of the inhabitants of the French Cameroons and new elections are not necessary before that territory takes its independence in January 1, 1960.
2. That the Northern and Southern areas of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration should be treated as separate entities with regard to their future status.
3. That no consultation of the peoples of the Northern area of the British Cameroons is necessary, and that they should be allowed to remain an integral part of the Northern region of the Federation of Nigeria when that territory attains its independence on October 1, 1960.
4. That the General Assembly should not take steps at the Resumed Session to abrogate the Trusteeship Agreement for the Southern area of the British Cameroons until the newly elected Legislative Assembly of that territory and its Government have arrived at a decision regarding the territory's future status. If no such proposal is forthcoming by the end of the resumed session, the General Assembly should defer its decision to its 14th regular session.

⁷⁸ From: Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London To: High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Ottawa. Inward Telegram Priority No: W.112, February 18, 1959. Confidential. "At your discretion you may convey this information to Commonwealth authorities adding that the situation remains confused and that Government and Opposition of Southern Cameroons, both commanding considerable electoral support, are not agreed on next steps."

⁷⁹ From: Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London To: High Commissioner for UK, Ottawa. Inward Telegram No: W.114, February 19, 1959. Confidential. Transmitted From: M.K. Evans, UK High Commissioner, Ottawa To: J.A. Irwin, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, February 19, 1959.

⁸⁰ From: L.A. Mc Cordick, Memorandum To: USSEA, Febr 25, 1959. Confidential

⁸¹ From: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa To: Permis N.Y. No: V60. February 26, 1959. Confidential. Under reference: N.Y. Telegram: 204 and 205 of February 24, not traceable; also Telegram: 28, February 18, 1959 From: Accra transmitted From: Ottawa To: New York – with conflicting views between the Government of Ghana and its Delegation in New York.

⁸² From: Permis N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. No: 221, February 27, 1959. Secret. Under reference: Permis Telegram 217 of February 26, not traceable. Information to: London, Washington D.C., Embassy Paris, Priority Bag Accra, from London. "The operative paragraph on the inadvisability of further consultation before independence was replaced by a rather vague text avoiding any allusion to possible new elections, but conveying recommendation against elections by implication. This change was considered desirable in order to avoid any unnecessary provocation of African and other partisans of a new election before 1960."

⁸³ Ibid., all the Visiting Mission's members were working for the French cause. This made the anti-colonials skeptical of the objectivity of the Visiting Mission's Report.

⁸⁴ From: Permis N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, No:243, March 3, 1959. Confidential. Under reference: N.Y. Telegram: 244, not traceable. "The qualifications of the voters and the exact wording of the questions to be put in the plebiscite in the South were supposed to

be the only outstanding matters." But this was just the beginning of the process for British Cameroons. See: RG 25 Vol: 4426 File: 12290-40 pt.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1374. Priority. Confidential. USA "took a slight tactical initiative by co-sponsoring [with mostly Africans] the resolution although remaining in the background. We spoke in favour of the resolution as authorised by your Telegram K137 of September 29." Resolutions A/C.4/591 Rev.1 adopted by 74 votes (Canada) to none with 2 abstentions (Afghanistan and Iraq):

- postponing plebiscite until early 1961 for Southern Cameroons.
- Question to be asked – either union with Nigeria or with the Cameroons Republic.
- Plebiscite results for Northern Cameroons available in November.

From: Canadian Delegation to N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa, No: Letter 7, October 6, 1959. Confidential. If the Northern Cameroons choose to join Nigeria "this raises the question whether the Trusteeship Agreement can be amended or...have to be replaced....The chief opposing [legal] views are the Indian and the UK argument....The Indian view – termination of Trusteeship Agreement and new interim arrangements....They do not wish to see a precedent created for the partition of a Trust Territory which could be applied to Southwest Africa...the UK and UN legal Council share views and the Trusteeship Agreement could be amended to exclude the territory of the Northern Cameroons."

From: David Stansfield, Commonwealth Division To: Mr. Graham, Legal Division, October 27, 1959. Confidential. "It would cause insurmountable difficulties for the British if they were called upon to administer for the Northern region of the Cameroons separately after Nigeria's independence....We should be grateful for your opinion as soon as possible...."

DEA Memorandum, From: Legal Division To: Commonwealth Division, November 6, 1959. Confidential. Subject: Future of British Cameroons: Legal Implications "...the legality of the amendment does not depend so much on the degree of change envisaged by the amendment as on the compatibility of the amendment with the purposes and plain meaning of the Agreement. Mr. Menon, himself, largely undermined his position by explaining that it was motivated, in part, by political considerations...we are unable to understand how a precedent established by amending the Cameroons Trusteeship Agreement...could endanger the status of Southwest Africa, provided, of course, the Administering Authority does not have undue control over the amending process."

From: SSEA, Ottawa To: Candel N.Y. K-618, November 9, 1959. Confidential. Transmitted legal Memorandum to Delegation. The British proposal for amendment "...would not be inconsistent with the 'basic objectives' of the Trusteeship Agreement. (Art.: 17 of Agreement and Art.: 79 and 85 of Charter) Under Art.: 18 of Charter any such amendment would require the approval of a 2/3 majority in the General Assembly that is to say that it is 'an important matter'."

⁸⁵ From: Permis N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. No: 275, March 9, 1959. Confidential. "The Africans even attempted to recall all petitioners but India, Iceland and Sweden undertook to forestall this." Nevertheless the Committee continued to hear Petitioners from French Cameroons well into late 1959. See: RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1641, November 6, 1959. Confidential. "Amid alternating between desultory questioning of Petitioners from the French Cameroons and Ruanda-Urundi and hearing the first speeches of the General Debate on this Item....We agree that a resolution calling for new elections under UN supervision before January 1, 1960 would be unlikely to receive much attention."

⁸⁶ From: High Commissioner for Canada, Accra To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch: 275, June 22, 1959. Restricted. "He felt that Nkrumah was 'undoubtedly influenced' by the prior elections in French Togoland which resulted in the overthrow of the old government." RG 25 Vol: 5362 File: 10283-L-40 pt.2. From: Canadian Ambassador, Paris To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch 238, March 17, 1960. Confidential. McPhail, Memorandum for the Minister as enclosure with above Despatch. "Moumie wanted an election before independence in order to be able to write his own constitution and to govern the independent state from its start along the (Marxist) line he favours."

⁸⁷ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1. From: DEA Intelligence Liaison (2) Division To: Commonwealth Division also To: UN Division, July 14, 1959. Secret. An extract from the Central Intelligence, United States Central Intelligence Agency.

⁸⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1. P. Dumas, UN Division, Ottawa, Resumed Thirteenth Session Fourth Committee CH: VII, Confidential. "It co-operated actively with these different Delegations in the preparation and introduction of the two main resolutions, notably in ensuring that these texts met with the approval of the Asian Delegations. Our Delegation also had occasional contacts with a number of uncommitted or neutral Delegations (such as those of Tunisia, Lebanon, Finland and Israel) and with a few Latin Americans."

⁸⁹ The real problems started for the UK with the return of the election results in Northern Cameroons. From: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa To: Candel N.Y. No: Letter K-189, November 19, 1959. Confidential. Northern Cameroons have voted against integration with Northern Nigeria, "we should be interested in any information that you may be able to obtain as to how the Assembly may treat this new development....We should also be interested in any UK interpretation of the reasons of the unexpected result."

From: Bestall, Yaounde To: Foreign Office, UK Inward Saving Telegram No: 5, November 20, 1959. Confidential. "...results of the plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons was received with pleasure in this territory. The Minister of Public Works, M. Dumaroa Sanda, deputy for Maroua in the district facing the Northern Cameroons...told me that the vote represented the desire of the mass of people for separation from Nigeria: He maintained that only the Chiefs really wanted integration and felt that now the region would eventually join the French Cameroons." RG 25 Vol: 4426 File: 12290-40-pt.1. From: Foreign Office To: Certain of Her Majesty's Representatives. Intel No: 138, December 23, 1959. Restricted. Transmittal slip From: K. Ewans, UK High Commissioner, Ottawa To: D. Stansfield, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. "The result came as a surprise although...confidence that the majority would desire the first choice [integration] had diminished as the plebiscite approached."

From: High Commissioner, London To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa Despatch No: 4234, November 24, 1959. Priority. Confidential. Emanuel, Head of the West African Department in Colonial Office explained the reasons for the election results: "was due partly to the way in which the UN Commission phrased the questions to be asked....Emanuel emphasised that it had never been a question of asking the Northern Cameroons whether they would join some other entity than Nigeria...the vote is not to be interpreted as an anti-Nigerian vote....The fresh plebiscite to be held after Nigeria's independence in March, 1961 is likely to result in a wish to join Nigeria."

From: Washington D.C. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2951, November 25, 1959. Confidential. "USA Consul General in Kaduna interpreted the plebiscite results as a heavy protest vote against the NPC and the Native Authorities by people who had never previously had an opportunity of expressing their feelings about their rulers." RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa 1828. November 26, 1959. Priority. Confidential. Under ref: Ottawa's Telegram K-189, November 19, 1959. UK Delegation instructed "to press for a decision on arrangements for a new plebiscite at this session. They envisage new plebiscite to be held early 1961....UK Delegation emphasise that despite their similarities the two plebiscites [for Northern and Southern Cameroons] must clearly be separate. They expect that in a second plebiscite the North will vote for union with Nigeria...the South may also vote for union with Nigeria but they are less certain." The alternatives on the both plebiscites will be the same: a clear choice between joining an independent Nigeria or joining the independent Cameroons. RG 25 Vol: 4426 File: 12290-40 pt.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1931, December 11, 1959. Confidential. Canada, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden introduced a resolution in the Fourth Committee "on arrangements" for a new plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons with the conditions outlined above. (A/C4/L636/Rev.1) The UK Delegation agreed on the points of the resolution "only when it became evident that no resolution could be successful unless it made provision for universal suffrage....There was "considerable Afro-Asian support" and a "strong feeling in the Committee" that the UK should undertake 'immediate' steps to separate the Northern Cameroons from Nigeria. "The operative language of the resolution makes several references to the pressing need, which was conceded by the UK Delegation, to initiate immediate reforms in the system of local government and undertake separation of the Northern Cameroons from Nigeria."

⁹⁰ Ibid., this friendly support from India was only temporary. Ghana and Guinea continued to be difficult. Ghana, Guinea, India, the UAR and others sponsored a resolution on the French Cameroons (A/C.4/L610) calling for a Commission of 3 members to be despatched immediately to the French Cameroons to ensure "that the territory will accede to independence in an atmosphere of peace and harmony." RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1856, November 30, 1959. Confidential Subj.: Report of the Trusteeship Council. "There was obviously considerable feelings in the Committee against this resolution. A number of Delegations within the anti-colonial group warned the Indians, who were generally considered along with the Guineans to be the villains of the piece, that the resolution was much too extreme and that the result of pressing it would be disastrous....A number of Delegation friendly to France, which do not normally appear in the Fourth Committee, appeared and voted against the resolution." 41 votes against (Canada, UK, USA) 33 in favour (Soviet, Arab blocs, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Mexico) with 7 abstentions.

⁹¹ RG 25 Vol: 6977 File: 5475-FA-78-40 pt.1. From: Williams, Accra To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No. 302, December 28, 1959. Restricted. Subj.: Visit of Secretary General of UN to Ghana. By changing the departure date of the Secretary General "the Ghanaians were, I think, trying to pull a fast one on the Secretary General by having him proceed to Togoland via HO, which is in the Volta region and is the centre of the Ewe community. There have been reports that the Secretary General...would encounter spontaneous demonstrations urging unification of Togoland with Ghana....The Ghanaians were, I think, a little inept in trying to use the Secretary General for their own purposes."

⁹² RG 25 Vol: 5498 File: 12290-40 pt.2. From: Yaounde To: Foreign Office, No: 1 Saving. January 13, 1961. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "The Camerounian Government is much concerned over the activities of Nigerian officials in the Northern Cameroons who are alleged to be conducting a vigorous campaign to persuade the people to vote in favour of joining Nigeria. The Government is upset that so far permission to send official representatives from the Republic to campaign in favour of 'reunification' has been refused."

⁹³ RG 25 Vol: 4426 File: 12290-40 pt.1. From: Australian Mission to UN, N.Y. To: R.G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs, Canberra. File No: 108/1 Despatch No: 2/60, January 18, 1960. Secret.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.2. From: Mr. Bestall, Yaounde To: Foreign Office. No:1. Saving. January 18, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "Reinforcements of troops have arrived from France for intensified operations in the Bamileke and the Mongo, Dschang. With the removal of the parental eye of the U.N.O. and the accompanying world spotlight, the Cameroonians are expected to take more drastic measures than previously...."

⁹⁶ From: Permiss N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 78, January 27, 1960. Restricted. Slim (Tunisia) "referred briefly to the alternative proposals for Cameroonian independence which Tunisia and other African states had unsuccessfully put forward during the last session and the rejection of those proposals...."Draft Resolution (Doc.5/4258/ADD.1) was unanimous in admitting Cameroons to the UN.

⁹⁷ This matter was not addressed in any of the correspondences. RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.2. From: Canadian High Commissioner, Accra To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 2, January 4, 1960. Subj.: Ghanaian Representation at French Cameroons Independence Ceremonies. M. Guiringaud, the French Ambassador told Williams that Ghana "did not attend the ceremonies because of its support of the UPC headed by Moumie and also probably to maintain the myth that the French Community members are not really independent and are creatures of France."

RG 25 Vol: 5362 File: 10283-L-40 pt.2. From: Mr. Hugh-Jones, Conakry To: Foreign Office, No: 14. Saving. Telegram; February 26, 1960. Restricted, Canadian Eyes Only. Subj.: Recognition of Cameroons. "Agence Guinéene de Presse today published an announcement that the Governments of Liberia, Ghana and Guinea had yesterday, February 25, recognised the independence and sovereignty of the State of Cameroon and wished the new state welcome de tout coeur in the community of nations. The three Governments assured the people of Cameroon of their sympathy and co-operation sans réserve."

⁹⁸ The West was certainly aware of this and undertook precautionary measures to head off Communist involvement, at least at the official level. See: Mr. Johnston, Yaounde To: Foreign Office, No: 6 Saving. March 2, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. Subj.: Situation in Cameroon. "A Chinese Nationalist Chargé d'Affaires is now installed in Yaounde [5 days after Cameroon is admitted to the UN] and an Ambassador is expected in due course. This appointment is evidently designed to block the establishment of a mission by the Chinese People's Republic, which sent a message of recognition at the time of independence." The West German Government followed the identical procedure to prevent East Germany getting a foothold there. See: From: G.B. Summers, Canadian Mission, Iran To: SSEA, Ottawa. Despatch 221, March 14, 1960. Confidential. Mr. Henning Thomsen, German Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon "told me that Bonn had made a very special effort to speed up the procedures for approval of his nomination which went through in record time, the Republic of the Cameroons had co-operated in giving an immediate agrément arranging for prompt presentation of the credentials. All this had been done with the specific objective of forestalling any possibility of East German representation...." Mr. Thomsen mentioned that East Germany was indeed showing interest in the former German colony...some East Germans had managed to enter the Cameroons and had propaganda material for distribution...." "He said that the political situation was extremely unstable and the Government has not, at the present time, effective control of the country."

⁹⁹ RG 25 Vol: 5499 File: 12290-40 pt.3. From: Embassy, Paris To: External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1338, October 19, 1961. Confidential. Subj.: Cameroons and Togoland. Info: Remouville, Desk Officer for Cameroun and Togo in the reorganised African services at the Quai.

¹⁰⁰ The UN obviously attempted to forestall this: RG 25 Vol: 4426 File: 12290-40 pt.1. From: PERMISNY To: External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 718, June 2, 1960. Restricted. Subj.: Trusteeship Council: Future of the Cameroons under UK admin – Annual Report. "Resolution requested the UK to take steps to insure that the people of the territory are fully informed before the plebiscite, of the constitutional arrangements that would have to be made for the implementation of the decisions of the plebiscite. This recommendation is equivalent to saying that the people in the Trust Territory should know the terms of the union with either Nigeria or with the Cameroun Republic before the plebiscite recommended in Resolutions 1352 and 1473 of the Fourteenth General Assembly take place." However, the Prime Minister of the Cameroun Republic was undertaking public overtures towards the re-unification of the Cameroons. See: RG 25 Vol: 5362 file: 10283-L-40 pt.2. From: Yaounde To: Foreign Office No: 19 Saving. June 22, 1960, Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "Not only must it be the subject of a free decision by the inhabitants of British Cameroons, but this decision must be seen to be free, which was why they have gone on record at the United Nations in requiring the complete separation of the administration of the Northern Cameroons from that of Nigeria....He hoped to meet Mr. Foncha shortly and discuss the bases of re-unification 'even before the plebiscite'." From: Foreign Office To: Paris No: 1510, August 5, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "...stress the undesirability of leaving the future of the British Cameroons open[to Mr. Ahidjo]" From: Lord Gladwyn, Paris To: Foreign Office No: 302, August 9, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "Acting Directeur d'Afrique/Levant, Limairac ...admitted...that, as Administering Authority, Her Majesty's Government had an obligation to see that the population of Southern Cameroons were fully informed on the implications of the two choices before them." From Yaounde To: Foreign Office, No: 26 Saving, August 17, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "Proposals for UNIFICATION between Southern Cameroons and Cameroun Republic." See also: From: Yaounde To: Foreign Office, No: 31 Saving. October 17, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "Delegation of Southern Cameroons majority party led by Prime Minister Foncha held discussions with Government of Republic in Yaounde from October 10 to 15."

¹⁰¹ RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/414 Vol: 207 File: 12858-40 pt.1. DEA Memorandum From: D.K. Doherty, Commonwealth Division To: USSEA. December 16, 1959. Secret. Subj.: CO, CRO and FO visited Ottawa to learn views of Canadian officials on UK inter-departmental Paper Africa: The Next Ten Years. 3. Northern Cameroons. "The result of the plebiscite held in Northern Cameroons, where the population opted to decide on its future status at a later date rather than integrate with Northern Nigeria on that countries independence, was a surprise to everyone

concerned and would raise serious administrative problems, according to the UK officials....The UK authorities intended to suggest to the General Assembly that there should be a second plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons...but the vote would be counted separately, so that the Northern Cameroons' choice would be independent of the choice of the people in the south. The UK considered this essential since there was a far more likelihood that the South would opt for unification with the French territory."

¹⁰² No: 1338, October 19, 1961. RG 25 Acc.No: 90-91/001 Vol: 229 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.2.Inward Saving Telegram No: 2, From: Watson, Dakar To: Foreign Office, January 7, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "Mr. Olympio had...made a point, in his address to the Special Session of the Togolese Assembly in front of Mr. Hammerskjöld of referring to the general discontent in British Togoland at the way in which that territory had been integrated into Ghana." RG 25 Vol: 5361 File: 10283-F-1-40 pt.2. Togo:History and Prospects. From: Watson To: Selwyn Lloyd, JF 1018/12, March 28, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. "In May 1956 a referendum was held in British Togoland as a result of which it was incorporated in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) in spite of Ewe opposition."

¹⁰³ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1. D.C. Arnould, Permiss, N.Y.: Resumed Thirteenth Session, Fourth Committee CH: VII Annex I. Confidential.

RG 25 Vol: 7792-40 pt.1.2. McInnes, Department of External Affairs, Study Tour, September, 1958. "Dr. Nkrumah's commanding position as a spokesman for emergent African nationalism.."

RG 25 Vol: 6977 File: 5475-FA-78-40 pt.1. From: High Commissioner for Canada, Ghana To: USSEA, Ottawa, Ghana Press Release No: 755/59 Subj.: French Cameroons "...it is our view that free and democratic elections should be held in the Cameroons before independence. We believe that such elections would help to establish peace and security in the new African State....The elections will also provide the United Nations with an opportunity of establishing a clear principle and procedure for the attainment of independence by Trust Territories for whom the United Nations has ultimate responsibility."

RG 25 Vol: 6977 File: 5475-FA-78-40 pt.1. From: Permiss N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Telegram No: 851, July 15, 1959. Secret. "Incidentally, Iha [India] tells me that he understands that Chapman may have been removed from his UN responsibilities because he was not...considered sufficiently vigorous in pursuing the more extreme lines of Ghana policy and that the new Permanent Representative may be expected to be more 'fanatical'." Ghana submitted a resolution (A/C.4/L 614) on the situation in Ruanda Urundi requesting the Trusteeship Council to consider the programme of reforms for the territory announced by Belgium:- adopted unanimously. RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1856, November 30, 1959. Confidential. "The resolution by Ghana...and the Guinean resolution on French Cameroons [A/C.4/L 610] provided perhaps the most striking example so far of the contrast between Ghanaian moderation and Guinean extremism."

¹⁰⁴ RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1. From: USSEA, Ottawa To: Permanent Mission of Canada to UN, N.Y. No: K-607, November 3, 1959. Confidential. Under Reference Telegram V-231 of June 23, 1959 on French Cameroons, not traceable. The French Ambassador in Ottawa suggested that "the initiative to reopen" the question of holding new elections under UN supervision before independence in French Cameroons "might come from Guinea with perhaps the support of the Soviet bloc and possibly a few Afro-Asian members. Ghana and Liberia which shared the views of Guinea...are described as now adopting a definitely reserved attitude....The Guinea initiative has little chance to succeed and therefore may be intended chiefly for propaganda purposes, notably with a view to representing Guinea as the staunchest defender of Black Africa and possibly to fostering opposition to the Colonial Powers in the African territories still under their control." Dumas, UN Division, Resumed Thirteenth Session. "As for the Soviet bloc Delegations, they could have been far more active, but obviously thought it more profitable to let the Africans and Arabs do battle against France and the United Kingdom."

¹⁰⁵ Arnould, Resumed Thirteenth Session

¹⁰⁶ Since India was perceived to be a key player in the UN context, the first contact as sought there. RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi To: SSEA, Ottawa No: Letter 689, July 28, 1959. Confidential. "From conversation with Mr. S.N.

Basu of the Ministry of External Affairs he is the Under Secretary concerned with African Affairs in the Ministry and the Canadian High Commissioners Office would like to keep in touch with him. Re: developments in Africa." Signed Mr. Carter.

¹⁰⁷ Arnould, Resumed Thirteenth Session.

¹⁰⁸ RG 25 Vol: 6977 File: 5475-FA-78-40 pt.1. From: High Commissioner for Canada; Accra To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Despatch 398, August 26, 1959. Confidential. "We have had a general discussion with Mr. Amonoo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the items which would be of greatest interest to Ghana....He indicated that the Ghanian Delegation would, together with other African states, propose strong resolutions on the question of South West Africa and racial discrimination in South Africa....On South West Africa they would press for a resolution similar to that approved by the Monrovia Conference: South Africa to implement UN resolutions, that South West Africa was a Trust Territory and would appeal to the UN to fix a target date for independence of South West Africa....Ethiopia and Tunisia intend to offer their good offices, at Monrovia, to obtain agreement between Africans on French Cameroons, this would have Ghana backtracking a little....Ghanians concerned Ahidjo would enter into some relationship with the French Community...would be opposed to any extension of French influence in Africa." On question of other dependent territories in Africa: "(presumably Angola, Uganda, Tanganyika etc.) Ghana would ask the UN to set target dates for independence....A period of five years should be set....African states had no intention of accepting the argument that the situation in Africa dependent territories [NSGTs] was a responsibility of only the Administering Powers. They, therefore, intend to exert pressure on Portugal to send information on its Non-Self-Governing-Territories and to oppose France's contention that it need no longer send such information....Ghane did not intend to take a very active part in discussion on other items on the agenda. They would devote their energies to the African items...."

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., "we have the impression that Ghana and other African states may have decided to moderate their stand on French Cameroons in the interest of obtaining Asian support for their views on Algeria, nuclear tests and dependant territories." Africans were aware that "the Asians generally tried to water down views held by the Independent African States." From: High Commissioner for Canada, Accra To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Despatch 257, September 9, 1960. After having several conversations with officials in the Foreign Ministry in regard to Ghanian interests at UN, Williams wrote: "Ghanian interest...unnaturally is directed to African issues."

RG 25 Vol: 4426 File: 12290-40 pt.1.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa Despatch 1374. Priority. October 13, 1959. Confidential. "The Debate on [South Cameroons] has ended....The African states sometimes suppressing sharp differences of opinion among themselves, persisted in the search for a compromise solution and appeared to take this object as a test of their statesmanship....The Committee has now moved onto the South West Africa Item...."

RG 25 Vol: 7261 File: 10283-L-40 pt.1.1. From: High Commissioner for Canada, Accra To: USSEA, Ottawa, No: Letter 508, October 30, 1959. Confidential. "Ghanian displeasure over the decision to let the French Cameroons become independent before a vote results from mistrust of intentions of Ahidjo...to take French Cameroons into French Community after independence....Ghanians would prefer to see Southern Cameroons united with French Cameroons. They would probably be happy if all three Cameroons formed a single state as this would reduce the size and influence of Nigeria."

¹¹⁰ RG 25 Vol 3446 File: 1-1960/3 pt.2. Item: V-C-1-Dependent Africa. March 10, 1960. Confidential.

¹¹¹ Ibid., "few countries which have attained independence in recent years have been ill-prepared for it as the Congo. The political leaders had not, until last year, held more than minor municipal offices." The white-settler colonies were the exception in British Africa and Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, they "have significant resident white populations....They represent stages through which other territories in Africa have already passed....Portugal indeed refuses to recognise that any 'colonial' problem exists."

¹¹² Ibid., the exception will be the policies in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya. "Black Africa has little real interest in Algeria, but Arab nationalism was successful in interesting African

nationalism in this cause at an early date, the second Accra Conference and the interest has remained alive."

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, see the second part of this chapter for Canada's position on these issues and, especially on the Portuguese territories, which continued to be a pro-colonial one.

¹¹⁴ Soviet Items to have the UN adopt a Declaration of the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples.

¹¹⁵ RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1778, October 13, 1960. Confidential.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Ormsby-Gore of the UK and Wilcox of the USA "therefore decided on reconsideration that they would both announce that they were withdrawing their objection to the proposal that the item be discussed in Plenary...and asked that the item be allocated to Plenary without objection."

¹¹⁷ RG 25 Vol: 3465 File: 6-1960/1 pt.1. Fifteenth Session: Part I (Intro) Survey. "There followed the U-2 incident on May 1 and quickly thereafter the collapse of the Summit Conference. Then the international scene rapidly erupted with a sustained barrage of angry charges, as pre-propaganda campaigns on both sides were stepped up...."

RG 25, Vol: 6977 File: 5475-FA-78-40 pt.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa Despatch No:1618, September 30, 1960. Subj.: Letter circulated (DOC A/4522), September 29 from Ghana, India, Indonesia, UAR, Yugoslavia addressed to the President of General Assembly. "In view of the present tension in international relations....Deeply concerned with the recent deterioration in international relations which threatens the world with grave consequences....Request...the USA and...USSR to renew their contacts interrupted recently...to find solutions of the outstanding problems by negotiation."

¹¹⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40- pt.1. Commonwealth Division and Defence Liaison (2) Division. "Mr. Sekou Touré's Intervention...." He was the only African Head of State present and he "wished to create an atmosphere of greater understanding and to orientate the debate in the direction of a collective constructiveness aimed at the welfare of colonial peoples....His appeal to the Colonial Powers, couched in restraint and judicious language was in sharp contrast with the temper of his previous utterances....Mr. Touré has come to be regarded as a pro-Communist and anti-Western African who is in most violent conflict with colonialism, both political and economic in Africa...." T.H. Read of the Commonwealth Division speculated whether Troure's past behaviour was not "conditioned by the abrupt and painful fracture of the ties between his country and France." Read also suggested that "the behaviour of Mr. Kruschov[sic] may have shown that the Soviet anti-colonial line is but a cover for the use of this important question as a cold war weapon."

¹¹⁹ RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.2. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 1899, October 22, 1960. Confidential. Boland of Ireland the President of the General Assembly Session and Zorkin had "been pressing" him to take this step. "Boland is apparently reluctant to take responsibility on his own shoulders alone. He is contemplating having this matter discussed in the General Committee Meeting set for October 25." The Canadian Delegation knew that Africans were aware of the implications of USA elections. "If the item is discussed in Plenary before USA election, the USA Delegation might feel obliged to mount a virulent attack against the USSR on behalf of the 'captive nations' and thus detract from the African emphasis which many of the new countries would understandably prefer to see in the item....The UK have been trying hard to persuade the Africans against early discussion, and have asked for our support." The Delegation 'speculated' that "...number of Delegations suspicions that USSR is anxious for an early debate on its colonial item in order to have a decision on it before a Soviet walk-out from the disarmament discussions and perhaps from the session as a whole." From: A. Zawisza, Polish Government in exile, London, To: Howard Green, SSEA, UN Delegation, N.Y. Letter, Reference No: 372/60. September 30, 1960. "Regret that colonialism in UN 'expressed...in too narrow fashion' to include Soviet colonialism and hopes that the Canadian Delegation would see fit to make a determined stand upon the international forum in defence of the nations held in subjection by Soviet Russia...." See also: From: Halstead, Permanent Mission of Canada to UN To: Greene, SSEA, Ottawa, No. Letter: 700, October 25, 1960, for his comments and request for any 'appropriate' Canadian action. Re: above Letter. By mid-November, the UK did not know what position it wanted to take on Soviet 'colonialism' in Eastern Europe. See No:1074/166 of

November 18, 1960. "...we shall take our main stand on our record and intention, and any counter-attack upon Soviet colonial policies e.g. in Central Asia, will only be made parenthetically [sic]." From: Canadian Minister, Prague To: USSEA Ottawa No: Letter: 1037A. November 24, 1960. Unclassified. Repercussions of Mr. Diefenbaker's speech in the UN General Assembly "had an astonishing impact in the Ukraine where the Soviet authorities have had to organise a widespread campaign of refutation." Appeared in the Swiss Newspaper. From: CANDEL N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs No: 2468, December 22, 1960. Confidential. Item 87. "The Irish Delegation...would like an implicit reference to Eastern European colonialism in the resolution....UK Representative at this morning meeting spoke strongly against such a step...because an amendment would reopen the resolution and bring in the Cold War. Australia (Plimsoll) echoed this but much more faintly, as did the Norwegian Ambassador. We did not offer an opinion."

¹²⁰ On the other hand, they also were aware that Africans were seeking alternatives to a period of further tutelage. See: RG 25 Vol: 7792 File: 12329-40 pt.1.1. From: Watson, Dakar To: Foreign Office No: 23 Saving, February 24, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. Communiqué from Bangui meeting of 4 states of Equatorial Federation: "underdeveloped states cannot expand to effective independence and rapid economic and social progress unless they belong to an organisation large and strong enough to assure their integrity and development." Watson believed that "applies with equal force in West Africa....These developments seem to me welcome. The excessive balkanisation of the former French Empire in Africa would appear to be neither in France's interest nor our own."

¹²¹ RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. No: 1920, October 25, 1960. Confidential.

¹²² RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/414, Vol: 207 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1964, October 26, 1960. Restricted. This was the first instance in which the Commonwealth group, as a whole, had met. Nigeria, Ghana and Ceylon "all commented favourably on UK record in bringing former colonial peoples to independence...." The Delegation estimated that the Africans would "favour some formulation for the fixing of target dates even though these would have to be reasonable and would probably not, in fact, be met"; From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 2058, November 3, 1960. Confidential. "Those favouring a target date rather than immediacy seem to be in the ascendancy and the year 1962 seems to have the lead...." This was indicative of the moderate attitude of the Africans in view of the Soviet demand for immediate independence for all colonial peoples. The anti-colonials had been consistent in applying pressure up to this point. See: RG 25 Vol: 4426 File: 12290-40 pt.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 2708 December 4, 1957. Item 13 – Report of Trusteeship Council. "The resolution on target dates was adopted as we foresaw by a considerable margin: 44 in favour, 16 against (Canada) and 12 abstentions which may make it difficult to obtain a blocking third in the Plenary Session."

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. No: 2079. November 5, 1960. Confidential.

¹²⁵ RG 25 Acc. No: 86-87/414 Vol: 207 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: Candel, N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, No: 2089, November 7, 1960. Confidential. In chapter V, we have already discussed the implications of a Declaration as opposed to that of a resolution.

¹²⁶ Ibid., "they have already indicated that...would be unacceptable." RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 2302 November 22, 1960. Confidential. Subj.: Item 87, Info: Wash.D.C., London, Embassy Paris, Geneva; Priority Bag: Delhi, Lisbon, Madrid, Pretoria, Karachi, CNBRA, Colombo; From London: Accra, Lagos. "We were allowed to read quickly today a very recent telegram from Wellington to New Zealand Delegation here...." Wellington "could not vote for clause affirming that independence should not be delayed for economic reasons, etc. or for the 'meaningless proclamation' of immediate independence...."

¹²⁷ RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: Candel, N.Y. To: USSEA, Ottawa. Scott, Transmittal Slip, November 9, 1960. Confidential. From: Office of High Commissioner for Canada to Wellington To: USSEAA, Ottawa, No: Letter 629, November 4, 1960. Transmitting. From:

Ministry of External Affairs, Wellington To: New Zealand Perm. Mission to UN, N.Y. No: 274. October 27, 1960. Confidential. Subj.: Soviet Declaration on Colonisation. "Our concern is that new states should become independent without falling prey to internal weakness on external pressures....We favour orderly process which, without providing a pretext for unnecessary delay, will avoid the creation of new or greater problems disturbing to international peace and harmony."

¹²⁸ RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa To: Candel N.Y. No: K 406, November 15, 1960. Confidential. This is not to say that the Soviet bloc had accepted defeat; further attempts were made in other UN bodies. See: From: Canadian Delegation, Geneva To: Department of External Affairs; Ottawa No: 1582, November 18, 1960. Restricted. Subj.: ILO Governing Body Geneva, November 15-18 "Soviet Intervention on Political matters, provocative political references re: proposal to include colonial item on the agenda." See also: Nos: 1577 and 1578 of November 17, 1960 "USSR proposal for the preparation of action within the normal field ILO to liquidate colonialism and its disastrous consequences in the field of labour and workers living conditions." Also: From: Canadian Delegation, Geneva To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 1587 November 19, 1960. Restricted. Subj.: Soviet Proposal on Colonialism. "Chairman put USSR proposal – that colonial item be inscribed on agenda of next session of Governing Body – to a vote. Proposal defeated by: 6 in favour (USSR and Rumania and 4 Afro-Asian: Ghana, Ceylon, India and Tunisia); 31 against (including Argentina, Panama, Uruguay); no abstentions. We understand that Indian Government Rep. recommended to his Government opposition to Soviet proposal but was instructed by Delhi to support Soviet proposal."

¹²⁹ RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa To: Candel N.Y. No: K406, November 15, 1960. See also: From: Office of High Commissioner for UK, Ottawa To: Stansfield, Commonwealth Division, Ottawa, November 18, 1960. No: 1074/166, November 18, 1960. Confidential, Canadian Eyes Only. Subj.: "Soviet Item on Colonies." Transmitted: From: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa To: Candel N.Y. No: K113, November 19, 1960. "The Soviet Union raised this item mainly in order to embarrass the West; we shall therefore probably take the line that it is most important to keep the cold war struggle out of colonial questions and thus to avoid a situation in which the Soviet bloc, by exploiting the susceptibilities of the Afro-Asians, can claim to have defeated the West....Obviously we should have to oppose condemnatory language about the evils of colonialism, etc. Many Delegations frequently claim that resolutions on this subject are not aimed at the United Kingdom but other states. But since the United Kingdom has by far the largest number of dependent territories, such language, if included in the draft resolution, could obviously not said to be inapplicable to the United Kingdom; it would also enable the Soviet Union to claim a propaganda victory, thus drawing the subject still more and more into the cold war arena...." See also: From: J.H. Taylor, UN Delegation, N.Y. To: Read, Ottawa, November 22, 1960 No:431 Forwarding Inward Telegram No: WAOT 1901, November 21, 1960. From: Plimsoll, Australian Delegation to UN, N.Y. To: Ministry of External Affairs, Canberra. Repeated: Washington No: UN1401. Confidential; London Saving. 775 Subj.: Colonialism Item. "Feeling of United Kingdom Delegation here is that every effort should be made to avoid a resolution which United Kingdom would have to vote against. They hold this view as against view that a bad resolution might suit us because we could vote against it. United Kingdom Delegation fears the consequences of a resolution being carried with the United Kingdom voting against it. An adverse United Kingdom vote could according to this view be exploited by troublesome elements in some of the British Colonies (e.g.Jagan in British Guiana). Opinion among Administering Powers here is generally in accord with foregoing approach. The Dutch in particular want to avoid having to vote against a resolution."

¹³⁰ RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa To: Candel N.Y. No: K406, November 15, 1960"adopting such a position is made somewhat easier this year by the novel practice of making statements in explanation of an affirmative vote which would in fact be justification for an abstention, and also of voting negatively or abstaining on parts of a resolution while voting positively for the resolution as a whole. Either or both techniques can be used to record something less than full agreement with a resolution which we nevertheless support." – This very sophisticated system of voting had been developed because of the realisation that: "This year, Canada's vote – like the votes of other moderate non-colonial powers

such as the Scandinavians – could have little effect upon the outcome and hence is of very little importance to the sponsors of anti-colonial resolutions. We are not consulted before or during drafting, and our chances of being able to secure changes at a later stage are slight...." See also: From: CANDEL N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 2261, November 19, 1960. Confidential. Subj.: Item 8: Emancipation of Colonies. "We were told yesterday that the Draft Document...had been moved from the Subcommittee to the full Afro-Asian Group, with only a few changes. We do not know what those changes were or what Group's final position will be. The Document has been shown in great secrecy by several Afro-Asians to several of our friends...." See also: From: CANDEL N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 2302, November 22, 1960. Confidential. "UK and Australian Delegations complained to us yesterday that they could not get the Afro-Asians to discuss the draft with them. This may be because the Afro-Asians had so much difficulty in agreeing on a draft that they do not want to re-open the disputation among themselves; or of course they may simply not want any compromises...." After sending off instructions to its Delegation, Ottawa was notified of the various preferred positions of some of the Old Commonwealth. There was no information on either South African and the USA plans. See: RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: High Commissioner for the UK, Ottawa To: Stansfield, Esq., Commonwealth Division, Ottawa No: 1074/166, November 18, 1960. Confidential:

1.(ii) "we fully share what we imagine to be the principal object of the Afro-Asians, viz. to bring the remaining colonial territories to independence and full self-government as rapidly as possible, but to do so without violence and chaos"; (iii) "it should be possible for the Assembly to evolve a resolution which we can support (a sub-committee of the Afro-Asian Group is drafting a declaration on colonialism which will be put to the General Assembly as an alternative to the Soviet draft declaration). Such a resolution would in any case be more effective than one which we had to oppose"; (iv) "we hope that friendly delegations will use their influence to see that the Afro-Asian resolution which ultimately emerges is both practical and not condemnatory in terms"; (v) "we could not accept a demand for 'immediate' independence for all territories, or that target dates should now be set for independence. It would be impossible to comply with such a demand in the case of many smaller territories such as the Solomon Islands or St. Helena. Moreover, it would endanger our chances of success in delicate negotiations which we are engaged upon in East and Central Africa with a view to enabling the territories there to advance to independence with harmony between all sections of the population";

3. "As you will be aware, many representatives at the United Nations (and particularly those of the Afro-Asian nations) tend to be influenced by the extremist atmosphere which prevails there on questions of colonialism. You may like to know that we therefore decided to approach certain Afro-Asian and other governments and to encourage them to provide their Delegations with reasoned and objective instructions. While we recognise that some of these governments might not receive with much sympathy the above arguments, we believed we could do no harm and probably much good by expounding them as widely as possible."

From: Candel N.Y. To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 2302, November 22, 1960. "Wellington would like to be able to vote for a resolution rather than against one and rather than abstain. Telegram contrasted this view with one termed 'Australian' which apparently was to hope for a resolution so high-pitched as to be obviously impossible of acceptance. We had not known that this has been the Australian view, though we have recently talked with them. Please protect source...."

RG 25 Vol 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1.2. From: Canadian Embassy, Hague To: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa No: 447, November 30, 1960. Confidential. Subj.: Item 87. "Foreign Ministry's attitude was governed by recognition of efforts of Afro-Asian Group to take sting out of USSR initiative. This consideration had led Netherlands to urge other Administering Powers, particularly UK, to take favourable attitude to Afro-Asian resolution....Netherlands would vote for resolution as a whole and all clauses with exception of paragraph 6 of Declaration (for which abstention was probable)."

¹³¹ UNGAOR, Sixteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1065th Meeting, November 27, 1961.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ RG 25 Vol: 7849 File: 12858-40 pt.1. From: Murray, UN Division To: Glazebrook, UN Division, Ottawa, November 3, 1960. Confidential. Subj.: Colonial Items.

¹³⁴ RG 25 Vol: 5586 File: 12858-40 pt.2. From: African and Middle Eastern Division, Memorandum To Under Secretary, June 2, 1961. Confidential.

¹³⁵ Ibid., recommendation for the membership of the Panel:

African and Middle Eastern Division
Economic Division
United Nations Division
Commonwealth Division
European Division
Defence Liaison (1) Division
Defence Liaison (2) Division

"We might begin by examining a number of immediate African problems...compare our recommendations on each...and attempt to assess what positive elements we think should govern Canadian reactions....The sort of early problems we have in mind are moves to establish target dates for colonial independence...commissions to recommend on conditions in colonial territories, recommendations for boycotts or sanctions against administering countries, or particularly violent phrased condemnations of the practices of Colonial Powers."

The Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office called a Meeting of Heads of United Kingdom Missions in West Africa, in London, May 17-19, 1961. RG 25 Vol: 5541 File: 12529-40 pt.2. From: Canadian High Commissioner, London To: USSEA, Ottawa No. Letter: 841, May 25, 1961. Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Under reference London Telegram No: 1634 of May 2, same subject, not traceable. "The meeting was not designed to evolve policy, but rather, through an exchange of views, to ascertain the nature of the problems confronting the heads...." Of importance was the realisation that "the French had 'disappeared into the back room' after the independence of the various French-speaking States"; that de Gaulle was "wise in his refusal to become unduly exercised over the flirtation of Mali with the Soviet bloc and in continuing to extend aid to Mali"; that "both Nkrumah and Sekou Touré entertained expansionist ideas and were personally ambitious." They had "considerable discussion" over the Fourth Committee's obsession at the 1960 General Assembly to have target dates set for independence. All heads agreed that this should be discouraged. "At the same time the UK, with so much at stake in the way of delicately planned constitutional developments in Central and East Africa, must be very careful to avoid alignment or the appearance of alignment with either Portugal or South Africa." They all "came out strongly in favour of the UK extending more aid, both in capital grants and technical assistance...." See also: From: Benjamin Rogers, Canada House, London To: SSEA, Ottawa No. Letter: 884, May 31, 1961. Subj.: Meeting of Heads of UK Missions. Wanted to reinforce the importance of their "discussing the care with which the United Kingdom should conduct its relations with Portugal and South Africa."

¹³⁶ From: L.A.D. Stephens, Memorandum to Under Secretary, June 5, 1961. Confidential. The process which began on June 2 involved seven Divisions in an extraordinary enterprise until about mid-August.

¹³⁷ RG 25 Vol: 5586 File: 12858-40 pt.2. Memorandum. From: L.A.D. Stephens To: G.P. De. T. Glazebrook, Record of First Meeting of Departmental Panel on Africa, June 6, 1961. Confidential.

¹³⁸ Ibid., the first meeting of the Panel made a list of the relevant topics which were "farmed out" to various Divisions for examination. Suggested Topics for Consideration by Departmental Panel on Africa.

A) Major Foreseeable 'African' issues for XVth UNGA Session.

B) African Attitudes.

C) Positions on Colonial Questions of:

1. Various Administering Powers
2. Soviet bloc.
3. Leading Asian states,
4. "Middle Rank" Western powers including Scandinavians and "non-colonial" Europeans, and Latin-American states.

D) Objectives of Canadian Policy on African Questions.

E) Guiding Principles of Canadian Policy.

F) Tactical Considerations.

Commonwealth Division was requested to look after the following topics:

1. UK's position on colonial questions.
2. Australia's position on colonial questions.
3. New Zealand's position on colonial questions.
4. India's position on colonial questions.
5. Ceylon's position on colonial questions.

African and Middle Eastern Division and UN Division were allotted the topics under section A).

¹³⁹From: European Division To: African Middle Eastern Division. "Draft Report of the Departmental Panel on Africa." June 26, 1961. Confidential.

¹⁴⁰RG 25 Vol: 7572 File: 5475-DW-39-A-40 pt.2.1. From: Canadian High Commissioner, Canberra To: SSEA, Ottawa No: 158, September 6, 1955. Reference: Ottawa's letter V-361 of August 12, 1955, informing Ottawa of the position Australia intended to take.

¹⁴¹See: Dennis C. Beller, The Portuguese Territories Issue in the United Nations: An Analysis of Debates: 1956-1965. Ph.D. Thesis. University of California, Los Angeles. 1970, p. 232.

"Measures the total amounts of debating and rates of participation in the debates....These measures suggest a certain amount of both encouragement to opponents to augment their contribution to the debates, and intimidation of supporters in the debates. It is at least circumstantially probable that some of the Delegates – particularly those of the Western states – subdued their supportive argument in the face of massive turning of the majority position against Portugal, and that others – especially the many African and other Non-Western Delegates – extended and escalated their argumentation in the context of a friendly climate of opinion in the Assembly. This conclusion means that anti-colonialism has tended to become not only a prevailing popular ideological tenet in the UN and in world politics, but that it has in some ways become an effective norm. It represents a standard capable of inducing significant changes in the behaviour of statesmen, or at least placing significant limitations on that behaviour. Its effectiveness is implied in both the 'climbing on the bandwagon' of those predisposed to anti-colonialism, and the restraint and ambivalence exhibited by those not really so predisposed."

Canada: In the net weighted score:

Phase I: 1956-58: Moderate Supporter (+ 450)

Phase II: 1959-61: Moderate Opponent (- 492).

Phase III: 1962-65: Very, very low Level of Opposition. (- 106).

"Canada was not alone in moving in the direction of greater support of United Nations activities in the functional area – it was a general tendency of the membership of the Organisation. The development of a consensus, however minimal, was obviously associated with the trend toward the universalisation of the membership of the world body and to the moral and political authority exercised by the demands of the majority of less developed states."

¹⁴²David A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967. (New York: Columbia Press, 1970), p.85. Out of the innumerable material on voting in the United Nations here are some of the significant studies: Kul B. Rai "Foreign Policy and Voting in the UN General Assembly," International Organisation, Vol: 26, 1972, pp. 589-594; Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," The American Political Science Review, Vol: LVII, No: 4. (Dec., 1963), pp.902-917; Margret Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly" International Organisation, Vol. V, No.1, (Feb., 1951), pp.3-31; Thomas Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Thomas Hovet, Africa in the United Nations (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1963.)

¹⁴³Ibid., p.84. The international community had become aware of "the impropriety of any defence of the continued existence of colonialism...." Kay claimed that, "even the Western European states have found the sanctuary of abstention even more alluring than outright opposition to the new nations on colonial issues."

Concluding Remarks

The United Nations is an ideal context in which contending parties are able to negotiate 'just' or 'fair' arrangements for the allocation of goods. It is a parliamentary setting in which the members can influence the priorities of the organisation through debates and votes. Alignments of "like-minded" members have served this purpose well. Because there was basic agreement on the premise of the Charter and the goal of UN activities on colonial matters, Canada found itself among the colonials in the UN. The Charter stipulated that some groups of dependent peoples required a further period of tutelage; this was understood by the Colonial Powers to entail an undefined period of time. Dependent peoples were non-white, Colonial Powers were white and the division in the UN between the colonials and anti-colonials fell into a similar racial category with the Soviet bloc constituting an exception. The colonial issue and the decolonisation process have to be seen in this context of a racial cleavage. However, it would have been an oversimplification, on our part, had we utilised this consistent and obvious racial dichotomy as the basis of an operational index of race in our analysis.

The parliamentary context of the UN reflected the diametrically opposed concerns of these two categories of the UN membership. The interpretation of the colonial situation in which relative standards were applied; the kinds of substantive arguments against the universal applicability of a self-evident right - which was already established in colonial practice in some white

settler colonies - and the implications which were drawn from these, are subjective indicators of the functional roles of race and culture. An intrinsic aspect of the colonial issue in the UN was whether self-determination should be a guiding principle or an operative right for dependent peoples. In the opinion of the colonials, the matter was not "adequately studied." In their perception, decolonisation was contingent upon their interpretation of the operative limits and application of certain concepts in the colonial world. They believed that "human rights," 'sovereignty' and 'self-determination' ought to be examined anew, simply because the context of application was a racially different one. The resort to semantic exercises in order to clarify certain terminologies – "acceptable standards," 'advancement' and 'development' – appeared to be a strategy whereby the central issue of the equality of human beings could be bypassed or postponed.

The debates were reflective of the importance of these aspects in the organising premises of colonial arguments. For example, the emphatic pursuit of certain members for technical elucidation contrasted with the dogged insistence, by other members, for substantive advancement. This dichotomy in the concerns of the UN was a clear indication of the potency of race and culture in influencing attitudes, in the exercise to attain some operational standard for the principle of self-determination, in the colonial world. It appeared that the whole problem of applying differential values and standards for non-white peoples, which had become the norm in some Western societies, had found a fit in the colonial context at the UN.

A content analysis of speeches on the colonial issue unfold preconceptions and beliefs which were seemingly uncompromising and inviolable. What is important here, is not the aim of granting or denying the right of self-determination to dependent peoples but rather the ideological convictions and other justifications which were utilised in defence of colonial rule. These convictions may be taken as systematic antecedents of a 'colonial' operational standard which was shared by Canada. Several interacting variables were operative in Canada's policy on substantive aspects of colonialism and decolonisation: geography, ideology such as racial superiority and anti-communism, national interest in a security-minded Cold War world, race and culture in a solidarity function.

The anti-colonials were not concerned with maintaining any mediating position between the two principal Powers in the Cold War. The apparent intensity in their commitment, to the termination of colonial rule and the priority which it seemed to hold in their foreign policy, served to align them with the Soviet bloc. There appeared to be a conscious effort of this bloc to capitalise on the possibility of alienating the emerging nations from Western or colonial connections. To this end, the Soviet bloc took an extreme anti-colonial position and, because of this, the entire colonial issue and decolonisation process has to be seen in an atmosphere of bipolarity and Cold War politics.

Several interacting variables are preponderant in identifying the community of members that came together to form blocs and to vote on this one issue. The heritage of Western civilisation has imparted to Canada a sense of

shared values and historical tradition about "the right and wrong ways of doing things." Most importantly, the uniting bond of a common culture and race has manifested itself in Canada's support of colonial regimes. Specific to this issue, geographical location and security concerns strongly relate to the racial and cultural variables which influenced Canada's policy; they were paramount in the allocation of priority in the hierarchy of values and interest.

Similarly, geographical and racial factors functioned as a solidarity factor in holding a diverse group of Afro-Asians together. The aim of this group was to alter the organising dynamics of an international system which discriminated in the allocation of collective social, economic and political goods. It was obviously in the interest of the Soviet bloc that such an endeavour should succeed. Western security considerations were intimately tied in with the way in which the decolonisation issue ought to proceed and Canadian officials believed that international stability depended upon economic stability and accessibility to markets and resources. They were concerned that restive areas in the colonial world might become targets of Communist intrigues. What were the consequences of this definition of the situation?

On October 27, 1961, the Canadian Delegation told the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly that Canada needed time for 'reflection' as to the dispensation of rights and freedoms to colonial peoples. Officials had determined, from first hand sources, that "a body of men and women capable of expressing the wishes of the peoples...must first be trained." The situation in the Congo and in Guinea had reinforced the Canadian position that this was a

necessary condition of self-rule. The documents show that Canadian officials in Ottawa, Paris, London and Africa were convinced that dependent peoples were incapable of self rule because they were not adequately prepared or trained to undertake administrative responsibilities on the Western scale. They spoke of the need for a further period of tutelage; they even believed that, especially in the white settler colonies, this process of training required much more time than had been anticipated by the anti-colonials. However, they did not think that Africans would never be able to rule themselves. In this sense, we found that Ottawa's conception of 'ability' does not find a fit in the conception of 'capability' as associated with the immutability of race. The documents also show that, when considering the behaviour of Nkrumah or any other leader of the new African states, officials were no longer preoccupied with considerations of 'advancement' or their 'ability' for self-rule.

Successive reassessments of Canadian policy on colonial issues concluded that Ottawa should undertake measures to prod the Colonial Powers to alter their recalcitrant stand in face of UN pressure. Officials found the open conflict between France and Tunisia in 1960, over the French base at Bizerta, 'embarrassing' and they knew that the Africans and Asians were beginning to link the Tunisian complaint with the situation in Algeria. The Algerian question had the potential to be 'difficult' and "embarrassing to the Western Powers" because France was not making any progress in the negotiations with Algerian nationalists. The situation in the Congo had placed the UN in an acute financial crisis, South Africa was still a major concern of the UN because of its apartheid

policy and its intransigence on South West Africa, and the conflict between Portugal and Angola was "very disturbing." Anti-colonials were still pressing for fixed target dates for independence in colonial areas; this was reinforced by calls for sanctions on 'recalcitrant' Colonial Powers. Most importantly, officials anticipated a "continuation of the pressure from the less-developed countries for a greater volume of financial aid and technical assistance to assist in the economic development of those countries."¹

Under these circumstances, ought we to expect officials in Ottawa to show a preference for an anti-colonial policy? The Instructions for the Delegation to the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly looked very much like those for earlier sessions, even though officials in Ottawa had incorporated the recommendations of the Panel on Africa in policy formulation. For the same old reasons, the Delegation was instructed to oppose the setting of target dates; international stability was more endangered than before. Under no circumstances, should anti-colonial efforts to extract political information from Non-Self-Governing-Territories or any move to invoke sanctions against Colonial Powers be supported, even if those Powers "remained uncooperative."

In view of the failure of efforts to influence the drafting of resolutions, especially at the 1960 Session, officials in Ottawa decided to develop a new strategy. The Delegation was instructed to seek the support of "like-minded members" whose outlook "is similar" to Canada's. In addition, the Delegation was advised to approach moderate Afro-Asians and other "serious and enlightened" Delegations, with the aim of behind-the-scenes 'consultation' on lines to follow

before "public discussion" of the items in the Committees.² On the whole, the broad principles which had always 'governed' Canada's approach to international responsibilities continued to operate in the formulation of Canadian policy, on colonial matters.

We can conclude that we have been able to identify a consistent pattern in Canada's policy which was designed to steer the UN in a specific direction. Canada's position on the stipulations in Chapters XI and XII of the Charter was congruous with that of the Colonial Powers. Although Ottawa initially displayed some concern that a Trust Territory should not lose its identity in an Administrative Union, the Delegation supported the Trusteeship Agreements for adoption. On the other hand, there was no hesitancy in Canada's support for military installations in Trust Territories. As a matter of fact, in Ottawa's interpretation, Articles 83 to 85 of the Charter made Trust Territories a necessary local link in the Western chain of international security.

The 'colonial' interpretation, of the rights and responsibilities of the Administering Authorities and the supervisory role of the UN, had a functional role in determining the length of the period of necessary tutelage for dependent peoples. Canadian officials accepted the idea of a Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories and the value of Annual Reports in facilitating the UN supervisory role. However, in Ottawa, great attention was paid to having the right 'kinds' of members in the Trusteeship Council, in Visiting Missions and in the Committee for drafting the Questionnaire for the Annual Reports. Canada was also in agreement with the Colonial Powers over the role of petitioners in the UN

supervisory function. In view of the onslaught of written and oral petitions and the subjective view of these, Canada saw the need to restrict and control the access of petitioners to the UN. These aspects were influential in determining, to what degree, Administering Authorities should have relative freedom to ascertain whether their wards had 'advanced' enough for self-rule.

Canada rejected UN attempts to speed up the decolonisation process by setting time-limits on the conviction that "constitutional evolution does not lend itself to rigid timetables." In addition, Canada supported the colonial contention that Non-Self-Governing-Territories were not the business of the UN. Colonial Powers had voluntarily undertaken obligations "to promote to the utmost...the well-being" of these peoples. But how was the UN to assess the degree to which the Colonial Powers were fulfilling this obligation, if it had no business in these areas? Non-political information had to be transmitted, as a part of this obligation undertaken, but without political information the UN was powerless to influence the duration of the period of tutelage. Canada resorted to Articles 2(7) and Article 14 of the Charter to keep UN interference out of Non-Self-Governing-Territories.

This mode of policy helped to create favourable conditions for economic opportunities and possibilities for military fortifications for the West, in colonial areas. This brings us to the question of accountability. In Ottawa's interpretation, Cold War tensions made it incumbent upon the West to secure natural resources and markets from Communist takeover; these were mostly in colonial areas. Officials, therefore, saw the need for the West to maintain some

measure of international stability. In this sense, the Colonial Powers were accountable to the 'free' world.

The authority and competence of the UN, in which the powerful Soviet bloc had aligned itself with the anti-colonials, had to be restricted and had to be kept within the limits set out by the Charter in Chapters XI and XII. In Chapter XI, the UN was expected to supervise the administration of the colonies without political information. Of course, an inherent factor in Canada's position was its trust in the good intentions of the Colonial Powers in their colonial territories. On the other hand, anti-colonials displayed a distrust of colonial intentions in colonial territories. As a consequence, the most contentious issue was the attempt by the Administering Authorities to terminate any sort of UN involvement in colonial areas on the premise of adequate 'advancement' and 'development.' Canada believed that the Administering Authorities had the sole authority and competence to decide on such matters and the anti-colonials refused to recognise this unilateral authority or competence; they believed that this was a cover for continued domination.

We have examined all the possible combinations of evidential relationships in Ottawa's decision making process. The result is a pro-colonial predisposition which displayed certain tendencies and attitudes; these coalesced into a perceptual code, specific to the colonial issue. Canada's substantive policy and voting position were of a relatively consistent pro-colonial genre and they could be interpreted as having been designed to support the status quo of the

Charter. The kinds of policy which Canada was predisposed to take on this one issue were in keeping with a characteristic mind set. Canada:

1. Shared a solidarity with the Colonial Powers and displayed a consolidation in positions;
2. Had a belief in the good intentions of Colonial Powers towards dependent peoples;
3. Was convinced of the necessity of a colonial period of tutelage for dependent peoples;
4. Was guided by the Charter conception of the authority and competence of Colonial Powers in promoting the welfare of dependent peoples and the future disposition of their colonial territories;
5. Displayed a tendency to reject any functional or authoritative role for the UN, which was not envisaged by the Charter, in colonial areas;
6. Had a careful and consistent policy of not supporting the attempts by the General Assembly: to set precedents or build upon precedence, to increase its responsibility, competence or authority in colonial areas, even in light of the violations of Charter obligations by the Colonial Powers.

The factor variables of self interest, geography, economics, national security, race, culture and ideology were operative in the formulation of Canada's foreign policy on the colonial issue, in the UN. However, Canada would not necessarily have taken a 'colonial' position had the Colonial Powers been prepared to pursue an altogether different goal. In practical terms, Canada's pro-colonial policy necessarily reflected support for a categorical distinction among

peoples. It also implied that it was acceptable to apply different values in setting the moral and ethical standards which circumscribe relationships between white and non-white peoples.

¹ RG 25 Vol: 3466 File: 6-1-1961/1; 1 Intro-7; John Sloan Dickey, "The Relationship in Rhetoric and Reality: Merchant-Heeney Revisited," International Journal, Vol: XXVII, 1971-2, Canadian Institute for International Affairs, p. 173. "...both nations faced deepening internal crisis: Canada with French-Canadian separatism, the United States with racial strife; and the world wide resurgence of nationalism fitted the mood of a Canada increasingly preoccupied with the interlocking problems of national identity and a[n] ubiquitous American presence."

² RG 25 Vol: 5586 File: 12858-40 pt.2. "Policy Guidance for Canadian Delegation on African Issues at the 16th UNGA Session." Confidential. Scandinavia, Ireland, New Zealand, Tunisia, Malaya and Sudan were the 'enlightened' members.

Appendix: I

INDEX IN SUPPORT OF THE DECOLONISATION OF EMPIRES

	TTs		NSGTs	Human Rights		Authority and Competence	Implementation	Inalienable Rights	Total
				Self-Determin.					
Resolutions:	16		16	1		25	15	20	88
Canada	Y: 7 N: 6 } A: 4 } 10		Y: 6 N: 4 } A: 3 } 7	Y: 2 N: 7 } A: 1 } 8		Y: 14 N: 18 } A: 12 } 30	Y: 10 N: 2 } A: 7 } 9	Y: 7 N: 6 } A: 12 } 18	46 82
USA	Y: 9 N: 4 } A: 4 } 8		Y: 6 N: 4 } A: 3 } 7	Y: 2 N: 6 } A: 2 } 8		Y: 13 N: 21 } A: 10 } 31	Y: 7 N: 3 } A: 9 } 12	Y: 1 N: 8 } A: 16 } 24	38 90
UK	Y: 6 N: 10 } A: 1 } 11		Y: 0 N: 5 } A: 8 } 13	Y: 2 N: 7 } A: 1 } 8		Y: 6 N: 21 } A: 17 } 38	Y: 3 N: 4 } A: 12 } 16	Y: 1 N: 8 } A: 14 } 24	18 110
France	Y: 6 N: 6 } A: 5 } 11		Y: 1 N: 7 } A: 5 } 12	Y: 2 N: 4 } A: 2 } 8		Y: 12 N: 6 } A: 26 } 32	Y: 1 N: 1 } A: 16 } 18	Y: 0 N: 5 } A: 17 } 25	22 106
USSR	Y: 13 N: 2 } A: 2 } 4		Y: 8 N: 3 } A: 2 } 5	Y: 8 N: 2 } A: 0 } 2		Y: 32 N: 7 } A: 5 } 12	Y: 16 N: 0 } A: 3 } 3	Y: 25 N: 0 } A: 0 } 0	102 26
India	Y: 14 N: 0 } A: 3 } 3		Y: 10 N: 1 } A: 2 } 3	Y: 7 N: 2 } A: 1 } 3		Y: 43 N: 0 } A: 1 } 1	Y: 16 N: 0 } A: 3 } 3	Y: 24 N: 0 } A: 1 } 1	114 14
Roll Calls	17		13	10		44	19	25	128

Appendix II:

RG 25 Vol 2659 File 5475-AT-40 pt.1

No: 3 Ottawa, October 22, 1946

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of June 29th in which three questions were raised in relation to the application of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter as follows:

1. What factors are to be taken into account in determining which are the non-self-governing territories referred to in Chapter XI?
2. What non-self-governing territories are subject to the jurisdiction of Canada?
3. In what form may information on non-self-governing territories be most usefully transmitted by the Members directly concerned?

Article 73 of the Charter is stated to apply to "Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government." Article 74 distinguishes between the territories to which Chapter XI applies and the "metropolitan areas" of Members of the United Nations. When these articles are read together, it seems clear that Chapter XI is not applicable to territories within the metropolitan area of a member state. Moreover it would appear to be a

question of fact to be determined in each case whether the peoples of territories outside the metropolitan areas of member states in substance govern themselves.

Canada has no jurisdiction over territory beyond its borders. It is consequently not responsible for the administration of any territory to which Chapter XI of the Charter may be regarded as applying.

We take the view that the form in which information may most usefully be transmitted by the Members directly concerned is a matter on which these Members themselves are best able to express a useful opinion at the present stage. However, since the specialised agencies are expected to make in due course a substantial contribution to the welfare of non-self-governing territories, it is assumed that no final decision will be reached concerning the form of the reports until the specialised agencies have had opportunities to discuss the question.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Louis S. St.Laurant

Secretary of State

for External Affairs

Appendix III:

RG 25, Vol 2659, File 5475-AT-40 pt. 1

India's Reply to Secretary General:

"Non-Self-Governing-Territories may, therefore, be defined to mean and to include territories where the right of the inhabitants, their economic status and social privileges are regulated by another state in charge of the administration of such a territory. A territory in which there are internal executive authorities and legislative bodies representing the inhabitants of the territory themselves which are free to regulate the economic conditions and social rights of their people cannot be said to be non-self-governing even though in some aspects, such as the conduct of foreign relations, the territory may be subject to the direction and control of another state. It is suggested, therefore, that the criterion should be whether, in any particular territory, there is or is not an institution legally established which is responsible for the internal administration and control of the affairs of the inhabitants of that territory; when there is no such institution, the territory should be defined as non-self-governing."

Appendix IV:

RG 25, Vol: 2659, File: 5475-AT-40 pt.1.

Non-Self-Governing-Territories

Three geographical divisions within the Department are concerned with the information submitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter:

- a. Commonwealth Division - 44 territories under the administration of three Colonial Powers. (Twelve of these territories are in the Pacific and Far Eastern area and twelve in the Western Hemisphere. The American and Far Eastern Division thus has a concurrent interest in 24 of these 44 territories.
- b. European Division - 14 territories under the administration of four Colonial Powers. (Three of these are in the Pacific and Far Eastern area and one in the Western Hemisphere. The American and Far Eastern Division has a concurrent interest in four of the 14 territories.
- c. American and Far Eastern Division - six territories under the administration of one Colonial Power. A concurrent interest in 28 other territories.

Appendix V:

General Assembly Resolution 1188 (XII) of 11 December 1957

Recommendations concerning international respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination.

The General Assembly,

Recalling that one of the purposes and principles of the United Nations is to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

Recalling further its resolution 545 (VI) of 5 February 1952 in which it decided to include in the International Covenants on Human Rights an article which should provide: "All peoples shall have the right of self-determination",

Reaffirming the principles embodied in the above-mentioned resolution that all States, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing-Territories, should promote the realisation of that right, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Considering that disregard for the right to self-determination not only undermines the basis of friendly relations among nations as defined in the Charter of the United Nations but also creates conditions which may prevent further realisation of the right itself,

Believing that such a situation is contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

1. Reaffirms that it is of international importance that, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations:
 - a) Member States shall, in their relations with one another, give due respect to the right of self-determination;
 - b) Member States having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing-Territories shall promote the realisation and facilitate the exercise of this right by the peoples of such Territories;
2. Decides to consider further at its thirteenth session the item "Recommendations concerning international respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination", including the proposals contained in Economic and Social Council resolution 586D(XX) of 20 July 1955.

Appendix VI:

The Charter of the United Nations

Article 1.

The purpose of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 7.

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular

circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to cooperate with one another, and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapter 12 and 13 apply.

Article 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

Article 76

- a. to further international peace and security;
- b. to promote the political, economical, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
- c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
- d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Articles 80.

Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

- a. territories now held under mandate;
- b. territories which may be detached for enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
- c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for

placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

Articles 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreement and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.

3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreement and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operation under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

Article 86

1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:

- a. those Members administering trust territories;
- b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and
- c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those who do not.

2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

Article 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, The Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

- a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;
- b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;
- c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and
- d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 91

The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.

Appendix: VII

Research – Sources, Methodology and Problems

Record Group (RG) 25

The '40 Series' covers all operations of the Department of External Affairs for the period 1940-1963. File: 5475 – 40 was designed to accommodate this material. Topics include – UN, NATO, "bilateral and multilateral relations with almost every country in the world along with files relating to the operation of the Department of External Affairs itself." According to Archivist Christian Rioux, "some records created by the Department were destroyed before being transferred to the National Archives." However, subject titles covering these destroyed files remained in the finding aid. Because documents which I had selected from the subject index 'KWOC' were never requested by another researcher, the National Archives was not aware that documents which were listed in the finding aid were destroyed or were no longer traceable. This necessarily created a time-consuming and frustrating procedure. In extreme cases, the finding aids were missing from the boxes or files were simply closed indefinitely. For example, RG 25 Vol: 79 File: 54755555, FA- 42-40 pt.1. "Foreign Policy for USA 05-02-53 to 12-12-57" or RG 25 Vol: 2099 File: 97664-A-40 pt.2. and pt.3. "UK Colonial Intelligence Dec. 47 to Aug. 63".

The Archives began to access my requests for documents in August 1991, in accordance with the Access to Information Act (1985). Because the information of any use in most of the Manuscript Group had been placed in the 'closed' files, I resorted to examining cross-references in the hope of gaining some insight into bilateral or multilateral processes on specific subjects. They were also helpful in locating missing despatches or letters under reference. In addition, it was helpful to know the placement of individuals in locating documents. For example, the finding aid for Hume Wrong Papers listed under the subject files a paper -

"Value of Portugal to NATO" Top Secret - in volume 5, file 29. This paper had been removed from the file. I suspected that a copy might be kept in his "Ambassador's File – Foreign Policy" because Wrong was stationed in Washington, the nerve centre of NATO matters. A copy of the paper was found in this file. Because an enormous amount of classified material had to be accessed for my requests, such a rare but valuable 'find' went undetected.

I assumed that a measure of the importance of any issue is whether it was brought to the attention of Cabinet. The Boxlist of Agendas of Cabinet Conclusions were helpful here. Since they were only conclusions and did not include the discussions of the subject matter, the value of the exercise was in the knowledge that a specific item was addressed in Cabinet. The disadvantage of this exercise was its time-consuming procedure. There is no subject index. Therefore, next to a discussion of Middle-East-Israeli troop concentration on the Syrian border is a discussion of the House of Commons simultaneous translation and then frozen peas-arbitration customs valuation. In one year, there were approximately 125 meetings. The Agendas were examined, item for item, because there were no alternative methods.

The "50,000 Series" contain Secret and Top Secret files on security, intelligence, defense and other 'sensitive' areas of Canada's relations with other countries. These are the highest level of Department of External Affairs records. Canadian Papers Prepared for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meetings belonged to this category. The papers, the minutes and the agendas of the meetings for 1955, 1956 and 1957 were placed in 'closed' files.

The Commentaries prepared by the Department for the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations are crucial for understanding the rationale and goals of Canadian foreign policy in the United Nations. Although the Department made an official two-tier classification of Commentaries in 1960, Access did make this distinction in processing some pre-1960 Commentaries which I had requested. For example, parts of the 1956, 1957 and 1959 Commentaries were 'closed'. As of 1960, Part II was automatically 'closed.'

Manuscript Group (MG)

No fixed rules were being followed in the classification and availability of this group of documents.

Diefenbaker Papers (MG 26 M)

Leader of the Opposition: 1956; Prime Minister: 1957-1963.

The finding aid and conversion list give the appearance that important documents are available for viewing. For example, such subject matters as "USA-USSR Relations" in Vol: 53 1/Reel M-8899; "Canada's involvement in International Economic Assistance" Vol: 5338/Reel M-89033; "Canada and the Commonwealth Meetings – Finance" or "Canada and the UN" and "Canada and NATO" in Vols: 547-549/Reel M-8908; "Canada and Foreign Countries – International Situation – Africa, Algeria, Angola etc.," Vols: 557-558/Reel/M-8914. However, neither the finding aid nor the conversion lists state that some of the above material have been removed to the PMO Numbered Restricted Sub-Series. One must examine each reel of microfilm, in detail, before discovering this discrepancy. In addition, 'closed' material are supposedly stored only in reel M-8503. In practice, documents of any value are stored in 'closed' reels. Under the subject heading listed above are simply useless information on hotel reservations, thank you messages etc.

Louis St.Laurent Papers, (MG 26L)

Minister of External Affairs: 1946-1948; Prime Minister: 1948-1957.

Access to materials was as difficult as it had been for all the other papers. Here are just two examples of material which had been removed from the boxes in 1991. "Immigration Asiatic – General" in Vol: 55 File: I-20-14 and "Communism – Secret." At the time, archivist Loretta Barber told me that the paper listing the documents in the box was an indication that the documents do, in fact, exist. On enquiry in 1996, Archivist Maureen Hoogenraad assured me that the documents should be back in

the boxes because they were no longer restricted. On delivery, the boxes were found to be still empty. In 1997, Archivist Christian Rioux told me that "30% of the fonds have been destroyed by External Affairs before it was transferred to the Archives holding." He was unable to explain why the finding aid continued to list documents which I had reported missing since 1991. He said that the finding aid was made up before the documents were destroyed and that no one has had the time to verify that the content of the boxes correspond to the finding aid.

Jack Pickersgill (MG32 B34)

Secretary of State: 1953-1954; Minister of Citizenship and Immigration: 1954-1957.

Any material of value has been placed in 'closed' files.

Howard Green Papers (MG32 B13)

Acting Minister of Defense: 1957-1958; Secretary of State: 1959-1963.

By all appearances, the subject index in the finding aid promised a fruitful exercise. After listing the material which I needed to look at, I discovered that it was placed in 'closed' files which were located in 'open' volumes. For example, Volume 10 was considered to be an 'open' one except for File 5: "NATO 1959-1960; East-West Relations; Military and Economic Review of the International Situation." Similarly, Volume 11 was an 'open' one, except for File 7: "Closer Atlantic and Commonwealth Unity." The 'open' files contained speeches, leaflets etc.

Arnold Heeney Papers (MG 30 E 144)

Under-Secretary of State: 1949-1952; Ambassador to NATO Council: 1952-1953; Ambassador to the USA: 1953-1957 and 1959-1962.

These papers are 'open' and are not subject to any restrictions. Therefore, I was not surprised to find most secondary material and no original correspondences of value under the subject heading: "Canada-USA Relations" in Files: 2,3,4, and 15.

Norman Robertson Papers (MG 30 E 163)

Under-Secretary of State: 1941; High Commissioner for Canada in the UK: 1946, 1952; Canadian Ambassador to the USA: 1957; Under-Secretary of State: 1958.

All 'sensitive' material have been placed in File:19 which is 'closed' and all the other material are considered to be 'open'. As a consequence, the documents located under the subject headings of "Foreign Affairs" in Vol: 17 and "Commonwealth, Asia and Africa" in Vol: 18, were of no value to me.

Paul Martin Papers (MG 32 B 12)

Secretary of State: 1945-1946; Occasional Representative to the UN.

Nothing of value in 'open' files. File: "UNGA 1949-1955" contained 8 thick folders of public correspondences. After examining the contents of several folders in this file, I realised that these remotely relate to Canada's general diplomatic business in the United Nations General Assembly.

C.D. Howe Papers (MG 27 111B20)

Minister of Trade and Commerce: 1948-1951; Minister of Defense Production: 1951-1957.

The following subject files were found in the finding aid in 1991 and were requested for viewing: "USA/Canada Trade Economic Affairs; Suez Crisis – Commonwealth; Anglo-American Trade 1950-1957" Vol:4 File:11. The second file which I requested should have contained material on "NATO exports; Commonwealth-Economic Conference; Canada/USA Negotiations, Bases for Strategic Air Command." Vol: 4 File: 12. The third file was supposed to have material on "Immigration – 1948." All three files were removed by access on receipt of my request on August 7, 1991. On further request to view this same material in 1996, I was notified by fax on December 16, 1996 that the entire fonds was 'closed' to be reviewed in the year 2000.

In view of this situation, I attempted in late 1996 and early 1997, to gain access to 'closed' files. Although I had been told, repeatedly, that 'closed' files were actually not accessible, I made a personal request to Senior Project Archivist, Judi Cumming. I asked her to consider whether I could be given access to Douglas LePan Papers, 'closed' Volume 2 Folder 13. Mr. LePan held the post as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from 1950-1951. I was particularly interested in the subject: "Evaluation of the International Situation." I also asked for access to the 'closed' Volume 3 Folders 26 and 28. Mr. LePan was the Ministerial Councillor in Washington from 1951-1955. The subjects of interest: NATO, EDC, Future of the Sterling Area; International Development Fund and "Psychological Strategy." There was absolutely no question in the Archivist's mind that volume 3 was not to be tampered with. However, she was prepared to accommodate my 'pressure' on volume 2, if possible. As I sat in her office, she consulted with other Senior Archivists on the telephone, among them Paulette Dezoir. They were all in agreement that volume 2 must also remain 'closed.'

Judi Cumming personally photocopied the material from the 'restricted' files to which I had been given access, on the condition that I sign a Restricted Access form which stated that: "When copying is permitted, these copies may not be published nor passed to a third party without written authorisation." Mr. LePan passed away on November 27, 1998. Judi Cumming, in consultation with other Senior Archivists, has now given me the authorisation to pass my thesis on to "third eyes."

Votes.

I searched for a record on all voting positions which Canada had taken in the United Nations in order to supplement the roll call sample in the assessment. I did find a document, RG 25 Vol: 3458 File: 6-1946-63/1, Interim Access 96 ATIP, which was compiled from United Nations Official Records and from the Final Reports of the Canadian Delegation to each United Nations Session. Since this document is 'unclassified' it did not include any voting positions which were not

already publicly taken in the United Nations. In view of the fact that this document was compiled for "its potential usefulness as a quick reference for posts abroad," it was a rather incomplete one. Although the Commentaries for the Delegation stipulated how the Delegation should vote on specific questions, in general, much depended on the positions of the relevant allies and the trend in the United Nations. At times, it was necessary for Ottawa to phone in last minute instructions which were seldom recorded either in New York or in Ottawa.

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RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
63 (I) 13-12-46	<p>Approval of Trusteeship Agreements:</p> <p>The GA Approves separately the following...Trusteeship Agreements:-</p> <p>1. The proposed Trusteeship Agreement of New Guinea submitted by the Government of Australia. (Document A/153/Rev.2)</p> <p>Roll-call separately on operative paragraph 1</p>						
141(II) 01-11-47	<p>Consideration of proposed new Trusteeship Agreements, if any: Question of South West Africa</p> <p>Whereas it is a fact that all other States administering territories previously held under mandate have placed these territories under the Trusteeship System (TS) or offered them independence;</p> <p>Whereas the Gov't of the Union of South Africa in a letter of 23 July 1947 informed the UN that it has decided...to maintain the status quo and to continue to administer the Territory in the spirit of the existing mandate, and...has undertaken to submit reports on its administration for the information of the UN;</p> <p>The GA, therefore, Firmly maintains its recommendation that South West Africa be placed under the Trusteeship System;</p>	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
436(V) 02-12-50	<p><u>Urges</u> the Gov't of the Union of South Africa to propose for the consideration of the GA a trusteeship agreement for the Territory of South West Africa...</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>Information on the Implementation of the Trusteeship Council and GA resolutions relating to Trust Territories:</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Considering</u> that it is necessary that both the GA and the TC should have at their disposal information on the implementation of the recommendations approved by both bodies in matters relating to Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter,</p> <p><u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General (a) <u>To prepare</u> a list, classified by subjects, of such resolutions, including in each case the text of the operative part of the document; (b) <u>To report</u> to the sixth session, of the GA on the measures taken by the AA's to implement such resolutions, using as a source the reports of the TC; (c) <u>If there has been no action on the part of an AA in respect of any particular resolution, to set forth the reasons given concerning that matter,</u></p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
		N	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
323(IV) 15-11-49	<p>Social advancement in Trust Territories: The GA <u>Recalling</u> that one of the basic objectives of the International Trusteeship System is to encourage respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, <u>Resolves:</u></p> <p>4. To recommend the abolition of discriminatory laws and practices contrary to the principles of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreements, in all Trust Territories in which such laws and practices still exist;</p> <p>5. To recommend that the Trusteeship Council (TC) should examine all laws, statutes and ordinances, as well as their application, in the Trust Territories (TTs) and make positive recommendations to the Administering Authorities (AAs) concerned with a view to the abolition of all discriminatory provisions or practices;</p> <p>6. To ask the TC to include in its annual reports to the GA a special section dealing with the implementation by the AAs of its recommendations concerning the improvement of social conditions in TTs....</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	A	Y	N	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
322(IV) 15-11-49	<p>Economic advancement in Trust Territories:</p> <p>The GA <u>Having</u> taken note of the conclusions and recommendations of the TC on the economic advancement of the following TTs: the Cameroons and Togoland under British administration, the Cameroons and Togoland under French administration, Western Samoa, New Guinea and Nauru,</p> <p><u>Resolves:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To express full support of the recommendations of the TC and of all steps leading to a greater participation of indigenous inhabitants in the profits and management of entities, public or private, engaged in the exploitation of mineral and other natural resources or in the production of, or trade in, raw materials and commodities basic to the economy of TTs; 2. To reaffirm the principle that the interests of the indigenous inhabitants must be paramount in all economic plans or policies in TTs, particularly in raising the standards of living and the level of wages, and in improving housing, nutrition and health conditions; 5. To recommend to the TC the inclusion in its annual reports to the GA of a special section on the implementation by the AAs of its recommendations on the economic advancement of the TTs. <p>Roll-call on Preamble and Operative Para. 1</p>	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
626(VII) 21-12-52	<p>Total Membership Voting: Y-55; N:-1; A-1; §-2.</p> <p>Right to exploit freely natural wealth and resources:</p> <p>The GA <u>Remembering</u> that the right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their sovereignty and is in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the UN,</p> <p>1. <u>Recommends</u> all Member States, in the exercise of their right freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources wherever deemed desirable by them for their own progress and economic development, to the need for maintaining the flow of capital in conditions of security, mutual confidence and economic co-operation among nations;</p> <p>2. <u>Further recommends</u> all Member States to refrain from acts, direct or indirect, designed to impede the exercise of the sovereignty of any State over its natural resources.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-36; N-4; A-20; §-0.</p>	A	N	N	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
558(VI) 18-01-52	<p>Attainment by the Trust Territories of the Objective of Self-Government or Independence:</p> <p>The GA, Considering that in the case of only one TT namely Somaliland under Italian administration, the Trusteeship Agreement (TA) provides, in accordance with GA resolution 289A(IV) of 21 November 1949, for a specific period of ten years at the end of which the TT shall be an independent sovereign State,</p> <p>Considering that under Article 76 b of the Charter one of the basic objectives of the International TS is the progressive development of the inhabitants of the TTs towards self-gov't or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each Territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided in the terms of each TA,</p> <p>2. Invites the AA of each TT other than Somaliland to include in each annual report on its administration information in respect of:</p> <p>(a) The measures, taken or contemplated, which are intended to lead the TT, in the shortest possible time, to the objective of self-gov't or independence;</p> <p>(b) The manner in which, in these respects, the particular circumstances of the Territory and its people and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned are being taken into account;</p>						

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
652(VII) 20-12-52	<p>(c) The adequacy of the provisions of the existing TAs in relation to all the foregoing factors;</p> <p>(d) The rough estimate of the time which it considers, under existing conditions, may be needed to complete one or more of the various measures which are meant to create the pre-conditions for the attainment by the TT of the objective of self-gov't or independence;</p> <p>(e) The period of time in which it is expected that the TT shall attain the objective of self-gov't or independence.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>Roll-call on operative paragraph 2(e) separately</p> <p>The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem:</p> <p>The GA <u>Bearing in mind</u> that the unification of the two Togolands is the manifest aspiration of the majority of the population of both TTs, <u>Desiring</u> to promote the political advancement of the two TTs and their freely expressed wishes in conformity with the basic objective of the TS as set forth in Article 76 of the Charter, 1. <u>Continues to urge</u>, as set out in its resolution 555 (VI), that the two <u>AAs</u> (UK & France) concerned and the peoples involved exert every effort to achieve a prompt, constructive</p>	N	A	N	N	Y	Y
		N	A	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
656(VII) 21-12-52	<p>and equitable settlement of the problem, taking fully into account the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned;</p> <p>12. <u>Requests</u> the AAs to include in...reports accounts of steps taken by them pursuant to the present resolution, as well as a full account of all factors affecting the unification question;</p> <p>13. <u>Requests</u> the TC to submit to the GA at its next regular session a special report on the implementation by the AA concerned of the present resolution and the action taken by the Council thereon.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>Hearing of petitioners from the TT of Somaliland under Italian Administration:</p> <p>The GA <u>Considering</u> that, in the particular case of this TT, the GA established an Advisory Council which is entitled to speak in the TC and the authoritative opinion of which should be heard for a better understanding of the Territory's problems, <u>Requests</u> the TC further to consider the desirability of preparing a special questionnaire for Somaliland and of sending a separate visiting mission to that Territory in view of its special position and of the fact that it will acquire its independence in the next eight years, and further requests that this matter be reported upon in the Council's next report.</p>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
946(X) 15-12-55	<p>Roll-call: resolution as a whole</p> <p>Attainment by the Trust Territories of the objective of self-government or independence:</p> <p><u>The GA</u></p> <p>1. <u>Draws</u> the attention of the TC to the importance which the GA continues to attach to the question of the attainment by the TTs of the objective of self-gov't or independence;</p> <p>2. <u>Requests</u> the Council to ensure that the procedure devised by it for dealing in future with this question will enable it to comply fully with the terms of the relevant GA resolutions and, accordingly, to include in its next and succeeding reports to the Assembly a separate section containing the information indicated in those resolutions and the conclusions and recommendations of the Council thereon.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y
1046(XI) 23-01-57	<p>The future of Togoland under French administration:</p> <p><u>The GA</u></p> <p><u>Noting</u> that the TC has forwarded the memorandum by the AA... requesting termination of the TA, ...</p>	N	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p><u>Taking note</u> also of the views expressed by the petitioners before the Fourth Committee,</p> <p>1. <u>Considers with satisfaction</u> that the extent of powers transferred to the <u>Territory of Togoland</u> under French administration by the AA in consequence of the new political Statute of the Territory represents a very significant step in the achievement of the objectives of Article 76 of the Charter and of the TA;</p> <p>3. <u>Resolves</u> to dispatch to Togoland under French administration a Commission of six members, to be appointed on the basis of equitable geographical distribution by the President of the GA, in order to examine in the light of the discussions in the Fourth Committee, the entire situation in the Territory resulting from the practical application of the new Statute and the conditions under which the Statute is being applied, and to submit a report thereon, with its observations and suggestions, to the Trusteeship Council for its consideration;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>Attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories:</p> <p>The GA <u>Taking into account</u> that, in accordance with the principles of</p>	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A
1064(XI) 26-02-57							

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>the Charter of the UN, one of the basic objectives of the International TS is the progressive development of the populations of the TTs towards self-government or independence,</p> <p><u>Recalling</u> that the GA, in its resolution 558(VI) of 18 January 1952, invited the AA of each TT to determine the period of time in which it was expected that the TT concerned should attain self-gov't or independence, and also taking into account that this question has been repeatedly discussed at subsequent sessions of the GA,</p> <p><u>Noting</u> that the TC, in its report to the eleventh session of the Assembly, drew the attention of the Assembly to the fact that up to now the AAs have not fixed such time-limits,</p> <p><u>Attaching great importance</u> to the fixing of definite time-limits for the termination of trusteeship in TTs and for the granting of self-gov't or independence to the peoples of these Territories,</p> <p>1. <u>Recommends</u> that the AAs take the necessary measures to ensure that the TTs of Tanganyika, the Cameroons under British administration, the Cameroons under French administration, Togoland under French administration and Ruanda-Urundi achieve self-gov't or independence at an early date;</p> <p>2. <u>Invites</u> the AAs to estimate the period of time required for the attainment of self-gov't or independence by all TTs, in conformity with GA resolution 558(VI) of 18 January 1952 and the present resolution;</p>						

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>3. <u>Invites</u> the AAs to submit appropriate information to the TC at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions on the implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2 above;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
1182(XII)	The Future of Togoland under French Administration:						
29-11-57	<p><u>The GA</u></p> <p><u>Notes</u> the statement of the AA that the Legislative Assembly to be elected by universal adult suffrage in 1958 and the Togoland Government will be asked to formulate, in consultation with the AA, proposals for the early attainment of the final objective of the TS;</p> <p><u>Invites</u> the AA to inform the TC concerning the carrying out of the above-mentioned transfer of powers, the results of the elections, the convening of the new Togoland Legislative Assembly, and regarding any wishes which may have been expressed by the Legislative Assembly concerning the new Statute and the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Togoland under French Administration;</p> <p><u>Requests</u> the TC to consider these matters and report thereon to the GA at its thirteenth session, so as to enable it, if so requested by the new Togoland Legislative Assembly and the AA, to reach a decision, in the light of the circumstances then prevailing, concerning the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement in accordance with Article 76 b of the Charter...</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1410(XIV) 05-12-59	<p>Dissemination of information on the United Nations and on the International Trusteeship System in Trust Territories:</p> <p>The GA <u>Keeping in view</u> the special status of Trust Territories and their inhabitants and also the GA's own special responsibilities under Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter of the UN, <u>Reiterating</u> that it is essential, in the GA's view, that the peoples of the TT should receive adequate information concerning the purposes and operation of the UN and of the International Trusteeship System,</p> <p>1. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to initiate discussions with the <u>Administering Authorities</u> concerned with a view to establishing, during 1960, in at least some of the larger Trust Territories, such as Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi and New Guinea, United Nations information centres in which the responsible positions would be occupied preferably by indigenous inhabitants of the Trust Territories concerned;</p> <p>2. <u>Also requests</u> the Administering Authorities to extend their co-operation and assistance to the Secretary-General in implementing the recommendations made in paragraph 1 above;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1579(XV) 20-12-60	<p>Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: The GA <u>Being</u> conscious of its responsibility to ensure that the supervision of the elections by the UN is effective, and that the elections, which will furnish the basis for the Territory's independence, are held in proper conditions so that their results are completely free of doubt or dispute, <u>Having heard</u> the views of the petitioners belonging to various political parties and groups of Ruanda-Urundi,</p> <p>1. <u>Considers</u> that the necessary conditions and atmosphere must be brought about expeditiously to ensure that the legislative elections, which will lead to the establishment of national democratic institutions and furnish the basis for the national independence of Ruanda-Urundi in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, take place in an atmosphere of peace and harmony;</p> <p>6. <u>Calls upon</u> the AA to refrain from using the Territory as a base <u>whether</u> for internal or external purposes, for the accumulation of arms or armed forces not strictly required for the purpose of maintaining public order in the Territory;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	A	A	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	TRUST TERRITORIES : ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1605(XV) 21-04-61	<p>Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: (AA-Belgium)</p> <p>The GA</p> <p>Regretting the failure of the AA to implement fully and effectively the terms of resolution 1579(XV), the resistance to such implementation by the local representatives of the AA in Ruanda-Urundi and their failure to co-operate fully and effectively with the UN Commission for Ruanda-Urundi,</p> <p>3. Recognizes that the Government of Belgium is alone responsible for the administration of the TT of Ruanda-Urundi and accountable to the UN, and that its responsibilities as AA cannot in any way be abdicated to local political bodies and leaders until after appropriate democratic institutions have been set up and the TA has been terminated, all with the approval of the UN;</p> <p>15. Reiterates its conviction that the best future for Ruanda-Urundi lies in the accession of that Territory to independence as a single, united and composite State;</p> <p>16. Considers that the full implementation of all the provisions of the present resolution will enable the GA at its sixteenth session to consider the termination of the TA at the earliest possible date.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73e	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
66 (I) 14-12-46	<p>Transmission of Information under Article 73e of the Charter:- relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories ...other than those to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.</p> <p>The value of the association of Non-Self-Governing Territories in the work of the specialized agencies as a means of attaining the objectives of Chapter XI of the Charter has been stressed.</p> <p><u>The GA, therefore,</u></p> <p>P. 4, op. part:- <u>Invites</u> the Secretary-General to convene... an ad hoc Committee composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Members transmitting information under Article 73e of the Charter and of representatives of Members elected, by the GA at this session, on the basis of an equitable geographical distribution;</p> <p>P. 5, op. part:- <u>Invites</u> the Secretary-General to request the FAO, the ILO, the UNESCO, and the WHO and the International Trade Organization, when constituted, to send representatives in an advisory capacity to the meeting of the <u>ad hoc</u> committee;</p> <p>P. 6, op. part:- <u>Invites</u> the <u>ad hoc</u> Committee to examine the Secretary-General's summary and analysis of the information transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter with a view to aiding the GA in its consideration of this information...making recommendations to the GA regarding the procedures to be followed in the future...the means of ensuring that...the specialized agencies are used to the best advantage.</p>	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73e	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
334(IV) 02-12-49	<p>Territories to which Chapter XI of the Charter applies:</p> <p>Having regard to the obligation to transmit information under Article 73e of the Charter, accepted by the Members which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government,</p> <p>P.1, op. part:- <u>Considers</u> that it is within the responsibility of the GA to express its opinion on the principles which have guided or which may in future guide the Members concerned in enumerating the territories for which the obligation exists to transmit information under Article 73e of the Charter;</p> <p>P.2, op. part:- <u>Invites</u> any special committee which the GA may appoint on information transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter to examine the factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether any territory is or is not a territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.</p> <p>roll-call on the resolution as a whole</p>	N	A	N	N	Y	Y
648(VII) 10-12-52	<p>Factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether a Territory is or is not a Territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government:</p> <p><u>The GA</u></p> <p>P.1, op. part:- <u>Approves</u> provisionally the annexed list of</p>						

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73e	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>factors which may serve as a guide...in deciding whether a Territory has or has not attained a full measure of self-gov't;</p> <p>P.2, op. part:- <u>Recognizes</u> that each concrete case should be considered in the <u>light of</u> the particular circumstances of that case and taking into account the right of self-determination of peoples;</p> <p>P.3, op. part:- <u>Declares</u> that the factors, while serving as a guide...should in no way be interpreted as a hindrance to the attainment of a full measure of self-government by the Non-Self-Governing Territories,</p> <p>P.5, op. part:- <u>Recommends</u> that, provisionally, the annexed list of factors should be taken into account in any case which the GA examines...concerning the cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73e of the Charter, or in relation to other questions that may arise concerning the existence of an obligation to transmit information under this Article;</p> <p>roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>						
748(VIII) 27-11-53	<p>Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73e of the Charter in respect of Puerto Rico: <u>The GA</u> <u>Having received</u> the communications...informing the UN of the</p>	N	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73e	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico...the Government of the United States of America would cease to transmit information under Article 73e of the Charter,</p> <p><u>Bearing in mind</u> the competence of the GA to decide whether a <u>Non-Self-Governing Territory</u> has or has not attained a full measure of self-government as referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter,</p> <p>P.5, op. part:- <u>Recognizes</u> that, in the framework of their Constitution...the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have been invested with attributes of political sovereignty which clearly identify the status of self-government attained by the Puerto Rican people as that of an autonomous political entity;</p> <p>P.6, op. part:- <u>Considers</u> that, due to these circumstances, the Declaration regarding <u>Non-Self-Governing Territories</u> and the provisions established under it in Chapter XI of the Charter can no longer be applied to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;</p> <p>P.8, op. part:- <u>Considers it appropriate</u> that the transmission of this information should cease,</p> <p>roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	N	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73e	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
849(IX) 22-11-54	<p>Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73e of the Charter in respect of Greenland;</p> <p><u>The GA</u> ...considers it essential that the UN be informed of any change in the constitutional status of any such Territory as a result of which the responsible Government concerned thinks it unnecessary to transmit further information in respect of that Territory under Article 73.e of the Charter, by resolution 222(III) of 3 November 1948,</p> <p><u>Having received</u> from the Government of Denmark a communication ...<u>Greenland</u> has become an integral part of the Danish realm... as a result of this constitutional change, the Danish Gov't regarded its responsibilities under Chapter XI of the Charter in respect of Greenland terminated and had, therefore decided to bring to an end the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter,</p> <p><u>Having studied</u> the report prepared by the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories...on the question of the cessation of the transmission of information on Greenland...,</p> <p><u>Having examined</u> the communication...in light of the basic principles and objectives embodied in Chapter XI of the Charter, the criteria established by the list of factors...</p> <p><u>Considers</u> that due to these circumstances the Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories with the provisions</p>						

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73e	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
945(X) 15-12-55	<p>established under it in Chapter XI of the Charter can no longer be applied to Greenland;</p> <p>Considers it appropriate that the transmission of information in respect of Greenland under Article 73 e of the Charter should now cease.</p> <p>roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>Communication from the Government of the Netherlands concerning the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam:</p> <p><u>Recalling</u>...resolution 222(III) of 3 November 1948,</p> <p><u>Having received</u> the communication...which...transmitted...the constitutional provisions embodied in the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands,</p> <p><u>Having studied</u> the report prepared by the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories... P.1, op. point:-</p> <p>Takes note of the documentation submitted...that the people of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam have expressed, through their freely elected representative bodies, their approval of the new constitutional order...</p> <p>P.2, op. point:-</p> <p><u>Expresses the opinion</u> that...as desired by the Government of the Netherlands, cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73 e ...in respect of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam is appropriate. (voting separately on this point.)</p>	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73e	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1467(XIV) 12-12-59	<p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>General questions relating to the transmission and examination of information:</p> <p><u>Noting</u> that Member States have expressed differing opinions as to the application of the provisions of Chapter XI to Territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government, including the obligation to transmit the information called for in Article 73 e of the Charter,</p> <p>P.1, op. point:- Considers that it would be desirable for the GA to enumerate the <u>principles</u> which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit...;</p> <p>P.2, op. point:- <u>Decides</u> to establish a special committee consisting of six members, to be elected by the Fourth Committee on behalf of the GA - three of whom shall be Members who transmit information under Article 73 e...and three non-administering Members- to study these principles and to report on the results of its study to the GA at its 15th session;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole...</p>	Y	Y	A	Y	N	A
		Y	Y	A	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73e	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1541(XV) 15-12-60	<p>Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the Charter:</p> <p><u>The GA</u></p> <p><u>Considering</u> the objectives set forth in Chapter XI of the Charter</p> <p><u>Having examined</u> the report of the Special Committee of Six... appointed under GA resolution 1467(XIV) of 12 December 1959...</p> <p>P.2, op. point:- <u>Approves</u> the principles set out...as they appear in the annex to the present resolution;</p> <p>P.3, op. point:- <u>Decides</u> that these principles should be applied in the light of the facts and the circumstances of each case to determine whether or not an obligation exists to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>						
1542(XV) 15-12-60	<p>Transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter:</p> <p><u>Recognizing</u> that the desire for independence is the rightful aspiration of peoples under colonial subjugation and that the denial of their right to self-determination constitutes a threat to the well-being of humanity and to international peace,</p>	Y	A	A	A	A	Y

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73e	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>Being aware that the Government of Portugal has not transmitted information on the territories under its administration which are enumerated in operative paragraph 1 below and has not expressed any intention of doing so, and because such information as is otherwise available in regard to the conditions in these territories gives cause for concern,</p> <p>P.1, op. part:- <u>Considers</u> that, in the light of the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter, GA resolution 742(VIII) and the principles approved by the GA in resolution 1541(XV) of 15 December 1960, the territories under the administration of Portugal listed hereunder are Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) The Cape Verde Archipelago; (b) Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea; (c) São Tomé and Príncipe, and their dependencies; (d) São João Batista de Ajudá; (e) Angola, including the enclave of Cabinda; (f) Mozambique; (g) Goa and dependencies, called the State of India; (h) Macau and dependencies; (i) Timor and dependencies; <p>P.2. op. part:- <u>Declares</u> that an obligation exists on the part of the Government of Portugal to transmit information under Chapter XI of the Charter concerning these territories and that it should be discharged without further delay;</p>						

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73 ^a	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>P.3. op. part:- <u>Requests</u> the Government of Portugal to transmit to the Secretary-General information in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter on the conditions prevailing in the territories under its administration enumerated in paragraph 1 above;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	A	A	A	N	Y	Y
1700(XVI) 19-12-60	<p>Question of the renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories:</p> <p>The GA <u>Having recognized</u> the usefulness and value of the work of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories in the interests of the advancement of peoples of NSGTs and of the attainment of the objectives set forth in Chapter XI of the Charter of the UN,</p> <p>P.1, op. part:- <u>Decides</u> to continue the Committee on Information from NSGTs on the same basis as hitherto until such time as the GA has decided that the principles embodied in Chapter XI of the Charter of the UN and in the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples have been fully implemented;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73o	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1745(XVI) 23-02-62	<p>General questions relating to the transmission and examination of information from Non-Self-Governing Territories:</p> <p><u>The GA</u></p> <p><u>Recalling</u> its resolution 742(VIII) of 27 November 1953, by which the GA approved a list of factors to be used as a guide in determining whether a territory is or is not within the scope of Chapter XI of the Charter of the UN, and in particular section C of the second part of that list,</p> <p><u>Recalling further</u> resolution 1541(XV) of 15 December 1960, by which the GA approved a list of principles to be applied in the light of the facts and the circumstances of each case to determine whether or not an obligation exists to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter,</p> <p><u>Bearing in mind</u> that, according to principle XI set forth in resolution 1541(XV), the constitution of a NSGT giving it self-government in economic and social matters has to be established through freely elected institutions,</p> <p><u>Mindful</u> of the fact that the indigenous inhabitants have not been adequately represented in the legislature and not represented at all in the government,</p> <p>P.I, op. part:- Requests the Special Committee established by GA resolution 1654(XVI) of 27 November 1961 to consider whether the territory of Southern Rhodesia has attained a full measure of self-government;</p>						

RESOLUTION	NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES : TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE 73e	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>P.2, op. part:- <u>Requests</u> the Special Committee to report on this matter to the GA at its seventeenth session.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	N	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
338 (IV) 6-12-49	Question of South West Africa: request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice:- Requests the Secretary-General to submit all documents likely to throw light upon the question.	N	N	A	N	N	Y
303 (IV) 9-12-49	Palestine: question of an international regime for the Jerusalem area and the protection of the Holy Places. <u>Operative Parts:-</u> Section I, P.1, point (1):- the City of Jerusalem shall be established as a <u>corpus separatum</u> under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations; Section I, P.1, point (2):- the Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority...; Section I, P.1, point (3):- the City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat... Section I, P.1:- <u>The G.A. Decides</u> To restate, therefore, its intention that Jerusalem should be placed under a permanent international regime, which should envisage appropriate guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places, both within and outside Jerusalem, and to confirm specifically the following	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES											CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
449 (V)A 13-12-50	provisions of G.A. resolution 181 (II): points (1), (2) & (3) as outlined above.																
	Section I, P.2, 1st Part:-To request for this purpose that the Trusteeship Council at its next session...complete the preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem...and, without prejudice to the fundamental principles of the international regime for Jerusalem set forth in GA resolution 181 (II) introducing therein amendments in the direction of its greater democratization, approve the Statute, and proceed immediately with its implementation.																
	Section I, P.2, 2nd Part:- The Trusteeship Council shall not allow any actions taken by any interested Government or Governments to divert it from adopting and implementing the Statute of Jerusalem;																
	Section II:- <u>Calls upon</u> the States concerned to make formal undertakings, at an early date and in the light of their obligations as Members of the UN, that they will approach these matters with good will and be guided by the terms of the present resolution.																
	Question of South West Africa:- <u>Considering</u> that the International Court of Justice is of the opinion that the Union of South Africa acting alone is not competent to modify the international status of the Territory of South West Africa, and that the competence to determine and modify the international status of the Territory rests with the Union of South Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations,																
	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
449 (V)B	<p>Question of South West Africa:- Considering that, under the terms of the Charter of the UN, it is clear that the International Trusteeship System takes the place of the former Mandates System instituted by the League of Nations and, further, that there is no specific provision indicating the permanent co-existence of the Mandates System with the International Trusteeship System,</p> <p>2. <u>Reiterates</u> that the normal way of modifying the international status of the Territory would be to place it under the Trusteeship System by means of a Trusteeship Agreement in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter.</p>	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
570 (VI)A 19-01-52	<p>Question of South West Africa:- <u>Considering</u> that the acceptance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 11 July 1950 is essential to the rule of law and reason in international affairs thus strengthening the cause of the UN,</p> <p>3. <u>Declares</u> that, since the Government of the Union of South Africa cannot avoid its international obligations by unilateral action, the UN cannot recognize as valid any measures taken unilaterally by the Union of South Africa which would modify the international status of the Territory of South West Africa;</p>	Y	Y	A	Y	N	Y
B	<p>Question of South West Africa:- <u>Having</u> accepted the advisory opinion of 11 July 1950 of the International Court of Justice concerning South West Africa, which states, <u>inter alia</u>, that:</p> <p>(a) The provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter are applicable to the Territory of South West Africa in the sense that they provide a means by which the Territory may be brought under the Trusteeship System,</p>						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	(b) The provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter do not impose on the Union of South Africa a legal obligation to place the Territory under the Trusteeship System,	A	A	A	A	N	Y
749 (VIII) A 28-11-53	Question of South West Africa:- <u>Records with deep regret</u> that the Government of the Union of South Africa... is prepared only to enter into new arrangements for the Territory of South West Africa with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of the First World War (France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America), and not with the UN; <u>Notes with further regret</u> that the Union of South Africa has refused to co-operate with the UN concerning the submission of petitions in accordance with the procedures of the Mandates System;	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y
A	P.6(b) op. pt.: - The Union Government should assume its obligations to the UN and not, as proposed by the Union Government, to the three Powers (France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) as principals;	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y
A	P.12 op. pt.: - <u>Establishes</u> , until such a time as an agreement is reached between the UN and the Union of South Africa, a Committee on South West Africa, consisting of seven Members, and requests this Committee to: (b) Examine, as far as possible in accordance with the procedure of the former Mandates System, reports and petitions which may be submitted to the Committee or to the Secretary-General;	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y
	(c) Transmit to the GA a report concerning conditions in the						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
B	<p>Territory taking into account, as far as possible, the scope of the reports of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations;</p> <p>Having <u>accepted</u>, by resolution 449 A(V) the advisory opinion of 11 July 1950 of the International Court of Justice concerning South West Africa, <u>inter alia</u>, to the effect that:</p> <p>(a) ...the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter... are applicable to the Territory of South West Africa,</p> <p>(b) ...the Union of South Africa acting alone has not the competence to modify the international status of the Territory of South West Africa....,</p> <p>2. <u>Reasserts</u> that the normal way of modifying the international status of the Territory would be to place it under the Trusteeship System....</p>	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y
849 (IX) 22-11-54	<p>Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter in respect of Greenland:-</p> <p>Last P. of Preamble:-<u>Bearing in mind</u> the competence of the GA to decide whether a <u>Non-Self-Governing</u> Territory has or has not attained a full measure of self-government as referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter,</p> <p>Communication from the Government of the Netherlands concerning the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam:-</p> <p>Fifth P. of Preamble:-<u>Bearing in mind</u> the competence of the GA</p>	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y
945 (X) 15-12-55		N	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1245(XIII) 30-10-58	to decide whether or not a Non-Self-Governing Territory has attained the full measure of self-government referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter of the UN, Conditions in the Territory of South West Africa. P.3, op. part:- Expresses <u>its deep concern</u> regarding the social, economic and political situation now prevailing in the Territory;	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
1580 (XV) 20-12-60	Question of the Mwami. (Administering Authority - Belgium) The GA.1. <u>Notes with regret</u> that the Administering Authority has arbitrarily suspended the powers of the Mwami of Ruanda and has not allowed him to return to Ruanda to resume his duties as Mwami, 2. <u>Requests</u> the Administering Authority to revoke the measures adopted by it to suspend the powers of the Mwami, and to facilitate his return to Ruanda to enable him to function as Mwami pending the ascertainment of the wishes of the people on this question;	A	A	N	A	Y	Y
1593(XV) 16-03-61	Appeal to Member States which have particularly close and continuous relations with the Government of the Union of South Africa, with respect to the situation in the Territory of South West Africa:- <u>Considering</u> that the conduct of the Government of the Union of South Africa constitutes a challenge to the authority of the UN, After <u>Noting with concern</u> that up to the present time the	N	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>Government of the Union of South Africa has ignored [the many] resolutions and has, instead, adopted an attitude contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN,</p> <p><u>Appeals</u> to those Members of the UN... to bring, as a matter of urgency, all their influence to bear on that Government with a view to ensuring that it shall adjust its conduct to its obligations under the Charter</p>	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y
1699(XVI) 19-12-61	<p>Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the UN and with GA resolution 1542 (XV):-</p> <p><u>Condemns</u> the continuing non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with its obligations under Chapter XI...and with the terms of GA resolution 1542 (XV), and its refusal to co-operate in the work of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories;</p>	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
2064(XX) 16-12-65	<p>Question of the Cook Islands:- (Administering Authority- NZ)</p> <p>P.4, op. part:- <u>Notes</u> that the Constitution of the Cook Islands came into force on 4 August 1965, from which date the people of the Cook Islands have had control of their internal affairs and of their future;</p> <p>P.5, op. part:- <u>Considers</u> that since the Cook Islands have attained full internal self-government, the transmission of information in respect of the Cook Islands under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations is no longer necessary;</p>	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y
		Y	Y	Y	A	N	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2107(XX) 21-12-65	<p>Resolution as a whole: <u>Reaffirms</u> the responsibility of the UN, under GA resolution 1514 (XV), to assist the people of the Cook Islands in the eventual achievement of full independence, if they so wish, at a future date;</p> <p>Question of Territories under Portuguese administration:- The resolution as a whole, <u>Noting with deep concern</u> that, in spite of the measures laid down by the <u>Security Council</u>...the Government of Portugal is intensifying the measures of repression and military operations against the African people of these Territories with a view to defeating their legitimate aspirations to self-determination, freedom and independence,</p> <p><u>Considering</u> that the evidence submitted by the petitioners confirmed that the Government of Portugal has continued to use the aid and weapons that it receives from its military allies against the populations of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and other Territories under its administration,</p> <p><u>Convinced</u> that the attitude of Portugal towards the African population of its colonies and of the neighbouring States constitutes a threat to international peace and security,</p> <p>P.8, op. part (out of 12 operative parts) <u>Requests</u> all States, and in particular the military allies of Portugal within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to take the following steps: (a) To refrain forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression</p>	Y	A	A	A	A	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2227(XXI) 20-12-66	<p>of the African people in the Territories under its administration;</p> <p>(b) To take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and military equipment to the Government of Portugal;</p> <p>(c) To stop the sale or shipment to the Government of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of arms and ammunition;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-66; N-26; A-15; S-10.</p> <p>Question of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea:</p> <p>The GA <u>Having considered</u> the report of the TC covering the period from 1 July 1965 to 26 July 1966,</p> <p>1. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of Papua and New Guinea to S-D and independence in accordance with GA resolution 1514 (XV);</p> <p>3. Calls upon the administering Power to implement fully resolution 1514 (XV) and to inform the TC at its thirty-fourth session and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration...of the action taken in this regard;</p>	N	N	N	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2232(XXI) 20-12-66	<p>5. <u>Further calls upon</u> the administering Power to refrain from utilizing the Territories for military activities incompatible with the Charter of the UN;</p> <p>Roll-call on Operative Paragraph 5 Total Membership Voting: Y-71; N-16; A-25; S-10.</p> <p>Question of American Samoa, Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Dominica, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Grenada, Guam, Mauritius, Monserrat, New Hebrides, Niue, Pitcairn, St. Helena, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tokelau Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands:</p> <p>The GA <u>Deeply concerned</u> at the information contained in the report of the Special Committee on the continuation of policies which aim, among other things, at the disruption of the territorial integrity of some of these Territories and at the creation by the administering Powers of military bases and installations in contravention of the relevant resolutions of the GA, <u>Conscious</u> that these situations require the continued attention and the assistance of the UN in the achievement by the peoples of these Territories of their objectives, as embodied in the</p>	N	N	N	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>Charter of the UN and in the Declaration...in GA resolution 1514 (XV), <u>Aware</u> of the special circumstances of geographical location and economic conditions concerning some of these Territories,</p> <p>2. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the peoples of these Territories to self-determination and independence;</p> <p>4. <u>Reiterates</u> its declaration that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of military bases and installations in these Territories is incompatible with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the UN and of GA resolution 1514 (XV);</p> <p>5. <u>Urges</u> the administering Powers to allow UN visiting missions to visit the Territories, and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance;</p> <p>6. <u>Decides</u> that the UN should render all help to the peoples of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-93; N-0; A-24; §-5.</p> <p>Separate roll-call on Operative Paragraph 4 Total Membership Voting: Y-72; N-18; A-27; §-5.</p>						
		A	A	A	A	Y	Y
		N	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
<p>2145(XXI)</p> <p>27-10-66</p>	<p>Question of South West Africa:</p> <p><u>The GA</u></p> <p><u>Convinced</u> that the administration of the Mandated Territory by South Africa has been conducted in a manner contrary to the Mandate, the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,</p> <p><u>Emphasizing</u> that the problem of South West Africa is an issue falling within the terms of GA resolution 1514 (XV),</p> <p>3. <u>Declares</u> that South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa and has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate;</p> <p>4. <u>Decides</u> that the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Gov't of the Union of South Africa is therefore terminated, that South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the UN;</p> <p>5. <u>Resolves</u> that in these circumstances the UN must discharge those responsibilities with respect to South West Africa;</p> <p>6. <u>Establishes</u> an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee for South West Africa - composed of fourteen Member States to be designated by the President of the GA- to recommend practical means by which</p>						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>South West Africa should be administered, so as to enable the people of the Territory to exercise the right of S-D and to achieve independence, and to report to the GA at a special session as soon as possible and in any event not later than April 1967;</p> <p>7. <u>Calls upon</u> the Gov't of South Africa forthwith to refrain and desist <u>from any action</u>, constitutional, administrative, political or otherwise, which will in any manner whatsoever alter or tend to alter the present international status of South West Africa;</p> <p>8. <u>Calls the attention</u> of the Security Council to the present resolution;</p> <p>9. <u>Requests</u> all States to extend their whole-hearted co-operation and to render assistance in the implementation of the present resolution;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-114; N-2; A-3; S-2.</p> <p>Roll-call on Op. Para, the words "and has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate". Total Membership Voting: Y-90; N-2; A-27; S-2.</p> <p>Roll-call on Operative Paragraphs 4-9 Total Membership Voting: Y-85; N-2; A-32; S-2.</p>	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y
		Y	Y	A	A	A	Y
		Y	Y	A	A	A	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2184 (XXI) 12-12-66	<p>Question of Territories under Portuguese administration</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Deeply concerned</u> at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening peace and security owing to the intensification of the measures of repression and military operation against the people of the Territories under Portuguese administration, <u>Noting with deep concern</u> that the activities of the foreign financial interests in these Territories which impede the African people in the realization of their aspirations to freedom and independence continue undiminished, <u>Further noting with deep concern</u> that Portugal continues to use the aid and weapons that it receives from its military allies against the population of these Territories,</p> <p>3. <u>Condemns</u>, as a crime against humanity, the policy of the Gov't of Portugal, which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of African workers to South Africa;</p> <p>4. <u>Further condemns</u> the activities of the financial interests operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination which exploit the human and material resources of the Territories and impede the progress of their peoples towards freedom and independence;</p>						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>5. <u>Calls upon</u> Portugal to apply immediately the principle of S-D to the peoples of the Territories under its administration, in accordance with GA resolution 1514 (XV) and Security Council resolutions 183 (1963) and 218 (1965);</p> <p>6. <u>Appeals</u> to all States to give the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights and to prevent their nationals from co-operating with the Portuguese authorities, especially in regard to investment in the Territories;</p> <p>7. <u>Recommends</u> to the Security Council that it make it obligatory for all States, directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members, to implement the measures contained in GA resolution 2107 (XX), and in particular those mentioned in paragraph 7 thereof;</p> <p>8. <u>Requests</u> all States, in particular the military allies of Portugal within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to take the following steps: (a) To desist forthwith from giving the Portuguese Gov't any assistance which enables it to continue its repression of the</p>						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>African peoples in the Territories under its domination; (b) To take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and military equipment to the Gov't of Portugal; (c) To stop the sale or shipment to the Gov't of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of arms and ammunition; (d) To take the necessary measures to put an end to such activities as are referred to in paragraph 4 above;</p> <p>9. <u>Appeals once again</u> to all specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance as long as the Gov't of Portugal fails to implement GA resolution 1514(XV)</p> <p>10. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to enter into consultation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in order to secure its compliance with GA resolutions 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965 and 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and with the present resolution;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-70; N-13; A-22; §-17.</p>	N	N	N	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2238(XXI) 20-12-66	<p>Question of Oman:</p> <p>The GA <u>Deeply concerned</u> at the serious and critical situation arising from the colonial policies pursued by the Gov't of the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the Territory,</p> <p>2. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of the Territory as a whole to S-D and independence and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve the rights laid down in the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence...;</p> <p>4. <u>Further deplores</u> the policies of the UK in installing and supporting any unrepresentative régime in the Territory in contravention of the relevant GA resolutions;</p> <p>5. <u>Recognizes</u> that the natural resources of the Territory belong to the people of Oman and that the concessions given to foreign monopolies without the consent of the people constitute a violation of the rights of the people of the Territory;</p> <p>6. <u>Considers</u> that the maintenance of military bases, depots and troops in the Territory constitutes a major hindrance to the exercise by the people of their right to S-D and independence and is prejudicial to the peace and security of the region, and that their immediate removal is therefore essential;</p>						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2248(S-V) 19-05-67	<p>7. <u>Calls upon</u> the Gov't of the UK to effect immediately the implementation in the Territory of the following measures: (a) Cessation of all repressive action against the people...; (b) Withdrawal of British troops; (c) Release of political prisoners...; (d) Elimination of British domination in any form;</p> <p>8. <u>Appeals</u> to all Member States to render all possible assistance to the people of the Territory in their struggle to attain freedom and independence;</p> <p>10. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to take, in consultation with the Special Committee, appropriate measures for the implementation of the relevant GA resolutions and to report thereon to the Assembly at its twenty-second session.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-70; N-18; A-28; S-6.</p> <p>Question of South West Africa:</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Having assumed</u> direct responsibility for the Territory of South West Africa in accordance with resolution 2145 (XXI), <u>Recognizing</u> that it has thereupon become incumbent upon the UN to give effect to its obligations by taking practical steps to transfer power to the people of South West Africa,</p>	N	N	N	A	Y	A

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>I</p> <p>Reaffirms the territorial integrity of South West Africa and the inalienable right of its people to freedom and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the UN, GA resolution 1514 (XV) and all other resolutions concerning South West Africa;</p> <p>II</p> <p>1. <u>Decides</u> to establish a UN Council for South West Africa (the Council) comprising of eleven Member States to be elected during the present session and to entrust to it the following powers and functions, to be discharged in the Territory:</p> <p>(a) To administer South West Africa until independence with the maximum possible participation of the people of the Territory;</p> <p>(c) To take as an immediate task all the necessary measures, in consultation with the people of the Territory, for the establishment of a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution on the basis of which elections will be held for the establishment of a legislative assembly and a responsible government;</p> <p>2. <u>Decides</u> that in the exercise of its powers and in the discharge of its functions the Council shall be responsible to the GA;</p> <p>III</p> <p>2. <u>Requests</u> the specialized agencies and the appropriate organs</p>						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>of the UN to render to South West Africa technical and financial assistance through a co-ordinated emergency programme to meet the exigencies of the situation;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">IV</p> <p>1. <u>Decides</u> that the Council shall be based in South West Africa;</p> <p>4. <u>Calls upon</u> the Gov't of South Africa to comply without delay with the terms of resolution 2145 (XXI) and the present resolution and to facilitate the transfer of the administration of the Territory of South West Africa to the Council;</p> <p>5. <u>Requests</u> the Security Council to take all appropriate measures to enable the Council to discharge the functions and responsibilities entrusted to it by the GA;</p> <p>6. <u>Requests</u> all States to extend their whole-hearted co-operation and to render assistance to the Council in the implementation of its task;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">VI</p> <p><u>Decides</u> that South West Africa shall become independent on a date to be fixed in accordance with the wishes of the people and that the Council shall do all in its power to enable independence to be attained by June 1968.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-85; N-2; A-30; S-5.</p>	A	A	A	A	A	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2270 (XXII) 17-11-67	<p>Question of Territories under Portuguese administration</p> <p><u>The GA</u></p> <p>4. <u>Strongly condemns</u> the colonial war being waged by the Gov't of Portugal against the peaceful peoples of the Territories under its domination, which constitutes a crime against humanity and a grave threat to international peace and security;</p> <p>5. <u>Condemns</u> the policy of the Gov't of Portugal, which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population...</p> <p>6. <u>Strongly condemns</u> the activities of the financial interests operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination, which exploit the human and material resources of the Territories and impede the progress of their peoples towards freedom and independence;</p> <p>7. <u>Urges</u> the Gov't of Portugal to apply without delay to the peoples of the Territories under its domination the principle of S-D in accordance with GA resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions of the GA and SC, and, in particular, to take the following action:</p> <p>(a) To recognize solemnly the right of the peoples under its domination to S-D and independence;</p> <p>(b) To desist forthwith from all acts of repression and to withdraw all military and other forces which it is using for that purpose;</p>						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>8. <u>Once again</u> requests all States, particularly the military allies of Portugal in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to take the following measures;</p> <p>(a) To desist forthwith from giving the Gov't of Portugal any assistance, including the training of Portuguese military personnel within or outside the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which encourages that Gov't to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its domination;</p> <p>(b) To prevent any sale or supply of weapons and military equipment to the Gov't of Portugal;</p> <p>(c) To stop the sale or shipment to the Gov't of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition;</p> <p>(d) To put an end to the activities referred to in paragraph 6 above;</p> <p>10. <u>Draws the urgent attention</u> of the SC to the continued deterioration of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination, as well as to the consequences of these violations by Portugal of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the neighbouring independent African States that border its colonies;</p> <p>12. <u>Appeals again</u> to all States to grant the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination the moral and material assistance necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights;</p>						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>13. <u>Appeals once again</u> to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance as long as the Gov't of Portugal fails to implement GA resolution 1514 (XV);</p> <p>14. <u>Expresses its appreciation</u> to the UNHCR, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the help they have given so far and requests them, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and through it with the national liberation movements, to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to those who have suffered and are still suffering as a result of military operations;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-82; N-7; A-21; S-12.</p> <p>Roll-call on Operative Paragraph 14 Total Membership Voting: Y-95; N-3; A-11; S-13.</p>	A	N	N	A	Y	Y
		A	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2311 (XXII) 14-12-67	<p>Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the UN</p> <p><u>The GA.</u></p> <p><u>Considering</u> that, by virtue of the Charter of the UN and in conformity with the agreements between the UN and the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies,</p> <p><u>Taking note</u> of the fact that the national liberation movements in some colonial Territories of Africa have asked the specialized agencies for urgent assistance in various social fields, particularly education, health and nutrition,</p> <p>1. <u>Recognizes</u> that the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the international institutions associated with the UN should extend their full co-operation to the UN in achieving the objectives of GA resolution 1514 (XV);</p> <p>3. <u>Recommends</u> the specialized agencies and international institutions concerned to take urgent and effective measures to assist the peoples struggling for their liberation from colonial rule, and in particular to extend, within the scope of their respective activities, all necessary aid to the oppressed peoples of Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination and to work out, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and through it with the national</p>						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>liberation movements, concrete programmes to this end;</p> <p>4. <u>Also recommends</u> the specialized agencies and international institutions not to grant any assistance to South Africa and Portugal until they renounce their policy of racial discrimination and colonial domination;</p> <p>5. <u>Requests</u> all States, directly and through action in the specialized agencies and international institutions of which they are members, to facilitate the implement of the relevant resolutions of the GA;</p> <p>6. <u>Requests</u> the Economic and Social Council to consider, in consultation with the Special Committee, appropriate measures for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies in implementing the relevant resolutions of the GA;*</p> <p>7. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to assist the specialized agencies and the international institutions concerned in working</p>						
	<p>* GA resolution 2105 (XX) 20 December 1965; 2107 (XX) 21 December 1965; 2151 (XXI) 17 November 1966; 2184 (XXI) 12 December 1966; 2189 (XXI) 13 December 1966.</p>						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>out appropriate measures to implement the relevant resolutions and to report thereon to the GA at its twenty-third session;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-81; N-2; A-18; S-22.</p> <p>Roll-call on Operative Paragraph 3 Total Membership Voting: Y-63; N-7; A-24; S-29.</p> <p>Roll-call on Operative Paragraph 4 Total Membership Voting: Y-66; N-7; A-27; S-23.</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y
		A	N	N	A	Y	Y
		A	N	N	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2357 (XXII) 19-12-67	<p>Question of American Samoa, Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Dominica, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Grenada, Guam, Mauritius, Monserrat, New Hebrides, Niue, Pitcairn, St. Helena, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tokelau Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands:</p> <p><u>The GA</u> Noting the constitutional changes that were introduced in February and March 1967 in the Territories of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St.Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and St. Lucia and that are envisaged for the Territory of St.Vincent, Noting further the decision taken by the Special Committee that GA resolution 1514 (XV)...and other relevant resolutions continue to apply to these Territories, <u>Deploring</u> the attitude of some administering Powers which <u>continue</u> to refuse to allow the UN visiting missions to visit these Territories.</p> <p>4. <u>Reiterates</u> its declaration that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of colonial Territories and the establishment of military bases and installations in these Territories is incompatible with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and resolution 1514(XV);</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-86; N-0; A-27; S-10.</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2325 (XXII) -12-67	<p>Roll-call on Operative Part - Paragraph 4 Total Membership Voting: Y-78; N-16; A-16; §-13.</p> <p><u>Note:</u> Please refer to GA resolution 2232(XXI) 20 December 1966, (page of this section) for the almost identical text and voting positions on these Territories. France changed its "N" vote on the operative part to "A" in 1967.</p> <p>Question of South West Africa:</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Having considered the report of the United Nations Council for South West Africa (the Council),</u></p> <p>3. <u>Condemns the refusal of the Gov't of South Africa to comply with GA resolutions 2145(XXI) and 2248(S-V), which provide for granting the people of South West Africa an opportunity to exercise their inalienable right to freedom and independence;</u></p> <p>5. <u>Calls upon the Gov't of South Africa to withdraw from the Territory of South West Africa, unconditionally and without delay, all its military and police forces and its administration to release all political prisoners and to allow all political refugees who are natives of the Territory to return to it;</u></p> <p>6. <u>Urgently appeals to all Member States, particularly the main trading partners of South Africa and those which have economic</u></p>	N	N	N	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2372 (XXII) 24-05-68	<p>and other interests in South Africa and South West Africa, to take effective economic and other measures designed to ensure the immediate withdrawal of the South African administration from the Territory of South West Africa, thereby clearing the way for the implementation of GA resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V);</p> <p>7. <u>Requests</u> the Security Council to take effective steps to enable the UN to fulfill the responsibilities it has assumed with respect to South West Africa;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-93; N-2; A-18; S-10.</p> <p>Question of South West Africa:</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Noting with grave concern</u> that the refusal of the Gov't of South Africa to withdraw its administration from the Territory of South West Africa has obstructed the attainment of independence by the Territory in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions, <u>Mindful</u> of the serious consequences of the continued foreign occupation by South Africa of the Territory of South West Africa which constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security, <u>Concerned</u> that the continued refusal of the Gov't of South Africa</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>to comply with its obligations to the UN and to the international community as a whole, making it impossible for the Council to perform effectively the functions that were entrusted to it by the GA, constitutes a flagrant defiance of the authority of the UN,</p> <p><u>Conscious of the special and direct responsibility of the UN towards the people and the Territory of South West Africa, in accordance with the provisions of GA resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V),</u></p> <p><u>Recalling Security Council resolution 246 (1968), in particular its last preambular paragraph, in which the Security Council took cognizance of its special responsibility towards the people and the Territory of South West Africa,</u></p> <p>1. <u>Proclaims</u> that, in accordance with the desires of its people, South West Africa shall henceforth be known as "Namibia";</p> <p>5. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the Namibian people to freedom and independence and the legitimacy of their struggle against foreign occupation;</p> <p>8. <u>Condemns</u> the actions of those States which by their continued political, military and economic collaboration with the Gov't of South Africa have encouraged that Gov't to defy the authority of the UN and to obstruct the attainment of independence by Namibia;</p> <p>9. <u>Calls upon</u> all States to desist from those dealings with the</p>						

RESOLUTION	AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE UN : COLONIAL ISSUES	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>Gov't of South Africa which would have the effect of perpetuating South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and to take effective economic and other measures with a view to securing the immediate withdrawal of South African administration from Namibia;</p> <p>10. <u>Further calls upon</u> all States to provide the necessary moral and material assistance to the Namibian people in their legitimate struggle for independence and to assist the Council [operative paragraph 3 of this resolution renamed the United Nations Council for South West Africa, referred to herein as "the Council", as the "United Nations Council for Namibia"] in the discharge of its mandate;</p> <p>13. <u>Recommends</u> the Security Council urgently to take all appropriate steps to secure the implementation of the present resolution and to take effective measures in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the UN to ensure the immediate removal of the South African presence from Namibia and to secure for Namibia its independence in accordance with GA resolution 2145 (XXI);</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-96; N-2; A-18; §-8.</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1514(XV) 14-12-60	<p>Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Mindful</u> of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the UN to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, <u>Convinced</u> that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory, Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations; And to this end <u>Declares that:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the UN and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation; 2. All peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue of their right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development; 3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence; 						

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected;</p> <p>5. Immediate steps shall be taken in Trust and NSGTs or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed, or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom;</p> <p>6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter...;</p> <p>7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>Total Membership Voting: 89Y; 9Abstentions- Australia, Belgium Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the UK and USA.</p>	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1603(XV) 20-04-61	<p>The Situation in Angola</p> <p>The GA <u>Recalling</u> resolution 1514(XV) etc., <u>Noting</u> the disturbances and conflict...the loss of life of the inhabitants, <u>Asks</u> for immediate steps "to transfer all powers to the people..."</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-73; N:-2; A-9; S-15.</p> <p>Roll-call on Preamble: paragraph 1 "...the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security".</p> <p>Total Membership Voting: Y-67; N-2; A-13; S-17.</p>	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y
1810. (XVII) 17-12-62	<p>The situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples</p> <p>The GA <u>Deeply</u> concerned by the negative attitude and the deliberate refusal of certain administering Powers to co-operate with the Special Committee, <u>Reaffirming its conviction</u> that any delay in the implementation of the Declaration constitutes a continuing source of international conflict, seriously impeding international co-operation and creating in many regions of the world increasingly dangerous</p>	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>situations likely to threaten international peace and security,</p> <p>4. <u>Deplores</u> the refusal of certain administering Powers to co-operate in the implementation of the Declaration in territories under their administration;</p> <p>5. <u>Calls upon</u> the administering Powers concerned to cease forthwith all armed action and repressive measures directed against peoples who have not yet attained independence, particularly against the political activities of their rightful leaders;</p> <p>6. <u>Urges</u> all administering Powers to take immediate steps in order that all colonial territories and peoples may accede to independence without delay in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Declaration;</p> <p>7. <u>Decides</u> to enlarge the membership of the Special Committee established by resolution 1654(XVI) by the addition of seven new members to be nominated by the President of the GA;</p> <p>8. <u>Invites</u> the enlarged Special Committee:</p> <p>(a) To continue to seek the most suitable ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration to all territories which have not yet attained independence;</p> <p>(d) To apprise the Security Council of any developments in these territories which may threaten international peace and security;</p> <p>9. <u>Requests</u> all Member States, especially the administering Powers, to afford the Special Committee their fullest co-operation;</p> <p>Total Membership Voting: Y-101; N-0; A-4; §-5. Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1956 (XVIII) 11-12-63	<p>The situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples</p> <p>The GA <u>Recalling</u> resolutions 1514(XV) of 14 Dec. 1960; 1654(XVI) of 27 Nov. 1961 and 1810(XVII) of 17 Dec. 1962, <u>Noting with deep regret</u> that, three years after the adoption of the Declaration, many territories are still under foreign domination and that, in some cases, not even preliminary measures have been taken towards the application of the Declaration, <u>Deploing further</u> the assistance given to some administering Powers by <u>certain States</u>, which enables those Powers to persist in their refusal to apply the Declaration,</p> <p>7. <u>Requests</u> all States to refrain from any action which may jeopardize the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the GA and the Special Committee for the application of the Declaration;</p> <p>8. <u>Further requests</u> the administering Powers to give their full co-operation to the Special Committee and to facilitate the task of the sub-committees and visiting groups instructed by the Special Committee to go to the territories under its mandate;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>Total Membership Voting: Y-95; N-0; A-6; S-10.</p>	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1979 (XVIII) 17-12-63	<p>Question of South West Africa</p> <p>The <u>GA</u> <u>Guided</u> by the Declaration...in resolution 1514(XV), <u>Considering</u> further that the situation obtaining in South West Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security,</p> <p>1. <u>Condemns</u> the Government of the Republic of South Africa for its <u>refusal</u> to co-operate with the UN in the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and for its non-compliance with the GA resolutions with regard to South West Africa;</p> <p>2. <u>Requests</u> the Security Council to consider the critical situation prevailing in South West Africa.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>Total Membership Voting: Y-89; N-2; A-2; S-19.</p>	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y
2105(XX) 20-12-65	<p>Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples:</p> <p>The <u>GA</u> <u>Recalling</u> the Declaration on the Granting of Independence... <u>contained</u> in its resolution 1514(XV), and its resolutions 1654</p>						

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>(XVI) of 27 Nov. 1961, 1810 (XVII) of 17 Dec. 1962 and 1956(XVIII) of 11 Dec. 1963, <u>Deploring</u> the negative attitude of certain colonial Powers, and in particular the unacceptable attitude of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa, which refuse to recognize the right of colonial peoples to independence,</p> <p>10. <u>Recognizes</u> the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and invites all States to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial Territories;</p> <p>11. <u>Requests</u> all States and international institutions, including the specialized agencies of the UN, to withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa until they renounce their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination;</p> <p>12. <u>Requests</u> the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones;</p> <p>13. <u>Requests</u> the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any Territory examined by it which may threaten international peace and security and to make suggestions which might assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the UN;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	A	N	N	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2065(XX) 16-12-65	<p>Total Membership Voting: Y-74; N-6; A-27; S-10.</p> <p>Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)</p> <p>The GA <u>Taking into account</u> the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration...relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), and in particular the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Committee with reference to that Territory, <u>Considering</u> that its resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960 was prompted by the cherished aim of bringing to an end everywhere colonialism in all its forms, one of which covers the case of the Falkland Islands(Malvinas), <u>Noting</u> the existence of a dispute between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain...concerning sovereignty over the said Islands,</p> <p>1. <u>Invites</u> the Governments of Argentina and the UK to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration...with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the UN and of GA resolution 1514(XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-94; N-0; A-16; S-9.</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2072(XV) 16-12-65	<p>Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara:</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Recalling</u> the Declaration...contained in resolution 1514(XV), <u>Bearing in mind</u> that the Declaration is inspired by the strong <u>desire of the international community</u> to put an end to colonialism wherever and in whatever form it may occur,</p> <p>2. <u>Urgently requests</u> the Gov't of Spain, as the administering Power, to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-100; N-2; A-4; S-11.</p> <p>Roll-call on Operative Paragraph 2 Total Membership Voting: Y-99; N-2; A-4; S-12.</p> <p>Roll-call on Operative Paragraph, the words: "...and to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories." Total Membership Voting: Y-33; N-2; A-69; S-13.</p>	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y
		Y	A	A	A	Y	Y
		A	A	A	A	A	A

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2070(XX) 16-12-65	<p>Question of Gibraltar</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Having</u> studied the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration...relating to Gibraltar,</p> <p>1. <u>Invites</u> the Governments of Spain and the UK to begin without delay the talks envisaged under the terms of the consensus adopted on 16 October 1964 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration...</p> <p>2. <u>Requests</u> the two Governments to inform the Special Committee and the GA, at its twenty-first session, of the outcome of their negotiations.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-96; N-0; A-11; §-10.</p>	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y
2189(XXI) 13-12-66	<p>Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples:</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Noting</u> with deep regret that six years after the adoption of the Declaration many Territories are still under colonial domination and deploring the negative attitude of certain colonial Powers, and in particular the intransigent attitude of the Governments</p>						

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>of Portugal and South Africa, which refuse to recognize the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence, <u>Bearing in mind</u> that the preservation of colonialism and its manifestations, including racism and apartheid, and the attempts of some colonial Powers to suppress national liberation movements by repressive activities and the use of armed forces against peoples are incompatible with the Charter and the Declaration, <u>Convinced</u> that further delay in the complete and universal implementation of the Declaration remains a source of international conflicts and differences, which are seriously impeding international co-operation and endangering world peace and security,</p> <p>6. <u>Declares</u> that the continuation of colonial rule threatens international peace and security;</p> <p>7. <u>Reaffirms</u> its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and urges all States to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial Territories;</p> <p>11. <u>Requests</u> the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones and from using those that still exist to interfere with the liberation of the peoples in colonial Territories in the exercise of their legitimate rights to freedom and independence;</p>						

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>12. <u>Condemns</u> the activities of those foreign financial and economic interests in colonial Territories, in particular in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination, which support colonial régimes and thus constitute a serious obstacle to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence... and calls upon the Governments concerned to take the necessary measures to put an end to those activities;</p> <p>17. <u>Requests</u> the Special Committee to continue to perform its tasks and to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration in all Territories which have not yet attained independence;</p> <p>20. <u>Decides</u> to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-second session an item entitled "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence... in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under colonial domination".</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Separate roll-call on operative Paragraph 11 Total Membership Voting: Y-76; N-7; A-20; §-19.(res. as a whole) Total Membership Voting: Y-58; N-23; A-21; §-20. (op. para.11)</p>	A N	N N	N N	A N	Y Y Y	

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2231(XXI) 20-12-66	<p>Question of Gibraltar:</p> <p>The GA <u>Having heard</u> the statements of petitioners, <u>Recalling</u> its resolution 2070(XX) of 16 Dec. 1965, and the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration...on 16 Oct. 1964, <u>Recalling further</u> its resolution 1514(XV) of 14 Dec. 1960</p> <p>1. <u>Regrets</u> the delay in the process of decolonization and in the implementation of GA resolution 1514(XV) with regard to Gibraltar;</p> <p>2. <u>Calls upon</u> the two parties to continue their negotiations, taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory, and asks the administering Power to expedite, without any hindrance and in consultation with the Government of Spain, the decolonization of Gibraltar, and to report to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence...as soon as possible, and in any case before the twenty-second session of the GA;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-101; N-0; A-14; S-7</p>	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2288 (XXII) 07-12-67	<p>Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under Portuguese domination and in all other Territories under Colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa:</p> <p>The GA <u>Considering</u> that the colonial Powers have the obligation to ensure the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Territories under their administration and to protect the population and the natural resources of these Territories against abuses, in conformity with Chapters XI and XII of the Charter of the UN, <u>Convinced</u> that any economic or other activity which impedes the implementation of resolution 1514(XV) is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter,</p> <p>2. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the peoples of the colonial Territories to self-determination and independence and to the natural resources of their Territories, as well as their right to dispose of these resources in their best interests;</p> <p>3. <u>Declares</u> that the colonial Powers which deprive the colonial peoples of the exercise and the full enjoyment of those rights, or which subordinate them to the economic or financial interests of their own nationals or of nationals of other countries, are</p>						

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>violating the obligations they have assumed under Chapters XI and XII of the Charter of the UN and are impeding the full and prompt implementation of GA resolution 1514(XV):</p> <p>7. <u>Further calls upon</u> the colonial Powers to prohibit the following practices, which run counter to the principles of the Charter, violate the economic and social rights of the peoples of the Territories under colonial domination and impede the rapid implementation of resolution 1514(XV):</p> <p>(a) The exploitation of human and natural resources contrary to the interests of the indigenous inhabitants;</p> <p>(b) The obstruction of the access of the indigenous inhabitants to their natural resources;</p> <p>(c) The promotion and tolerance of injustice and discrimination in the remuneration of labour and in the establishment of working conditions;</p> <p>11. <u>Urges</u> all States concerned to co-operate fully with the UN in the rapid and effective implementation of resolution 1514(XV) so as to ensure to the peoples the exercise of their right to self-determination and independence and to the use of the natural resources of their own Territories;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-91; N-2; A-17; S-12.</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2324 (XXII) 16-12-67	<p>Question of South West Africa:</p> <p>The GA <u>Recalling</u> its resolution 2145(XXI) of 27 October 1966, by which it terminated the Mandate for South West Africa and decided, <u>inter alia</u>, that South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the UN, <u>Conscious</u> of the special responsibilities of the UN towards the people and Territory of South West Africa,</p> <p>1. <u>Condemns</u> the illegal arrest, deportation and trial at Pretoria of the thirty-seven South West Africans as a flagrant violation by the Government of South Africa of their rights, of the international status of the Territory and of GA resolution 2145(XXI);</p> <p>4. <u>Draws the attention</u> of the Security Council to the present resolution;</p> <p>5. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to report as soon as possible to the Security Council, the GA, the UN Council for South West Africa and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples...</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-110; N-2; A-1; S-10.</p>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2353 (XXII) 19-12-67	<p>Question of Gibraltar</p> <p>The GA <u>Having heard</u> the statements of the administering Power and the representative of Spain, <u>Considering</u> that any colonial situation which partially or <u>completely</u> destroys the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the UN, and specifically with paragraph 6 of GA resolution 1514 (XV),</p> <p>2. <u>Declares</u> the holding of the referendum of 10 September 1967 by the administering Power to be a contravention of the provisions of GA resolution 2231 (XXI) and of those of the resolution adopted on 1 September 1967 by the Special Committee...;</p> <p>3. <u>Invites</u> the Governments of Spain and the UK to resume without delay the negotiations provided for in GA resolutions 2070(XX) and 2231(XXI) with a view to putting an end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar and to safeguarding the interests of the population upon the termination of that situation;</p>						

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2356 (XXII) 19-12-67	<p>4. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to assist the Governments of Spain and the UK in the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the GA at its twenty-third session.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-73; N-19; A-27; S-4.</p> <p>Question of French Somaliland</p> <p><u>The GA</u></p> <p><u>Considering</u> the circumstances in which the referendum organized by the administering Power took place on 19 March 1967,</p> <p>1. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of French Somaliland (Djibouti) to S-D and independence in accordance with GA resolution 1514 (XV);</p> <p>2. <u>Regrets</u> that the administering Power has not co-operated with the UN in the application of resolution 1514 (XV) and did not implement GA resolution 2228 (XXI);</p> <p>3. <u>Calls upon</u> the administering Power to create the political conditions necessary for accelerating the implementation of the</p>	N	A	N	A	Y	A

RESOLUTION	G.A. RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ...	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>right of the people to S-D and independence, including the full exercise of political freedoms, and to allow the return of all refugees to the Territory;</p> <p>4. <u>Urges</u> the administering Power to co-operate fully with the Special Committee and with the UN in accelerating the process of decolonization in the Territory and to grant independence to the inhabitants at an early date;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-86; N-1; A-29; S-7.</p>	A	A	A	S	Y	A

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1568(XV) 18-12-60	<p>Question of South West Africa: (Union of South Africa : AA for former Mandated Territory)</p> <p>The GA</p> <p><u>Noting with grave concern</u> that the administration of the Territory, particularly in recent years, has been conducted in a manner increasingly contrary to the Mandate, the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice and the resolutions of the GA,</p> <p><u>Considering with concern</u> that the present situation in South West Africa constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,</p> <p><u>Recognizing</u> that the Territory of South West Africa has an inalienable right to independence and to the exercise of its full national sovereignty,</p> <p>4. <u>Invites</u> the Committee on South West Africa, in addition to its normal tasks, to go to South West Africa immediately to investigate the situation prevailing in the Territory and to ascertain and make proposals to the GA on:</p> <p>(b) The steps which would enable the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa to achieve a wide measure of internal self-government designed to lead them to complete independence as soon as possible;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-78; N-0; A-15; S-6.</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1573(XV) 19-12-60	<p>Question of Algeria: (AA:France)</p> <p>The GA <u>Deeply concerned</u> with the continuance of hostilities in Algeria, <u>Considering</u> that the present situation in Algeria also constitutes a threat to international peace and security, <u>Taking note</u> of the fact that the two parties concerned have accepted the right of S-D as the basis for the solution of the Algerian problem, <u>Recognizing</u> the passionate yearning for freedom of all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence, <u>Convinced</u> that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory,</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <u>Recognizes</u> the right of the Algerian people to S-D and independence; 2. <u>Recognizes</u> the imperative need for adequate and effective guarantees to ensure the successful and just implementation of the right of S-D on the basis of respect for the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria; 3. <u>Recognizes further</u> that the UN has a responsibility to contribute towards the successful and just implementation of this right. <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-63; N-8; A-27; S-1.</p>	Y	A	A	S	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1596(XV) 07-04-61	<p>Question of South West Africa:</p> <p>The GA <u>Bearing in mind</u> the provisions of resolution 1514(XV), which declares that immediate steps shall be taken to transfer all powers to such peoples, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom, <u>Noting with grave concern</u> the continuing deterioration in the situation in South West Africa resulting from the continued application, in violation of the letter and spirit of the Mandate, of tyrannical policies and practices, such as <u>apartheid</u> of the administration of the Union of South Africa in South West Africa,</p> <p><u>Reiterating its concern</u> that this situation constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,</p> <p>1. <u>Recognizes and supports</u> the passionate yearning of the people of South West Africa for freedom and the exercise of national independence and sovereignty;</p> <p>7. <u>Decides</u> to call the attention of the Security Council to the situation in respect of South West Africa which, if allowed to continue, will in the GA's view endanger international peace and security, and to the present resolution, the full implementation of which is necessary to bring that situation to a speedy end;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1760 (XVII) 31-10-62	<p>Total Membership Voting: Y-83; N-0; A-9; S-7.</p> <p>Question of Southern Rhodesia: (AA: UK)</p> <p>The GA</p> <p>Recalling its resolution 1514(XV), the provisions of which are fully applicable to the Territory of Southern Rhodesia, Confirming the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to S-D and to form an independent African State, Having heard the petitioners,</p> <p><u>Noting with deep regret</u> that the administering Power has not yet taken steps...which would ensure the rights of the majority of the people, on the basis of "one man, one vote", in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the UN and the Declaration on the granting of independence...embodied in resolution 1514.</p> <p>3. <u>Requests</u> the Gov't of the UK...to take the necessary measures to secure:</p> <p>(b) The immediate suspension of the enforcement of the Constitution of 6 December 1961 and cancellation of the general elections scheduled to take place shortly under that Constitution;</p> <p>(c) The immediate convening of a constitutional conference, in accordance with resolution 1747(XVI), to formulate a new constitution for Southern Rhodesia;</p> <p>(d) The immediate extension to the whole population, without discrimination, of the full and unconditional exercise of their</p>						

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1807 (XVII) 14-12-62	<p>basic political rights, in particular, the right to vote, and the establishment of equality among all inhabitants of the Territory;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>*The UK did not participate in the voting.</p> <p>Total Membership Voting: Y-81; N-2; A-19; S-7.</p> <p>Territories under Portuguese administration:</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Noting</u> the statements of the petitioners, <u>Noting</u> that the Portuguese military and other forces of repression have used extensively and continue to use, for the repression of the nationalist movements, military and other equipment supplied to Portugal by some of its allies for other purposes and also equipment obtained from other sources, <u>Noting with deep concern</u> that the policy and acts of the Portuguese Gov't with regard to the Territories under its administration have created a situation which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,</p> <p>2. Condemns the attitude of Portugal, which is inconsistent with the Charter of the UN;</p>	A	A	*	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1819 (XVII) 18-12-62	<p>3. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese administration to S-D and independence and upholds without any reservations the claims of those peoples for their immediate accession to independence;</p> <p>7. <u>Earnestly requests</u> all States to refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Gov't any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories under its administration and, for this purpose, to take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Gov't;</p> <p>8. <u>Requests</u> the Security Council, in case the Portuguese Gov't should refuse to comply with the present resolution and previous GA resolutions on this question, to take all appropriate measures to secure the compliance of Portugal with its obligations as a Member State.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>Total Membership Voting: Y-82; N-7; A-13; §-8.</p> <p>The Situation in Angola: (AA:Portugal)</p> <p>The <u>GA</u> <u>Deplores</u> the armed action being taken by Portugal for the suppression of the people of Angola and the use in this</p>	A	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1899 (XVIII) 13-11-63 2.	<p>process of arms supplied to Portugal by certain Member States, Convinced that the colonial war being carried on by the Gov't of Portugal in Angola...constitute a source of international conflict and tension as well as a serious threat to world peace and security,</p> <p>2. <u>Solemnly reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of Angola to S-D and independence, and supports their demand for immediate independence;</p> <p>7. <u>Requests</u> all Member States to deny Portugal any support or assistance which may be used by it for the suppression of the people of Angola, and in particular to terminate the supply of arms to Portugal;</p> <p>9. <u>Requests</u> the Security Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure Portugal's compliance with the present resolution and with the previous resolutions of the GA and of the Security Council.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-57; N-14; A-18; S-21.</p> <p>Question of South West Africa: The GA <u>Solemnly reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of</p>	N	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>South West Africa to S-D and independence;</p> <p>3. <u>Condemns</u> the Gov't of the Republic of South Africa for its persistent refusal to co-operate with the UN in applying the principles of the Charter of the UN and implementing the resolutions of the GA;</p> <p>6. <u>Decides</u> to draw the attention of the Security Council to the present critical situation in South West Africa, the continuation of which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security;</p> <p>7. <u>Urges</u> all States which have not yet done so to take, separately or collectively, the following measures...</p> <p>(a) Refrain forthwith from supplying in any manner or form any arms or military equipment to South Africa;</p> <p>(b) Refrain also from supplying in any manner or form any petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa;</p> <p>8. <u>Requests</u> the Special Committ</p> <p>(b) To consider, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the agencies of the UN, the implications of the activities of the mining industry and the other international companies having interests in South West Africa, in order to assess their economic and political influence and their mode of operation;</p> <p>(c) To report on these questions to the GA at its nineteenth session;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p>	A	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
1913 (XVIII) 03-12-63	<p>Total Membership Voting: Y-84; N-6; A-17; §-4.</p> <p>Territories under Portuguese administration:</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Recalling in particular</u> that the Security Council, by its resolution of 31 July 1963, urgently called upon Portugal to implement the following: (a) The immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to S-D and independence, (b) The immediate cessation of all acts of repression.... (d) Negotiations...with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples, in accordance with resolution 1514(XV), <u>Noting with deep regret and great concern</u> the continued refusal of the Gov't of Portugal to take any steps to implement the resolutions of the GA and of the Security Council,</p> <p>1. <u>Requests</u> the Security Council to consider immediately the question...and to adopt necessary measures to give effect to its own decisions, particularly those of resolution 31July1963;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-91; N-2; A-11; §-7.</p>						
		A	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2022(XX) 05-11-65 2.	<p>Question of Southern Rhodesia:</p> <p>The GA Reaffirms the right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence....</p> <p>3. Solemnly warns the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia and the UK...in its capacity as administering Power, that the UN will oppose any declaration of independence which is not based on universal adult suffrage;</p> <p>7. Requests that the administering Power effect immediately: (a) The release of all political prisoners... (b) The repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation.. (c) The removal of all restrictions on African political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom...</p> <p>10. Requests all States to render moral and material help to the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for freedom and independence</p> <p>12. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the threats made by the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia, including the threat of economic sabotage against the independent African States adjoining Southern Rhodesia;</p>						

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2023(XX) 05-11-65	<p>13. <u>Further</u> draws the <u>attention</u> of the Security Council to the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia which threatens international peace and security, and decides to transmit to the Council the records and resolutions of the twentieth session of the GA on this question;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-82; N-9; A-18; §-8.</p> <p>Question of Aden: (Administering Authority: UK)</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Deeply concerned</u> at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening peace and security in the area, arising from the policies pursued by the administering Power in the Territory,</p> <p>4. <u>Further deplores</u> the attempts of the administering Power to set up an unrepresentative régime in the Territory, with a view to granting it independence contrary to GA resolutions 1514(XV) and 1949(XVIII), and appeals to all States not to recognize any independence which is not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections held under adult suffrage;</p> <p>5. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to S-D and to freedom from colonial rule and recognizes the legitimacy of their efforts to achieve the rights laid down in</p>	N	N	S	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence...;</p> <p>6. <u>Considers</u> that the maintenance of the military bases in the Territory constitutes a major obstacle to the liberation of the people of the Territory from colonial domination and is prejudicial to the peace and security of the region, and that the immediate and complete removal of these bases is therefore essential;</p> <p>11. <u>Draws the attention</u> of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory;</p> <p>12. <u>Requests</u> the UNHCR, the specialized agencies and the international relief organizations to offer all possible assistance to the people who are suffering as a result of the military operations in the Territory;</p> <p>Roll-call on Operative Part- Paragraph 6 of resolution Total Membership Voting: Y-64; N-22; A-25; §-6.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole... Total Membership Voting: Y-90; N-11; A-10; §-6.</p>	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
		N	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2071(XX) 16-12-65	<p>Question of British Guiana (AA: UK)</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Noting</u> that British Guiana will achieve independence on 26May1966</p> <p>2. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of British Guiana to freedom and independence in accordance with the provisions of GA resolution 1514(XV);</p> <p>3. <u>Requests</u> the administering Power to end the state of emergency and to release all political prisoners and detainees so as to enable them to participate in the political life of the Territory</p> <p>5. <u>Notes</u> the announcement...of independence...and requests the administering Power not to take any action which might delay the independence of the Territory.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-87; N-0; A-19; S-11.</p>						
2073(XX) 17-12-65	<p>Question of Oman (AA: UK)</p> <p><u>The GA</u></p> <p>3. <u>Recognizes</u> the inalienable right of the people of the Territory as a whole to S-D and independence in accordance with their freely expressed wishes;</p>	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>4. <u>Considers</u> that the colonial presence of the UK in its various forms prevents the people of the Territory from exercising their rights to S-D and independence;</p> <p>5. <u>Calls upon</u> the Gov't of the UK to effect immediately the implementation in the Territory of the following measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Cessation of all repressive actions against the people.... (b) Withdrawal of British troops; (c) Release all political prisoners...; (d) Elimination of British domination in any form; <p>6. <u>Invites</u> the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence...to examine the situation in the Territory;</p> <p>7. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to take, in consultation with the Special Committee, appropriate measures for the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the GA at its twenty-first session.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-61; N-18; A-32; S-6.</p>	N	N	N	A	Y	A

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2067(XX) 16-12-65	<p>Question of Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni) (AA: Spain)</p> <p><u>The GA</u></p> <p><u>Having heard</u> the statements of the administering Power and the petitioners, <u>Noting</u> that the Territories of Fernando Póo and Río Muni have been merged and named Equatorial Guinea,</p> <p>1. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to S-D and independence;</p> <p>2. <u>Requests</u> the administering Power to set the earliest possible date for independence after consulting the people on the basis of universal suffrage under the supervision of the UN;</p> <p>Roll-call on Operative Paragraph 2 Total Membership Voting: Y-77; N-4; A-26; §-10.</p>						
2111(XX) 21-12-65	<p>Question of the Trust Territory of Nauru: (AA: Australia)</p> <p><u>The GA</u></p> <p><u>Recalling</u> the proposals made by the Nauruan representatives to the Administering Authority for the establishment of a Legislative Council by 31 January 1966 and for the granting of independence on 31 January 1968, after two years of legislative experience through an Executive Council in the forms and</p>	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>procedure of democratic political administration and in the executive processes of government.</p> <p>1. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of Nauru to self-government and independence;</p> <p>2. <u>Calls upon</u> the Administering Authority to take immediate steps to implement the proposal of the representatives of the Nauruan people regarding the establishment of a Legislative Council by 31 January 1966;</p> <p>3. <u>Requests</u> the Administering Authority to fix the earliest possible date, but not later than 31 January 1968, for the independence of the Nauruan people in accordance with their wishes;</p> <p>4. <u>Further requests</u> that immediate steps be taken by the Administering Authority towards restoring the island of Nauru for habitation by the Nauruan people as a sovereign nation;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-84; N-0; A-25; S-8.</p> <p>Question of the Trust Territory of New Guinea and the Territory of Papua: (AA:Australia)</p> <p>The GA <u>Endorsing</u> the recommendations and conclusions of the Special</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y
2112(XX) 21-12-65							

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>Committee on these Territories,</p> <p>1. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of New Guinea and Papua to freedom and independence;</p> <p>2. <u>Notes</u> that the Administering Authority has not yet taken sufficient steps towards the full implementation of the Trusteeship Agreement for New Guinea and of GA resolution 1514 (XV);</p> <p>3. <u>Calls upon</u> the Administering Authority to implement fully resolution 1514(XV) and, to this end, to fix an early date for independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-86; N-0; A-22; §-9.</p> <p>Question of Southern Rhodesia</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Noting with grave concern</u> that the "talks about talks" between the Gov't of the UK and the illegal racist minority régime further jeopardize the inalienable rights of the Africal people of Zimbabwe,</p> <p>1. <u>Condemns</u> any arrangement reached between the administering Power and the illegal racist minority régime which will not recognize the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y
2138(XXI)							
22-10-66							

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2229(XXI) 20-12-66	<p>S-D and independence in accordance with GA resolution 1514 (XV);</p> <p>2. <u>Reaffirms</u> the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of universal adult suffrage, in accordance with the principle of "one man, one vote".</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-86; N-2; A-18; §-15.</p> <p>Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara:</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Noting</u> that the Spanish Gov't, as the administering Power, has not as yet applied the provisions of the Declaration,</p> <p>1. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the peoples of Ifni and Spanish Sahara to S-D in accordance with GA resolution 1514(XV)</p> <p>3. <u>Requests</u> the administering Power to take immediately the necessary steps to accelerate the decolonization of Ifni and to determine with the Gov't of Morocco, bearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population, procedures for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of GA resolution 1514 (XV);</p> <p>4. <u>Invites</u> the administering Power to determine at the earliest</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>possible date, in conformity with the aspirations of the indigenous people of Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum under UN auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous population of the Territory to exercise freely its right to S-D and, to this end;</p> <p>(c) To refrain from any action likely to delay the process of the decolonization of Spanish Sahara;</p> <p>5. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee, to appoint immediately a special mission to be sent to Spanish Sahara for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the GA, and in particular for determining the extent of UN participation in the preparation and supervision of the referendum and submitting a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee;</p> <p>Roll-call on Operative Paragraph 4, phrase: "in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party"</p> <p>Total Membership Voting: Y-75; N-3; A-37; §-7.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>Total Membership Voting: Y-105; N-2; A-8; §-7.</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y
		Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2230(XXI) 20-12-66	<p>Question of Equatorial Guinea: (AA: Spain)</p> <p>The GA <u>Taking into account</u> the declarations of the administering Power that it would accede to the desires of the people of the Territory for independence whenever they so requested, Noting the desire of the overwhelming majority of the people consulted that the Territory should become independent not later than July 1968, <u>Having noted</u> the statement of the representative of the administering Power that a constitutional conference will be convened early in 1967, <u>Recognizing</u> the need for further measures to promote the economic social and educational advancement of the people of the Territory</p> <p>2. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to S-D and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence...;</p> <p>8. <u>Urges</u> the administering Power to take effective measures, including increased assistance, to ensure the rapid economic development of the Territory and to promote the educational and social advancement of the people, and requests the specialized agencies to render all possible assistance towards this end;</p> <p>9. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to take appropriate action, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee, to ensure the presence of the UN in the Territory for</p>						

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2226(XXI) 20-12-66	<p>Question of the Trust Territory of Nauru: (AA:Australia)</p> <p>The GA <u>Noting</u> that the people of Nauru, through their elected representatives in the Legislative Council which was established on 31 January 1966, have expressed the wish to achieve independence by 31 January 1968, <u>Recognizing</u> that the phosphate deposits on the island of Nauru belong to the Nauruan people,</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of Nauru to S-D or independence; 2. <u>Recommends</u> that the AA should fix the earliest possible date, but not later than 31 January 1968, for the independence of the Nauruan people in accordance with their freely expressed wishes; 3. <u>Recommends further</u> that the AA should transfer control over the operation of the phosphate industry to the Nauruan people and take immediate steps, irrespective of the cost involved, towards restoring the island of Nauru for habitation by the Nauruan people as a sovereign nation. <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-85; N-2; A-27; §-8.</p>	A	A	N	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2228(XXI) 20-12-66	<p>Question of French Somaliland:</p> <p>The <u>GA</u> <u>Having</u> noted the recent political developments in the Territory and the subsequent announcement made by the administering Power that a referendum will be held in the territory before July 1967 to enable the people to decide their political future,</p> <p>1. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of French Somaliland (Djibouti) to S-D and independence in accordance with GA resolution 1514 (XV);</p> <p>2. <u>Calls upon</u> the administering Power to ensure that the right of S-D shall be freely expressed and exercised by the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;</p> <p>4. <u>Requests</u> the administering Power, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to make appropriate arrangements for a UN presence before, and supervision during, the holding of the referendum;</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-95; N-1; A-18; §-8.</p> <p>Roll-call on Operative Paragraph 4 Total Membership Voting: Y-72; N-2; A-39; §-9.</p>	Y	A	A	S	Y	Y
		A	A	A	S	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2262 (XXII) 03-11-67	<p>the supervision of the preparation for, and the holding of, the election based on universal adult suffrage ...and to participate in any other measures leading towards the independence of the Territory;</p> <p>10. <u>Further requests</u> the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the administering Power and to report to the Special Committee on its implementation;</p> <p>11. <u>Decides</u> to maintain the question of Equatorial Guinea on its agenda.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-109; N-0; A-7; S-6.</p> <p>Question of Southern Rhodesia: (AA:UK)</p> <p><u>The GA</u> <u>Recalling further</u> that the situation in Southern Rhodesia has been declared by the Security Council in resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 as constituting a threat to international peace and security, <u>Recalling further</u> that the Gov't of the UK has declared on several occasions that the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia is illegal, that it will not negotiate with that régime</p>	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>on the future of Southern Rhodesia and that it will not grant independence until majority rule is established in the Territory</p> <p>1. <u>Reaffirms</u> the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for the restoration of their inalienable right to freedom and independence;</p> <p>3. <u>Reaffirms</u> the obligation of the administering Power to transfer power without further delay to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of elections conducted according to the principle of "one man, one vote";</p> <p>4. <u>Condemns</u> the failure and the refusal of the Gov't of the UK, in its capacity as the administering Power, to take effective measures to bring down the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to transfer power to the people of Zimbabwe;</p> <p>5. <u>Affirms its conviction</u> that the sanctions adopted so far will not put an end to the illegal racist minority régime and that sanctions, in order to achieve their objective, will have to be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force;</p> <p>9. <u>Condemns</u> the activities of all those States which, contrary to the resolutions of the GA and the Security Council are still trading with the illegal racist minority régime in the Territory and calls upon such States to sever immediately all economic and</p>						

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>other relations with that régime, in accordance with those resolutions;</p> <p>11. <u>Condemns</u> in the strongest terms the policies of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal of continued support for the illegal racist minority régime in blatant defiance of GA and Security Council resolutions;</p> <p>16. <u>Urges</u> all States, as a matter of urgency, to render all moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe, either directly or through the Organization of African Unity;</p> <p>17. <u>Draws the attention</u> of the Security Council to the need for applying the necessary measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, in view of the deterioration of the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia;</p> <p>18. <u>Appeals</u> to the specialized agencies concerned and to other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Zimbabwe and those who are suffering from oppression by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and, through it, with the national liberation movements in the colonial Territory of Southern Rhodesia;</p> <p>21. <u>Calls upon</u> the administering Power to report to the Special</p>						

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
2348 (XXII) 19-12-67	<p>Committee on its actions in the implementation of the present resolution;</p> <p>22. <u>Decides</u> to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda.</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole Total Membership Voting: Y-92; N-2; A-18; S-10.</p> <p>Question of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea:</p> <p><u>The GA</u> Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the UN and GA resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, Recalling further its resolutions 2112 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and 2227 (XXI) of 20 December 1966,</p> <p>1. <u>Reaffirms</u> the inalienable right of the people of Papua and New Guinea to S-D and independence in accordance with GA resolution 1514 (XV);</p> <p>2. <u>Reaffirms</u> its previous position as set forth in GA resolutions 2112 (XX) and 2227 (XXI);</p> <p>3. <u>Calls upon</u> the administering Power to take the necessary measures without delay the provisions of the above-mentioned</p>	A	A	A	A	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	G.A. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ... TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
	<p>resolutions.*</p> <p>Roll-call on resolution as a whole</p> <p>Total Membership Voting: Y-85; N-16; A-18; S-4.</p>	N	N	N	A	Y	Y
	<p>*For text and voting on resolution 2112 (XX) 21 December 1965</p> <p>" " " " 2227 (XXI) 20 December 1966</p>						

RESOLUTION		CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
545(VI) 05-02-52	<p>Inclusion in the International Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights of an article relating to the right of peoples to self-determination:</p> <p>The GA</p> <p>(i) To save the present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war,</p> <p>(ii) To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, and</p> <p>(iii) To take due account of the political aspirations of all peoples and thus to further international peace and security, and to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,</p> <p>1. Decides to include in the International Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights an article on the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination in reaffirmation of the principle enunciated in the Charter of the UN. This article shall be drafted in the following terms: "All peoples shall have the right of self-determination", and shall stipulate that all States, including those having responsibility for the administration of NSGTs, should promote the realization of that right, in conformity with Purposes and Principles of the UN, and that States having responsibility for the administration of NSGTs should promote the realization of that right in relation to the peoples of such Territories;</p> <p>Roll-call on Op. pt. Pl:Phrase "All peoples shall have the right of self-determination..."</p>	N	N	N	N	Y	Y

RESOLUTION	CAN	USA	UK	FR	USSR	IND
637(VII) 16-12-52	<p>Total Membership Voting: Y-36; N-11; A-12; §-1.</p> <p>The right of peoples and nations to self-determination:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">A</p> <p><u>Whereas</u> the right of peoples and nations to self-determination is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights,</p> <p><u>Whereas</u> the Charter of the UN, under Articles 1 and 55, aims to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the equal rights and self-determination of peoples in order to strengthen universal peace,</p> <p><u>Whereas</u> the Charter of the UN recognizes that certain Members of the UN are responsible for the administration of Territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government, and affirms the principles which should guide them,</p> <p><u>Whereas</u> every Member of the UN, in conformity with the Charter, should respect the maintenance of the right of self-determination in other States,</p> <p><u>The GA recommends that:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The States Members of the UN shall uphold the principle of self-determination of all peoples and nations; 2. The States Members of the UN shall recognize and promote the realization of the right of self-determination of the peoples of NSGTs and TTs who are under their administration and shall 					

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	<p>facilitate the exercise of this right by the peoples of such Territories according to the principles and spirit of the Charter of the UN in regard to each Territory and to the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, the wishes of the people being ascertained through plebiscites or other recognized democratic means, preferably under the auspices of the UN;</p> <p>3. The States Members of the UN responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories shall take practical steps, pending the realization of the right of self-determination (S-D) and in preparation thereof, to ensure the direct participation of the indigenous populations in the legislative and executive organs of government of those Territories, and to prepare them for complete self-government or independence.</p>					
#1.	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
#2.	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
#3.	A	A	A	N	Y	Y
#1.	Roll-call on resolution, Part A (separately)					
#2.	Roll-call on resolution, Part A - First Para. of Preamble (separately)					
#3.	Roll-call on resolution, Part A - Operative Part, Para. 3 (separately)					
#1.	Total Membership Voting: Y-40; N-14; A-6; S-0.					
#2.	Total Membership Voting: Y-38; N-13; A-9; S-0.					
#3.	Total Membership Voting: Y-39; N-3 ; A-17; S-1.					